(1)

In 2013, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, advocated for a change in the types of warfare used by the Russian Federation and for the use of political, diplomatic and other non-military measures in combination with the use of military force. Gerasimov stated that the information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy.

(2)

On 21 September 2021, in its judgment in the case of Carter v Russia (20914/07), the European Court of Human Rights concluded that Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned by two individuals acting under the direction or control of the Russian authorities.

(3)

On 9 March 2022, the European Parliament, in its resolution on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, stated that Russia has been engaging in disinformation of an unparalleled malice and magnitude across both traditional media outlets and social media platforms, in order to deceive its citizens at home and the international community on the eve of and during its war of aggression against Ukraine. The European Parliament underlined that Russia is one of the countries which have targeted journalists and opponents in the Union.

(4)

On 10 May 2022, the Union and its international partners strongly condemned the malicious cyber activity conducted by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which targeted the satellite KA-SAT network, owned by Viasat. That cyberattack took place one hour before Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, thus facilitating the military aggression, and was another example of Russia’s continued pattern of irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace.

(5)

On 19 July 2022, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) condemned malicious cyber activities conducted in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and the distributed denial-of-service attacks against several Member States and partners claimed by pro-Russian hacker groups.

(6)

In its conclusions of 21 June 2022, the Council of the European Union noted that while definitions of hybrid threats and campaigns may vary, they need to remain flexible in order to allow for proper responses to the evolving nature of those threats. In that context, the Council took note of the conceptualisation of ‘hybrid threat’ and ‘hybrid campaign’ provided by the Commission and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in ‘The landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model’.

(7)

In its conclusions of 21 June 2022, as well as those of 18 July 2022, the Council reiterated the call for the High Representative and the Commission to present options, fully respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, for well-defined measures that could be taken against actors engaged in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (‘FIMI’) where necessary to protect public order and security in the Union.

(8)

In February 2023, the European External Action Service published a report on FIMI threats, in which it defined FIMI as a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character and conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner by state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory.

(9)

On 3 February 2023, in a statement following the 24th EU-Ukraine summit, the Union reconfirmed its solidarity with Ukraine in countering hybrid threats and cyberattacks and its commitment to continue its support in this regard. The Union and Ukraine acknowledged the importance of strengthening cooperation in tackling Russian state-controlled information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, as well as building resilience in Ukraine’s digital transformation.

(10)

On 1 June 2023, the European Parliament in a resolution on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the Union, including disinformation, stressed that Russia uses an array of different methods of interference, embedded within a larger strategy, to harm, confuse, frighten, weaken and divide the Member States and its neighbourhood.

(11)

In its conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023, the European Council condemned all hybrid attacks, including the instrumentalisation of migrants by third countries for political purposes, and stated that it remained determined to ensure effective control of the Union’s external borders. The European Council underlined that the Union is determined to counter at its external borders the ongoing hybrid attacks launched by the Russian Federation.

(12)

In its conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, the European Council underlined, in the context of the European elections, the Union and its Member States’ determination to contain any risks stemming from FIMI in electoral processes.

(13)

The instrumentalisation of migrants, as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), is liable to put at risk the essential functions of a Member State, including the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security.

(14)

In its conclusions of 21 May 2024, the Council acknowledged that state and non-state actors are increasingly using hybrid tactics, posing a growing threat to the security of the Union, its Member States and its partners and called on Union institutions and the Member States to step up action to monitor attempts by foreign actors to interfere in the Union’s democratic process.

(15)

In its conclusions of 27 June 2024, the European Council strongly condemned all types of hybrid activities, which are on the rise and target the Union, its Member States and its partners, including intimidation, sabotage, subversion, foreign information manipulation and interference, disinformation, malicious cyber activities and the instrumentalisation of migrants by third countries, and stressed that Russia has intensified its campaign with new active operations on European soil. The European Council called, inter alia, for work to be taken forward in the Council to establish a new sanctions regime in view of hybrid threats.

(16)

In the view of the gravity of the situation, restrictive measures should be imposed against persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, or supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the fundamental values of the Union and its security, independence and integrity, as well as the stability, security or independence of its Member States, of international organisations or of third countries, or the sovereignty of Member States or third countries. Such targeted restrictive measures will pursue common foreign and security policy objectives as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and contribute to the Union’s actions to safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity, to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, and to prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with points (a) to (c) of Article 21(2) TEU.

(17)

Such measures are consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, as recognised in Articles 11, 16 and 17 thereof. In particular, such measures do not modify the obligation to respect the rights, freedoms and principles referred to in Article 6 TEU, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in Member States’ constitutions, within their respective fields of application.

(18)

In order to increase consistency across the Union’s restrictive measures regimes and with those measures adopted by the UNSC or its Sanctions Committees, and to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities supporting basic human needs, it is appropriate to introduce an exemption from the asset-freeze measures applicable, and the restrictions on making funds and economic resources available, to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies designated under this Decision, for the benefit of actors referred to in UNSCR 2664 (2022), organisations and agencies to which the Union has granted the Humanitarian Partnership Certificate, organisations and agencies which are certified or recognised by a Member State, and the Member States’ specialised agencies. Furthermore, the Council considers that a derogation mechanism should be introduced for those organisations and actors involved in humanitarian activities that cannot benefit from that exemption. The Council also considers that a derogation mechanism should apply, in place of the exemption, in cases where the Council has determined that scrutiny by national competent authorities is required due to a higher risk that the funds or economic resources provided would be misused for purposes other than humanitarian assistance.

(19)

Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures,