Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber)

15 January 2026 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Law applicable to non-contractual obligations – Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 – Article 4(1) – Scope – Liability in tort or delict of an officer of a company that organises online games of chance without holding the required licence – Action for the recovery of gambling losses – Place where the damage occurred )

In Case C‑77/24 [Wunner (i)],

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria), made by decision of 11 January 2024, received at the Court on 1 February 2024, in the proceedings

NM,

OU

v

TE,

THE COURT (First Chamber),

composed of F. Biltgen (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, acting as Judge of the First Chamber, I. Ziemele, S. Gervasoni and N. Fenger, Judges,

Advocate General: N. Emiliou,

Registrar: I. Illéssy, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 5 February 2025,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        OU and NM, by C. Leitgeb, Rechtsanwalt,

–        TE, by O. Peschel, Rechtsanwalt,

–        the Austrian Government, by C. Hribar and F. Koppensteiner, acting as Agents,

–        the Belgian Government, by M. Jacobs and M. Van Regemorter, acting as Agents, and by R. Verbeke and P. Vlaemminck, advocaten,

–        the German Government, by J. Möller and A. Sahner, acting as Agents,

–        the Maltese Government, by A. Buhagiar, acting as Agent, and by J. Baldacchino, advocate at law, and D. Sarmiento Ramírez-Escudero, abogado,

–        the European Commission, by L. Hohenecker and W. Wils, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 12 June 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1(2)(d) and Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 40) (‘the Rome II Regulation’).

2        The request has been made in proceedings between, on the one hand, NM and OU, in their capacity as the directors of a Maltese gambling company, and, on the other, TE, a person domiciled in Austria, concerning the recovery of losses incurred in connection with participation in online games of chance that that company offered in Austria without holding the licence required under the law of that Member State.

 Legal context

 European Union law

 The Rome II Regulation

3        Recitals 6, 7, 14 and 16 of the Rome II Regulation state:

‘(6)      The proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to improve the predictability of the outcome of litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of judgments, for the conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the court in which an action is brought.

(7)      The substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should be consistent with [Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1)] and the instruments dealing with the law applicable to contractual obligations.

…

(14)      The requirement of legal certainty and the need to do justice in individual cases are essential elements of an area of justice. This Regulation provides for the connecting factors which are the most appropriate to achieve these objectives. Therefore, this Regulation provides for a general rule but also for specific rules and, in certain provisions, for an “escape clause” which allows a departure from these rules where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with another country. This set of rules thus creates a flexible framework of conflict-of-law rules. …

…

(16)      Uniform rules should enhance the foreseeability of court decisions and ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage. A connection with the country where the direct damage occurred (lex loci damni) strikes a fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage, and also reflects the modern approach to civil liability and the development of systems of strict liability.’

4        Article 1 of the Rome II Regulation, entitled ‘Scope’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof:

‘1.      This Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. It shall not apply, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters or to the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii).

2.      The following shall be excluded from the scope of this Regulation:

…

(d)      non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated regarding matters such as the creation, by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, internal organisation or winding-up of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated, the personal liability of officers and members as such for the obligations of the company or body and the personal liability of auditors to a company or to its members in the statutory audits of accounting documents;

…’

5        Chapter II of that regulation is devoted to torts and delicts. Article 4 of that regulation, entitled ‘General rule’, is contained in that chapter and is worded as follows:

‘1.      Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur.

2.      However, where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply.

3.      Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question.’

6        Chapter V of that regulation, which sets out the ‘common rules’, includes Article 15, entitled ‘Scope of the law applicable’ and worded as follows:

‘The law applicable to non-contractual obligations under this Regulation shall govern in particular:

(a)      the basis and extent of liability, including the determination of persons who may be held liable for acts performed by them;

…

(g)      liability for the acts of another person;

…’

 Regulation No 1215/2012

7        Article 7 of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides:

‘A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State:

…

(2)      in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur;

…’

 Austrian law

8        Paragraph 1301 of the Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Austrian Civil Code) is worded as follows:

‘Two or more persons may be held liable for damage caused unlawfully in that they contributed to it jointly, directly or indirectly, by inducement, threats, orders, assistance, concealment and the like, or merely by refraining from fulfilling the special obligation to prevent harm.’

9        Paragraph 1311 of that code provides:

‘The person whose property or person is affected by mere coincidence shall bear the consequences therefrom. However, if a person has caused the coincidence culpably or has infringed a law intended to prevent coincidental damage …, that person shall be liable for any detriment which would not otherwise have occurred.’

10      Paragraph 3 of the Glücksspielgesetz (Law on Gambling; ‘the GSpG’) provides:

‘Unless this Law specifies otherwise, the right to organise games of chance shall be reserved to the Bund [(Federal State)] (gambling monopoly).’

 The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

11      The company Titanium Brace Marketing Limited (‘TBM’), which is in liquidation and of which NM and OU were the directors, operated an online casino from its registered office in Malta; that casino offered games to the entire European market. TBM held a gambling licence under Maltese law, but did not hold a licence under the GSpG.

12      Between 14 November 2019 and 3 April 2020, TE, who played online games of chance on TBM’s website, sustained a total gambling loss of EUR 18 547.67.

13      In order to be able to play on TBM’s website, TE agreed to that company’s general terms and conditions and, in that context, was prompted to open a ‘player account’. In order to fund that player account, TE made a transfer from his Austrian bank account to a bank account opened with a Maltese bank. That bank account was a real account belonging to TBM, opened for TE and separate from that company’s assets. When the player participated in a game of chance, the sum at stake was debited from the player account and, in the event of a win, was credited to that player account.

14      Claiming that, in the absence of a licence granted to TBM under Austrian law, the gambling contract was null and void, TE sought from NM and OU, before the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Vienna, Austria), recovery of the losses which he had incurred, alleging in support of his claim that those parties were liable in tort. TE submitted, in that regard, that the failure to observe the Austrian gambling monopoly entails an infringement of a protective law (Schutzgesetz) and that NM and OU are personally as well as jointly and severally liable for the fact that TBM offered illegal games of chance in Austria.

15      Before the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Vienna), NM and OU claimed that that court lacked international jurisdiction, arguing that TE could not rely on Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012. According to NM and OU, they had not been empowered to decide whether TBM had to withdraw from the Austrian market, on which it had already been established. In addition, they had not taken decisions that were strategic for that undertaking. They claimed that the place where the event that gave rise to the damage had occurred and the place where the damage had occurred were in Malta. According to them, the substantive law applicable is not Austrian law but Maltese law, which does not provide for liability on the part of company officers vis-à-vis the company’s creditors.

16      The Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Vienna) dismissed TE’s action for lack of international jurisdiction. That decision was set aside on appeal by the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Higher Regional Court, Vienna, Austria), which held that the conditions for finding that the Austrian courts had jurisdiction, under Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, were satisfied.

17      Hearing an appeal on a point of law (Revision) brought by NM and OU, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria), which is the referring court, considers that a finding that the Austrian courts have jurisdiction presupposes, first of all, that the national provision that may serve as the basis for TE’s claim be applicable in accordance with the Rome II Regulation. In that context, that court is uncertain as regards the scope of the exception provided for in Article 1(2)(d) of that regulation.

18      In the event that the action in the main proceedings comes within the scope of the Rome II Regulation, the referring court is uncertain also as to the determination of the place where the damage occurred, for the purposes of Article 4(1) of that regulation, which could be the place, in Austria, from which TE made transfers from his bank account to his player account or the place where that player account is located, namely Malta. The referring court states that, if only the definitive loss of the right to payment of a credit balance into the player account is to be considered to be the initial damage, the place where that damage occurred could be located in Malta, where the account is maintained, at TE’s domicile, at the place where his main assets are located, or elsewhere.

19      In those circumstances, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      Must Article 1(2)(d) of [the Rome II Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that it also applies to claims for damages against an officer of a company which a creditor of the company bases on tortious liability for infringement of protective provisions [(Schutzgesetze)] (such as provisions of legislation on games of chance) by that officer?

(2)      If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

Must Article 4(1) of the abovementioned regulation be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an action for damages based on tortious liability in respect of gaming losses suffered which is brought against an officer of a company offering online games of chance in Austria without a licence, the place where the damage occurred is determined by

(a)      the place from which the player effects credit transfers from his or her bank account to the player account maintained by the company,

(b)      the place where the company maintains the player account in which deposits from the player, winnings, losses and bonuses are entered,

(c)      the place from which the player places bets via that player account which ultimately result in a loss,

(d)      the player’s place of residence as the location of his or her claim to payment of the credit balance in his or her player account,

(e)      the location of the player’s main assets?’

 Consideration of the questions referred

 The first question

20      By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome II Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that an action seeking to establish tortious liability, aimed at the directors of a company, for infringement of a prohibition imposed by national legislation on offering games of chance to the public without holding a licence for that purpose is covered by the category of non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies, within the meaning of that provision.

21      According to Article 1(1) of the Rome II Regulation, that regulation is to apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.

22      Under Article 1(2)(d) of that regulation, ‘non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated regarding matters such as the creation, by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, internal organisation or winding-up of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated, the personal liability of officers and members as such for the obligations of the company or body and the personal liability of auditors to a company or to its members in the statutory audits of accounting documents’ are, however, excluded from the scope of that regulation.

23      It must be noted that Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2008 L 177, p. 6) contains an analogous exception in Article 1(2)(f) thereof, in respect of which the Court held that it applies exclusively to the structural aspects of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2019, Verein für Konsumenteninformation, C‑272/18, EU:C:2019:827, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

24      Nevertheless, since the personal liability of officers and administrators as such for the obligations of the company or body as well as that of auditors in the statutory audits of accounting documents to a company or to its members, referred to in Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome II Regulation, do not constitute structural aspects of those companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated, it is necessary to clarify the scope of the exclusion provided for by that provision by means of a functional criterion (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2022, BMA Nederland, C‑498/20, EU:C:2022:173, paragraph 53).

25      As the Advocate General observed in point 30 of his Opinion, in the absence of a reference to any national law, the category of ‘non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies’ must be interpreted autonomously, taking into account the objective pursued by that rule, thereby guaranteeing the full effectiveness of the Rome II Regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, C‑29/10, EU:C:2011:151, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

26      Since the objective underlying that exclusion is the wish of the EU legislature to keep matters for which there is a specific modus operandi on account of the link between such matters and the operation and organisation of a company or other body corporate or unincorporated subject to the single body of law of the lex societatis, it is necessary to ascertain in each case whether the officers, administrators or auditors referred to in Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome II Regulation have a non-contractual obligation for reasons specific to, or extraneous to, company law (judgment of 10 March 2022, BMA Nederland, C‑498/20, EU:C:2022:173, paragraph 54).

27      Accordingly, the liability of the company’s officers, including that of directors, arising from a failure to comply with an obligation incumbent on them owing to the creation of the company or to their appointment and linked to the management, operation or organisation of the company, must be regarded as arising out of the law of companies, within the meaning of Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome II Regulation. By contrast, the exclusion provided for in that provision cannot cover the liability of a director of a company arising out of an obligation that is external to the company’s affairs.

28      Thus, the Court has previously held, as regards specifically the breach of the duty of care, that a distinction must be drawn between the specific duty of care arising from the relationship between the officers and the company, which does not fall within the substantive scope of the Rome II Regulation, and the generic duty of care erga omnes, which does (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2022, BMA Nederland, C‑498/20, EU:C:2022:173, paragraph 55).

29      As regards the action at issue in the main proceedings, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that that action seeks to establish liability on the part of NM and OU on account of an alleged infringement by a company of which they were the directors of the prohibition imposed by the GSpG on any person offering games of chance to the public without holding a licence for that purpose.

30      Accordingly, and without prejudice to the classification of other actions which might be brought against those directors on account of the breach of a duty they might have vis-à-vis the company, it should be concluded that an action seeking to establish liability on the part of NM and OU owing to an alleged infringement of a general prohibition on offering online games of chance without holding a licence for that purpose is not covered by the category of non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies, within the meaning of Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome II Regulation. Such a legal action does not concern the relationship between a company and its directors.

31      Furthermore, as the Advocate General observed in point 38 of his Opinion, the question whether that non-contractual obligation must be imputed to the directors of the company or to the company itself is not determined by the lex societatis, but by the law applicable to the tort, since that law determines, in accordance with Article 15 of the Rome II Regulation, in particular, in accordance with point (a) thereof, the basis and extent of liability, including the determination of persons who may be held liable for acts performed by them, and, in accordance with point (g) thereof, the liability for the acts of another person.

32      It follows from the system established by the Rome II Regulation that it is necessary, first, to determine the law applicable to a legal act in order to be able to determine the scope of the rules applicable pursuant to that law (see, to that effect, judgement of 10 December 2015, Lazar, C‑350/14, EU:C:2015:802, paragraph 28).

33      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome II Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that an action seeking to establish tortious liability, aimed at the directors of a company, for infringement of a prohibition imposed by national legislation on offering games of chance to the public without holding a licence for that purpose is not covered by the category of non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies, within the meaning of that provision.

 The second question

34      By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of an action for damages for losses incurred when participating in online games of chance offered by a company in a Member State in which that company did not hold the required licence, the damage sustained by a player is deemed to have occurred in the Member State in which that player is habitually resident.

35      It must be recalled at the outset that, as regards the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, based not only on its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 December 2015, Lazar, C‑350/14, EU:C:2015:802, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

36      In accordance with the general rule set out in Article 4(1) of that regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort or delict is to be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur.

37      As follows from recitals 6, 14 and 16 of the Rome II Regulation, the objective of using a uniform rule of conflict consists, inter alia, in improving certainty as to the law applicable irrespective of the country of the court in which the action is brought, enhancing the foreseeability of court decisions and ensuring a reasonable balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and those of the person who has sustained damage.

38      As the Advocate General noted in point 48 of his Opinion, damage is defined as harm to the victim or interference with a legally protected interest of that person.

39      It follows from the case-law on jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict that the place where the alleged damage occurred is liable to vary according to the nature of the right allegedly infringed and that a finding that damage has occurred in a particular Member State is subject to the requirement that the right in respect of which infringement is alleged is protected in that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Pinckney, C‑170/12, EU:C:2013:635, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited).

40      In accordance with the requirements of consistency laid down in recital 7 of the Rome II Regulation, that case-law must also be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2022, BMA Nederland, C‑498/20, EU:C:2022:173, paragraphs 59 and 60 and the case-law cited).

41      Furthermore, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that the place where the damage occurred is the place where the alleged damage actually manifests itself (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2021, Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, C‑709/19, EU:C:2021:377, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

42      First, it is apparent from the order for reference that the alleged tort consists in an interference with TE’s interests, which are protected in law by the prohibition, applicable in the Member State in which he has his habitual residence, on offering the public, without holding a licence for that purpose, the possibility of participating in online games of chance.

43      Second, as the Advocate General observed in points 61 and 69 of his Opinion, the damage alleged by TE actually manifested itself when he participated, from Austria, in online games of chance offered in breach of a prohibition applicable in that Member State. In those circumstances, the damage must be regarded as having occurred in Austria.

44      In the light of the very nature of online games of chance, which does not make it easy to situate them in a specific physical location, it must be stated that those games took place where the player is habitually resident.

45      In that regard, it must be specified, as the Advocate General observed in point 64 of his Opinion, that the conduct of TBM and of its directors, who, from their domicile in Malta, offered games of chance to persons habitually resident in another Member State, is merely the event giving rise to the damage alleged by TE.

46      It is clear from paragraph 36 above that the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred is not a relevant connecting factor for determining the law applicable within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation.

47      Similarly, as regards the financial loss alleged to have been sustained on the player account specially created with a view to TE’s participation in online games of chance, or on TE’s personal bank account from which his player account was funded, it must be noted that that loss is only an indirect consequence of the alleged damage, which cannot be taken into account for the purpose of determining the law applicable under Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, as recalled in paragraph 36 above.

48      If the place where the alleged damage occurred is considered to be the place where the player is habitually resident, from which participation in the online games of chance may be deemed to have taken place, that is consistent with the objective of predictability referred to in paragraph 37 above, given that TBM and its directors could reasonably expect that, by offering online games of chance to persons residing in another Member State, with whose legal requirements they failed to comply, those persons would participate in those games of chance and thereby suffer harm to their interests that are protected in law.

49      The determination of the place where the damage occurred in that manner is borne out by the case-law of the Court relating to Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012.

50      In the context of the determination of the meaning of the concept ‘place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’ in Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, that concept does not refer to the place where the applicant is domiciled and where his or her assets are concentrated by reason only of the fact that he or she has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his or her assets which arose and was incurred in another Member State, unless that place is in fact the place in which the event giving rise to the damage or that where the damage occurred (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2021, Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, C‑709/19, EU:C:2021:377, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited).

51      In the present case, those requirements militate also in favour of designating the place where the player is habitually resident as the place where the alleged damage occurred, thereby leading to the applicable law coinciding with the jurisdiction of the court.

52      For the avoidance of doubt, it is important to note that the law designated in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation may be departed from in favour of the law applicable in accordance with Article 4(3) of that regulation, where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort or delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in Article 4(1).

53      As is apparent from recital 14 of the Rome II Regulation, the objective of such a rule of derogation is to enable the court seised to deal with different situations with the necessary flexibility in order to ensure that the applicable law is the law which is in fact most closely connected with the tort or delict.

54      Nevertheless, as a rule of derogation, it is subject to strict interpretation and the law designated in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation should be departed from only exceptionally, that is to say, where, on the basis of an overall analysis of the circumstances of the case, the tort or delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that in which the damage occurred, so as to ensure the predictability and legal certainty sought by that regulation.

55      Although, according to Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation, a manifestly closer connection with another country may be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort or delict in question, it must nevertheless be specified that the existence of such a relationship is not sufficient in itself to exclude the application of the law applicable by virtue of Article 4(1) or (2) of that regulation and does not permit the automatic application of the law of the contract to the non-contractual liability, since the court seised has discretion to assess whether there is a significant connection between the non-contractual obligation and the country whose law governs the pre-existing relationship (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2022, BMA Nederland, C‑498/20, EU:C:2022:173, paragraphs 63 to 65).

56      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of an action for damages for losses incurred when participating in online games of chance offered by a company in a Member State in which that company did not hold the required licence, the damage sustained by a player must be deemed to have occurred in the Member State in which that player is habitually resident.

 Costs

57      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:

1.      Article 1(2)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations

must be interpreted as meaning that an action seeking to establish tortious liability, aimed at the directors of a company, for infringement of a prohibition imposed by national legislation on offering games of chance to the public without holding a licence for that purpose is not covered by the category of non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies, within the meaning of that provision.

2.      Article 4(1) of Regulation No 864/2007

must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of an action for damages for losses incurred when participating in online games of chance offered by a company in a Member State in which that company did not hold the required licence, the damage sustained by a player must be deemed to have occurred in the Member State in which that player is habitually resident.

[Signatures]

*      Language of the case: German.

i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any of the parties to the proceedings.