EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 17.4.2018

SWD(2018) 110 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement

{COM(2018) 212 final}
{SWD(2018) 111 final}

1Policy and legal context

1.1.Introduction

1.2.Policy and legal context

2Problem definition

2.1.What are the problems (and their drivers)?

2.1.1.    Insufficient acceptance of ID and residence documents in another Member State    

2.1.2.    Document fraud and lack of authentication of ID and residence documents    

2.1.3.    Complexity of issuance and administration of ID and residence documents    

2.2.How will the problem evolve?

3Why should the EU act?

3.1.Legal basis

3.2.Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action

3.3.Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action

4Objectives: What is to be achieved?

5What are the available policy options?

5.1.What if there is no EU action?

5.2.Policy Option ID – format and security of ID cards

5.3.Policy Option RES – format and security of residence documents

5.4.Policy option PROCESS – process regarding the issuance of ID cards and residence documents, as well as Member States sharing information about the related processes

6What are the impacts of the policy options?

6.1.Impacts of the options for ID cards

6.2.Impacts of the options for residence documents

6.3.Impacts of the options for PROCESS

7How do the options compare?

7.1.Comparing the options for ID cards

7.2.Comparing the options for residence documents

7.3.Comparing the options for PROCESS

7.4.How sensitive are the preferred options to using different weights for the criteria?

8Preferred option

8.1.The preferred options

8.2.Combined impact of the preferred options

8.3.REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)

9How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated?

Annex 1: Procedural information

Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation

Annex 3: Who is affected and how?

Annex 4: Analytical methods

Annex 5: Scope of initiative (ID cards and residence documents)

Annex 6: Consequences to problems identified

Annex 7: Policy Options - details

Annex 8: The preferred option(s) - details

Annex 9: Monitoring and evaluation of impacts - details

Annex 10: Impact of preferred option per Member State

Glossary

1Policy and legal context

1.1.Introduction

European citizens are increasingly mobile. They make hundreds of millions of journeys every year within the EU or entering and leaving its external borders. More than 15 million EU citizens reside in another EU country and more than 11 million working in another Member State 1 . European students and young people increasingly use their free movement rights to do an ERASMUS in another EU country or when joining the European Solidarity Corps.

The free movement of EU citizens relies on ID cards, which can be used by EU citizens as travel documents and also to establish their identity when exercising their right to live in another country ('mobile citizens') after three months. These mobile citizens – and their non-EU family members – also receive documents to prove their residence in their host Member State. These documents (registration certificates, residence cards and permanent residence cards for EU citizens and their non-EU family members) are not travel documents. However, residence cards of non-EU family members of mobile EU citizens used together with a passport give the right to travel visa-free if they travel with or join the EU citizen.

There is no standardisation at the EU level of the information all these documents contain and/or of their security features. There are currently about 250 different versions of ID cards and residence documents in valid circulation in the European Union. This diversity creates insufficient acceptance by public and private entities of both ID cards and residence documents. Insufficient security of both ID cards and residence documents for non-EU family members hampers the free movement of citizens and undermines security within borders. In addition, there have been a number of problems reported related to the issuance, handling and administration of all these documents.

This initiative addresses difficulties in exercising free movement and aims to increase security within the European Union. Security and free movement are inherently linked: in the Preamble to the Treaty on the European Union the Member States are “resolved to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, by ensuring an area of freedom, security and justice (…)”

This Impact Assessment is based on the findings of an external study 2 , a public consultation and stakeholder consultation 3 and other sources. (See Annex 5 for more details on the scope.)

1.2.Policy and legal context

Europeans consider free movement to be a major achievement of European integration. It covers the right to enter and leave territory of another Member State, as well as the right to stay there. Measures regarding free movement are inseparable from measures introduced to guarantee security within the European Union.

The most relevant EU instrument in this context is the Free Movement Directive (2004/38/EC) 4 which establishes the conditions for the exercise of the right of free movement and residence (both temporary and permanent) for EU citizens and their family members. This directive lays down that, in conjunction with a valid ID card or passport, EU citizens and their family members may enter and live in another Member State (subject to exceptional restrictions) and may register for residence documentation. The Directive, however, does not regulate the format and minimum standards for ID cards to be used to enter or leave EU Member States. In the same way, it does not provide for specific standards as regards residence documents issued to EU citizens and their non-EU family members.

EU law already provides for standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States 5 and on uniform formats for visas 6 and residence permits for third country nationals. 7 These standards are also used for local border permits 8 and permits issued in the framework of the EU legal migration acquis, but not for the documents under consideration in this impact assessment. In 25 October 2017, a new common design for the residence permit for third-country nationals was adopted to improve its security features 9 . This ‘uniform format’ may be used for another purpose, such as for residence and permanent residence cards for third country national family members of mobile EU citizens ("TCN FAM cards"), if this purpose is clearly indicated on the card 10 .

The Schengen Borders Code 11 sets out procedures for checks on EU and non-EU nationals at the external borders. Border guards have to perform these checks quickly and efficiently and rely on technologies/databases, training and guidance tools to enable them to verify travel documents, including identity cards. The recent amendment of the Schengen Borders Code 12 makes it obligatory to check all persons and verify their travel documents, regardless of the holder’s nationality, against the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD) database. The security features of electronic identity (eID) documents should also be checked when technically possible. Holders of eID documents should be able to use e-gates, freeing up time for border guards to handle other travellers.

To contribute to the modernisation of the border management at the external Schengen borders, to help Member States dealing with ever increasing number of travellers, and to identify over-stays and contribute to EU security, a Regulation establishing an Entry Exit System (EES) 13  has been recently adopted. This system will register the entry and exit data of non-EU nationals crossing the EU’s external borders who are admitted for a short stay into the Schengen area (maximum 90 days in any 180-day period) including third country family members of EU citizens exercising their free movement rights 14 . However, this system will not register data for third country family member holders of a residence card, as their right to stay/reside is not limited to a short term stay. The system is expected to be operational by the end of 2020.

Again in relation to short stays, in November 2016 the Commission presented a legislative proposal to establish the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS). This initiative aims to improve control over who is allowed to enter the EU and who is admitted for a short stay into the Schengen area (maximum 90 days in any 180-day period), including the third country family members of EU citizens exercising their free movement rights. Like the EES, the ETIAS legislative proposal excludes the registration of both EU citizens and of third country nationals holding a residence card 15 , given that their rights to reside are different.

The initiative addresses applications of ID card and residence documents where a person is mobile, crosses a border, travels or temporarily or permanently moves to another country with the intention of residing there. When moving to and residing in other countries certain actions, such as registration at school or opening a bank account are carried out. Usually this will require personal interaction. The ID cards and residence documents addressed should help citizens do these things.

In the future a lot of these actions, however, might be carried electronically. ID cards and residence documents can also serve as platforms for electronic functionalities such as eID 16 , digital signature, etc. which are key to accessing electronic services abroad. ID cards and residence documents are also used by EU citizens and their non-EU family members to identify themselves to public and private entities for instance at polling stations during European elections 17 or to buy specific products. They enable the completion of certain administrative formalities online (e.g. birth certificate requests) or access to certain services (waste recycling facilities in a municipality), for instance 18 .

This initiative supports this development, however improvement of cross-border access to services is mainly tackled by other initiatives, such as the eIDAS Regulation and the Single Digital Gateway.

Technical and data protection requirements will have to be respected, so that the main functionalities of ID cards and residence documents (proof of identity and residence and travel documents) are not jeopardised.

The eIDAS Regulation ('Regulation on electronic Identification and Authentication Services’) 19 entered fully into force on 1 July 2016. This Regulation introduced the EU-wide mutual recognition of electronic identifications in access to public services. The eIDAS Regulation helps citizens moving to another Member State by requiring electronic identification means to be recognised in another Member States. One of the means is to include electronic identification on the identity card. The Regulation is aligned with the objectives of the Digital Agenda for Europe 20 , one of the seven pillars of the Europe 2020 Strategy 21 and thus plays a key role in achieving growth and security in the European Union 22 .

In May 2017 the Commission submitted a proposal for a Regulation on the Single Digital Gateway 23 . The General Approach reached in November 2017 24 states that users should have easy, online access to information about, inter alia, travel documents (including ID cards) and residence documents via the ‘single portal’.

The European Commission 2018 Work Programme (REFIT) 25 includes the presentation of a legislative initiative to improve the security of ID cards and residence documents of EU citizens and of their non-EU family members.  26  

There is support for an initiative on ID cards and residence documents at political level. This initiative addresses the Council's repeated calls to improve the security of identity and residence documents 27 . Most recently, in 2017, it adopted two sets of Council Conclusions 28 , recognising the crucial importance of secured travel and identity documents to tackle the phenomenon of travel document fraud, underlining the importance of security standards of ID cards and residence documents, and called on the Commission to ensure appropriate follow up. These Conclusions followed the Commission's presentation of its:

·2017 citizenship report, in which the Commission committed analyse policy options to improve the security of identity cards and residence documents

·2016 Communication on security and mobility 29 , in which the Commission highlighted the need for quality and certainty in identity documents, and

·2016 Action Plan on document security of December 2016 30 , in which the Commission addresses travel document fraud including identity cards and residence documents.

The European Parliament in its Resolution on the EU Citizenship Report 2017, adopted on 12 December 2017 31 , supported the possibility of introducing a European identity card in addition to national identification documents.

At technical level there is a more mixed response to a potential initiative, depending on the Member State and the part of the national administration answering. Member States experts in charge of borders largely support harmonisation of security features of ID cards and residence cards, whereas national experts from the FREEMO expert group (in charge of free movement) support to a lesser extent harmonisation of the security features for ID cards and residence documents.  32

EU citizens and their family members responding to the open public consultation were largely in favour of an EU intervention on ID cards and residence documents largely support the idea of an EU intervention. Around 70% of respondents supported it for ID cards, with almost 75% supporting strong or very strong security features. 70% would even support a European format for ID card.

Certain civil society organisations support Member States phasing out of paper-based identity cards as soon as possible and argue for minimum harmonisation as regards security features and format but without the need ‘that the ID cards should necessarily look exactly the same’. 

More details from the stakeholder consultations are presented in Annex 2.

2Problem definition

Figure 2.1 Problem Tree – Initiative on ID and residence documents

2.1.What are the problems (and their drivers)?

2.1.1.Insufficient acceptance of ID and residence documents in another Member State

Up to 370 of the 440 million citizens in 26 Member States (DK and UK do not issue ID cards) could hold national ID cards. While Member States are obliged to accept each other’s (at least 86 currently circulated versions 33 of) national ID cards as travel documents on the basis of the EU free movement acquis, there are no EU identity document standards (see Table 2.1 in Annex 5 for examples of national ID cards issued).

Member States do not apply a common format, minimum standard information or minimum production standards. Public and private actors must nonetheless all treat all these ID cards, of variable quality, as being of equal evidential value.

This creates problems: because of the inconsistent design and information provided, it is often challenging even to identify ID cards as such and verify they are validly issued. This causes citizens to be wrongly turned away at the border or refused boarding on flights, and to be unable to access public or private services they are entitled to. These problems discourage citizens from exercising their rights to move freely in the Union. Along with the issues of security and authentication considered below, this means that despite the legal obligation to recognise each other's documents, in practice ID cards issued in one Member State are often not accepted in another.

Compared to ID cards residence documents have a narrower function and use. They are usually not used as stand-alone documents but in combination with an identity document to register with an administration, access a service or TCN family members to cross a border without a visa. The order of magnitude of the problems associated with residence documents is therefore somewhat narrower than those for ID cards.

It is estimated that there are at least 181 different types of residence documents issued in the EU with no consistent terminology applied, great variety in their format, the information they bear, and – if needed – their security features. 34  

Not all residence documents include the most relevant data (e.g. date and place of issue). Regarding residence documents for EU citizens there are at least 15 Member States 35 and regarding TCN FAM residence documents 10 Member States 36 where no translation of the title to another EU language is provided.

Not every Member State issues all the various types of residence documents, and certain residence documents, in particular registration certificates, are still very often issued on plain paper (see Annex 5, Table 2.3 for more details). There is also some considerable confusion over the legal status and the distinctive role of the various types of residence documents. 37 This confusion and inconsistency among residence documents creates problems for mobile EU citizens when they have to prove their residence in other Member States.

As regards insufficient acceptance of documents, there is only indirect evidence, as no public or private entity collects statistics on this. The indirect evidence relies upon citizens affected by this who subsequently report this incident directly to us or via Your Europe Advice, SOLVIT, consultations, REFIT, surveys or other channels. What can be said is that dozens of non-acceptance cases have been reported very regularly throughout the years and that certain incidents of non-acceptance can be attributed to documents issued by certain Member States. Of the 250 respondents to the open public consultation, over a third reported difficulties regarding acceptance of their national ID cards as proof of ID when dealing with public and private services.

2.1.2.Document fraud and lack of authentication of ID and residence documents 

Swift and reliable authentication of a document and its holder requires a high quality document. While there are currently no EU standards for national identity documents, there are international standards for machine readable travel documents set out in DOC 9303 38 by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) providing for global interoperability in respect of documentary recognition, authentication and security characteristics. The Passport Regulation 39 which harmonises the security features for passports in the EU, applies this standard, including the parts on biometric e-passports. This can be considered the current state-of-the-art in the EU for secure travel documents.

Some ID cards and TCN FAM residence cards are not up to those standards regarding document security (see Annex 5, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for more details). This does not allow for their swift and reliable authentication. Some Member States include biometric data in their ID cards and TCN FAM residence cards and others do not. 40 Physical security features also differ, such as printing techniques and UV (ultraviolet) features.

This makes fraud based on the ‘weakest link’ easier. Documents are particularly prone to fraud where they lack key security features or where issuing Member States do not ensure that the digital data contained in the contactless (RFID) chip are sufficiently protected. Forged cards and the prevention and detection of fraud create costs for private and public sector entities.

Three Member States 41 issue ID cards without a functional machine readable zone as set by ICAO DOC 9303 for travel documents. Seven countries 42 issue ID cards without a RFID chip. Thirteen Member States 43 do not include any biometric data. Facial images and fingerprints – included in passports – provide assurance in cases where there is a doubt on the identity of the card holder. 44 Machine readability and RFID chips facilitate this. (See Annex 5, Table 2.2 for more details.)

For ID card holders, this negatively affects the interoperability and efficiency of border checks across the EU. It means that citizens cannot use them in automatic e-gates, and it means that they are much more likable to be tampered with, much harder to authenticate, thus more susceptible to being misused, which increases the likelihood that they will be rejected wrongly, or that false or misused documents will be allowed to circulate. Security in the Union is reduced, citizens are disadvantaged and risk and cost for authorities and private service providers is increased.

Where TCN FAM residence card are falsified exploiting weak document standards 45 , their bearers could be wrongly exempted from the visa obligation at external borders.

A wider security risk to the European Union stems from the fact that, once a person has entered the Schengen Area using a fraudulent document, they can travel on to other Schengen Member States without in principle facing another document inspection. 46

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) has collected statistics on fraudulent ID and residence documents over the last years. The number of documents detected does not seem very high (38 870 ID cards from 2013-2017) but this is based upon a small sample of random checks.

Table: Document fraud data by FRONTEX (for further details see Annex 6 - section 1) 

In its 2017 annual risk analysis, FRONTEX underlined that EU Member States’ ID cards with fewer security features were facing a higher risk of document fraud, in particular those issued by Italy, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. Less secure travel documents can be more easily forged and so are more vulnerable than well-secured ones” 47 .

In its analysis FRONTEX specified that Italian ID cards are the most reported fraudulent documents, especially counterfeited and stolen blanks Italian ID cards. The impostor phenomenon recorded 9% increase and remained the second most reported fraud type in 2017.

There is a 4% decrease on the external EU borders, while there is a 9% increase on intra-EU/Schengen movements. Top nationalities using fraudulent documents are Ukrainians, Moroccans, Albanians and Iranians, while fraudulent EU documents, in particular ID cards were the most commonly used. Air routes accounted for 74% of all detections, while UK (38%), Germany (13%) and Ireland (12%) are the most affected points of destinations.

By type of fraud the trend depicts 71% on document fraud versus 29% on identity fraud. In the later, 72% are impostors and 28% are fraudulently obtained genuine documents. Counterfeits represent 53% of the document fraud and are more frequent on less secure documents.

According to FRONTEX while at the external borders passports are slightly on the lead, on the intra-EU/Schengen movements the ID cards are by far the most fraudulently document used.

The precise cost of fraud is difficult to estimate but the costs to citizens who are victims of identity theft 48 , and/or their insurers can be considerable, especially when their ID is used to make purchases or carry out monetary transactions. 0.8 M individuals in the EU are affected by identity theft (0.2% of the EU’s population) with an average individual loss of around EUR 250 or EUR 2bn at the EU level. 49 ID documents account around 16% of all types of ID thefts 50 , and the average time victims spend trying to resolve each incident of ID abuse theft is up to 12 hours and the average out-of-pocket cost to victim to resolve each identity theft abuse is estimated EUR 354. 51

In order to ensure a high level of border control, access to sensitive security relevant document data such as fingerprints, is required. Keys to read this data need to be exchanged among Member States on a bilateral basis. However, the keys to access data change over time and they are not always communicated immediately to the relevant national authorities.

Member States do not cooperate enough in other areas affecting the swift authentication of ID and residence documents. For example, the Council has established two web registries on documents issued by Member States 52 , but many ID cards and residence documents are missing in practice because Member State authorities do not always update them in practice.

2.1.3.Complexity of issuance and administration of ID and residence documents

Apart from the legally incorrect application of the free movement acquis by Member State administrations which is not the subject of this initiative 56 , problems arise for EU citizens regarding the issuance and administrative handling of ID cards and residence documents.

For example, currently not all Member States offer their citizens the opportunity to request ID cards outside their country 57 . As a consequence, EU citizens need to travel back to their home country to request ID cards, resulting in considerably higher costs. Summing up the number of expatriates from those seven countries suggests that approximately 4.6 M people are affected by this. 58 Most Member States also charge either shipping costs or a considerably higher fee when documents are requested from abroad. 59

The typical timeframe for obtaining registration certificates varies between Member States. Six EU countries usually issues registration certificates quickly following a successful application. 60 However, EU citizens can face delays and excessive formalities when applying in other countries. Examples of this have been reported in BE, DE 61 , ES, IE 62 , SE 63 , and UK. Although documents are more likely to be issued more quickly if citizens are able to apply for ID and residence documentation online, very few Member States 64 do this.

2.2.How will the problem evolve?

It is assumed that some aspects of the problems identified will improve slightly with time because Member States will gradually upgrade their documents. For instance Bulgaria has announced to introduce new ID cards in 2018. Belgium will add mandatory fingerprints to the national ID cards by 2019. Greece has started a tendering process to replace its current paper ID cards. Moreover, EL, IE, PT and RO have recently established the uniform format for their TCN FAM residence documents (see Annex 5, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for a more detailed overview about the state of play).

Such improvements are more likely to address the problems of non-acceptance based on appearance because it may be sufficient to issue documents with a more modern "look and feel" to make documents more acceptable to private or public services, whereas to actually tackle the problem of document fraud more ambitious changes would be needed with substantial inclusion of security features (including biometrics).

It is clear that Member States have not consistently converged on such improvements, as while a number have recently updated the appearance of their ID cards, they have not been consistent in the security features that they have introduced, and some have not introduced biometrics, for instance. 66 Moreover, as the general security level is shaped by the weakest link, a single country issuing weak documents remains sufficient to undermine the overall EU security. For instance, an unsecure Italian ID card could be misused to enter Germany by plane.

Since there is e a clear upward trend as regards mobility and travel, it is also likely that any gains through unilateral upgrades will be outweighed by the absolute increase in fraud expected through this development.

Table: Mobility figures

In 2015 residents (aged 15 and above) from within the EU28 made an estimated 1.2 billion trips for personal or business purposes which crossed an internal or external EU border. 75 As the volume of EU travel continues to rise, the pressure on the external border and on checks within the territory will also continue to grow.

Simultaneously, the number of EU citizens working or studying in a Member State other than that of their nationality is also steadily increasing. In 2015 around 11.3 million EU28 citizens were working in a Member State other than their country of citizenship. This is an increase of 5.3% on 2014 76 .

Intra-EU mobility reached an annual growth rate of over 5% in recent years 77 and this trend is expected to continue. It is estimated that up to 19.6 million citizens could be affected by problems related to residence in another Member State in the three years up to 2019 78 . Furthermore, due to a high number of citizens travelling in the EU, many citizens could be affected by problems in relation to ID cards when travelling from one Member State to another, or when they reside outside their home country. 79

Public authorities and private service providers such as banks or airlines will continue to have to handle a large and evolving variety of ID and residence documents presented to them by EU citizens, which requires continuous training as an ongoing cost. Even if mutual understanding regarding currently validly circulating documents improves the cost of maintaining awareness of diverse and probably further diverging documents will remain.

The missing and inconsistent security features in documents will continue to raise security and border management related issues. Even if it is assumed that Member States will incrementally adapt to new technology when issuing such documents and gradually improve the security of ID and residence documents, the remaining inconsistency of identity and residence documents, the lack of simultaneous and coordinated action and the lack of consistent and timely communication, will make the overall problems with acceptance and verification persist.

Although the number of fraud detections fluctuates instead of showing a clear upward trend 80 , it can still be expected that pressure on border control officials will be higher in the foreseeable future due to the upward trend in the number of journeys, increased security concerns, increased requirements for document controls and the general pressure on maintaining efficiency while keeping costs down.

The legitimacy of the principle of free movement will continue to be undermined by its abuse by counterfeiters and fraudsters. Action in relation to ID cards is particularly urgent from a security perspective as otherwise the situation is likely to deteriorate 81 .

As a result, while there is an increasing need to use identity and residence documents and, security gaps notwithstanding, the considerable resultant difficulties in exercising free movement rights will remain or increase.

3Why should the EU act?

3.1.Legal basis 

The Treaties provide for the necessary legal basis for the initiative. Article 20 TFEU (Part Two of TFEU on non-discrimination and citizenship of the Union) establishes Union citizenship and Article 21 TFEU refers to the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Article 21 provides for the possibility for the Union to act and adopt provisions with a view to facilitating the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States if action to attain this objective is necessary to facilitate the exercise of this right. The ordinary legislative procedure applies.

Article 77 (3) TFEU (in Part Three, Title V of the TFEU on an area of freedom, security and justice) participates to the policies on border checks, asylum and migration and provides that the Council may adopt provisions concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits or any other such document if action by the Union should prove necessary to facilitate the exercise of the right to move and reside freely (Article 20(2)(a) TFEU) if the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers. In such cases a special legislative procedure applies: the Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. The UK and Ireland have a flexible opt-out from the legislation adopted in the area of freedom, security and justice, 82 and Denmark does not take part in the adoption of measures pursuant to this Title 83 .

3.2.Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action

Individual Member States have been using their scope for initiatives to improve security and support the right to free movement in relation to ID and residence documents. For example, some Member States have established web registries allowing both public and private sector entities to check the authenticity of documents. However, a common approach to enhancing the security features of documents and establishing the data that documents should provide as a minimum is still missing and results in continuing problems across Member States and an open door to document fraud.

If measures are not taken consistently they will result in even more problems for European citizens, national authorities and businesses. National measures are subject to the obvious limitation that their direct benefits are largely or exclusively confined to a single Member State (or several Member States in case of data exchange and other forms of cooperation), whereas addressing systemic problems in relation to free movement clearly requires action with an EU-wide dimension.

There are also real obstacles to free movement (e.g. no acceptance of the visa exemption for TCN family members), a lack of awareness with respect to ID and residence documentation (e.g. no awareness that residence documents are not travel documents), and administrative delays in respect of ID and residence documentation (e.g. a long waiting time after submitting an application and before receiving registration certificates).

Border control authorities and private sector entities are often ill-informed about specific ID and residence requirements, while databases are not updated and the exchange of information does not take place regularly. The national authorities or private sector services lack information about ID cards and residence requirements elsewhere in the EU.

Relying on uncoordinated national initiatives is likely to entail a lack of focus on improving the sharing of information and practical cooperation between EU Member States.

Member States cannot improve the current situation by acting alone, since the underlying problem is that cross-border acceptance and verification of ID and residence documents is hampered due to the problem drivers and root causes described in section 2.1. There is a high likelihood that such problems will persist. Economic discrepancies in Europe, and citizens’ increased mobility, knowledge of foreign languages and ease of travel across Europe drive citizens to use their ID and residence documents to exercise their rights.

Since the unanimously adopted Council Conclusions from 2005, where Member States unanimously agreed to work together to establish minimum security standards for national identity cards, including inter alia “to use as a starting point the technical specifications established for the integration of biometrics in the passport in accordance with Regulation (EC) 2252/2004” 84 , there have been a number of political agreements and repeated calls to improve the security of identity and residence documents. Only recently another set of Council Conclusions have been adopted that underpin the same issue. 85  

The Commission itself has made successive calls for such action, including in its Communication on Security and mobility 86 in 2016, not to mention its Action Plan on document security of December 2016 87 .

Despite some progress having been achieved, a considerable number of countries still issue weak documents (13 Member States use no biometrics for their ID cards and at least 16 do not use the uniform format including biometrics for their family member residence documents).

It is therefore unlikely that any further non-binding guidelines, political agreements or recommendations (either from the Council or the Commission) would achieve sufficient progress and address the problems within an acceptable time frame.

3.3.Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action

EU action can add considerable value in addressing the challenges mentioned above. The current situation affects the security within the EU and at its borders and the opportunity for EU citizens fully to enjoy their free movement rights. External borders and the European Union as a whole have been placed under considerable strain lately. Ongoing challenges have underlined the inextricable link between free movement of persons inside the EU and robust external border management. Measures to enhance security checks on persons entering the EU and to improve external border management are weakened if the main instrument for identifying citizens is problematic even within a national context.

Looking at the ‘weakest link’, it is essential that all Member States comply with minimum standards as regards ID and residence document security and features in order to maintain an adequate level of security within the EU and its borders.

The issuance, handling and administration of ID and residence documents are a national matter. Nevertheless, good administrative practices around the issuance of documents should be effectively communicated across the EU and properly trained at EU level.

As a result, the objectives of any initiative to remedy this situation could not be achieved at a national level and there is a strong argument for EU action. Even if the documents originate from a national competence (notably ID cards), they all have an intrinsic European dimension because of their interconnection with the exercise of free movement.

4Objectives: What is to be achieved?

The objectives of this EU policy initiative are to:

·improve security within the EU and at its borders, and

·facilitate and promote the EU citizens’ and their family members’ right to move and reside freely within the EU.

Such goals complement and reinforce each other, as security and free movement are inherently linked. The abolition of internal border controls in the Schengen Area relies on authorities in the Member States following certain minimum standards with regard to document and border security.

The specific objectives of the initiative are to reduce document fraud, to improve the acceptance and authentication of the ID and residence documents and improve the identification of people based on them, in answer to the problems detailed in section 2.1. In particular document fraud (see section 2.1.2) is aggravated by the wide variety of documents and their lack of security features.

Another specific objective is to raise awareness among citizens, national authorities and the private sector about the documents issued, and the right to free movement linked to them.

A cross-cutting overall goal is to simplify daily life for EU citizens, cut red tape and lower costs both for citizens and private and public entities, by reducing administrative barriers for citizens and their family members related to the use of ID cards and residence documents, in the exercise of their rights, as well as in the issuance and administrative processes related to the documents. For example, citizens and their family members are often unable to access certain services with their ID and residence documents due to the national authority or private sector actor’s non-acceptance of those documents. They are at once faced with administrative delays and hurdles when requesting documents. This results in costs and barriers for them.

The various policy options analysed here intend to achieve these objectives and tackle the problems identified in section 2.1 and the individuals concerned by this initiative are EU citizens and their family members.

5What are the available policy options?

Currently there is no significant 91 hard or soft law at EU level as regards format, security or process related issues for ID cards and residence documents issued to EU citizens and their family members. 92 It is therefore neither necessary nor possible to include an option in this assessment which could aim to do less or simplify an existing EU framework.

2 93 out of 28 Member States do not issue ID cards (Denmark and the United Kingdom). Their citizens travel in the EU with their passports which already include security features and therefore do not pose the security risks under discussion. Six Member States do not issue registration certificates for EU mobile citizens. Nationals of those Member States could encounter occasional problems when exercising their free movement rights without these documents. However, requiring these Member States to introduce or reintroduce such documents would place a substantial administrative burden both on citizens and on the authorities, for modest benefit to a limited group of citizens. As a consequence, this is excluded from all the policy options considered. 94  

There is no evidence to support the case for optional harmonisation in this context, as this would not tackle the problems arising from the current diversity of documents. Member States might not feel sufficiently encouraged to adopt the necessary changes on an optional basis.

The intervention logic with a view to the policy options chosen is presented in Figure 5.1.

5.1.What if there is no EU action?

The baseline scenarios for the format and security issues for ID cards and residence documentation, and for the process related issues are to maintain the status quo. Three baselines are therefore considered.

At baseline, the situation remains unchanged. Pressure at external borders will increase, and more persons are going to try to irregularly enter the EU and want to exercise free movement by means of document fraud 95 (see also section 2.2). ID cards and residence documents continue to be regulated differently across EU Member States. Based on the experience of the Council Conclusion of 2005 96 , voluntary alignment is not happening or does so at such a slow a pace that it constitutes a security risk within the EU.

There is no evidence that there will be swift convergence regarding the choice of substrate (paper, laminated paper, plastic) and format (ID-1, ID-2, A4 paper document), and security features will still vary providing an opportunity for forgers to target the documents of those countries where the standards are relatively low. 97 Currently, only 2 out of 13 Member States 98 issuing ID cards not compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 plan to upgrade their ID cards’ design in the near future.

Member States' policies towards harmonisation will still show discrepancies between EU Member States as policies will continue to be uneven and asymmetrical. For instance, the DE authorities recently introduced e-gates at airports, but due to lacking interoperability, the e-gates can only be used with DE national ID cards. Moreover, differences will be kept among Member States with regard to the use of ID cards to access public and private sector services.

Under the “no policy change” scenario, some measures for residence documents are also already underway, e.g. DE and ES both recently abolished residence cards for EU citizens, but there is no coordination whatsoever of these policies. Cross-border use of electronic identity (eID) functions was boosted by EU legislation (eIDAS Regulation). 99 Nevertheless the development of an eID infrastructure is technically challenging and expensive, and a lot of Member States are still quite slow in introducing national ID cards with eID function 100 . If the status quo is maintained, this could lead to continued uncertainty among citizens as to whether they can use eID features with their cards in other Member States.

There are currently big differences with regard to the process-related aspects of ID and residence documents, and these will remain or even increase with the growing mobility of citizens. 101 Whereas several countries already have online application systems for residence cards 102 , the administrative inconveniences, in particular the considerable delays around the issuance of residence documents will also remain. Furthermore, some nationals will continue to not be able to request an ID card when being abroad.

Figure 5.1:    Intervention logic of options (ID and residence documents)

5.2.Policy Option ID – format and security of ID cards

Option ID SOFT) Non-legislative measures related to ID cards

The suggested soft law measures would be mainly directed at preparing stakeholders in the best possible way to deal with the legislative diversity in the EU.

Awareness raising measures across the EU to inform citizens better about various obligations and rights in relation to their documents (e.g. through the Your Europe Portal, the Single Digital Gateway 103 and information campaigns with target groups in frequent contact with mobile citizens such as universities and employers from other EU countries).

Soft reinforcement of the authority of SOLVIT centres within their national administration in order to simplify the daily lives of mobile citizens in relation to residence documents.

Capacity-building and training organised through an EU-wide network. For example, training organised via FRONTEX 104 , CEPOL or OSCE 105 for border control officials.

Enhanced administrative cooperation can focus on engaging in best practice sharing with regard to detecting fraudulent documents and practices and on exchanging views about having the necessary equipment in place to check ID cards.  106  

With regard to the practicalities of enhanced administrative cooperation and the further refinement of the technical standards for the documents, the expertise of the Article 6 Committee will be of particular use 107  and beneficial to discuss matters in relation to security features of ID cards and residence documents 108 . Other groups composed by Member States experts, such as the FREEMO expert group 109 or Schengen related structures, should also be involved.

Databases or web registries use by Member State authorities shall be fostered. For example, the role of FADO 110 could be further developed as an information sharing tool.

To designate a structured Points of Contact network, as main entry and exit points for information exchange in each EU Member State, to provide a route for enquiries from another Member State being routed through to the correct authority 111 .

To inform citizens about the usefulness and functioning of eID functions on their (ID or residence) documents to access public and private services, in particular as regards the possibility for cross-border transactions in the Internal Market (which are facilitated by the eIDAS Regulation 112 ). To exploit the full potential of cards with eID functionality across the EU, the interoperability of eID infrastructure of the Member States will also need to be improved. The respective forums and working groups will be used for this. Recent policy developments for managing EU sector specific “identities” of citizens (e.g. social security 113 , taxation 114 , and student mobility 115 ) will be taken into account.

Option ID 1) ID SOFT) + Minimum common requirements for ID format and security

In addition to the non-legislative measures under ID SOFT this option involves legislative action at EU level to promote the minimum harmonisation of ID card features. This largely mirrors the approach taken for passports of EU citizens. 116 This will address the objective to improve internal security but also facilitate free movement.

Firstly, it is required that the ID or identity card should actually be named as such (rather than other terms currently used in some Member States) 117 . Secondly, Member States shall require that ID cards are regularly renewed for security reasons. A maximum validity period of 10 years for ID cards is proposed 118 (except where under national law facilitation for a specific age group is foreseen, i.e. senior citizens; see Annex 5, Table 2.2 for more details on validity regimes).

This option also includes adopting a format with some common features such as the information on the card and minimum security features taking into account ICAO Doc 9303 (see Annex 7, Table 5.1 for detailed list of mandatory features). Member States can however freely choose the colour of the ID card. Given the key objective to improve the security of ID cards as travel documents, a mandatory RFID chip including biometrics (facial image mandatory, fingerprints optional) is proposed.

The EU data protection acquis shall apply to all aspects of the ID cards and adequate safeguards and protections will be provided for citizens in order to ensure compliance with fundamental rights as provided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”).  The data contained in the chip shall be described in a closed list and be protected in its integrity, authenticity, and security. A purpose limitation should be included for the use of the biometric features in IDs, such as that provided in Art. 4 Regulation 2252/2004: "the biometric features in passports and travel documents shall only be used for verifying: a) the authenticity of the document; b) the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features when the passport or other travel documents are required to be produced by law". Exceptions and safeguards must be provided for cases where fingerprints are required from vulnerable persons, to ensure their rights under EU law and the Charter of fundamental rights are upheld, particularly regarding children and individuals who are unable to provide fingerprints. In this sense, the same rules shall apply as for passports: "children under the age of 12 years are exempt from the requirement to give fingerprints" (Art 1(1) para 2a (a) Regulation No 444/2009 amending Council Regulation No 2252/2004.

Moreover, in order to ensure the access and accuracy of the data as provided under Article 8(2) of the Charter, the proposal would ensure that data subjects right under GDPR fully apply and guarantee the data subject's right to effective remedies available to challenge any decisions, which shall in any case include an effective remedy before a court or tribunal in line with Article 47 of the Charter, without prejudice to the rights under the general data protection regime.

Optional elements can be added as required in the light of the national provisions, such as the address of the holder, the national emblem, etc. Member States could also enter details, for instance numbers which are used for e-government, tax identification, personal identification number or social security. Member States could also incorporate a dual interface or a separate contact chip for additional eID functionality 119 . Such additional storage shall comply with ISO standards and in no way interfere with the RFID chip for biometrics. In parallel but not addressed here (as at this point in time it is considered premature to completely replace physical ID cards by digital identification in particular for travelling throughout Europe), Member States may also develop fully digital mobile phone based identification solutions. 120 Member States can also look into the integration of format features that render the ID cards more accessible and user-friendly to people with disabilities, such as visually impaired persons. 121  

A requirement will be introduced to phase out all documents currently in circulation and which do not meet the requirements suggested under this option by a fixed deadline 122 .

The deadline should allow sufficient time for the authorities and citizens to cope with the transition to new documents 123 . This option would require that all previous non-compliant versions of ID cards are phased out within 10 years after entry into force of the EU measure. Member States not producing ID cards with a properly functional machine readable zone (MRZ) according to ICAO shall shorten this time period to five years in order to achieve the desired effects more quickly.

Option ID 2) ID SOFT) + ID 1) + Common format for ID cards

In addition to the measures under ID SOFT and ID 1) this option represents a more ambitious approach with measures to harmonise all key features of national ID cards beyond ICAO requirements.

The card will bear the EU emblem and the colour will be fixed. The inclusion of fingerprints will be mandatory.

The phasing out of currently circulating old documents will follow the same approach as under option ID 1).

Option ID 3) ID SOFT) + EU ID cards in addition

In addition to the non-legislative measures an alternative legislative instrument to ID 1) and ID 2) can provide Member States with the option to adopt an EU identity card in addition to their national ID cards. This EU ID card can be specifically created to serve the purposes of the rights as Union citizen. 124  

The format and security of these additional EU ID cards follow the completely harmonised features as laid out in option ID 2). The production of the cards would still rely upon the Member States.

National ID cards are not addressed by this option. None of the old currently circulating national ID cards will be required to be phased out.

5.3.Policy Option RES – format and security of residence documents

A potential legislative instrument can lay down requirements for only one, some or all of the different residence documents (see Annex 5, Table 2.3 for more details). With the exception of TCN FAM residence documents which are used as a visa waiver, there is no evidence suggesting the need to distinguish the different residence documents.

Option RES SOFT) Non-legislative measures related to residence documents

Soft law measures related to residence documents follow a similar path to the one under ID SOFT) and would include similar activities (Your Europe, Single Digital Gateway 125 , SOLVIT, training, enhanced administrative cooperation, FADO, etc.) and actors (FRONTEX, FREEMO expert group and other Member State expert groups etc.).

Regarding residence documents, awareness-raising 126 will specifically focus on: (i) residence requirements; (ii) the procedure for obtaining different forms of residence documents; (iii) rights and duties in regard to residence documentation.

Option RES 1) RES SOFT) + Harmonise a limited amount of residence document data

This option will require some mandatory features in addition to the non-legislative measures under RES SOFT). 

First, the use of the document title as referred to in Directive 2004/38/EC (registration certificate, document certifying permanent residence, residence and permanent residence cards to family members of a Union citizen 127 ). The document title in the national language shall be repeated in at least one other (maximum two) official languages of the institutions of the Union, in order to facilitate the recognition of the document.

Second, the document number, name (surname and forenames(s)) of the holder, date of issue, and place of issue will be required.

There will be no other mandatory requirements, such as regarding the substrate, format, printing technique, etc. On an optional basis, other features could be added (e.g. date and place of birth of the holder, nationality of the holder, sex of the holder, address of the holder, date/signature/issuing authority, date/signature/document holder).

The validity of documents will not be affected by this option, because the intervention is too minor to justify quicker replacement of non-compliant TCN FAM cards. The replacement of valid residence documents of EU citizens could create legal uncertainties in relation to Directive 2004/38/EC, and is therefore excluded (no phasing out).

Option RES 2) RES SOFT) + RES 1) + Common format for TCN FAM residence documents

As only TCN FAM residence documents act as visa waivers, there is a substantive argument that only these should be improved. In addition to soft law measures (RES SOFT) and a harmonisation of a limited amount of residence document data (RES 1) this option therefore suggests harmonising TCN FAM residence documents.

TCN FAM residence cards and permanent residence cards will draw on the specifications set out in the ICAO document 9303 and use the common uniform format for residence permits 128 , including biometrics (both mandatory facial image and fingerprints). (See Annex 7 Table 5.2 for a list of all mandatory and optional features.)

As for ID cards, the collection of personal data under this option should be implemented with strong fundamental rights checks, guarantees and balances and ensure full compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and applicable data protection legislation, including the rights of the data subject and right to effective remedy. Moreover, insofar as this option entails the mandatory collection of fingerprints relating to minors 129 , measures shall provide for robust fundamental rights safeguards and protection measures in light with Article 24 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights 130 .

The card will be made entirely of a substrate compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 (lasting for at least 10 years), using specific printing techniques and be a specific colour.

Documents not compliant with any of the mandatory elements based upon the uniform format as stipulated by the latest legislation (Regulation (EU) No 2017/1954) should be phased out within 10 years. However, Member States, whose current TCN FAM residence documents do not even comply with the older uniform format under Council Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 will need to phase those documents out within 5 years after the proposed legislation enters into force. No phasing out for residence documents issued to EU citizens.

Option RES 3) RES SOFT) + RES 1) + Common format for all residence documents 

In addition to the requirements under RES SOFT) and RES 1) this option will involve establishing a harmonised common format not only for TCN FAM cards but for all types of residence documentation as referred to by Directive 2004/38/EC. The harmonised format will be again the uniform format used for residence permits (see RES 2).

Due to their impact on border and other security, phasing out is again required for old non-compliant TCN FAM residence documents. The validity of existing residence documents issued to EU citizens should not be touched upon for legal reasons, even if their format will be harmonised (see RES 1). There will be no phasing out under RES 3) for residence documents issued to EU citizens.

5.4.Policy option PROCESS – process regarding the issuance of ID cards and residence documents, as well as Member States sharing information about the related processes

Option PROCESS SOFT) Promote more and better options for requesting and receiving documents and improving Member States sharing information about related processes

This option includes the promotion of online application tools. 131 When promoting such online tools, security requirements will be carefully taken into account, such as the need to have at least one physical contact with the applicant when issuing a ID and residence document including biometric data. Moreover, state-of-the-art safeguards regarding data security and protection need to be respected.

Moreover under this option, Member States should step up the sharing of information and views on issues they all face relating to the production, issuing and use of ID cards and residence documents. Furthermore, experiences regard the abolition of certain types of documents can be exchanged (e.g. Member States stopping the production of residence cards for EU citizens and the phasing out of old versions of ID cards). The listed EU-wide fora, such as the FREEMO expert group (see also ID SOFT and RES SOFT) will also be better used to exchange Member States experiences in this regard.

Option PROCESS 1) PROCESS SOFT) + Issue ID cards through consular networks of all Member States

A potentially effective solution to mobile EU citizens’ problem of renewing ID cards is to issue ID cards through the consular network.

In addition to the soft law under PROCESS SOFT, PROCESS 1) will thus require the Member State consular networks to issue ID cards to their mobile citizens on a mandatory basis. This will be linked to the requirement not to charge citizens more for this service than the costs in the home country for requesting ID cards (except for the additional shipping costs).

6What are the impacts of the policy options?

This section explains the impacts of the given set of policy options described above in comparison with the dynamic baseline scenario (see also section 2.2 and 5.1). Actions and measures on ID cards and residence documents tackle different "instruments" (types of documents with different functions, uses and legal value) and cannot be compared with each other. Equally, process related issues cannot be compared with format related issues. Hence, there are no relevant interdependencies between them and the impacts of each "instrument/measure" for (a) ID cards, (b) residence documents and (c) process-related issues are therefore discussed and assessed separately.

The impact assessment attends particularly to potential impacts on three groups: citizens, business including small and medium sized enterprises, and public administration.

Member States’ authorities and the private sector are reluctant to share data regarding the production and issuance of national documents, as well as the costs associated with the use of those documents. As a result, precise quantification of impacts (in particular aggregate impacts) of the different options is hardly possible. It is however fair to assume that the costs of policy change and implementation for most options would be set off by the reduction of costs to citizens, business and public authorities. These costs are, especially for citizens, mainly ‘hassle’ costs 132 , a very broad category of costs that vary greatly from individual to individual and as a result are even more difficult to quantify.

Many of the implementation and operation-related costs are based on estimates of monetary costs and possible cost savings for public administrations and private service operators. In addition there could be considerable intangible gains and benefits.

All options should have wider economic and social impacts. It is safe to assume that the more effectively hurdles for free movement are removed the more positive these impacts will be. Reduced constraints on cross-border mobility could potentially have benefits for a quite wide range of economic sectors. Whether SMEs are affected to the same extent as larger companies by facilitated freedom of movement is difficult to assess.

Rendering documents more secure will also contribute to the level of security within the EU and the Member States, since it would be more difficult to falsify documents and to enter the EU based on falsified documents. Fraud in accessing social benefits should also be reduced. Moreover, this could also be a promoter of social inclusion with the affected individuals feeling they are treated on an equal basis to nationals of the host country and being generally able to access the same public and private sector services. 133

As regards environmental impact, facilitation of free movement can increase air traffic, which would however be impossible to attribute directly to any option implemented. The environmental costs of a potentially increased plastic card production (depending on the option chosen) are rather low and negligible. 134  

Fundamental rights are also affected. There are three main rights affected by the policy initiatives: Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFEU) on freedom of movement, and Article 7 CFEU on the respect of private life read and Article 8 on the right to the protection of personal data.

We assume that all the policy option positively affect the right of freedom of movement and residence. By strengthening the security of ID and residence cards and dependent services, all policy options aim at facilitate free movement of persons and residence, particularly for TCN.

Additionally, the policy options, particularly on the residence cards, present ancillary benefits/impact for other fundamental rights such as Articles 39 and 40 CFEU, since the exercise of political rights would be facilitated while residing in a Member State other than their country of origin. Moreover, some of the policy options will have a positive impact in Article 26 CFEU (the right to integration of persons with disabilities), as they will have a targeted positive impact by facilitating the reading of documents.

The processing, including collection, access and use of personal data falls under Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union because it constitutes the processing of personal data within the meaning of that article. 135 Accordingly, data protection including data security shall be implemented in light of the relevant EU acquis 136 . Options, which require the processing of the personal data of citizens including collection, access and use of personal data, affect the right to the protection of personal data under the Charter. Interference with this fundamental right must be justified, and this will be analysed specifically in this section.

The CJEU established the criteria for justification of such interference in the context of Regulation 2252/2004 in Case C-291/12 Schwarz v Stadt Bochum, ECLI:EU:C:2013:670. It recalled that limitations to Charter rights must be ‘provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights, and, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, [be] necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’ and found that the objective ‘to prevent the falsification of passports and the second, to prevent fraudulent use thereof’ met those criteria.

No derogation from the data protection regime is envisaged and clear rules, conditions and safeguards shall be considered as appropriate. In particular, nothing in these initiatives shall provide a legal basis for the centralised storage of data collected thereunder or for the use of such data for purposes other than that of verifying the authenticity of the document and the identity of the holder by means of directly applicable comparable features when the ID are required to be produced by law. 137

6.1.Impacts of the options for ID cards 

General impacts

Free movement of persons: Through better awareness of rights 138 ID SOFT) will have a positive impact on free movement of persons, including labour mobility. Laying down a limited harmonisation of national ID cards (ID 1) or a completely harmonised ID card (ID 2) will reduce the negative effects of the diversity of documents and improve the acceptance of IDs because e.g. paper-based ID cards will be replaced in Member States still issuing them. The effect of ID 3) is lower because national ID cards are not phased out, and thus the problems related to national ID cards remain.

Reduction of document fraud: By enhancing administrative cooperation, such as exchanging information about fraudulent documents through FADO and more training (FRONTEX), ID SOFT) will reduce document fraud. ID 1) will require the addition of security features and make documents even less vulnerable regarding falsification. Under ID 2) fingerprints will be added and further reduce the likelihood of counterfeiting. In general ID 3) has a less significant positive impact than ID 1 and 2) because national ID cards are not phased out.

Reduction of identity theft: ID SOFT) will help to reduce identity theft caused by ID cards (also as a consequence of its effect on reducing document fraud). The impact of the options ID 1) and ID 2) will be even more significant because the upgraded security features will help to tackle a root cause of identity theft. The effect of ID 3) is less significant because the other national ID cards are not phased out.

Security (reduction of crime, fraud 139 , terrorism): Soft law measures will help to reduce crime and improve security including at the borders through enhanced administrative cooperation, such as optimised information exchange between police forces. For combating all types of serious crime the availability of fingerprints on ID cards has added value because fingerprints could be checked against databases (e.g. Prüm checks, Europol Information System). ID 2) (where fingerprints are mandatory) has therefore a more positive impact than ID 1), also regarding the detection of criminals and the reduction of crime and terrorism. Although ID 3) also foresees mandatory fingerprints, its impact on the reduction of crime is again weaker than under ID 2) because national ID cards are not phased out. Regarding the reduction of fraud the effects of ID 1) and 2) will be more or less equal because – on the contrary to the security agencies - private and public services affected will not have access to fingerprints.

Fundamental rights: Beyond reinforcing Article 45 CFEU, ID SOFT) will have a positive (albeit very limited) effect on the rights of persons with disabilities (Art. 26 CFEU) by creating a forum (e.g. drawing from the expertise of the Article 6 Committee) to discuss the specific needs of disabled persons (such as Braille for visually impaired) in relation to ID cards. All the legislative options will add to this effect by encouraging Member States to voluntarily opt for specific features on their ID cards that increase the accessibility for disabled persons.

The exercise of fundamental political rights (Arts. 39-40 CFEU) as well as the exercise of the right of petition (Art. 44 CFEU) will be positively impacted by the soft law measures because better acceptance of ID cards will facilitate the participation of mobile EU citizens in elections or the launch of a petition through easier registration. 140 All the regulatory options will have a positive impact in a similar extent.

Both soft-law and regulatory options will improve the security of ID cards and reduce document fraud, which reinforces the individual’s right to liberty and security (Art. 6 CFEU) by enabling national authorities to better prevent and detect identity theft.

The fundamental rights to a private and family life under Article 7 CFEU, and the right to the protection of personal data under Article 8 CFEU are negatively impacted, particularly by the regulatory options ID 1-3.

Data processing will be involved in all options. ID SOFT) will not significantly change data processing as compared to the baseline. ID 1) will require biographical data and an obligatory facial image, which needs to be encrypted. For this purpose cryptographic keys need to be exchanged with the specific services (border guards, police).

ID 2) and ID 3) will extend this requirement to fingerprints and certain biometric data will be collected. As this is currently not done under national ID schemes (though for national passports), more people will be affected in their protected rights. Nevertheless, it is established that the use of biometrics of the type proposed and accessible in the manner proposed (as under the Passports Regulation 141 ) are justified by the objectives of reducing travel document fraud, improving the acceptance and authentication of the ID and improving the identification of people based on them, and are proportionate to achieving these objectives, particularly in terms of extending their use to the entire EU population who possess national ID cards which can be used as travel documents.

The question of how Member States set up their national databases to store biometrics is not touched upon by any policy option in keeping with the principle of the administrative autonomy of the Member States, though naturally any implementation will have to be compatible with EU law and the fundamental rights it protects.

The right of the individuals to access their personal data, rectification and objection is not impacted by any of the options, and no derogation to the general data protection regime will be created. 142  

There is therefore no change as compared to the baseline under any option. Data processing activities by private services which might be accelerated through better acceptance of documents will only use biographical data which have been already used so far, i.e. none of the options will have a significant impact as compared to the baseline.

In addition to the EU-wide mutual recognition of electronic identifications in access to public services 143 , cross-border data use deriving from cards with eID functionality will require specific work on personal data safeguard mechanisms. Data processing activities by private services will be certainly fostered through better use of cross-border eID functionality (optional under ID 1), ID 2) and ID 3)). Should Member States opt for such functionalities this will bear additional risks which must be addressed by safeguards. 144  

Table 6.1 Summary table on the general impacts under the Policy Option ID

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

Impacts on citizens

Reduction of administrative burden: With non-legislative measures (ID SOFT), citizens will be better informed about their rights and obligations (e.g. via the Single Digital Gateway) in respect to ID cards before relocating to another Member State and before engaging in intra-EU travel. Through soft law promoting a more and better use of (cross-border) eID functionality online procedures to make cross-border purchases can be further simplified. The additional elements under the legislative options can further reduce the administrative burden for citizens, (e.g. by making it possible to use e-gates at airports with an ID card). Since under ID 3) national ID cards are not phased out, the positive impact is not as high as for ID 1) and 2).

Reduction of hassle costs: Under ID SOFT) citizens will continue to experience differences in respect to ID cards across the EU. Nevertheless, e.g. training measures for border guards should already reduce the hassle costs for citizens crossing borders. The potential cost savings to citizens (e.g. from quicker border checks) will increase with progressive harmonisation of ID cards (from ID 1 to 2). The exact amount, however, cannot be quantified. The benefits and cost savings of ID 3) to citizens are likely to be limited, since all Member States will likely still need also to accept national ID cards. Therefore, potentially many citizens would not apply for an (extra) EU ID card.

Awareness: Citizens’ awareness is mainly improved through non-legislative measures (e.g. Your Europe and in the future the Single Digital Gateway). None of the legislative options has a large impact on awareness.

Access to services: The impact of the different options is similar as for free movement. Access is facilitated with a similar (ID 1) or identical layout of ID cards (ID 2 and 3). Citizens can expect to face fewer problems when traveling to other Member States and in accessing private sector services (e.g. opening bank accounts or making use of other private/public services where an ID card is required). Quantification of these effects is however not possible.

Compliance costs: Soft law implies no compliance costs for citizens. So does ID 3), since the additional EU ID card is voluntary. Under any legislative measure the implementation foresees that the production of cards with upgraded features is initiated as early as possible. Old not compliant cards will be in principle replaced naturally after they expire. However, to tackle the most imminent security features missing, a card will need to be replaced before the originally defined expiry date because it does not fulfil the requirements as referred to by the phasing out regime. This could also create some replacement costs to citizens in those cases when the country charges its citizens for a renewal of the card. However, a simple technical upgrade (such as from contact to contactless chip) should not render the production of a card more expensive. Replacement costs would be equally high under option ID 1) and ID 2) as the phasing out regime would impact on the same countries and citizens under both options. 145

Social impacts: The impacts of the various options on employment levels and social inclusion generally mirror the impacts on free movement of persons. The higher the awareness about ID cards, the better their acceptance and the smoother their authentication, the more positive will be the effects for mobile EU citizens and their family members when integrating into the labour market and the social system of another Member State.

Table 6.2 Summary table on the impacts on citizens under the Policy Option ID

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

Impacts on businesses

Compliance costs: There are no compliance costs for companies under any option because any technical upgrades to read cards will be voluntary.

Cost savings at pre-boarding checks and when opening a bank account: Private sector entities such as banks or airlines will continue to have to deal with a large variety of documents under ID SOFT) but awareness raising measures and training could speed the process up when dealing with EU mobile citizens. Currently, it takes banks longer on average to open a bank account for non-national EU citizens than for nationals due to longer background checks. This applies also to airlines carrying out pre-boarding checks on nationals and non-national EU citizens. If procedures were as quick for non-national EU citizens for nationals EUR 3.9M could be annually saved when opening a bank account and EUR 12.4M for pre-boarding checks. 147 It can be assumed that ID cards under ID 1) are sufficiently harmonised to achieve the same impact as under full harmonisation under ID 2).

The costs for private sector services of having to deal with an additional EU ID card under ID 3) would most likely be higher than any potential benefit to them from it. At best it can thus be assumed that ID 3) is cost neutral compared to the baseline.

Awareness: The proposed sector-oriented training sessions and the improved FADO functionalities (ID SOFT) should help raise awareness of the layout of the different types of documents. As they include the soft law measures the legislative options will have the same impact on awareness.

Reduction of training costs: Training via associations as proposed under ID SOFT) will save costs invested in training. This will lead to more efficiency in handling different types of documents. The training costs of banks and airlines will be lower if ID cards comply with the ICAO standards as set out by policy options ID 1) and 2).

Companies producing the cards: The companies will benefit from activities carried out under ID SOFT), e.g. awareness raising, the direct exchange of Member States and private sector association experts, as well as the information retrieved via the single digital gateway. ID 3) will offer an opportunity to companies to produce a limited number of fully harmonised EU ID cards which will not replace national ID cards. ID 2) will do this on a larger scale. Under ID 1) each Member State will do its own national tendering process based upon ID card requirements that will be Member State specific, and it is more likely that more companies across the EU will benefit from this situation.

Table 6.3 Summary table on the impacts on businesses under the Policy Option ID

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

Impacts on public authorities

Costs of guidance, dissemination, awareness-raising, training: Soft law measures will build on existing structures 148 and activities in the Member States and at EU level. Under ID SOFT) (as well as included under all legislative options) there will be certain costs for e.g. awareness raising and information campaigns, support for citizens’ requests, a Points of Contact system within Member States to facilitate exchange of information and checks on documents or an improved FADO (PRADO) web registry. 

Following the implementation of soft law measures national administrations and border control officials will be more aware of the layout, design, security features of documentation in other EU countries. Although not possible to determine exactly how this could also reduce cost, in particular by increasing efficiency in border and local administrations which issue and check documentation. EU-wide training workshops and capacity-building will be based on existing FRONTEX workshops. Increased training will have a positive impact on the detection of fraudulent documents. Such activities across the EU could cost around EUR 11 M per year. 149

Costs of enhancing regulatory and advisory bodies: Enhanced administrative cooperation mechanisms will be via e.g. the Member States expert groups on document security and its sub-groups and the FREEMO expert group. The additional costs for tasking these groups will be marginal.

Remove regulatory complexity: ID SOFT) will not remove any regulatory complexity. ID 1) will largely harmonise and ID 2) fully harmonise the Member States rules on format and security of ID cards, whereas ID 3) will even add further complexity by establishing another ID card with specific format and security features.

Compliance costs – implementation: Under the legislative options ID 1) to 3) public administrations will have to invest administrative and financial resources, hardware and software updates in changing the format and security of ID cards. In particular the upgrade to chips and biometrics will add some costs. 150 Nevertheless, equipment to issue passports is already available and can also be used for the issuance of ID cards.

Under ID 1) at least 19 Member States 151 will require a certain upgrade, whereas under ID 2) this is the case for all 26 Member States which currently produce ID cards. Under option ID 3) all Member States would need to establish a new card which – at the request of the citizens - would be issued in addition to the national ID cards. 152  

As option ID 2) and 3) establish a fully harmonised format for national ID cards, the production costs would be marginally higher than for ID 1). Moreover, the obligatory use of fingerprints would also increase these options’ overall implementation costs. 153  

The same reading equipment at border control points used for passports could be used for verifying biometric ICAO-compliant ID cards, meaning the cost of additional card reader infrastructure to fully implement policy options ID 1) to 3) would be marginal. 154  

Compliance costs (production) – phasing out: Member States either already fulfil the basic requirements or the phasing out of non-compliant ID cards will mostly coincide with the natural replacement cycle of usually 10 years. ID cards from EL, IT and FR do not possess fully functional machine readable zones (MRZ) and would thus incur higher additional costs because of the quicker phasing out foreseen under options ID 1) and 2).

Moreover, a number of other Member States (BE, BG, CZ, ES, HU, RO, SI, SK) issue specific cards for senior citizens with longer or indefinite validity which – if replaced – would also bear some additional costs after the ten-year transition phase, again for both options ID 1) and 2). The total cost for phasing out in all cases will amount to EUR 778.3M. 155 ID 3) does not foresee any phasing out and is thus cost neutral.

Time savings – public services: Public services, such as national social security providers will continue to have to deal with a large variety of documents under ID SOFT) but those non-legislative measures will speed up processes. With increasing harmonisation of ID cards under ID 1) and 2) procedures can be as quick for non-national EU citizens as for nationals. ID 3) would not add anything here because another ID card would just add complexity. At best ID 3) will be cost neutral.

Time savings – border control: Border guards deal with diverse ID cards. Through training of border officials, the use of FADO/PRADO and other measures ID SOFT) could save time and thus costs.

Simultaneously, however, border control authorities will further benefit from common features in ID cards, such as under ID 1) and 2), as this would substantially facilitate the procedures at borders and could again facilitate the detection of fraudulent cards, thus increasing security. It is shown that if ID cards were more largely harmonised and checks for non-national EU citizens would be as fast as for nationals 156 , considerable cost savings of around EUR 17.1M per year could be obtained throughout the EU.

Under ID 3) none of the current ID cards will be replaced but instead another document will be added to the numerous documents that are already subject to border checks.

Access to social protection systems: The social protection systems will benefit from increased awareness of document formats and security features under ID SOFT), as this reduces scope for abuse. ID 1) and 2) will further reduce document fraud, whereas adding another document under ID 3) that will not replace other documents will not.

Governance and good administration: Beyond removing regulatory complexity governance will benefit both from non-binding soft law, and from some harmonisation of ID cards because the authentication of the documents and the identification of persons will be improved. In online services eID functionality on ID cards could speed up bureaucratic processes, cut paperwork and reduce administrative spending.

E-government: eID functionality will be optional under all options. Apart from general capacity building and contributions by research and innovation from non-legislative measures there is no additional effect from legislative measures.

Table 6.4 Summary table on the impacts on public authorities under the Policy Option ID

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

6.2.Impacts of the options for residence documents

General impacts

Free movement persons: Soft law measures, such as awareness raising about the rights linked to residence documents 158 , have a positive impact on the free movement of persons, including indirectly on labour mobility. The more harmonised residence documents across Member States are (from RES 1 to 3), the higher is the positive impact because the consequences of the diversity of documents are reduced.

Reduction of document fraud: By enhancing administrative cooperation, such as exchanging information about fraudulent documents through FADO/PRADO and more training, RES SOFT) will reduce document fraud. The more security features are progressively added from RES 1) to 3) the less prone they are to counterfeiting.

Security (reduction of crime, fraud, and terrorism): Soft law measures (e.g. training) will contribute to reducing crime and improving security within the EU and at its borders because administrations, border guards and police will be more aware about false residence documents. Streamlining formats for and adding security features under RES 2) and 3), such as mandatory fingerprints to TCN FAM cards, may be particularly beneficial to internal security. The main effects will be on border security.

Fundamental rights: By creating more harmonised and robust TCN FAM cards the policy options RES 2) and 3) have clearly some impact on private and family life (Art 7 CFEU) because unjustified denial of their holders’ entry at the borders or their boarding of planes entering the EU will become less likely.

By taking up the discussion in the relevant forum, such as the Member States expert groups on free movement and on document security RES SOFT) will have a positive effect on the rights of persons with disabilities (Art 26 CFEU). No additional effect will be achieved by the legislative options.

Both soft-law and regulatory options will contribute equally to preventing the current forgery of documentation, which reinforces the individual’s right to liberty and security (Art. 6 CFEU) by enabling national authorities to better prevent and detect identity theft.

The obligation to collect personal data affects the protection of Articles 7 and 8 CFEU. RES SOFT) will not significantly change data processing compared to the baseline. The harmonisation of the very limited amount of data for other residence documents (for EU citizens) under RES 1) will not change these requirements. Apart from the name of the holder, which is already an indispensable feature of any document, the minimum data proposed (title of the document, document number, place and date of issue…) are administrative data which aim to increase the acceptance of the documents by other stakeholders. Higher impacts on fundamental rights are anticipated by policy options RES 2) and RES 3), since they include an obligation to collect mandatory biometrics.

The use of biometrics can have positive impacts on reducing the risk of mistaken identity and also contribute to addressing protection risks for children (such as children going missing or falling victims of trafficking). Because the collection, storing and processing of such data affects the fundamental rights of protection of private life and personal data as enshrined in the CFEU, any measures need to be implemented, corresponding to the safeguards already applied for the biometric data required under the Residence Permit Regulation with a set of complementary safeguards to fully comply with data protection acquis   159 . This is particularly relevant for those cases where minors over the age of six are under options RES 2) and RES 3) will be required to provide fingerprints and other biometric features. 160 Article 24 of the Charter emphasises that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all actions public authorities and private actors take concerning children. This also applies to fingerprinting.

The right of the individuals to access, rectification and objection is not impacted by any of the options. Specific access, erasure and rectification rights should be provided, including an effective remedy before a court or tribunal in line with Article 47 of the Charter. Data processing activities of biometric data for residence documents (especially TCN FAM cards) will only be carried out by competent authorities (border guards, police).

Table 6.5 Summary table on the general impacts under the Policy Option RES

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

Impact on citizens 

Reduction of administrative burden: Non-legislative measures (RES SOFT) will reduce the administrative burden on citizens, because information about residence documents and the rights linked to them will be more easily available including via the promotion of the single digital gateway. No large effects by the other legislative options.

Reduction of hassle costs: RES SOFT) will improve the acceptance of certain residence documents (through raising awareness). With progressively increasing harmonisation level of format and security of residence documents in all EU countries (from RES 1 to 3) it would be more likely that problems of acceptance and authentication of documents are reduced. This will reduce hassle costs.

Awareness: RES SOFT) will have a positive impact on the awareness of mobile EU citizens and their family members of their residence documents via the non-legislative measures, such as the information citizens will retrieve via the single digital gateway.

However, as under RES 3) all residence documents – despite their differences in document titles and function (see Directive 2004/38/EC) – will have the same format this could create also more confusion among citizens.

Access to public and private services: The impact of the different options on access to public and private services will mirror the impact on reduction of hassle costs and free movement. When EU citizens open a bank account or want access to social security the acceptance of progressively harmonised residence documents will be improved and authentication procedures will be accelerated. Particularly relevant is the improved acceptance of TCN FAM cards under option RES 2) and RES 3) because the use of the uniform format for those cards will increase the probability that TCN family members are not wrongly denied boarding of planes when entering the EU.

Compliance costs: Whereas RES SOFT) will not add any compliance costs for citizens and RES 1) no significant costs, the phasing out regime for TCN FAM cards under RES 2) and 3) will require that the affected TCN FAM card holders 161 in up to 21 countries 162 to need to replace their documents before their expiry date. How much they will charge family members of EU citizens for this will depend on the individual Member State. 

Time savings at the border: Under RES SOFT) EU citizens and their family members will benefit indirectly from training of officials because they will verify TCN FAM cards 163 more quickly at the external borders. RES 2) and 3) will further reduce waiting times at the borders for TCN family members due to a harmonised standard document for TCN FAM cards across the EU which could be easily checked by border officials.

Social impacts: The effects of the different options on employment levels and social inclusion will mirror the effects on free movement of persons.

Table 6.6 Summary table on the impacts on citizens under the Policy Option RES

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

Impact on businesses

Awareness: With soft law measures there will be more awareness and support via different channels about document features (FADO, single digital gateway…).

Reduction of training costs: RES SOFT) will help to reduce costs by bundling training with help for private sector associations. The more harmonised the documents (from RES 1 to RES 3), the lighter the training requirements which does again reduce costs.

Cost savings in private services – time: The more harmonised the documents are the more benefits for businesses (banks, estate agents, insurance companies etc.) which require a residence document together with an ID when carrying out services. The time for checking documents will be reduced. However, as for citizens, an identical format for all types of residence documents as under RES 3) with slightly different function (registration certificate, TCN FAM card, etc.) might also create some confusion when these documents are used for private sector services.

Cost savings at pre-boarding checks – time: As for private services cost savings, RES 2) and RES 3) will have particular benefits by harmonising the security features of TCN FAM cards, 164 to be easily accepted in all EU Member States when checked before boarding. This will reduce the airlines’ liability costs for wrongly denying boarding to passengers carrying a valid but low quality TCN FAM card.

Companies producing the cards: RES SOFT and 1) will not change the production system of documents. The switch from the current format to the obligatory uniform format for TCN FAM cards under RES 2), and all residence documents under RES 3) will however create a rather small opportunity for card manufacturers, including SMEs.

Table 6.7 Summary table on the impacts on businesses under the Policy Option RES

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

Impact on public authorities

Costs of guidance, dissemination and awareness-raising, training: RES SOFT) will largely rely upon the activities of public administrations. They need to adjust their activities to their needs and possibilities. In particular, enhanced administrative cooperation between Member States (FREEMO expert group, etc.) to exchange information about residence documents issued will produce substantial benefits for the Member States involved. As in practice soft law measures for options ID, RES, PROCESS are bundled, the cost estimate will follow a similar logic as for ID cards.

Costs of enhancing regulatory and advisory bodies: There will be only marginal costs to task the relevant bodies (FREEMO expert group, expert group on document security) with discussions about the format and security of residence documents.

Remove regulatory complexity: The more documents’ format and security is harmonised the more regulatory complexity across the EU Member States is reduced.

Time savings – border control: There is some effect on speedier border checks through better awareness and training related to TCN FAM cards used as visa waiver (RES SOFT). The limited harmonisation of certain data (RES 1) will have no greater impact. RES 2) and 3) will however increase time saving through the implementation of harmonised TCN FAM cards.

Time savings – public services: Mirroring the general effects on free movement increasing harmonisation will have a positive impact on quicker procedures for public services. Under RES 3) the expected benefit will contribute to removing problems for the 7.2 million residents in other Member States. However, it is not possible to quantify what benefits can be expected, since it will be impossible to link any benefits directly to the policy change proposed.

Compliance costs – implementation: By asking for a limited amount of data to be harmonised, RES 1) will not place a substantial burden on public administrations but ensure that residence documents contain a minimum of information relevant for administrative purposes EU-wide. At least 19 Member States will have to correct or translate the title of the documents. 165

Under RES 2) at least 21 Member States 166 will need to upgrade their production for TCN FAM cards. And as there is currently no single Member State that issues its entire set of residence documents in compliance with the uniform format, under option RES 3) all 28 Member States will have to adapt their existing production for residence documents.

Compliance costs– phasing out of TCN FAM cards: As regards the phasing out of old non-compliant documents, at least 14 Member States 167 , not using yet the uniform format, will need to bear some additional costs for the quicker 5-years transition period. The only cards to be phased out prematurely are some of the TCN FAM permanent residence documents, whereas TCN FAM residence cards are anyway naturally replaced within a five years cycle. The additional cost that Member States would have to bear under RES 2) and 3) will amount to EUR 3.1M 168 .

Reduction of number of queries: Better acceptance and authentication of harmonised TCN FAM documents under RES 2) and 3) will reduce the number of queries made by the national authorities concerning the TCN family member’s Schengen visa exemption.

Table 6.8 Summary table on the impacts on public authorities under the Policy Option RES

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

6.3.Impacts of the options for PROCESS

General impacts 

Free movement of persons: PROCESS SOFT) will foster free movement of persons by promoting more citizen-friendly administrative procedures, such as online applications for residence documents. In respect to option PROCESS 1), requiring all consulates to issue ID cards to their citizens in addition, will clearly facilitate free movement for citizens of those countries 169 where this is currently not possible. This will also have a positive impact on labour mobility and cross-border services.

Reduction of document fraud: Promoting robust online procedures, such as under PROCESS SOFT, will have a very limited impact on the reduction of document fraud. Moreover, Member States will share information about production and issuance processes, as well as whether they have stopped producing a certain document. Under PROCESS 1) the effect on document security is the same because issuing an ID card via the consular network is not more secure than travelling back to the home country and personally applying for a document at a local authority.

Improve security including at borders: Based upon the positive impacts on the reduction of document fraud (see above) soft law will contribute to improving the general security level including at the external borders.

Fundamental rights: PROCESS SOFT) will have a positive effect on the rights of persons with disabilities (Art 26 CFEU) by creating online procedures to receive documents. Moreover, persons with disabilities accessibility will be improved via the possibility to apply for ID documents via the consular network (PROCESS 1).

Because data processing will be involved with both options, Articles 7 and 8 CFEU are affected and adequate safeguards will be required, compatibly with the data protection acquis and in alignment with those already described for the ID and RES options. The right of the individuals to access, rectification and objection is not impacted by any of the options. Access, erasure and rectification rights an effective remedy would be ensured in line with requirements of the data protection acquis and Article 47 of the Charter

Table 6.9 Summary table on the general impacts under the Policy Option PROCESS

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

Impact on citizens

Reduction of administrative burden: Online application for residence documents will reduce the administrative burden on citizens (PROCESS SOFT). If consulates provide their nationals with the opportunity to request ID documents via the consulate this will also substantially reduce the administrative burden on mobile EU citizens (PROCESS 1).

Awareness: Through soft law measures awareness will be raised about opportunities for application online, as well as via the consular network.

Reduction of hassle costs (cost of the trip): After soft law measures under PROCESS SOFT), citizens will most likely have fewer problems e.g. requesting residence documentation or opening bank accounts where residence certificates need to be presented. Under PROCESS 1) the benefits for expatriates can be quite substantial, as the opportunity to apply for an ID card via a consulate will save a potentially costly trip back to their home country which would otherwise be needed to renew the ID card.

Shipping costs: Only relevant for PROCESS 1). The costs of shipping the card from the Member State where the card is produced to the consulate is charged to the citizen.

Impact on public authorities

Costs of guidance, dissemination and awareness-raising, training: The costs for soft law measures are a part of the overall soft law package as discussed under the ID SOFT) and RES SOFT) options. Measures can be adjusted to the needs of the Member States.

Costs of enhancing regulatory and advisory bodies: Tasking the usual groups, such as the FREEMO expert group or the expert group on document security with exchanging process-related information will not add significant costs

Remove regulatory complexity: No effect under soft law. PROCESS 1) will simplify and harmonise the regulatory framework for issuing ID cards via the consular network.

Reduction of administrative costs: Public authorities can save administrative costs if application procedures are undertaken online as proposed under PROCESS SOFT). As there is little evidence available on the administrative costs of issuing residence documents, it is impossible to calculate the precise gains but extrapolating the Danish case 170 argues for substantial cost savings. Under PROCESS 1) this cost saving will be partially offset by the administrative costs of issuing ID cards via the consular network.

Compliance costs – implementation: No compliance costs for soft law (PROCESS SOFT), as non-binding. PROCESS 1) will involve only costs for those seven Member States that currently do not issue ID cards via their consular network. 171 There are two types of costs. First, those Member States will incur costs to establish the process for issuing the ID cards. Second, excluding shipping costs, they will only be able to charge the same amount for issuing the document via the consular network as for issuing it within their home administration. The costs cannot be calculated due to a lack of data.

Table 6.10 Summary table on the impacts on citizens and public authorities under the Policy Option PROCESS

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

7How do the options compare?

Based on the assessment of the likely various impacts (economic, social, security and fundamental rights impacts) and their distribution across stakeholders (citizens, businesses and public authorities) under section 6, this section compares the different options with regard to their effectiveness, efficiency, coherence with other (EU) policies and their compliance with the proportionality principle.

Options are compared within each policy instrument and it is ensured that the preferred options for the ID cards, for the residence documents and for the process related-issues do not change if the choice of options changes for the other policy instruments. For example, choosing a solution addressing format and security of ID cards is independent of choosing the format and security of residence documents (or the choice of a solution for addressing process-related issues). Finally, it shall be clear that ranking the preferred options is independent from the choices made elsewhere.

Multi-criteria analysis is used in this report to compare the different options within each policy instrument. This methodology is chosen in particular due to the difficulty to quantify impacts and to take into consideration some distributional concerns.

7.1.Comparing the options for ID cards

Effectiveness: ID SOFT will rather effectively contribute to tackle some of the root causes (lack of awareness, bureaucratic procedures) of the problems (see 2.1) but not completely address the problems of insufficient acceptance and lacking authentication of ID cards because format and security of ID cards will not be upgraded with soft law measures. Promoting (optional) eID functionalities on ID cards can simplify the daily life of citizens as referred to by the opinion of the REFIT platform.  173

Option ID 1) will demonstrate a high degree of effectiveness by a fair level of harmonisation of format and security features. ID 1) will reduce document fraud and identity theft and reduce hassle costs and administrative burden on citizens. There will be, for example, less uncertainty among airlines as to whether a document makes the holder eligible to travel. This will simplify the daily life for citizens and also effectively save time and costs (cut red tape) for businesses.

Option ID 2) will address the same issues as option ID 1) and even be more effective at achieving the specific objectives of reducing document fraud and improving document authentication. As a specific feature substantially contributing to combating crime and improving security, fingerprints will be obligatory and ID cards will be further harmonised. This will simplify the work of stakeholders, such as border control officials and private sector service providers.

Option ID 3) will establish the same layout and same security features for ID cards as under ID 2), but will not address the specific objectives as effectively as ID 1) and ID 2), since national ID cards will still co-exist alongside the voluntary EU ID card.

Efficiency: Whereas the efficiency of ID SOFT is variable depending on the activity implemented and adaptable to the specific Member State needs, ID 1) will involve some costs for several countries (changing substrate, printing, etc.) but also create substantial intangible benefits (see section 6.1).

With slightly higher benefits than ID 1), ID 2) will bear substantially higher costs for implementation and management (mainly due to mandatory fingerprints) and is, as a result, also less efficient than ID 1).

ID 3) will be less efficient than ID 1) and 2) because the benefits from introducing an additional EU ID card with mandatory fingerprints but not harmonising at all the national ones will not substantially outweigh the costs. ID 3) does not bear phasing out costs like ID 1) and 2) but the general implementation costs are almost as high as for ID 2), because a harmonised card including the management of fingerprint data needs to be established.

In the long run, all legislative options ID 1) to 3) might reduce some costs due to economies of scale within the production process.

Coherence: Both non-legislative and legislative ID options will be compatible with the existing EU framework of initiated EU policy initiatives, such as the initiative launched to establish a European Social Security Number.

The coherence of the proposed soft law measures is also ensured, as they are delivered through existing forums to minimise costs and to avoid a disproportionate administrative burden. Using non-legislative measures to promote eID functionality is coherent with the existing framework, such as eIDAS. eIDAS is aligned with the objectives of the Digital Agenda for Europe, which plays a key role in achieving growth in the EU. However, recent events 174 have also shown that very strong safeguards are required to avoid hacking and fraud of national cards with eID functionality (optional feature under all legislative options).

The coherence of option ID 1) will be high as no major amendments to the current situation are foreseen. Furthermore, most ID cards in most countries already meet most of the basic requirements. For option ID 1) and ID 2) documents will basically follow the standards as established for passports 175 or residence permits 176 .

ID 1) and ID 2) would be particularly coherent with the existing EU Action Plan on travel document fraud, as they would address the security gap for ID cards. The Action Plan, as well as the related Council Conclusions, do not specify whether fingerprints should be mandatory or not. Therefore both ID 1) and ID 2) can be regarded as equally coherent.

Policy Option ID 3) could lead to incoherence with current national ID cards and to duplication, as national ID cards and EU ID cards will both need to be valid in parallel. 177  

Proportionality 178 : ID SOFT) will rely on existing frameworks for their implementation. Soft law does not require Member States to change existing legislation or to fundamentally change national practices. Simultaneously a positive effect can be expected since awareness and knowledge of all involved stakeholders will be improved.

Option ID 1) will only require changes to a relatively small number of Member States 179 while potentially having a major positive impact in clarifying the status and functionality of ID cards. It will require citizens to provide biometric data in the form of a photograph (which is in no case a new requirement). Nevertheless, as this will be compulsory in those states for which ID cards are compulsory, adequate safeguards will be required.

Option ID 2) goes beyond ID 1) in its ambition to harmonise having a higher positive effect on security but also creating higher cost and requiring additional safeguards to respect certain fundamental rights (in particular the right to the protection of personal data) (see above Effectiveness and section 6.1).

Under options ID 2) and ID 3) citizens will be required to provide their fingerprints when ID cards are requested. This obligation interferes with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection 180 . While in the Schwarz case the CJEU held that the interference with regard to passports is proportionate to the objective of maintaining security, in the context of ID cards the threshold for satisfying the necessity test may be higher, because ID cards are compulsory in some Member States in which fingerprints are not currently collected.

In terms of document security, a completely harmonised common document, like under ID2 or 3), could also mean that the impact of falsification will be much greater than if only one country’s document were falsified. An analogous issue is created through the implementation of a common contactless chip standard.

Representing an additional and not a replacement card regime, policy option ID 3) also highlights the question of where the data contained on the ID cards will be stored. 181 Given existing Member State practices which do not require centralisation of storage, the outcomes envisaged under ID 3) can clearly be achieved without them. However, ID 3) is a mere add-on and does not considerably change and influence the system in relation to national ID cards. It will not address most of the problems defined and encountered by stakeholders. ID 3) is therefore the least proportionate option.

Table 7.1 Comparison of the options within the Policy Option ID

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

As a result of the comparison of the options (see Annex 4 for a detailed assessment on the comparison of the options based on a multi-criteria analysis), there are two optimal ranking solutions where ID 1) always ranked first. The two optimal ranking solutions are:

·Option ID 1), followed by ID 2), followed by ID SOFT), followed by ID 3) and followed by the baseline scenario;

·Option ID 1), followed by ID 2), followed by ID 3), followed by ID SOFT) and followed by the baseline scenario.

Therefore, ID 1) is identified as the preferred option in both optimal solutions. Although less effective than ID 2), it is more efficient and proportional. ID 1) also address all specific objectives satisfactorily and leaves the Member States as much scope as possible for national decisions about a document that they regard as an “expression of the identity of their country” (see Annex 2 – section 3 stakeholder views). 

7.2.Comparing the options for residence documents

Effectiveness: Soft law measures under RES SOFT will contribute to addressing the problems. Nevertheless the root causes of the problems (differences and inconsistency of documents, missing security features in particular for TCN FAM cards) will not be effectively targeted (see section 6.2).

Progressive legislative harmonisation of format and security of residence documents (from RES 1) to 3) will mean increasing effectiveness, as this will also increasingly reduce document fraud and acceptance and authentication of documents by facilitating the work of national authorities.

This will mean that – given the order of magnitude of residence documents for EU citizens in circulation – options RES 1) and RES 2) will solve the same share of the problems identified in 2.1 for residence documents of EU mobile citizens. However, RES 2) will also target security gaps in TCN FAM cards, which have an important function as visa waivers at the external borders. RES 2) is thus more effective than RES 1).

RES 3) will address format and security features of all documents and will thus address all the root causes of the problems of all the residence documents. The increased streamlining of all documentation will mean that authorities will be more familiar with all documents regardless where they are issued.

Under RES 3) the initiative’s specific objectives (reduce document fraud, improve acceptance and authentication of documents, raise awareness and simplify the lives of all target groups) will be addressed. There will therefore be greater effectiveness in carrying out authenticity checks, which might be quicker. The overall harmonisation under RES 3) will also potentially further simplify the daily life for citizens. However, at the same time harmonising residence documents with different function and use can also cause some confusion which would outweigh some of the additional positive effects by RES 3). This means that overall RES 2) and RES 3) are equally effective as regards their potential to simplify the daily life for citizens.

Efficiency: RES SOFT) is adjustable to the needs of a Member State and is therefore relatively cost neutral. RES 1) will not create any significant compliance costs, since production standards will not need to be changed.

Some Member States already use the uniform format for TCN FAM cards, which will therefore trigger some but not substantial compliance costs under RES 2). If only one type of document needs to be printed and only adapted to the specific residence status, the authorities will only need one type of machinery, one procedure and one type of material to issue different documents. In practice, the uniform format for residence documentation should contain all the necessary information and meet very high technical standards, in particular regarding safeguards against counterfeiting and falsification. The format will also be suited to use by all the Member States and bear universally recognisable harmonised security features, visible to the naked eye. 183  

If this is extended to the other types of documents related to residence status (RES 3) there will be even greater economies of scale. However there will also be very substantial and much bigger investment (costs) in changing printing techniques, etc. for all other documents. This will by far outweigh the additional benefits of RES 3) and thus make this option less cost-efficient than all the others.

Coherence and proportionality: The remarks made with respect to ID cards about the issue of proportionality in the context of interference with fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter, and in particular the fundamental rights to private and family life and the protection of personal data, apply mutatis mutandis to this section.

The more the residence documents across Member States are harmonised (in ascending order from RES 1) to 3) the more likely it is that the problems described in section 6.2 will be addressed (see effectiveness above). Improved security of the TCN FAM cards (with their specific function) will be achieved by RES 2) and RES 3) by mandatorily adopting the uniform format. This will be particularly coherent with the treatment of other TCNs receiving a residence permit. Simultaneously RES 2) and RES 3) will guarantee that the TCN FAM cards are properly marked, so that the specific rights of TCN family members under Directive 2004/38/EC are properly flagged.

As noted in section 6, creating a level playing field in the treatment of TCNs with respect to the application of the residence permit format does mean that in some Member States biometric data will have to be collected and stored, and in some cases this will be for minors aged over 6 years. While this does mean that particular case would have to be taken to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place if these options are implemented, the requirements for biometric data would not go beyond those already in place under the residence permit regulation, and are necessary in that context.

Directive 2004/38/EC puts each specific residence document type (e.g. registration certificates, TCN FAM residence cards) in the specific context of the provisions of the free movement acquis. A complete harmonisation of all residence documents will therefore only make sense if the objectives and provisions related to those residence documents, as referred to in Directive 2004/38/EC, are the same. This is not the case and reduces the coherence and proportionality of a solution like under RES 3) requiring harmonisation of all documents, no matter what their use is.

Table 7.2 Comparison of the options within the Policy Option RES

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

Based on the multi-criteria analysis methodology for comparing the different options, in the two optimal ranking solutions RES 2) always ranked first (for more details on the methodology see Annex 4). Therefore, despite option RES 3) being slightly stronger in effectiveness, option RES 2) is selected as preferred option due to its better scores on efficiency, coherence and proportionality.

7.3.Comparing the options for PROCESS

Effectiveness; PROCESS SOFT) will simplify the life of citizens by promoting more speedy and comfortable ways for requesting ID and residence documents, Adding the possibility to request ID cards via the consular network in PROCESS 1), will be even slightly more effective and promote the general policy objectives of facilitating free movement. Both options will – to a lesser extent – also contribute to improving security via a very limited impact on document fraud (see also section 6.3).

Efficiency: Overall, the costs related to both PROCESS options are considered minimal. Promoting the use of an online tool for requesting ID and residence cards can be adapted to each Member State’s needs. The costs to the countries currently not providing ID card renewal via consular networks can be regarded as higher but still limited. The benefits should outweigh the costs for both options, in particular for citizens living abroad. As a result both options under PROCESS can be regarded as equally efficient.

Coherence: Option PROCESS SOFT) will be coherent with the EU e-Government Action Plan 2016-2020. PROCESS SOFT) is also compatible with the possibility to request information about the rights and obligations linked to ID and residence documents, as proposed through the single digital gateway (SDG).

The original proposal to the Single Digital Gateway 184 envisaged that citizens will be able to request and renew inter alia ID cards via the single digital gateway. However, this possibility was deleted during negotiations because Member States were concerned about abuse/fraud if these procedures were fully online and also because some Member States require biometric checks etc. 185 The feature to require all Member States to issue ID cards through consular networks set out in PROCESS 1) is thus not entirely coherent with the current framework in this respect.

Proportionality: under PROCESS SOFT) the intensity of action will be adjusted to the needs of each Member State. PROCESS 1) will require a legal intervention into the Member States administrative procedures related to document issuance. This is hardly acceptable to Member States (see also coherence above).

Table 7.3 Comparison of the options within the Policy Option PROCESS 

Note:    The evaluation is based on a scale of 10 steps from very negative impact (---) to very positive impact (+++)

"0" indicates no change (i.e. neutrality)

As a result of the comparison of options using the multi-criteria analysis (for more details see Annex 4) option PROCESS SOFT) ranks first in the unique optional ranking solution, in particular because of its higher scores in coherence and proportionality.

7.4.How sensitive are the preferred options to using different weights for the criteria?

The multi-criteria analysis presented uses equal weights between the individual criteria. When equal weights are used between the individual criteria, effectiveness (adding the three sub-criteria) gets the highest weight (50% for ID and RES options and 40% for PROCESS option). A sensitivity test was carried out to see if the conclusions of the multi criteria analysis are stable when applying different weights (see Annex 4).

The preferred options are kept, even if

(i)    Equal weights are used between the categories of criteria (25% each for effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality)

(ii)    Efficiency gets the highest weight (50% weight used for efficiency)

(iii)    Coherence gets highest weight (50% weight used for coherence)

In case the proportionality criterion gets the highest weight, only the preferred option for ID policy area changes (ID SOFT instead of ID 1). For the other policy areas (RES and SOFT) the previous results of the preferred option are kept.

A further test is to look at the specific objectives of this initiative and increase the weight of the individual effectiveness sub-criteria. We can focus on the options presented towards the:

(i)    Security specific objective:

Option ID 1) and Option RES 2) are the preferred options. This outcome changes if a weight around 1/3 is given to the criterion ‘Improve authentication of documents and reduce document fraud’ (and all the other criteria with equal weight). In this case, Option ID 2) (including mandatory fingerprints) and Option RES 3) (harmonising all residence documents) are the preferred options. PROCESS SOFT is still the preferred option under these circumstances.

(ii)    Free movement objective:

Option ID 1) is the preferred option unless the weight attributed to the criterion ‘Improve acceptance of documents’ is very close to 1. Option ID 2) would be in this case the preferred option. Regarding RES option, RES 1 is the preferred option unless a weight around 1/3 is given to the criterion. RES 3 would be the preferred option in this case.

8Preferred option

8.1.The preferred options

Following the comparison of policy options in section 7, Table 8.1 shows the options found most suitable to promote the objectives of improving security at borders and internally within Member States, and freedom of movement.

Table 8.1: Overview about the preferred option(s) and the measures included

The selected policy options follow a set of minimum standards for document format and security and thus make border control more effective and more secure. Regarding free movement, the preferred policy options diminish ‘hassle costs’ to EU citizens when crossing the border and when accessing private and public sector services.

Non-legislative measures will allow for adaptable tailor-made support for the work on documents, but also on the administrative processes regarding issuance, renewal and handling of documents. Soft law support will also connect the discussion about documents in the context of security and free movement to other identity management, sectoral debates such as in taxation, social security or student mobility.

The issuance of ID and residence documents is a national prerogative and this will remain unchanged. As shown above, the selected options respect the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, as they do not disproportionately intrude on national policy, requiring more modest harmonisation than, e.g., the uniform EU driving licence.

In the long run a potentially large number of ID card holders (more than 300 M) will profit from a more secure ID card format but only a very limited number of people (around 15 M) will be required to quickly renew their cards and the respective Member States' obligation to hold an ID card from a certain age (see Annex 8 Figure 8.1).

8.2.Combined impact of the preferred options

The principal impact analysis of the preferred options is described in the previous sections 6 and 7. Here only the aggregate impacts of the preferred options compared with the baseline scenarios (no EU intervention) are presented.

Phasing in

After entry into force of legislation all new ID cards and residence documents will need to be produced based on the requirements in line with the preferred option and the more detailed technical specifications to be laid down by a Technical Committee 186 .

A few countries 187 produce documents which already fully comply with those proposed requirements. All the other Member States will need to upgrade their new ID cards, TCN FAM documents, and residence documents to mobile EU citizens.

This may have a financial impact, although compared to the baseline, the additional costs related to a simple upgrade might not be substantial. For example, the upgrade of biographical data, such as in the case of the German ID card, or the title, such as in the case of IE, should have no significant cost impact. Similarly, the material cost of an ID card with a contactless chip will not be significantly higher than for a card with a contact chip (such as in FI). However, the shift from a paper ID card without biometrics to a plastic card with biometrics, such as in EL, will obviously mean higher cost. The costs related to new card reader infrastructure and an additional handling of biometric data could be even more expensive. However, since all Member States already handle their passports under the technical conditions set under the preferred option for ID cards, any additional costs in this regard will be very limited.

For TCN FAM cards the upgrade for at least 21 countries will be to meet the requirements of the 'uniform format' as introduced by the respective legislation on residence permits. 188 This will range from simply adding the title in another EU language (e.g. SK) which will have no relevant cost impact to switching from an ordinary paper card to the fully fledged card respecting the 'uniform format' (e.g. AT).

The simple upgrade of the residence documents for mobile EU citizens, i.e. adding either the document number, the correct title of the document and its translation, or the date/place of issue, in 24 Member States will not have any relevant financial impact. There will be no other changes in format and production required from Member States.

See Annex 8, Figures 8.2-3 and Tables 8.2-4 for a more detailed analysis of the preferred option's impact for each document type and Member State. A more detailed presentation per Member State ("country fiches") is included in Annex 10. 189  

Phasing out

A phasing out is foreseen for ID cards and TCN FAM cards but not for residence documents issued to EU citizens (e.g. registration certificates), as this would create legal uncertainties regarding the free movement acquis. The phasing out regime simply serves the purpose of accelerating the upgrade. Hence, a quicker phasing out of old documents is foreseen where the requirements regarding security are more urgent. Should it be decided to further accelerate the phasing out, this would imply higher and increasing costs (see also Annex 4 section 1).

For ID cards phasing out within 10 years will be required for AT, BE, CZ, EE, FI, DE, ES, HR, IE, MT, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI, SE. For most ID cards the validity of cards is already up to 10 years. This means the phasing out will not create additional costs because they will be naturally replaced within 10 years.

BE, CZ, ES, RO, SK, SI however have produced cards with longer validity for senior citizens (see Annex 5, Table 2.2). The same applies to BG and HU whose new ID cards are compliant with the preferred option but nevertheless some old cards issued to senior citizens will need to be replaced. These cards will therefore need to be phased out earlier than foreseen which will have a financial impact. However, this will concern a very limited part of the population, as, if we count the deadline for adoption of the Regulation (2 years), finalisation of the standards by a committee (1 year) and the 10 years phasing out, only seniors above 68 (RO), 71 (for BG), 73 (SK), 78 (HU), 83 (CZ, ES and SI) and 88 (BE) will be concerned in the respective Member States.

Phasing out within five years will be required for ID cards which do not have a fully functional machine readable zone (MRZ) allowing for basic interoperability and a form of automated checks of EU citizens’ identification. This will impact on EL, FR and IT, since ID cards will need to be renewed considerably faster than the 15 years foreseen in EL and FR and the 10 years foreseen in IT.

For TCN FAM cards phasing out within five years will be required when the TCN FAM cards are not currently based on the uniform format for residence permits. This will create no additional financial impact for the phasing out of TCN family member residence cards because their validity is always five years and they will be therefore naturally replaced in this time frame.

However, phasing out TCN FAM permanent residence cards (which are usually valid for 10+ years) within five years will bring additional costs in at least 14 states (AT, BG, CY, CZ, DK, ES, FI, HR, HU, IT, LU, PL, SI and UK). EL, IE, PT, and RO have announced that they are currently implementing the uniform format but if they do not manage in time, this will also affect their phasing out of TCN FAM permanent residence cards.

Tables 8.5-7 in Annex 8 give an overview about any compliance cost for phasing in and out regimes for each document type and Member State, including quantification if possible. A broad analysis of cost savings is provided in section 8.3 (REFIT). An overview of cost and benefits (quantified as far as possible) is presented in Annex 3. For a cost estimate of a range of freely adjustable soft law activities see Annex 3 and 4.

The wider economic and social impacts of the preferred option have been discussed in the previous sections 6 and 7.

The legislative proposal affects fundamental rights in five main areas:

i.    to citizens liberty and security (Article 6 Charter FEU),

ii.    to their private and family lives (Article 7), and the protection of their personal data (Article 8),

iii.    to the integration of persons with disabilities (Article 26 CFEU),

iv.    to their political rights (Articles 39-40 and 44 CFEU),

v.    to their freedom of movement and residence (Article 45 CFEU).

The elimination of the problems identified in the exercise of free movement and to security through the non-legislative and legislative measures proposed naturally yield a positive impact on liberty and security and free movement rights. The protection of disability rights and political rights can be improved in principle under the non-legislative measures if they are included as an objective of the enhanced coordination and dialogue pursued.

The provisions on ID cards and on uniform format residence cards including biometrics affect the protection of private life and personal data (Article 7 and 8 CFEU), because they involve the collection, storage and processing of personal data, including biometric data (facial image and potentially fingerprints) about the bearer of the card.

EU law on data protection 190 applies to personal data processed in application of any regulation related to ID and residence documents including the right of data subjects to have access to personal data processed in their documents and have them corrected. The protection of fundamental rights is ensured principally by safeguards which are based on or directly reference to existing provisions of identical or parallel legal frameworks for achieving the same results, either in national ID card schemes, or through alignment to other EU instruments including the Passport Regulation framework.

The question of data protection is much more acute in how and the extent to which Member States will store biometrics in national databases of identities and issued cards. The preferred option does not tackle this, and the civil registry databases are not within the scope of any future proposal. In any case the initiative shall not provide a legal basis for the centralised storage of data collected thereunder or for the use of such data for purposes other than that of the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features when the passport or other travel documents are required to be produced by law (as set out e.g. in Art. 4 Regulation 2252/2004).

As regards the inclusion of fingerprints, account has to be taken of the case law of the Court of Justice. The Court concluded in C-291/12 ('Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum') that although the taking and storing of fingerprints in passports constitutes an infringement of the rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data, the inclusion of fingerprints in passports is lawful given the general objective of preventing illegal entry into the EU and the protection of fraudulent use of passports. However, given that the ID cards serve more purposes than crossing the border and given the different traditions in Member States for the use of ID cards, it is not self-evident that the same conclusion could be drawn.

The collection of personal data under this option should be implemented with strong fundamental rights checks, guarantees and balances and ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and EU data protection legislation. Particularly, insofar as this option entails the mandatory collection of fingerprints relating to minors, measures shall provide for robust fundamental rights safeguards and protection measures in light with Article 24 of the EU Charter. The preferred option would ensure safeguards and guarantee the data subject's right applicable under GDPR including the right to effective remedy.

For TCN FAM residence documents, the preferred option is precisely aligned to the existing arrangements for the issuance of residence permits for TCN, where data on the cards issued, including fingerprints, are specifically encrypted and secured. This means that some Member States will begin collecting biometric data for the TCN family member of EU citizens if their existing procedures did not provide for this, including for minors aged over 6 years

The general safeguards to be provided for biometrics are:

·For chip verification the chip shall contain a digital certificate, exchange of certificate (PKI);

·Adequate state-of the art encryption level to protect data on the chip (Basic Access Control for alphanumeric data and facial image; Extended Access Control for fingerprints if included);

·The data contained in the chip must be described in a closed list;

·A purpose limitation should be included, such as “biometric features in passports and travel documents shall only be used for verifying: a) the authenticity of the document; b) the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features when the passport or other travel documents are required to be produced by law;

·Exceptions and safeguards must be provided for cases where fingerprints are taken (age limitation as referred to by the Passport Regulation);

·Furthermore, Member States could decide to exclude central storage of the fingerprints of their citizens and only store them on the chip. 191

·Ensure that the right to access, rectification and erasure of the data stored is fully applied.

The potential of the ID card provisions to facilitate EU-wide mutual recognition of electronic identification in access to public and private services is an additional consideration which was taken into account when preparing these safeguards. When used to accessing digital services and to secure information stored on the card the following requirements shall apply:

·To enable eID functionalities, cards need to be compliant with the assurance levels defined in the EU framework (Art 8 eIDAS Regulation and Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/1502) 192 ;

·Data used via such eID functionalities must be clearly separated from the biometric data;

·Such cards shall contain a digital certificate;

·Certificates must be exchanged;

The cost of the safeguards for biometrics should be comparable to the passport and the residence permit framework. Moreover, basic infrastructure and knowledge can be re-applied to ID cards and TCN FAM residence cards. Nevertheless the exact costs for biometrics, as well as for the eID management cannot be quantified, as Member States did not share any basic data that could be used to model the cost.

The harmonisation of the very limited amount of data for other residence documents (for EU citizens) under the preferred option will not change the requirements for data protection. Apart from the name of the holder, which is already an indispensable feature of any document, the required minimum data proposed (title of the document, document number, place and date of issue…) are administrative data which aim to increase the acceptance of the documents by other stakeholders. Other optional personal data of the document holder will be processed according to usual data protection requirements.

8.3.REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)

* See CSES study

9How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated?

Implementation will be monitored in terms of the measures adopted at the EU and Member State level to implement the legislative and non-legislative measures deriving from the preferred option. The Commission should also submit an implementation report to the European Parliament and the Council three years after the entry into application of the legislative measures.

The assessment of impacts will probably have to rely on an essentially qualitative methodology (e.g. an analysis of feedback from national authorities and other key stakeholders such as citizens groups and business representatives) on the extent to which implementation of the preferred policy option achieves the desired impacts and contributes to the achievement of the general aims of EU intervention. It is unlikely that it will be possible to establish a causal link between any quantitative data, for example, trends in the number of citizens exercising their free movement rights, and the measures envisaged in the preferred policy option on a specific document.

It is envisaged that some contextual information will be collected on a periodic basis, i.e. developments not intentionally related to the policy intervention, although they may be influenced by it. The key developments in this context relate to free movement, namely trends with regard to cross-border mobility (for ID cards) and trends with regard to the number of non-nationals residing in different Member States (for residence documents).

It is envisaged that national authorities will introduce monitoring systems so that the data needed for the key performance indicators can be collected 193 . Nevertheless, it will be important to adopt a realistic approach to monitoring the implementation of the preferred policy option and not to over-burden national authorities. Consultations with Member States will be needed to determine the most appropriate frequency of data collection and reporting but an annual cycle could be suggested. The data collected at Member State level will then have to be analysed on the EU level.

Apart from the national activities, monitoring at the EU level could complement this, for example, through FRONTEX or Member States expert groups. Similarly, some EU-level coordination of national monitoring activities will be needed (e.g. to define a common template for data collection) as well as the collation and analysis of information provided by national authorities.

It should be noted that some relevant information is already shared at the EU level. In particular, information can be retrieved to a certain extent from the FADO/PRADO web registry. This provides an overview of documents in circulation at Member State level and it explains the features included in these documents. However, the web registry is not always updated for all Member States and thus the system needs to be improved to serve as data source for the preferred option monitoring purposes.

See Annex 9, Table 9.1 for a more detailed summary table.

Annex 1: Procedural information

1. Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references

DG JUSTICE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS

DECIDE PLANNING: 2016/JUST/050

CWP 2018: REFIT initiatives: An Area of Justice and Fundamental Rights Based on Mutual Trust (9.ID cards and Residence Documents): Legislative Initiative to improve the security of ID cards and residence documents of EU citizens and of their non-EU family members. This initiative responds to an opinion of the REFIT Platform. (legislative, incl. impact assessment, Art. 21 and/or 77(3) TFEU, Q2 2018)

2. Organisation and timing

Commission responds to an opinion of the REFIT platform in April and June 2017 and to the developments at Council level.

A Commission inter-services steering group (ISG) was established in September 2014 for preparing this initiative. The following DGs and services were invited to the inter-services group included: General Secretariat (SG), Legal Service (SJ), Migration and Home Affairs (HOME), Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW), Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (EAC), Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL), Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT), Joint Research Centre (JRC), Mobility and Transport (MOVE), Human Resources and Security (HR), Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD). The ISG met 7 times in the period from September 2014 to January 2018 and an additional written consultation before the submission to the RSB was held in January 2018.

3. Consultation of the RSB

The Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) received the draft version of the present impact assessment report on 24 January 2018, as well as upon request a shortened version on 31 January 2018.

The RSB meeting was held on 21 February 2018, and the RSB delivered a positive opinion on 23 February 2018. The table below shows how this report takes into account the RSB comments.

4. Evidence, sources and quality

The Commission awarded a contract to the Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (CSES) to carry out a study on ‘EU policy initiatives on residence and identity documents to facilitate the exercise of the right of free movement’, August 2017.

The Commission additionally drew on other sources to gather evidence that was used to support this impact assessment. This included for example:

-A review of the concepts of the initiative was carried out by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre.

-A study established by Milieu for the European Parliament “The Legal and Political Context for setting up a European Identity Document, May 2016. 194  

-A consultation of Member States within the FREEMO expert group

-A public consultation from September to December 2017

Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation

1. Stakeholders mapping

The main stakeholders categories identified overall are:

•Citizens/individuals – EU citizens living and/or traveling in an EU Member State other than their Member State of nationality. EU citizens living in an EU Member State other than their Member State of nationality, travelling to and returning from a third country, particularly to and from third countries which permit entry and exit using an EU national ID card. Non-EU family members of the former and the latter.

•Public authorities – National authorities of the Member States which issue ID cards to their own nationals and residence documents to EU citizens and their third country family members. National authorities which deal directly with and in particular provide services (such as schooling, housing, healthcare) to non-national EU citizens and their third-country family members. National authorities which control the external EU border.

•Industry/business/workers’ organisations – Businesses which provide services to EU citizens from other Member States, particularly businesses which are required by law or policy to establish the identity and/or residence of such EU citizens when providing services, such as banks, airlines, insurance companies, other transport carriers and their organisations.

EU citizens from Member State which issue ID cards (all Member States except for UK, DK and IE) are the main stakeholders with respect to the aspect of this consultation which considers ID cards, as these are the most commonly used proofs of identity in these Member States, and are also very commonly used as travel documents within the EU, and outside the EU where relevant (EU Member States have bilateral arrangements with many third countries to allow entry and exit of Member State nationals to those third countries using ID cards).

All EU citizens living in a Member State other than their own are the main stakeholders with respect to the aspect of this consultation which considers residence documents, because they are the citizens who must rely on these documents to prove their residence status, and who have direct experience of the status quo in this respect. The third country family members of EU citizens living in a Member State other than their state of nationality also have a strong interest in this consultation because their residence document exempt them from visa when they travel in the EU.

2. Consultation methods

The consultation process combined tools of a more general reach such as a public consultation with more targeted consultations of stakeholder groups. Part of the consultation process, especially regarding technical information requiring analysis of data, was carried out by an external contractor.

The following types of consultation activities have been carried out:

•Online open public consultation of 12 weeks (12 September to 5 December 2017) in three parts, one each targeting EU citizens, the third country family members of EU citizens living in a Member State other than their state of nationality, and Industry/business/workers’ organizations, respectively. The open public consultation did not contain questions specifically addressed to the Member States and public authorities, due to the excessively technical nature of the information which needs to be gathered. They were approached by means of a questionnaire/survey and interviews instead. However, the consultation remained open to the Member States and Public Authorities, should they wish to participate. The open public consultation questionnaire was made available in 23 official languages with possibility to respond in any of them.

•Targeted interviews were used to gather information from specific groups of stakeholders (e.g. collection of information on current costs and impacts of potential options) by the external contractor who conducted 69 interviews with NGOs, companies producing cards and documents and businesses requiring proof of identity to conclude services, academics experts 195 . A specific questionnaire targeted businesses during the public consultation with 15 replies.

•A first questionnaire/survey for the Member States was carried out by an external contractor, followed by 53 interviews of national authorities 196 . This tool was used due to the need of collecting technical information (legislation, specimen of documents etc.).

•A questionnaire to Member States was sent through the FREEMO expert group, on security features of ID and residence documents, costs and possibilities of EU harmonisation, with an answer from 24 Member States 197 . 15 Member States agreed that common security features and a certain or partial harmonisation are required for ID cards, and the same number supported this for residence documents, and in particular for TCN FAM residence cards. 198

•Structured and semi-structured interviews were carried out by an external contractor with the authorities of all the Member states, as mentioned above (53 individual interviews in all Member States except the United-Kingdom).

•Semi-structured discussion was conducted at two meetings of the Expert Group on Free Movement on 4 May and 16 November 2017, discussing the result of the questionnaire sent to the group and the support for a harmonisation at EU level.

3. Results from the consultation in the context of the external study

All document types

Soft law measures (ID SOFT, RES SOFT) with regard to all types of documents are favoured by many stakeholders that have been consulted (e.g. national authorities in HU, SK, FI and HR and civil rights organisations in BE, ES and SE).

A widely supported proposal of a quite specific nature is for more regular updates of the FADO/PRADO database with document specimen. 199  

The Council stressed the importance of security of ID cards and residence documents in two Council conclusions adopted in 2017. 200

ID cards 201 :

The DE Ministry of Interior asked that the Council Resolution 202 on minimum security standards of identity cards from 2006 should be “extended to include the minimum security guarantees for electronic identifications (elDs), since the elDAS Regulation provides for the mutual recognition of national elD solutions.”

Within the free movement expert community, introducing security features (ID 1 or ID 2) is favoured by many national authorities (such as those in BG, CY, DE, EL, FI, IE, PT, RO, SI, and SK). However, it has also been argued that in particular harmonisation for ID cards should not go beyond minimum features, since documentation ‘is an expression of the identity of each country’ (e.g. SK), and since it could facilitate falsification of documents as counterfeiters would need to deal with fewer versions of ID cards across Europe (e.g. BG). Amongst those who favour (limited) action at the EU level, the starting point is a willingness to accept a certain degree of diversity as long as ID cards are machine-readable (functional MRZ) and contain a microchip with biometric data. Linked to this, phasing out paper-based and old plastic ID documents which are not machine-readable and can be easily forged is seen as highly desirable.

There are very mixed views on the scope for action at the EU level to promote harmonisation of ID cards. For instance, some of the national authorities (primarily Ministries of Interior in AT, CZ, HR, DK, NL, MT and PL) explicitly stated they did not see the necessity of a legislative measure on ID cards. In contrast, national authorities in some other countries (e.g. CY and EE) advocated EU measures to lay down minimum requirements with regard to key security features and the inclusion of biometrics to help prevent fraud.

Amongst the private sector and the NGO stakeholders opinions were very mixed with around half of those consulted indicated that no legislative action is necessary or that they are not really concerned by the issue, while the others argued that harmonisation could be beneficial.

An EP study 203 assessed the added value of introducing an additional European identity card in order to facilitate political participation at the EU level. The study argues that an EU ID card (ID 3) would enhance democratic participation rights at the EU level and facilitate free movement. However, the report also referred to the limited legal and political feasibility of and challenges for setting up an interoperable European identity card given the current legislative and political context.

Residence documents: 

In order to increase clarity of the legal status and the functionality of residence cards it was mentioned explicitly by authorities in several Member States (e.g. Austria and Lithuania) that it will be helpful to require Member States to print the title of the document in both the original and the English language on the document and when not equivalent also mention the terminology used in Directive 2004/38/EC on the document (RES 1).

Some national authorities in LU, FR and EL suggested that, as already implemented by a number of Member States, TCN family members of EU citizens should hold residence cards in the uniform format of residence permits for TCNs (RES 2). FRONTEX suggests that further harmonisation of TCN FAM residence documents may further improve security 204 .

Others (e.g. national authorities in CY, DK, EE, FR, EL, LU and MT) favoured a greater degree of harmonisation of all residence documents (RES 3), possibly following the uniform format as well, or pleaded at least for adding a facial image on registration certificates for EU citizens.

4. Results from the open public consultation

Three questionnaires were used in the consultation, a) one questionnaire for EU citizens (398 replies), b) one questionnaire for non-EU citizens (34 replies) and c) one questionnaire for businesses (15 replies). Member States authorities were not specifically consulted again, since they were addressed and consulted in the context of the external study before. 205 As a result no national authorities replied to the questionnaires used in this open public consultation.

a) The 398 replies from EU citizens are further analysed below in the sections on ID cards, residence documents, and processes.

Of the total of 398 individual EU citizens responding, 375 (95%) were of working age (18 to 65). Only 15 respondents were above, and 8 under 18.

The 398 answers were received from all Member States with a high level of answers from Italy (68) and a cluster of Member States with an answer rate of around 30: Spain, the United-Kingdom, Germany, France, Bulgaria and Belgium. Then follow the Netherlands, Greece and Finland with around 20 respondents each. Only Malta, Cyprus and Luxemburg have only one respondent.

b) 34 non-EU citizens replied to the specific questionnaire for non-EU citizens. The results are mainly relevant to residence documents for third country national family members of EU citizens (see section on TCN FAM cards).

c) Moreover, 15 ‘businesses’ (including 7 civil society organisations) from across the EU replied to a specific business questionnaire, and of those five uploaded more specific content. The results are integrated in all the following sections.

1. ID cards

Of the 398 respondents to the EU citizen questionnaire, 318 (almost 80%) hold a national ID card and 289 use their ID to travel in the EU. However, a quarter (72) of them reported difficulties:

- 36 mention problems at airport to get their ID accepted as a travel document, principally in the United-Kingdom for two-thirds; 18 reported longer queues than for passport holders;

- Several problems with paper ID cards were reported by Italian and Greek citizens: deterioration or no expiry date (for Greek ID cards); lack of Latin alphabet in Greek cards, specific kinds of ID cards (e.g. specific colour of German-speaking Italians’ ID cards);

- The differences in cards were also reported as causing problems: unusual format of the Czech (booklet) and of Romanian cards, or the use of several surnames on Spanish ID cards; 2 French citizens mentioned problems with ID card with prolonged validity not indicated on the cards themselves;

- 3 cases reported non-European or low cost airlines refusing to accept ID cards for intra-EU flights;

250 respondents (79%) used their ID cards in other Member States, in most cases for contacts with administrations, local authorities, at banks and post offices. In more than one third of the cases (91), proof of identity was problematic, for example when no address was mentioned on the card or it used non-Latin alphabet, or the age or the date of issue was missing.

Problems regarding acceptance and authentication of ID cards, as well as problems of citizens identifying themselves at borders and with private sector service providers, such as airlines, were also reported by civil society organisations. 206

As regards strong security features to reduce the risk of document and identity fraud, a large majority wants strong (155 respondents) or even the strongest possible (141 respondents) security features to reduce the risk of fraud. Only 22 believe that strong security features are not essential to reduce the risk (see below).

Civil society organisations206 support Member States phasing out paper-based identity cards as soon as possible and argue for minimum harmonisation as regards security features and format but without the need ‘that the ID cards should necessarily look exactly the same’.

On the increased costs of ID cards with increased security features, respondents answered that this should be borne by the national budget (51%) or shared between the national budget and applicants (45%). 161 (41%) EU citizen respondents recommended a price less than EUR 15, and 142 (36%) a price between EUR 15 and EUR 50.

On the appearance of ID cards, 278 (70%) respondents are in favour of a European format for national ID cards, with a slightly lower percentage for respondents who hold currently no ID cards (67.5%).

272 (68.3%) EU citizen respondents believe that ID cards should have special identity features for people who are visually impaired (e.g. braille) for easy recognition by them.

This is also supported by civil society organisations 207 responding to the ‘business’ questionnaire. In addition to Braille, those organisations want ID cards (and where relevant residence document) to meet additional criteria to address the needs of persons with disabilities:

·Maximise readability;

·Mark orientation;

·Use of Braille (see above);

·Low-slip cards (easy to handle);

·Easy to understand;

·Provide the card information in other formats (see section on e-ID).

2. Residence documents (Registration certificates, Residence cards and Permanent residence cards for EU citizens)

Of the 398 EU citizens responding to the public consultation, 211 have lived in another EU country in the past 5 years. 55 of these EU citizens have held a registration certificate, 39 a residence card and 26 a permanent residence card.

Registration certificates

Most of the registration certificates of those surveyed are paper documents (31), with the remaining 22 respondents possessing a registration certificate in card form. The main advantage of a registration certificate according to the respondents is that it enables them to prove to the authorities of their host Member State that they are a legal resident (37).

A second use for registration certificates is to be able to prove residence to national authorities (34).

Others also mentioned that it is considered an added value when applying for permanent residence after 5 years of residence (12), and that they use it to prove their residence in another Member State in their Member State of origin after they have returned (11). Regarding difficulties encountered when using the registration certificate, only 7 of the 55 respondents noted experiencing difficulties. The majority of these difficulties relate to the paper format of the registration certificate, which is deemed not to be robust enough for such an important document. Others note the requirement of an additional apostille when using the document outside of their host Member State, and the embassies of their Member State of origin requiring them to be translated into their native language.

Regarding the advantages of EU harmonization of registration certificates, most respondents considered that it would make it easier for the national authorities to accept the registration certificate (45), as well as making this easier for private companies (33). Others noted that it would make it easier to carry the document due to a better size and shape (30), as well that registration certificates could benefit from higher production standards (especially those from IT and EL).

Residence cards for EU citizens

36 respondents possessed residence cards in the EU country where they lived or continue to live. The main reason for the respondents applying for residence cards was because they were obliged to apply for one (23)(BE, NL, ES, DK), wanted to have a document to prove their legal residence in the host Member State (17) and to have a useful document when contacting public authorities or private companies (16). A residence card is required for essential services such as entering into a contract, opening a bank account and paying taxes or receiving wages, with some citizens considering it an unwanted but necessary formality. Other reasons include proving one’s identity (33), proving residence status when applying for a permanent residence card (17) and proving residence status when returning to the EU country of origin (16).

Most residence cards look similar to ID cards or TCN FAM residence cards, making them easy to confuse (30). Others are distinct documents which are not easily mixed up with other EU documents (7), or cards which are not comparable to other documents (6). As opposed to registration certificates, only 4 respondents had residence cards made of paper, in Italy. At the other end of the spectrum, Swedish residence cards include a picture, signature and biometrics.

Regarding views on the advantages of EU harmonization, the main improvement was felt to be making it easier for national authorities to accept the residence card (32), to improve the size and shape of the document (21) and to enable private companies to more easily accept the document (21). Comments also noted that EU harmonization would create a stronger sense of ‘Europeaness’, and two respondents called for integrating the residence card function into their national ID cards.

Permanent residence cards for EU citizens

26 respondents indicated having permanent residence cards. 23 of these respondents indicated that they did so because they considered it useful to prove their residence status, especially in the light of Brexit. Other respondents thought that it would prove useful in case they needed to identify themselves (8). 3 respondents noted that a permanent residence card is also a prerequisite for applying for UK nationality.

Other comments suggested incorporating the permanent residence card into documents already available such as national ID cards or driver licences (2), to permit all MS authorities to access the information found on the these identification documents.

3. Residence documents for third country nationals who are family members of EU citizens (TCN FAM cards)

Thirty-four non EU citizens responded to the specific questionnaire, of diverse nationalities and residing in various EU Member States, with the highest numbers of residents in Belgium (5), Germany (5), Italy (4), Spain (4) and the UK (4). Most respondents are young, 26 below the age of 45. The majority are spouses of EU citizens, with only 4 being their registered partners and 3 dependent direct relatives. Almost a third of respondents claimed they travel within the EU several times a year.

18 respondents hold or held EU residence card as family members of EU citizens, 8 a permanent residence card of family members of EU citizens, and 7 a residence permit.

·TCN FAM residence cards

A majority of respondents claimed their residence card is useful for proving their status as a legal resident (16), for travelling in the EU without a visa (14), and for being able to apply for a permanent residence card after 5 years (13). Moreover, respondents stated it is useful for online signature and access to online services, for applying for jobs, working and paying taxes in another country, and for proving the relationship with an EU citizen. As a respondent from Spain stated, ‘aside from the above benefits mentioned, the EU residence card improves my sense of independence and confidence when establishing credibility, and most importantly [provides for an] access to standard social integration that may require the specific document. For example, [it is useful] when opening a bank account, when trying to rent an accommodation, employment, health and safety.’

A similar number of respondents stated that they should be able to use their residence card to prove their identity (16), to prove their residence status to national authorities (16), to prove their residence status when going back to the home EU country of the mobile EU citizen (14), to prove their residence status when applying for a permanent residence card (14), and to apply for jobs (1). One of the respondents, resident in Germany, suggested that residence card should have the same status as an ID card for EU citizens, which would in particular eliminate the obligation to hold a passport.

15 respondents consider the main advantage of all residence cards looking exactly the same in all EU countries that it would be easier for national authorities to accept the documents (15), easier to carry due to better size and shape (11), and easier for shops/private companies to accept (8). One of the respondents, resident in Belgium, wrote: ‘the residence card of a family member of an EU citizen has to be uniformed so the rights of the card holder can be recognised more easily in another country. In Belgium the F card looks like Belgian national ID card which is very misleading for many people and even could be misused. To give another example, Portugal still issues paper version of the card which is very unpractical and unsecure.’ Furthermore, as another respondent described, such a uniform card would ‘improve communication and neutralise the tension that bureaucracy usually creates.’

·TCN FAM permanent residence cards

Permanent residence cards in the EU Member States in which the respondents reside either look like a regular residence card for non-EU nationals (4), are formal documents which are not like a residence card or identity card (2), or are paper documents (1). For instance, a respondent from Slovenia described that their permanent residence card is just an ID-sized paper with their picture and identification number, without any biometric features.

6 respondents found their permanent residence card useful in proving that they are legally resident, 3 for travelling in the EU without a visa, and 1 did not find the card useful. The respondent dissatisfied with the usefulness of their permanent residence card was requested to present their passport to board a plane to Venice since, they were told, the Belgian F+ permanent residence card was not a proof of identity. This sentiment was repeated by another respondent who raised the issue with Belgian residence card, which involved a lengthy procedure and did not facilitate cross-border work in Germany.

Residents think they should be able to use their permanent residence card to prove identity (7), to prove residence status to national authorities (5), to prove residence status when going back to the home EU country of the mobile EU citizen (5), and to prove residence status when re-applying for a permanent residence card (5). A respondent from Belgium added that ‘the permanent residence card should grant access to the labour market without need of a work permit.’

Respondents stated that if permanent residence cards looked exactly the same in all EU countries, it would be easier to carry due to better size and shape (6), easier for national authorities to accept (5), and easier for shops/private companies to accept (3).

Civil society206 feedback pleads for harmonisation of TCN FAM cards on the basis of the uniform format for residence permits. 208

4. e-ID for EU citizens

Electronic ID cards and the possibility to pass through electronic border control gates were noted as additional functions that just over 30 respondents would be willing to pay more for. Such technical features, in the view of some citizens, would facilitate border control, voting, or access to many online services or even contactless payments. Moreover, technical features including personal digital signature, biometric information, chip, secure encryption key or centralised data storage also recurred throughout the responses. Several citizens suggested ‘e-government functions’ that e-IDs could be useful for and with which they could be integrated (i.e. through creation of an ‘electronic personal file’), in aspects such as social security, healthcare, driving license, insurance. One respondent expressed willingness to ‘pay for the possibility to have a virtual version of my ID Card/e-Passport securely stored and accessible on my mobile to authenticate with higher assurance and trust to online services.’

Nevertheless, some respondents admitted they considered citizens should not pay more for such technical features, as they ‘allow the authorities to save money.’

While e-ID and the possibility to cross electronic border control gates would generally be welcomed by many respondents, some concerns about data protection and privacy were also raised. For instance, one of the respondents emphasised the necessity to ensure an opt-out possibility with regard to biometric data. Another citizen stated that ‘standardized procedures at European level should be enforced to ensure cards security mechanisms do pass checks according to stringent security certifications to avoid, e.g. ‘vulnerabilities in digital certificates present in large number of issued e-ID cards in a number of EU countries.’

5. Processes (applying, issuing etc.)

161 respondents felt that the price of issuing ID cards with additional security features should be borne by the national budget. 142 respondents indicated that these costs could be shared by the national budget and applicants, and only 15 respondents felt that all costs should be paid by the applicant.

129 respondents felt that ID card should cost citizens less than EUR 15, whereas 116 respondents felt that EUR 15-EUR 50 was fair. 74 respondents felt that an ID card should be free.

No further specific questions regarding the application and issuance procedures for ID cards or residence were asked in the public consultation.

A comment from a German citizen suggested an opt-out of the biometric chips, so citizens may choose themselves to keep the price of their ID card down. Other comments suggested to in the situation where a citizen loses his or hers ID card before the expiration date, he or she should borne the full costs of the replacing ID card.

Annex 3: Who is affected and how?

1. Practical implications of the initiative

The following stakeholders would be mainly affected by the initiative as set out in the preferred option (see section 8):

National administrations

Public administrations will have to administrate ID cards and residence documents according to the minimum format and security standards defined at EU level. 209

Adjustments to new production processes and staff training regarding ID and residence documents can build on existing regimes for passports and residence permits which already need to take into account of ICAO standards. In the long run, this could yield economies of scale in the production, issuance and handling of all these documents, if efforts to coordinate and collaborate to make savings are successful.

Phasing out ID cards and residence cards for the family members of EU citizens will be in line with the natural replacement rate of the documents in most Member States. The shorter five-years phasing-out regime for ID cards will impact only 3 Member States. Fourteen countries are affected by the quicker phasing out of non-compliant TCN FAM permanent residence cards. 210 This does not affect very many citizens because only few such documents are issued. 211

Public administrations, in particular border guards, will benefit from the harmonisation of ID and residence cards, because verification of cards and documents issued by other Member States will be facilitated. It will reduce the need for training of the officials involved, reduce the staff resource needed to handle the same number of IDs by permitting authentication to be performed more quickly and reliably, and also increase the trust in those documents, which will be more difficult to misuse.

EU citizens and their family members

EU citizens and their family members will have to obtain new ID and residence documents. For most, the issuance of a new document will be according to the usual renewal period and will not require early or additional action.

Some EU citizens may have to request new ID cards before their normal expiry date, namely in FR, IT and EL. This will also apply to a number of senior citizens in a limited number of Member States 212 whose ID cards have currently very long validity or no expiry date at all.

In return, all EU citizens will benefit from having their ID cards accepted more easily throughout the EU by public administration and business, as those cards will be easier to verify and more trusted because of their increased security features. They will also benefit from more robust residence documents, whose acceptance will also be improved.

As for third country family members of EU citizens, only those already holding permanent residence cards in 18 Member States would have to renew their card before the normal validity period of ten years expires. In return they will benefit from greater certainty in the use of their cards, notably when travelling and benefitting from using this documents as visa waivers.

2. Summary of costs and benefits

* See CSES study

* Whether the quantified cost to the administrations will be passed to individuals and the levels of potential additional support to implementation provided is not known at this stage.

# 7 Member States produce ID cards that do not require any changes regarding format and features. The other 19 MS that issue ID cards will need to upgrade their cards (depending on the MS from adding biographical data to switching to plastic cards or adding chips and biometric data). The costs of each of these upgrade steps are unknown, as MS do not share these data.

+ Insufficient data was provided by national authorities to permit assessment of costs of this element.

X Calculation method of phasing out costs presented in Annex 4.

XX Figures drawn from estimates in CSES study. More details presented in Annex 4.

Annex 4: Analytical methods

1. Calculation of phasing out costs for ID cards and TCN FAM residence documents

Phasing out costs for ID cards in France, Greece and Italy

The phasing out regime for EL, FR and IT will require that their ID cards are phased out within five years. Since it can be assumed that half of the IT population holds modern ICAO compliant ID cards, only the other 50% of the IT ID card holders would be affected by the phasing out. 213

It is assumed that the population to which the phasing out regime in EL, FR and IT is mostly relevant is the group of persons above the age of 15. This is under the assumption that this is the usual part of the population carrying an ID card for travel and other purposes. Moreover, ID cards in EL are mandatory from the age of 12. In FR and IT ID cards are not mandatory at all.

Due to the different validity regimes the phasing out has a different impact. In EL and FR two thirds of the ID cards would need to be phased out prematurely, in IT 50% of them.

The few figures received through the external study 214 indicate that the production cost of plastic cards in the individual countries may range from EUR 5 in Slovakia to EUR 23 in Germany. The average costs of a new plastic ID card is therefore estimated EUR 12. The compliance cost of a premature upgrade of French, Greek and Italian ID cards is therefore estimated to be at most EUR 666 million (one-off over five years).

Table 1: Calculation of phasing out costs for EL, FR, IT

Phasing out costs for senior citizen ID cards

BE, BG, CZ, ES, HU, RO, SK, SI must phase out cards that are non-compliant with the preferred option within 10 years. Since they produce cards with longer validity for senior citizens (see Annex 5 Table 2.2), these cards will need to be phased out earlier than foreseen which will have a financial impact.

This will concern a very limited part of the population, as if we count the deadline for adoption of the Regulation (2 years), finalisation of the standards by a committee (1 year) and the 10 years phasing out, only seniors above 68 (RO), 71 (for BG), 73 (SK), 78 (HU), 83 (CZ, ES and SI) and 88 (BE) will be affected in the respective Member States.

Assuming that all persons above the indicated ages held cards needing renewal, again using the average cost of EUR 12 per plastic card produced (see above), the compliance costs to phase out senior citizens' cards would thus be at most EUR 111.9 million (one-off over 10 years).

Table 2: Calculation of phasing out costs for senior citizen ID cards

"*": based upon EUROSTAT 2016 figures

Phasing out costs for TCN FAM permanent residence cards

For TCN FAM cards under the preferred option, phasing out within five years will be required when the TCN FAM cards are currently not based upon the uniform format for residence permits. This phasing out within five years will create no additional financial impacts for the phasing out of TCN family member residence cards because their validity is always five years and they will be therefore naturally be replaced in five years.

Phasing out TCN FAM permanent residence cards within five years requires additional costs in at least 14 countries (AT, BG, CY, CZ, DK, ES, FI, HR, HU, IT, LU, PL, SI and UK). If they are valid for 10 years, we assume that half will need to be phased out early. If their validity is unlimited we can assume that they all need to be replaced.

Very few countries delivered figures about production cost of such cards (from EUR 5.63 in CZ to EUR 15.40 in BE). 215 It is therefore assumed that a state-of-the-art plastic card with security features will cost as much as for ID cards (average EUR 12). The overall phasing out costs for TCN FAM cards are therefore estimated to be at most EUR 3.1 million over five years (one-off).

Table 3: Calculation of phasing out costs for TCN FAM permanent residence cards

Cost implications if the phasing out is accelerated

To speed up the security gains to be provided by the improved documents the phasing out of documents that are non-compliant with the preferred option can be accelerated.

If the phasing out period was for instance cut in half (2-3 years for the least secure documents and 5 years for the other non-compliant documents) the (one-off) phasing out cost would not only double but almost triple both for ID cards and TCN FAM cards.

For ID cards more countries would be affected by the phasing out regime. In addition to the ID cards in EL, FR and IT, and the senior citizen ID cards in BE, BG, CZ, ES, HU, RO, SI and SK, a substantial number of ID cards would need to be phased out in AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, ES, HU, LU, MT, PL, RO, SI, SK.

Regarding TCN FAM cards, under a similarly accelerated phasing out regime, the phasing out would also create additional financial impacts for more countries. Furthermore it would also affect TCN FAM residence cards and not only TCN FAM permanent residence cards because non-compliant TCN FAM residence cards would usually not be naturally replaced within the requested phasing out period.

2. Annual costs for non-legislative measures across the EU

As set out in section 5 the soft law measures under ID SOFT), RES SOFT) and PROCESS SOFT) are non-binding and can be adapted to the needs of the individual Member State.

We therefore only provide examples of how much such activities will cost. 217

a) Awareness raising

Each Member State could invest in awareness-raising activities at the national and local level (EUR 80-90 000). EU funding could be used for this.

b) Reinforce SOLVIT

SOLVIT could be used to coordinate the awareness-raising campaign: one additional FTE might be needed to coordinate the action in each country. The costs would be lower in some Member States and higher in others. The average salary for the additional FTE is based upon a grade 5 Commission official’s cost of employment.

c) Enhanced administrative cooperation

This would be best achieved through a dedicated group on document security (drawing on the expertise of the 'Article 6' Committee).

It is assumed that there would be one or two officials fulfilling this role per Member State and that issues would be discussed by experts of the Article 6 Committee. In this way no additional costs would arise apart from the expenses for the participation of two more experts. It should be noted that additional activities might need to be undertaken by officials apart from simply attending the meetings (e.g. preparation for the meeting and follow-up actions after the meeting). However, these costs are not accounted for in the following estimate as they would not necessarily lead to specific additional costs since they would form part of the routine function of the official.

d) EU wide training

The key target group would be national authorities, especially border control officials. FRONTEX could be responsible for coordinating this measure. FRONTEX already provides training for border control officials on document security. More training sessions than currently are provided would take place. It should be noted that the costs for a training courses and road shows have been based on information from FRONTEX based on its experience in carrying out such workshops. Furthermore, the e-learning course does not involve any extra-costs as it has already been developed by FRONTEX.