(1)

On 19 December 2025, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of sodium benzoate originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’ or ‘the country concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2)

The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 10 November 2025 by Lanxess Chemical B.V. (‘the complainant’ or ‘Lanxess‘). The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of sodium benzoate in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

(3)

The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/366 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’).

(4)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed for example the complainant, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the Government of China (‘GOC’), known importers, users, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

(5)

Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

(6)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(7)

To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked the Union producers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(8)

Out of the two known Union producers, only one company came forward, namely Lanxess. It was therefore decided that sampling is not necessary and this producer accounting for more than 60 % of the total Union production was considered to represent a major proportion within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation thus constituting the Union industry.

(9)

To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(10)

Only one unrelated importer, namely Falken Trade Sp. z o.o, provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. Hence, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary.

(11)

To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(12)

Three exporting producers in the country concerned provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of two exporting producers, on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned, and the authorities of the country concerned were consulted on the selection of the sample (4). No comments were received on the selection of the sample.

(13)

The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’).

(14)

Furthermore, the complainant provided in the complaint sufficient prima facie evidence of raw material distortions in the People’s Republic of China regarding the product concerned. Therefore, as announced in the Notice of Initiation, the investigation covered those raw material distortions to determine whether to apply the provisions of Article 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation with regard to the People’s Republic of China. For this reason, the Commission sent additional questionnaires in this regard to the GOC.

(15)

The Commission also sent questionnaires to the Union producers and to importers and made questionnaires available to the sampled exporting producers in the PRC. Other questionnaires, such as questionnaires for Union users, were made available online (5) on the day of initiation.

(16)

The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for a provisional determination of dumping, resulting injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

(17)

The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2022 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(18)

The product under investigation is sodium benzoate, usually falling under the Customs and Statistics (‘CUS’) number 0023120-9 and the Chemical Abstracts Service (‘CAS’) number 532-32-1, currently classified under ex CN code 2916 31 00 (TARIC code 2916 31 00 91) (‘the product under investigation’).

(19)

Sodium benzoate – in granular or powder form – is used in a wide range of applications, primarily due to its antimicrobial properties and high level of water solubility. Such applications include: personal care, food, beverages, pharmaceuticals, home care or animal nutrition products.

(20)

The product concerned is the product under investigation originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the product concerned’).

(21)

The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

(22)

The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(23)

In view of the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation pointing to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation with regard to the PRC, the Commission considered it appropriate to initiate the investigation with regard to the exporting producers from this country having regard to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(24)

Consequently, to collect the necessary data for the eventual application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, in the Notice of Initiation the Commission invited all exporting producers in the PRC to provide information regarding the inputs used for producing sodium benzoate. Two exporting producers submitted the relevant information.

(25)

To obtain information it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(26)

No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in the PRC.

(27)

In point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it had provisionally selected Türkiye as an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The Commission further stated that it would examine other possibly appropriate representative countries in accordance with the criteria set out in 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

(28)

The Commission issued two notes for the file to inform interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value: the first note on the production factors of 10 February 2026 (hereinafter the ‘First Note’) and the second note on the production factors of 1 April 2026 (hereinafter the ‘Second Note’).

(29)

In these notes, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of the product concerned. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified two possible representative countries, namely Argentina and Türkiye.

(30)

In the First Note, while it could not find financial data pertaining to producers of sodium benzoate, the Commission identified readily available financial statements for eleven producers in Türkiye active in the sector of manufacturing of organic chemicals, falling under NACE code 2014. The Commission could not find readily available financial data from producers in Argentina. Thus, the Commission considered that Türkiye would be an appropriate representative country, while inviting all parties to comment upon the proposal and to put forward alternative countries fulfilling the basic criteria under Article 2(6a)(a) first indent.

(31)

In the second Note and in the absence of alternative representative countries put forward by any interested party, the Commission proposed to establish selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A costs’) and profits based on the eleven producers in Türkiye active in the sector of manufacturing of other organic basic chemicals, falling under NACE code 2014 (6).

(32)

These Notes also addressed the comments received by the interested parties on these elements and on the relevant sources. The comments provided by the parties are also addressed in the following sections.

(33)

According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

(34)

However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined … that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is referred hereinafter as ‘SG&A costs’).

(35)

As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

(36)

Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation states that ‘significant distortions are those distortions which occur when reported prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials and energy, are not the result of free market forces as they are affected by substantial government intervention. In assessing the existence of significant distortions regard shall be had, inter alia, to the potential impact of one or more of the following elements:

(37)

As the list in Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation is non-cumulative, not all the elements need to be given for a finding of significant distortions. Moreover, the same factual circumstances may be used to demonstrate the existence of one or more of the elements of the list.

(38)

However, any conclusion on significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation must be made on the basis of all the evidence at hand. The overall assessment on the existence of distortions may also take into account the general context and situation in the exporting country, in particular where the fundamental elements of the exporting country’s economic and administrative set-up provide the government with substantial powers to intervene in the economy in such a way that prices and costs are not the result of the free development of market forces.

(39)

Article 2(6a)(c) of the basic Regulation provides that ‘[w]here the Commission has well-founded indications of the possible existence of significant distortions as referred to in point (b) in a certain country or a certain sector in that country, and where appropriate for the effective application of this Regulation, the Commission shall produce, make public and regularly update a report describing the market circumstances referred to in point (b) in that country or sector’.

(40)

Pursuant to this provision, the Commission issued a country report concerning China (‘the Report’) (7), which contains evidence of the existence of substantial government intervention at many levels of the economy, including specific distortions in many key factors of production (such as land, energy, capital, raw materials and labour) as well as selected sectors (such as chemical). Interested parties were invited to rebut, comment or supplement the evidence contained in the investigation file at the time of initiation. The Report concerning China was placed in the investigation file at the initiation stage. The complaint also contained some relevant evidence complementing the Report.

(41)

The complainant relied on the evidence contained in the Report to indicate that there are distortions in the Chinese sodium benzoate industry. These distortions stem from the organization of the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’), which is based on the concept of social market economy that is developed under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) and covers all essential aspects of the State. According to the complaint, at the economic level, the CCP exercises a particularly tight control, which is translated into the high importance of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’) in the economy and the CCP’s strong leverage over the private sector. The complainant pointed to three main channels of intervention by the GOC in the Chinese economy: administrative, financial and regulatory control of the State (8).

(42)

The complainant also referred to Commission findings in several recent investigations concerning the chemical sector in China, which confirmed the existence of significant distortions (9).

(43)

Moreover, the complaint recalled the following elements resulting in significant distortions.

(44)

First, the sodium benzoate sector is being served to a significant extent by enterprises that operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of state authorities.

(45)

The complainant argues that the GOC ensures a strong influence over both SOEs and private-owned companies, especially in encouraged industries like the chemical sector which encompasses sodium benzoate. The GOC and CCP exercise control over SOEs and shape their corporate structure and competitive landscape in order to achieve strategic economic goals, notably, by the appointing and controlling key executives through the CCP Organization Department, and by providing SOEs with preferential access to important inputs (10).

(46)

Moreover, at both national and local level, the GOC established the State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commissions (‘SASAC’) intending to represent the State’s shareholder interests in SOEs. In addition, the GOC adopted a Law on State-owned Assets of Enterprise among other measures mandating State control and ownership over strategic industries. Additionally, the complaint states that the ‘Social Credit System’ reinforces the Party’s influence over enterprises in China and threatens to pressure foreign companies to comply with relevant Chinese industrial policies. The complainant further argues that with the 14th Five-Year-Plan (‘FYP’), the GOC targets to uphold socialist policies and to bolster economic growth. With respect to SOEs, the FYP aims at building a stronger connection between the GOC and SOEs (11).

(47)

According to the complaint, in the industry of toluene (12) derivatives in particular, a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC continues to persist. SOEs have played a central role in facilitating the GOC’s intervention in the PRC’s chemical sector. These SOEs maintain a dominant position in the upstream feedstock supply chain, benefiting from privileged access to government-allocated resources, including financing, subsidies, land use rights, and other forms of state support. Moreover, their close alignment with state policy and significant influence over government decision-making processes further consolidate their strategic position within the industry (13).

(48)

The complaint refers to at least three of the largest toluene producers globally which are all Chinese SOEs. The GOC regularly allocates financial resources to these companies which distorts the toluene and the sodium benzoate markets (14).

(49)

Privately owned companies also remain under close control of the GOC. The complainant relies on the example of privately owned companies producing sodium benzoate which were granted preferential corporate income tax rates, government grants or subsidies. The GOC’s involvement in the sodium benzoate market also includes the participation of CCP members in corporate governance structures (15).

(50)

Based on the foregoing, the complainant concludes that the Chinese sodium benzoate market is, to a significant extent, served by enterprises that are subject to GOC ownership, financial support, political control, or policy supervision and guidance.

(51)

Second, the state presence in both SOE’s and private sodium benzoate companies also allows the authorities to interfere with prices and/or costs.

(52)

According to the complaint, the GOC preserves its influence in SOEs through the appointment and removal of key management personnel in SOEs, which is the main responsibility of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). It also does so by heavily influencing the production of critical raw materials to produce sodium benzoate, notably toluene and sodium hydroxide (16).

(53)

One of the main strategies of the GOC to maintain control over SOEs is the appointment of personnel management, often members of the CCP. The Chinese SOE Law clearly establishes that SASAC and local SASACs have the power of appointing the management of SOEs. Additionally, the SASAC Regulation confirms that one of its duties is to ‘appoint or remove the responsible persons’ of SOEs. The complainant relies on the Commission’s findings in the Report, to argue that this is a ‘sign of significant State influence considering the scale of SOEs and the dominant role of the state-owned economy in China’. This strong influence is further reinforced by the fact that the CCP is directly involved in the appointment of SOE managers and has the right to set the relevant procedures and recommend specific candidates for the positions (17).

(54)

Additionally, SOEs in China benefit from preferential access to a wide variety of inputs like land and energy, but also to financing systems. The strong State intervention within companies results therefore in a distorted allocation of resources, which is then translated into distorted costs and distorted prices for the products manufactured. Moreover, the GOC influences costs and prices of chemical products like sodium benzoate through its presence and intervention in the upstream sectors of raw materials and inputs necessary for its production. For instance, the strong production of toluene in the PRC is mainly due to the rapid investment and expansion in the sector, as well as the availability of both financing and raw materials. The overcapacities in the production of toluene resulted in bigger investments in the downstream industries, and particularly the one of sodium benzoate. Furthermore, the GOC interferes with respect to prices and costs of energy. Although the GOC has undertook some efforts to create competition in the market and allow prices to be set by market forces, it remains that energy prices are still strongly controlled. This circumstance unquestionably allows the GOC to significantly lower the costs of energy to the benefit of chemical producers, notably of toluene and sodium benzoate (18).

(55)

Third, the GOC particularly intervenes in the energy sector and the electricity market through subsidization of coal as the main source of energy for steam production. In addition, the electricity market is being served to a significant extent by enterprises operating under the Chinese authorities.

(56)

According to the complaint, through direct subsidies, preferential financing, and price controls, the GOC ensures that coal remains artificially cheap, benefiting industries that rely on it as a primary energy source. While coal is predominantly used for electricity generation, it is also essential for producing industrial steam, a critical input in chemical manufacturing and other energy-intensive processes. The GOC’s influence extends further through price controls. For instance, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has set a ‘reasonable range’ for medium- and long-term coal transaction prices between CNY 570 and 770 per tonne. Additionally, major state-owned miners such as China Shenhua Energy Co. and China Coal Energy Co. frequently sell coal at capped price, ensuring stable but artificially low costs for downstream industries (19).

(57)

Moreover, the complaint argues that beyond steam production, China’s subsidized coal sector also provides an unfair advantage to domestic industries through its impact on electricity supply and pricing. As of 2022, coal-fired power plants accounted for 60 % of China's electricity generation. The GOC’s role in the electricity market extends beyond fuel subsidies to direct ownership and pricing controls, creating a system where electricity costs are artificially suppressed. The electricity sector is dominated by SOEs. The extensive state control over electricity pricing and distribution results in substantial market distortions. The PRC’s model ensures artificially low electricity costs for industrial users. This intervention benefits energy-intensive sectors, particularly the chemical industry, where electricity is a significant component of production costs (20).

(58)

Fourth, the GOC pursues public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces.

(59)

The development of the Chinese economy is determined by an elaborate system of planning which sets out priorities and prescribes the goals that the central and local governments must focus on and strive to implement. These plans, which cover virtually all economic sectors, set specific mandatory objectives which are monitored by authorities at each administrative level. The planning mechanism guides the allocation of resources, which is geared towards sectors designated as strategic or politically important by the government, rather than being allocated according to market forces (21).

(60)

The GOC has consistently given a strong focus to the chemical industry in its different policy documents and has clearly shaped its measures to favour domestic chemical producers. For instance, the central 14th FYP lays out the strategic visions of the GOC for the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, and the development axis for strategic emerging industries, like the chemical, building material, new material, and chemical fiber industries. Additionally, in the 2024 version of the Guidance Catalogue for the Industrial Structure Adjustment, the chemical and petrochemical industry appears as an encouraged one. Having this status allows for this industry to generally benefit from numerous subsidies and financial support by way of public finance, taxation, credit, import and export, as well as land. The complainant concludes that the production and sales of the entire sodium benzoate chemistry value chain is actively controlled and regulated at the national and the provincial levels by the GOC (22).

(61)

Fifth, much like in any other sector in the Chinese economy, the sodium benzoate sector is subject to the distortions resulting from the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of Chinese bankruptcy, corporate and property rules. According to the complaint, the Chinese bankruptcy system delivers inadequately on its main objectives such as to fairly settle claims and debts, and to protect the rights of creditors and debtors. The Chinese Bankruptcy Law is systematically under-enforced and targets mainly small companies. The complainant relies on the Commission’s Report to support the low enforcement of Bankruptcy Law, notably due to the lack of clarity in the criteria to open the proceedings and their outcome, and to the strong influence of State authorities in bankruptcy procedures. Moreover, the under-enforcement of bankruptcy laws impacts the Chinese financial and borrowing market, amounting to grant implicit State guarantees to these companies, which in turn distorts the costs of credits and access to finance (23). Furthermore, regarding property laws, the deficiencies of the system of property rights are particularly clear regarding ownership of land and land-use rights in the PRC. Land allocation depends exclusively on the State, which may follow political goals rather than free market principles. While there are a number of laws that aim at allocating land use rights in a transparent manner and at market prices, the complainant argues that these provisions are frequently not respected (24). The complainant concludes that much like any other sector in the Chinese economy, producers of sodium benzoate are subject to the Chinese bankruptcy, corporate and property rules, and are therefore also subject to the distortions resulting from the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of these laws.

(62)

Sixth, wage costs are distorted in the sodium benzoate sector as well. According to the complaint, since wage formation in the PRC does not stem from normal market forces or genuine free collective bargaining, wage costs are subject to significant distortions. A truly market-based wage system cannot fully emerge in the PRC due to structural impediments to the rights of workers and employers to freely organize. In practice, only one trade union is legally recognized, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (‘ACFTU’). However, the ACFTU lacks independence from the state. Moreover, evidence shows that senior positions within the ACFTU are often held by high-ranking party officials in SOEs or by managers in private companies (25).

(63)

Furthermore, the mobility of the Chinese workforce is significantly constrained by the household registration system (hukou), which restricts access to comprehensive social security and public welfare benefits to individuals officially registered as residents of a given administrative area. As a result, many low-skilled workers remain excluded from essential public services and are placed in a precarious employment position, often compelled to accept lower wages and inferior working conditions compared to their locally registered counterparts. According to the complaint, this difference of treatment inevitably results in a wage cost distortion on the Chinese labour market (26).

(64)

Much like any other sector in the Chinese economy, the industry of sodium benzoate is also subject to Chinese labour laws and consequently also affected by these distortions in wage costs. The wage costs distortions are further exacerbated by labour subsidies provided by the Chinese state, particularly to sodium benzoate producers (27).

(65)

In conclusion, the complainant argued that significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation are present in the sodium benzoate sector.

(66)

The Commission examined whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in China, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission did so based on the evidence available on the file. The evidence on the file included the evidence contained in the Report, which relies on publicly available sources.

(67)

That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in China’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product concerned. The Commission further supplemented these evidentiary elements with its own research on the various criteria relevant to confirm the existence of significant distortions in China.

(68)

The Chinese economic system is based on the concept of a ‘socialist market economy’. That concept is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and determines the economic governance of China. The core principle is the ‘socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people’ (28).

(69)

The state-owned economy is the ‘leading force in the national economy’ and the state has the mandate to ensure its ‘consolidation and growth’ (29). Indeed, compared to the 13th FYP, SASAC confirmed that total assets of central enterprises grew by 44,6 % during the 14th FYP, ‘effectively driving the integrated development of upstream and downstream enterprises in the industrial chain and providing strong support for the successful achievement of the main goals and tasks of my country’'s economic and social development’ (30).

(70)

Consequently, the overall setup of the Chinese economy not only allows for substantial government interventions into the economy, but such interventions are expressly mandated. The notion of supremacy of public ownership over the private one permeates the entire legal system and is emphasized as a general principle in all central pieces of legislation.

(71)

The Chinese property law is a prime example: it refers to the primary stage of socialism and entrusts the state with upholding the basic economic system under which the public ownership plays a dominant role. Other forms of ownership are tolerated, with the law permitting them to develop side by side with the state ownership (31).

(72)

In addition, under Chinese law, the socialist market economy is developed under the leadership of the CCP. The structures of the Chinese state and of the CCP are intertwined at every level (legal, institutional, personal), forming a superstructure in which the roles of CCP and the state are indistinguishable.

(73)

Following an amendment of the Chinese Constitution in March 2018, the leading role of the CCP was given an even greater prominence by being reaffirmed in the text of Article 1 of the Constitution.

(74)

Following the already existing first sentence of the provision: ‘[t]he socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China’ a new second sentence was inserted which reads: ‘[t]he defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China’ (32). This illustrates the unquestioned and ever growing control of the CCP over the economic system of China.

(75)

This leadership and control are inherent to the Chinese system and goes well beyond the situation customary in other countries where the governments exercise general macroeconomic control within the boundaries of which free market forces are at play.

(76)

The Chinese state engages in an interventionist economic policy in pursuance of goals, which coincide with the political agenda set by the CCP rather than reflecting the prevailing economic conditions in a free market (33). The interventionist economic tools deployed by the Chinese authorities are manifold, including the system of industrial planning, the financial system, as well as the level of the regulatory environment.

(77)

First, on the level of overall administrative control, the direction of the Chinese economy is governed by a complex system of industrial planning which affects all economic activities within the country. The totality of these plans covers a comprehensive and complex matrix of sectors and crosscutting policies and is present on all levels of government.

(78)

Plans at provincial level are detailed while national plans set broader targets. Plans also specify the means in order to support the relevant industries/sectors as well as the timeframes in which the objectives need to be achieved. Some plans still contain explicit output targets.

(79)

Under the plans, individual industrial sectors and/or projects are being singled out as (positive or negative) priorities in line with the government priorities and specific development goals are attributed to them (industrial upgrade, international expansion, etc.).

(80)

The economic operators, private and state-owned alike, must effectively adjust their business activities according to the realities imposed by the planning system. This is not only because of the binding nature of the plans, but also because the relevant Chinese authorities at all levels of government adhere to the system of plans and use their vested powers, accordingly, thereby inducing the economic operators to comply with the priorities set out in the plans (34).

(81)

Second, on the level of allocation of financial resources, the financial system of China is dominated by the state-owned commercial and policy banks. Those banks, when setting up and implementing their lending policy need to align themselves with the government’s industrial policy objectives rather than primarily assessing the economic merits of a given project (35).

(82)

The same applies to the other components of the Chinese financial system, such as the stock markets, bond markets, private equity markets etc. Also, these parts of the financial sector are institutionally and operationally set up in a manner not geared towards maximizing the efficient functioning of the financial markets but towards ensuring control and allowing intervention by the state and the CCP (36).

(83)

Third, on the level of regulatory environment, the interventions by the state into the economy take a number of forms. For instance, the public procurement rules are regularly used in pursuit of policy goals other than economic efficiency, thereby undermining market-based principles in the area. The applicable legislation specifically provides that public procurement shall be conducted in order to facilitate the achievement of goals designed by state policies. However, the nature of these goals remains undefined, thereby leaving broad margin of appreciation to the decision-making bodies (37).

(84)

Similarly, in the area of investment, the GOC maintains significant control and influence over destination and magnitude of both state and private investment. Investment screening as well as various incentives, restrictions, and prohibitions related to investment are used by authorities as an important tool for supporting industrial policy goals, such as maintaining state control over key sectors or bolstering domestic industry (38).

(85)

In sum, the Chinese economic model is based on certain basic axioms, which provide for and encourage manifold government interventions. Such substantial government interventions are at odds with the free play of market forces, resulting in distorting the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (39).

(86)

In China, enterprises operating under the ownership, control and/or policy supervision or guidance by the state represent an essential part of the economy.

(87)

The sector of the product concerned is mainly served by private companies, such as Tianjin Dongda Chemical Group (40) or Wuhan Youji (41). Still, in the upstream sector of toluene, an input used to produce sodium benzoate, while some producers are private companies like Hengli Petrochemicals (42), the degree of state ownership remains significant, with a number of producers being controlled by the state, such as Sinopec (43) or Sinochem (44), both state owned enterprises (‘SOEs’) controlled by SASAC (45).

(88)

Moreover, CCP interventions into operational decision making have become the norm not only in SOEs, but also in private companies (46), with CCP claiming leadership over virtually every aspect of the country’s economy. Indeed, the State’s influence by means of CCP structures within companies effectively results in economic operators being under the government’s control and policy supervision, given how far the State and Party structures have grown together in China. Moreover, the whole sector of the product concerned, is subject to several government policies such as, the 14th FYP on raw materials (47) which directly addresses the petrochemical and chemical sectors by stating that ‘[i]n sectors including petrochemicals and chemicals, steel, non-ferrous metals, and building materials, we shall foster a number of industry chain pioneer enterprises exerting leadership on the ecosystem and characterized by core competitiveness, (…). The guiding role of leading enterprises in chemical and building materials sectors shall be leveraged to promote corporate reform and restructuring.’

(89)

Additionally, the Work Plan for the steady growth of the petrochemical and chemical industry (48) is formulated in order ‘to promote the stable operation and structural optimization and upgrading of the petrochemical industry’ and to ‘expand effective investment and promote transformation and upgrading’.

(90)

Similarly, at provincial level, the Shandong 14th FYP on developing the chemical industry (49) seeks to ‘promote the high-quality development of the chemical industry in the province’ and to ‘comprehensively promote the upgrading of the industry base and the modernization of the industry chain, […] accelerate the withdrawal of backward and inefficient production capacity, […] guide enterprises to merge and reorganize, optimize resource allocation and industry chain structure and improve production efficiency and profitability’.

(91)

Also, the Hubei 14th FYP on economic and social development and 2035 perspectives (50) stipulates that the governmental authorities ‘will optimize the development of specialty oils and downstream ethylene industries, upgrade traditional industries such as phosphorus chemicals, salt chemicals, and coal chemicals, vigorously develop high-end fine chemicals and new chemical materials, optimize the layout of the chemical industry along the Yangtze River, and focus on building a number of green and intelligent specialized chemical industrial parks in Wuhan, Yichang, Jingmen, Xiangyang, Jingzhou, Xiaogan, Huanggang, Qianjiang, and Xiantao to create a trillion-yuan-level modern chemical industry cluster’.

(92)

Moreover, the Tianjin 14th FYP on economic and social development and 2035 perspectives (51) requires ‘[t]he petrochemical industry [to] focus on developing high-end chemicals and fine chemicals, extending the industrial chain, increasing product added value, and creating a world-class Nangang chemical new materials base and petrochemical industry cluster.’

(93)

Government control and policy supervision can be also observed at the level of the relevant industry associations (52).

(94)

For instance, the China Petrochemical and Chemical Industry Federation (‘CPCIF’) is the industry association for the sector of the product concerned. According to Art. 3 of CPCIF’s Articles of Association, the organisation ‘adheres to the comprehensive leadership of the CCP [and] accepts the professional guidance, supervision and management by the entities in charge of registration and management, by entities in charge of Party building, as well as by the relevant administrative departments in charge of industry management’ (53).

(95)

Moreover, Art. 36 of CPCIF’s Articles of Association stipulates that the president, vice-presidents and secretary-general of the Association must ‘adhere to the leadership of the CCP, support socialism with Chinese characteristics, [and] resolutely implement the Party’s line, principles and policies’ (54).

(96)

Furthermore, the CPCIF has set up Light Hydrocarbons and Aromatics Special Committee covering aromatic hydrocarbons like toluene and aromatic acids like sodium benzoate (55).

(97)

Hengli Petrochemicals (56), Sinopec (57) and Sinochem (58) are members of CPCIF.

(98)

Consequently, privately owned producers in the sector of the product concerned are prevented from operating under market conditions. Indeed, both public and privately owned enterprises in the sector are subject to policy supervision and guidance.

(99)

The GOC is in position to interfere with prices and costs through state presence in firms. Indeed, CCP cells in enterprises, state-owned and private alike, represent an important channel through which the state can interfere with business decisions.

(100)

According to China’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution (59)) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the Party organisation.

(101)

In the past, this requirement appeared not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has been reinforcing its claims to control business decisions in companies as a matter of political principle (60), including exercising pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow Party discipline (61).

(102)

Already in 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies (62). These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of the product concerned and the suppliers of their inputs.

(103)

In addition, on 15 September 2020 a document titled General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era (‘the Guidelines’) (63) was released, which further expanded the role of the Party committees in private enterprises.

(104)

Section II.4 of the Guidelines states: ‘[w]e must raise the Party’s overall capacity to lead private-sector United Front work and effectively step up the work in this area’; and Section III.6 states: ‘[w]e must further step up Party building in private enterprises and enable the Party cells to play their role effectively as a fortress and enable Party members to play their parts as vanguards and pioneers’. The Guidelines thus emphasise and seek to increase the role of the CCP in companies and other private sector entities (64).

(105)

The investigation confirmed that overlaps between managerial positions and CCP membership / Party functions exist also in the sodium benzoate sector.

(106)

To provide an example, the General Manager of Wuhan Youji is also the Party Secretary and was rewarded as an outstanding CCP affairs worker by the Wuhan Municipality CCP Committee (65).

(107)

Additionally, the 2022 annual report of the Sinopec Group, points out that ‘[t]he company continuously improves the quality of party building work, boosting the spirit of the employees, strengthening discipline inspection and supervision work, helping the board of directors to effectively implement various decisions and arrangements, and promoting the high-quality development of the company’ (66). Moreover, Sinopec Group’s chairman of the board of directors is the secretary of the Party committee and several members of the board serve as deputy secretaries of the Party committee (67). Sinopec Group stated that it intends to ‘focus on the company's new mission and new tasks on the new journey, carry forward the party’s self-revolutionary spirit, strengthen the party’s leadership and party building in an all-round and integrated manner, and systematically promote comprehensive and strict party governance, so as to provide a strong guarantee for writing a new chapter of China's modern petrochemical industry’ (68).

(108)

Also, Sinochem’s chairman of the board of directors and general manager are respectively secretary and deputy secretary of the Party committee (69).

(109)

The state’s presence and intervention in the financial markets as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs further have an additional distorting effect on the market (70). Thus, the state presence in firms, in the sodium benzoate and other sectors (such as the financial and input sectors) allows the GOC to interfere with respect to prices and costs.

(110)

The direction of the Chinese economy is to a significant degree determined by an elaborate system of planning which sets out priorities and prescribes the goals the central, provincial and local governments must focus on. Relevant plans exist at all levels of government and cover virtually all economic sectors. The objectives set by the planning instruments are of a binding nature and the authorities at each administrative level monitor the implementation of the plans by the corresponding lower level of government.

(111)

Overall, the system of planning in China results in resources being driven to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the government, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (71).

(112)

The Chinese authorities have enacted a number of policies guiding the functioning of the sector of the product concerned.

(113)

The 14th FYP on economic and social development and 2035 perspectives (72) aims to ‘upgrade traditional industries, promote the optimization and structural adjustment of raw material industries such as petrochemicals, steel, nonferrous metals, and building materials, expand the supply of high-quality products in sectors such as light industry and textiles, speed up the transformation and upgrading of enterprises in key industries such as the chemical industry and papermaking, and improve the green manufacturing system’ (73) .

(114)

According to the 14th FYP on the raw materials industry (74), China ‘will develop a batch of industrial clusters in petrochemicals. […] In sectors including petrochemicals and chemicals, steel, non-ferrous metals, and building materials, [China] will foster a number of pioneering enterprises that could lead the ecosystem of the industrial chain with core competitiveness’ (75).

(115)

Additionally, the Guiding Opinion on promoting the high quality development of the petrochemical and chemical industry (76) requires to ‘strengthen sectoral policies and scientifically regulate the scale of the industry: […] enhance the supply capacity of high-end polymers, specialty chemicals and other products’[…] as well as to ‘[i]mprove supporting policies: strengthen the coordination of fiscal, financial, regional, investment, import and export, energy, ecological, environmental, price and other policies with industrial policies [and to g]ive full play to the role of the national industry-finance cooperation platform […]’.

(116)

Also, the Hubei 14th FYP on the high quality development of a modern chemical industry (77) requires to ‘implement the upgrading and transformation of specialty oil products, promote product upgrading and premium brand development, expand the total scale of high-end products, further enhance the scale and efficiency of specialty products manufacturing bases with one million tons capacity, and accelerate the construction of chemical products manufacturing bases with one million tons capacity; [to i]ntegrate and optimize aromatic resources, actively connect with industries such as plastics and rubber, and create a petrochemical processing product industrial chain including C2, C3, C4, C5, toluene, C8, and C9 aromatics, promoting the transformation and development towards integrated refining, chemical, and specialty products.’ More specifically, as regards the Qianjiang Oil Upgrading and Deep Processing Project, the plan seeks to ‘actively develop aromatic chemicals, […] and improve and extend the petrochemical industrial chain’ (78).

(117)

Wuhan Youji (79) is located in Hubei.

(118)

Moreover, as regards the petrochemical industry, the Tianjin 14th FYP on the high quality development of the manufacturing industry (80) seeks to ‘focus on refinement, green and smart development, optimize and upgrade traditional chemicals, improve the level of refining and chemical integration, vigorously develop deep processing of olefins, high-end fine and specialty chemicals, extend the industrial chain, and promote industrial structure optimization and transformation and upgrading’ and to ensure that by ‘2025, the industry scale will reach 260 billion yuan, with an average annual growth of 7,5 %.’.

(119)

Tianjin Dongda Chemical Group (81) is located in Tianjin.

(120)

Furthermore, Tianjin Dongda Chemical Group is a Tianjin Municipality ‘little giant (82)‘ enterprise. The GOC defines ‘little giant’ companies as ‘the novel elites of China’s small and medium-sized enterprises that are engaged in manufacturing, specialize in a niche market and boast cutting-edge technologies’ and intends to ‘scale up support for “little giants” during the 2024-2026 period, with a focus on key industrial chains, strategic emerging industries and other sectors. These funds will be used to encourage these firms to tackle technological challenges, develop new products, build up the supporting capacities of the industrial chain, and support local governments in nurturing “little giants”’ (83). Moreover, the Shandong 14th FYP on the development of chemical industry (84) calls on the local authorities to ‘[i]ncrease the technological transformation of existing enterprises, improve energy and resource utilization efficiency, and enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises [and to] establish a mechanism for enterprises to withdraw from parks, resolutely eliminate obsolete production capacity, strictly control restricted production capacity, and implement differentiated policies and measures for the allocation of resource factors such as land, electricity, and water to force enterprises to transform and develop’. It also calls to ‘[i]ncrease financial support. Strengthen fiscal policy incentives, coordinate and involve special funds, support chemical companies in accelerating technological transformation, intelligent transformation, industrial transfers, relocation into parks, elimination of obsolete equipment, etc., and implement tax exemptions applicable to imports of major technical equipment, VAT refunds, research and development policies such as additional deduction of expenses and insurance compensation for the first set of technical equipment. Actively guide various financial institutions and social capital to invest in the chemical industry, leverage the advantages of policy finance, development finance and commercial finance, and increase financial support for key areas of chemical technology’.

(121)

Through these and other means, the GOC therefore directs and controls virtually every aspect in the development and functioning of the sector, as well as the upstream inputs and the downstream products.

(122)

In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives concerning the sector. Such measures impede market forces from operating freely.

3.2.2.4.   Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation: the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws

(123)

According to the information on file, the Chinese bankruptcy system delivers inadequately on its own main objectives such as to fairly settle claims and debts and to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of creditors and debtors. This appears to be rooted in the fact that while the Chinese bankruptcy law formally rests on principles that are similar to those applied in corresponding laws in countries other than China, the Chinese system is characterised by systematic under-enforcement.

(124)

The number of bankruptcies remains notoriously low in relation to the size of the country’s economy, not least because the insolvency proceedings suffer from a number of shortcomings which effectively function as a disincentive for bankruptcy filings. Moreover, the role of the state in the insolvency proceedings remains strong and active, often having direct influence on the outcome of the proceedings (85).

(125)

In addition, the shortcomings of the system of property rights are particularly obvious in relation to ownership of land and land-use rights in China (86). All land is owned by the state (collectively owned rural land and State-owned urban land), and its allocation remains solely dependent on the state. There are legal provisions that aim at allocating land use rights in a transparent manner and at market prices, for instance by introducing bidding procedures. However, these provisions are regularly not respected, with certain buyers obtaining their land for free or below market rates (87). Moreover, authorities often pursue specific political goals including the implementation of the economic plans when allocating land (88).

(126)

Much like other sectors in the Chinese economy, the producers of the product concerned are subject to the ordinary rules on Chinese bankruptcy, corporate, and property laws. That has the effect that these companies, too, are subject to the top-down distortions arising from the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws. Those considerations, based on the evidence available, appear to be fully applicable also in the sodium benzoate sector. The present investigation revealed nothing that would call those findings into question.

(127)

In light of the above, the Commission concluded that there was discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws in the sector of the product concerned.

(128)

A system of market-based wages cannot fully develop in China as workers and employers are impeded in their rights to collective organisation. China has not ratified a number of essential conventions of the International Labour Organisation, in particular those on freedom of association and on collective bargaining (89).

(129)

Under national law, only one trade union organisation is active. However, this organisation lacks independence from the state authorities and its engagement in collective bargaining and protection of workers’ rights remains rudimentary (90). Moreover, the mobility of the Chinese workforce is restricted by the household registration system, which limits access to the full range of social security and other benefits to local residents of a given administrative area.

(130)

This typically results in workers who are not in possession of the local residence registration finding themselves in a vulnerable employment position and receiving lower income than the holders of the residence registration (91). Those findings lead to the distortion of wage costs in China.

(131)

No evidence was submitted to the effect that the sodium benzoate. sector would not be subject to the Chinese labour law system described. The sector is thus affected by the distortions of wage costs both directly (when making the product concerned or the main raw material for its production) as well as indirectly (when having access to capital or inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in China).

3.2.2.6.   Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation: access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting independently of the state

(132)

Access to capital for corporate actors in China is subject to various distortions.

(133)

First, the Chinese financial system is characterised by the strong position of state-owned banks (92), which, when granting access to finance, take into consideration criteria other than the economic viability of a project. Similar to non-financial SOEs, the banks remain connected to the state not only through ownership but also via personal relations (the top executives of large state-owned financial institutions are ultimately appointed by the CCP) (93) and they regularly implement public policies designed by the GOC.

(134)

In doing so, the banks comply with an explicit legal obligation to conduct their business in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the state (94). While it is acknowledged that various legal provisions refer to the need to respect normal banking behaviour and prudential rules such as the need to examine the creditworthiness of the borrower, the overwhelming evidence, including findings made in trade defence investigations, suggests that these provisions play only a secondary role in the application of the various legal instruments.

(135)

Recent developments further illustrate the extent of government influence over financial institutions in China. In March 2025, the Government of China (GOC) announced an issuance of CNY 500 billion in treasury bonds to provide substantial financial support to major banks, including the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of Communications, and Postal Savings Bank of China. This intervention was aimed at stabilising these institutions amidst declining profitability and record low net interest margins, highlighting the proactive measures taken by the state to maintain economic stability (95).

(136)

Also, the GOC has clarified that even private commercial banking decisions must be overseen by the CCP and remain in line with national policies. One of the state’s three overarching goals in relation to banking governance is now to strengthen the Party’s leadership in the banking and insurance sector, including in relation to operational and management issues (96). Also, the performance evaluation criteria of commercial banks have now to, notably, take into account how entities ‘serve the national development objectives and the real economy’, and in particular how they ‘serve strategic and emerging industries’ (97) .

(137)

Furthermore, on the level of allocation of financial resources, with Several Measures to Further Promote the Development of Private Investment (98), the GOC seeks to ‘increase central budget resources to support qualified private investment projects and to actively play a guiding and leading role’. The GOC also intends to ‘make good use of new policy financial instruments [and] support a number of qualified private investment projects in important industries and key areas’ (99) .

(138)

Additionally, bond and credit ratings are often distorted for a variety of reasons including the fact that the risk assessment is influenced by the firm's strategic importance to the GOC and the strength of any implicit guarantee by the government (100). This is compounded by additional existing rules, which direct finances into sectors designated by the government as encouraged or otherwise important (101). This results in a bias in favour of lending to SOEs, large well-connected private firms and firms in key industrial sectors, which implies that the availability and cost of capital is not equal for all players on the market.

(139)

Second, borrowing costs have been kept artificially low to stimulate investment growth. This has led to the excessive use of capital investment with ever lower returns on investment. This is illustrated by the growth in corporate leverage in the state sector despite a sharp fall in profitability, which suggests that the mechanisms at work in the banking system do not follow normal commercial responses.

(140)

Thirdly, although nominal interest rate liberalization was achieved in October 2015, price signals are still not the result of free market forces but are influenced by government-induced distortions. The share of lending at or below the benchmark rate still represented at least one-third of all lending as of the end of 2018 (102). Official media in China have recently reported that the CCP called for ‘guiding the loan market interest rate downwards’ (103). Artificially low interest rates result in under-pricing, and consequently, the excessive utilization of capital.

(141)

Overall credit growth in the China indicates a worsening efficiency of capital allocation without any signs of credit tightening that would be expected in an undistorted market environment. As a result, non-performing loans have increased rapidly, with the GOC a number of times opting to either avoid defaults, thus creating so called ‘zombie’ companies, or to transfer the ownership of the debt (e.g. via mergers or debt-to-equity swaps), without necessarily removing the overall debt problem or addressing its root causes.

(142)

In essence, despite the steps that have been taken to liberalize the market, the corporate credit system in China is affected by significant distortions resulting from the continuing pervasive role of the state in the capital markets. Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

(143)

No evidence was submitted in the present investigation demonstrating that the sector of the product concerned is not affected by the government intervention in the financial system in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

(144)

The Commission noted that the distortions described in the updated Report are characteristic for the Chinese economy. The evidence available shows that the facts and features of the Chinese system as described above as well as in Part I of the updated Report apply throughout the country and across the sectors of the economy. The same holds true for the description of the factors of production as set out above and in Part II of the updated Report.

(145)

The Commission recalls that in order to produce the product concerned, certain inputs are needed. When the producers of the product concerned purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned before. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors. These distortions were described in detail above, in particular in recitals (68) - (148). The Commission pointed out that the regulatory setup underpinning those distortions is generally applicable, sodium benzoate producers being subject to those rules as any other economic operator in China. The distortions have therefore a direct bearing on the cost structure of the product concerned.

(146)

As a consequence, not only the domestic sales prices of the product concerned are not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are also affected because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the updated Report.

(147)

Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout China. This means, for instance, that an input that in itself was produced in China by combining a range of factors of production is exposed to significant distortions. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth.

(148)

No evidence or argument to the contrary has been adduced by the GOC or the exporting producers in the present investigation.

(149)

The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

(150)

As explained in recital (28), the Commission issued two notes for the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value. These notes described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria, and also addressed the comments received by the parties on these elements and on the relevant sources. In the Second Note, the Commission informed interested parties of its intention to consider Türkiye as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

(151)

In the First Note on production factors, the Commission identified Argentina and Türkiye as countries with a similar level of economic development as the PRC according to the World Bank, i.e. they are all classified by the World Bank as ‘upper-middle income’ countries on a gross national income basis where production of the product under investigation was known to take place.

(152)

According to import statistics of raw materials, imports of the factors of production (‘FOPs’) necessary to produce sodium benzoate were found in Argentina and Türkiye, both of which met the criteria set out in 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation. It is also considered likely that sodium benzoate is produced in those two countries.

(153)

THE Commission assessed the existence of market distortions by export and/or import restrictions on the product under investigation, as well as on the raw materials, namely those representing the most important items of cost of manufacturing used for producing the product under investigation.

(154)

With regard to Argentina, the Commission provisionally concluded in the First Note that, among the raw materials listed, the import prices from the rest of the world of benzoic acid – an intermediary product between toluene and the product concerned – are likely affected by the large volume of imports from China. Given the limited import volumes of toluene, caustic soda, cobalt salt and nitrogen, imports of those inputs were considered insufficient to serve as reliable benchmarks for the construction of the normal value. Furthermore, the Commission noted that in October 2022 Argentina imposed anti-dumping duties on sodium benzoate against China (2,4 %) and the Netherlands (32,3 %). The imposition of such measures may have affected the import price of raw materials used for manufacturing the product under investigation.

(155)

With regard to Türkiye, the Commission provisionally concluded in the First Note that, among the raw materials listed, the import prices of benzoic acid from the rest of the world were likely affected by the large volume of imports from China. Given the limited import volumes of cobalt salt, that input was considered insufficient to serve as reliable benchmarks for the construction of the normal value. The Commission therefore concluded that the price of imports of benzoic acid is likely to be distorted by the large volume imported from China.

(156)

In the First Note the Commission analysed whether prices of toluene, caustic soda, activated carbon and nitrogen could be also distorted by significant imports from Russia in the two potential representative countries. The Commission analysed the imported volumes of the raw materials in the two potential representative countries. No imports of toluene from Russia were found, and those of nitrogen and activated carbon were negligible.

(157)

No comments were received arguing against the two countries identified in the First Note regarding the level of economic development. However, the sampled exporting producer Wuhan Youji Industries Co., Ltd. expressed a preference for Türkiye as imports of toluene and caustic soda – the two main factors of production – were far greater in volume into Türkiye than into Argentina.

(158)

In the Second Note, the Commission informed interested parties of its intention to use Türkiye as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

(159)

In the Second Note, the Commisison also informed interested parties that for the main factors of production, data on imports from China in the representative country would be excluded if the significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation are confirmed in the final disclosure, and that the imports of factors of production from countries listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council (105) would also be excluded.

(160)

In response to the Second Note, no party objected to select Türkiye as representative country. However, several parties had claims and suggestions concerning the import data on FOPs as listed in that Note.

(161)

Wuhan Youji stated that the price of imports of benzoic acid into Türkiye was unrepresentative and possibly likely to be distorted by large volumes of imports originating in the PRC.

(162)

The Commission informed in the Second Note that it searched another benchmark price to represent an undistorted value for benzoic acid, following the conclusions in the First Note that the price of imports of benzoic acid is likely to be distorted by the large volume imported from China. However, after the on-the-spot verification (which took place after the Second Note was made available), the Commission concluded that benzoic acid was not sourced externally by any of the sampled exporting producers, as both were upstream integrated and thus purchased toluene instead. Thus, import prices of benzoic acid have not been used in the calculation of the normal value and benzoic acid is not listed in Table 1 below.

(163)

Wuhan Youji highlighted that the price listed in the Second Note for imports of nitrogen (as derived from Global Trade Atlas’ import statistics) did not use the same unit of measurement as Wuhan Youji had reported in its questionnaire reply. Wuhan Youji had reported its consumption of nitrogen in Nominal Cubic Meter, while the price level indicated in the Second Note indicated Cubic Meters as unit of measurement. The Commission confirmed the different units of measurement, which required a conversion when establishing the benchmark for Wuhan Youji.

(164)

Tianjin Dongda submitted that imports of toluene into Türkiye are subject to import licence requirements and thus give rise to market distortions.

(165)

The Commission found no evidence of import prices into Türkiye being distorted. Using the GTA database, it compared import prices of toluene into the rest of the world with the import prices into Türkiye and found that these prices were aligned.

(166)

Tianjin Dongda also considered that the import prices of natural gas into Türkiye, sourced from the Turkish Statistical Institute, showed large variances compared to Eurostat and had a preference for using the latter as a source for natural gas.

(167)

The Commission considered that data from the Turkish Statistical Institute is the appropriate and undistorted source for prices of natural gas in Türkiye and considered such source reliable for the purpose of establishing a normal value. Tianjin Dongda did not provide any concrete evidence capable of putting the reliability of such data into question.

(168)

The complainant claimed that the HS Code for crude benzene (a by-product when manufacturing the product concerned) in the Second Note was erroneous and that it should be HS Code 2707 10 rather than HS Code 2902 20 .

(169)

Following the on-spot verification, the Commission recognized the erroneous HS Code listed in the Second Note and accepted the claim. However, in the absence of any imports of crude benzene under HS Code 2707 10 into Türkiye shown from GTA extraction, the Commission used import prices from/to the rest of the world, excluding China, as the source for the benchmark price.

(170)

In the First Note, the Commission could not identify any producer of the product under investigation in Argentina and Türkiye for which financial data were readily available. It therefore sought after companies producing benzoic acid, which is derived from toluene and used as main raw material of sodium benzoate. However, the Commission could not identify any producer of benzoic acid established in both countries for which financial data were readily available. The Commission thus considered companies active in the sector of manufacturing of organic chemicals, falling under NACE code 2014 (106). Two companies were identified in Argentina, however there were no financial data available for them. Thirty-five companies active in the sector of manufacturing of organic chemicals were identified in Türkiye, out of which eleven showed a reasonable level of profitability for a period partially overlapping with the investigation period.

(171)

In the Second Note, the Commission concluded that it found no readily available financial data in either of the two countries for any producer of sodium benzoate. However, it found financial data for thirty-eight producers within the same category of manufacture as sodium benzoate, i.e. NACE Code C2014 (‘Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals’) in Türkiye.

(172)

The Commission analysed the readily available financial data of the thirty-eight Turkish companies and found that twenty-six of them had incomplete data and one was in a loss-making situation. It therefore considered only the eleven companies with a positive profit margin. The financial data pertaining to these eleven producers were listed in Annex III to the Second Note (107). The Commission informed interested party in the Second Note that none of these eleven producers are active in the production of the product concerned.

(173)

The level of SG&A and Profit collected from the eleven profitable producers in Türkiye is laid down in recital (208) below.

(174)

Interested parties were invited to comment on the appropriateness of Türkiye as a representative country and the eleven companies listed in Annex III to the Second Note, as producers in the representative country as well as other elements of the Note.

(175)

In response to the Second Note, Wuhan Youji and Tianjin Dongda objected to the inclusion of certain of the eleven producers included in the selection listed, as according to their intelligence, the business activities of these companies were not related to the product under investigation.

(176)

However, in the absence of readily available financial data relating to producers of the product under investigation, the Commission had no choice but to use readily available financial data of business activities that, beyond the product under investigation, included business activities falling under NACE Code C2014.

(177)

As explained above the Commission initially considered two potential representative countries: Argentina and Türkiye. As explained in recital (154), Argentina was found not to be an appropriate representative country in this case because of lack of readily available financial data and inadequate level of import of raw materials. It follows that Türkiye was the only appropriate representative country.

(178)

Having established that Türkiye was the only available appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

(179)

In view of the above analysis, Türkiye met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country.

(180)

In the First Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as raw materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under investigation by the exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose publicly available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that note.

(181)

The Commission did not receive any objection to the list of factors of production in its the First Note.

(182)

Subsequently, in the Second Note, the Commission stated that, to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use GTA (for import prices) into Türkiye to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials.

(183)

Considering all the information submitted by the interested parties and collected during the verification visits, the following factors of production and their sources have been identified in order to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

Table 1

Factors of production of product under investigation

(184)

The Commission included a value for manufacturing overhead costs in order to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. To establish this amount, the Commission used the verified data reported by the sampled exporting producers and added research and development costs for the investigation period as they were incurred and accounted by the exporting producers.

(185)

To establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA to which import duties and transport costs were added.

(186)

An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council (112).

(187)

The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded in Section 3.2.1 that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation.

(188)

Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices.

(189)

For a number of factors of production, the actual costs incurred by the sampled exporting producers represented a negligible share of total raw material costs in the investigation period. As the value used for these had no appreciable impact on the dumping margin calculations, regardless of the source used, the Commission decided to include those costs into consumables, as explained in recital (197).

(190)

The Commission expressed the transport cost incurred by the sampled exporting producers for the supply of raw materials as a percentage of the actual cost of such raw materials and then applied the same percentage to the undistorted cost of the same raw materials in order to obtain the undistorted transport cost. The Commission considered that, in the context of this investigation, the ratio between the exporting producers’ raw material and the reported transport costs could be reasonably used as an indication to estimate the undistorted transport costs of raw materials when delivered to the company’s factory.

(191)

Labour is a factor of production representing between 4 % to 7 % of total cost of production. The Commission used the statistics published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (113) to determine the wages in Türkiye using the detailed information on wages in the producing sector for 2022, for the economic activity for NACE code 2014 – manufacturing of basic organic chemicals, in which the production of sodium benzoate falls, according to NACE Rev.2 classification (114).

(192)

The average monthly value has been duly adjusted for inflation using the domestic producer price index as published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (115) to adapt to the investigation period, going from 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025. The hourly rate for the investigation period obtained after indexation amounts to 89,64 CNY/hour.

(193)

The Commission intends to use the electricity price statistics published by the EMRA, Energy Market Regulatory Authority of Türkiye (116) in its regular press releases. The Commission intends to use the average industrial electricity prices in the corresponding consumption band in kWh covering the investigation period. The Commission established the cost for electricity for the investigation period at 0,66 CNY/kWh.

(194)

The Commission used the average natural gas prices in m3 duly adjusted for inflation using the Producer Price Index published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (117) to adapt to the investigation period. The price is adjusted for VAT of 18 %, as the quoted price is VAT included. The Commission established the price for natural gas for the investigation period at 4,63 CNY/m3.

(195)

The Commission established the benchmark for steam on the basis of the benchmark calculated for natural gas, considering that the unit for steam is GigaJoule (GJ). One GJ is converted into m3 gas based on the general accepted content of mmbtu (million metric British thermal units) in 1 GJ (118), and the general accepted content of natural gas in 1 mmbtu (119). The consumption of steam by the exporting producer is expressed in tonnes, so the Commission converted the equivalent of 1 GJ into tonnes (120). The Commission also noted a clerical mistake in the conversion formula from GJ into tonnes which had resulted in an incorrect steam benchmark price in the Second FOP Note and it therefore put on file a revised version of the Annex V to the second FOP Note, correcting the mistake. By applying the benchmark for natural gas, the Commission established a benchmark of 501,61 CNY/ton for steam, as presented in Table 1 above.

(196)

The Commission established the benchmark by using the average cost of water in Türkiye as published by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Investment Office. This cost includes the cost of wastewater disposal.

(197)

Due to the negligible weight in the total cost of production, some of the factors of production were considered consumables. These factors of production include the packaging materials.

(198)

The Commission calculated the percentage of the consumables in the total cost of production and applied this percentage to the recalculated cost of production based on benchmarks.

(199)

The Commission identified crude benzene as a by-product obtained from the production of the product under investigation which can be sold without further processing. The Commission used the import statistics from the GTA database as benchmark of crude benzene with HS code 2707 10 . The Commission established an undistorted import price of 8,75 CNY/Kg for benzene.

(200)

According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs ('SG&A') and for profits. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

(201)

For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG&A costs and profit, the Commission relied on the financial data extracted from Orbis database for the year 2024 for the eleven Turkish producers as referred to in recital (173). SG&A costs expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 25,56 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 11,22 %.

(202)

The manufacturing overheads incurred by the cooperating exporting producers are expressed as a share of the costs of manufacturing actually incurred by the exporting producers. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing.

(203)

The exporting producers’ respective costs for Research and Development, as provided in the questionnaire reply were added to the manufacturing overheads, as it was not explicit apparent from the published accounts of the eleven producers in Türkiye that those costs were had been included in their respective SG&A.

(204)

On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(205)

First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the sampled exporting producers. These consumption rates were verified during the verification. The Commission multiplied the usage factors by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country.

(206)

Once the undistorted manufacturing cost established, the Commission applied the manufacturing overheads, SG&A costs, profit and depreciation as noted in recital (201). They were determined on the basis of the financial statements of the companies as explained in recital (31).

(207)

Then the Commission added manufacturing overheads and depreciation, to the undistorted cost of manufacturing to arrive at the undistorted costs of production.

(208)

To the costs of production established as described in the previous recital, the Commission applied SG&A and profit from the eleven Turkish producers referred to in recital (172). SG&A expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 25,56 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 11,22 %.

(209)

On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(210)

The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union directly to independent customers in the Union. One of the exporting producers also exported via unrelated traders located in the PRC.

(211)

The export price for direct sales to independent customers in the Union was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(212)

Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability.

(213)

In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the export prices were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability.

(214)

As explained in Section 3.2 above, the normal value was established at the ex-works level of trade by using costs of production together with amounts for SG&A and for profit, which were considered to be reasonable for that level of trade. Therefore, no adjustments were necessary to net the normal value back to the ex-works level.

(215)

The Commission found no reasons for making any allowances to the normal value, nor were such allowances claimed by any of the sampled exporting producers.

(216)

In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of, insurance, handling loading and ancillary expenses.

(217)

For the sampled exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the like product with the weighted average export price of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

(218)

On this basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

(219)

For the cooperating exporting producer outside the sample, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the margins of the sampled exporting producers.

(220)

On this basis, the provisional dumping margin of the cooperating exporting producer outside the sample is 63,8 %.

(221)

For all other exporting producers in the PRC, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation was calculated on the basis of the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers, sampled and non-sampled, to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the PRC to the Union in the investigation period, that was established on the basis of import statistics from Eurostat for the CN codes listed in recital (18).

(222)

The level of cooperation in this case was low because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 65 % of the total imports during the investigation period.

(223)

On this basis, and in order not to reward non-cooperation, the Commission found it appropriate to establish the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporting producer taking the weighted average of the fourteen individual transactions with the highest dumping margins, jointly representing 6,9 % of the export volumes.

(224)

The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

(225)

The like product was manufactured by two producers in the Union during the investigation period. Only one producer came forward and fully cooperated, namely Lanxess Chemical BV. During the investigation period, this producer accounted for more than 60 % of total production in the Union. On this basis, it was concluded that Lanxess represented a major proportion of the total Union production of sodium benzoate. It is therefore considered that Lanxess constitutes the Union industry within the meaning of Articles 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(226)

As the data relating to the injury assessment was derived from only one Union producer, the figures for the injury analysis are given in ranges for reasons of confidentiality. However, the indexes are based on actual data and not on the ranges.

(227)

The total Union production during the investigation period was established at 23 000 – 25 000 tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as the actual figure on the basis of a verification of the accounting records of the Union producer, Lanxess.

(228)

The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of (i) the verified sales of Lanxess; (ii) the estimated sales of the second Union producer; and (iii) the imports from the country concerned and from all other countries.

(229)

For the Union producer that did not come forward, estimates for Union consumption were done based on data extracted from market reports and by extrapolating ratios coming from data of the collaborating producer. As no other producers of sodium benzoate were identified within the Union industry, both sets of data were found to be representative to estimate the consumption at the level of the Union industry.

(230)

Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (tonnes)

(231)

The Union consumption developed strongly from 2022 until 2024 and then decreased in the IP. Union consumption increased by 46 % over the period considered.

(232)

As sodium benzoate was classified under ‘basket’ TARIC code 2916 31 00 90 until initiation of the current investigation, it was not possible to establish the volume of imports based on import statistics from Eurostat. Instead, import volume was based on data of specialised market intelligence providers of trade statistics to which the complainant has a subscription.

(233)

The source of the data concerning the Chinese imports could not be disclosed at the request of the data provider. The Commission cross-checked the data provided by the complainant with other available statistical sources (Eurostat and Surveillance) and with the sampling and questionnaire replies of the cooperating Chinese exporting producers and found it reliable.

(234)

Imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

(235)

Table 3 shows a steep increase in the volume of imports from China throughout 2022-2024 period, which was mirrored by an increase of the corresponding market share, to the detriment of the Union industry. While in 2023 and 2024 the biggest surge in imported quantities were recorded, the imports in the investigation period are still at a level significantly above 2022 levels (higher by 158 %), which demonstrate the expanded footprint reached by the imports from China (53 % - 56 % market share) when compared to the base year 2022 (30 % - 33 %).

(236)

The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of the specialised market intelligence indicated in recital (233). Price undercutting of the imports was established on the basis of verified questionnaire replies of the sampled exporting producers in the PRC and of the cooperating Union Producer.

(237)

The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 4

Import prices (EUR/ tonne)

(238)

The import prices from the PRC continued to decrease throughout the period concerned, reaching a level representing 71 % of the average import prices in 2022.

(239)

The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:

(240)

The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the cooperating Union producer’s theoretical turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of between 43 % and 46 % by the imports from the country concerned on the Union market. Undercutting was found for 100 % of the imported volumes of the sampled companies.

(241)

In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(242)

As explained in recitals (226) and (227), the analysis of injury indicators was established based on Lanxess data.

(243)

For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic and the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the complaint and the questionnaire reply of Lanxess.

(244)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(245)

The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(246)

The Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(247)

The level of production was the most severely impacted in 2023 (decrease of 11 % as compared to previous year), when the import prices decreased the most from one year to the other (namely, by 22 % – see Table 4). The production levels continued further to vary around the 2022 levels (ending with a 6 % decrease during the investigation period versus 2022), due to the still low elasticity of the demand, justified by the small weight of sodium benzoate price in the total price of the final products it is incoporated. Nevertheless, the users’ preference for the sodium benzoate produced by the Union industry seems to be at its turning point, due to the continuous decrease in import prices, offering cheaper product alternatives (overall 29 % decrease during the period considered).

(248)

The capacity utilisation was at its lowest in 2023, due to the low production levels explained above. During the investigation period, it did not show meaningful variation when compared to 2022, as production capacity decreased by 8 %.

(249)

The Union industry’s sales quantity and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Sales quantity and market share

(250)

In 2023, the sales volume decreased by 7 % against 2022 levels, as the Union industry had to face increasing production costs, without being able to pass through this increase to the client prices, simultaneously with the increasing pressure from the decreasing import prices. The most acute decrease in sales volumes occurred, however, during the investigation period, when also the selling prices reached the lowest level of the period under concern. Additionally, the continuous increase in import quantities led to a deterioration of the market share of the Union industry by 37 %, when compared with 2022.

(251)

Union market consumption increased throughout the period concerned (+46 % – see Table 2). The production and sales of the Union industry (Tables 5 and 6) decreased by 6 % and 9 %, respectively, in contrast with the significant increase in import volumes. This market dynamic led to a sharp deterioraton of the Union industry market share from 45 %-50 % in 2022 to 28 %-31 % in the investigation period. This evolution indicates satisfying the new increasing sodium benzoate demand via imports, rather than via local production, due to more attractive prices.

(252)

Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Employment and productivity

(253)

Despite the unfavourable situation of the Union industry, the number of employees increased throughout the period concerned, as the Union industry chose to retain their skilled workforce by internalising contractual employees.

(254)

This aspect, corroborated with the variations in production led to the deterioration of the productivity of the workforce, which over the period considered recorded a decrease of 17 %.

(255)

All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was not negligible, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.

(256)

This is the first anti-dumping investigation regarding the product concerned. Therefore, no data were available to assess the effects of possible past dumping.

(257)

The weighted average unit sales prices of the Union producer to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Sales prices in the Union

(258)

The prices decreased by 5 % in 2023 and varied around this level for the following period to record a 6 % decrease in the investigation period in relation to 2022. The decrease occurred despite the increasing costs, to counteract the significant decrease in the import prices and the considerable increase in the import quantities, in an attempt of the Union producer to keep its market share.

(259)

The unit production cost increased considerably in 2023 and maintained at levels above the one registered in 2022 for the last two years of the period concerned. Overall it recorded and increase of 9 % over the period considered. The increasing costs, in combination with the decreasing importing prices which no longer allowed charging higher prices in order to compensate for the higher costs, led to a deterioration of the profit margins of the Union producer (see Table 11).

(260)

The average labour costs of the Union producer developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Average labour costs per employee

(261)

The average employee costs varied slightly around the 2022 levels and recorded a 2 % decrease over the period considered. This reflects the company’s efforts of keeping the cost under control, when facing increasing pressure from market.

(262)

Stock levels of the Union producer developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Stocks

(263)

The level of stocks increased significantly during the investigation period, mostly due to the discrepancy between the market realities (decreasing demand for higher priced Union industry product) and the level of production, as the users are not willing to pay a higher price for Union industry products. This was also reflected in the increase in the level of stocks as percentage of the production during the same period. This indicator suggests that the low elasticity of the demand to the price (due to low weight of the sodium benzoate price in the cost of the final products the product under investigation is incorporated) is not holding anymore.

(264)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the Union producer developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

(265)

The Commission established the profitability of the Union producer by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the ex-works turnover of those sales.

(266)

The profitability was at a healthy level in 2022, but evolved towards significant losses in 2023, when the Union market faced the highest decrease in import prices for the product under investigation. The slightly positive profitability in 2024 was temporary, since, as a result of continuous decreasing import prices, the loss returned during the investigation period. In particular, it was due to the fact that Union producer had the highest quantity produced in the course of the whole period concerned (see recitals (246) to (248) above), thus the manufacturing overheads per unit produced, were lower than in 2023. It was also due a decrease in direct costs per unit produced.

(267)

The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow followed a similar trend to that of profitability, negatively accentuated during the investigation period due to the increase in stock levels.

(268)

The level of investments was closely linked to the registered profitability, decreasing significantly during the period concerned, as the Union producer focused on urgent needs, rather than on development requirements under ordinary course of business, due to the weakening capacity of the business to finance the latter.

(269)

The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. Closely linked with the profitability numbers, it was at a healthy level in 2022, but took a sharp downturn in 2023 and kept negative in the period that followed.

(270)

The Union producer’s ability to raise capital was seriously impacted as its cash flow and profitability reached unsustainable levels during the investigation period, following a level of production not supported by the market demand realities.

(271)

All of the injury indicators except employment for the reasons mentioned in recital (253), showed a deterioration of the situation of the Union industry.

(272)

The volume of imports from the country concerned increased substantially by 158 %, concomitantly with a decrease of the import prices of 29 % over the period concerned, these developments being the main cause that triggered a deterioration of the Union industry situation. The development of the market shares supports the above findings. Specifically, the Chinese market share increased by 77 % in the period considered taking more than 50 % of the EU market, whereas the EU market share decreased by 37 %.

(273)

While the production levels did not vary significantly when compared with the beginning of the period considered, the closing stock as percentage of production demonstrated an increasing sensitivity of the sodium benzoate market demand to the price levels. Thus, the demand for the more expensive Union industry products decreased, while the demand for the cheaper Chinese imports increased, against a background of a significant increase in consumption over the period considered, from which the Union industry, with the exception of year 2024, did not benefit.

(274)

The fact that the production levels did not vary significantly over the period considered reflected the focus of the Union industry to maintain a reasonable capacity utilisation in an attempt to keep fixed costs under control. The market preference for lower prices and the increase in costs led to a loss making situation, which further impacted the cash flows and the Union industry capacity to finance investments.

(275)

Profitability, cash flow and the investments are the most impacted injury indicators by the increased Chinese import volumes in decreasing prices. The product business continuity is at a great risk, considering that the Union industry was forced to operate at a capacity under optimal levels.

(276)

The investigation showed the dumped imports from the countries concerned increased significantly in absolute terms and in terms of market share during the period considered. The Commission also found that the dumped imports undercut the Union industry prices and depressed and/or suppressed prices to a significant extent. The Commission provisionally concluded that the EU Industry suffered inury in terms of volumes, market share and prices.

(277)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(278)

In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: imports from third countries, export performance and increase in the cost of production.

(279)

During the period considered, the Union industry lost significant market share on the Union market. The increase of consumption mainly benefitted Chinese imports (at levels 2,6 times higher in the investigation period than in 2022), which forced the Union industry to operate under optimal levels of its capacity utilisation.

(280)

At the same time, Chinese import prices undercut the Union industry prices by more than 44 % during the investigation period. The Chinese import prices supressed and/or depressed the prices of the Union producer, adversely affecting its financial indicators, despite Union producer’s efforts to absorb the increase of the manufacturing costs. This led to unsustainable negative margins for the last 3 years analysed.

(281)

In order to remain competitive and maintain a certain level of production, the Union industry was forced to lower its sales prices to untenable levels, in view of the increase in the cost of production.

(282)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that a significant increase in dumped imports from China at prices that were causing significant negative effects on Union industry prices, caused material injury to the Union producers.

(283)

During the investigation period, the quantity of imports from other third countries analysed at TARIC basket code level (2916 31 00 90) were estimated as being very marginal the biggest four third-country exporters (UK, USA, India and Israel) represented each under 2 %. Consequently, these imports were not analysed further, as they were neither relevant, nor they would impact the analysis or the causation conclusions.

(284)

The volume of exports of the Union producer developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Export performance of the Union producer

(285)

The export volumes decreased by 6 % over the period considered. The export price followed a downward trend, due to intense competition from Chinese exporters on the Union industry’s export markets.The export volume represented 52 % of total Union industry’s sales of the like product in the investigation period. The exports sales, recorded decreasing prices, which were made to satisfy, and not to lose, the global demand of multinational clients.

(286)

In view of the higher volume of sales on the third country markets, declining export performance of the Union producer might have contributed to injury, but did not attenuanate the genuine and substantial causal link between the Chinese dumped imports and the material injury found. It rather demonstrated that the Union industry was confronted with dumping pressure for the product under investigation not only on the domestic market, but on other markets as well.

(287)

There has been an increase in the cost of production by 9 % in the period considered because of an increase in some direct costs such energy and labour costs per unit and an increase of the allocated fixed costs due to decreased production volumes.

(288)

The Commission considers that the increases in costs have a limited impact on causation, because the Union producer could have passed on the cost increases to its clients by increasing the prices sufficiently to non-injurious levels if there was not the pressure exerted by the Chinese imports in such great volumes and low prices.

(289)

In light of the above considerations, the Commission provisionally established a genuine and substantial causal link between the material injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from China. As a result of the significant increase of dumped imports from China, the Union industry was precluded from setting prices and production volumes at sustainable levels, which resulted in a strong deterioration of its economic situation.

(290)

The timing and scale of these negative developments showed a clear causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(291)

The Commission examined alternative factors that could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry. These included imports from other third countries, the export performance of the Union industry and increase in the cost of production. However, none of these were found to weaken the genuine and substantial causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(292)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the genuine and substantial causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. The injury consists notably of reduced market share, profitability, productivity, return on investments, cash flows and capacity utilisation.

(293)

To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

(294)

The injury would be removed if the Union Industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(295)

In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(296)

As a first step, the Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition. The basic profit was set at [11 % - 13 %] reflecting the historical profitability of the Union industry in 2022, a year before the surge of imports in the Union market.

(297)

The Union producer provided evidence that its level of investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition. The Commission verified this information and concluded that the provided internal documentation and communications showed that the company did not carry out certain investments due to the situation on the Union market. To reflect this in the target profit, the Commission calculated the difference between investments, R&D and innovation ('IRI') expenses under normal conditions of competition as provided by the EU Industry and verified by the Commission with actual IRI expenses over the period considered. Such difference, expressed as a percentage of turnover, was [3,7-4,5] %.

(298)

Such percentage was added to the basic profit mentioned in recital (296), leading to a target profit of [14,7-16,8] % for the like product, produced by the Union producer.

(299)

In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). The Union producer provided evidence of having incurred environmental compliance costs. Based on the evidence available, which was supported by the company’s reporting tools and forecasts, the Commission established an additional cost of [4,6-5,3] EUR/tonne, which was reflected in the non-injurious price for the product produced by the Union producer.

(300)

On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of [2 710-3 130] EUR/tonne for the like product of the Union industry by applying the target profit margin mentioned in recital (298) to the cost of production of the Union producer during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

(301)

The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in China, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the Union producer on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(302)

The injury elimination level for ‘other cooperating companies’ and for ‘all other imports originating in country concerned’ is defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies and imports (see Section 3.5 above).

(303)

In the present case, the complainants claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Thus, in order to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin of sampled exporting producers would be higher than their injury margin.

(304)

As explained in the Notice of Initiation, the complainant provided the Commission sufficient evidence that there are raw material distortions in the country concerned regarding the product under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, this investigation examined the alleged distortions to assess whether, if relevant, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury.

(305)

However, as the margins adequate to remove injury are higher than the dumping margins, the Commission considered that, at this stage, it was not necessary to address this aspect.

(306)

Following the above assessment the Commission concluded that it is appropriate to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation.

(307)

The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(308)

From the two known Union producers, only one producer, which also lodged the complaint (covering 64 % of the total Union production) cooperated in the investigation.

(309)

The investigation has shown that the Union producer is suffering material injury caused by the dumped imports from the country concerned. These imports exercised significantly price suppression and depression, forcing the Union industry to sell below costs. As a result, the Union industry was making significant losses. Chinese imports still severely undercut the Union industry’s prices, and the volume increase of these imports caused a significant loss of Union industry market share.

(310)

The imposition of measures would likely prevent a further surge of imports from China at very low prices and enable the industry to start its recovery process. Without measures, Chinese producers will continue to dump the product concerned on the Union market and it will not take long before the Union industry will be forced to cease sodium benzoate operations.

(311)

As the Union industry has the capacity in place to cover the entire Union consumption, following the imposition of anti-dumping provisional measures, it is expected that Chinese imports to the Union would decrease and that the sales volumes and prices of the Union industry on the Union market would rise. This would allow the Union industry to restore its market share from the beginning of the period concerned and to improve its profitability and other financial indicators.

(312)

It was therefore concluded that imposing measures against China would be in the interest of the Union industry.

(313)

Only one importer opposing measures (Falken Trade Sp z o.o.) came forward and provided a questionnaire reply. Its import volumes represented 2 % of total imports from China. Moreover, the product under investigation only covered 1 % of its total sales. Following a deficiency process, the unrelated importer provided a new reply that had significant deficiencies and lacked supporting documents. Therefore it was ultimately disregarded.

(314)

Four other importers (among which, the largest importer of sodium benzoate into the Union, i.e. FF Chemicals) declared interest in the case, without filling in a questionnaire reply.

(315)

No users provided questionnaire replies. Since the product under investigation is covering an insignificant cost share in their final products, the measures are not expected to influence the users significantly.

(316)

Considering the lack of cooperation and data from users and the majority of importers, the Commission cannot estimate with precision the impact of the measures on this market participant category. Given that sodium benzoate accounts for only a very small share of the production costs of the downstream products in which it is used, the Commission considers that the measures will not disproportionately impact the importers and users.

(317)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of product concerned originating in country concerned at this stage of the investigation.

(318)

On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(319)

Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of sodium benzoate originating in the People’s Republic of China , in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins (Section 6 above). The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins.

(320)

On the basis of the above, the provisional anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

(321)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the People’s Republic of China and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to that those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(322)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

(323)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(324)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(325)

As mentioned in recital (3), the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation.

(326)

In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should cease/be discontinued.

(327)

No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures has been taken/can be taken at this stage of the proceeding.

(328)

In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE's website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(329)

Both exporting producers submitted comments on pre-disclosure. Wuhan Youji submitted comments not related to the accuracy of the calculations but to the methodology used by the Commission, thus they were outside of the scope of the pre-disclosure and will be addressed at a later stage. Tianjin Dongda submitted comments on clerical inconsistencies in the calculations of CIF value and the normal value (manufacturing overheads), comments which were taken into account by the Commission. The anti-dumping duty was adjusted accordingly.

(330)

In order to ensure effective monitoring of imports of the direct upstream product of sodium benzoate, i.e. benzoic acid currently falling, among with other products, under CN code 2916 31 00 , the Commission considers appropriate to introduce a specific TARIC code for monitoring purposes. This measure will allow the Commission to gather accurate and detailed statistics on trade flows, assess market trends, and detect any potential circumvention of trade defence measures. The introduction of this TARIC code is for monitoring purposes only and does not impose any additional duties or restrictions on imports at this stage.

(331)

The specific TARIC code should be structured in a way that distinguishes benzoic acid from other products under the same CN heading, ensuring precise data collection. The Commission should regularly review the data collected under this code to determine whether further action, such as the initiation of an anti-dumping or an anti-subsidy investigation, is warranted.

(332)

In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(333)

The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,