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P10_TA(2025)0175 – 2023 and 2024 reports on Ukraine – European Parliament resolution of 9 September 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine (2025/2026(INI))

OJ C, C/2026/1471, 9.4.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/1471/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

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C/2026/1471

9.4.2026

P10_TA(2025)0175

2023 and 2024 reports on Ukraine

European Parliament resolution of 9 September 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine (2025/2026(INI))

(C/2026/1471)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine,

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Ukraine 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0699) accompanying the 2024 Commission communication on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690),

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Ukraine 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0699) accompanying the 2023 Commission communication on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690),

—	having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 June 2022 granting Ukraine candidate status, of 15 December 2023 endorsing the opening of accession negotiations, and of 20 March 2025,

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility (1),

—	having regard to the report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of 2021 entitled ‘OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Ukraine’ and the subsequent follow-up dialogues in 2024,

—	having regard to the International Monetary Fund’s eighth review of the 2023–2026 Extended Fund Facility for Ukraine,

—

having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, in particular the urgent follow-up opinion to the opinions on the Law ‘On Amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine to clarify the provisions on the competitive selection of candidates for the position of judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’ of 9 October 2023, and the follow-up opinion to the opinion on the law on national minorities (communities) of 9 October 2023,

—	having regard to the reports by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on Ukraine, in particular the Fourth Evaluation Round and the addendum to the second compliance report on corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors in Ukraine of 22 November 2024,

—

having regard to the report submitted by Ukraine pursuant to Article 68, paragraph 1 of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Baseline Report) of 3 July 2025 and to the additional information received by the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence from Ukrainian civil society organisations,

—	having regard to Human Rights Watch reports on Ukraine, including its report of 5 December 2024 entitled ‘ “All She Did Was Help People” – Flawed Anti-Collaboration Legislation in Ukraine’,

—	having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence (2),

—	having regard to the statements by the leaders of Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ukraine following the meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington DC on 18 August 2025,

—	having regard to the statement by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen with the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy following their meeting in Brussels on 17 August 2025,

—

having regard to the joint statement issued on 16 August 2025 by the leaders of France, Italy, Germany, the UK, Finland, Poland, the President of the European Council António Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen following the meeting between US President Donald Trump and the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, Alaska on 15 August 2025,

—	having regard to previous declarations, including the joint statement by the leaders of France, Germany, Poland, the UK and Ukraine following the meeting in Kyiv on 10 May 2025 and the Weimar+ joint statement on Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic security of 12 May 2025,

—	having regard to the joint statement issued by several MEPs on 11 August 2025 on the negotiations towards a just peace for Ukraine based on international law and the will of the Ukrainian people,

—	having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0154/2025),

whereas Parliament condemns in the strongest possible terms the illegal, unjustified and unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine and supports Ukraine’s right to sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; whereas Russia invaded Ukraine and therefore the most straightforward and only just path towards peace in Ukraine consists of Russia withdrawing its forces from the entirety of the Ukrainian territory and paying reparations for the damage it caused throughout its illegal war of aggression;

whereas Russia, with the political, material and military support provided by its allies – in particular Belarus, Iran and North Korea – has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine began, however, in 2014 with the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

whereas there was a drastic increase in the number of Russian missile strikes and attacks carried out with unmanned aerial vehicles in June and July 2025, targeting civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, residential buildings and cultural institutions, which resulted in the highest number of civilian casualties since May 2022; whereas, according to data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, at least 232 civilians were killed and 1 343 injured in June 2025, while July 2025 recorded 286 civilian deaths and 1 388 injured, constituting the highest monthly toll of civilian casualties since May 2022;

whereas Russia is carrying out assassinations and sabotage against prominent Ukrainian public figures, servicemen and critical infrastructure; whereas Andriy Parubiy, the former Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada and former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, was brutally assassinated in Lviv on 30 August 2025;

whereas Russia has been committing documented war crimes and deportations in all the Ukrainian territories that it illegally occupies, and has been relying heavily on information manipulation, disinformation and the spreading of propaganda so as to purposefully keep the population mis- and uninformed;

whereas on 28 August 2025, Russia launched another utterly brutal drone and missile attack on several buildings in Kyiv, killing at least 23 people and leaving more than 63 injured, including children; whereas the premises of the EU Delegation to Ukraine were severely damaged in the attack, constituting a grave violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; whereas the Kyiv offices of the British Council were also hit during the strikes, suffering serious damage and leaving one person injured;

whereas, in response to Russia’s war of aggression, the Core Group for the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine was launched in January 2023; whereas the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression was set up in The Hague in March 2023 under Eurojust; whereas the Core Group finalised the legal framework for the Tribunal in March 2025; whereas over 40 countries endorsed its creation through the joint statement of the Foreign Ministers Meeting of 9 May 2025 on the conclusion of the work of the Core Group (Lviv Statement); whereas on 25 June 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset signed in Strasbourg the formal agreement establishing the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine;

whereas US President Donald Trump and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin held a bilateral summit in Anchorage, Alaska on 15 August 2025; whereas this summit was followed by meetings between President Trump and President Zelenskyy along with European leaders on 18 August 2025 in Washington DC;

whereas Ukraine has shown remarkable resilience and commitment to its European path and has made tangible progress in this regard despite the ongoing Russian war of aggression, which has resulted in the deaths of thousands, inflicted deep trauma on veterans and their families, left many cities and vital civil infrastructure in ruins, and led to the continued occupation of parts of its territory by Russian forces;

whereas, as a result of the Russian invasion, over 4 million Ukrainians are currently living in EU Member States under the temporary protection mechanism and benefit from rights to residence, access to the labour market, housing, medical care, social welfare assistance and education for their children;

K.	whereas Ukraine’s EU accession process constitutes an important contribution to and path towards peace and prosperity for Ukraine, a strategic response to Russia’s aggression and a credible security guarantee for Ukraine, reinforcing the EU’s geopolitical resilience;

L.	whereas the legislative reforms Ukraine has initiated reflect its dedication to alignment with the EU acquis;

whereas GRECO continues to acknowledge the strong commitment shown by Ukraine in respect of work to counter corruption at an extremely difficult time for the country; whereas GRECO in particular recognised Ukraine’s progress in preventing corruption among parliamentarians, judges and prosecutors; whereas, despite progress in areas such as judicial independence and systemic corruption, challenges remain which must be addressed through greater governmental accountability, further strengthening of institutional capacities, and international oversight;

N.	whereas the OECD noted that Ukraine has made significant strides in reforming its anti-corruption framework in the past decade through enhancing transparency, accountability and integrity through open data, digitalisation, and bolstering of the independence of anti-corruption bodies;

whereas in mid-July 2025, the Ukrainian authorities attempted to undermine the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) by adopting Law 12414, granting the Prosecutor General extensive powers to interfere with their investigations; whereas on 31 August 2025, as a result of extensive internal and external pressure, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law 13533 in the aim of at re-establishing the status quo ante, thus taking the necessary measures towards fully restoring the independence of the NABU and SAPO;

whereas while Ukraine scored 35 out of 100 points and ranked 105th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, and while there has been a strong commitment to anti-corruption efforts, actual reforms to implement these intentions are still needed; whereas comprehensive public-administration reform, the fight against corruption, the promotion of fundamental rights and the effective functioning of democratic institutions are core conditions for EU accession;

Q.	whereas Ukraine has made advancements in regional cooperation and in socio-economic reforms to align its policies with EU standards;

whereas Ukraine’s democratic institutions have demonstrated adaptability by showcasing that, even amid Russia’s ongoing war of aggression and under martial law, Ukraine remains an institutionally, democratically and economically viable state; whereas, while Ukraine remains at war and is under martial law, elections are legally banned and impractical; whereas Parliament welcomes indications that preparations for elections may begin once martial law has ended;

S.	whereas progress has been made on public administration reform, but further capacity building, evidence-based policymaking, and improvements to human resources management are still required;

T.	whereas the judiciary has resumed key functions, including the vetting of judges and the implementation of anti-corruption measures, though integrity and transparency standards must be strengthened and there should be continuous oversight from international partners;

U.	whereas the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary has benefited from the assistance of international experts in judicial selection commissions, which has also built public trust in the judicial system;

V.	whereas international experts’ involvement in the selection of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) ended on 1 June 2025;

W.	whereas Ukraine has shown a commitment, despite the continuous destruction of energy facilities by Russia, to the green agenda through legislation on renewable energy and by aligning with the objectives of the European Green Deal;

whereas the environmental damage caused by Russia has had devastating consequences for Ukraine’s natural resources, critical ecosystems and people’s health, livelihoods and security; whereas green recovery is about remedying that damage and setting Ukraine on a new path of environmental and social sustainability aligned with the environmental laws in the EU acquis; whereas Ukraine ceased to operate as a transit country for Russian gas on 1 January 2025;

whereas foreign investors and multinational corporations have significantly expanded their control over Ukraine’s natural resources, including agricultural land, minerals and critical infrastructure; whereas such developments risk undermining national sovereignty, food security and economic self-determination;

whereas in 2024, the EU purchases of Russian fossil fuels totalled EUR 21,9 billion, surpassing the EUR 18,7 billion in financial aid provided to Ukraine that same year; whereas since the start of the full-scale invasion, the EU has spent more than EUR 200 billion on Russian fossil fuels, thus contributing to funding Russia’s war chest; whereas the Commission has announced an end to Russian gas imports by 2027; whereas if the EU continues importing Russian energy at the rate it did in 2024, it would pay an additional EUR 57,4 billion to Russia before the end of 2027;

AA.

whereas civil society remains a pillar of resilience and democracy in Ukraine; whereas, despite the restrictions imposed by martial law, NGOs continue to operate relatively unhindered, though instances of pressure against activists raise concerns and require government action; whereas recent abrupt US funding cuts have had devastating consequences for Ukrainian civil society;

AB.

whereas the freedom of expression and media independence face challenges, particularly under martial law; whereas measures are required to restore pluralism, protect journalists and create a financially enabling environment; whereas it is understandable that certain restrictions are necessary during martial law;

AC.

whereas the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has raised serious concerns regarding the deterioration of labour rights in Ukraine, including violations of trade union freedoms and social dialogue; whereas freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike are protected under International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions to which Ukraine is a party, and are key elements of the EU acquis and the Copenhagen criteria;

AD.	whereas Ukraine’s EU integration process is widely supported by public and institutional consensus, reflecting a strong societal commitment to EU membership despite the current difficulties;

AE.

whereas EU accession carries a distinct security dimension and strong symbolic significance for the country and its population, in the context of Ukraine's existential war against ongoing Russian aggression; whereas the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence are not dependent on the speed of the country’s European integration;

AF.

whereas EU membership remains a crucially important driver for the democratic development of Ukraine and will represent a key factor in ensuring the country’s future security, stability and independence; whereas Ukraine’s EU membership is a strategic investment in peace, security, democracy and prosperity for the entire continent as it will strengthen the Union by contributing to its geopolitical resilience, enhancing its economic potential, and reinforcing its commitment to shared values of democracy, the rule of law and freedom;

AG.	whereas accession remains a merit-based process and progress on reform implementation must be assessed thoroughly and carefully, which is also in the interest of Ukraine;

The Russian war of aggression as the context for Ukraine's EU accession preparations

Condemns in the strongest terms the Russian Federation’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the brave people of Ukraine, who, since 2014, have paid the highest price in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in protecting Europe and our shared democratic values and principles; expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the fallen heroes and innocent civilian victims of the Russian aggression, including the more than 600 children who have been killed;

Strongly condemns Russia’s organised assassinations of prominent Ukrainian public figures and servicemen and its sabotage of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure; expresses horror and outrage at the heinous assassination, on 30 August 2025 in Lviv, of Andriy Parubiy, the former Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada and former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, who had demonstrated strong commitment to Ukraine’s European aspirations;

Expresses its outrage at the intensified drone and missile attacks carried out by Russia against civilian targets, including the attack on Kyiv on 28 August 2025, when the EU Delegation to Ukraine and the British Council were directly targeted; stresses that the recent attack, as well as all other strikes targeting civilian infrastructure, constitutes a war crime and showcases once again Russia’s blatant disregard for human life, international law, US efforts towards peace and the fundamental principles governing the protection of civilians;

Confirms its unwavering commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; reiterates its policy of non-recognition of temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine by Russia, including Crimea; strongly underlines Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which entails the right to strike military targets on Russian soil; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on terms that are acceptable to Ukraine and its people, ensuring the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the prosecution of those responsible for war crimes, as well as the payment of reparations; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for international law and Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, as well as Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; stresses that any peaceful solution must respect the will of the Ukrainian people and not be imposed by any other international actor and must not reward aggression or undermine Ukraine’s future security; regards the disingenuous approach to negotiations and unserious proposals by Russian leaders over the past months as additional proof that Russia intends to prolong its war on the entire Ukrainian territory as long as it can and is allowed to; stresses that peace negotiations must be preceded by an unconditional ceasefire; calls for continued EU support to Ukrainian and international efforts to strengthen the documentation and investigation of war crimes committed by Russian forces;

Expresses deep concern over the shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included engaging directly with Russia without exerting meaningful pressure, publicly renouncing major leverage, refusing additional and discussing lifting of sanctions, and attempting to coerce Ukraine into making territorial concessions and relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence; stresses that in light of these developments, the EU and its Member States must remain Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and should reinforce their leadership role in supporting Ukraine’s struggle for sovereignty, peace and justice; acknowledges that Ukraine’s security represents a crucial part of the EU’s security; notes that EU support to Ukraine has now surpassed that of the United States, underlining the EU’s vital role in sustaining Ukraine’s resilience and recovery;

Stresses that the EU and its Member States must significantly increase the effectiveness and accelerate the delivery of military, material and financial assistance they provide to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence; insists that the EU and its Member States, together with partners and allies, must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression and enable Ukraine to fully focus on pursuing the necessary reforms on the path towards EU accession; underlines the importance of permanently strengthening the security of the EU’s and NATO’s eastern flank in response to threats from Russia; calls for the development of military and logistical infrastructure in Ukraine’s neighbouring countries; recognises Ukraine’s sovereign right to choose its military alliances;

Takes note of the recent meeting between US President Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and stresses that it contrasts blatantly with Russia’s massive escalation of attacks against Ukraine, which prove yet again that Russia is not at all interested in peace, but rather in subjugating Ukraine; underlines that Vladimir Putin is disingenuously engaging with US peace efforts and is merely playing for time in order to continue Russia’s war of aggression; calls on President Trump to act on his announcement that the United States would adopt further resolute economic sanctions against Russia and those countries that are fuelling its war machine; stresses that no durable and just peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without the full participation of Ukraine’s leadership and the support of its people, as well as the participation of the European Union; notes with approval that a meeting took place between President Trump and President Zelenskyy and a number of European leaders on 18 August 2025; reaffirms its steadfast commitment to providing security guarantees and taking all the necessary steps to strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces and defence industry; rejects any Russian claims to be a guarantor of future security arrangements for Ukraine and any attempts to condition the numerical and operational sovereignty of the Ukrainian armed forces;

Recalls that Europe has already supported Ukraine with EUR 50 billion in military aid but underlines that further assistance is required and that such support now depends largely on Europe itself; urges the Member States to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine before any negotiations are concluded, and to substantially reinforce intelligence sharing with Ukraine; calls on the EU Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; welcomes Ukraine’s efforts to strengthen its domestic defence industrial base, including the production of drones and other critical technologies; insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with and the integration of Ukraine into EU defence initiatives, including the integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in order to strengthen the EU's strategic autonomy; encourages the development of joint arms manufacturing projects with EU and NATO partners; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support these initiatives through the European Defence Industrial Strategy and relevant instruments, in order to reinforce Ukraine’s long-term self-defence capabilities; highlights the urgency of properly financing the European defence industry programme’s Ukraine Support Instrument, which has not yet had any funds allocated to it;

Reiterates its call on the EU Member States to follow the Danish and Dutch examples to partner with the Ukrainian defence industry and support their production capacities in the most efficient manner;

10.

Welcomes the achievements of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM), which has provided training for Ukrainian military personnel; supports the Council’s decision of 8 November 2024 to extend the mandate of the mission for two years; calls for EUMAM’s financial, logistical and human resources to be expanded and adapted to the evolving military training needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as to long-term reform efforts in line with the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine; emphasises that EUMAM should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices, ensuring that European forces benefit from the battlefield experience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

11.

Condemns in the strongest terms the violent actions of Russia, and the complicity of Belarus, in the mistreatment of Ukrainian children, including murder, forced transfer, deportation and illegal adoption and in erasing Ukrainian identity by enforced Russification; calls for the EU to cooperate closely with and support Ukrainian authorities, international organisations and NGOs in documenting all missing and deported children, ensuring their safe return and reintegration, and providing the necessary legal, psychological and social support;

12.

Condemns Russia’s inhumane treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war, including torture and executions, which grossly violates the Geneva Conventions, while Russian prisoners of war in Ukraine enjoy all the rights afforded to them by international law, including visits and assistance from the international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); welcomes the largest prisoner exchange to date, which took place in May 2025, and calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to facilitate further exchanges and apply necessary pressure to ensure they continue; deplores the illegal imprisonment of Ukrainian civilians by Russia, who are being held incommunicado and under inhumane conditions, which includes torture and extrajudicial killings; calls for increased international pressure to ensure the release of all detained Ukrainians; calls on the ICRC to insist that the Russian authorities provide international ICRC representatives unhindered access to all locations where Ukrainian prisoners of war are held;

13.

Underlines the importance of comprehensive accountability and justice mechanisms; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and corresponding amendments to the Criminal Code; welcomes the Core Group Foreign Ministers’ Joint Statement (Lviv Statement) of 9 May 2025 on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine; underlines that prosecuting the crime of aggression is essential for upholding the rules-based international order and preventing impunity; calls for the EU institutions and Member States to continue supporting the establishment and functioning of the Special Tribunal within the framework of the Council of Europe; encourages all parties to guarantee that Ukrainian civil society organisations and victims of the war can play a meaningful role in the tribunal’s work; is convinced that a just and lasting peace is possible only when Ukrainian children, other civilians forcibly deported or detained, and prisoners of war, are released and reunited with their families, and when those responsible are brought to justice;

14.

Welcomes the European Court of Human Rights judgement of 9 July 2025 in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, which held Russia responsible for widespread and flagrant abuses of human rights in Ukraine – including the downing of MH17, torture, rape as a weapon of war, summary executions, unlawful and arbitrary detentions, and the organised removal of children to Russia and their adoption there;

15.

Underlines that sanctions, alongside the prevention and countering of sanction circumvention, remain crucial instruments to undermine Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression and to neutralise threats posed to European security; calls for the expansion of sanctions targeting the Russian economy, including in the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical, energy and financial sectors; welcomes the adoption of 18 packages of sanctions against the Russian Federation and calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt additional sanctions packages, particularly aimed at tackling the circumvention of existing measures; stresses that strict implementation and enforcement of sanctions are essential to deprive Russia’s war machine of resources and strengthen Ukraine’s resilience; calls on the Commission and the Member States to work to ensure continued US participation in sanctions implementation against Russia in order to maintain the pressure on Russia’s economy and state budget; is of the opinion that sanctions must be extended and continued until Russia ends its war of aggression against Ukraine and pays war reparations;

16.

Urges an accelerated phasing out of Russian hydrocarbon products in the EU to finally achieve a total ban; reiterates that ending the EU energy dependence on Russia’s hydrocarbons is essential for Europe’s energy security; welcomes the effective implementation of the EU’s full embargo on Russian coal, which has ended the EU’s dependence on Russian coal; recalls the EU embargo on Russian oil but regrets that the Hungarian Government and the Slovak Government have chosen to remain dependent on it and urges them to swiftly end this harmful reliance, where needed, with specific support measures; calls on the Council to sanction all vessels operating within the Russian shadow fleet and contact the flag states to de-list these vessels from their ships register, thereby making them ‘uninsurable’ for insurance companies; urges the increase of efforts to prevent the circumvention of existing sanctions against Russian oil; urges the EU and G7 coalition to lower the price cap on oil to further reduce Russia’s financial capacity to wage war; welcomes the Re-Power EU Plan recently announced by the Commission; urges the Commission, however, to advance the timelines thereof wherever possible and to take where needed interim measures such as lowering the oil price cap and implementing a liquefied natural gas price cap and import quota; strongly rejects calls to resume projects like Nord Stream 1 and 2; deeply regrets that more than three years after the start of the full-scale invasion, the Council has not adopted a full embargo on Russian gas; calls for a swift adoption of such a measure;

17.

Deplores the obstructive behaviour of governments within the EU that have threatened to veto or undermine restrictive measures against Russia; supports the intention to criminalise the violation and circumvention of sanctions in Ukraine, as proposed in urgent draft law No. 12406; underlines that enforcing such legislation is essential to closing loopholes that allow sanctioned assets to be withdrawn during the blocking stage and to bringing to justice enablers of Russia’s war of aggression; urges Ukraine to adopt this draft law in line with the relevant EU best practices;

18.

Urges the Commission and the Member States to confiscate the immobilised Russian assets and make them available for Ukraine’s defence, reconstruction and reparations for victims, in line with international law and the principle of state responsibility; stresses, in order to achieve the former, the paramount importance of ensuring that sovereign Russian assets remain immobilised within the EU;

19.

Calls for strong leadership from the Council and the Commission to find a sustainable solution regarding the EU’s temporary protection mechanism for over 4 million Ukrainians, which has been extended until March 2026; emphasises the need to ensure equal treatment and prevent fragmentation across the EU; highlights the importance of upholding the rights of Ukrainians who cannot return and wish to remain in the EU, while also supporting those who choose to return and rebuild their lives in Ukraine;

20.

Encourages Ukraine and the Member States to cooperate closely with a view to maximising the potential economic participation of Ukraine’s refugee and diaspora population to ensure resilience and inclusivity of Ukraine’s ongoing and future economic recovery and reconstruction;

21.

Calls on political forces in Ukraine to remain united and continue to be guided by a sense of firm political unity and cohesion, which has proven to amplify Ukraine’s resilience in the face of the ongoing existential threat to the country’s freedom and independence; calls on all political actors in Ukraine, in particular those currently in power, to use their wartime powers to foster political unity and coherent and inclusive policymaking;

Commitment to EU accession

22.

Strongly welcomes Ukraine’s steadfast dedication to meeting the requirements of EU membership, including compliance with the EU acquis, despite Russia’s brutal and relentless war of aggression and its recently renewed escalation; urges Ukraine to maintain its dedication and pace of reforms; highlights the strong momentum in the implementation of reforms in Ukraine and welcomes Ukraine’s increasing rate of alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, which amounted to 95 % in 2024; notes that EU reform demands under the accession process are supported by over 70 % of Ukrainians, underlining the significance of continued EU leverage, structured conditionality and public communication during this period;

Democracy, the rule of law and the fight against corruption

23.

Commends Ukraine’s extraordinary efforts in strengthening democratic institutions during wartime; encourages Ukraine and its government to keep up the pace of reforms; recalls that, according to widely recognised democratic principles and Ukraine’s Constitution, elections cannot be held during wartime and under martial law; underlines that democratic elections require adequate time for preparation and access to information to meet international standards; calls on the Ukrainian authorities to refrain from untimely and politically motivated judicial proceedings and sanctions against opposition representatives, and to uphold parliamentary pluralism and foster constructive dialogue across political factions in the Verkhovna Rada;

24.

Reiterates the recommendation, in the context of EU accession, to lift all restrictions on mandate-related and political foreign travel for members of the Verkhovna Rada; emphasises the importance of respecting and reinforcing the institutional role of the Verkhovna Rada, and supports ongoing reform efforts to enhance its legislative capacity, oversight of the executive and accountability to the public;

25.

Welcomes the adoption of the Law on Law-Making, which the Commission has assessed as a foundational step towards a more structured and effective legislative process in Ukraine following the eventual lifting of martial law and the efforts of Ukraine’s Central Election Commission in updating the national voter register;

26.

Salutes the development by Ukraine, in cooperation with the Commission, of three reform roadmaps covering the rule of law, public administration reform and the functioning of democratic institutions, with anti-corruption efforts embedded throughout; notes that these roadmaps, once approved by the Commission, will serve as a critical benchmark for monitoring Ukraine’s reform progress; welcomes the inclusion of anti-corruption efforts as an integral element of all three roadmaps; underlines the importance of anchoring reforms within broader societal and political transformations to ensure their long-term durability, effective implementation, and the independent functioning of public institutions; stresses the importance of nurturing a constructive political culture and fostering trust-based cooperation among political parties in Ukraine; notes positively the active participation of Ukrainian parliamentarians in the Jean Monnet Dialogue and encourages the application of European best practices to promote cross-party collaboration in the face of shared challenges on the path to EU membership;

27.

Welcomes progress in judicial reform during the reporting period and encourages Ukraine to further enhance transparency in its legislative processes and to allocate to it increased financial, human and technical resources to address the challenges obstructing judicial development, increase judicial independence and strengthen the fight against corruption, thereby ensuring alignment with EU standards while avoiding superficial measures that could hinder EU accession;

28.

Notes that, despite the improved legislative framework, the judiciary remains one of the sectors more vulnerable to corruption and political interference, as evidenced by repeated instances of high-scale corruption and undue influence in court and judicial institutions operations, including the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) and the HQCJ; notes with concern the continued paralysis of the CCU, and urges swift appointment of the remaining judges and filling of vacancies at the High Council of Justice; calls, furthermore, on the Verkhovna Rada to adopt a Law on the Constitutional Court in line with Venice Commission opinions and, in addition, calls on Ukraine to adopt an action plan and internal reforms to prevent undue interference and to strengthen judicial ethics; underlines the particular importance of safeguarding the institutional independence of the HQCJ also in the light of commitments made under international agreements, including with the International Monetary Fund; emphasises the need to intensify the fight against corruption and vested interests in the judiciary, which is indispensable for building public trust and advancing Ukraine’s accession process; highlights the importance of transparent and merit-based selection processes for judicial governance bodies and managerial positions, including the involvement of independent national and international experts; stresses the need for depoliticised judicial appointments, functional integrity safeguards, transparency, integrity, accountability and enhanced international monitoring to prevent selective justice and foster public confidence in the judiciary;

29.

Notes with concern the critical shortage of judges, excessive caseloads in most courts, substantial funding deficiencies and the uneven distribution of judicial work, all of which undermine the quality and timeliness of proceedings and impede citizens’ access to justice; stresses the need to address these issues, including through the use of mediation and procedural filtering mechanisms to alleviate pressure on the judiciary; notes that Transparency International ranked Ukraine 105th out of 180 countries in its 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, scoring 35 out of 100 points, which underscores the scale of ongoing challenges in anti-corruption governance; stresses that improving judicial education and completing the digitalisation of Ukraine’s courts are key to Ukraine’s broader judicial reform;

30.

Welcomes the appointment of a new head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and the commencement of independent audits to evaluate the effectiveness of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) in combating corruption; salutes the entry into force of the amended Criminal Code and of the Criminal Procedure Code, which are expected to enhance the efficiency of anti-corruption enforcement, notably through improvements to the plea bargaining framework; recognises the increase in annual verdicts delivered by the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and the rise in indictments submitted by NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), reflecting steady progress in prosecutorial activity; welcomes the restoration of asset declaration procedures and public access, the strengthening of conflict-of-interest regulations, and improvements in the independence of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office; commends the adoption of the action plan for implementing the 2024–2025 asset recovery strategy and related measures; calls for the urgent reform of the Asset Recovery and Management Agency and supports the prompt adoption of draft law No. 12374-d to enhance its functioning; welcomes the expansion of staff within the Specialised Environmental Prosecutor’s Office of the Office of the Prosecutor General and urges continued development of anti-corruption policies in natural resource governance;

31.

Notes the continuing shortage of judges at the HACC and stresses the urgency of launching a new transparent competition to fill vacant posts, ensuring the Court has sufficient personnel and premises to function effectively; highlights the need to fill the vacant position of Prosecutor General without delay and underlines the importance of reinforcing the institutional independence of the office, while ensuring proper checks on its powers;

32.

Encourages Ukraine to safeguard the independence and effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions, including SAPO and NABU, by ensuring transparent appointment procedures, shielding these bodies from political interference, and reinforcing their institutional autonomy; stresses the importance of granting SAPO greater independence from the Prosecutor General’s Office and of equipping NABU with the means for timely access to forensic expertise and autonomous wiretapping capacity to conduct effective investigations; commends Ukraine for increasing the number of staff of SAPO and underlines the need to match this growth with adequate financial and technical resources to ensure operational capacity; encourages Ukraine to consider a structural reform of the State Bureau of Investigations in order to strengthen its independence and effectiveness to prevent it from being abused in the context of post-war political developments in Ukraine, in particular in connection with electoral campaigns;

33.

Expresses concern at the failed attempt by the Ukrainian authorities to undermine the independence of the anti-corruption institutions; welcomes the robust opposition by civil society to those unacceptable attempts, which forced the authorities to backtrack; considers this move by the authorities a dangerous attempt to undermine the achievements of a genuine fight against corruption; underscores that – had it been successful – this step would have merely benefited Ukraine’s enemies; stresses that this should serve as a stark reminder to all those in Ukraine who, out of narrow-minded interests, do not shy away from putting the country’s future at risk; reiterates that fighting corruption requires a long-term commitment and comprehensive efforts to establish good governance with well-functioning checks and balances; supports the Commission’s position that these institutions are crucial to Ukraine’s reform agenda and must operate independently to fight corruption and maintain public trust;

34.

Welcomes the adoption of the Law ‘On Lobbying’ as part of Ukraine’s de-oligarchisation agenda; stresses the need for a renewed and comprehensive strategy to counter oligarchic influence, ensuring the involvement of national stakeholders, international experts, and civil society organisations; encourages the Ukrainian authorities to continue working on reforming the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in line with OECD guidelines, in order to minimise the potential for patronage and to prevent corruption, including by publishing all SOE beneficial-ownership data, and ensuring that all major SOEs have independent, gender-balanced boards;

35.

Emphasises the importance of further reform in financial control, including improving the monitoring performance by the State Audit Service and proper implementation of the Accounting Chamber reform to safeguard national spending;

36.

Acknowledges the findings of the addendum to the Second Compliance Report adopted by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption on 22 November 2024, according to which Ukraine has implemented satisfactorily or dealt with in a satisfactory manner 18 out of 31 recommendations contained in the report; encourages Ukraine to fully implement the remaining recommendations, particularly by introducing a system for random allocation of cases to prosecutors, clarifying the definitions of disciplinary offences, and expanding the range of disciplinary sanctions to ensure proportionality and effectiveness, taking into account Ukraine’s specific circumstances;

37.

Urges Ukraine to prioritise the strengthening of the rule of law, judicial reform and the fight against corruption, and calls for the EU and the Member States to intensify support for these efforts, as progress in these areas is critical not only for EU membership but also for successful reconstruction and economic trust; recommends the adoption of a robust whistleblower protection law in line with the EU acquis; notes that Ukraine’s current anti-corruption policy framework expires in 2025 and highlights the need for a renewed State Anti-Corruption Programme that reflects civil society input and sets ambitious goals, measurable criteria and clear timelines;

38.

Calls on the Commission to include Ukraine in the EU rule-of-law toolbox to strengthen democratic reform implementation in advance of accession; encourages enhanced law enforcement capacity for financial investigations by developing methodological guidance and clarifying responsibilities, including better responses to criminal schemes such as the use of money mules;

39.

Notes that Russia’s war of aggression places immense pressure on Ukraine’s judicial system, including as a result of the high volume of ‘collaboration’ cases; calls, in this regard, for careful application of the legislation on ‘collaboration’, safeguarding fundamental rights and judicial fairness, and encourages a unified prosecutorial approach based on legal clarity and factual rigour, crucial for the reintegration of liberated territories; encourages the Ukrainian authorities, in this respect, to prioritise prosecutions based on their gravity and relevance to state security, in line with the Fourth Geneva Convention; calls for improved transparency and public access to data on such prosecutions;

40.

Urges Ukraine to regulate virtual assets by adopting comprehensive legislation, designating a supervisory authority, conducting a risk assessment, and supporting the detection of financial crimes involving virtual assets; welcomes, in this respect, the recent adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of draft law No. 11290 and urges the adoption of draft law No. 12207, which inter alia introduces European cybersecurity certification schemes and aims to align the Ukrainian legislation with EU standards;

Fundamental freedoms and human rights

41.

Commends Ukraine’s commitment to upholding fundamental rights in the context of and despite the ongoing Russian war of aggression; underlines the essential role of civil society in the reform and EU accession processes; stresses the need to maintain a safe, enabling, and participatory environment for civil society organisations, including human rights defenders and activists; calls for the urgent update of the National Human Rights Strategy and for a comprehensive implementation plan; encourages meaningful civil dialogue across all areas of public and political life and urges continued political unity around Ukraine’s European path; encourages the alignment of legislation defining the mandate of the Ombudsman of Ukraine with the EU acquis;

42.

Recognises the challenges in maintaining pluralistic media in wartime conditions, including market collapse, security constraints and human resource shortages; believes that Ukraine’s vibrant information space and media freedom constitute one of the country’s key strengths in resisting the Russian invasion and its propaganda; calls for the restoration of full nationwide broadcasting for media providers as a matter of policy, firmly rejecting a further slide into political censorship while applying wartime restrictions, as they are necessary;

43.

Commends the courageous work of Ukrainian human rights defenders and journalists who document human rights violations in temporarily occupied regions; recognises Ukraine’s strategic position at the forefront of information warfare and welcomes its engagement in European initiatives such as the Democracy Shield and the Joint Security Commitments to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); acknowledges that Ukraine is a key partner of the EU in the fights against FIMI and urges the EU and its Member states to intensify the fight against Russian disinformation and hybrid threats; calls for digital literacy to be promoted, the Digital Services Act to be enforced on social media platforms, and the EU’s own strategic communications to be strengthened to counter Russian interference and to clearly publicise the EU’s substantial support for Ukraine;

44.

Welcomes legislative initiatives to promote equality for LGBTQI+ persons and other marginalised groups, notably draft laws 5488 (hate crimes), 12252 (civil partnerships), and 9103 (registered partnerships); urges prompt adoption of these laws to ensure compliance with European Court of Human Rights standards; calls for the adoption of a new Anti-Discrimination Law covering sexual orientation, gender identity and disability, and for the further strengthening of Ukraine’s anti-discrimination legal framework;

45.

Welcomes the July 2024 amendments to the Law on National Minorities introducing bilingual education pathways, and encourages the swift implementation of these reforms through adequate funding and teacher training; welcomes the creation of the Council of National Minorities and the adoption of the Action Plan for the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities until 2027, aimed at aligning legislation with European standards; calls for structured and substantive dialogue with minority communities and for the full implementation of Venice Commission recommendations;

46.

Commends Ukraine’s ability to ensure educational continuity and reform, notably through digital tools, EU-supported programmes, and resilient public infrastructure development; encourages the Commission to expand support for Ukrainian students and institutions under Erasmus+, Horizon Europe and the EU4Youth programmes;

47.

Welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention and the establishment of survivor-support centres; encourages Ukraine to provide sustained funding for gender-based violence prevention and victim support, especially given the heightened risks during war; encourages Ukraine to improve the Law ‘On the Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine’ and the Criminal Code of Ukraine on hate crimes in accordance with international standards, and to introduce the necessary legislative changes to implement the Istanbul Convention;

48.

Recognises the increased risks of human trafficking, especially for women and children, in conflict and post-conflict settings; calls on the Ukrainian authorities, with EU support, to strengthen detection mechanisms, and to collaborate with civil society to ensure the protection and rehabilitation of victims in line with the EU Anti-Trafficking Directive (3);

49.

Supports enhanced EU assistance to Ukraine in the field of physical rehabilitation and prosthetic care, especially for injured soldiers, mine victims and amputees; stresses the importance of developing a national prosthetics and rehabilitation system with EU and Member State support; encourages partnerships with European medical institutions to enhance capacity, training and access to modern equipment;

50.

Takes note of the adoption of the law that will allow the Orthodox parishes from Ukraine to disaffiliate from the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate and to decide freely on their new hierarchical affiliation; condemns the unlawful appropriation and removal of cultural heritage items from temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories by Russian forces; urges respect for religious and cultural heritage in temporarily occupied areas, including 485 already destroyed sites, places of worship and sacred sites; underlines the responsibility of all parties to protect cultural heritage in line with international conventions;

51.

Calls on Ukraine to continue the approximation of labour standards, in particular as regards freedom of assembly and social dialogue, and encourages Ukraine to continue aligning its national labour and social legislation with EU standards, particularly in the areas of employment, social policy and equal opportunities; calls on the Commission to provide additional support to advance this progress; emphasises the need for broad consultations with trade unions and civil society and recommends that the expertise of the International Labour Organization on the matter be taken into account;

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

52.

Welcomes Ukraine’s active participation in regional initiatives, such as its leadership in the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum and the coordination of cross-border projects with EU Member States;

53.

Welcomes the recent joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘The European Union’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region’ (4) and in particular the opportunities for Ukraine to contribute meaningfully within this framework; encourages Ukraine’s continued active participation in the Eastern Partnership and the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly as an ‘integration leader’ that champions European values and reforms across the region;

54.

Welcomes and encourages any efforts by Ukraine and the EU Member States to address unresolved aspects of historic bilateral and regional relations, for example the Volhynia massacre, in the spirit of true and sincere reconciliation, and with respect for the EU values of human dignity and good neighbourly relations, as well as a critical assessment of historical events; believes that with the good will of all parties concerned, a patient process of reconciliation will be approached constructively aiming at mutual understanding; welcomes, in this context, the ongoing talks between the Polish and Ukrainian authorities, which have led to the resumption of the excavation of graves of Polish citizens on Ukrainian territory in April 2025; hopes for the process to be continued with the clear aim of providing the victims with a dignified burial and remembrance;

55.

Is deeply concerned about the recent discovery of intelligence-gathering activities by Hungarian security agencies in the south-western Zakarpattia region of Ukraine; expresses regret at the Hungarian Government’s systematic policies aimed at undermining Ukraine’s self-defence efforts and exploiting issues related to the Hungarian minority in Ukraine for political gain, thereby hindering Ukraine’s progress towards EU integration;

Socio-economic reforms

56.

Welcomes the implementation by Ukraine of the Priority Action Plan for 2023-2024 and the adoption of the legislation necessary to reform the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine allowing it to combat tax evasion and economic crime more effectively;

57.

Recalls the adoption of the Law on Local Public Service in 2023 and encourages the Ukrainian Government to adopt a systemic approach to forthcoming public administration reforms by establishing a clear vision and structured implementation strategy; emphasises the need to build up the institutional and administrative capacity required to secure the long-term success and impact of the accession-related reforms, not only in legislation, but also in practice; welcomes the recent adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of Draft Law No. 8222, which standardises the remuneration system for civil servants, aiming to improve governance efficiency while aligning it with European standards for public service management;

58.

Encourages Ukraine to make progress on the approval of the amendments to the law on local state administration, including draft law No. 4298 with a view to aligning local governance reforms with EU standards; calls for a balanced legal framework for administrative supervision that respects the principle of proportionality and the European Charter of Local Self-Government, while safeguarding the competences, prerogatives and self-governing functions of local authorities; reiterates its call for the formal introduction of legal personality for local and regional public authorities;

59.

Calls for continuous progress in decentralisation reform and the strengthening of self-governance on the local level; welcomes the launching of the Phase III of EU and Member States supported U-LEAD, which is focused on enhancing local self-government and fostering a resilient recovery at the local and regional levels; stresses the importance of ensuring that any future constitutional or institutional reforms, including electoral and decentralisation reforms, are conducted transparently, inclusively, and in line with Venice Commission recommendations;

60.

Welcomes Ukraine’s achievement of key milestones and calls on Ukraine to continue making progress in the implementation of the Ukraine Plan, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/792, while upholding the values and standards upon which it is based; stresses the need for the Commission to maintain conditionality, particularly regarding pillar III of the Facility, to ensure sustainability and accountability in the reform process; underscores that the strong momentum in the implementation of reforms is driven by the broad societal consensus and the conditionality of the Ukraine Facility;

61.

Welcomes the continued support for civil society organisations through the Ukraine Facility’s Civil Society Window and encourages Ukraine to ensure that financial reporting requirements do not unduly restrict the activities of civil society organisations; underlines the importance of meaningful engagement with civil society and local authorities to ensure effective implementation and quality reforms under the Ukraine plan; encourages Ukraine’s judicial authorities to strengthen existing mechanisms, including through judicial action, to protect civil society activists; urges Ukraine to ensure that financial reporting requirements and the regulation of beneficial ownership of legal entities does not unduly affect the functioning and independence of civil society organisations; welcomes the continued support for civil society organisations through the Ukraine Facility’s Civil-Society Window;

62.

Underlines that Ukraine’s reconstruction must be closely linked with its EU accession reforms and guided by principles of social fairness, sustainability, transparency and local ownership; stresses, furthermore, that Ukraine’s reconstruction must be rooted in robust rule of law, transparent governance and democratic inclusion; emphasises that judicial reform, anti-corruption efforts and public administration improvements are not only conditions for EU accession but also fundamental to attracting investment and restoring trust among Ukraine’s partners and citizens; calls for the integration of gender-sensitive approaches in all reconstruction efforts, including increased representation of women and minorities in decision-making processes; calls on the Ukrainian Government to ensure transparency in the implementation of ‘RebuildUkraine’, and with respect to the consultation and participation of civil society and at-risk groups in society, in particular as regards respect for fundamental rights and rule of law, as well as non-discriminatory distribution and use of EU funds;

63.

Highlights the essential role played by the EU’s Ukraine Facility and the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loan programme, which together provide over EUR 30 billion in 2025 in support of Ukraine’s public services, macro-financial stability and reform agenda; calls for continued and enhanced financial support for Ukraine in 2026 and 2027, including through a new macro-financial assistance package to meet Ukraine’s expected EUR 39 billion budget shortfall; notes, in addition, that Ukraine’s financial and economic resilience remains a core prerequisite for sustaining its defensive capacity and reform process; calls, therefore, for solutions to be considered to alleviate Ukraine’s foreign debt burden;

64.

Takes note of the US-Ukraine economic partnership agreement on critical minerals and acknowledges the agreement’s affirmation of long-term US support for Ukraine’s security and reconstruction, and notes the intention, expressed in the agreement, to safeguard Ukraine’s EU accession process and related obligations, and to ensure compatibility with Ukraine’s commitments to international financial institutions or other official creditors; calls on the Commission to invite both parties to further clarify how the provisions intended to safeguard Ukraine’s EU integration path will be implemented, and to report regularly on their compatibility with Union law; considers it essential that the exploitation of minerals under this agreement fully respect high social and ecological standards and that compliance is ensured through robust control mechanisms; expects, furthermore, Ukraine to fully incorporate relevant EU environmental legislation, including the Water Framework Directive (5) and the Directive on the management of waste from extractive industries (6), into its national legal framework;

65.

Recalls that EU enlargement must ensure that accession does not result in the exploitation of candidate countries’ natural resources or contribute to social inequality and environmental degradation;

66.

Welcomes Ukraine’s progress in partially adopting animal welfare legislation, albeit with significant delays to the commitments made under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area; encourages Ukraine to make further progress in adopting Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 (7) on the protection of animals during transport, taking into account the ongoing revision of this legislation within the EU, which is crucial for meeting EU production standards and facilitating increased exports of animal-based products to the EU; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide Ukraine with financial and technical assistance in this regard;

67.

Highlights the resilience and importance of the agricultural sector (19 % of GDP, 53 % of goods exports) but underlines the need to diversify value chains and the benefit of swiftly adopting EU phytosanitary standards; underlines the importance of environmental safeguards in ensuring the green recovery of Ukraine; calls on the Commission to further support Ukraine with the implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment procedures, in particular in the forestry and agriculture sectors, and Strategic Environmental Assessment procedures; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to further support Ukraine in building administrative capacity for the full implementation of the EU environmental acquis, including public participation in decision-making, and in aligning its legislation with the Renewable Energy Directive (8), in particular the sustainability criteria for bioenergy;

68.

Calls on the Verkhovna Rada and the Ukrainian Government to amend Law No. 12089, which allows the legalisation of land ownership illegally withdrawn from the state, including forests and water bodies, to private individuals, which is not in line with EU acquis as the law in its current form includes legal uncertainties that will make the return of such land to the state impossible;

Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

69.

Welcomes the substantial progress made on energy sector reforms and Ukraine’s alignment with the objectives of the European Green Deal and encourages Ukraine not to backtrack in this regard; underlines the need to further bolster Ukraine’s energy security by deepening its integration into the EU energy market – including through the synchronisation of Ukraine’s electricity grid with continental Europe and enhanced cooperation on gas storage and supply – as well as by accelerating the deployment of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency measures; stresses that strengthening the resilience of critical energy infrastructure remains key to Ukraine’s economic stability and strategic autonomy;

70.

Underscores that Ukraine has substantial potential as a provider of energy and energy-intensive products to the rest of Europe; encourages, therefore, Ukraine to continue developing energy interconnections with neighbouring Member States and regional partners, such as the Republic of Moldova, with a view to further integration in the EU energy market; recognises that Russia’s war of aggression has targeted and destroyed relevant networks and plants; urges Ukraine, therefore, to use reconstruction to build back better, using the most climate-friendly technologies and processes wherever possible, investing in renewable energy sources and energy-efficiency, and minimising the impact on the environment throughout the production chain; welcomes the Commission’s continued engagement in this area to support Ukraine’s energy sector reform, including reconstruction and green transition; calls for the advancement of the implementation of existing commitments under the Ukraine Plan and the Energy Community packages, including the unbundling of regional energy distribution companies;

71.

Encourages Ukraine to explore the most cost-effective and reliable solutions for Ukraine’s energy sector, following Russia’s attacks on its energy infrastructure, for example by replacing, to the extent possible given the ongoing war, its fossil fuel power plants with decentralised and sustainable energy technologies; calls on the Commission and the Ukrainian authorities to strategically use the funds under the Ukraine Facility to prioritise investments in renewable energy sources, which are critical to ensure long-term energy security, environmental sustainability and economic resilience both in Ukraine and in the rest of the continent;

72.

Expresses grave concern over Russia’s detrimental influence within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite its repeated violations of the IAEA’s core principles of nuclear safety and non-interference; calls for the EU and its Member States to advocate for greater scrutiny of Russia’s role within the IAEA and to explore reforms to ensure that aggressor states cannot undermine the neutrality and credibility of international nuclear oversight;

73.

Underlines that the Russian war of aggression amounts to an ecocide that has caused severe and long-lasting damage to Ukraine’s environment, including the destruction of ecosystems, contamination of water and soil, and the targeting of industrial and energy infrastructure; considers their international recognition as war crimes crucial to ensure full legal accountability for Russia and consequent compensation for Ukraine and calls for a comprehensive environmental recovery strategy to be supported by the EU as part of Ukraine’s reconstruction; calls for the EU and its Member States to give full support to all initiatives documenting the environmental destruction caused by Russia’s war and to back efforts for accountability and compensation in foreign jurisdictions;

74.

Commends Ukraine for adopting its national energy and climate plan, and coordinating and planning energy and climate policies by 2030, with specific targets including a significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and an increased share of renewable energy; supports the ongoing efforts of the Energy Efficiency Fund and the newly established Decarbonisation Fund; calls for the EU and the Member States to ensure the financial sustainability of these instruments, particularly in the context of reconstruction and integration of renewables in housing; encourages Ukraine to integrate the just transition principle into energy reforms to mitigate social impact and support vulnerable groups;

75.

Urges the Commission and Member States to include nuclear safety as a central component of Ukraine’s recovery and EU integration strategy, ensuring alignment with the EU acquis on nuclear energy and radiation protection under the Euratom framework; supports the strengthening of Ukraine’s nuclear safety and radiological emergency response capabilities as a central component of Ukraine’s recovery and EU integration strategy, including through technical and financial assistance from the EU and international partners; calls for the establishment of an EU-led initiative to reinforce nuclear security, safeguard critical infrastructure, and prevent radiological incidents stemming from Russian aggression; expresses grave concerns at attempts by the Russian Federation to de facto annex Ukrainian critical infrastructure including credible public reports that it intends to sever the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) from the Ukrainian electricity grid and forcibly integrate it into the Russian energy system, which would violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and international law and pose a significant risk to nuclear safety; urges the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian military personnel and equipment from the premises of the ZNPP and all other nuclear sites in Ukraine and calls on the IAEA to publicly and unequivocally oppose any such plans; stresses that the integrity and resilience of Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure is not solely a national issue, but a shared European responsibility; calls for coordinated contingency planning and increased cross-border cooperation among EU Member States to respond to potential nuclear threats emanating from Russian actions in Ukraine;

76.

Urges Ukraine to effectively fight illegal logging in accordance with sustainable forestry management and environmental protection standards, such as illegal logging in the primeval Carpathian forests; calls for the EU to contribute to the prevention of illegal logging in connection with the unlawful Svydovets ski resort project; encourages Ukraine to invest in ecologically and environmentally safe and sustainable tourist infrastructure;

77.

Calls on the Commission to assist Ukraine in maintaining progress towards a high degree of sufficiency of its Emerald Network concerning the Areas of Special Conservation Interest;

78.

Welcomes the fact that EU-oriented exports accounted for 63 % of total exports in 2024, up from 42 % in 2021, reflecting successful trade re-orientation;

79.

Notes the strategic importance of developing and expanding railway corridors linking Ukraine with the EU through the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), serving both civilian and military logistical purposes as part of a broader dual-use infrastructure strategy; encourages continued efforts to align Ukraine’s digital and transport standards with those of the EU, thereby facilitating trade, mobility and secure communication; stresses that improved connectivity will support Ukraine’s economic recovery and integration;

80.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to allocate all the necessary funds to enhance intended transport connectivity and resilience in Ukraine up to 2050, including the further updating of the TEN-T maps; welcomes the successful development and implementation of the Solidarity Lanes, which have enabled Ukraine to bypass Russia’s Black Sea blockade and export a variety of goods to global markets via the neighbouring EU Member States and Moldova; commends the fact that, despite the war atrocities incurred and the significant drop in its grain production, Ukraine played a key role in preventing a global food crisis, as via the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ humanitarian food programme, launched by President Zelenskyy in 2022, more than 170 000 tonnes of wheat have been provided to countries experiencing the worst food crises, particularly in Africa; notes that the vast majority of Ukraine’s grain exports are destined for developing countries;

81.

Acknowledges the progress of Ukraine’s integration into EU transport and digital connectivity initiatives and highlights the importance of alignment with the EU acquis in these areas; welcomes in particular the steps taken to include Ukraine in the EU’s free roaming area, eliminating mobile roaming charges between Ukraine and the EU for citizens and businesses;

82.

Underlines the importance of strengthening connectivity, interoperability, and the capacity of digital and IT systems between the EU and Ukraine in line with the Association Agreement; calls for continued efforts to harmonise digital policies, expand cybersecurity cooperation, and ensure resilient and secure digital infrastructure; welcomes, in this regard, the conclusion of a working arrangement in December 2023 between the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity and the Ukrainian cybersecurity authorities;

On accession negotiations

83.

Recalls the decision of the European Council of 14–15 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, marking a historic milestone on Ukraine’s path towards EU membership; commends the swift convening of the first EU-Ukraine Intergovernmental Accession Conference on 25 June 2024, which officially launched the negotiation process and welcomes Commissioner Kos’s assessment that all screenings could be completed by autumn 2025;

84.

Recognises Ukraine’s significant reforms and commitment and therefore recommends that the Commission swiftly open negotiating clusters with Ukraine to advance the country’s EU membership bid at the fastest pace possible, subject to its continued implementation of the EU acquis and the completion of the reforms it has undertaken; underlines that accession negotiations should follow a clear and transparent path, guided by objective and measurable criteria; stresses that these must include in-depth reforms in all fundamental areas and the functioning of stable institutions that uphold democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and particularly the respect for and protection of minorities; underscores the Commission’s recommendations for the coming year;

85.

Calls on the Hungarian Government and the Member States to act in good faith when resolving any issues similar to those related to the Ukrainian Law on National Minorities, and to refrain from using such issues as a reason to block Ukraine’s accession to the EU; calls therefore on the Hungarian Government to no longer block the start of the first clusters of negotiations and allow Ukraine and its neighbour Moldova to continue progressing together on their path towards EU membership;

86.

Recalls that the enlargement process must not be instrumentalised to settle bilateral disputes or delay a merit-based approach, and that such issues should be resolved independently of the accession track and through constructive dialogue and genuine cooperation; recalls that excessive delays on the path toward full EU membership risk undermining both public support and the political resolve within the candidate country;

87.

calls, in preparation for negotiations, for continuous EU support, particularly in the form of expert assistance to offset any administrative shortcomings resulting from ongoing aggression against Ukraine; urges the EU, furthermore, to provide technical assistance to help Ukraine meet all accession requirements efficiently; regrets the decision by the US Government to withdraw funding from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which has already directly affected support in Ukraine for critical reform processes, including those related to the rule of law, anti-corruption, public financial management, economic development, energy security and the delivery of humanitarian assistance; welcomes the efforts by the Commission and international partners to address the most urgent gaps left by this withdrawal of funding;

88.

Stresses, before Ukraine’s EU accession, the need for increased EU support to accelerate Ukraine’s integration through targeted financial and technical assistance programmes and underlines that both Ukraine and the EU would benefit from progressive integration of the country into EU policies and programmes, alongside the formal accession negotiations;

89.

Notes that the complexity of Ukraine’s EU integration, due to its size and the ongoing war, presents challenges in key areas such as agriculture, and necessitates significant institutional and financial reforms within the EU to ensure its capacity to absorb Ukraine; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to proactively address these challenges, clearly communicate the benefits of Ukraine’s integration to EU citizens, find sustainable and equitable solutions for sensitive sectors, and pursue necessary internal reforms in parallel with the ongoing accession negotiations; calls on the Commission to support the sectors most exposed to the impacts of trade liberalisation in the context of Ukraine’s accession; notes, at the same time, following the experience of previous rounds of enlargement, that there may be a need for transition periods in certain specific sectors in which the full acquis does not yet apply in order to allow current Member States to adapt; reiterates its call on the Member States to demonstrate a clear and unequivocal political commitment towards the enlargement process and not to misuse it to settle bilateral disputes, which should be resolved independently of the accession track;

90.

Repeats its calls to enhance the EU’s capacity to act by reforming its decision-making, including through the introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council on the intermediate steps in the accession process, in particular at the start of negotiations and the opening and closing of individual negotiating clusters and chapters;

° °

91.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.

(2) OJ C, C/2025/3151, 20.6.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3151/oj.

(3) Directive (EU) 2024/1712 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (OJ L, 2024/1712, 24.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1712/oj).

(4) Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 May 2025 entitled ‘The European Union’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region’ (JOIN(2025)0135).

(5) Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj).

(6) Directive 2006/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the management of waste from extractive industries and amending Directive 2004/35/EC (OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 15, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/21/oj).

(7) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations and amending Directives 64/432/EEC and 93/119/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 (OJ L 3, 5.1.2005, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2005/1/oj).

(8) Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 (OJ L, 2023/2413, 31.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/1471/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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