JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

4 February 2026 (*)

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark WelMedis – Earlier international registration in respect of the figurative mark médis – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑142/25,

Médis - Companhia portuguesa de seguros de saúde, S. A., established in Lisbon (Portugal), represented by M. Martinho do Rosário, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

RGCC Holdings AG, established in Zug (Switzerland), represented by P. Campolini, V. Van der Wangen and C. Jonckheere, lawyers,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of N. Półtorak, President, J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares and I. Dimitrakopoulos (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Médis – Companhia portuguesa de seguros de saúde, S. A., seeks, in essence, annulment and alteration of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 December 2024 (Case R 1017/2024-2) (‘the contested decision’).

 Background to the dispute

2        On 3 May 2022, the intervener, RGCC Holdings AG, filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO, with a Swiss priority date of 17 December 2021, for the following figurative sign:

3        The mark applied for designated goods and services in Classes 3 and 44 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 3: ‘Soaps; Perfumery; Essential oils; Cosmetics; Hair lotions’;

–        Class 44: ‘Hygienic and beauty care; Beauty salon services; Consultancy in the field of body and beauty care’.

4        On 2 August 2022, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5        The opposition was based on the earlier international registration No 597679 of the following figurative mark:

6        The earlier international registration covered goods and services in, inter alia, Classes 5, 41 and 44 corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 5: ‘Pharmaceutical and veterinary products, hygienic products for medical purposes; dietetic substances for medical purposes; food for babies; plasters; materials for dressings; teeth filling material; dental impression materials; disinfectants’;

–        Class 41: ‘Education, training, entertainment, sporting and cultural activities relating to health and well-being’;

–        Class 44: ‘Health care, including the services of doctors, hospitals and other health care providers’.

7        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

8        On 19 March 2024, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, finding that the similarity between the goods and services in question was not sufficient to outweigh the differences between the signs at issue and that, therefore, the relevant public would be able to distinguish between the mark applied for and the earlier mark with certainty.

9        On 15 May 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Opposition Division.

10      By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, upholding the Opposition Division’s decision, dismissed the appeal under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion in the present case in the light of the very low degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue, their below-average degree of phonetic similarity and their low degree of conceptual similarity, as well as the lack of identity between the goods and services in question.

 Forms of order sought

11      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision and reject the application for the mark applied for;

–        order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.

12      EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

13      The intervener contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the application;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

14      The applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, which plea is divided, in essence, into three complaints concerning, first, the assessment of the distinctive character of the term ‘médis’; secondly, the assessment of the visual and phonetic similarity of the signs at issue; and, thirdly, the impact on the present case of earlier decisions of EUIPO, of the Portuguese courts, and of the Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial (INPI, National Institute of Industrial Property, Portugal).

15      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for is not to be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

16      The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).

17      For the purposes of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

18      According to the case-law, two marks are similar where, from the point of view of the relevant public, they are at least partially identical as regards one or more relevant aspects, namely the visual, phonetic and conceptual aspects (see judgment of 17 February 2011, Annco v OHIM – Freche et fils (ANN TAYLOR LOFT), T‑385/09, EU:T:2011:49, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

19      Furthermore, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, must be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

20      Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).

21      In the present case, the Board of Appeal noted that, in its view, (i) the earlier mark as a whole was distinctive to an average degree; (ii) the element of similarity between the signs at issue possessed a weak inherent distinctive character and would therefore have a low impact on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion; (iii) the mark applied for would not be perceived as a variant of the earlier mark on account of their difference; (iv) those signs possessed very low visual similarity, below-average phonetic similarity and low conceptual similarity; and (v) the goods and services in question were similar and not identical. Accordingly, it found that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue for the relevant public, which has an average to high level of attention, in Portugal.

22      In that connection, it should be noted, in the first place, that the parties do not dispute certain of the findings made by the Board of Appeal, namely those drawn from the explanations given by the Opposition Division concerning the comparison of the goods and services in question, according to which (i) soaps and cosmetics in Class 3 are similar to disinfectants in Class 5, as hair lotions in Class 3 are similar to hygienic products for medical purposes in Class 5, hygienic and beauty care and beauty salon services in Class 44 are similar to health care, including the services of doctors, hospitals and other health care providers in the latter class, or consultancy in the field of body and beauty care, also in Class 44, is similar to health care, including the services of doctors, hospitals and other health care providers in the same class; (ii) essential oils in Class 3 are similar to a low degree to disinfectants in Class 5; and (iii) perfumery in Class 3 is dissimilar to the goods and services covered by the earlier mark. There is nothing, moreover, in the file before the Court that calls those findings into question.

23      In the second place, the Board of Appeal’s findings that the relevant territory is Portugal and the relevant public consists in the general public and professionals in the medical or beauty sector, since, in relation to health-related goods and services and services which affect appearance, that public displays an increased level of attention and, in relation to the goods in Class 3, that public has an average level of attention, are also not disputed. There is nothing, moreover, in the file before the Court that calls those findings into question.

24      In the third place, as regards the comparison of the signs at issue, the parties have not called into question the Board of Appeal’s findings that, conceptually, those signs display a low degree of similarity in that they coincide in a weak element. There is nothing, moreover, in the file before the Court that calls those findings into question.

 The first complaint, alleging incorrect assessment of the distinctive character of the term ‘médis’

25      The Board of Appeal found that the part ‘méd’ or ‘médi’ of the earlier mark referred to medicine (‘medicina’ in Portuguese). Furthermore, it noted that the applicant had acknowledged that the sign ‘médis’ evoked something related to ‘medicine’ or the ‘medical’ field and that the term ‘med’ was often used in trade marks in the field of medicine and health. Accordingly, it found that the term ‘médis’ had a low degree of distinctiveness in respect of the goods and services covered by the earlier mark related to health care, namely hygienic products for medical purposes, disinfectants, health care, including the services of doctors, hospitals and other providers in that field. The Board of Appeal also found that the same applied to the part ‘med’ or ‘medi’ in the mark applied for, in relation to the goods and services found to be identical or similar to those covered by the earlier mark, namely soaps, essential oils, cosmetics, hair lotions, hygienic and beauty care, beauty salon services, consultancy in the field of body and beauty care, taking into account, inter alia, the growing interest and offer in dermatologist-approved skincare products or cosmeceuticals.

26      In its analysis of the distinctive character of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal also found that the term ‘médis’ was not particularly distinctive in so far as it referred to the medical nature or scope of application of the goods and services in question even though, overall, that mark was distinctive to an average degree. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to prove that the mark had a reputation or enhanced distinctiveness for the relevant goods and services.

27      The applicant takes the view that the Board of Appeal should not have disregarded the importance of the total reproduction of the term ‘médis’ making up the earlier mark in the mark applied for. According to the applicant, while the terms ‘med’ and ‘medi’ can evoke goods or services related to the medical field or medicine depending on their place in a mark, that is not so in the present case and they will not be perceived by consumers as autonomous elements within the earlier mark. In addition, the letter ‘s’ of the term ‘médis’ creates a fanciful word with a distinctive character that cannot be neglected. On that basis, the applicant argues that, since ‘médis’ has an inherent distinctive character and is not equivalent to the terms ‘méd’ or ‘médi’, which do not have that distinctive character, the comparison between the signs at issue and the global assessment of whether there is a likelihood of confusion must therefore reflect that fact.

28      EUIPO and the intervener dispute those arguments.

29      First of all, it should be noted that, in paragraph 25 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the part ‘méd’ or ‘médi’ of the earlier mark referred to medicine and that the applicant had accepted that the term ‘médis’ evoked something related to ‘medicine’ or the ‘medical’ field. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal found that that term had a low degree of distinctiveness for the goods and services related to health care covered by the earlier mark. In the same way, in paragraph 32 of that decision, it also stated, in the context of the examination of the distinctive character of the earlier mark and without being expressly contradicted by the applicant, that the word element of that mark was not particularly distinctive inasmuch as it referred to the medical nature or scope of application of the goods and services in question.

30      Thus, even though the Board of Appeal indicated, in paragraph 26 of the contested decision, that the part ‘méd’ or ‘médi’ of the earlier mark referred to medicine, the applicant’s arguments that, in essence, the Board of Appeal failed to take the term ‘médis’ into consideration in its entirety are unfounded.

31      Furthermore, it should be recalled that, for the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of an element of a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods and services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods and services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, it is necessary to take into account, in particular, the inherent characteristics of that element and to ask whether it is at all descriptive of the goods and services for which the mark has been registered (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 September 2010, Companhia Muller de Bebidas v OHIM – Missiato Industria e Comercio (61 A NOSSA ALEGRIA), T‑472/08, EU:T:2010:347, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

32      The allusive character of an element composing a mark, like the descriptive or laudatory character of such an element, is capable of affecting its inherent distinctive character. The ability aimed at enabling the consumer to distinguish immediately and with certainty the goods and services covered by a mark, in so far as it contains that element, from the goods and services of other undertakings, is reduced in all the abovementioned situations (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 May 2019, Dentsply De Trey v EUIPO – IDS (AQUAPRINT), T‑312/18, not published, EU:T:2019:358, paragraph 50).

33      In the present case, the Board of Appeal rightly found that the Portuguese term ‘medicina’ meant ‘medicine’. As the applicant acknowledged in its application, the term ‘med’ may, in itself, evoke goods and services related to the medical field (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 9 December 2020, Promed v EUIPO – Centrumelektroniki (Promed), T‑30/20, not published, EU:T:2020:599, paragraph 51), as does the term ‘medi’ (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 2 April 2025, Paul Hartmann v EUIPO – Medisept (MEDISET), T‑429/24, not published, EU:T:2025:355, paragraph 31).

34      The applicant has merely argued that the term ‘médis’ was fanciful on account of the presence of the letter ‘s’ without, however, disputing the Board of Appeal’s finding that that term referred to the medical field or the scope of application of the goods and services in question. The applicant has failed to explain in a specific and substantiated manner how the addition of that letter ‘s’ would affect the degree of distinctive character of that term or the meaning that the relevant public would attribute to it.

35      Consequently, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 31 and 32 above, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment in concluding that the term ‘médis’ had a low degree of distinctiveness in the present case.

 The second complaint, alleging errors of assessment in the visual and phonetic comparison of the signs at issue

36      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, must be based on the overall impression given by those signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

37      As recalled in paragraph 20 above, assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components. It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraphs 41 and 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 24 October 2019, ZPC Flis v EUIPO – Aldi Einkauf (Happy Moreno choco), T‑498/18, EU:T:2019:763, paragraph 71).

38      Furthermore, the fact that one of the words making up a word mark is descriptive or allusive does not, in itself, allow the conclusion to be drawn that that word is insignificant in the overall impression produced by that mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2014, Oracle America v OHIM – Aava Mobile (AAVA CORE), T‑618/13, not published, EU:T:2014:1053, paragraph 33).

39      In the present case, it should be noted that, first, the applicant did not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding that the figurative elements of the mark applied for and the earlier mark and their word element, namely ‘médis’, in relation to the latter, and ‘welmedis’, in relation to the former, are co-dominant.

40      Secondly, as the Board of Appeal correctly observed, it should be noted that the mark applied for and the earlier mark are both figurative. The latter is represented by the word element ‘médis’, written in lower case and in dark blue over which, above the first letters, there is a figurative element made up of two blue and green half-discs, the colours of which are gradated and in which a white shape appears. As to the mark applied for, it is represented by a word element ‘welmedis’, in grey, with the letters ‘w’ and ‘m’ in upper-case letters, above which, spanning the letters ‘l’ to ‘e’, are two hexagons, one grey and the other light blue, interlinked with each other.

41      It is in the light of those considerations that the visual and phonetic comparison of the signs at issue should be examined.

 Visual comparison

42      The Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were visually similar to a very low degree in so far as they had a different overall image and composition. According to the Board of Appeal, the signs differed in their length and their figurative elements. In the first place, as regards their length, the Board of Appeal noted that the word element of the earlier mark consisted of five letters compared with eight letters for the mark applied for. Furthermore, it observed that the term ‘wel’, making up the word element of the mark applied for, was placed at the beginning of that mark and, therefore, it would in principle attract the attention of the public. In the second place, as regards the figurative elements, it noted that they were very different in those signs and that they played a role in the overall impression conveyed. According to the Board of Appeal, those figurative elements differed in their stylisation, their structure and the colour combination used. Nevertheless, it found that those differences were not sufficient to exclude any visual similarity between the signs in question on account of the coincidence of the letters ‘m’, ‘e’, ‘d’ and ‘i’ in both the word element of the mark applied for and the word element of the earlier mark.

43      The applicant submits that, visually, the figurative elements of the signs at issue, which do not prevail over their word elements, have some differences, but share the same blue colour scheme. It also notes that the term ‘médis’ is reproduced in full in the mark applied for. Thus, it considers that those signs are highly similar from a visual point of view.

44      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

45      In the present case, as is argued by the applicant and as is apparent from paragraph 40 above, it must be observed that the term ‘médis’ constitutes the word element of the earlier mark and that the term ‘medis’, which differs from the term ‘médis’ only in the acute accent on the letter ‘e’, constitutes the final part of the word element of the mark applied for. Thus, inasmuch as the earlier mark is completely contained in the mark applied for, the difference related to the term ‘wel’ at the beginning of the word element of the mark applied for is not sufficiently important to cancel out any similarity arising from the coincidence of the letter combination ‘medis’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 October 2015, Bonney v OHIM – Bruno (ATHEIST), T‑714/14, not published, EU:T:2015:802, paragraph 31).

46      However, as the Board of Appeal states in paragraph 29 of the contested decision, the signs at issue differ visually, first, in the length of their word element, namely ‘medis’, a term consisting of five letters, as regards the earlier mark, and ‘welmedis’, a term consisting of eight letters, as regards the mark applied for, and, secondly, in their figurative elements. Their stylisation and their structure are different as are, to a lesser extent, their respective colour combinations, of which blue forms part, as is clear from paragraph 40 above.

47      Consequently, the Board of Appeal was right to find that the signs at issue were visually similar to a very low degree.

 Phonetic comparison

48      The Board of Appeal found that the phonetic similarity between the signs at issue was below average. According to the Board of Appeal, the mark applied for was pronounced ‘wel-me-dis’, whereas the earlier sign was pronounced ‘me-dis’, their number of syllables differed and the phonetic differences lay at the beginning of the marks. It also found that the coincidence of the ‘me-dis’ pronunciation of the marks had only a limited impact in that the letter combination ‘medi’ was ‘weak’ for the goods and services in question which were found to be identical or similar.

49      The applicant claims that consumers will more easily refer to the marks at issue by their word elements, which coincide in the full reproduction of the term ‘médis’, the sole word element of the earlier mark, in the mark applied for. Furthermore, as regards the mark applied for, the applicant submits that that term is easily perceived and separated from the term ‘wel’, because it is longer and more relevant than ‘wel’. Thus, the applicant takes the view that the signs at issue are highly phonetically similar and that consumers will assume that the goods and services in question in the mark applied for have the same commercial origin as those covered by the earlier mark.

50      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

51      First of all, it should be noted, as the Board of Appeal stated in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, that the pronunciation of the mark applied for includes the full and nearly identical pronunciation of the earlier mark, namely ‘me-dis’, which gives rise to a certain phonetic similarity between the signs at issue.

52      Nevertheless, the term ‘wel’ at the beginning of the word element of the mark applied for leads to a clearly perceptible difference in sound between the signs at issue.

53      Furthermore, the fact that the number of syllables of the word elements of the signs at issue differs and that the term ‘wel’ is not pronounced in the earlier mark gives rise, in the present case, to a considerable difference in pronunciation of those signs phonetically.

54      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was right to find that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a below-average degree.

 The third complaint, regarding the impact of earlier decisions of EUIPO, the Portuguese courts, and the INPI

55      The Board of Appeal noted that in an earlier decision, Mediswiss v medis of 14 February 2019 (R 879/2018-1), the First Board of Appeal had found that the Portuguese mark MÉDIS enjoyed a very strong reputation in Portugal for health insurance services. However, according to the Board of Appeal, that finding had no impact on the present case in that the services concerned in that case which gave rise to that decision were dissimilar to all the goods and services in question. Moreover, it found that the earlier decisions on which the applicant relied before it were not applicable to the present case in that, first, the weak character of the word element ‘medis’ had not been considered in those decisions and judgments, secondly, the earlier marks involved in the cases which gave rise to those decisions were not identical to the earlier mark in the present case, and thirdly, the reputation of the earlier mark for health insurance services had been taken into account.

56      The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal was wrong not to take into account the various decisions referred to in the Opposition Division’s decision, concerning the term ‘médis’ and reflecting the point of view of several examiners from EUIPO, the Portuguese courts and the INPI. The applicant claims that, even though EUIPO is not bound by its own previous decisions or by those delivered by national courts, it cannot disregard them inasmuch as they concern the reproduction of that term. Thus, the applicant takes the view that, as EUIPO found in one of its earlier decisions that there was a likelihood of confusion between two marks coinciding in that term, it should, a fortiori, have refused the application for registration of the mark applied for in the present case in so far as the perception of the term in question is even clearer between that mark and the earlier mark. Furthermore, it observes that EUIPO has already considered that, where two marks share the element ‘medis’ which makes up the entire word element of one of the marks in question and is clearly perceptible in the other, there is a likelihood of confusion between those marks.

57      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

58      First of all, it should be recalled that for reasons of legal certainty and, indeed, of sound administration, the examination of any trade mark application must be undertaken in each individual case. The registration of a sign as a mark depends on specific criteria, which are applicable in the factual circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of which is to ascertain whether the sign in question is caught by a ground for refusal (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2011, Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

59      Furthermore, the decisions concerning registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which the Boards of Appeal are called on to take under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the registrability of a sign as an EU trade mark must be assessed only on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 September 2005, BioID v OHIM, C‑37/03 P, EU:C:2005:547, paragraph 47).

60      It follows that EUIPO’s earlier decisions concerning the registration of a trade mark cannot give rise to legitimate expectations (see judgment of 9 November 2016, Smarter Travel Media v EUIPO (SMARTER TRAVEL), T‑290/15, not published, EU:T:2016:651, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

61      In the present case, in paragraphs 37 and 41 of the contested decision, as is clear from paragraph 55 above, the Board of Appeal set out the reasons why some of EUIPO’s earlier decisions, on which the applicant relied in so far as they had in common the fact that they concerned the reproduction of the term ‘médis’, did not apply in the present case, namely that, first, the ‘weak’ character of that term had not been taken into consideration in those decisions, and, secondly, the figurative marks concerned were not the same as those in the present case. The Board of Appeal also stated that even if an enhanced distinctiveness had been recognised, in an earlier decision, in respect of health insurance services, that had no impact on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, given that the opposition considered in the present case was not based on those services and given that health insurance services were dissimilar to the goods and services in question. Lastly, it stated that the reputation of the earlier mark for health insurance services had also been taken into account. In addition, it follows from the foregoing and from paragraphs 35, 47 and 54 above that the Board of Appeal, after carrying out a full and specific examination of the mark applied for, correctly concluded that the term ‘médis’ had weak distinctive character in the present case, that the signs at issue were visually similar to a very low degree and that those signs were phonetically similar to a below-average degree.

62      Accordingly, the applicant cannot usefully rely, for the purposes of invalidating the Board of Appeal’s findings, on the earlier decisions of EUIPO, the Portuguese courts or the INPI.

63      Lastly, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to put forward any specific argument disputing the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion carried out by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision. It put forward arguments, examined in the context of the present plea, in relation to the visual and phonetic comparison of the signs at issue and concerning the weak distinctive character of the term ‘médis’, in which the marks at issue coincide. In that regard, it should be observed, as the Board of Appeal did in paragraph 38 of that decision, that where the elements of similarity between two signs arise from the fact that they share a component which has a weak inherent distinctive character, the impact of such elements of similarity on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion is itself low (judgment of 13 September 2023, Korres v EUIPO – Naos (EST. KORRES 1996 HYDRA-BIOME), T‑328/22, not published, EU:T:2023:533, paragraph 97).

64      Furthermore, the applicant has not disputed the definition of the relevant public, the level of attention of that public, the comparison of the goods and services in question and other factors relevant to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

65      Thus, it must be held that the applicant is wrong to claim that there is a likelihood of confusion in the present case.

66      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, since the single plea in law relied on by the applicant in support of its claims cannot be upheld, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

67      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

68      In the present case, although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened. Since no hearing was convened, it is appropriate to order EUIPO to bear its own costs.

69      Since the intervener has claimed that the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs relating to the proceedings before the Court, the applicant must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the intervener in the present action.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Médis – Companhia portuguesa de seguros de saúde, S. A. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by RGCC Holdings AG;

3.      Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 February 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.