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Document 62015TN0576

Case T-576/15: Action brought on 1 October 2015 — VIK v Commission

OJ C 7, 11.1.2016, p. 29–30 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

Date of document:
01/10/2015
Date lodged:
01/10/2015
Author:
General Court
Form:
Judicial information
Authentic language:
German
Type of procedure:
Action for annulment
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Select all documents mentioning this document
Case affecting:
Instruments cited in case law:
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11.1.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 7/29

Action brought on 1 October 2015 — VIK v Commission

(Case T-576/15)

(2016/C 007/40)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: VIK Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e. V. (Essen, Germany) (represented by: C. Kahle, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

annul, pursuant to Article 264 TFEU, the decision of the European Commission of 25 November 2014 in the proceedings ‘State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) — Germany — Support for renewable electricity and reduced EEG-surcharge for energy-intensive users’ C(2014)8786 final, published in the Official Journal (OJ 2015 L 250, p. 122), in so far as

—

in Article 1 and Article 3(1) of the decision, the defendant classifies the support of electricity production from renewable sources and the cap on the EEG-surcharge under the EEG-Act 2012 as new aid, and

—

in Article 2, Article 3(2), Article 6 and Article 7 of the decision, the defendant declares the incompatibility of the special compensation rule with the internal market and orders the recovery of the aid;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law: No advantage

The applicant claims that the special compensation rule does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since no advantage is granted to energy-intensive users by the cap on the EEG-surcharge.

2.

Second plea in law: No selectivity

The applicant also argues that the special compensation rule does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since the condition of selectivity is absent. Energy-intensive users were not favoured over other users who are in a comparable factual and legal situation. In addition, the cap on the EEG-surcharge is justified on the basis of the nature and general scheme of the rule.

3.

Third plea in law: No resources received from the State

In that regard, it is claimed that neither the nationwide compensation scheme nor the special compensation rule of the EEG-Act 2012 contained aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since there is no burden on State resources.

4.

Fourth plea in law: No restriction on competition

In this respect, the applicant states that the cap on the EEG-surcharge merely serves to compensate for a competitive disadvantage which electricity/energy-intensive users must bear in comparison with sectors of users in other countries owing to the payment of the EEG-surcharge.

5.

Fifth plea in law: Compatibility of the aid with the common market

The applicant claims that, if the cap on the EEG-surcharge were to be classified as aid, it would be compatible with the common market. The cap does not distort competition; rather, a competitive disadvantage for the users concerned is compensated for by this means.

6.

Sixth plea in law: No new aid

The applicant also claims that, if the Court classifies the special compensation rule as aid, it is existing aid, to which the procedure under Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (1) is not applicable.

7.

Seventh plea in law: Infringement of the general legal principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty

The applicant submits in that regard that, by approving the EEG-Act 2000, the defendant created a legitimate expectation, which is infringed by the final decision.

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).

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