EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 30.9.2026

COM(2026) 1010 final

2026/0301(COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

establishing the European Union Critical Communication System (EUCCS)

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CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

In any emergency situation, from floods and earthquakes to terrorist attacks, fires and traffic accidents, people rely on first responders and emergency services, such as law enforcement, rescue and medical services, and firefighters, for help. To provide help effectively, these first responders and emergency services need to be able to communicate and coordinate. Each Member State therefore provides dedicated, non-public, and secure communications systems for its emergency services (“critical communications systems”). These are mobile radio communication systems used by emergency services 1  that meet specific requirements in terms of reliability, security and availability. These systems are built to withstand disruption and continue to operate even when other communication channels fail. They are crucial for coordinating the response to emergency and crises and thus ultimately help save lives.

However, these national systems reach their limits when first responders cross borders or when they need to communicate with first responders from another Member State. Emergencies, especially major emergencies, often affect several Member States or require support from services from other Member State. An effective response to such emergencies, as well as the daily protection of citizens across the Union and the Schengen area, require that emergency services can cooperate with each other whenever and wherever they are, and can communicate seamlessly across the EU. Yet today, there is no European system that allows critical cross-border communication. This can complicate and delay the response in scenarios like joint police patrols, hot pursuits across borders, as well as accidents or major disasters such as fire or flood. In all these scenarios, most emergency services in Europe must rely on ad-hoc arrangements, such as the physical exchange of radios, creating a patchwork of different communication solutions or using commercial phones that are neither designed nor equipped for public security and safety tasks. Efficient and seamless communication is however not a matter of convenience: the ability to communicate defines the speed in which emergency services can react. And that in turn defines how fast they can save lives.

The European Union Critical Communication System (EUCCS) aims to provide a European solution, to equip those who protect us with the best communication means to fulfil their mission. EUCCS will serve more than 5 million first responders in emergency services 2 across Europe in their daily life-saving operations and during major emergencies. It will significantly increase Europe’s response capability both in times of large-scale crises, but also in daily emergencies, accidents, missing persons, crime and terrorism.

The 2015-16 wave of terrorist attacks, which brought to light the lack of communication among emergency services in major crisis situations, showed the clear need for greater interconnectivity and interoperability of critical communications. This need led to the launch of technical and operational coordination projects that prepared the EUCCS. The Covid-19 Pandemic, large-scale natural disasters such as wildfires, as well as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine further highlighted the importance of improved critical communication capabilities, across different sectors. The initiative thus builds on, and is part of, a long-term and strategic approach that is based on concrete operational needs.

EUCCS directly addresses the operational needs expressed by Member States and emergency responders. Building on the results of EU-funded security research projects carried out in 2016-2023 - with involvement of first responders - the Commission is currently developing with Member States the technical framework for EUCCS. In 2023, DG HOME established the Mission Critical Communication Group (MCCG), comprising experts in the field of critical communication from the EU Member States, the Schengen Associated countries, and EU Agencies. This demonstrates the strong involvement of Member States, who had specifically requested leadership by the Commission on EUCCS with the common understanding that only EU-level action would be able to deliver such an ambitious system.

The legal framework presented in this Regulation is a light regulatory approach with a minimum set of binding rules at EU level. This solution responds best to the complex technological, operational, legal and political needs of the initiative. EUCCS creates a ‘system of systems’ in which Member States remain in full control of their critical communication systems, with mandatory inter-operability. At the EU-level, there would be no central data management infrastructure. Rather, a technical interconnection infrastructure overseen by a light governance component consisting of national Competent Authorities represented in a European Union Critical Communication Group would provide the basis for interoperability, as well as common support functions for Member States’ systems and operations. The system is planned to be built in a gradual approach, taking into account the different stages of transition to broadband communication of Member States’ national critical communication systems. A first group of Member States should start operations in 2030, followed by the other Member States in 2033 and 2036, the latter being the final deadline by which all Member States must connect to the EUCCS. This flexibility allows Member States to adapt their adherence to the EUCCS to the progress at national level, while already providing the full benefits of the interoperability to those Member States that are ready earlier.

The system will cover the whole EU and – in view of the need and benefit of including the full Schengen area – also the Schengen Associated Countries. For EUCCS to unfold its full added value and to allow comprehensive communication and coordination in case of major emergencies, it is essential that it covers all emergency services: law enforcement, firefighters 3 , civil protection and medical emergency responders. This proposal is therefore intrinsically linked with the proposal for a Regulation establishing the framework for the use of the European Union Critical Communication System by the Member States’ services and other organisations in charge of civil protection.

• Consistency with existing provisions in the policy area

In the field of critical communication, an EU acquis does not yet exist. Member States’ critical communication systems are operating independently without legal harmonisation and with limited interoperability.

• Consistency with other Union policies

The proposed Regulation establishes the legal basis for the EUCCS in line with the provisions laid down in accordance with the existing and proposed legal acts in the area of civil protection, space and defence, cybersecurity, digital innovation and infrastructure and connectivity, including spectrum related aspects. Specifically, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 4 establishes operational cooperation between Member States in emergency response. The 112 and eCall provisions as part of the European Electronic Communications Code 5 and the Digital Networks Act 6 regulate the electronic communications sector. Regarding mobile satellite systems (MSS) management it takes into account the recently proposed MSS Regulation 7 . For what concerns coverage and backup, the proposed EUCCS regulation is in line with the Space Programme, in particular its secure connectivity component. Finally, it is coherent with the Network and Information Security 2 (NIS2) 8 and Critical Entities Resilience (CER) 9 Directives. The proposed Regulation complements the regulatory landscape by determining resilience requirements for Member States’ critical communication systems that are aligned with NIS-2 and CER, as well as the Cyber Resilience Act to be fully applicable as of 11 December 2027.

The proposal is consistent with the Council Conclusions of 7 June 2021 on the protection of public spaces 10 , which emphasised the importance of secure, interoperable mission-critical communication. The EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence 11 was the first European Commission document to identify the creation of a European Union Critical Communication System as a policy objective. 12 In 2024, the political commitment was confirmed in the Commission White Paper ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs’, which announced the establishment of EUCCS by 2030. 13 Further momentum came with the 2024–2029 Political Guidelines of Commission President von der Leyen, which stated that “our united approach to security should be centred around a new European Critical Communication System (…)”. The Niinistö Report 14 also urged the EU to complete the EUCCS as soon as possible and recommended to ensure its interoperability with systems used by armed forces. This direction was reaffirmed in 2025 in ProtectEU – the European Internal Security Strategy 15 and the European Preparedness Union Strategy 16 , both announcing a legislative initiative. The Preparedness Union Strategy specifically highlights the effects of recent crises on multiple sectors and promotes a whole-of-government approach, bringing together all relevant actors, across all levels of government, ensuring collaboration and sharing of resources, to which the EUCCS would contribute. 

1.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

• Legal basis

The legal basis is Article 87(2)(a) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Article 87(1) of the Treaty of the European Union lays down the legal basis for the establishment of police cooperation, including police, customs and other specialized law enforcement services in relation to prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences. In this regard, Article 87(2)(a) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union provides for the possibility to establish measures concerning the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information. This includes the development of necessary technical infrastructure.

Article 87(2)(a) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union is the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of the European Union Critical Communication System for law enforcement authorities across borders among Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. This regulation constitutes further development of the Schengen acquis, as it further develops the Decision of the Executive Committee of 28 April 1999 on the Schengen acquis relating to telecommunications.

• Subsidiarity

This proposal responds to calls from Member States and first responders for action at EU level to facilitate and establish a legal framework for broader critical communication among Member States as system of systems. The proposal aims to create a Union-wide interoperable communication system for first responders by interconnecting the national systems, ensuring seamless coordination during emergencies across Member States.

Given the transnational nature of the European Union Critical Communication System, including standardisation, interoperability and cross-border cooperation among first responders, EU action is necessary.

National rules are insufficient to guarantee the required interoperability, responsibility, and resilience of the communication system as they cannot create the necessary binding EU-wide interoperability framework. The measures set out in this proposal must be adopted at Union level to achieve the intended cross-border objective of establishing the European Union Critical Communication System. Therefore, Union action is justified under the principle of subsidiarity.

• Proportionality

The proposal lays down rules for Member States and providers of publicly available interpersonal communications services for the establishment of an effective, secure and interoperable critical communication system. The proposal defines clear rules for Member States to develop the required architecture and infrastructure for the EUCCS, including minimum resilience and security standards. These technical and operational demands are strictly limited to what is essential to ensure that the EUCCS functions as a cohesive and secure network system, capable of supporting cross-border communication among public security authorities. The interconnectivity between current communication networks enhances the systems’ efficiency and operational readiness, ensuring that first responders and emergency services can rely on secure communication channels during critical operations.

The proposal takes into account that a system of systems solution imposes requirements on Member States and service providers in order to establish a decentralised EU framework that allows the national critical communication systems to be interconnected. It creates a framework for Member States to designate competent national authorities that are obliged to ensure the interconnectivity of Member States’ critical communication systems. The chosen form of a decentralised EU framework - i.e. without a central EU competent authority - balances the necessary requirements to establish a functioning EU and Schengen wide interoperable communication system and the respect for national autonomy, without imposing excessive requirements on the Member States. This architecture ensures that the EUCCS functions as a unified framework to enhance overall effectiveness.

The proposal also requires Member States to impose rules on telecommunications service providers to ensure the use of their networks for critical communication. These requirements ensure that existing infrastructure can support the operational needs of the EUCCS, without placing disproportionate technical or financial demands on service providers.

The measures taken are limited to responding to the essential needs for the creation of a resilient and secure cross-border critical communication system between Member States and security agencies.

• Choice of the instrument

Given the nature of emergency services, which bring together several different authorities and services from Member States, the EUCCS consists of two proposals relying on two different legal bases to ensure comprehensive interoperability across all relevant services. The first – present – proposal is based on Article 87 (2) (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which gives the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, the possibility to establish directives and regulations to facilitate police cooperation.

To include all relevant emergency services in the EUCCS, the scope of the framework is extended to civil protection services and other organisations in charge of public safety by a second regulation, Regulation EU (…/…) on establishing the framework for the inclusion of the Member States’ civil protection services and other organisations in charge of public safety into the European Union Critical Communication System, which is proposed in parallel and is based on Article 196 TFEU.

Given the need to ensure a light central governance structure and one clear and unified interoperability framework interconnecting the national systems, a regulation is the appropriate legal instrument.

The proposal aims to establish a Union-wide critical communication system across Member States and Schengen associated countries, ensuring secure and interoperable cross-border communication for public authorities. A regulation is necessary to achieve direct application across all Member States, thereby guaranteeing consistent implementation without the risk of divergent national approaches that could compromise interoperability. This also ensures the system can be operational without delay, addressing urgent security needs effectively. A regulation is the only suitable legal instrument for establishing the binding technical specifications, security standards, and governance structures required to support such a system.

2.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

As the Regulation relates to a new area with no existing legislation at EU level, this point does not apply.

• Stakeholder consultations

The Commission collected data through various sources and consultations methods.

The EUCCS system is built in close cooperation with the European industry, therefore directly contributing to the overarching priorities of strategic autonomy and competitiveness. In compliance with the Better Regulation guidelines, DG HOME published a Call for Evidence in April 2025 and commissioned an external study to support the Impact Assessment. The research for the initiative and this impact assessment started with targeted surveys and interviews with EU Member States, which took place from July 2025 until June 2026 and mapped how Member States authorities are currently implementing their critical communications system.

A Commission Open Public Consultation was conducted from 16 January until 10 April 2026. Commission services also conducted targeted surveys and organised dedicated meetings with representatives of industry, such as providers of critical communication infrastructure and services and mobile network operators, as well as NGOs and other relevant associations, which took place from July 2025 until June 2026.

• Collection and use of expertise

As mentioned in the preceding section, the Commission has drawn on external expertise in the context of consultations with, e.g. independent experts, expert networks and members of academia, in developing the proposal at hand.

• Impact assessment

This proposal is supported by an impact assessment, which analysed a range of policy options to address the identified problems related to limited operational mobility, limited functionality of legacy systems and insufficient resilience.

The general objective of EUCCS is to enhance Europe’s capacity to react swiftly and effectively to incidents and crises that require response across borders and by cooperation of different types of emergency services.

Three specific objectives have been identified as:

–Specific Objective no. 1: Promote interoperable and secure cross-border and cross-agency/operator critical communication and operational mobility among emergency services

The objective is to provide emergency services with a resilient critical communication infrastructure. The system should enable seamless operational mobility, meaning the ability of emergency services to communicate seamlessly whenever, wherever and with whomever they are tasked to cooperate. It shall furthermore promote interoperability and strengthen cross-border and cross-agency operational mobility for an enhanced emergency response. Specifically, all the critical communication systems of law enforcement, civil protection, and other emergency response services across Member States need to be harmonised and interconnected.

–Specific Objective no. 2: Support Member States in deploying broadband critical communication systems

The ability to exchange data-rich information, such as images or video, across borders and in real time is a key driver behind Member States’ decision to upgrade the current narrowband systems used, notably TETRA 17 . It is important to underline that EUCCS does not ‘replace’ TETRA. Rather, it is the technological shift to broadband that will phase out narrowband technologies, similar to what happened in commercial telecommunication.

The transition to broadband is necessary for the deployment of interoperable 5G mission-critical capabilities. Broadband communications technology satisfies the current and evolving needs for increasing data consumption, supporting advanced functionalities, such as real time incident reporting and facilitating the integration of Artificial Intelligence. Furthermore, technological harmonisation will contribute to making national investment in critical communications attractive and help build a more integrated and technologically advanced European critical communications ecosystem.

–Specific Objective no. 3: Facilitate the achievement of a high and consistent level of resilience of critical communications across Member States

Resilient infrastructure is essential to ensure connectivity and availability in all circumstances. In this context, resilience refers to the capacity of critical communication infrastructures to withstand, absorb, and rapidly recover from natural hazards, man-made disasters or security incidents. Notably this can be achieved by ensuring advanced backup power, redundant coverage, the separation of mission critical core network and radio access networks, as well as strong protocol and cryptographic security. A broadband system would also contribute to a higher level of security by authentication allowing for stronger protection against cyberattacks. Furthermore, achieving this specific objective would contribute to future-proofing critical communication systems and increasing Europe’s strategic autonomy against potential geopolitical developments harming EU interests.

On the basis of these objectives, the impact assessment that supported the development of this initiative explored different policy options. Besides the baseline situation, which would entail no change over the current situation, these options included:

–Policy Option 1: voluntary pursuit of technical interconnectivity

This policy option is based on voluntary measures to promote interconnection of critical communication systems between Member States. This would include the publication of non-binding guidance by the Commission. Similarly to the baseline scenario, Member States would continue to develop their national critical communication systems independently. They would either maintain narrowband systems or transition to broadband solutions, in line with national strategies, priorities, and available resources.

In theory, PO1 addresses all problems and their drivers, however it is very unlikely to solve any of them in a satisfactory manner. Given the voluntary nature it is extremely unlikely that all Member States and all emergency services would participate in a ‘voluntary EUCCS’. The consultation with Member States concluded that only eleven Member States would be willing to work on interoperability of broadband systems in the absence of a binding EU framework. The BroadMap and BroadWay projects (2016 – 2022) were based on a voluntary approach that should lead to a coordinated procurement of inter-operable solutions. Experience gained from those projects largely led to the common understanding of Member States and the Commission services that only an approach based on binding EU-level rules is likely to successfully establish EUCCS.

In PO1, the Mission Critical Communication Group would recommend relevant international standards (e.g. those developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute or 3GPP) and promote common operational procedures to support interconnection among participating Member States. EU funding of projects could be leveraged aligning to existing priorities.

–Policy Option 2: adoption of an EU legal act providing a legal basis for the establishment of a decentralised EU framework

This policy option would establish a ‘system of systems’ enabling the interconnection of Member States national critical communication systems while preserving Member States’ sovereignty over their national critical communication systems.

The legal act would set out objectives, roles and responsibilities, minimum technical requirements, and cross-border procedures. Implementation would take place gradually following a convergence period with an initial system connecting around eight to ten Member States by 2030, followed by a progressive expansion of services and participation in 2033 and 2036.

At the EU level, there would be no central data management infrastructure or central operations capacity but a governance, as well as common support functions for Member States’ systems. Interconnection of Member States’ systems will be facilitated, and a central EU level monitoring capacity will be established. The combination of those elements is the EU-level component of EUCCS. Two sub-options exist that differentiate from each other according to the level of centralisation of this EU-level component:

·In sub-option 2.1 the EU-level component is light with a stronger role of the Member States, for which the current EUCCS Preparation Project will be reinforced to become the EUCCS Cooperation Project and only the necessary elements for facilitating interconnectivity, monitoring and support tasks being handled at EU-level.

·In sub-option 2.2 a central EU competent authority covers tasks related to facilitation on technical interconnectivity, common EU services as well as monitoring of the implementation of EUCCS across Member States.

Policy Option 2.1 and Policy Option 2.2 present very similar benefits and impacts.

Policy Option 2.1 ensures a higher degree of coherence with existing EU policies and respects the principle of proportionality, as its measures are appropriately calibrated to the scale of the challenges addressed. The creation of the governance measures and the light EU component are relatively easy to achieve.

There is a variation of the cost, as Policy Option 2.2 requires slightly less human resources at EU level due to the centralised governance structure. However, Policy Option 2.2 would have required the creation of an EU Agency, or the significant modification of an existing Agency mandate and resources, to act as competent authority. The Commission has thoroughly reviewed existing Agencies and none of them would have the necessary legal mandate to cover the different first responder groups, as well as the resources and capacity to handle the EU component of EUCCS. Creating a new Agency on the other hand was determined to be disproportionate.

Considering these facts, Policy Option 2.1 emerges as the preferred option. This Policy Option provides the most effective response to the identified problem, offering a comprehensive and reliable framework for achieving the policy objectives. While it may entail higher costs compared to Policy Option 1, these are justified by the significantly greater benefits and the more substantial impacts generated across economic, social, and environmental dimensions. By contrast, Policy Option 1, although less burdensome, is not expected to deliver sufficient impact to address the identified problems, limiting its overall suitability.

Different types of impacts have been identified and assessed in the Impact Assessment, including but not limited to:

·Social impacts: Significant and structural benefits through binding interoperability, harmonized procedures, and full operational mobility for an estimated 3.7 million first responders across the Union. Enhanced safety and security for citizens.

·Economic impacts: Substantial public investment (€3.571 billion) required for an interoperable EU-wide system. Medium- to long-term benefits include economies of scale, a more integrated market, and opportunities for European industry, particularly Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), in critical communication services, infrastructure, and equipment.

·Environmental impacts: More positive and structurally significant benefits through strengthened cross-border response capacity, enabling faster and more coordinated interventions to mitigate environmental risks.

EUCCS strengthens the capacity of emergency services and supports efficient coordination in emergency and crisis situations, accelerates response to disasters and emergencies, and enhances accountability and reliability. The general and specific objectives of the EUCCS contribute to various United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 18 , notably: SDG 11, SDG 13 and SDG 16.

The Impact Assessment was subject to scrutiny by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, which issued a positive opinion with reservations on 22 May 2026. The Board suggested to identify better the collection of evidence presented; describe in more details the intervention logic and problem drivers, specifically what concerns the interoperability between Member States; elaborate in more detail the EU added value, preparedness of the Member States’ technological solutions and future-proofness of the chosen policy option; and better clarify, assess and compare the costs and benefits of the options, including their distribution among the various stakeholders.

All these elements have been addressed in the final version of the Impact Assessment.

Lastly, the impact assessment explains that EUCCS will have positive impacts on the environment, notably as it enhances the capability to respond to disasters with environmental impacts such as floods, fires and industrial accidents, as well as the fight against environmental crime. Therefore, this legislative proposal is consistent with the climate-neutrality objective set out in European Climate Law.

The summary sheet of the impact assessment is available at the following link: [LINK to be inserted]

• Regulatory fitness and simplification

This initiative is not a revision of existing legislation; therefore, a REFIT test has not been performed.

• Fundamental rights

This proposal does not affect fundamental rights, but it supports Member States in the exercise of their responsibility to ensure the safety and security of their citizens. Specifically, the EUCCS enhances interoperability among emergency services across agencies and borders, ensuring an effective and coordinated response to security threats, crises, and the protection of citizens throughout the Member States. Member States’ responsibility to ensure the security of every person is protected under Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter), and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). With respect to Article 2 ECHR and Articles 2(1) and 3(1) of the Charter, the EUCCS could support the protection of life as well as the physical and mental integrity of people by enabling rapid emergency response and coordination during crises such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters. EUCCS does not equip law enforcement and emergency services with any capabilities that may be used for direct exercise of force or infringements of other rights.

–Compliance with Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR Regulation)

The EUCCS fully comply with the standards laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (GDPR), in line with Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life), Article 7 (respect for private and family life) and Article 8 of the Charter (protection of personal data. The EUCCS facilitates the exchange of operational data exclusively among emergency services and directly associated entities, e.g. emergency medical services, hospitals. Such exchanges may include victim-related data, such as name, age, sex, physical or psychological condition, but remain strictly limited to public security and safety purposes. These advancements serve solely to improve emergency response, without altering the existing legal framework for data protection. The EUCCS not enhance the capabilities of law enforcement for activities with a potential fundamental rights impact, such as surveillance of private communication.

The restrictions of data subject rights (e.g. access, erasure, or objection) in cross-border data exchanges are in line with Article 23 GDPR, as the new dimension permits restrictions by way of a legislative measure when necessary for public security, national defence, or law enforcement, provided such limitations are proportionate. For critical communication, processing of personal data would be based on the vital interest to protect life and to prevent serious threats.

3. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

The total costs have been established as part of the Impact Assessment in close cooperation with Member States’ experts.

The total direct costs amount to €3,571 billion. Of those, for the EU component of the EUCCS, which is to be provided by the European Commission, the impact assessment estimated the costs to amount to €1,156 billion, covering costs for the dedicated initial network connection, standardisation and certification, satellite connectivity, testbeds, the European Union Network Monitoring Centre, the European Union Security Monitoring Centre, the European Critical Communications Group Committee, the System Accreditation Board, the tasks of the EUCCS Cooperation mechanism, the elaboration of standard operating procedures and guidelines additional human resources and for training of staff.

The costs that are directly related to the establishment of the System at the level of the Member States and the interconnection of Member States’ systems to jointly form the EUCCS amount to €2,415 billion, consisting of adjustment costs for network, infrastructure, user equipment, applications and software licences for connecting to the EUCCS, as well as of administrative costs, consisting of reporting tools for the national competent authority, human resources needed for reporting and statistical work, training.

The costs that Member States would have to cover for transiting critical communication to broadband over a period of 7 years are estimated at €12,667 billion, including the costs for using existing public networks. Those costs are not induced by the EUCCS.

Without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations on the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) the proposal, may be supported by Union programmes in accordance with the objectives set out in the regulations establishing those programmes. The LFDS presents estimated budgetary impact under Heading 4 including related human and administrative resources.

4.OTHER ELEMENTS

• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) will be used to measure the success of EUCCS, aligned with its specific objectives. These include: (i) the designation of National Competent Authorities (NCAs) and EU competent bodies; (ii) the establishment of the European Union Critical Communications Group (ECCG) and System Accreditation Board (SAB); (iii) the number of Member States connected to EUCCS and number of first responders with connectivity; (iv) the increased cross-border operational mobility (for instance, roaming minutes); (v) the service quality metrics (for example, connection time, roaming service quality, backup power capacity); (vi) compliance with security requirements (NIS2, Cybersecurity Act), using European cybersecurity certification schemes where available; (vii) the number of joint exercises and trained first responders; and (viii) progress in implementing national strategies and adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

The Commission will evaluate the functioning and effectiveness of the Regulation in line with standard evaluation requirements and report on its performance.

• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

The proposal is based on two Regulations as explained above. The main Regulation is based on Art. 87 TFEU and is structured as follows:

Chapter I – General Provisions

This chapter describes the subject matter and the scope, namely enabling emergency services and other public authorities in charge of security and public safety to seamlessly communicate and exchange mission-critical information with each other, across borders, thereby enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of response to emergencies and crisis situations. Furthermore, it provides the key definitions and sets out the obligation for Member States to ensure the interoperability of their national critical communication systems.

Chapter II – Member State Critical Communication Framework

This chapter describes the architecture of the Member States’ Critical Communication Framework, which consists of the national critical communications system and the policies governing its upgrade and use, supervised by a national Competent Authority. Specifically, it describes the role of the Member State Competent Authority, the content of the national mission critical-broadband communication strategy, the minimum components, spectrum management and resilience requirements of the national critical communication system and the obligations for providers of public electronic communications networks. These rules ensure comparable frameworks and minimum harmonisation at Member State level, which is a prerequisite for a coordinated transition into mission critical broadband and the basis for the eventual interconnection of critical communication systems via the EUCCS.  In line with the objective of technological sovereignty and with the Commission’s Joint Communication on Strengthening EU economic security 19 , to lower the risk of data leakage, espionage and of physical and cyber-disruption, these rules exclude ownership, control or operation by high-risk entities and avoids dependencies on single suppliers or high-risk suppliers, as well as concealed vulnerabilities, backdoors or potential systemic ICT supply disruptions, by excluding high-risk vendors from the core of the system and thus contributing to ensure the supply chain security of the system.

Chapter III – European Union-level Governance

This chapter describes the governance at Union level. It sets out the European Union Critical Communication Group, consisting of Member States’ delegates, that will steer policy implementation, as well as the System Accreditation Board which will perform the technical accreditation of Member States’ critical communication systems to ensure readiness to join the EUCCS. A dedicated governance system ensures a strong role for Member States to safeguard their control over national systems, while providing clear and coherent guidance for the functioning of the EUCCS, as well as ensuring trust and verification of the accreditation, to support the future development of the System.

Chapter IV – System Accreditation and Interconnection

The chapter describes the steps for Member State systems’ interconnection to form gradually the European Union Critical Communication System. It includes an empowerment for the Commission to adopt a delegated act to define the mandatory standards, explains the general principles of accreditation and interconnection and how the Commission will facilitate the interconnection via a dedicated infrastructure. Furthermore, it describes the principle of gradual establishment and the assessment missions to be performed before an accreditation to verify compliance with the legal obligations and technical standards. Due to the fact that Member States have different starting points and the transition into mission critical broadband will happen in different timelines and with different budgetary implications, agradual approach is the only effective solution to ensure interconnection. The proposal sets 2036 as the final date for transition and interconnection. The provisions of this Chapter are supplemented by the Annex, which defines the Member States’ maturity levels.

Chapter V – European Union Components

This chapter describes the European dimension of the light technical components of the System, namely the competences of the European Union Network monitoring centre and of the European Union Security Monitoring Centre. The Network Monitoring Centre would host the interconnection infrastructure and support the high-level monitoring of the functioning of the interconnection and the interoperability. The Security Monitoring Centre would support Member States’ Security Operation Centres by monitoring security threats to critical communication systems. Both centres would be created as virtual service entities using framework contract arrangements of the European Commission that are already today used for similar tasks for the Commission and other EU bodies. Where relevant, both centres could be supported with advice from ENISA.

Chapter VI – Union-level operational support

This chapter describes the different European level operational support measures, namely the standard operating procedures and the use of EU Satellite Secure Connectivity services. Standard operating procedures are a key element to ensure that apart from the technical aspects, there is also operational harmonisation that is the basic for effective communication in emergency situations. EU Satellite Assets will support the System by offering Member States back-up and additional coverage where terrestrial systems are not available or disrupted. Finally, the chapter describes the supporting role of the Commission for Member States operations and system development, notably providing testbeds for the mission-critical interconnection, developing best practices, guidance materials and methodologies, and cross-border training activities and exercises to test critical communication systems for emergency services.

Chapter VII – Evaluation

This chapter defines the measures for evaluation of the Regulation.

Chapter VIII – Delegated and Implementing Acts

This chapter confers the power on the Commission to adopt delegated acts and specifies the committee procedure for the development of implementing acts.

Chapter IX – Final Provisions

This chapter lists the final provisions, notably that the Regulation would take immediate effect in all Member States.

2026/0301 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

establishing the European Union Critical Communication System (EUCCS)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 87 (2), point (a) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee 20 ,

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions 21 ,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)People facing emergency situations in the Union depend on the fast, efficient, and professional response, including by law enforcement authorities. From daily operations, countering crime and terrorism, preserving the public order in case of incidents or attacks, or providing security for mass events, these services need to communicate seamlessly, exchange information in real time, and collaborate effectively between each other and across borders.

(2)The effective functioning of the Schengen area and the prevention and response to security threats or disasters depend on close cross-border law enforcement cooperation, underpinned by continuous and reliable communication and information exchange in cross-border operations, such as hot pursuits. Law enforcement cooperation across borders within the area free of internal border controls on persons relies on the ability of competent public authorities to maintain reliable and interoperable communications when operating in a cross-border context, including in situations requiring real-time coordination. Such cooperation significantly contributes to ensuring the long-term security of the the Schengen area and of the Union citizens and, as such, constitutes an important safeguard in an area without internal border controls.

(3)It is essential that public authorities in charge of ensuring public order and security have, within the framework of applicable Union and national law, the ability to communicate effectively both within and across borders. In such an area, law enforcement activities carried out by one Member State may have cross-border implications for the security of others, and effective cooperation increasingly depends on the capacity of authorities to coordinate actions and exchange information in a mission critical and reliable manner. Secure, resilient and interoperable critical communication systems therefore play a central role in ensuring continuity of law enforcement operations and missions across borders and constitute an essential component of the measures underpinning public security in an interdependent area without internal border controls. Critical communication infrastructure should guarantee the reliable, secure, and efficient transmission of vital information to respond, coordinate and cooperate.

(4)At present, no system enables seamless cross-border cooperation between law enforcement authorities in the Schengen area. Critical communication systems of the Member States operate largely independently at national level and are based on differing technical approaches, resulting in very limited interoperability and lack of continuity of communications across internal borders. In an interdependent area without internal border controls, such fragmentation undermines effective law enforcement cooperation and the ability of authorities to respond jointly to security threats. It is therefore necessary to establish clear, harmonised and effective requirements at Union level, including common interoperability requirements and standards, to support the modernisation and interconnection of Member States’ critical communication systems.

(5)In order to address the need for operational mobility, strong resilience and strategic autonomy of the Member States’ critical communication systems, the European Union Critical Communication System (EUCCS) should be established as an overarching framework that enables  the relevant law enforcement authorities to communicate and exchange data continuously and seamlessly with corresponding authorities in other Member States for cross-border missions while operating within their familiar operational environments, including the devices, applications, authentication mechanisms and communication services they use in their routine activities.

(6)The European Union Critical Communication System constitutes a key action at Union level in support of internal security objectives, as reflected in ProtectEU – the European Internal Security Strategy 22 , which emphasises the importance of enhanced cooperation, resilience and preparedness in addressing security threats to public order and security. Moreover, as highlighted in the European Preparedness Union Strategy 23 , the Union should strengthen its response capabilities and strategic preparedness, including crisis-response tools, to address major emergencies, critical shortages and hybrid attacks. The establishment of a European Union Critical Communication System contributes to those objectives by providing a common framework enabling competent authorities in charge of security and safety to communicate and exchange data continuously and seamlessly.

(7)Whereas Member States may have different models for their national critical communication systems, a set of key minimum requirements and the ability of different types of law enforcement authorities to effectively communicate between each other within a given Member State is a prerequisite for interconnecting to the European Union Critical Communication System.

(8)The critical communication framework established by this Regulation should be without prejudice to the organisation, command or conduct of law enforcement activities, or to the ownership and operation of national critical communication systems, which remain the responsibility of the Member States. The provisions laid down in this Regulation do not interfere with the competence of Member States and their authorities in terms of administrative autonomy. They do not affect their responsibility for safeguarding national security and defence, their power to safeguard other essential State functions, in particular concerning public security, territorial integrity and the maintenance of law and order.

(9)In order for the European Union Critical Communication System to unfold its full operational value, Member States should be encouraged to ensure its use also by their services and other organisations in charge of civil protection, enabled by Regulation (EU) 2021/836 of the European Parliament and of the Council 24 . Cooperation between different types of emergency services is the daily operational reality. Law enforcement authorities depend on the seamless cooperation with firefighters, civil protection and medical emergency responders to effectively conduct its mission, thereby ensuring joint response of all relevant authorities in emergency situations.

(10)There are other important users of critical communication systems. To cater for the different situations in Member States and to allow for flexibility, Member States should have at their discretion the to include other users into the System. This applies notably to armed forces, national security authorities, public authorities responsible for the protection of the environment and authorities or private entities responsible for the delivery of essential services, notably as provided in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2450 25 as well as for the operation of critical infrastructure as defined in national law. Private security operators, in particular Monitoring and Alarm Receiving Centres, play an essential role in the early detection and verification of incidents, including coordinated first response with competent authorities, affecting citizens, essential services, the resilience of critical entities, and public space security. They should therefore be recognised as trusted contributors to emergency response systems and consequently be included where appropriate in critical communication networks in a complementary role to emergency services and other public authorities.

(11)With a view to ensuring a comprehensive and harmonised approach to the transition towards critical broadband and the interconnection of Member States’ systems into the European Union Critical Communication System, each Member State should have in place a strategy for critical communication. The strategy should set out objectives and policy measures to be implemented. In the interests of coherence and efficiency, the strategy should be designed to seamlessly integrate existing policies, building, wherever possible, upon relevant existing national and sectoral strategies, plans or similar documents.

(12)Critical communication is increasingly shifting towards broadband, using commercial public electronic communications networks on a shared infrastructure basis. In this context, the EUCCS should promote an ongoing transition from narrowband critical communication systems to broadband, which is in line with the overall digital policy of the Union. Coherence with the commercial public electronic communication developments will allow critical communication to benefit also more quickly from the market-driven technological advancement of the commercial sphere.

(13)Whereas Member States may have different models for their national critical communication systems, a set of key minimum requirements and the ability of different types of law enforcement authorities to effectively communicate between each other within a given Member State is a prerequisite for interconnecting to the European Union Critical Communication System.

(14)Until today, critical communication was delivered usually through dedicated, self-contained networks designed to ensure availability, control, and resilience under adverse conditions. This model provided law enforcement authorities with a high degree of assurance over mission-critical communications.

(15)Modern critical communication is however dependent on commercial, publicly available broadband networks, cloud-based services, and complex, software-defined infrastructures, meaning they are embedded within a wider and highly interdependent digital and electronic communications ecosystem. Critical communication can no longer be considered in isolation but should be approached in coherence with the security and resilience of the commercial public electronic communications networks.

(16)It is necessary to lay down a set of minimum requirements for the resilience and security of Member States critical communication systems via this Regulation, without prejudice to Member States full sovereignty over those systems.

(17)Critical communication systems may include or define as products with digital elements. For products with digital elements placed on the internal market, including both hardware and software, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council 26  sets out cybersecurity requirements that require manufacturers to ensure a security by design approach and manage vulnerabilities during the lifecycle of the product. To facilitate the implementation for manufacturers, the requirements of the Cyber Resilience Act are being further specified by harmonised standards requested by the European Commission to the European Standardisation Organisations in line with Commission Implementing Decision C (2025)618 27 .

(18)The Union and its Member States should be able to operate the System without foreign interference, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the System and of data transmitted via the System, including prohibiting the use of equipment from high-risk suppliers, especially those subject to intrusive third-country laws regarding national intelligence and data security. In this regard, the Union and its Member States should also take into account the EU ICT Supply Chain Security Toolbox 28 and make use of the possibility to exclude an economic operator from participation in a procurement procedure where the operator has been identified as a high-risk supplier pursuant to Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXX [CSA2 proposal] 29 in relation to the provision of key components for the creation, functioning or operation of the EUCCS.

(19)Strengthening European control over key technologies required for the System is essential for its security and resilience and is also one of the priorities of the Joint Communication on strengthening Union economic security. The EUCCS should leverage the required state-of-the-art technologies and innovative solutions, thereby promoting strategic autonomy and competitiveness of the Union. The System should therefore support the continuous innovation, testing, validation and integration of emerging technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence, cloud computing, post-quantum encryption and device-to-device communication, thus ensuring it remains resilient in an evolving threat landscape.

(20)The EUCCS can rely on the use of dedicated spectrum to ensure interoperability and continuous availability. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/687 30 enables Member States, subject to national decisions and choice, to designate and make available up to 8 MHz of paired spectrum for critical communications within the 700 MHz frequency band. Member States should exchange experience and best practice through the Radio Spectrum Policy Group to facilitate the coordinated designation and availability of EU-harmonised spectrum for critical communications in accordance with that Implementing Decision.

(21)Furthermore, Article 17 of Regulation […] of the European Parliament and of the Council [on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act)] 31  provides that the Union spectrum strategy shall identify radio spectrum needs and ensure availability and, where relevant, protect radio spectrum necessary for fulfilling objectives of different Union policy areas involving the use of radio spectrum, including critical communications.

(22)Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXX [The Digital Networks Act] recognises the role of critical communication, that enable emergency services and public authorities in charge of security and safety to fulfil their mission and should therefore be fully available on public communication networks. Consequently, providers of electronic communications networks and services should adopt specific measures to ensure uninterrupted electronic communications, including internet traffic, to the extent necessary to effectively conduct emergency response.

(23)Critical communications may be supported by new technologies, like network slicing, which should benefit from sufficient network capacity to ensure quality of service in crisis situations. If necessary to ensure the quality of such services, the related traffic should be prioritised and redundancy for continued availability of critical communications should be ensured.

(24)Critical communication can be provided in the exercise of public powers 32 for the fulfilment of sovereign missions related to public security, safety and emergency response, and therefore may fall outside the scope of internal market and competition rules. Member States maintain competency to regulate the operational and financial conditions of these services at the national level, in line with the applicable Union law. Where the same communications infrastructure is used for the provision of both commercial and critical communications services, appropriate safeguards may prevent possible cross-subsidisation or overcompensation.

(25)In order to ensure the technical feasibility of seamless and continuous access to the European Union Critical Communication System, it is necessary to establish common technical and interoperability requirements enabling the mission critical interconnection, interoperability and continuity of communications between Member States’ critical communication systems. Standards are therefore required to ensure operational mobility for law enforcement authorities across the Union and the Schengen area, to guarantee interoperability between national mission-critical communication systems. Compliance with such harmonised standards should provide one of the means to demonstrate conformity with the requirements laid down in this Regulation.

(26)In order for the European Union Critical Communication System to function, it is essential that Member States’ systems are compliant with a set of minimum requirements, including readiness to interconnect with the systems of other Member States. In order to accredit Member States’ systems readiness for inclusion into the System in line with the security assurance levels laid out in the Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXX of the European Parliament and the Council [on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s cloud and AI ecosystem] 33 , it is necessary to establish a System Accreditation Board. Its activities should cover the verification of Member States’ critical communication systems interconnection, roaming readiness, rollout of baseline mission critical services and key enabling capabilities, as well as alignment with the European Union Critical Communication System security and resilience. The Board will ensure that Member States retain the key role in accrediting critical communication systems, while at the same time ensuring the necessary level of trust that is needed to perform their interconnection. The assessment of the Board will be formalised by the Commission which adopts the decision on the accreditation.

(27)Member States have different starting points and the transition into mission critical broadband will happen in different timelines. Therefore, a gradual approach in which Member States connect in three groups from 2030 onwards, with 2036 as the final date for transition and interconnection.

(28)A European Union Network Monitoring Centre should be set up by the Commission by outsourcing its cybersecurity and network management tasks. The centre should operate as virtual entity to provide a specific service, thus removing the need to create any official body. It should support the interconnection of Member States’ critical communication systems and monitor the availability, performance, and continuity of service. To facilitate the interconnection of Member States’ critical communication systems, it is appropriate for the Union to provide a central mission critical interconnection infrastructure. A central interconnection node should be established to connect Member States’ systems, thus removing the need for a high number of bilateral or regional interconnections.

(29)In order to ensure operational integrity, detect, assess and mitigate security threats to the European Union Critical Communication System, it is necessary to establish a European Union Security Monitoring Centre, using the same approach as for the Network Monitoring Centre. It should cooperate closely with the Network Monitoring Centre through continuous information exchange and coordinated incident-management procedures. As per established practice in the telecommunication and cyber security domain, the Security Monitoring Centre is separated from the Network Monitoring Centre.

(30)The Commission should facilitate cooperation among Member States and the exchange of information, including best practices, on issues relating to this Regulation with the support of a European Union Critical Communication Group, consisting of experts from Member States.

(31)To ensure the resilience and continuity of critical communications for emergency services, it is necessary to integrate non-terrestrial networks, including secure satellite connectivity, as a backup and supplementary capability where terrestrial networks are unavailable, degraded, overloaded, or compromised. The Union Secure Connectivity Programme (IRIS²), established by Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council 34 , and the Governmental Satellite Communication (GOVSATCOM) component, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council 35 , provide the secure and scalable infrastructure required to complement terrestrial networks in such scenarios. Access to these systems remains subject to the decision-making authority of the GOVSATCOM and IRIS² Competent Authorities and should respect the primary mission or operational priorities of IRIS² or GOVSATCOM.

(32)Use of satellite connectivity within the EUCCS should be operationally driven, based on authorisation by the competent authorities, technically feasible, and authorised, with clearly defined service modes—including stationary backup, communication-on-the-pause, communication-on-the-move, and direct-to-device connectivity to address the diverse needs of law enforcement authorities. Such use should be granted only where capacity and budgetary resources are available, and should be governed by interoperability, security, and prioritisation rules to ensure alignment with Union law and the operational requirements of Member States.

(33)When providing mobile satellite services (MSS) using the harmonised 2 GHz frequency band, it is essential that sufficient MSS spectrum and capacity for broadband and Direct-to-Device connectivity will be available for the EUCCS.

(34)The EUCCS is built on more than 10 years of Union funded research and deployment projects. It is essential to continue to provide Member States, law enforcement authorities and industry a framework for technical cooperation, innovation and testing, building on the results of the projects Horizon 2020 Broadmap, Broadway and EUCCS Preparation Project. Their results are fundamental for the development of Member State pilot projects, for the organisation of large-scale exercises and trials of the System and the Member States’ interconnections, to promote sharing of feedback for evolving operational requirements and as a testbed for testing and validating updated or new technological solutions before deployment.

(35)The System should furthermore provide the basis for the roll-out and use of increasingly harmonised solutions for communication and situational awareness at a Union level, including notably solutions piloted by Union funded initiatives. This is in line with the EUCCS architecture, which follows a system of systems approach, in which Member States’ critical communication systems interact and collaborate on the basis of common standards and rules, resulting in enhanced functionalities and performance beyond the capabilities of the individual systems.

(36)This Regulation respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by Articles 2 and 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

(37)Where, under this Regulation, personal data are processed, such processing should be carried out in accordance with applicable Union and national law on the protection of personal data. Given that critical communication systems are operated at national level and remain under the responsibility of the Member States, the processing of personal data carried out through such systems should continue to be subject to the applicable data protection regime governing the respective national or Union actors involved. Any processing of personal data under this Regulation is therefore subject, as applicable, to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 36 , Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council 37 , and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council 38 .

(38)The EUCCS represents a trans-European digital public service within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council 39 . An interoperability assessment has thus been carried out, and the resulting report will be published on the Interoperable Europe Portal.

(39)In order to ensure the interconnection, at Union level, of the Member States critical communication systems used by competent law enforcement authorities, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of establishing the list of relevant standards related to critical communication. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making 40 . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(40)In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission on establishing minimum requirements for the security and resilience of the Member States’ critical communication systems, on laying down procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning and decision-making of the System Accreditation Board, on the decision on granting or refusing the accreditation to the Member States’ critical communication system, on laying down standard operating procedures for the Member States’ competent law enforcement authorities for the use of the system for interagency and cross-border critical communications, on required capacity, capabilities, technical standards, governance, security, and accreditation for the use of satellite connectivity within the system, on the prioritisation and service allocation procedures between users at national level, ensuring uninterrupted access for law enforcement authorities.

(41)Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 41 .

(42)The objectives of this Regulation of enhanced cooperation among law enforcement authorities across borders cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States individually but can rather by reason of enhanced cooperation among law enforcement authorities across borders be better achieved at Union level. The Union may therefore adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(43)In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Regulation builds on the Schengen acquis, to the extent that it applies to cross-border cooperation between law enforcement authorities, Denmark shall, in accordance with Article 4 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Regulation whether it will implement it in its national law.

(44)As regards Ireland, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland takes part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland’s request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis. Ireland is therefore bound by this Regulation and subject to its application.

(45)As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter’s’ association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis 42 , which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point G, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC. 

(46)As regards Switzerland, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis 43 , which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point G, of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC 44 .

(47)As regards Liechtenstein, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis 45 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point G, of Decision 1999 /437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU 46 , 

(48)The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council and delivered an opinion on [,,,].

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Subject matter

This Regulation establishes the European Union Critical Communication System (EUCCS) which interconnects, at Union level, the Member States’ critical communication systems used by competent law enforcement authorities to ensure secure and reliable connectivity for those systems.

Article 2

Responsibilities and duties of the Member States

1. Member States shall ensure that their national critical communication systems used by competent law enforcement authorities are interoperable so that they can be interconnected at Union level.

2.This Regulation shall apply to critical communication systems used by any authority of the Member States competent under national law to exercise authority and to take coercive measures for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences, including those carrying out the following functions:  

(a)policing;

(b)border control as defined in Article 2, point 10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council 47 ;

(c)coast guard functions;  

(d)customs controls as defined in Article 5, point (27) of Regulation (EU) 2026/2108 48 .

3.Member States shall ensure that the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) is granted access to use the EUCCS in line with its mandate.

4.Member States shall ensure that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is granted access to use the EUCCS, including the European Operational Support in accordance with Chapter VI, for all operational activities in line with its mandate.

5. Member States shall ensure that the European Union Customs Authority is granted access to use the EUCCS in line with its mandate.

Article 3

Definitions

1.For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(1)‘competent law enforcement authorities’ means any police, customs or other authority of the Member States competent under national law to exercise authority and to take coercive measures for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences including to maintain security and public order; 

(2)‘critical communication’ means electronic communication that is not publicly available, and which is essential for communication in emergencies and crisis situations and for restoring or maintaining security and public safety;

(3)‘users of critical communications’ means physical or legal persons that provide public services of critical nature whose effective provision of which may require situational awareness or confidential and uninterrupted communication and that are recognised by Member States as such; 

(4)‘critical communication services’ means standardised electronic communication services that provide enabling capabilities for competent law enforcement authorities and other public authorities in charge of security and safety;

(5)‘non-terrestrial network’ means a network, or segments of a network, that use an airborne or space-borne platform to host transmission equipment, which can function as a relay node or a base station; 

(6)‘critical communication interconnection’ means the resilient technical and operational linking of national critical communication systems via a network of dedicated connectivity means, -such as fibre optics-, therefore enabling cross-border critical communication;

(7)‘public network’ means a public electronic communications network that is not dedicated to governmental or mission-critical use;

(8)‘radio access network’ means the part of a mobile network that connects user devices to the mobile core network; 

(9)‘critical communication core’ means a mobile core network in accordance with applicable European Telecommunications Standards- used for critical communication that serves users separately from publicly available electronic communication services and includes additional safeguards in terms of resilience, and security to ensure guaranteed service and reliability providing users with optimal quality of service, priority and pre-emption over commercial users in emergency situations where Radio Access resources are shared; 

(10)‘broadband critical communication’ means IP based packet switched critical communication that enables Gigabit connectivity and real-time data, video, text, voice and conferencing services;

(11)‘narrowband critical communication’ means critical communication that is not based on mission critical broadband, such as those defined under ETSI EN 300 392-1;

(12)‘harmonised standard’ means a harmonised standard as defined in Article 2(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 49 .

CHAPTER II

FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE MEMBER STATES

Article 4

Competent authorities

1.Each Member State shall designate a competent authority which shall have at least the following tasks:

(a)prepare and implement the critical communication strategy as referred to in Article 5;

(b)ensure the overall functioning, resilience and security of the critical communication system in that Member State, including ensuring that it is used in compliance with the interoperability, security, resilience and operational requirements laid down by this Regulation; 

(c)oversee the evolution of the critical communication system of that Member State from narrowband towards broadband critical communication, as well as any other technological development affecting critical communication;

(d)supervise personnel, networks and equipment necessary for the functioning of the critical communication system of the Member State and take the measures to allow for its interconnection with other Member States’ systems;

(e)ensure that providers of public electronic communications networks comply with obligations in relation to Article 8 of this Regulation;

(f)act as single point of contact for the Commission and for the other competent authorities for the purpose of the implementation of this Regulation;

(g)nominate a representative to the System Accreditation Board referred to in Article 10;

(h)carry out pilot projects for the further development of the EUCCS, using dedicated parts of the critical communication system of the Member State as testbeds, validating and integrating state-of-the-art technologies and innovative solutions before deployment of those deployments.

2.By 3 months after the entry into force of this Regulation at the latest each Member State shall notify its competent authority to the Commission.

3.Each Member State shall ensure that its competent authority has the powers and the adequate financial, human and technical resources to carry out, in an effective and efficient manner, the tasks assigned to it.

4.Each Member State shall ensure that its competent authority, whenever appropriate, and in accordance with Union and national law, consults and cooperates with other relevant authorities, including the national competent authority established in accordance with Article 68(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 and Article 11(4) of Regulation (EU) 2023/588.

Article 5

Critical Communication Strategy of the Member State

1.Member State shall adopt and transmit to the Commission a critical communication strategy. That strategy shall set out the measures required for the transition from existing narrowband to broadband and packet switched critical communication, as well as for the interconnection of the critical communication system of the Member State to the systems of other Member States.

2.The critical communication strategy shall include at least the following elements:

(a)defining the users of the Member State’s critical communication system;

(b)determining the framework for procurement for the purposes of the transition to the broadband critical communication system and of the interconnection via the critical communication interconnection infrastructure established on the basis of commercial agreements with providers of publicly available electronic communication networks;

(c)setting out the framework for the strategic collaboration with providers of publicly available electronic communication networks and their role to ensure the resilience of critical communication services; 

(d)describing the deployment of the Member State’s critical communication system in line with Article 6 and the measures to ensure its resilience in line with Article 7;

(e)ensuring its coherence with national broadband plans;

(f)determining the transition period for narrowband critical communication systems;

(g)outlining investment plans and envisaged funding;

(h)setting out the steps to be taken for interconnection with other Member States’ critical communication systems;

(i)setting out a framework and schedule for regular monitoring and, where appropriate, adaptation of the national critical communication system to the continuous innovation in critical communication and commercial electronic communications, ensuring the future-proof evolution of its critical communication system.

3.Member States shall regularly review and, where appropriate, update their critical communication strategies and communicate any updates to the Commission upon their adoption.

Article 6

Critical communication system of Member States

1.Critical communication system of a Member State shall consist as a minimum of the following components:

(a)radio access network;

(b)critical communication core;

(c)critical communication services.

2.In accordance with the deadlines and requirements laid down in this Regulation and the maturity levels set out in the Annex, each Member State shall establish its-critical broadband communication system using existing network infrastructures offered by providers of publicly available electronic communication networks to the extent possible and appropriate on a shared basis using advanced traffic differentiation techniques such as network slicing. Member States may use narrowband systems for their critical communication systems as back-up and for providing additional coverage.

3.Each Member State shall ensure that its critical communication system is able to establish an interconnection with the critical communication systems of other Member States by complying with the standards as defined under Article 11.

4.Member States shall exchange best practices on the use of EU-harmonised spectrum suitable for critical communications in accordance with Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/687.

5.Member States shall ensure that services, systems and interconnection components used for their critical communication system comply with standards as referred to in Article 11 and are subject to conformity assessment, certification, interoperability testing and field validation. 

6.Member States may carry out pilot projects for the further development of the System, including via the use of dedicated parts of the Member States’ critical communication systems as for testing, validating and integrating state-of-the-art technologies and innovative solutions before deployment.

Article 7

Resilience of Member States’ critical communication systems

1.Member States shall ensure a high level of resilience and security of their critical communication systems. For that purpose, Member States shall:

(a)take appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures that reflect the principles of security by design and by default to ensure the cybersecurity of the critical communication systems and its components, including, where relevant, measures listed in Article 21(2) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council 50 ;

(b)take appropriate and proportionate technical, security and organisational measures to ensure the resilience of the critical communication systems and its components, including, where relevant, measures listed in Article 13(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 51 ; 

(c)meet pre-defined specific requirements to ensure the highest level of resilience and appropriate separation end-to-end from any publicly available commercial communications services. Such separation may be achieved through physical, logical, technical, operational, organisational and/or contractual measures, provided that those measures effectively guarantee the required level of security, resilience, availability and control. Such separation shall not preclude the deployment of critical communication services over public electronic communications networks on a shared infrastructure basis;

(d)ensure the sovereignty, the exclusion of high-risk suppliers and overall supply chain security related to the Critical Communication Core and any other key ICT assets, in accordance with Regulation (EU) XXX/XXXX of the European Parliament and the Council [on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881] 52 ;

(e)ensure that critical communication data is not subject to third country legislation requiring providers to grant, assist or support access to their authorities or any other party.

2.Member States shall establish their critical communication security operations centre. Those centres shall ensure the secure operation of the national critical communications system and cooperation with the European Union Security Monitoring Centre referred to in Article 15. Member States shall notify those centres to the Commission upon establishment.

3.The Commission is empowered to adopt an implementing act establishing minimum requirements for the security and resilience of the Member States’ critical communication systems. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 22(2).

4.This Regulation shall not preclude Member States from adopting or maintaining provisions of national law with a view to achieving a higher level of resilience of critical communication systems, provided that such provisions do not interfere with Member States’ obligations laid down in Union law.

Article 8

Use of public electronic communications networks for critical communication

1.Member States shall ensure the availability of public electronic communications networks to convey critical communications with the level of quality required to ensure its uninterrupted availability and effective functioning, including in emergency and crisis situations subject to the relevant commercial agreements with providers of such public electronic communication services. Such level of quality shall take into account relevant technical parameters, including latency, jitter, packet loss and throughput.

2.In situations of network congestion, or other duly justified cases, Member States shall ensure that providers of public electronic communications networks implement traffic management measures ensuring prioritisation and pre-emption of traffic related to critical communication, in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council 53 .

3.Remuneration for the conveyance of critical communications over public electronic communications networks, including data, shall be subject to commercial agreements between the relevant parties and shall be based on fair and reasonable terms and conditions. Such remuneration shall not be excessive. 

CHAPTER III

UNION-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

Article 9

European Union Critical Communication Group

1.The European Union Critical Communication Group (‘the Group’) is established. 

2.The Group shall be composed of one representative for each of the Member States, which are nominated by Competent Authorities and notified to the Commission, and one representative of the Commission, nominated by the Director-General of the Directorate for Internal Affairs and Migration of the European Commission. The Commission’s representative shall chair the Group. Where relevant for the performance of its tasks, the Group may nominate permanent observers or invite relevant stakeholders and other Commission services to participate in its work, including the meetings of the Group. Where requested by the European Parliament, the Chair may invite a representative from the European Parliament to attend one or several meetings of the Group.

3.The Group’s tasks include:

(a)providing strategic guidance to Member States on the establishment and further development of the System and the Member States’ components;

(b)collecting, exchanging and making available to relevant stakeholders best practices on matters related to critical communication, such as resilience, security, operational aspects, procurement or innovation;

(c)contributing to the preparation of implementing and delegated acts stemming from this Regulation;

(d)reviewing and, where appropriate, providing input on the Mission Critical Broadband Strategies as referred to in Article 5;

(e)providing guidance for Member States on compliance with Article 7(1), points (c) and (d);

(f)cooperating with relevant Union institutions, bodies and agencies, third countries or international organisations on matters related to this Regulation;

(g)monitor the progress of standardisation related to critical communication and cooperate with relevant standardisation organisations;

(h)adopting non-binding guidance or recommendations on matters related to critical communication; 

(i)reviewing the outcome of assessment missions as referred to in Article 13 and, where appropriate, making use of the results of such missions in the identification of best practices according to point (b) of this paragraph and in the provision of guidance and recommendations according to point  (h) of this paragraph;

(j)where relevant, assisting the Commission in the development of related policies and documents, including on internal security, digital transition, space connectivity or civil protection;

(k)exchanging on any topic relevant for critical communication.

Article 10

System Accreditation Board

1.A System Accreditation Board (‘the Board’) is established.

2.The Board shall be composed of a representative of each Member State, nominated by the competent authority, and of a representative of the Commission. Representatives of Member States shall be duly qualified in the field of critical communication and accrediting communication systems, have an appropriate level of security clearance, where necessary, and act objectively.

3.The Board shall assess Member States’ systems readiness for connection to the EUCCS, on the basis of maturity levels set out in the Annex. The Board shall assess the readiness of the Member State system, based on assessment missions in accordance with Article 13 and on any other relevant information after notification by the Member State of the readiness of the national system for accreditation.

4.The Board shall send to the Commission the outcome of the assessment without undue delay and where possible within three months of the notification.

5.The Commission may adopt implementing acts laying down procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning and decision-making of the Board. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 22(2).

CHAPTER IV

SYSTEM ACCREDITATION AND INTERCONNECTION

Article 11

Standards and general principles of accreditation and interconnection

1.Member States' critical communication systems shall, in order to be accredited, comply with European and international standards and technical specifications related to critical communication covering at least the following requirements:

(a) the proper functioning and interoperability of the components laid down in Article 6(1);

(b) the use of broadband critical communication systems that use existing public electronic communication network infrastructures laid down in Article 6(2);

(c) the ability of a Member States’ critical communication system to establish an interconnection with the critical communication systems of other Member States laid down in Article 6(3);

(d) technical, security and organisational measures to ensure the resilience and cybersecurity of critical communication systems as laid down in Article 7(1);

2.The Commission shall adopt a delegated act to supplement the requirements for critical communication systems of Member States referred to in paragraph 1 by establishing the list of relevant standards. 

3. Member States shall ensure compliance of their critical communication systems with the standards referred to in this Article and shall pursue accreditation of those systems by requesting the Board to accredit the national system and ensuring full cooperation of all relevant entities during the accreditation process.

4. Taking into account the outcome of the assessment of the critical communication system by the Board, referred to in Article 10(3), the Commission shall decide on granting or refusing the accreditation, by means of an implementing act. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 22(2).

5.When their critical communication system is accredited, Member States shall ensure the interconnection of their national system via the critical communication interconnection infrastructure referred to in Article 13 and in accordance with Article 14.

Article 12

Assessment missions

1.Upon receipt of a request for accreditation of a critical communication system of a Member States, the Commission shall organise a mission to assess the compliance with the requirements for accreditation set out in this Regulation and with the standards referred to in Article 11.

2.In duly justified cases, the Board may also request the Commission to organise a mission to a Member State whose critical communication system has already been accredited to verify continuous compliance.

3.The Commission may request Member States to provide information before a mission, notably on the functioning of the Member States’ critical communication framework, national legal provisions affecting the components of the Member States’ critical communication system, standards adhered to, certifications obtained, as well as system and interconnection technical performances, compliance with requirements relating to the relevant the maturity levels of the EUCCS set out in the Annex.

4.The Commission shall, following a consultation with the Member State whose critical communication system is assessed, select and appoint the members of each mission. Each mission shall consist of experts from the Member State, experts from any other Member States and Commission representatives. Additional experts, including from Union Agencies or bodies, may be nominated as observers by the Commission to join a mission.

5.Member States shall ensure that entities involved in their national critical communication system provide missions with full and unhindered access to information, systems and facilities, without prejudice to that Member State’s responsibility for national security and the protection of its security interests.

6.The Commission, based on the findings of the mission, shall communicates its opinion to the Board and the Member State whose critical communication system was assessed.

7.The Member State that hosts the critical communication system shall ensure that its competent authority and entities involved in the critical communication system concerned take into account the findings and provide information to the Commission and Board on the measures it has taken pursuant to the findings of the mission.

8.The Board shall consider the findings of the mission in its decision for accreditation of a Member State’s system.

Article 13

Critical communication interconnection infrastructure

1.The Commission shall make available a critical communication interconnection infrastructure that facilitates the interconnection of Member States’ systems. The Critical Communication Interconnection infrastructure shall:

(a)provide connectivity dedicated to communications and information exchange between Member States’ critical communication systems;

(b)ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of communications and related data;

(c)be designed to remain operational and performant, including during crises affecting all electronic communication networks used for critical communications.

2.The Critical Communication interconnection infrastructure shall use an existing Union secure network for communications to connect Member States’ critical communication systems. 

3.The critical communication interconnection infrastructure shall be designed and operated to minimise exposure to threats and reduce any attack surface. 

4.The Commission and the Member States shall ensure continuity of service for the interconnection by taking resilience measures thar are coherent with the measures taken under Article 7.

Article 14

Gradual establishment

1.Interconnection of the accredited critical communication systems of the Member States shall be implemented in three stages:

(a)the first stage shall start on 1 December 2030, as provided for in paragraph 2;

(b)the second stage shall start on 1 December 2033, as provided in paragraph 3;

(c)the third stage shall start on 1 December 2036, as provided in paragraph 4.

2.Member States whose critical communication systems comply with the requirements for the initial maturity level as set out in the Annex and have been accredited by the Commission under the conditions set out in Article 11(4) by the dates referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) shall interconnect their systems with other Member States’ accredited systems in the first stage.

3.Member States whose critical communication systems comply with the requirements for the initial and advanced maturity levels as set out in the Annex and have been accredited by the Commission under the conditions set out in Article 11(4) by the date referred to in paragraph 1, point (b) shall interconnect their systems with other Member States’ accredited systems in the second stage. The Member States referred to in paragraph 2 shall comply with the requirements for the advanced maturity level by the date referred to in paragraph 1, point (b).

4.All Member States shall ensure that their critical communication systems comply with the requirements for the initial, advanced and optimal maturity levels as set out in the Annex and that those systems have been accredited by the Commission pursuant to Article 11(4) under the conditions set out in Article 10 by the date referred to in paragraph 1, point (c).

5.The Commission shall make publicly available the list of Member States that are to be included in the stages as defined in paragraph 1.

6.The EUCCS shall commence operations from the date referred to in paragraph 1, point (a).

7.Member States may engage in bilateral or regional interconnection of their critical communication systems prior to the dates referred to in paragraph 1, provided those systems comply with the requirements set out in this Regulation.

8.Member States may engage with neighbouring third countries and territories that do not contravene the interests of the Union, in view of establishing targeted interconnection between respective critical communication systems, provided the third country or territories’ critical communication system abides to the standards as referred to in Article 11.

9.Before pursuing bilateral, or regional, interconnection as referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8, concerned Member States shall notify the Commission prior to the start of the interconnection, and the Commission shall in turn inform the Board and the Group without delay.

CHAPTER V

EUROPEAN UNION COMPONENTS

Article 15

European Union Critical Communication Network Monitoring Centre

1.The Commission shall establish a European Union Critical Communication Network Monitoring Centre (‘Network Monitoring Centre’) for the System by 1 December 2029.

2.The European Union Critical Communication Network Monitoring Centre shall perform, inter alia, the following tasks:

(a)host the Critical communication interconnection infrastructure;

(b)support the interconnection of Member States’ critical communication systems as referred to in Article 14;

(c)monitor the availability, performance, and continuity of Union-level critical communication roaming and interconnection;

(d)enable the roaming of users of critical communication systems across Member States;

(e)monitor transmission for cross-border operational needs, including critical communication roaming authentication and authorisation arrangements for visiting users of the Member States’ critical communication systems;

(f) support cross-border testing of critical communications roaming functionality and interoperability between Member States’ critical communication systems.

3.The Network Monitoring Centre shall cooperate closely with the European Security Monitoring Centre and shall provide it, without undue delay, with network events, performance information and other operational data necessary for cybersecurity monitoring, incident detection and response.

4.The Network Monitoring Centre’s activities shall be without prejudice to the provisions of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council 54 .

Article 16

European Union Critical Communication Security Monitoring Centre

1.The Commission shall establish a European Security Monitoring Centre (‘Security Monitoring Centre’) to collect and aggregate information on threats to the System by 1 December 2029. 

2.To this end, the Member States’ Critical Communication Security Operations Centres as referred to in Article 7 shall provide reports on a regular basis concerning security incidents, vulnerabilities and risks affecting the System to the European Security Monitoring Centre. A Critical Communication Security Operations Centre shall notify any incident that interferes with or interrupts the functioning of the national critical communications system or of its interconnection (‘critical incident’) to the Security Monitoring Centre without delay and latest within [48 hours] of the discovery of the incident.

3.The European Security Monitoring Centre shall monitor the System’s overall security indicators, including authentication and authorisation events, trust management, certificate status, access attempts, abnormal roaming patterns, misuse of interconnection interfaces and threats affecting the communication infrastructure. 

4.The Security Monitoring Centre and the Network Monitoring Centre shall provide evidence to the System Accreditation Board for its decisions to accredit a Member State system, or to verify its continuous compliance, by assessing the security, cybersecurity and resilience requirements for the Member States’ critical communication systems and their interconnections. 

5.The Security Monitoring Centre shall support testing of security controls for roaming authentication and authorisation, trust management, interconnection interfaces and mission-critical service interoperability.

6.The Security Monitoring Centre shall issue recommendations, propose mitigation measures or suggest corrective actions concerning security incidents, vulnerabilities and risks affecting Union-level critical communication roaming, communication infrastructure, users’ authentication and mission-critical service interoperability. It shall provide on a regular basis reports to the Commission, the European Union Critical Communications Group, and the System Accreditation Board. In case of a critical incident as referred to in paragraph 1, it shall provide a report without undue delay. It shall cooperate with the Member States’ competent authorities and cybersecurity authorities, CSIRTs Network members and relevant Union bodies and agencies to manage incidents and to follow-up on recommendations and corrective actions.

CHAPTER VI

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

Article 17

Standard operating procedures

1.The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts to lay down standard operating procedures for the Member States’ competent law enforcement authorities, for the consistent, efficient and compliant use of the EUCCS for interagency and cross-border critical communications. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 22(2).

2.The standard operating procedures shall lay down the roles, tasks, coordination mechanisms and protocols needed for the operational use of the System with regards to:

(a)the Member State competent authority referred to in Article 4;

(b)the cooperation of the Member State competent authority with the competent authorities designed under Regulations (EU) 2021/696 and (EU) 2023/588;

(c)the cooperation of the Member State competent authority with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and Emergency Response Coordination Centre

(d)the operational cooperation between Member States’ competent law enforcement authorities and other organisations using the EUCCS. 

3.The standard operation procedures shall cover the following elements with regards to cross-border critical communications:

(a)defining which service leads the communication arrangements based on the incident type or location;

(b)establishing shared situational awareness and ensuring an efficient response;

(c)determining the responsibilities of the host and visiting countries’ authorities at strategic, operational and tactical level;

(d)establishing communication and interaction protocols, including for alerting, group communication, fleet-mapping and dispatching, training and joint learning.

Article 18

Use of Union Satellite Secure Connectivity services

1.Where authorised by a competent authority designed under the Regulations (EU) 2021/696 and (EU) 2023/588, the GOVSATCOM and IRIS² Competent Authorities, users and devices of the System shall employ secure satellite connectivity services provided under GOVSATCOM and IRIS² to extend, complement, or back up terrestrial networks for emergency services in cases of unavailability, degradation, overload, or compromise. The competent authorities designated under Regulations (EU) 2021/696 and (EU) 2023/588, shall retain sole discretion over the approval of such access and the allocation of resources between users. The allocation of GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 capacities between users should be made in accordance with the rules defined under Regulations (EU) 2021/696 and (EU) 2023/588.

2.For back-up and complementary coverage, as well as for direct-to-device connectivity, users and devices of the EUCCS shall have access to secure governmental communications services provided by the operator of the secure MSS/hybrid system in accordance with Regulation (EU) XXX/XXXX of the European Parliament and the Council [on the procedure for authorisation of systems providing mobile satellite services using the harmonised 2 GHz frequency band and repealing Decision No 626/2008/EC]  55 .

3.When the services are accessed pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, they shall be used in the following four operational service modes:

(a)stationary mode in which fixed infrastructure providing backup connectivity for critical communications during terrestrial network outages;

(b)communication-on-the-pause in which rapidly deployable satellite connectivity for emergency services in scenarios where fixed infrastructure is temporarily unavailable or insufficient;

(c)communication-on-the-move in which continuous connectivity for vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and aerial platforms, enabling real-time command, control, and coordination during operations;

(d)direct-to-device in which satellite connectivity directly to handsets or other user equipment used by competent authorities, in line with the MSS Regulation or in the context of GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 , where such services are available.

4.The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts to specify:

(a)the required capacity, capabilities, and technical standards for each operational service mode referred to in paragraph 2;

(a)the governance, security, and accreditation rules for the use of satellite connectivity within the EUCCS, in accordance with the operational requirements of critical communication;

(b)the prioritisation and service allocation procedures between the EUCCS users at national level, ensuring uninterrupted access for law enforcement authorities without exceeding the approved capacity and budgetary limits.

5.In preparing the draft implementing acts, the Commission shall take into account the operational requirements of EUCCS users. Those implementing acts shall not affect the application of Regulations (EU) 2021/696 , (EU) 2023/588 and Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX[on the procedure for authorisation of systems providing mobile satellite services using the harmonised 2 GHz frequency band and repealing Decision No 626/2008/EC].

6.The implementing acts referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 22(2).,

7.Member State competent authorities designated under Article 4 of this Regulation shall cooperate with competent authorities designated under Regulations (EU) 2021/696 and (EU) 2023/588s, as well as the Commission in the context of Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX  [on the procedure for authorisation of systems providing mobile satellite services using the harmonised 2 GHz frequency band and repealing Decision No 626/2008/EC] to ensure the availability, interoperability, and effective use of secure satellite connectivity services within national critical communication systems. Such cooperation shall include:

(a)the authorisation for the access to the services, at national level;

(b)the alignment of security and accreditation standards;

(c)the monitoring and reporting of service performance, incidents, and compliance with Union rules, including capacity usage and budgetary impacts.

8.For Member States participating in the EUCCS, but not participating in the relevant Union space programmes, access to non-terrestrial or secure connectivity services shall be subject to the applicable international agreements, association arrangements or specific operational agreements governing such access concluded with the Union or with participating Member States in accordance with Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 696/2021 and Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 588/2023.

Article 19

Commission support to Member States

1.The Commission shall support the coordination of Member States’ technical and operational cooperation on critical communication.

2.The support referred to in paragraph 1 may include:

(a)providing testbeds to prepare for the interconnection as referred to in Chapter IV;

(b)funding of trials and exercises for emergency services to test the interoperability of critical communication systems, operational procedures or resilience of critical communication systems;

(c)supporting Member States in cooperating with industry and research to ensure the continuous innovation of critical communication in the Union;

(d)supporting technical cooperation projects with third countries, in particular candidate countries and potential candidates, with a view of achieving targeted interoperability;

(e)the support referred to in paragraph 2 may be subject of Union funded projects.

CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION

Article 20

Evaluation

1.By [five years after the entry into force of this Regulation], and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of this Regulation, including detailed information on how each Member State has implemented it, and shall, where appropriate, propose amendments to this Regulation.

2.Member States shall, at the request of the Commission, provide it with the information necessary for the preparation of the report referred to in paragraph 1, no later than nine months before the expiry of the reporting deadline.

3.The reports referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall, where relevant, take into account the results of evaluations carried out pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922 56 , in particular as regards communication and the exchange of information.

CHAPTER VIII

DELEGATED AND IMPLEMENTING ACTS

Article 21

Exercise of the delegation

1.The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

2.The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 11 (2) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period from the entry into force of this Regulation.

3.The delegation of power referred to in Article 11 (2) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

4.Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.

5.As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.

6.A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 11 (2) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.

Article 22

Committee procedure

1.The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

2.Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

CHAPTER IX

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 23

Responsibilities for operation and maintenance

1.The costs incurred by the Member State for the operation, maintenance, development and modernisation of their critical communication system shall be borne by each Member State.

2.Each Member State shall set up and maintain at their expense the technical infrastructure necessary to implement their obligations under this Regulation at national level and shall be responsible for bearing the associated costs.

Article 24

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the […] day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.

Done at Brussels,

LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL STATEMENT

ANNEX 4

Contents

1.CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

5.OTHER ELEMENTS

1.FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

1.1.Title of the proposal/initiative

1.2.Policy area(s) concerned

1.3.Objective(s)

1.3.1.General objective(s)

1.3.2.Specific objective(s)

1.3.3.Expected result(s) and impact

1.3.4.Indicators of performance

1.4.The proposal/initiative relates to:

1.5.Grounds for the proposal/initiative

1.5.1.Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for roll-out of the implementation of the initiative

1.5.2.Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g. coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member States alone.

1.5.3.Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past

1.5.4.Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with other appropriate instruments

1.5.5.Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for redeployment

1.6.Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact

1.7.Method(s) of budget implementation planned

2.MANAGEMENT MEASURES

2.1.Monitoring and reporting rules

2.2.Management and control system(s)

2.2.1.Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed

2.2.2.Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up to mitigate them

2.2.3.Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)

2.3.Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities

3.ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

3.1.Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected

3.2.Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations

3.2.1.Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations

3.2.1.1.Appropriations from voted budget

3.2.3.Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget

3.2.4.Estimated requirements of human resources

3.2.4.1.Financed from voted budget

3.2.5.Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments

3.2.6.Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework

3.2.7.Third-party contributions

3.3.Estimated impact on revenue

4. Digital dimensions

4.1. Requirements of digital relevance

1.FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE 

1.1.Title of the proposal/initiative

1.2.Policy area(s) concerned 

1.3.Objective(s)

1.3.1.General objective(s)

1.3.2.Specific objective(s)

1.3.3.Expected result(s) and impact

Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.

1.3.4.Indicators of performance

Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements.

1.4.The proposal/initiative relates to: 

¨ a new action 

x a new action following a pilot project / preparatory action 57  

¨ the extension of an existing action 

¨ a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action

1.5.Grounds for the proposal/initiative 

1.5.1.Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for roll-out of the implementation of the initiative

1.5.2.Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g. coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member States alone.

1.5.3.Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past

1.5.4.Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with other appropriate instruments

1.5.5.Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for redeployment

1.6.Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact

¨ limited duration

–¨    in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY

–¨    financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.

x unlimited duration

–Implementation with a start-up period from 2030,

–followed by full-scale operation.

1.7.Method(s) of budget implementation planned 60  

¨ Direct management by the Commission

–¨ by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;

–¨    by the executive agencies

¨ Shared management with the Member States

¨ Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:

–¨ third countries or the bodies they have designated

–¨ international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)

–¨ the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund

–¨ bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation

–¨ public law bodies

–¨ bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they are provided with adequate financial guarantees

–¨ bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with adequate financial guarantees

–¨ bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act

–¨ bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.

Comments

2.MANAGEMENT MEASURES 

2.1.Monitoring and reporting rules 

2.2.Management and control system(s) 

2.2.1.Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed

2.2.2.Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up to mitigate them

2.2.3.Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure) 

2.3.Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities 

3.ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE 

The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.

3.1.Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected 

·Existing budget lines

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.

3.2.Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations 

3.2.1.Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations 

–¨    The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations

–x    The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below

3.2.1.1.Appropriations from voted budget

EUR million (to three decimal places)

The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative

3.2.3.Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations 

–¨    The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature

–x The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget

The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.

3.2.4.Estimated requirements of human resources 

–¨    The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources

–x    The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below

3.2.4.1.Financed from voted budget

Estimate to be expressed in full-time equivalent units (FTEs) 67