(1)

By Council Regulation (EC) No 172/2008 (2), the Council imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of ferro-silicon, originating in the Russian Federation (‘Russia’) and the People’s Republic of China (‘China’ or ‘the PRC’) (‘the original measures’). The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

(2)

Following a partial interim review (3) pursuant to Article 11(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (4), on 26 January 2012 the Council confirmed the measures in force applicable to the Russian exporting producer JSC Chelyabinsk Electrometallurgical Integrated Plant and its related company JSC Kuznetsk Ferroalloy Works. Following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, on 10 April 2014, the Commission extended the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia and the PRC by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 360/2014 (5). Following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) the basic Regulation, on 1 July 2020, the Commission extended the measures for a second time by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/909 (6).

(3)

The anti-dumping duties currently in force range from 15,6 % and 31,2 % for imports from China and from 17,8 % to 22,7 % for imports from Russia.

(4)

Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry of the anti-dumping measures in force (7), the Commission received a request for a review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(5)

The request for review was submitted on 28 March 2025 by Euroalliages (‘the applicant’) on behalf of the Union industry of ferro-silicon in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation and likely recurrence of dumping from Russia and China and recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

(6)

Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 30 June 2025 the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports into the Union of ferro-silicon originating in Russia and China (‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (8) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(7)

The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024 (‘review investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(8)

In the Notice of Initiation, interested parties were invited to contact the Commission in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicant, other known Union producers, the known producers in and the authorities of Russia and China, known importers, users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to participate. The Commission also informed the Government of Russia (‘the GOR’) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘the GOC’) and provided the GOC with a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in China within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation.

(9)

Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. None of the interested parties requested a hearing.

(10)

The Commission received comments on initiation from the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. They claimed that current sanctions imposed by the European Union against imports of Russian goods, including ferro-silicon, had completely halted imports of Russian ferro-silcon and that therefore, a recurrence of imports and dumping could not materialise for an unlimited period of time, should the measures lapse. These comments were reiterated after the disclosure referred to in recital (22).

(11)

The Commission noted that the sanctions are of a temporary nature, linked to Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine, and that their scope, modulation and duration are not predictable, while anti-dumping measures have a life span of five years. In addition, the sanctions do not preclude the initiation of a review investigation and have no grounds in the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping on the Union market, neither on the regard of the attractiveness of the Union market, nor on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury to the Union industry. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(12)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(13)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of sales and production volume of the like product in the Union during the review investigation period. This sample consisted of two Union producers representing more than 65 % of total Union production. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the sample was representative of the Union industry, and it confirmed the sample on 15 July 2025. The Commission instructed the sampled Union producers to reply to the questionnaire that had been made available online (9) on the day of initiation.

(14)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(15)

No unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. Hence, the Commission decided that sampling of unrelated importers was not necessary.

(16)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all known exporting producers in Russia and China to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the Russia Federation to the European Union and the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(17)

None of the producers in the countries concerned provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. The Commission therefore considered that no producers in China and Russia cooperated with the investigation.

(18)

The Commission did not receive any reply to the questionnaire from the GOC referred to in recital (8) above. Therefore, there was no cooperation from the GOC.

(19)

Questionnaire replies were received from the applicant and the two sampled Union producers.

(20)

The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and of the Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

Union producers

(21)

The Commission carried out remote crosschecks (‘RCC’) of the questionnaire reply of the applicant.

(22)

On 23 April 2026, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping duties in force (‘Final Disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

(23)

The applicant and the GOR submitted comments. These comments were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate.

(24)

The product under review is the same as in in the original investigation and the previous expiry review namely ferro-silicon, currently falling under CN codes 7202 21 00 , 7202 29 10 and 7202 29 90 , originating in China and Russia (‘the product under review’).

(25)

As established in the original investigation as well as in the previous expiry review, this expiry review investigation confirmed that the following products have the same basic physical and technical characteristics and the same basic uses:

(26)

These products are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(27)

In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether dumping was taking place during the review investigation period and whether dumping was likely to continue or recur upon a possible expiry of the measures in force.

(28)

As mentioned in recital (17) none of the Chinese exporting producers cooperated in the investigation.

(29)

Therefore, the Commission informed the authorities of the PRC that, due to the absence of cooperation, the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation and base its findings on continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury in respect of the exporters/producers in the PRC on the facts available. The Commission did not receive any comments nor claims from the GOC regarding the application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(30)

Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available, in particular the information contained in the request for the expiry review, in the submissions by interested parties, combined with other sources of information such as trade statistics on imports and exports from Eurostat and Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’), statistical data from independent providers of pricing intelligence, news, data, analysis and conferences for the iron and steel industry such us Metal Expert (10) and AlloyMetrics (11), statistics obtained from the Istituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estastítica (12) (‘IBGE’) and the Serviço Geológico do Brasil (‘SGB’) of the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (13).

(31)

Given the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation tending to show, with regard to China, the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission initiated the investigation on the basis of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(32)

In order to obtain the information deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. As mentioned in recital (18), no questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, on 17 October 2025, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in China.

(33)

In point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it may need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The Commission further stated that it would examine other possibly appropriate countries in accordance with the criteria set out in first indent of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(34)

On 21 November 2025, the Commission informed interested parties by a note on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value (‘the FOP Note’). In that FOP Note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of ferro-silicon. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified Brazil as an appropriate representative country. The Commission received no comments on the FOP Note.

(35)

According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

(36)

However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is referred hereinafter as ‘SG & A’).

(37)

As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC and the exporting producers, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

(38)

The Commission examined the evidence on the file to decide whether significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation exist in China, rendering the use of domestic prices and costs in that country inappropriate. That analysis covered the following evidentiary elements on the various criteria relevant to establish the existence of significant distortions.

(39)

First, the evidence contained in the request included the following elements pointing to the existence of significant distortions.

(40)

The applicant argues that the Chinese economy is premised on the socialist ownership of the means of production, with the State-owned economy being the leading force of the national economy and the State having the mandate to ensure the consolidation and growth of the national economy. In addition, the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) exercises effective control over the economic system of the PR China by engaging in an interventionist economic policy in pursuance of political goals. This effective control is exercised first, at the level of overall administrative control, second through the financial system which is notably dominated by owned commercial banks that align their lending policy with government industrial policy, third the Chinese regulatory environment enables economic intervention in a number of forms.

(41)

In addition, according to the request, the GOC and CCP actively formulate economic policies and oversee their implementation by State-Owned Enterprises (‘SOEs’), claiming a right to participate in their operational decision-making by requiring party members to be present on SOE executive bodies, by rotating cadres between executive bodies and party cells in companies, and by shaping the corporate structure of the SOE sector. Additionally, SOEs are granted a number of economic benefits, such as shielding from competition and preferential access to inputs, including finances.

(42)

The request also claims that the reach of CCP cells in State-owned and private enterprises represents a channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to Chinese legislation, State authorities are permitted to appoint and remove key management personnel in SOEs, reflecting corresponding ownership rights. In the ferro-silicon sector, Party structures overlap with the management bodies of a number of ferro-silicon producers. This overlap is a structural problem. The request notably mentions the Articles of Association of the Junzheng Energy and Chemical Group and to the fact that a board member serves as a member of the People’s Political Consultative Conference (‘CPPCC’) of Otog Banner, as a member of the CPPCC of Wuhai City, as chairman and manager of Junzheng Water Supply, as director of Xilinhot Junzheng, as supervisor of Junzheng Tianyuan, and as director and executive deputy general manager of Junzheng Group.

(43)

Furthermore, the request mentions that the Chinese economy is directed according to an elaborate system of planning that drives resources to sectors that the GOC designates as being of strategic or political importance rather than being allocated in line with market forces. One third of Chinese ferro-silicon output is attributable to two companies: Inner Mongolia Autonomous Erdos Resources Co., Ltd. and Inner Mongolia Junzheng Energy & Chemical Group Co., Ltd for which evidence show that they have received various forms of subsidisation from the Chinese State. In addition, ferroalloy products, including ferro-silicon, are produced in submerged arc furnaces, which contribute to high electricity costs and a number of government plans are targeted at addressing these issues. The request also refers to Commission’s Report on Significant Distortions in the Economy of China (‘Report’) (14), to state that raw materials that are used in the production of ferro-silicon are also subject to significant government interventions, and to OECD data showing that the GOC has implemented export restrictions taking the form of licensing requirements for coke, coking coal, and the form of export taxes for metal waste and scrap.

(44)

Regarding the enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws, the request states that the Chinese system of bankruptcy appears to be characterised by systematic under enforcement. Shortcomings to Chinese insolvency proceedings function as a disincentive for filing bankruptcy. Furthermore, the role of State often has direct influence on the outcome of proceedings. Shortcomings also appear in relation to ownership of land and land use rights in China with rules on allocating land at market prices regularly not being respected. Authorities have also been known to pursue political goals, such as the implementation of economic plans, when allocating land. The CCP has also recognised the provision of land use rights as a legitimate incentive for enterprises’ engagement in M & As. The request also refers to a report describing how the Chinese regulatory environment has been designed in such a way that the industrial sector and, in particular metallurgical companies, can be sold land against lower prices in order to attract investment projects.

(45)

Regarding wage costs being distorted, the request points to a number of ILO Conventions not being ratified by China, particularly those on the freedom of association and on collective bargaining. Because of this, the development of market-based wages in the PR China is impeded by limits on workers’ rights to collective organisation. The request also mentions that there is only one trade organisation under Chinese law, which additionally lacks independence from the State. In addition, reliance on the household registration system limits the mobility of the Chinese workforce and there are evidence of employment stabilisation subsidies.

(46)

Finally, the Chinese financial system is characterised by a strong position of State-owned banks guided by a legal obligation to conduct their decision-making in accordance with State policy, and whose top executives are ultimately appointed by the CCP. Bond and credit ratings are also typically distorted for reasons like the strategic importance of a firm to the GOC and the strength of any implicit guarantee by the government.

(47)

Second, in previous investigations concerning the ferro-silicon sector in China (15), the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present. In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in China resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (16). In particular, the Commission concluded that in the ferro-silicon sector, not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persists in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation (17) but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation (18). The Commission found further that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs further have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in China results in resources being driven to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces. (19) Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in China (20). In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the ferro-silicon sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation (21), as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in China (22).

(48)

Third, in the most recent expiry review concerning the product under review (23) the Commission concluded that significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation were present. No major structural changes in China in general and/or in the relevant sector in particular, capable of affecting that conclusion, are known to the Commission.

(49)

Fourth, additional evidence available in the Report (24), prepared by the Commission pursuant to Article 2(6a)(c) of the basic Regulation, pointed to the existence of significant distortions also during the review investigation period.

(50)

Fifth, no evidence or arguments to the contrary have been adduced by the GOC or the exporting producers in the present investigation.

(51)

In view of the above, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under review, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein. On that basis, and in the absence of any cooperation from the GOC and the exporting producers, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(52)

The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation:

(53)

As explained in recital (34), the Commission issued on 21 November 2025 a Note for the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value: the FOP Note. This note described, inter alia, the facts and evidence underlying the above criteria. In this Note, the Commission informed interested parties of its intention to consider Brazil as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

(54)

In the FOP Note, the Commission identified Brazil as a country with a similar level of economic development as China according to the World Bank, i.e. it is classified by the World Bank as ‘upper-middle income’ country on a gross national income basis.

(55)

Furthermore, Brazil was identified as a country where the product under review is produced in significant volumes on a both regionally or globally competitive market, and through a similar production process as in China.

(56)

In the FOP Note, the Commission carefully analysed all relevant data available in the file for the factors of production in Brazil and noted the following:

(57)

In light of the above considerations, the Commission informed the interested parties through the FOP Note that it intended to use Brazil as an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to source undistorted prices or benchmarks for the calculation of the normal value. Interested parties were invited to comment on the appropriateness of Brazil as a representative country.

(58)

The applicant submitted comments on the by-product ferro-silicon slag, the price of which was considered significantly higher than the price proposed in the review request and the price in the Union market, since the CN code 2621 90 00 , under which ferro-silicon slag is classified, encapsulates other products which have the effect of distorting the average price. The applicant thus proposed to disregard the price of this by-product and to account for its revenue by applying a percentage of the total cost of manufacturing instead.

(59)

The Commission assessed the applicant’s submission. In light of the comments received, the Commission revised its approach and established the undistorted value of ferro-silicon slag as the average price invoiced by a Union producer to two of its unrelated customers in the Union.

(60)

Having established that Brazil was the only available appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

(61)

In view of the above analysis, the Commission concluded that Brazil met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country.

(62)

In the FOP Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under review by the exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose readily available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that note.

(63)

The Commission stated that, in order to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use GTA to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials. In addition, the Commission stated that it would use the statistical database of IBGE and SGB for establishing undistorted costs of labour (27) and energy (28) respectively.

(64)

Finally, the Commission stated that to establish the SG & A costs and profit, it would use Orbis and the financial data from the Brazilian producer of the product concerned, as set out in recitals (73) to (75) below.

(65)

In the absence of cooperation by the Chinese exporting producers, the Commission relied on the information provided by the applicants to establish the factors of production used in the production of ferro-silicon.

(66)

Considering all the information contained in the request, the following factors of production and their sources have been identified in order to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

Table 1

Factors of production of ferro-silicon

(67)

To establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA to which import duties and transport costs were added. An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding China and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council (30).

(68)

The Commission decided to exclude imports from China into the representative country as it concluded in recital (51) that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in China due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices. After excluding imports from China into Brazil, the volume of imports from other third countries remained representative.

(69)

With regard to quartz, after issuance of the FOP Note, the Commission noted that the import price for this raw material into Brazil was unduly high. The Commission therefore decided to consider international benchmarks instead, taking into account imports of quartz from all exporting countries into all importing countries to establish its undistorted value, excluding China and non-WTO countries.

(70)

Normally, domestic transport prices should also be added to these import prices. However, considering the nature of this expiry review investigation, which is focused on finding whether dumping continued during the review investigation period or could reoccur, rather than finding its exact magnitude, the Commission decided that adjustments for domestic transport were unnecessary. Such adjustments would only result in an increase of the normal value and consequently a higher dumping margin.

(71)

IBGE (31) publishes detailed information on wages in different economic sectors in Brazil. The Commission used the latest available statistics of 2023 for average labour cost in the metalworking industry of Brazil.

(72)

The price of electricity for companies (industrial users) in Brazil is published by the SGB. In the FOP Note, the Commission used the data then available, which was the electricity price for industrial consumers for the year 2023. However, the Commission found that subsequently the price of electricity for industrial consumers for the year 2024 was available, therefore it made use of the data pertinent to the review investigation period in the corresponding consumption band in kWh (32).

(73)

According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

(74)

In order to establish an undistorted value of the manufacturing overheads and given the absence of cooperation from the exporting producers, the Commission used facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. Therefore, based on the data of provided by the applicant, the Commission established the ratio of manufacturing overheads to the total manufacturing and labour costs. This percentage was then applied to the undistorted value of the cost of manufacturing to obtain the undistorted value of manufacturing overheads.

(75)

To establish SG & A costs, the Commission used the financial data of the Brazilian producer Companhia de Ferro Ligas da Bahia – Ferbasa (‘Ferbasa’) for the financial year 2024.

(76)

On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(77)

First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers, the Commission relied on the information provided by the applicant in the review request on the usage of each input (materials and labour) for the production of ferro-silicon. The consumption ratios provided by the applicant were verified during the verification visits to the sampled Union producers. The Commission multiplied the consumption ratios by the undistorted costs per unit observed in Brazil, as described in Section 3.1.2.6 above.

(78)

Once the undistorted manufacturing cost is established, the Commission added the manufacturing overheads, the SG & A costs and profit as noted in recitals (74) and (75). Manufacturing overheads were determined based on the data provided by the applicant. The SG & A costs and profit were determined based on the financial statements of Ferbasa for the year 2024 as reported in the company’s audited accounts. The Commission added the following items to the undistorted costs of manufacturing:

(79)

On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(80)

The normal value thus established amounted to 3 094,79 EUR/ton.

(81)

In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers in China, the Commission would determine the export price on CIF Eurostat data corrected to ex works level. Similar to the approach adopted in the previous expiry review, the import volumes were first extracted from the Eurostat import database for the three CN codes covered by this review and then CN codes 7202 29 10 and 7202 29 90 were adjusted to the silicon content of CN code 7202 21 00 (75 %). The import volumes of these CN codes were aggregated and weighted to reflect one average.

(82)

However, on that basis, the volume of imports from China amounted to 788 tonnes during the review investigation period, equivalent to 0,1 % of the total consumption in the Union.

(83)

The Commission considered that this negligible volume could not form the basis for analysing the continuation of dumping. The Commission therefore analysed the likelihood of recurrence of dumping in the next section.

(84)

The Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, should the measures be repealed. In this respect, the Commission analysed the relationship between the normal value in China and the export prices to third countries, the production capacity and spare capacity in China and the attractiveness of the Union market.

(85)

As a consequence of non-cooperation of the GOC and the exporting producers from China, this examination was based on the information available to the Commission, that is information supplied in the request for review and information from other available sources, such as the GTA database.

(86)

In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers from China, the Commission could not establish the export price for imports into the Union during the review investigation period. Thus, the Commission compared the normal value as established in recital (80) with the Chinese export price in the review investigation period to China’s five main export destinations (33), as reported in the GTA database. These prices were adjusted to ex-works level.

(87)

The export prices at EXW level ranged from 824 EUR/ton to 881 EUR/ton. These export prices were significantly (70 %-75 %) below the calculated normal value as reported in recital (80). The Commission therefore considered it likely that, if the current measures were to be repealed, the Chinese exporting producers would export to the Union at dumped prices.

(88)

The information on file showed that China had a significant overcapacity during the review investigation period. According to the data provided in the review request, China has an estimated production capacity of around 10 million tonnes per year, with a total production during the review investigation period amounting to 5,5 million tonnes. The spare capacity in China is estimated at around 4,5 million tonnes per year. Based on the Union consumption as reported in recital (112), the Commission noted that the Chinese producers have thus sufficient spare capacity to potentially serve the Union market up to nine times.

(89)

The Commission compared the Chinese sales prices into the five main export destinations of ferro-silicon from China as described in recital (86) to the average Union industry sales price in the Union, as expressed in recital (138). The analysis showed that export prices to third countries were on average 16 % lower than the average Union industry sales price in the Union.

(90)

Thus, the Commission concluded that the Union market is a very attractive market for Chinese producers when compared to other export markets.

(91)

The Commission also noted that the Union market is the second largest single market after China in terms of consumption (34), and it considered that the big size of the Union market is an attractive factor for any country with huge spare capacity, including China.

(92)

Based on the considerations made in recitals (86) to (92), the Commission concluded that repealing the current measures are likely to result in a recurrence of dumping of imports of Chinese ferro-silicon on the Union market.

(93)

In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether dumping was taking place during the review investigation period and whether dumping was likely to continue or recur upon a possible expiry of the measures in force.

(94)

The Commission noted that after 24 February 2022, in response to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, the Union put trade prohibiting sanctions in place in relation to Russia. Ferro-silicon was added to the Union sanctions against Russia on 18 December 2023, as part of the 12th package of sanctions (35). During the review investigation period and following the implementation of sanctions, imports of the product under review from Russia into the Union virtually disappeared. According to Eurostat statistics, there were no imports of ferro-silicon from Russia in the review investigation period, and the highest level of imports during the period considered was reached in 2022 with approximately 1 900 tonnes. Consequently, imports of ferro-silicon from Russia accounted for 0,0 % market share of the total Union market in the review investigation period.

(95)

As mentioned in recital (17), none of the Russian exporting producers cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, the Commission informed the authorities of Russia that, due to the absence of cooperation, the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation and base its findings on continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury in respect of the exporters/producers in Russia on the facts available. The Commission did not receive any comments or claims from the GOR regarding the application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(96)

Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available, in particular, the information contained in the request for the expiry review, in the submissions by interested parties combined with other sources of information such as trade statistics on imports and exports from Eurostat and GTA, statistical data from specialist websites such us Metal Expert and independent expert reports such as AlloyMetrics.

(97)

As mentioned in recital (96) above, due to the non-cooperation from exporting producers in Russia, the Commission used facts available to establish the normal value. To this end, the Commission used domestic price data provided by the applicant in the request for review, complemented with additional data provided by the applicant to cover the whole review investigation period.

(98)

On that basis, the normal value was established at 1 250 EUR/tonne during the review investigation period.

(99)

There were no exports of the product concerned from Russia into the Union during the review investigation period. The Commission therefore analysed the likelihood of recurrence of dumping.

(100)

In view of the absence of exports of the product concerned from Russia into the Union during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, should the measures be repealed. In this respect, the Commission analysed the relationship between export prices to third countries and prices in Russia, the production capacity and spare capacity in Russia, and the attractiveness of the Union market.

(101)

The Commission compared the normal value, established as explained in recital (98), with the Russian export price in the review investigation period to Russia’s five main export destinations (36), as reported in the GTA database. Similar to the approach adopted in the previous expiry review and as also described in recital (81), the import volumes were first extracted from the GTA database for the three CN codes covered by this review and then CN codes 7202 29 10 and 7202 29 90 were adjusted to the silicon content of CN code 7202 21 00 (75 %). The import volumes of these CN codes were aggregated and weighted to reflect one average. These prices were adjusted to ex-works level. The export prices at EXW level ranged from 967 EUR/tonne to 1 066 EUR/tonne. The comparison, at ex works level, between the normal value and the Russian export prices showed that Russian export prices were on average 19 % lower than the Russian normal value.

(102)

Given the non-cooperation by Russian exporting producers, production capacity and spare capacity in Russia were established on the basis of facts available and in particular the information provided by the applicant, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(103)

Based on the data provided in the review request, the total production in Russia was estimated at 296 000 tonnes during the review investigation period (37), with a domestic consumption of 127 000 tonnes and exports of 169 000 tonnes. The applicant established the total production capacity in Russia at 835 000 tonnes and the Russian spare capacity of 65 % or 539 000 tonnes in the review investigation period, which is more than the total consumption in the Union.

(104)

Thus, on the basis of facts available, the Russian spare production capacity for ferro-silicon amounted to 539 000 tonnes which is more than the total Union consumption in the review investigation period. The Commission therefore found it likely that part of such spare capacity would be directed to the Union market, if measures were allowed to lapse.

(105)

The Commission compared the Russian sales prices into the five main export destinations for ferro-silicon from Russia to the average Union industry sales price in the Union during the review investigation period. The analysis showed that Russian export prices to third countries were on average 21 % lower than the average Union industry sale price in the Union. Thus, the Commission concluded that the Union is a very attractive market for Russian producers when compared to other export markets.

(106)

In addition, the Commission also noted that the Union is the second largest single market after China in terms of consumption (38), and it considered that the big size of the Union market is an attractive factor for any country with huge spare capacity, including Russia.

(107)

Based on the considerations made in recitals (102) to (107), the Commission concluded that repealing the current measures is likely to result in a recurrence of dumping of Russian ferro-silicon imports on the Union market.

(108)

The like product was manufactured by five producers in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(109)

The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 132 378 tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as the data provided by the applicant and the verified data provided by the sampled Union producers. As indicated in recital (13), two Union producers were selected in the sample representing 65 %-75 % of the total Union production of the like product.

(110)

The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the total sales of Union producers and total imports into the Union, as extracted from Comext. The import volumes were first extracted from the Eurostat import database for the three CN codes covered by this review and then CN codes 7202 29 10 and 7202 29 90 were adjusted to the silicon content of CN code 7202 21 00 (75 %). The import volumes of these CN codes were aggregated and weighted to reflect one average, in line with the approach followed in the previous expiry review.

(111)

Union consumption developed as described in Table 2 below; the captive market was nihil in the period considered and negligible in the review investigation period.

Table 2

Union consumption (tonnes)

(112)

The Union consumption of ferro-silicon followed the demand of the automotive and cast-iron industries, which are the main downstream markets. During the period considered, the overall consumption declined year by year and by 19 % in the review investigation period as compared to 2021.

(113)

The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of the data extracted from Comext at TARIC code level. The market share of these imports was established on the basis of its volume as compared to the total consumption in the Union.

(114)

Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

(115)

During the period considered, imports from China and Russia were negligible, with the exception of 2022 due to the exceptional strong demand after the COVID-19 pandemic.

(116)

The Commission established the import prices from the countries concerned on the basis of the Comext database.

(117)

The weighted average price (39) of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 4

Import prices (EUR/tonne)

(118)

Import prices from China and Russia increased during the period considered and in particular in 2022. However, in view of the negligible volume of imports from the countries concerned, the Commission considered that no meaningful conclusion could be drawn from these import prices. For the same reason, the Commission did not conduct an undercutting analysis based on the import prices from Comext from the countries concerned.

(119)

The imports of ferro-silicon from third countries other than China and Russia were mainly from Norway, Iceland, Kazakhstan and Brazil.

(120)

The total volume of imports into the Union (40) as well as the market share and price trends for imports of ferro-silicon from other third countries developed as follows:

Table 5

Imports from third countries

(121)

The overall volume of imports was stable between 2021 and 2023, and then decreased (-17 % when compared to 2021) during the review investigation period. Norway maintained the position of leading exporting country into the Union, with a market share above 26 % from 2021 to 2023, which even increased above 33 % in the review investigation period.

(122)

Overall, the price of imports of ferro-silicon into the Union increased sharply in 2022 with a 77 % rise from 2021, and decreased in the following two years, reaching the same level of 2021 in the review investigation period. The fluctuation of price was due to increase of energy prices and restrictions in international trade caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

(123)

The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(124)

As mentioned in recital (13), sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(125)

For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the review request, the questionnaire replies of the two sampled Union producers and the applicant. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(126)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(127)

The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(128)

The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(129)

The production volume of the Union industry decreased by 29 % when comparing the review investigation period with 2021, i.e. much stronger than the drop in consumption (-19 %). The Union production capacity remained stable from 2021 to 2023 and subsequently decreased by 10 % in the review investigation period.

(130)

The capacity utilisation, expressed as a ratio between actual production and production capacity, shrank by 22 % in the review investigation period as a consequence of the reduced volume produced and despite the decrease in the overall production capacity.

(131)

The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Sales volume and market share

(132)

From the beginning of the period considered, the sales volume of the Union industry had decreased by 46 % in 2023. The Union industry regained some sales volumes and market share in the review investigation period. However, compared to 2021, its market share decreased by 2,2 percentage points over the period considered, while its sales volume on the Union market also declined strongly, by 25 %.

(133)

In the period considered the market of ferro-silicon in the Union shrank, with production and capacity utilisation decreasing respectively by 29 % and 22 %, and sales volume decreasing by 25 %, with a peak of decrease of 46 % in 2023. The overall reduction of the Union market affected negatively the ability of the Union industry to maintain a healthy financial position.

(134)

Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity

(135)

Employment remained stable from 2021 to 2023 and increased by 6 % in the review investigation period. The productivity however, expressed as a ration between volume produced over number of full-time equivalent (FTE), followed the respective trends in production and employment, marking a significant decrease of 33 % in the review investigation period. The decrease in productivity impacted negatively the Union industry’s ability to absorb labour fixed costs.

(136)

As explained in recitals (83) and (99), it was not possible to establish an affirmative determination of dumping during the review investigation period. The investigation therefore focused on the likelihood of a recurrence of dumping should the anti-dumping measures be repealed.

(137)

The anti-dumping measures initially imposed with the original investigation and subsequently extended by the previous expiry review, as indicated in recitals (1) and (2), allowed the Union industry to recover from the injury suffered from past dumping and maintain their position in the market, notwithstanding the high pressure from imports and other challenges on the market over the years.

(138)

The average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonne)

(139)

The average unit cost of production of the Union industry increased strongly in 2022, then decreased in the following year to increase strongly again in the review investigation period. These strong variations were due to the global turmoil triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the variations in the energy price and the increase of labour costs. It was also affected by the reduced capacity utilisation (recital (129)) and productivity (recital (134)), as these indicators reduced the ability of the Union industry to absorb fixed costs.

(140)

From 2021 to 2023, the average sale price followed the trend of the cost of production. However, during the review investigation period, whereas the cost of production sharply increased, the Union industry average sale price plummeted.

(141)

The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee

(142)

The average labour cost per FTE of the Union industry increased by 38 % over the period considered. Such increase was due to salary adjustment following the increasing inflation over the same period.

(143)

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Inventories

(144)

The volume of ferro-silicon stock present in the inventories of the Union industry increased by 85 % during the period considered, with a peak in 2023 marking an increase of volume more than five times higher than the beginning of the period considered. The significant increase in stock levels in 2023 was explained by the Union industry as a frontloading of incoming orders from unrelated customers during periods when the energy costs were more advantageous.

(145)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

(146)

The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. Profitability had a positive trend until 2023, then decreased sharply in the review investigation period due to combined effect of decreasing average sale price and increasing unit cost of production.

(147)

The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow increased in 2023, and in the review investigation period it dropped dramatically by 254 % from the beginning of the period considered, following the trend of the Union industry’s profitability.

(148)

The investments by the Union industry during the period considered were aimed mainly at the maintenance of the production facilities of ferro-silicon. They went up in 2022 and 2023 but then dropped sharply in the review investigation period to arrive at a level 19 % below 2021.

(149)

The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It developed negatively in the review investigation period, decreasing by 206 %, as a consequence of the loss-making situation of the Union industry in the same period.

(150)

In spite of the anti-dumping measures in place, the Union industry was not in a healthy situation in the review investigation period. The Union industry’s market share went down by 8 % and it amounted to no more than 26,9 % in the review investigation period (compared to 29,1 % at the beginning of the period considered. During the period considered, both production (-29 %) and sales volumes (-25 %) of the Union industry decreased. Concurrently, the Union industry’s cost of production increased by 34 %-40 %, whereas its sales prices on the Union market decreased by 18 %-24 %. As a consequence, whereas the Union industry made a healthy profit between 22 %-27 % in 2021, it recorded a loss between 27 %-33 % in the review investigation period.

(151)

The Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

(152)

During the period considered, the Union industry suffered material injury. However, imports of ferro-silicon from China and Russia during the period considered did not have any material impact on the Union industry’s situation. Due to the measures in force, their market share was minimal throughout the whole period.

(153)

The decrease in Union consumption by 19 % over the period considered was one of the main causes of injury. That drop in demand by the EU iron and steel industry (with the automotive sector being the main driver) dragged down the productivity and profitability of the Union industry. The double digit loss that the Union industry incurred in the review investigation period was due to an important decrease of sales price, pushed by significant competition in the EU market in which the Union industry is only one of many players. The fierce competition on the EU market was intensified by the reduction in consumption and increase of global overcapacity, and in addition the Union industry was confronted with a very strong increase of the unit cost of production, linked to soaring energy and labour costs.

(154)

After final disclosure the GOR concurred with the conclusion that the above factors caused injury and it pointed, in addition, to the high energy prices for the Union industry in 2022 and to what it called ‘the EU stringent environmental regulatory framework’. The Commission took note of the GOR’s submission but observed that the claim with regard to the Union industry’s environmental compliance costs was unsubstantiated.

(155)

On that basis, the Commission concluded that Chinese and Russian imports are not responsible for the material injury to the Union industry, but that other factors, in particular those mentioned in recital (153), caused that injury.

(156)

Therefore, the Commission decided to further assess, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the PRC and Russia if the measures against such imports were allowed to lapse.

(157)

In the absence of cooperation from any party in the PRC and Russia, the Commission relied on the information available on file in order to analyse the likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the PRC and Russia. In this respect the following elements were analysed by the Commission with regard to the countries concerned: the production capacity and spare capacity, the attractiveness of the Union market and the impact of increased volumes of Chinese and Russian imports on the Union industry.

(158)

As concluded in recitals (88) and (103), the Commission established that China and Russia have significant overcapacity of ferro-silicon production which can cover several times the Union consumption. That spare capacity could be used for export to the Union if measures were allowed to lapse.

(159)

As reported in recitals (89) and (105), the average sale prices in the Union of the Union industry in the review investigation period well above the average sales prices of the Chinese and Russian exporting producers on their five main export destination markets. Moreover, the large size of the Union market – the second largest market worldwide – makes the Union market even more attractive. A redirection of exports to the Union is therefore likely if no measures would be in place.

(160)

Should measures be allowed to lapse, the Union industry will be confronted with an important increase of Chinese and Russian imports of ferro-silicon. Therefore, the likely arrival into the Union of high volumes of imports from the countries concerned, at much lower prices, would force the Union industry to further reduce its production volumes. As it was already heavily loss-making in the review investigation period, the inability of the Union industry to compete with such influx of low-priced, dumped imports would jeopardize its continued existence.

(161)

In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China and Russia at injurious price levels, therefore further aggravating the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(162)

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved.

(163)

The investigation found that the Union industry suffered injury during the review investigation period. The Union industry is in a dire situation, being confronted with weak demand, high costs and low prices. Should measure lapse, the expected influx of low-priced imports from the countries concerned would further aggravate the injury it currently suffers. Therefore, it is clearly in the interest of the Union industry to maintain the anti-dumping measures.

(164)

All known importers were informed about the initiation of the expiry review. No importer came forward.

(165)

In the current investigation there is no evidence on file suggesting that the measures in force affected importers in any negative way.

(166)

Therefore, it was concluded that it would not be disproportionate to importers to maintain the measures.

(167)

In the previous expiry review investigation, it was concluded that users would not be disproportionally affected, even if measures were to be extended. No user came forward in the context of this investigation.

(168)

In the current investigation there is no evidence on file suggesting that the measures in force affected users in any negative way.

(169)

Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the measures currently in force had no substantial negative effect on the financial situation of users and that the continuation of the measures would not unduly affect them.

(170)

In light of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in China and Russia.

(171)

On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon from China and Russia should be maintained.

(172)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’ in China or ‘all other companies’ in Russia.

(173)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(174)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(175)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in China and Russia and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’ respectively for imports originating in China and Russia. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(176)

A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (41). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (42) when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(177)

An exporter or producer that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the period that was used to set the level of the duty currently applicable to its exports may request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request, provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the period that was used to set the level of the duty applicable to its exports; (ii) it is not related to a company that did so and thus is subject to the anti-dumping duties; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

(178)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(179)

The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,