Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)

18 June 2026 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – Equal treatment in employment and occupation – Directive 2000/78/EC – Article 1 – Purpose – Article 2(2)(a) and (b) – Prohibition of discrimination on the ground of belief – National legislation requiring military personnel to be vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2 – Difference in treatment based on membership of a particular professional category – Concept of ‘belief’ )

In Case C‑522/24,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy), made by decision of 23 July 2024, received at the Court on 29 July 2024, in the proceedings

BG

v

Ministero della Difesa,

other party to the proceedings:

Presidenza dei Consiglio dei Ministri,

THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, J. Passer, E. Regan (Rapporteur), D. Gratsias and B. Smulders, Judges,

Advocate General: T. Ćapeta,

Registrar: E. Sartori, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 10 July 2025,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        BG, by himself and L. Parenti, avvocato,

–        the Italian Government, by S. Fiorentino, acting as Agent, and by E. Feola, E. Ferretti, A. Granato, V. Pilloni and F. Urbani Neri, avvocati dello Stato,

–        the French Government, by B. Fodda and T. Lechevallier, acting as Agents,

–        the European Commission, by D. Recchia, E. Schmidt and F. van Schaik, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 20 November 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16), in particular Article 2(2) thereof, and Articles 1 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

2        The request was made in proceedings between BG, a senior officer of the Army Engineer Corps, and the Ministero della Difesa (Ministry of Defence, Italy) (‘the Ministry’) concerning the suspension of BG’s employment relationship as a result of his refusal to undergo the compulsory vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 which was imposed on military personnel.

 Legal context

 European Union law

3        Article 1 of Directive 2000/78, entitled ‘Purpose’, provides:

‘The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.’

4        Article 2 of that directive, entitled ‘Concept of discrimination’, states:

‘1.      For the purposes of this Directive, the “principle of equal treatment” shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1.

2.      For the purposes of paragraph 1:

(a)      direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1;

(b)      indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons unless:

(i)      that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary, or

(ii)      as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer or any person or organisation to whom this Directive applies, is obliged, under national legislation, to take appropriate measures in line with the principles contained in Article 5 in order to eliminate disadvantages entailed by such provision, criterion or practice.

…

5.      This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down by national law which, in a democratic society, are necessary for public security, for the maintenance of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, for the protection of health and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’

 Italian law

 Legislative Decree No 216/2003

5        Decreto legislativo n. 216 – Attuazione della direttiva 2000/78/CE per la parità di trattamento in materia di occupazione e di condizioni di lavoro e della direttiva n. 2014/54/UE relativa alle misure intese ad agevolare l’esercizio dei diritti conferiti ai lavoratori nel quadro della libera circolazione dei lavoratori (Legislative Decree No 216 implementing Directive 2000/78/EC for equal treatment in employment and occupation and Directive 2014/54/EU on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers) of 9 July 2003 (GURI No 187 of 13 August 2003, p. 4), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, has the objective of transposing Directive 2000/78 into Italian law.

 Decree-Law No 172/2021

6        According to the preamble to decreto legge n. 172 – Misure urgenti per il contenimento dell’epidemia da COVID-19 e per lo svolgimento in sicurezza delle attività economiche e sociali (Decree-Law No 172 on urgent measures for combating the COVID-19 pandemic and for the safety of economic and social activities) of 26 November 2021 (GURI No 282 of 26 November 2021, p. 2), converted into law, with amendments, by legge n. 3 (Law No 3) of 21 January 2022 (GURI No 19 of 25 January 2022, p. 1) (‘Decree-Law No 172/2021’):

‘Whereas …

The current situation of risk calls for the continuation of the extraordinary and urgent measures taken to adequately address any situation prejudicial to the community;

An extraordinary and urgent need exists to adopt provisions in order to ensure that activities aimed at curbing the pandemic and reducing public health risks are carried out in a uniform manner within the national territory, also in the light of data and medical and scientific knowledge acquired with a view to combating the COVID-19 pandemic and of the commitments made, including at international level, in terms of prophylaxis and … vaccine coverage;

An extraordinary and urgent need exists to extend the vaccination requirement to certain categories of people working in particularly exposed sectors;

…’

7        Article 2 of Decree-Law No 172/2021 inserted into decreto legge n. 44 – Misure urgenti per il contenimento dell’epidemia da COVID-19, in materia di vaccinazioni anti SARS-CoV-2, di giustizia e di concorsi pubblici (Decree-Law No 44 on urgent measures to curb the COVID-19 pandemic, concerning vaccination against SARS-CoV-2, justice and public competitions) of 1 April 2021 (GURI No 79 of 1 April 2021, p. 1) (‘Decree-Law No 44/2021’), as amended and converted into Law No 76/2021 of 28 May 2021 (GURI No 128 of 31 May 2021, p. 1), Article 4-ter(1)(b) which extends to military personnel the requirement to undergo vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 and states that vaccination is an essential condition in order for those subject to the requirement to be able to pursue their professional activities and that a finding of non-compliance with that requirement entails the suspension, with immediate effect, of a person’s right to perform their professional activity, without disciplinary consequences and with the right to maintain the employment relationship. During the suspension period, no salary, or any other remuneration or emolument whatsoever is payable. The suspension is effective until the employer is notified that the vaccine has been administered and, in any event, for no longer than six months as from 15 December 2021.

 The Military Law Code

8        Article 89(3) of decreto legislativo n. 66 – Codice dell’ordinamento militare (Legislative Decree No 66 on the Military Law Code) of 15 March 2010 (GURI No 106 of 8 May 2010, Ordinary Supplement No 84), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Military Law Code’), states:

‘Armed forces contribute to the safeguarding of free institutions and carry out specific tasks in the event of public disasters and in other cases of extraordinary necessity and urgency.’

9        Article 206-bis of the Military Law Code provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘The military health authorities may declare it essential to administer specific prophylactic vaccines to military personnel, in accordance with appropriate protocols, in order to enable their deployment in particular and defined operational or service conditions with a view to ensuring the health of individuals and the community.’

10      Article 894 of that code states:

‘1.      The military profession shall be incompatible with the exercise of any other profession, except in cases provided for by special provisions.

2.      The military profession shall also be incompatible with the pursuit of a trade, an industrial activity or a commercial activity, and with taking on the role of executive, director, auditor or any other similar role, paid or unpaid, in for-profit companies.’

 The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

11      By decision of 10 January 2022, the applicant in the main proceedings, a senior officer of the Army Engineer Corps, was suspended from his duties because of his refusal to comply with the SARS-CoV-2 vaccination requirement imposed on military personnel.

12      The applicant brought an extraordinary appeal challenging that decision before the President of the Italian Republic, in the context of which the Ministry sought the opinion of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy), which is the referring court, in accordance with the applicable national legislation.

13      That court states that the applicant in the main proceedings challenges that decision on the ground that, first, in so far as he suffered direct discrimination as compared with civilian personnel, that decision infringes Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78. Although the applicant does not call into question the possibility for a State to impose a vaccination requirement, he criticises the manner in which the Italian Government implemented it in the present case. The applicant claims that he was discriminated against as compared with members of the civilian personnel working in the same command as his own who, although their occupation and employment relationship comes under a different system from that of military personnel, were not subject to the vaccination requirement at issue in the main proceedings despite performing tasks similar to those of the applicant.

14      Secondly, the applicant in the main proceedings alleges infringement of Article 2(2)(b) of that directive, in that he suffered, in particular as compared with vaccinated military personnel, indirect discrimination based on his beliefs, without that discrimination being justified on scientific grounds. In that regard, although he indeed refused to be vaccinated, he was nevertheless willing to undergo a swab test every 48 hours. From a scientific point of view, in accordance with reports submitted to the Senato della Repubblica (Senate of the Republic, Italy) by experts called upon to provide an opinion on Decree-Law No 172/2021, an unvaccinated person accessing the workplace after receiving a negative swab test result less than 48 hours beforehand poses a similar, or even lower, risk of infecting others as compared with his or her vaccinated colleagues.

15      Moreover, the applicant in the main proceedings claims that, in respect of workers in other sectors of activity, who are not subject to the SARS-CoV-2 vaccination requirement and who carry out their activities in working environments far more frequented by the public than his own, the Italian legislation provided that the vaccination certificate and the proof of a negative swab test result are equivalent for the purposes of accessing the workplace, which demonstrates that they are also equivalent, as regards safety, for the purpose of establishing that a person has not been infected with SARS-CoV-2.

16      Thirdly, the applicant in the main proceedings alleges infringement of Articles 1 and 24 of the Charter. The suspension decision at issue in the main proceedings prevented him from pursuing his professional activity, depriving him of any remuneration, compensation or emolument and of any possibility of pursuing another professional activity in a commercial company. He was therefore unable to provide for himself and his family, namely his wife and two minor daughters.

17      The referring court is of the view that both Directive 2000/78 and the provisions of the Charter relied on in support of the action before it are applicable to military personnel in the armed forces, with the result that if the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for the compulsory vaccination of military personnel as a condition for the pursuit of their professional activity, does not comply with those provisions, that legislation must be disapplied. However, that court is uncertain whether the infringement of EU law alleged by the applicant in the main proceedings has been established.

18      As regards, first, infringement of Article 2(2)(a) of that directive on account of direct discrimination of military personnel as compared with civilian personnel, that court endorses the findings made by the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy) in its review of the compliance with the Italian Constitution of a vaccination requirement, similar to that at issue in the main proceedings, which was introduced for the category of healthcare professionals.

19      In those circumstances, the referring court states, inter alia, that it does not agree with the assertion made by the applicant in the main proceedings that the vaccination neither guarantees immunity against the disease nor prevents infection with, or transmission of, SARS-CoV-2. It states that the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) found that the vaccination at issue in the main proceedings had no negative impact on the health of the persons who received it and was effective in reducing the spread of that virus and that, therefore – in the light of medical and scientific data attesting to the full effectiveness of the vaccine and the appropriateness of the vaccination requirement to the objective of reducing the spread of that virus – that vaccination requirement was not unreasonable.

20      Moreover, as for the choice of professional categories subject to that obligation and the review of whether that choice is discriminatory, the referring court claims that, in accordance with Article 2(5) of Directive 2000/78, that directive is without prejudice to measures laid down by national law which are necessary, inter alia, for public security and for the protection of health. It should therefore be borne in mind that the Italian legislature chose, with a view to protecting public health and combating the pandemic, to impose a vaccination requirement on military personnel, who, compared to civilian personnel, are more exposed to constant contact with the public and are called upon to perform, in that context, a mission of public security.

21      As regards, secondly, infringement of Article 2(2)(b) of that directive, on account of indirect discrimination based on the beliefs of unvaccinated military personnel willing to undergo swab testing as compared with military personnel who were not opposed to the vaccination, the referring court is of the view that that claim of discrimination cannot be upheld, for reasons identical to those relating to the alleged existence of direct discrimination.

22      Moreover, and in any event, in the referring court’s view, such indirect discrimination is, in accordance with Article 2(2)(b)(i) of that directive, justified by the pursuit of a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the health of individuals and the community through means which are appropriate and necessary. In that regard, the referring court states that the principles set out by the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) in relation to healthcare professionals are applicable, namely that frequent diagnostic testing for SARS-CoV-2 could not constitute an appropriate alternative to vaccination in order to demonstrate that the solution chosen by the Italian legislature was unreasonable or not proportionate.

23      Thus, contrary to what the applicant in the main proceedings maintains, according to the referring court it cannot be claimed that, in order to gain access to the workplace, a vaccination certificate and proof of a negative swab test result are equivalent, given that national legislation requires, depending on the case, either one or the other, due precisely to the characteristics of the category to which the worker concerned belongs, with a view to achieving, in a manner that is proportionate, the objective of reducing the risk of spreading SARS-CoV-2 and protecting the health of both the public and the worker himself or herself.

24      As regards, thirdly, infringement of Articles 1 and 24 of the Charter, alleged by the applicant in the main proceedings on account of the suspension of his right to pursue his professional activity, with no remuneration, compensation or emolument, the referring court states that the principles identified by the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) in relation to healthcare professionals are again relevant for the purpose of assessing whether the decision at issue in the main proceedings is compatible with EU law.

25      In particular, the temporary impossibility for a worker who has not complied with the vaccination requirement to perform work results, nevertheless, from that worker’s exercise of his or her freedom of self-determination in relation to healthcare decisions. In that regard, by suspending that worker, the employer is fulfilling a safety obligation.

26      Accordingly, the referring court takes the view that it is legitimate that, during the suspension, no salary, or any other remuneration or emolument is due, since a worker decides of his or her own free will not to receive the vaccination and may reconsider that choice at any time.

27      That court points out that respect for human dignity, guaranteed by Article 1 of the Charter, which is achieved also by recognising an individual’s right to work and receive sufficient remuneration to ensure his or her own subsistence and that of his or her family, requires that that individual act in accordance with the law when the rule imposing an obligation, such as the vaccination requirement at issue in the main proceedings, pursues objectives of general interest in a manner that is reasonable and proportionate.

28      For the same reasons, an infringement of Article 24 of the Charter in respect of the worker’s minor children should be ruled out, since negative consequences which may arise from the suspension of the parent from his work and of the payment of the corresponding remuneration do not result not from a failure of the public authorities to meet their obligations, but rather from voluntary conduct, contrary to the law, on the part of the worker.

29      However, although the referring court does not share the position of the applicant in the main proceedings, it considers it necessary to make a reference to the Court in that regard, in particular because the arguments raised before it are new.

30      In those circumstances, the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      Given that the administration has not deemed it necessary to introduce a specific vaccination requirement for the military pursuant to Article [206-bis] of [the Military Law Code], assuming responsibility for the effects of the vaccine, does Directive [2000/78] preclude the transposition of [Decree-Law No 172/2021], in so far as it amends [Decree-Law No 44/2021] by adding [Article 4-ter(1)(b)], which introduces compulsory vaccination for a member of the military [personnel] contrary to his [or her] personal views, since it requires him [or her] to voluntarily submit to such medical treatment, still in the trial phase, at his [or her] own risk, as an additional prerequisite for being able to work in the same working environment as civilian workers who are not required to undergo vaccination, despite the fact that they perform duties that, from the point of view of contagiousness and the potential for person-to-person transmission, are similar to those performed by the military?

(2)      Given that, according to Italian legislation on access to the workplace, even in crowded settings such as public transport, stadiums and restaurants, for workers not referred to in Decree-Law [No 172/2021], a vaccination certificate or negative COVID test carried out within the previous 48 hours [is] considered equivalent, does Article 2(2)(b) of Directive [2000/78] preclude a measure such as Decree-Law [No 172/2021] in so far as it amends Decree-Law [No 44/2021] by adding [Article 4-ter(1)(b)], which introduces compulsory vaccination for a member of the military [personnel] contrary to his [or her] personal views, as a prerequisite for working in the same working environment as military personnel who, in line with their personal views, have chosen to be vaccinated even in the absence of a requirement to do so, despite the fact that the member of military staff who is not vaccinated is willing, and in any event is already required, to produce proof of a negative COVID test at intervals of less than 48 hours?

(3)      Does the measure referred to in Decree-Law [No 172/2021], supplementing Decree-Law [No 44/2021], in which [Article 4-ter(3)] renders employees who have been suspended for failing to comply with the vaccination requirement unable to provide for their family and offer the protection and care necessary for the well-being of minor daughters, infringe Articles 1 and 24 of the [Charter] pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter?’

 Consideration of the questions referred

 The first question

31      By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides for the compulsory vaccination of military personnel as a condition for the pursuit of their professional activity, whereas civilian personnel, who perform their duties in the same environment and in a similar health context, are not subject to such an obligation.

32      Article 2(2)(a) states that direct discrimination is to be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 of that directive.

33      As provided for by that latter provision, ‘the purpose of [that] directive is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.’

34      In that regard, it is clear from settled case-law that the grounds referred to in Article 1 of that directive are exhaustive and that that directive is not concerned with discrimination on the basis of professional category or place of work (judgment of 17 October 2024, Zetschek, C‑349/23, EU:C:2024:889, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

35      In the present case, it is apparent from the file before the Court that the difference in treatment referred to in the first question – namely that some of the persons concerned are subject to compulsory vaccination in order to be able to pursue their professional activity – stems from the fact that the persons concerned are either members of the military personnel or members of the civilian personnel and those different categories of personnel, under the national legislation, fall under separate systems as regards their occupation and employment relationship.

36      It follows that a difference in treatment such as that referred to in the first question is based on the fact that those workers belong to a particular professional category.

37      Since that ground for discrimination is not one of the grounds listed in Article 1 of Directive 2000/78, it must be concluded that that difference in treatment does not come within the general framework established by that directive and, in particular, within Article 2(2)(a) thereof.

38      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides for the compulsory vaccination of military personnel as a condition for the pursuit of their professional activity, whereas civilian personnel, who perform their duties in the same environment and in a similar health context, are not subject to such an obligation, since such a difference in treatment does not come within the scope of Article 2(2)(a).

 The second question

39      By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as precluding, on the ground of indirect discrimination based on belief, national legislation which provides for the compulsory vaccination, as a condition for the pursuit of his or her professional activity, of a member of the military personnel who – unlike, in particular, other members of the military personnel performing their duties in the same environment – objects to such vaccination.

40      Article 2(2)(b) provides that, except in the cases referred to in points (i) and (ii) of that subparagraph (b), indirect discrimination is to be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons.

41      As is apparent from the Court’s case-law, the concept of ‘religion’ in Article 1 of Directive 2000/78 covers both the forum internum, that is the fact of having a religious belief, and the forum externum, that is the manifestation of religious faith in public. Furthermore, that article refers to religion and belief together, as does Article 19 TFEU, according to which the EU legislature may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on, inter alia, ‘religion or belief’, and Article 21 of the Charter, which refers, among the various grounds of discrimination which it mentions, to ‘religion or belief’. It follows that, for the purposes of the application of Directive 2000/78, the terms ‘religion’ and ‘belief’ must be analysed as two facets of the same single ground of discrimination (judgment of 28 November 2023, Commune d’Ans, C‑148/22, EU:C:2023:924, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

42      According to that case-law, as is apparent from Article 21 of the Charter, the ground of discrimination based on ‘religion or belief’ is to be distinguished from the ground based on ‘political or any other opinion’ and therefore covers both religious belief and philosophical or spiritual belief (judgment of 13 October 2022, SCRL (Religious clothing), C‑344/20, EU:C:2022:774, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

43      Thus, given that the protection against discrimination guaranteed by Directive 2000/78 covers, as pointed out in paragraph 34 above, only those grounds which are exhaustively mentioned in Article 1 thereof, that directive does not cover beliefs understood as opinions, be they political opinions or any other opinion.

44      In the present case, it is apparent from the file before the Court that the applicant in the main proceedings argues, inter alia, in support of his claim of discrimination on the basis of his beliefs, that the compulsory vaccination imposed on him could not, having regard to the duties he was required to perform, be justified on health grounds. Furthermore, the applicant alleges, first, that such vaccination is ineffective in preventing the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and, secondly, that such vaccination is equivalent to a swab test. In that regard, the applicant argues that workers in other sectors of activity were able to access their workplace by presenting either a vaccination certificate or proof of a negative swab test result.

45      It should also be noted that, in support of that position, the applicant relies on various scientific documents in order to establish, first, that there is limited knowledge regarding the effectiveness of the vaccination at issue in the main proceedings and its adverse effects and, secondly, that the risk of infecting others posed by a vaccinated person is the same as that of an unvaccinated person who has received a negative swab test result. He thereby seeks to challenge, on the basis of scientific arguments, the views expressed in that connection by the referring court in the order for reference.

46      It follows that, by those arguments, the applicant in the main proceedings does not seek to oppose the compulsory vaccination at issue in the main proceedings on the basis of his own beliefs, but to challenge, as such, the choices made by the Italian authorities in the field of public health.

47      The same is true of the argument by which, as the Advocate General noted in points 51 and 52 of her Opinion, that applicant challenges the manner in which the compulsory vaccination at issue in the main proceedings was implemented, namely that a choice was made to impose that vaccination in such a way that military personnel received it at their own risk, rather than imposing it by way of an order, such that the issuer of the order would have to assume responsibility for its consequences.

48      Accordingly, in the light of the elements set out in paragraphs 41 to 43 above and as the Advocate General emphasised, in essence, in point 55 of her Opinion, considerations such as those on the basis of which the applicant in the main proceedings seeks to challenge the compulsory vaccination at issue in the main proceedings do not come within the concept of ‘belief’, within the meaning of Directive 2000/78, but constitute opinions – which in the present case relate to public health – the protection of which, as indicated in paragraph 43 above, is not governed by the provisions of that directive.

49      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as not precluding, on the ground of indirect discrimination based on belief, national legislation which provides for the compulsory vaccination, as a condition for the pursuit of his or her professional activity, of a member of the military personnel who – unlike, in particular, other members of the military personnel performing their duties in the same environment – objects to such vaccination, where the grounds for that objection constitute opinions on public health, which are not covered by the concept of ‘belief’, within the meaning of that directive, with the result that such a difference in treatment does not come within the scope of Article 2(2)(b).

 The third question

50      By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 1 and 24 of the Charter preclude national legislation providing for the suspension of the employment contract of a worker who refuses to comply with the compulsory vaccination imposed as a condition for the pursuit of his or her professional activity, thereby preventing him or her from providing for his or her family, including his or her minor children.

51      It should be noted that the scope of the Charter is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which its provisions are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law.

52      In that regard, the Court has held that the concept of ‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in that provision, presupposes a degree of connection between the measure of EU law and the national measure at issue which goes beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other (judgment of 12 June 2025, Tallinna linn, C‑219/24, EU:C:2025:442, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

53      It follows from this, according to settled case-law, that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgment of 12 June 2025, Tallinna linn, C‑219/24, EU:C:2025:442, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

54      In the present case, it is apparent from an examination of the first two questions that Article 2(2) of Directive 2000/78 does not preclude national legislation which imposes compulsory vaccination as a condition for a member of the military personnel to pursue his or her professional activity and which gives rise to the suspension constituting the subject matter of the third question referred, on the ground that differences in treatment such as those established by that legislation and which are at issue in the main proceedings do not come within the scope of that provision.

55      Furthermore, it is not apparent from the file before the Court that that national legislation has any connection with another provision of EU law.

56      Accordingly, that national legislation cannot be regarded as ‘implementing Union law’ within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, with the result that Articles 1 and 24 thereof are not applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.

 Costs

57      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:

1.      Article 2(2)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation

must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides for the compulsory vaccination of military personnel as a condition for the pursuit of their professional activity, whereas civilian personnel, who perform their duties in the same environment and in a similar health context, are not subject to such an obligation, since such a difference in treatment does not come within the scope of Article 2(2)(a).

2.      Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78

must be interpreted as not precluding, on the ground of indirect discrimination based on belief, national legislation which provides for the compulsory vaccination, as a condition for the pursuit of his or her professional activity, of a member of the military personnel who – unlike, in particular, other members of the military personnel performing their duties in the same environment – objects to such vaccination, where the grounds for that objection constitute opinions on public health, which are not covered by the concept of ‘belief’, within the meaning of that directive, with the result that such a difference in treatment does not come within the scope of Article 2(2)(b).

[Signatures]

*      Language of the case: Italian.