ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

30 June 2026 (*)

( Application for interim measures – Public procurement – Exclusion from procurement and award procedures governed by Regulations (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and (EU) 2018/1877 or from being selected to implement EU funds – Publication of information – Application for suspension of operation – Prima facie case – Urgency – Balancing of interests )

In Case T‑108/26 R,

QS, represented by A. Guillerme and L. Marchal, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by T. Isacu de Groot, A. Koričić and P. Rossi, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

having regard to the order of 4 March 2026, QS v Commission (T‑108/26 R, not published),

makes the following

Order

1        By its application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, QS, seeks suspension of the operation of Article 2 of the decision of the European Commission of 8 December 2025 excluding it from participating in procurement and award procedures governed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1877 or from being selected to implement funds governed by those regulations (‘the contested decision’), in so far as that article provides for the publication of information relating to that exclusion on the Commission’s website.

 Background to the dispute and forms of order sought by the parties

2        The applicant is [confidential]. (1)

3        On 1 August 2017, a consortium, of which the applicant was a member, submitted a tender which included a statement of exclusivity and availability in the context of the service contract [confidential].

4        On 9 May 2018, the service contract [confidential] was awarded to the consortium of which the applicant was a member.

5        On 13 May 2018, the consortium confirmed to the contracting authority that [confidential] would be available, in the capacity of expert (‘the expert concerned’), from 1 August 2018 for the implementation of service contract [confidential].

6        On 22 May 2018, the applicant, as leader of a consortium, submitted a tender in the context of the restricted procedure for the service contract [confidential]. That tender included a statement of exclusivity and availability which the expert concerned had signed on 1 April 2018.

7        On 18 June 2018, the evaluation committee, in the course of evaluating the tenders submitted in the call for tenders [confidential], asked the applicant if, prior to the deadline for submission of tenders for that project, the expert concerned had submitted one or more statements of exclusivity and availability in connection with any other EU-funded external action service tender procedures for which he had not received a confirmed engagement.

8        On 19 June 2018, the applicant replied that the expert concerned had signed a declaration of exclusivity and availability for the call for tenders [confidential] on 1 April 2018. It explained that, prior to that date, the expert concerned had signed a declaration of exclusivity and availability for another project [confidential]. Lastly, it confirmed that the expert concerned had not signed any other declaration of exclusivity and availability for any other EU service tenders which were still valid and in respect of which the evaluation outcome was pending.

9        Following the evaluation carried out by the evaluation committee for the call for tenders [confidential], the contract was awarded to another tenderer.

10      On 28 August 2018, [confidential] informed the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) of possible irregularities and fraud concerning the call for tenders [confidential].

11      On 30 August 2018, OLAF initiated an investigation, with reference [confidential], into possible irregularities and fraud committed by the applicant and the expert concerned.

12      On 2 March 2021, OLAF sent the applicant a summary of the factual allegations concerning it, which had been drawn up during the investigation, and invited it to submit observations, which it did on 10 March 2021.

13      On 8 June 2021, OLAF adopted its final report.

14      On 20 December 2023, the panel provided for in Article 143 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ 2018 L 193, p. 1), sent the applicant an adversarial letter informing it of the facts at issue and their preliminary classification in law (‘the adversarial letter’). By its letter, the panel invited the applicant to submit written observations, which it did on 29 January 2024.

15      In the adversarial letter, the panel referred to in paragraph 14 above took the preliminary view that the applicant should be excluded for a period of two and a half years on the following grounds:

–        in its application to participate, individually or as a member of a consortium, in three projects and in a call for tenders, the applicant had proposed the same expert;

–        on 1 April 2018, when the expert concerned signed the declaration of exclusivity and availability for the call for tenders [confidential], the service contract [confidential] had not yet been awarded;

–        for three contracts, awarded to the applicant individually or as a member of a consortium, and for the call for tenders [confidential], which were all to be implemented in different countries, the workload accumulated by the expert concerned was such that, between September 2018 and September 2019, it would have been impossible for him to fulfil all his obligations;

–        when the evaluation committee asked the applicant whether the declaration of exclusivity and availability of the expert concerned for the call for tenders [confidential] was compatible with his outstanding commitments under two contracts and whether he had submitted declarations of exclusivity and availability in other EU-funded external action service tender procedures, the applicant’s reply of 19 June 2018 contained an inaccurate statement of the number of working days that were left for the expert to fulfil his obligations and asserted, misleadingly, that it was not aware of any other declarations of exclusivity and availability signed by the expert concerned between 1 April 2018 and the tender deadline which were still valid and in respect of which the evaluation outcome was still pending.

16      On 29 October 2025, the panel referred to in paragraph 14 above adopted Recommendation No 2025/07 in which it recommended that the Commission (i) exclude the applicant from participating in award procedures governed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509) and by Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1877 of 26 November 2018 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2015/323 (OJ 2018 L 307, p. 1), and from being selected to implement EU funds, for a period of two years, on account of grave professional misconduct, in accordance with Article 138(1)(c) of Regulation 2024/2509, and (ii) publish information regarding the exclusion on the Commission’s website, in accordance with Article 142(1) of Regulation 2024/2509.

17      On 8 December 2025, the Commission notified the applicant of the contested decision.

18      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 15 February 2026, the applicant brought an action seeking, inter alia, the annulment of the contested decision.

19      By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 3 March 2026, the applicant made an application for interim measures, in which it claims that the President of the General Court should:

–        suspend the operation of Article 2 of the contested decision, in so far as it provides for the publication of the exclusion on the Commission’s website;

–        reserve the costs.

20      In its observations on the application for interim measures, which were lodged at the Court Registry on 18 March 2026, the Commission contends that the President of the General Court should:

–        dismiss the application for interim measures as unfounded;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

 General considerations

21      In accordance with Articles 278 and 279 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 256(1) TFEU, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of an act challenged before the Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, under the conditions laid down in Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12).

22      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.

23      Thus, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order suspension of the operation of an act and other interim measures if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law (fumus boni juris), and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main proceedings. Those conditions are cumulative, with the result that an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim measures is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

24      In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing an application for interim measures has a wide discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

25      Having regard to the material in the case file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information needed to rule on the application for interim measures without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties.

26      In the circumstances of the present case, it is appropriate first to examine the condition relating to a prima facie case.

 The condition relating to a prima facie case

27      According to settled case-law, the condition relating to a prima facie case is satisfied where at least one of the pleas in law put forward by the applicant for interim measures in support of the main action appears, prima facie, not unfounded. That is the case where one of those pleas reveals the existence of a major legal or factual disagreement the solution to which is not immediately obvious and therefore calls for a detailed examination that cannot be carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures, but must be the subject of the main proceedings (see, to that effect, orders of 3 December 2014, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P-R, EU:C:2014:2418, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and of 1 March 2017, EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet international, C‑512/16 P(R), not published, EU:C:2017:149, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

28      In the present case, in order to demonstrate that the contested decision is, prima facie, vitiated by illegality, the applicant puts forward five pleas in law.

29      It is appropriate to begin by examining the fifth plea, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality. That plea is divided into two parts.

30      By the first part, the applicant claims that the duration of the exclusion was not sufficiently reduced following its observations and the withdrawal, in the contested decision, of several allegations relied on in the recommendation of the panel referred to in paragraph 14 above.

31      In that context, the applicant submits, inter alia, that the withdrawal of the only allegation supporting the existence of intent, namely that it had provided incorrect information concerning the availability of the expert concerned, should logically have led to a significant reassessment of the gravity of its conduct. It adds that the fact that it did not engage in that conduct again should have had a material mitigating effect, in accordance with the EU institutions’ practice with regard to penalties. Lastly, it states that the prolonged duration of the administrative procedure weakened the justification for maintaining such a lengthy exclusion and for its publication.

32      By the second part of the fifth plea, the applicant claims that the Commission erred in its assessment of the circumstances of the case, leading to a disproportionate decision.

33      In that context, first, the applicant submits, as regards the seriousness of the situation, that the Commission did not take sufficient account of the factual and legal circumstances specific to the case. In particular, the Commission did not take due account of the fact that the validity period of the tender in respect of the service contract [confidential] had expired, with the result that neither the applicant nor the expert concerned was legally bound by that tender or by the corresponding statement of exclusivity and availability.

34      Secondly, the applicant states, as regards whether the conduct it is alleged to have engaged in was intentional or negligent, that the Commission failed to establish, on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence, that it had acted intentionally. It maintains that it has always acted in good faith and in accordance with the rules applicable to the various tenders and the confirmed engagements of the expert concerned. It has consistently denied any intention to mislead the evaluation committee or to conceal information and the Commission did not adduce sufficient proof to the contrary. In any event, the identification of a single, limited and isolated instance of conduct occurring in an unclear legal and regulatory context cannot be regarded as sufficiently serious to call into question the reliability of the economic operator concerned vis-à-vis the contracting authorities.

35      Thirdly, it argues, as regards the period of approximately seven years which elapsed since the alleged misconduct ended, that the Commission acknowledged that, in the circumstances of the present case, such a lapse of time cannot justify a two-year exclusion, particularly where the conduct at issue was isolated, did not recur and did not produce any adverse effects.

36      Fourthly, the applicant claims that, in the absence of any financial damage to the European Union, an exclusion of such duration cannot reasonably be justified, let alone an exclusion accompanied by publication.

37      Fifthly, the applicant submits that the Commission failed to take proper account of additional mitigating circumstances, such as the fact that (i) the alleged conduct was limited in duration to a short period from 22 May to 19 June 2018, related only to one call for tenders and did not recur; (ii) the applicant cooperated fully and transparently throughout the OLAF investigation and the procedure, responded to all requests for information, remained available to provide further clarification, and expressly requested to be heard in person to clarify the facts, a request which was refused; and (iii) the Commission also failed to consider the applicant’s proposed remedial measures.

38      The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments and contends that the exclusion decision and the decision to publish that exclusion are not disproportionate.

39      In the first place, as regards the reduction of the exclusion period which, it is claimed, it should have granted as a result of the withdrawal of several allegations set out in the adversarial letter, the Commission states that, should that argument be upheld, it would be deprived of its discretion to determine the appropriate duration of an exclusion.

40      In the second place, as regards the alleged error in the assessment of the circumstances of the case which led to the imposition of a disproportionate exclusion on the applicant, the Commission submits that it took into account the specific factual and legal context of the case, in particular the fact that the period of validity of the tender [confidential] had expired.

41      In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument that it had no intention of jeopardising the proper implementation of EU-funded projects, the Commission maintains that the fact that there were no consequences is the result of circumstances beyond the applicant’s control, namely the fact that it was ultimately not awarded the call for tenders [confidential]. Conversely, had the applicant been awarded the call for tenders, while the expert concerned was committed to other contracts, that would have raised concerns about the validity of the award, given the incomplete nature of the information provided during the evaluation.

42      In the fourth place, the Commission states that, since the applicant had guaranteed the availability of the expert concerned for the performance of several contracts simultaneously, such conduct is contrary to good faith. Had it entertained doubts, the applicant could have asked the contracting authority whether its interpretation of the concept of ‘commitment’ in point 4.1 of the instructions to tenderers was correct, but it preferred to leave space to ambiguity since that allowed it to preserve its chances of being awarded several contracts.

43      As a preliminary point, it should be noted, as the Commission did (see recital 31 of the contested decision), that it appears, prima facie, that the allegations made against the applicant and which led to its exclusion occurred between May and June 2018, namely between the submission of its bid in the call for tenders [confidential] and its response to the evaluation committee’s questions.

44      Consequently, the provisions applicable in the present case are those of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L 298, p. 1), as amended.

45      Article 106(3) of Regulation No 966/2012, as amended, is worded as follows:

‘Any decision of the contracting authority taken under Articles 106 to 108 or, where applicable, any recommendation of the panel referred to in Article 108, shall be made in compliance with the principle of proportionality and in particular taking into account the seriousness of the situation, including the impact on the Union’s financial interests and image, the time which has elapsed since the relevant conduct, its duration and its recurrence, the intention or degree of negligence … or any other mitigating circumstances, such as the degree of collaboration of the economic operator with the relevant competent authority and its contribution to the investigation as recognised by the contracting authority, or the disclosure of the exclusion situation by means of the declaration referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article.’

46      It is also clear from settled case-law in the field of the law governing penalties that, by virtue of the principle of proportionality, the acts of the institutions must not go beyond what is appropriate and necessary to achieve the desired objective. The gravity of infringements has to be determined by reference to numerous factors and it is important not to confer on one or other of those factors an importance that is disproportionate in relation to other factors. In that context, the principle of proportionality requires the penalty to be set proportionately to the factors taken into account for the purpose of assessing the gravity of the infringement and also requires those factors to be applied in a way which is consistent and objectively justified (see judgment of 9 February 2022, Companhia de Seguros Índico v Commission, T‑672/19, not published, EU:T:2022:64, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

47      In the present case, first, in order to determine the duration of the exclusion, it follows from recital 100 of the contested decision that the Commission took into account, in accordance with Article 106(3) of Regulation No 966/2012, as amended, as an aggravating circumstance the fact that ‘the [applicant]’s conduct was intentional and not just negligent (as detailed in [recital] (92))’, whilst also taking into account, as mitigating circumstances, the time that had elapsed since the conduct at issue, namely seven years, and the absence of direct damage to the financial interests of the European Union (recital 101 of the contested decision).

48      The argument by which the applicant challenges the proportionality of the decision to exclude it for a period of two years in the light of the circumstances of the case must be interpreted as inviting the Court to assess, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the proportionate nature of the exclusion penalty and its duration taking into account the circumstances invoked (see judgment of 2 October 2024, VC v EU-OSHA (Exclusion from participation in public procurement procedures on the basis of a national administrative decision which has been stayed), T‑126/23, under appeal, EU:T:2024:666, paragraph 125 and the case-law cited).

49      In accordance with Article 108(11) of Regulation No 966/2012, as amended, the Court ‘shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review a decision whereby the contracting authority excludes an economic operator and/or imposes on it a financial penalty, including reducing or increasing the duration of the exclusion and/or cancelling, reducing or increasing the financial penalty imposed’. Beyond the mere review of legality, which allows only for the dismissal of the action for annulment or for the annulment of the contested act, that unlimited jurisdiction empowers the Court to vary the contested act, even without annulling it, by taking into account all the factual circumstances, so as to amend, for example, the duration of the exclusion. In those circumstances, the Court may, if necessary, make different findings from those made by the Commission in the contested decision with regard to the duration of the exclusion (judgment of 29 June 2022, LA International Cooperation v Commission, T‑609/20, EU:T:2022:407, paragraph 157).

50      It is true that the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction does not amount to a review of the Court’s own motion, and proceedings are inter partes. Thus, unlimited jurisdiction does not require that the Court should be obliged to undertake of its own motion a new and comprehensive investigation of the file, independently of the claims put forward by the applicant. However, in order to satisfy the requirements of a review in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction with regard to penalties, the EU judicature is bound to examine all complaints based on issues of fact and law that seek to show that the penalty is not commensurate with the gravity or the duration of the misconduct. By challenging the proportionate nature of its exclusion, the applicant is specifically challenging the commensurate nature of the penalty in the present case (see judgment of 2 October 2024, VC v EU-OSHA (Exclusion from participation in public procurement procedures on the basis of a national administrative decision which has been stayed), T‑126/23, under appeal, EU:T:2024:666, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited).

51      In the present case, it cannot be ruled out that the Court may make use of that jurisdiction when ruling on the action in the main proceedings and reduce the duration of the exclusion.

52      Secondly, the Commission considered the allegedly intentional nature of the applicant’s conduct to be an aggravating circumstance (see recital 100 of the contested decision).

53      However, the assessment of whether the Commission established, on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence, that the applicant had acted intentionally is a complex matter the solution to which is not immediately obvious in the context of proceedings for interim measures, but rather calls for a detailed examination by the court adjudicating on the substance of the case. It will be for that court to examine, in the light of the specific circumstances, whether all the evidence relied on in the contested decision reflects wrongful intent or at least gross negligence on the part of the applicant. It should be noted in that regard that the applicant insists that it acted in good faith and did not intend to mislead the evaluation committee or conceal information. It also draws attention to the fact that this was a single, limited and isolated instance of conduct which occurred in a legal and regulatory context that was unclear.

54      Thirdly, as regards the time which elapsed since the misconduct ended, as mentioned in paragraph 47 above, it is apparent from recital 101 of the contested decision that the Commission took due account of the fact that seven years had elapsed since the conduct alleged against the applicant took place.

55      In that regard, it must be stated that a period of seven years between the commission of the wrongful acts and the adoption of the exclusion decision is a period which appears, prima facie, to be unreasonable.

56      Fourthly, as regards the absence of any impact on the financial interests of the European Union, as mentioned in paragraph 47 above, it is apparent from recital 101 of the contested decision that the fact that no damage was caused to the financial interests of the European Union was indeed regarded as a mitigating circumstance.

57      However, although the Commission took account of the absence of damage to the financial interests of the European Union as a mitigating circumstance, the mere fact that it was taken into account does not make it possible to ascertain, prima facie, the specific weight which the Commission attached to that mitigating circumstance.

58      The question whether, in accordance with Article 106(17)(b) of Regulation No 966/2012, as amended, the decision to publish the information relating to the applicant’s exclusion on the Commission’s website is disproportionate, given the absence of damage to the financial interests of the European Union, thus depends on the examination of the specific circumstances of the case by the court adjudicating on the substance.

59      Fifthly, in the contested decision, the Commission does not appear to have taken into account, as a mitigating circumstance, the applicant’s level of cooperation.

60      The answer to the question whether the Commission should have taken account of additional mitigating circumstances, in particular the applicant’s degree of cooperation, is also not obvious. It should be noted that the procedure was not only lengthy, but also involved several actors and the applicant had to submit to each of them the information requested as well as its observations on the various points they raised. A thorough examination of all those elements and the related documents in order to determine the precise degree of cooperation of the applicant cannot be carried out in proceedings for interim measures, but is the responsibility of the court adjudicating on the substance.

61      Sixthly, in the contested decision, the remedial measures proposed by the applicant do not appear to have been taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. According to the applicant, even if those measures were considered insufficient to justify not excluding it entirely from award procedures, they should have been taken into account as a mitigating circumstance in setting the duration of the exclusion and in deciding on its publication on the Commission’s website.

62      In that regard, it must be held that the applicant’s arguments call for a detailed examination that cannot be carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures, but must be the subject of the main proceedings.

63      It follows from the foregoing that, without prejudging the decision of the Court in the main action, it must be concluded that the applicant’s arguments, put forward in the context of the fifth plea, appear, prima facie, not unfounded within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 27 above.

64      It must therefore be found that there is a prima facie case.

 The condition relating to urgency

65      In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the EU judicature. To attain that objective, urgency must generally be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measures. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see, to that effect, order of 14 January 2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

66      It is in the light of those criteria that it is necessary to examine whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency.

67      In the present case, in the first place, the applicant argues that, in addition to the material damage resulting from the loss of contracts and turnover, the damage resulting from the publication of an exclusion decision is irreversible, unquantifiable and, thus, irreparable, since its non-public nature cannot be restored, even if the action on the merits were subsequently upheld by the Court.

68      In the second place, according to the applicant, the damage to its reputation as a result of the publication of the decision to exclude it for two years from EU public procurement procedures for alleged irregularities could not be erased ex post facto by financial compensation. Such exclusion would, it is claimed, permanently undermine the applicant’s commercial relationships with its counterparts in the public and private sectors, relationships built on trust over many years, which could not simply be reinstated after the expiry of the exclusion period.

69      In the third place, the applicant submits that the same reputational damage would also prevent it from retaining and attracting the most qualified professionals in its field, entailing a loss of human capital which, by its nature, could not be recovered even after several years and which cannot be quantified. Indeed, the publication of a decision excluding an undertaking for two years from EU public procurement proceedings accounting for approximately 70% of its turnover would make it virtually impossible to retain qualified professionals and to attract new ones. The potential annulment of the contested decision would not enable the applicant to remedy that situation retrospectively.

70      To conclude, the applicant maintains that the publication of the contested decision exposes it to a serious deterioration of its reputation and financial position. Such deterioration risks placing it in a situation in which the continuation of its activities may be jeopardised, with potentially irreversible consequences for its organisational structure, its workforce and its market presence.

71      The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

72      In the first place, the Commission submits that a press article published on [confidential] had already disclosed the same information concerning the exclusion as that to be published under Article 2 of the contested decision and that, consequently, the applicant could not derive any additional damage in terms of jeopardising the continuation of its activities, with potentially irreversible consequences for its market presence.

73      In the second place, the Commission states that the applicant is challenging only the publication of the information relating to the exclusion, but not the exclusion itself. It follows that even if the publication were suspended, the applicant would still suffer the loss of the opportunity to conclude new financing contracts resulting from the exclusion, which would not be suspended, and not from the publication itself.

74      In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the damage resulting from publication is a priori irreversible, the Commission contends that, if the applicant were to succeed in the main proceedings, the Commission would consider it appropriate, as a measure to comply with the judgment in accordance with Article 268 TFEU, to publish on its website the information relating to the judgment in question and the non-exclusion of the applicant on the ground referred to in the contested decision, for the same period as that for which the information on the exclusion would be published under Article 2 of the contested decision.

75      To conclude, the Commission asks the President of the General Court to find that, in the present case, the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant, in terms of it being potentially discredited as a result of the publication of the information on the Commission’s website, could be effectively remedied by the proposed subsequent publication of information relating to its exoneration and that, consequently, such damage should not be regarded as irreparable. If the contested decision is ultimately annulled, the applicant would be able to remedy that situation retroactively.

76      In that connection, in the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the damage resulting from the publication of an exclusion decision is irreversible, not quantifiable and, thus, irreparable, it must be borne in mind that, admittedly, damage of a financial nature cannot, otherwise than in exceptional circumstances, be regarded as irreparable since, as a general rule, pecuniary compensation is capable of restoring the aggrieved person to the situation that obtained before that person suffered the damage. That is however not the case, and such damage can then be deemed to be irreparable, if it cannot be quantified (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

77      It is true that the uncertainty of obtaining compensation for pecuniary damage if an action for damages is brought cannot in itself be regarded as a factor capable of establishing that such damage is irreparable within the meaning of the case-law of the Court of Justice. At the interlocutory stage, the possibility of subsequently obtaining compensation for pecuniary damage if an action for damages is brought following annulment of the contested measure is necessarily uncertain. Interlocutory proceedings are not intended to act as a substitute for an action for damages in order to remove that uncertainty, since their purpose is only to guarantee the full effectiveness of the final future decision that will be made in the main action (in this case an action for annulment), to which the interlocutory proceedings are an adjunct (order of 28 November 2013, EMA v InterMune UK and Others, C‑390/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:795, paragraph 50).

78      By contrast, the situation is different where it is already clear, when the assessment is carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures, that, in view of its nature and the manner in which it will foreseeably occur, the harm alleged, should it occur, may not be adequately identified or quantified and that, in practice, it will not therefore be possible to make good that harm by bringing an action for damages (order of 28 November 2013, EMA v InterMune UK and Others, C‑390/13 P(R), EU:C:2013:795, paragraph 51).

79      In the present case, it must be stated that it appears to the judge hearing the application for interim measures that, in view of its nature and the manner in which it will foreseeably occur, the harm alleged, should it occur, may not be adequately determined and that, in practice, it will not therefore be possible to make good that harm by bringing an action for damages.

80      Contrary to the Commission’s argument, it is not clear to the judge hearing the application for interim measures that that harm may be quantified in particular by assessing the extent to which the applicant would suffer the loss of the opportunity to conclude new financing contracts with public or private bodies, since the prospect of concluding new financing contracts is uncertain and unforeseeable and is based on subjective factors, such as the discretionary decision of public and private organisations or of the general public, which is impossible to quantify.

81      It should also be added that, as regards the risk of losing the opportunity to secure contracts and business at a later stage, the range of the public and private organisations concerned is unknown.

82      Lastly, such damage is, a priori, irreversible since, once the information contained in the publication concerned has been made available, its non-public nature can no longer be restored, even if the applicant’s action in the main proceedings were ultimately upheld.

83      The Commission’s reasoning that the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant could be effectively remedied by the subsequent publication by the Commission of information relating to its exoneration does not cast doubt on that conclusion.

84      By subsequently publishing information relating to the applicant’s exoneration, the Commission could not ensure that the same public which, for two years, had had access to the information concerned would be informed of that exoneration.

85      In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the publication of the decision to exclude it for two years from EU public procurement procedures for alleged irregularities would very seriously harm its reputation, it must be stated that that publication is not a communication limited to the sphere of the EU institutions.

86      It is true that, in the context of the EDES database, Article 144(5) of Regulation 2024/2509 provides that all persons and entities involved in budget implementation in accordance with Article 62 of that regulation are to be granted access by the Commission to the information on decisions on exclusion pursuant to Article 138 thereof.

87      However, unlike registration in the EDES database, which is intended only for internal use and is accessible only to authorised users, not to all authorities (see, to that effect, order of 8 May 2024, Lattanzio KIBS and Others v Commission, T‑113/24 R, not published, EU:T:2024:306, paragraph 44), the publication at issue here is accessible to the general public.

88      Accordingly, if the application for interim measures is dismissed, when such publication takes place, it will be likely to have a significant impact on the applicant’s reputation and, consequently, to place it in a situation in which the continuation of its activities may be jeopardised, with potentially irreversible consequences for its organisational structure, its workforce and its market presence.

89      That situation is all the more harmful since the information at issue remains available on the internet for the entire duration of the exclusion, that is to say, for two years. It is of little importance, in that regard, that the contested decision is not disclosed to the public, given that the absence of any justification concerning the errors committed by the applicant is likely to fuel speculation on the part of the public (see, to that effect, order of 7 August 2025, JB v EUSPA, T‑281/25 R, not published, EU:T:2025:782, paragraph 86).

90      It follows that the damage which the applicant risks suffering in the event of disclosure of that information must be regarded as irreparable.

91      In view of the foregoing considerations, it must be found that the requirement relating to urgency is satisfied in the present case, since the likelihood of the applicant suffering serious and irreparable damage has been established to the requisite legal standard.

 Balancing of interests

92      According to the case-law, in weighing up the different interests involved, the judge hearing the application for interim relief has to determine, in particular, whether or not the interest of the party seeking suspension of operation of the contested measure in securing that suspension outweighs the interest in the immediate application of the measure, by examining, more specifically, whether the possible annulment of the measure by the court when ruling on the main application would allow the situation that would be brought about by its immediate implementation to be reversed and, conversely, whether suspension of operation of the measure would prevent it from being fully effective in the event of the main action being dismissed (see order of 11 March 2013, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑110/12 R, EU:T:2013:118, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

93      It is therefore necessary to examine whether the applicant’s interests in obtaining the immediate suspension of Article 2 of the contested decision, in so far as that decision provides for the publication on the Commission’s website of certain information relating to its exclusion from participation in procedures for the award of public contracts, outweigh those pursued by the Commission in adopting that decision.

94      As regards the interests pursued by the applicant, the applicant claims, in the first place, that the refusal to suspend publication of the information concerned would deprive a later judgment annulling the contested decision of any practical effect. Once the information has been made public, its private nature can no longer be restored. Consequently, the applicant argues that the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and its right to an effective remedy would only be illusory.

95      In the second place, the applicant submits that the refusal to suspend publication of the information concerned would expose it to serious and irreparable damage, whereas granting the suspension, followed by an annulment in the action in the main proceedings, would prevent any irreversible disclosure and avoid the need for subsequent compensation.

96      In the third place, according to the applicant, suspending publication of the information concerned has no adverse consequences for the Commission or the European Union, since the exclusion decision would remain fully effective, the applicant would be listed in the EDES database and the EU contracting authorities could take that exclusion into account. The requested suspension merely preserves the status quo and avoids irreversible reputational harm pending a decision in the main proceedings.

97      As regards the Commission’s interest, the Commission submits that, in recitals 106 to 109 of the contested decision, the authorising officer responsible duly justified why publication was an appropriate remedial measure in the present case, in particular for specific and general deterrence purposes. Therefore, if the suspension of the publication decision were to be granted, such specific forms of deterrence and the related protection of the financial interests of the European Union would be undermined.

98      According to the Commission, in view of the seriousness of the misconduct at issue and the risk to the EU budget resulting from the possibility that the applicant might mislead the authorising officers responsible for the award of contracts, in relying on the commitments about experts working exclusively on the performance of the contracts to be awarded, the interest in maintaining the contested decision in full effect in order to reinforce the general and specific deterrent effects of publication clearly outweighs the interests of the applicant. In particular, suspension of the contested decision should not take precedence over maintaining the effects of that decision, as the applicant could obtain compensation for any material damage caused unfairly in the light of the final judgment to be handed down in the main proceedings as well as reparation for the unfair reputational damage by the publication on the Commission’s website of the outcome of the final judgment in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 142(1) of Regulation 2024/2509.

99      Moreover, the Commission recalls that, under the fourth subparagraph of Article 142(1) of Regulation No 2024/2509, the published information is to be removed as soon as the exclusion has ended. Thus, since it is likely that the judgment closing the main proceedings will be delivered after the exclusion has ended, it follows that, if the publication decision were suspended, it could never be enforced and would therefore be completely ineffective.

100    In that regard, in the first place, it must be borne in mind that what is at issue in the present case is the publication of information outside the institutions of the European Union which is likely to have a significant impact on the applicant’s reputation and, consequently, on the possibilities of carrying on its activities.

101    In addition, it should be noted that the objective pursued by publication is to achieve a deterrent effect on the applicant and that publication does not in itself constitute direct and immediate protection against the risks of financial loss for the European Union.

102    The financial interests of the European Union are protected, according to recital 105 of Regulation 2024/2509, by the EDES. In the present case, in accordance with recital 105(ii) of the contested decision, the applicant must be entered in the EDES database for the duration of the exclusion.

103    In the second place, it should be noted that, in the absence of suspension of operation of the publication on the Commission’s website of certain information relating to the exclusion of the applicant, the applicant’s fundamental right to effective judicial protection and its right to an effective remedy would only be illusory, since, once the information has been made available, its non-public nature could no longer be restored, even if the applicant’s action in the main proceedings were ultimately upheld.

104    The General Court will be called upon to rule, in the main proceedings, on whether the contested decision, by which the Commission ordered, inter alia, the publication of the information at issue, must be annulled. If the operation of the publication of the information at issue were not suspended, any judgment annulling the decision would be deprived of any practical effect as regards the damage caused to the applicant as a result of that publication.

105    The Commission’s reasoning that, if the publication decision were suspended, it could never be enforced and would therefore be completely ineffective, since it is likely that the decision bringing an end to the proceedings dealing with the substance of the case will be delivered after the exclusion has ended, cannot call that conclusion into question.

106    Otherwise, if the publication decision were not suspended, the applicant’s fundamental right to effective judicial protection and its right to an effective remedy would not be sufficiently guaranteed, for the reasons set out in paragraph 103 above.

107    Lastly, if the action in the main proceedings were dismissed, even though the fourth subparagraph of Article 142(1) of Regulation 2024/2509 provides that the information published is to be removed as soon as the exclusion has ended, that provision does not expressly prevent the Commission, in the light of Article 266 TFEU, from subsequently publishing information relating to the applicant’s exclusion, after the decision in the main proceedings has been delivered.

108    In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the interest defended by the applicant must prevail over the interest in the dismissal of the application for interim measures, especially since the grant of the suspension of operation sought would amount only to maintaining the status quo for a limited period of time, a period which is relatively short compared with the period that elapsed since the events at issue occurred, approximately seven years ago.

 Conclusion

109    It follows from all the foregoing that the application for interim measures must be granted and that the operation of Article 2 of the contested decision must be suspended in so far as it provides for the publication on the Commission’s website of information relating to the exclusion of the applicant from participating in procurement and award procedures governed by Regulations 2024/2509 and 2018/1877.

110    Since the present order closes the proceedings for interim measures, it is necessary to cancel the order of 4 March 2026, QS v Commission (T‑108/26 R, not published), made on the basis of Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure, under which the Commission was ordered to suspend the operation of Article 2 of the contested decision, in so far as that provision provides for the publication of the applicant’s exclusion on the Commission’s website, until the date of the order terminating the proceedings for interim measures.

 Costs

111    Pursuant to Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved.

On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT

hereby orders:

1.      The operation of Article 2 of the decision of the European Commission of 8 December 2025 excluding [confidential] from participating in procurement and award procedures governed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1877 of 26 November 2018 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2015/323, or from being selected to implement EU funds for a period of two years, in so far as it provides for the publication of information relating to that exclusion on the website of the Commission, is suspended.

2.      The order of 4 March 2026, QS v Commission (T‑108/26 R) is cancelled.

3.      The costs are reserved.

Luxembourg, 30 June 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.

1      Confidential information redacted.