Rapporteur:	Maurizio MENSI
Co-rapporteur:	Jan PIE

Referral	European Commission, 2.5.2023
Legal basis	Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Section responsible	Consultative Commission on Industrial Change
Adopted in section	22.6.2023
Adopted at plenary	12.7.2023
Plenary session No	580
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	170/1/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The EESC supports the EU’s acknowledgement of the security and defence dimension of space, symbolised by the publication on 10 March 2023 of the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (the Strategy).

1.2.

The EESC shares the stated common understanding of the new geopolitical context with the serious problems caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the criticality of space assets and services, and the necessity to develop measures aiming at protecting and defending these, which is an indispensable step in devising a serious Europe-wide space policy.

1.3.

The EESC agrees that before even enhancing the resilience and protection of space systems and services, the identification of threats is a priority, for which the involvement of all relevant actors, including industry, social actors and civil society, in the mapping and recommendations exercise needs to be ensured by the EU institutions. It will be important to encourage organised civil society to fully understand the relevant public interest and the benefits of the strategy for citizens in order to improve its legitimacy and strengthen public support, due to the relevant civilian applications of the space technologies.

1.4.

The EESC recommends enhancing the resilience and protection of space systems and services in the Union in the current worrying geopolitical context. The EESC notes that an underlying challenge in relation to this objective is the capability to increase the current low level of public investment, reduce its fragmentation, and promote a European value-added approach in a context where Europe is far behind the United States, China and Russia in terms of public investments in space.

1.5.

The EESC believes that enhancing the resilience and protection of space systems and services in the Union also means implementing measures to support technological sovereignty and resilience of critical industrial value chains to ensure non-dependence. In this regard, the EESC strongly recommends that the key role of industry in the identification of dependence issues and mitigation measures is fully recognised and highlighted.

1.6.

The EESC wishes to recall that the way space permeates and brings added value to humanity is increasingly recognised and confirmed by world leaders. Today, the European space sector is tackling some of the most pressing challenges of our times, such as monitoring climate change, helping to stimulate technological innovation, and providing concrete socioeconomic benefits to citizens’ daily lives. Institutions, business and citizens increasingly rely on space technology, data and services for communication, navigation and positioning systems, and earth observation (e.g. immediate information and on-the-spot communications when disasters strike). The role of space is essential for citizens and for Europe’s strategic autonomy, as well as in global diplomacy, in embracing the European identity, and in inspiring and motivating the next generations.

1.7.

The EESC very much welcomes a future ‘EU Space Law’ to cover safety, security and sustainability and standardisation that goes in the direction of a needed EU approach to Space Traffic Management (STM) (1).

1.8.

The EESC is convinced of the necessity for all the actions related to industry (e.g. competitiveness, critical technologies, security of the supply chain) to be integrated as part of a coherent and European-wide industrial policy, in a context of a very strong dependence of the European space industry on very limited open markets.

1.9.

The EESC insists that even if specific measures are needed and can be useful for dealing with particular situations, those measures can only make sense and be fully efficient if they combine a tailor-made procurement policy, an ambitious and efficient research and development policy, and support for the market uptake of European-developed space technologies and services, also addressing export markets, in particular through economic diplomacy.

1.10.

The EESC is convinced that an ambitious, but also coherent, support to research and innovation is a cornerstone of the sustainability of the space sector and of its capacity to serve public policy needs. Europe needs a stronger and more consistent support for R&I to maintain its position in space and to ensure the availability of a domestic industry able to design, deliver and exploit state-of-the-art space systems.

1.11.

In areas where cooperation with third countries is key, the EESC underlines the importance of preserving European sovereignty and avoiding non-European dependencies in strategic areas while promoting collaboration and interoperability, with reciprocity and mutual benefit with the US and other like-minded third parties as common rules.

1.12.

The EESC believes that the Strategy must be followed by concrete and rapid actions in terms of targeted budget, schedules for implementation of the actions, and job creation (2). Such an accurate roadmap must be devised by the EU following a European-wide coordination of the actors involved in space activities.

2.   Background

2.1.

As the COVID crisis revealed Europe’s lack of autonomy and control relating to critical network infrastructure, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further accelerated the path towards strengthening and reinforcing the security and defence dimension of space.

2.2.

At institutional level, this was symbolised by two key milestones:

2.2.1.

The Versailles Declaration, issued on 11 March 2022 by leaders of the European Union in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, puts a special emphasis on space for defence activities as EU leaders notably agreed to enhance the security and defence dimension of space industries and activities.

2.2.2.

A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, issued on 21 March 2022 by the European Commission, under the leadership of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Identifying space as an increasingly contested domain with strong defence implications, the Strategic Compass has many repercussions for the European space sector.

2.3.

These EU initiatives have been complemented by other cooperative programmes; for example in the context of the ESA Council at Ministerial Level 2022, which proposed several security-in-space and -from-space initiatives for Member State contributions.

2.4.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown, beyond the benefit of doubt, the absolute criticality of space as a key asset. The war has also shown the relevant and defining impact of commercial assets in complement to governmental assets and strategies — hence the importance of regular public-private interaction and cooperation, in particular concerning technical and operational capabilities.

3.   General comments

3.1.

The EESC recognises the absolute criticality of space as a key asset for independent and informed decision-making and action-taking by European policymakers in relation to crisis management and security, which is an indispensable step in devising a serious Europe-wide space policy. It will be important to encourage organised civil society to fully understand the relevant public interest and the benefits of the strategy for citizens in order to improve its legitimacy and strengthen public support, due to the relevant civilian applications of the space technologies.

3.2.

Europe’s efforts towards gaining credible and assured autonomy in space for the implementation of its strategic autonomy are now a reality, and represent an increasingly shared challenge across the continent. The EESC believes that all efforts, whether civil or military, national or European, public or private must converge towards efficiency and reliability for security users, as highlighted in the Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries (3), hence the need for strengthened public-private partnerships and potential partnerships with like-minded countries.

3.3.

There is an ever-increasing risk of new threatening actors targeting space systems to impact critical services enabled by satellites. The EESC finds it increasingly vital that Europe’s growing interest in and reliance on space-based services is accompanied by measures aiming to protect and defend space-based capabilities and services, in order not to expose Europe’s society and economy to even more critical vulnerabilities.

3.4.

The EESC is convinced that Member States must fully assert their responsibility and commitment to world peace and security by strengthening their freedom of action towards and in space relying on their sovereign capability and assets, and considers it one of the most direct and critical tools at their disposal to exert action and influence. To do so, they must guarantee the resilience of their space industry and the security of their supply and services infrastructure for the benefit of their citizens. In this context, ensuring Europe’s sovereign and sustainable access to space is a non-debatable priority.

4.   Specific comments

4.1.   The space threat landscape

4.1.1.

The EESC welcomes the identification of threats that could be responsible for the disruption, degradation or destruction of space systems via the preparation of an annual space threat landscape analysis, deemed key to understanding the hostile environment in which space and ground infrastructure and services are evolving today and tomorrow.

4.1.2.

The EESC recognises that such an assessment would help to prevent sensitive capabilities (including skills, technologies, assets and building blocks) being acquired by potentially hostile countries or organisations with the aim of guaranteeing European governance and control of ‘sensitive capabilities’.

4.1.3.

The EESC believes that the European space industry (large and small entities), research and technology organisations, and academia views and inputs need to be encompassed by the European Commission and the EEAS in the elaboration of the annual space threat landscape analysis, and in the identification of the recommendations and measures that will result therefrom.

4.1.4.

The EESC is convinced that such a process would allow the private sector to: (a) Work on new R & D priorities specific to already-known threats or a new type of threat that would be arising; (b) Raise awareness among customers and institutional players of the need for preventive approaches; (c) Define new standards at European level and therefore contribute to the standardisation process at global level; (d) Exchange best practices between public and private entities; (e) Adapt ‘ground’ approaches to space.

4.2.   Enhancing the resilience and protection of space systems and services in the EU

4.2.1.   An EU-wide security framework for the protection of space systems, information sharing and cooperation on space security incidents

4.2.1.1.

The EESC believes that global regulatory initiatives and unilateral decisions regarding STM are likely to create a challenging environment for European actors. Reforms undertaken outside of Europe could indeed potentially hamper the European space sector’s ability to compete on a level playing field and affect its sustainability, and further jeopardise European sovereignty as an overarching objective of the EU in relation to space.

4.2.1.2.

The EESC is convinced that the European Union has an opportunity to seize to be at the forefront of discussions and provide the grounds to protect key European space infrastructure and associated services. By being proactive and by promoting EU Member State cooperation instead of fragmentation, the European Union will allow the European space sector to use agreed rules and procedures to its advantage, and further promote them at global level. A more harmonised and cooperative approach between Member States would encourage common investments in EU defence and industry more broadly. In this regard, the possibility of joint procurement could enhance the efficiency of the demand side and contribute to the competitiveness and efficiency of the European space and defence industry (4).

4.2.1.3.

The EESC believes that reinforcement of the potential of spill-over technologies and industries, such as aerospace and technologies that have both military and civil applications (‘dual use’), would have major impacts on both the industrial and military development of the EU.

4.2.1.4.

Regarding security and cybersecurity, the EESC fully agrees that the ‘security by design’ requirement is essential for resilience. Common European security standards are also essential as long as they are used in a practical way, as the definition and adoption cycles are often too long in the competitive market faced by the European space sector. This means that: (a) They need to be developed in parallel to the development of the technology; (b) An agile certification process needs to be laid down; (c) The inclusion of start-ups and SMEs through their ability to meet security requirements requires better institutional support and collaboration within the supply chain; (d) New standards need to be developed.

4.2.1.5.

The EESC notes that the CER Directive (5) (‘on the resilience of critical entities’) and the NIS2 Directive (6) (‘on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union’) are applicable only at Member State level and not at EU institution level. The EESC believes that these directives should be applied to EU-owned assets as well.

4.2.2.   Strengthening the technological sovereignty of the EU space sector

4.2.2.1.

The EESC fully welcomes the will to aim at increasing the budget of the European Defence Fund and Horizon Europe as, in relation to the latest stages of development, the EU has seemed so far unable to align its budget — and related financial instruments — with its stated ambitions to bring advanced technologies to the required readiness level.

4.2.2.2.

In the context of the ‘re-energisation’ of the Joint Task Force, the EESC believes that a single process should be laid down leading to a single agreed and shared repository of critical situations. The presence of the European space industry as a key stakeholder in the process is important, because dependence reduction could improve European sovereignty as much as it contributes to industrial competitiveness.

4.2.2.3.

The EESC wonders about the future respective roles and interactions of the Joint Task Force and the Observatory of Critical Technologies and highlights the need for better synergies between them.

4.2.2.4.

The EESC favours the establishment of new alliances and Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) related to technologies relevant for space and defence, as these could contribute to increasing the level of funding and the development and sustainability of double sources in Europe.

4.2.3.   Addressing risks to security in the space sector in the EU

4.2.3.1.

Addressing risks to security in the space sector in the EU via the protection of its supply chains and procurement rules that fully guarantee security of supply is very much welcome.

4.2.3.2.

The EESC believes however that it is key that these actions be widely integrated as part of a coherent and European-wide industrial policy for space.

4.2.4.   Developing capabilities, including EU autonomous access to space, to increase resilience

4.2.4.1.

The EESC agrees that self-protective payloads, responsive launchers, space situational awareness capabilities, in-orbit servicing, and a secured sovereign cloud dedicated to space applications are key technologies/capabilities for resilience.

4.2.4.2.

The EESC believes that long-term EU independent access to space should be ensured, as Europe cannot depend on third countries for the launch of its space capabilities and for the maintenance of its own space infrastructure. In this regard, applying the principle of European preference in launchers for institutional launches is a must.

4.2.5.   Responding to space threats

4.2.5.1.

The EESC believes that detecting threats requires the development of a fully-fledged and autonomous Space Traffic Management architecture, relying, inter alia, on the establishment and supporting of funded programme lines to further develop European STM capabilities (Space Surveillance and Tracking — SST, Space Domain Awareness — SDA) and speeding up the deployment of commercially viable, competitive and scalable European SST and STM capabilities (7).

4.2.5.2.

In this sense, the EESC fully agrees with the strong focus of the Joint Communication on Space SDA capabilities provided that it relies on industry’s support, expertise and capabilities — in addition to European and EU Member States’ capabilities — every step of the way.

4.2.5.3.

The EESC encourages the efforts of the EU Member States to be strongly coordinated at EU level in support of the objective of increased European open strategic autonomy, in line with the transatlantic partnership alliance, collaboration with key strategic partners such as the United States and United Kingdom, engagement at multilateral level and possibly prepare the way for capability at EU level.

4.2.5.4.

The EESC recognises the importance of space exercises, as coordination between Europeans should be stronger, more efficient and have more weight with respect to our allies, in particular the United States. This supposes to build a common culture of space operations.

4.2.6.   Enhancing the use of space for security and defence

4.2.6.1.

The EESC agrees that improving the contribution of space to European defence capabilities also means relying on already-existing European Flagship Programmes, and improving them with a security and defence dimension.

4.2.6.2.

The EESC stresses that an extension of Copernicus towards security capabilities would mean a significant increase in the programme objectives, which should be carefully assessed particularly in relation to the associated risks for the Copernicus Programme’s funding capacities and its current open data policy.

4.2.6.3.

The EESC underlines the importance on the contribution of the Strategy to the EU Green Deal and associated industrial ecosystems. In particular, Copernicus, considered to be a world-class reference for climate change and environmental monitoring, directly contributes to addressing and finding solutions to climate change and to supporting Europe’s role on the world stage. As Copernicus has become the globally-accepted standard for science-grade imagery and data quality, it needs to be further supported with unfailing ambitions.

4.2.6.4.

Concerning IRIS2, the EESC strongly supports a programme that will help the Union remain a leading international player with freedom of action in the space domain.

4.2.6.5.

The EESC is convinced of the necessity for all the actions related to industry (competitiveness, critical technologies, security of the supply chain, etc.) to be integrated as part of a coherent and European-wide industrial policy, in a context of a very strong dependence of the European space industry on very limited open markets.

4.2.6.6.

The EESC wishes to underline that space is an innovative and constantly evolving sector. To ensure the competitiveness of European space activities, the development of professional skills requires constant adaptation and improvement. As industry recruitment trends have been strong in recent years, and are expected to remain strong in the near future, this needs to be further accompanied with concrete actions such as the institution of an EU Space Academy.

4.2.7.   Partnering for responsible behaviours in outer space

4.2.7.1.

The EESC agrees that to ensure secure, sustainable and reliable use of space-based capabilities, partnerships and joint ventures with other regions, entities and like-minded third parties are essential.

4.2.7.2.

If cooperation is key, the EESC alerts that preserving European sovereignty and autonomy should be included as a must while promoting collaboration and interoperability, with reciprocity and mutual benefit with the United States and other like-minded third parties as common rules.

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(1)  In line with Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023–2027 (COM(2022) 57 final — 2022/0039 (COD)) and Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management — An EU contribution addressing a global challenge (JOIN(2022) 4 final) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 172); and New Space.

(2)  In particular women’s employment.

(3)  COM(2021) 70 final.

(4)  As underlined in Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European defence industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (COM(2022) 349 final) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 168).

(5)  Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164).

(6)  Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80).

(7)  In line with Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023–2027 (COM(2022) 57 final — 2022/0039 (COD)) and Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management — An EU contribution addressing a global challenge (JOIN(2022) 4 final) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 172); and New Space.