ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

12 August 2026 (*)

( Application for interim measures – Civil service – Member of the temporary staff – Fixed-term contract – Termination of the contract – Application for suspension of operation and interim measures – Lack of urgency )

In Case T‑310/26 R,

TB, represented by T. Chiuariu and T. Şoldănescu, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), represented by C. Carroll and R.-A. Popa, acting as Agents, and by L. Lence de Frutos and M. Troncoso Ferrer, lawyers,

defendant,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

makes the following

Order

1        By his application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, TB, seeks, first, suspension of the operation of Decision Ares(2026) 3802357 of 13 April 2026 of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) terminating his employment contract (‘the contested decision’) and, second, as an interim measure, his reinstatement in his former post and functions pending the outcome of the main proceedings.

 Background to the dispute, forms of order sought and facts subsequent to the lodging of the application for interim measures

2        The applicant joined Frontex on 16 June 2020 as a member of the temporary staff, under a contract for a fixed five-year period, which was then renewed for an additional five-year period expiring on 15 June 2030.

3        On 15 December 2025, Frontex notified the applicant that it was considering terminating his employment contract on the ground that he had failed to disclose ongoing legal proceedings prior to and during his employment, public disclosure of which could, according to Frontex, result in reputational damage and potential loss of public trust for it. Frontex thus took the view that the failure to disclose that information had led to a breakdown in the relationship of trust between Frontex and the applicant.

4        After allowing the applicant to submit his comments, Frontex, by the contested decision, terminated the applicant’s contract of employment with a notice period of two months.

5        On 4 May 2026, the applicant brought an action against the contested decision pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

6        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 22 May 2026, the applicant brought an action for annulment of the contested decision.

7        By a separate document, lodged at the Court Registry on the same day, the applicant brought the present application for interim measures, in which he claims that the President of the General Court should:

–        suspend the operation of the contested decision;

–        by way of interim measure, reinstate the applicant in his former post and functions;

–        order Frontex to pay the costs.

8        On 10 June 2026, Frontex issued a corrigendum to the contested decision to the applicant, extending the notice period by three additional months.

9        In its observations on the application for interim measures, which were lodged at the Court Registry on 11 June 2026, Frontex contends that the President of the General Court should:

–        dismiss the application for interim measures;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

10      It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, together with Article 256(1) TFEU, that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, pursuant to Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (see order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited).

11      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures must state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measures applied for’.

12      Hence, the judge hearing an application for interim relief may order suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim relief is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

13      In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application for interim measures enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre‑established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

14      Having regard to the material in the case file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information needed to rule on the present application for interim measures, without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties.

15      In the circumstances of the present case, it is appropriate to examine first whether the condition relating to urgency is satisfied.

16      In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to avoid a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Court. To attain that objective, urgency must generally be assessed in the light of the need of an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see order of 14 January 2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

17      It is in the light of those criteria that it is necessary to examine whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency.

18      In the present case, in order to demonstrate the serious and irreparable damage alleged, the applicant claims that suspension of operation of the contested decision and his reinstatement in his former post and functions are necessary in order to preserve his financial well-being and health.

19      Frontex disputes that line of argument.

20      In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument concerning the preservation of his financial well-being, the damage alleged is financial in nature.

21      In that regard, it should be noted that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, purely pecuniary damage cannot be regarded as irreparable or even as reparable only with difficulty since it may, as a rule, be the subject of subsequent financial compensation (see order of 2 October 2019, FV v Council, T‑542/19 R, not published, EU:T:2019:718, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

22      It is true that, even in the case of purely pecuniary damage, an interim measure is justified if it appears that, in the absence of that measure, the party requesting it would be in a situation likely to jeopardise their financial viability, as they would not have an amount of money which under normal circumstances should enable them to meet all the expenditure necessary for satisfying their own basic needs until judgment is given on the main action (see order of 2 October 2019, FV v Council, T‑542/19 R, not published, EU:T:2019:718, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

23      However, to be able to determine whether the damage alleged is serious and irreparable and therefore provides grounds for, exceptionally, the suspension of the operation of the contested acts, the judge hearing the application must, in any event, have specific evidence, substantiated by detailed documentation showing the financial situation of the party requesting the interim measure and allowing the judge to determine the consequences which the absence of the measures applied for would in all probability entail (see order of 27 April 2010, Parliament v U, T‑103/10 P(R), EU:T:2010:164, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

24      In the present case, the applicant states that, as a retired police officer, he is completely unable to return to an active post in the police force and that the pension he currently receives is insufficient to cover his ongoing financial obligations, including the repayment of his loans and basic expenses. In that regard, by way of evidence, he has provided a personal loan contract signed with his spouse, which expires on 14 April 2031, under which the monthly payments are around EUR 750.

25      However, those claims and that single piece of evidence do not amount to sufficiently specific evidence enabling the judge hearing the application for interim measures to establish an accurate, overall picture of the applicant’s financial situation, as required by the case-law referred to in paragraph 23 above.

26      Consequently, in such circumstances, the judge hearing the application for interim measures is not in a position to determine whether the financial damage alleged can be categorised as serious and irreparable.

27      In the second place, as regards the damage resulting from the risk of deterioration in the applicant’s state of health, it should be noted that he alleges that that damage will result from the loss of his health insurance coverage and his resulting inability to pay for his medical costs.

28      However, the applicant has failed to establish such financial inability as described in paragraph 25 above and has failed to establish that he will not have any health insurance following the termination of his employment contract.

29      It follows from the foregoing that the application for interim measures must be dismissed as the applicant has failed to establish that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied, without it being necessary to rule on whether there is a prima facie case or to undertake a weighing of the competing interests.

30      In accordance with Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved.

On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

hereby orders:

1.      The application for interim relief is dismissed.

2.      The costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 12 August 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.