(1)

By Regulation (EU) 2019/2092 (2) (‘the Definitive Regulation’), the Commission imposed a definitive countervailing duty on imports of biodiesel originating in Indonesia (‘the country concerned’) (‘the original measures’). The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

(2)

By Regulation (EU) 2025/1883 (3) , the Commission corrected the Definitive Regulation to include CN codes ex 2710 19 11 , ex 2710 19 15 , ex 2710 19 21 , ex 2710 19 25 and ex 2710 19 29 and the corresponding TARIC codes for sustainable aviation fuels (‘SAF’). The amendment did not have any impact on the product scope of the measures in force.

(3)

Following the publication of the notice of impending expiry of the countervailing measures in force (4), the Commission received a request for the initiation of an expiry review of the countervailing measures pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation (‘the request’).

(4)

The request was submitted on 8 September 2024 by the European Biodiesel Board (‘EBB’ or ‘the applicant’) on behalf of the Union industry of biodiesel in the sense of Article 10(6) of the basic Regulation. The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the countervailing measures would likely result in the continuation or recurrence of subsidisation and injury to the Union industry.

(5)

Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, the Commission announced on 6 December 2024, by a Notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union (6) (‘the Notice of Initiation’), the initiation of an expiry review of the countervailing measures applicable pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(6)

Prior to the initiation of the expiry review, and in accordance with Article 10(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission notified the Government of Indonesia (‘GOI’) that it had received a properly documented review request and invited the GOI for pre-initiation consultations with the aim of clarifying the situation as regards the contents of the review request and arriving at a mutually agreed solution. The GOI accepted the offer of consultations which were subsequently held on 5 December 2024. During the consultations, no mutually agreed solution could be arrived at.

(7)

The GOI submitted comments on the initiation of the investigation. It claimed that (i) neither the Oil Palm Plantation Fund (‘OPPF’) nor the GOI’s provision of crude palm oil (‘CPO’) for less than adequante remuneration are subsidies within the meaning of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures (‘WTO SCM agreement’) and that (ii) the termination of the countervailing duty on imports of biodiesel from Indonesia to the EU would not cause injury or possible recurrence of injury to the EU biodiesel producers.

(8)

The evidence provided regarding the continuation of subsidisation in Indonesia was sufficient at initiation stage. Concretely, the request provided evidence that the schemes mentioned by the GOI in its submission are still in place, constitute subsidies as they were found to be countervailable in previous EU investigations, and are available for producers in the sector. No evidence at the Commission services’ disposal at the time of initiation contradicted the evidence regarding subsidy schemes in the request which led to the initiation of the investigation.

(9)

Equally, the evidence provided regarding the likelihood of recurrence of injury was sufficient at initiation stage. Concretely, the request contained evidence on the biodiesel capacity in Indonesia, the attractiveness of the Union market for Indonesian producers and the injurious price level at which Indonesian imports would enter the Union if the measures were repealed. On the basis of these elements, the request provided sufficient evidence that the repeal of the measures would likely result in recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

(10)

The GOI provided no evidence to the contrary in its submission during the pre-initiation consultation process. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the evidence presented in the request was sufficient to justify the initiation of the expiry review investigation. The claim was therefore rejected.

(11)

The investigation of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidisation covered the period from 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(12)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicant, the known Union producers, the known unrelated importers in the Union, unrelated users in the Union known to be concerned, the known producers in Indonesia and the authorities of Indonesia about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to participate.

(13)

Interested parties were invited to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence within the time limits set out in the Notice of Initiation. Interested parties were also granted the opportunity to request in writing a hearing with the Commission investigation services and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. No such a request was received.

(14)

In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 27 of the basic Regulation.

(15)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers, in accordance with Article 27 of the basic Regulation. Prior to the initiation, 32 Union producers had provided the information requested for the selection of the sample and expressed their willingness to cooperate with the Commission. On that basis, the Commission provisionally selected a sample of four producers, which were found to be representative of the Union industry in terms of volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union. The sampled Union producers accounted for approximately 12 % of the estimated total production of the Union industry and for approximately 13 % of the total sales volume of the Union industry to unrelated customers in the Union during the review investigation period. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received and the provisional sample was thus confirmed.

(16)

In order to decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. None of them came forward.

(17)

To decide whether sampling was necessary with regard to the exporting producers and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in Indonesia to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(18)

No exporting producer returned the sampling form. Subsequently, on 8 April 2025 the Commission informed the GOI that there was no cooperation by exporting producers in Indonesia and thus it may base its findings with regard of the continuation and recurrence of subsidisation and injury on facts available within the meaning of Article 28 of the basic Regulation. No comments were received.

(19)

The Commission sent questionnaires to the four sampled Union producers, the applicant and the GOI. Questionnaires for the Union producers, unrelated importers, users and the exporting producers in Indonesia were also made available online (7), on the day of initiation of the investigation.

(20)

Replies to the questionnaires were received from the four sampled Union producers and the applicant.

(21)

The Commission sought and verified all the information it deemed necessary for a determination of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of subsidisation and injury, and of the Union interest. Verification visits were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

(22)

On 24 November 2025, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on which basis it intended to maintain the countervailing duties in force. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

(23)

EBB and the GOI provided comments on the final disclosure. EBB agreed with the Commission’s intention to maintain the countervailing duties. The comments of the GOI are analysed in the relevant sections of this Regulation. No parties requested a hearing.

(24)

The product under review is the same as the one in the original investigation, that is fatty-acid mono-alkyl esters and/or paraffinic gasoils obtained from synthesis and/or hydro-treatment, of non-fossil origin, in pure form or as included in a blend (‘the product under review’), currently falling under CN codes ex 1516 20 98 (TARIC codes 1516 20 98 21, 1516 20 98 29 and 1516 20 98 33), ex 1518 00 91 (TARIC codes 1518 00 91 21, 1518 00 91 29 and 1518 00 91 33), ex 1518 00 95 (TARIC codes 1518 00 95 21, 1518 00 95 33), ex 1518 00 99 (TARIC codes 1518 00 99 21, 1518 00 99 29 and 1518 00 99 33), ex 2710 19 11 (TARIC code 2710 19 11 10), ex 2710 19 15 (TARIC code 2710 19 15 10), ex 2710 19 21 (TARIC code 2710 19 21 10), ex 2710 19 25 (TARIC code 2710 19 25 10), ex 2710 19 29 (TARIC code 2710 19 29 10), ex 2710 19 42 (TARIC codes 2710 19 42 21 and 2710 19 42 29), ex 2710 19 44 (TARIC codes 2710 19 44 21, 2710 19 44 29 and 2710 19 44 33), ex 2710 19 46 (TARIC codes 2710 19 46 21, 2710 19 46 29 and 2710 19 46 33), ex 2710 19 47 (TARIC codes 2710 19 47 21, 2710 19 47 29 and 2710 19 47 33), 2710 20 11 , 2710 20 16 , ex 3824 99 92 (TARIC codes 3824 99 92 10, 3824 99 92 14 and 3824 99 92 17), 3826 00 10 and ex 3826 00 90 (TARIC codes 3826 00 90 11, 3826 00 90 19 and 3826 00 90 33) (8).

(25)

The original investigation established that biodiesel produced in Indonesia is primarily palm oil methyl ester (‘PME’), which is derived from palm oil (9). The current investigation did not bring not light any information which would have devaluated this finding.

(26)

Biodiesel is mainly used in the transport sector, namely in diesel engines, and can be blended with mineral diesels or used in its pure form.

(27)

The product concerned by this investigation is the product under review originating in Indonesia (‘the product concerned’).

(28)

As established in the original investigation, this expiry review investigation confirmed that the following products have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

These products are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the basic Regulation.

(29)

In accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, and as stated in the Notice of Initiation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the existing measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of subsidisation.

(30)

On 7 March 2025, the Commission sent the anti-subsidy questionnaire to the GOI together with a specific appendix (‘Appendix A’), consisting of a questionnaire for input suppliers.

(31)

No reply to the questionnaire nor to the Appendix A was submitted either by the GOI or any Indonesian biodiesel exporting producer or input supplier.

(32)

On a submission dated 21 March 2025 the GOI notified the Commission that it would not cooperate in the investigation, explicitly stating that ‘both the GOI and the Indonesia biofuel producers will focus on the DS618: European Union – countervailing duties on Imports of Biodiesel from Indonesia litigation process, which is still ongoing at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) WTO. Therefore, we do not submit responses to the investigation questionnaire’ (10).

(33)

The absence of cooperation prevented the Commission from collecting the information it considered relevant for its findings in this investigation. For example, the Commission could not obtain from the GOI any information on the palm oil market based on direct information provided by CPO suppliers nor did it have information regarding the role of PT Perkebunan Nusantara (‘PTPN’), a CPO producer fully owned by the GOI, with regard to the biodiesel industry.

(34)

Consequently, as explained in recital 18, the Commission informed the Indonesian authorities by Note Verbale of 8 April 2025 that, due to the non-cooperation from the GOI and the Indonesian exporting producers, the Commission intended to make its findings on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. The GOI and Indonesian exporting producers were also informed that a finding based on facts available may be less favourable than if they cooperated.

(35)

No comments in this regard were received. In the absence of any information from the GOI or the input suppliers, the Commission relied on facts available for its findings to establish the continuation of subsidy practices of Indonesia in the biodiesel industry in accordance with Article 28 of the basic Regulation.

(36)

Accordingly, the Commission used for its analysis all facts available to it, in particular:

(37)

To establish whether there was continuation of subsidisation, the Commission examined whether the subsidies countervailed in the original investigation continued to confer benefit to the exporting producers of biodiesel from Indonesia. Subsequently, the Commission analysed whether the Indonesian biodiesel producers benefitted from subsidies which were not countervailed in the original investigation (‘additional subsidies’) as alleged in the request (11).

(38)

At the outset it must be noted that in this regulation the Commission refers to the OPPF rather than Biodiesel Subsidy Fund. The latter is a term used by the complainant in the original complaint and again by the applicant in the request. However, the official name of the subsidy scheme is OPPF.

(39)

In the original investigation the Commission found the following:

(40)

The original investigation established that all Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers chose to partake in the procurement of biodiesel and were therefore under the obligation to sell the monthly quota to the petrofuel entities operating the blending mandate (20). It was also established that the biodiesel reference price was higher than the diesel reference price, hence resulting in payments from the OPPF in favour of the Indonesian biodiesel producers (21). It follows that there existed no real market price for biodiesel in Indonesia because of the GOI’s intervention to regulate and distort the whole Indonesian CPO-biodiesel value chain (22). Indeed, the biodiesel reference price set by the GOI did not reflect what the price would be under undistorted market condiditons without the GOI’s intervention (23).

(41)

The Commission also found that the GOI created the OPPF and expressly entrusted the Management Agency to make payments to the biodiesel producers (24). Also, the qualification of the OPPF as a public body was undisputed (25). The OPPF funds, financed through the normal fiscal and public revenue collecting activity of the GOI (26), constituted public funds collected pursuant to a compulsory export levy (27), and the OPPF disbursment in favour of the Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers constituted a direct transfer of funds in the form of grant (28).

(42)

The Commission’s analysis of the legal framework implementing the OPPF expressly confirmed that the OPPF funds were meant for the benefit of the Indonesian biodiesel producers (29), without expecting anything in return (30). To that end, the GOI both granted the Management Agency the right to use CPO export levies and imposed the duty to procure and use biodiesel (31).

(43)

In the request the applicant claimed that the biodiesel subsidy fund is the most important subsidy programme available to the Indonesian biodiesel producers since 2015. The biodiesel subsidy fund was envisaged to implement the blending mandate established by the GOI, which dates back to 2006 with an initial blend of 1 % biodiesel and 99 % diesel fuel (‘B01’) and is deemed one of the most aggressive worldwide (32). According to the evidence put forward by the applicant, as of 2023 the GOI had introduced a blending mandate of 35 % biodiesel and 65 % diesel fuel (‘B35’) (33). In this regard, the applicant observed that since 2018 the GOI has extended the blending mandate also to non-public service obligations (‘PSO’) sectors, resulting in a massive increase in subsidisation now available to both PSO and non-PSO (34).

(44)

The biodiesel subsidy fund is part of the OPPF, as set forth by the Presidential Regulation No 61/2015. The OPPF consists in a sum of money collected by the Management Agency (35), a public body established by the GOI with the specific purpose of collecting, administering, managing, storing and distributing the OPPF funds (36). By virtue of the underlying legal basis, the funds include export levies on CPO commodities and/or their derivatives (37). In this regard, the applicant pointed out to the legal provision pursuant to which ‘[t]he use of funds […] is intended to close the gap between the market index price of diesel fuel oil and the market index price of biodiesel biofuel on certain types of fuel oil’ (38).

(45)

The applicant argued that, according to the subsidy scheme, Indonesian biodiesel producers wishing to partake in the programme had to sell on the Indonesian domestic market the quota of biodiesel to the petrofuel entities, Pertamina and AKR, at a reference price of mineral diesel instead of the actual biodiesel price (39). By so doing, the Indonesian producers received in exchange grants from the GOI. Those grants were equal to the difference between the reference price for biodiesel as set by the GOI and the reference price for mineral diesel, i.e. the price at which oil companies purchased biodiesel. According to the applicant, grants stemmed from the export levies imposed on palm oil commodities and conferred a benefit to the Indonesian biodiesel producers in the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation.

(46)

Also, the applicant claimed that the Management Agency exercised governmental functions within the Indonesian biodiesel sector. Notably, the Management Agency was the means through which the GOI directly transfers funds equal to the difference between the diesel and biodiesel reference price to the Indonesian biodiesel producers (40), according to Article 3(1)(a)(i) of the basic Regulation.

(47)

The applicant insisted that CPO export levies collected were mainly intended for the Biodiesel Subsidy Fund and provided evidence that 91,3 % of the funds collected between 2015 and 2023 was paid as incentives to Indonesian biodiesel producers (41). In this respect, the applicant provided evidence showing that in 2023 the funds allocated to the Biodiesel Subsidy Fund amounted to 2 124 Mio EUR, which translated in an increase by eight times in comparison with 2019 and in an estimated allocation of subsidy of 0,2128 EUR/l of biodiesel sold on the Indonesian domestic market (42).

(48)

Lastly, the applicant concluded that since 2015 the GOI has been showing firm support for the biodiesel blending mandate programme, which had allowed funds stemming from the collection of CPO export levies as managed by the Management Agency to subsidise the price difference between biodiesel and mineral diesel (43).

(49)

In light of the above, the Commission established that the direct transfer of funds by the Management Agency conferred a benefit, in the form of grants (44), to the Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers. Specifically, those grants placed biodiesel producers in a better position than they would have been on the market, because, absent this scheme, they would have had to align to the market price of mineral diesel instead of the reference price (45).

(50)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that the money paid by the Management Agency to the biodiesel producers for the biodiesel sold to cover the difference between the diesel reference price paid by Pertamina and the biodiesel reference price during the review investigation period was a benefit within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation (46).

(51)

Since during the review investigation period the OPPF was available for the industries involved in the CPO value chain only, the Commission concluded that the OPPF is specific by virtue of Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation (47).

(52)

This investigation did not bring into light any information contradicting the original findings. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the OPPF as a countervailable subsidy continued during the review investigation period.

(53)

In the original investigation (48), the Commission established that the set of measures adopted by the GOI led to a financial contribution in the form of government’s provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration to the Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers (49). The Commission also established that Indonesian CPO producers were entrusted and directed by the GOI to provide goods to the Indonesian biodiesel producers in line with Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation (50).

(54)

The original investigation showed that the GOI designed, introduced and monitored the export restraints on CPO with the specific purpose of keeping CPO prices at a lower level for the benefit of the downstream industries (51). Namely, through a depressing effect on the domestic CPO price in Indonesia, the GOI ensured that the price of raw materials for biodiesel remained significantly lower than global prices, to the benefit of Indonesian biodiesel producers (52).

(55)

In the subsequent analysis the Commission concluded on the existence of a benefit to the Indonesian producers of biodiesel within the meaning Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation (53). This benefit resulted from the provision of raw materials for less than adequate remuneration by the CPO producers, with the PTPN acting de facto as a price setter (54): the price set by PTPN constituted the maximum price on the domestic market which was in turn followed by all CPO and biodiesel producers on the Indonesian market (55). Indeed, the domestic price of CPO closely reflected the award price of the daily auctions of PTPN (56). It follows that the actions of the GOI directed CPO suppliers to provide CPO at less than adequate remuneration to Indonesian bioidiesel producers by de facto setting a maximum price on the Indonesian market (57).

(56)

On the basis of the information on file in the original investigation, it was established that the prices of CPO in Indonesia were distorted because of the GOI’s intervention.

(57)

Furthermore, that subsidy programme was found to be specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(c) of the basic Regulation given that CPO was only used by a limited number of industries and enterprises in Indonesia in their production process (58).

(58)

Ultimately, the Commission found that by means of Presidential Regulation No 66/2018, the GOI had put in place an explicit policy to support the development of the domestic biodiesel industry (59), and recalled that the GOI explicitily announced its support to the biodiesel industry by setting up the OPPF whose policy remit was to solely support the biodiesel industry (60).

(59)

In the request, the applicant contended that during the review investigation CPO prices were distorted because of the GOI’s intervention, and underlined that it is since 1994 the GOI has put in place an export constraint regime on CPO, which is the main raw material to produce biodiesel in Indonesia, as a tool to control and influence prices of downstream products (61). Indeed, CPO amounts to around 85 % of the total production costs of biodiesel (62).

(60)

The applicant argued that during the review investigation period the export constraints regime on CPO was still fully in force in Indonesia despite some amendments to the underlying legal framework (63). Indeed, through the Regulation No 154/PMK.05/2022 of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia in force as of 1 January 2023, the GOI (i) amended the price range for the export taxes/levies on CPO and biodiesel, i.e. by imposing the export dutywhenever the CPO reference price falls below USD 680/MT (instead of the priorly applicable threshold of USD 750/MT) (64); and (ii) adjusted the price ranges for the export levy on biodiesel (65). Pursuant to Regulation No 123/PMK.010/2022 of the Ministry of Finance, the GOI set price ranges and the relative export duties for CPO and biodiesel (66). The former were revoked by Regulation No 38/PMK.010/2024 of the Ministry of Finance, which nonetheless maintained the export duties applicable to CPO and biodiesel (67).

(61)

The applicant claimed that the GOI has maintained such subsidy schemes since 2019 (68). Besides the export restraint regimes, the GOI has kept on intervening in the Indonesian market to de facto control the CPO prices through the PTPN, a public body and State-owned company fully controlled by the GOI (69). Through daily auctions, the PTPN has acted de facto as a price setter for CPO according to the GOI’s aim of keeping CPO domestic prices lower so that the downstream industries – namely the biodiesel industry – could benefit from it (70). By so doing, the GOI supported and artificially stimulated the Indonesian biodiesel industry. It follows that, according to the applicant, Indonesian CPO suppliers were entrusted or directed by the GOI to provide input materials to the domestic users of CPO, namely Indonesian biodiesel producers, for less than adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation (71). The applicant concluded that the GOI has put in place a system that creates a high demand for biodiesel through the blending mandate (72), with CPO producers consequently being responsible for an artificially low-priced domestic CPO market (73).

(62)

The provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration is a subsidy as per Article 3(1)(a)(iii) of the basic Regulation as these input suppliers have been entrusted or directed by the GOI to do so at less than market value.

(63)

Because the GOI aimed at artificially lowering the domestic price of CPO, the Commission found that the GOI’s support to the Indonesian biodiesel industry conferred a benefit by reference to the difference between the prices paid by domestic biodiesel producers purchasing CPO locally and the benchmark based on the prevailing market conditions for CPO. The difference between the two resulted in a benefit to the Indonesian biodiesel producers, which were put in the position to source the main raw material for biodiesel at a price below the international market price (74). As to the appropriate benchmark to be used in the comparison, in the original investigation, the Commission deemed the FOB CPO export price form Indonesia to the rest of the world, as found in the Indonesia Export Statistics, appropriate. The Commission compared the domestic price of CPO paid by the Indonesian producers with the calculated benchmark. It found that the difference represented the ‘savings’ obtained by the Indonesian producers of biodiesel that purchased CPO on the distorted domestic market compared to the price that they would have had in the absence of distortions. Such total amount represented the benefit conferred on the Indonesian biodiesel producers by the GOI during the review investigation period.

(64)

In the absence of cooperation from the Indonesian exporting producers, the Commission had no company-specific information on which it could calculate the amount of subsidy conferred during the review investigation period.

(65)

The subsidy in question is specific within the meaning of Article 4(2)(c) of the basic Regulation taking into account that the its availability is restricted to certain companies in Indonesia, namely those active in the palm oil value chain (75).

(66)

This investigation did not bring into light any information contradicting the original findings.

(67)

Accordingly, the Commission concluded that that the provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration as a countervailable subsidy continued during the review investigation period. Also, the Commission confirmed that, during the review investigation period, through a set of measures including export taxes and levy, and by de facto acting as a price setter on the market, the GOI induced domestic CPO producers to sell CPO locally, and entrusted and directed them to provide this raw material to Indonesian biodiesel producers for less than adequate remuneration.

(68)

In the original investigation (76), the Commission established that the bonded zone scheme, whereby the GOI (i) suspended import duty on imported machinery and (ii) exempted VAT on imported machinery, was a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(ii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation.

(69)

The Commission also established that the subsidy was specific under Article 4.2(a) and 4.2(c) of the basic Regulation because the Bonded Zones scheme was available only to ‘export oriented companies’, i.e. companies generating more than 50 % of their turnover from exports (77). Nonetheless, in the original investigation, the GOI explained to the Commission that companies in the biodiesel industry were eligible to the scheme even though they did not meet the requirement of generating more than 50 % of their turnover from export. The reason for such exemption was that, by so doing, they could comply with the blending mandate imposed by the GOI (78). Therefore, the Comission concluded that the granting of the exemption relating to the eligibility criteria was completely at the GOI’s discretion (79).

(70)

In regard to the advantages conferred by the Bonded Zones schemes, the Commission found that it resulted in either (i) the suspension of the import duty; or (ii) the exemption of VAT on goods imported into the Bonded Zones until such goods were sold on the Indonesian domestic market or directly exported. It followed that if those goods remained within the Bonded Zones or are directly exported, import duty or VAT are never due (80). Essentially this meant that Indonesian exporting producers never paid either import duty or VAT on the machinery they first imported and which then remained within the Bonded Zones or were directly exported (81).

(71)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that the import duty suspension and the VAT exemption on the goods imported into the Bonded Zones constituted a financial contribution by the GOI in the form of revenue foregone (82). Namely, import duty and VAT on imported machinery remained exempted until the goods would be sold on the Indonesian domestic market or directly exported (83).

(72)

In the request the applicant provided evidence that during the review investigation period Indonesian biodiesel producers continued to benefit from (i) the suspension on import duties and (ii) the VAT exemption on imported machinery into the bonded zones (84).

(73)

The applicant indicated that the Finance Minister Regulation (PMK) No 188/PMK.010/2015 on the Second Amendment to Finance Minister Regulation (PMK) No 176/PMK.011/2009 on Duty Exemption of Imported Machines, Goods and Materials for Industrial Construction and Development for the Investment was still the legal basis for this subsidy scheme (85).

(74)

According to the applicant, (i) the suspension of import duties on imported machinery amounted to revenue foregone or nor collected in the sense of Article 3(1)(ii) of the basic Regulation, and (ii) the VAT exemption specifically amounted to public revenue foregone, because, under normal circumstances, Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers would have paid the VAT first to the State and then they had in turn compensated such VAT when selling the imported goods domestically (86).

(75)

Neither the GOI nor any Indonesian exporting producer provided evidence suggesting the biodiesel industry stopped benefiting from the scheme described above.

(76)

In the absence of cooperation from the GOI and any Indonesian exporting producers, the Commission had no company-specific information on the basis of which to calculate the amount of subsidy conferred during the review investigation period. The previous investigation established that machineries used in the Bonded Zones are generally imported and once installed, because of the incentives, they never left the Bonded Zones (87). Therefore, the import duty on such machineries never became payable in fact. Similarly, VAT on such machineries was actually always exempted, since Indonesian exporting producers benefited from retaining cash availability (88).

(77)

The Commission confirmed that thanks to this scheme the Indonesian exporting producers were better off than they would be absent such scheme. Indeed, had not such scheme been in place, Indonesian exporting producers would have paid both import duties and VAT upon importation of machinery into the Bonded Zones (89).

(78)

For the findings of the continued subsidisation in the current expiry review, the Commission confirmed the calculation of the subsidy amount of the original investigation. For the exemption of import duty on imported machinery, the benefit consisted of the total amount of unpaid duty allocated to the review investigation period based on the useful life of the underlyng assets; wherereas for the VAT exemption, the benefit was negligible and hence did not materially affect the final results (90). It is likely that at the very least subsidisation continued at the same levels as those of the original investigation.

(79)

The subsidy is specific within the meaning of Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(3) of the basic Regulation as during the review investigation period it was available only to certain companies depending on both their export performance and their location in specific geographic areas within the jurisdiction of the granting authority (91).

(80)

The legal situation has not substantially changed and this investigation did not bring into light any information contradicting the original findings. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that that the Bonded Zones scheme and the exemption of import duty and VAT on imported machinery as countervailable subsidies continued to confer a benefit to the biodiesel industry during the review investigation period.

(81)

In the original investigation, the complainant identified a number of additional subsidy programmes, namely the income tax benefits for listed investments, the industrial estate subsidy, and the pioneer industry tax benefits (92). However, the Commission found that no Indonesian exporting producer benefitted from any of those programmes (93).

(82)

In the request, the applicant recalled those additional subsidy programmes (94), and acknowledged that, in comparison with the original investigation, the regulation establishing income tax benefits for listed investment is no longer in force as it has been repealed by the Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No 78 of 2019 (95). In this regard, the applicant noted that the new legal act no longer included the biodiesel industry among those eligible for the subsidisation incentives listed therein (96). Therefore, the applicant brought forward specific claims relating to the remaining two subsidy programmes only (97), i.e. the industrial estate subsidy and the pioneer industry tax benefit.

(83)

However, the applicant did not provide any evidence on any Indonesian biodiesel exporting producer being qualifiable as an ‘industrial company’ or being located in a geographical area meeting the requirements of an ‘industrial estate’, an eligibility requirement to benefit from the industrial state subsidy, or of any Indonesian exporting producers having a new investment plan worth at least 500 billion rupiah, an eligibility requirement for the pioneer industry tax benefit. In the absence of cooperation from the GOI and any Indonesian exporting producers, the Commission could not establish a benefit as there is no information on which to assess whether the Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers made use of this subsidy programme.

(84)

Consequently, there is no evidence showing that this schemes were in place as countervailable subsidies during the review investigation period.

(85)

In light of the above, the Commission concluded that during the review investigation period Indonesian biodiesel producers continued to benefit from countervailable subsidies.

(86)

Following final disclosure, the GOI claimed that neither the OPPF nor the provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration are subsidies under the WTO SCM agreement. This was based on its submissions in the original investigation as well as on the findings of the Panel in DS618 (98): European Union – countervailing duties on Imports of Biodiesel from Indonesia.

(87)

Due to the express non-cooperation from both the GOI and Indonesian producers, the Commission’s conclusions on continuation of subsidisation in this expiry review were based on facts available as explained in recitals 32 to 36. To this end, the Commission used the request for review and the findings of the previous investigation. The submissions made in the original investigation and their substance were already addressed in that investigation, that established that both schemes constituted countervailable subsidies (99). The European Union has appealed the findings of the Panel in DS618 (100). Therefore, according to standing WTO case-law, the findings of the Panel in DS618 are not final and have no legal status in the WTO system (101), since they have not been endorsed by the Dispute Settlement Body through a decision by the WTO Members and are consequently not capable of putting into question the findings in the present expiry review. Furtherfore, the comments of the GOI were provided only after the final disclosure and in any case did not provide any factual information or new evidence contrary to the conclusions of the expiry review. Therefore, the comments by the GOI were rejected.

(88)

Further to the finding of existence of subsidisation during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated the likely development of subsidised imports into the Union from the country concerned if the measures were repealed. The following elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in Indonesia and the attractiveness of the Union market. Given the lack of cooperation, these elements were established on the basis of facts available within the meaning of Article 28 of the basic Regulation, i.e. the request and the findings of the previous investigation.

(89)

According to publicly available information reported by EBB and the sampled Union producers, in 2024, the production capacity in Indonesia is estimated at more than 16 Mio tonnes, while production and consumption are estimated at around 11 Mio tonnes (102). On this basis, the spare capacity in Indonesia is estimated at almost 5 Mio tonnes, which represents around 30 % of the Union consumption during the review investigation period.

(90)

Therefore, and also in view of the findings in recitals 91 to 93 on the attractiveness of the Union maket, the Commission considered that should the measures be repealed, Indonesian biodiesel producers would be able to increase their exports to the Union market.

(91)

The Union market remains a very attractive market for Indonesian biodiesel producers. The Union is indeed the world’s largest biodiesel market, and it is foreseen to be the first user of biodiesel worldwide in 2028, accounting for 33 % of the total biodiesel use globally, ahead of the United States of America (‘US’) with 22 % of total biodiesel use globally (103). Also, the US has imposed anti-dumping and countervailing measures on imports of biodiesel originating in Indonesia since 2018, both extended in July 2023, with dumping margins ranging from 92,52 % to 276,65 % and subsidy rates ranging from 34,45 % and 64,73 % respectively (104).

(92)

The Union market is also attractive to Indonesian exporting producers in terms of prices. As set out in recitals 108 and 146, without the countervailing duties, imports from Indonesia into the Union at their price level in the RIP would undercut Union industry’s prices by 5,8 %. The Commission also compared Indonesian export prices to the Union to Indonesian export prices to other third country markets. In the absence of cooperation, the Commission used GTA statistics (105) for Indonesian exports under Harmonised System (‘HS’) subheadings 1516 20 , 1518 00 , 2710 19 , 2710 20 , 3826 00 and 3824 99 at FOB level. The comparison showed that the average export price to the Union was EUR 989 per tonne while the average export price to all other third countries together was EUR 642 per tonne in the RIP. This indicates that the Union market is attractive as it offers Indonesian producers better prices than other markets and such prices would still be lower than Union industry’s prices.

(93)

Therefore, the Commission considered that, should the current measures be repealed, it is likely that the Indonesian biodiesel producers would direct at least part of their spare capacity to the Union as well as redirect exports towards the Union.

(94)

The Commission found that there is sufficient evidence that subsidisation of the biodiesel industry in Indonesia continued during the review investigation period. This is likely to continue in the future, bearing in mind the increasing blending mandate described in recital 43. Specifically, with regard to the OPPF and the provision of CPO for less than adequate remuneration, considering the way these schemes have been operating since their establishment, the benefits to the Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers deriving therefrom will likely continue in the future (106).

(95)

The Commission also found that the repeal of the countervailing measures would likely result in an increase of exports of subsidised Indonesian biodiesel to the Union market.

(96)

The Commission therefore concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the expiry of the countervailing measures would result in the continuation of subsidisation.

(97)

The like product was manufactured by 40 producers in the Union that were members of the EBB plus an estimated 20 other Union producers who are not EBB members. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation.

(98)

The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 14 179 182 tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of verified macro questionnaire submitted by EBB. EBB’s data on Union biodiesel production was estimated on the basis of the data from an external market intelligence provider (107) for 2023, to which the percentage evolution between 2023 and the review investigation period of the production of EBB members was applied.

(99)

As indicated in recital 15, the Union producers selected in the sample represented 12 % of the total Union production of the like product during the review investigation period.

(100)

The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the sales volumes of the Union industry in the Union market reported in the reply to macro questionnaire by EBB and import data from Eurostat (Comext).

(101)

On this basis, Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 1

Union consumption (tonnes)

(102)

During the period considered, the Union consumption of biodiesel decreased overall by 7 %. It increased by 4 % from 2021 to 2022, remained stable in 2023 and decreased by 11 % from 2023 to the review investigation period.

(103)

The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of import statistics from Eurostat. The market share was established on the basis of the import volumes from the country concerned and the Union consumption.

(104)

Over the period considered, imports from Indonesia into the Union developed as follows:

Table 2

Import quantity (tonnes) and market share

(105)

The volume of imports of biodiesel from Indonesia was negligible throughout the RIP. It fluctuated but overall decreased over the period considered (- 39 % overall). Their market share was also negligible, decreasing from 0,6 % in 2021 to 0,4 % during the review investigation period.

(106)

Over the period considered the price of imports from Indonesia into the Union developed as follows:

Table 3

Import prices (EUR/ tonne)

(107)

The prices of Indonesian imports increased by 37 % in 2022, but then fell back to their previous level and decreased slightly (by 4 %) from 2023 to the review investigation period. In the review investigation period, the average price of Indonesian imports was 1 113 EUR/tonne.

(108)

Due to the non cooperation of the Indonesian exporting producers, the Commission determined price undercutting during the review investigation period based on the facts available within the meaning of Article 28 of the basic Regulation. Thus, the Commission compared the average import price as recorded in Eurostat, established on a Cost, Insurance, Freight (‘CIF’) basis, with appropriate adjustments for standard customs duties and post-importation costs, to the weighted average sales price of the Union industry charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, based on the verified questionnaire replies provided by the sampled Union producers. On this basis no undercutting was found. However, as also set out in recital 146, when deducting the countervailing duties, the Indonesian prices undercut the Union industry sales price by 5,8 %.

(109)

The imports of biodiesel from third countries other than Indonesia were mainly from China, the United Kingdom and Singapore.

(110)

The volume of imports into the Union as well as the market share and price trends for imports of biodiesel from other third countries developed as follows:

Table 4

Imports from third countries

(111)

During the period considered, volumes of imports from other third countries decreased slightly, but in view of the higher decrease of overall consumption, they increased their market share. Imports from China however increased significantly, and the respective market share tripled. As regards prices, during the review investigation period, the average import price from imports from other third countries was slightly higher than the import price from Indonesia.

(112)

The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(113)

As mentioned in recital 15, sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(114)

For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the macro questionnaire response submitted by the applicant. The data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(115)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, employment, productivity, growth, magnitude of subsidisation margins and recovery from the effects of past subsidisation.

(116)

The analysis of microeconomic indicators (average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital) was carried out at the level of the sampled Union producers. The assessment was based on their information which was duly verified during an on-spot verification visit.

(117)

Over the period considered production, production capacity and capacity utilisation of the Union industry developed as follows:

Table 5

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(118)

Production capacity increased slightly in 2022 before decreasing again in the review investigation period where it reached a similar level as in 2021. Production volume and capacity utilisation experienced a continuous decline from 2020 up to the review investigation period and overall decreased by 7 % and 6 %, respectively.

(119)

The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Sales volume (tonnes) and market share

(120)

The sales by the Union industry on the Union market decreased during the period considered, and overall by 9 %. This is reflected in a decrease of market share from 74,5 % in 2020 to 72,8 % in the review investigation period. Market share of the Union industry decreased between 2021 and 2022 by 10 %, followed by a rebound in 2023 and a further increase in the review investigation period. Yet, market share in the review investigation period was still below 2021 levels.

(121)

In a context of decreasing consumption and production, the Union industry lost sales volume and market share. Overall, there was no growth for the Union industry over the period considered.

(122)

Over the period considered employment level and productivity within the Union industry developed as follows:

Table 7

Employment and productivity

(123)

The number of employees engaged in the production of the product under review in the Union fluctuated but overall decreased during the review investigation period. The productivity of the Union industry’s workforce also decreased during the review investigation period.

(124)

Subsidisation continued during the review investigation period, as explained under Section 3 above. However, since the volumes of the subsidised imports from Indonesia were negligible during the review investigation period, the Commission concluded that the impact of the magnitude of subsidisation of the imports from Indonesia on the Union industry was limited.

(125)

The average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonnes)

(126)

The industry’s average sales prices increased drastically by 42 % in 2022 and have been decreasing since, in line with the trend in costs. Despite a decrease in 2023 and during the review investigation period, the prices remain considerably higher compared to 2021.

(127)

The unit cost of production surged substantially in 2022 and 2023, then dropped during the review investigation period, yet remained well above the level seen in 2021 and above the sales price. Since 2023, the Union industry was unable to reflect the cost of production in their sales price.

(128)

The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Average labour costs per employee

(129)

During the period considered, average labour costs increased by 11 %. While the number of employees slightly decreased but remained overall stable over the same period (as shown in Table 7), the average labour cost per employee increased.

(130)

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Inventories

(131)

As already established during the original investigation, the level of stocks is a less meaningful indicator for this type of industry (108). The Commission confirmed that the Union industry endeavoured to keep stocks low, but this was not always possible in light of the market situation which was characterised by strong presence of dumped imports from China/decreasing demand. It also noted that, given that the product under review is sold in bulk, a single delivery can comprise a significant volume of more than 10 000 tonnes which can have a significant impact on the stock level, depending on the precise transaction date.

(132)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

(133)

The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. After achieving very low profitability in 2021 and 2022, the sampled Union producers incurred losses in 2023 and during the review investigation period.

(134)

The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. A drastic fall in 2021 was followed by a strong rebound in 2023 and during the review investigation period. This rebound was due to one of the sampled producers selling large quantities of biodiesel from stock.

(135)

Investments were at low levels in 2021 and 2022 and the sharp increase in relative terms in 2023 has to be seen against this background. In the review investigation period investments slightly decreased again. In general, the investments were aimed at diversifying the product range with the objective of moving to more profitable products and remaining competitive.

(136)

The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. The return on investments decreased during the period considered and was negative in 2023 and during the review investigation period, in line with the negative profitability.

(137)

During the period considered, most of the injury indicators showed a negative trend. This is particularly evident in the declining trend of the Union industry’s profitability and its loss making situation as of 2023. Other important indicators also developed negatively, such as production and sales volumes, capacity utilisation, employment and productivity, as well as cash flow and return on investment.

(138)

Although market share showed an increasing trend as of 2023, this followed a sharp decrease in 2022, and the Union industry was despite this positive development not able to reach the same level as in 2021. Sales prices also showed a positive development, but given the parallel increase in the cost of production, they were below cost of production in the last two years of the period considered, leading to a loss making situation. Finally, investments that showed a positive trend, were at low levels throughout the period considered.

(139)

Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period.

(140)

Following the imposition of countervailing measures in 2019, Indonesian biodiesel imports declined and remained below the de minimis threshold defined in Article 10(9) of the basic Regulation, with a market share of 0,4 % during the review investigation period. Therefore, the material injury suffered during the review investigation period could not be attributed to the subsidised imports from Indonesia.

(141)

However, the Commission imposed, on 14 August 2024, provisional measures against China (109), that is, at the end of the review investigation period of the present investigation. These measures were confirmed on 10 February 2025 where the Commission imposed definitive anti-dumping measures (110). As established during this investigation, the material injury suffered by Union industry was caused by the Chinese imports (111).

(142)

The Commisison concluded in recital 139 that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period. The Commission also concluded in the section above that the injury to the Union industry obverved during the review investigation period could not have been caused by subsidized imports from Indonesia due to their low volume. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 18(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the subsidised imports from Indonesia if the measures in force were allowed to lapse.

(143)

In this regard, the Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in Indonesia, the attractiveness of the Union market, and likely price levels of imports from Indonesia in the absence of countervailing measures and their impact on the Union industry.

(144)

As concluded in recital 89, the producers in Indonesia have significant spare capacity, that, in line with the findings of the attractiveness of the Union market below, would be available, at least partly, for export to the Union if measures were allowed to lapse.

(145)

As described in recitals 91 to 93, the Union market is attractive to Indonesian producers due to its size and in terms of prices, and also the fact that the USA have trade defence measures in place, making it likely that Indonesian biodiesel producers would direct at least part of their spare capacity to the Union as well as redirect exports towards the Union if the measures are allowed to expire.

(146)

As explained in recital 108 above, Indonesian import prices did not undercut the Union industry sales price during the review investigation period. The Commission considered further what would be the likely price level of imports from Indonesia should measures be allowed to lapse and concluded that a reasonable proxy to determine such price level was the import price from Indonesia during the review investigation period after deducting the countervailing duties. On this basis, the Commission established an undercutting margin of 5,8 %. Such price levels would also be clearly below the level of the Union industry’s unit cost. It is reasonable to consider that increased volumes of Indonesian biodiesel imports would come at price levels that, all other things being equal, would be similar to the levels observed during the review investigation period. Given also that export prices to third countries of the Indonesian producers are lower than the export prices to the Union as explained in recital 92, it can be concluded that the exporting producers have the possibility to lower even further their prices when exporting to the Union, in case the measures were repealed.

(147)

Such low price level combined with a likely significant increase of Indonesian imports should measures be allowed to lapse, will create a further price pressure on the Union market. Given the negative profitability of the Union industry, the further pressure on Union industry’s prices would likely lead to depressing even further its profitability and eventually leading to loss of employment and investments. It is not likely that the Union industry would be able to maintain and even less to increase its price levels in order to obtain its target profit in the near future, if Indonesian imports are allowed to enter the Union market at such low prices.

(148)

In view of the above, the Commission concluded that, if the measures were allowed to lapse, not only would Indonesian imports increase considerably, they would also enter at injurious prices, thus causing a further aggravation of the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(149)

In view of the above, it is concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of subsidised imports from Indonesia at injurious levels and injury caused by subsidised imports from Indonesia would be likely to recur.

(150)

Following definitive disclosure, the GOI claimed that there is no substantiated risk of material injury to the Union industry of biodiesel and that the conclusions set out in the final disclosure violate Art. 15.5 of the WTO SCM agreement. The GOI’s claim was based on the following arguments:

(151)

Since the imposition of measures, the volume of imports of biodiesel from Indonesia and its market share in the Union have decreased significantly, therefore there can be no loss from such imports.

(152)

The Commission failed to examine known factors other than the subsidised imports which harm the Union industry (such as rising costs, changes in demand, third-country imports and sector specific regulation) and has not distinguished the harm caused by such factors from the effects of the subsidised imports.

(153)

The findings of recurrence of injury rests entirely on old arguments dismissed by the Dispute Settlement Body in WTO case DS618.

(154)

As set out in recital 140, contrary to what the GOI’s submission suggested, the Commission did not make a finding that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was caused by Indonesian imports. The Commission only made a finding that the injury caused by Indonesian imports is likely to recur if measures were allowed to lapse. In view of this, the decrease of Indonesian imports, which according to the GOI came as a result of the imposition of measures, does not contradict the Commission’s findings. If anything, it corroborates the conclusion that if measures are allowed to lapse, the volume of imports is likely to increase significantly.

(155)

In the same vein, since the material injury suffered by the Union industry was not caused by Indonesian imports, the more detailed examination of factors other than Indonesian imports, and the attribution of causality to any of those factors, is irrelevant.

(156)

Finally, contrary to what the GoI submission stated, the findings of likelihood of recurrence of injury, as set out in recitals 142 to 148 relied on (i) the assessment of the likely development of volume of imports, (ii) the likely price behaviour of Indonesian exporting producers if measures were allowed to lapse, and (iii) the likely impact on the situation of the Union industry, based on the information available in the file of the current investigation. The GOI did not provide any comment on this assessment or any evidence that would refute the Commission’s conclusions.

(157)

In any event, the Commission recalled that the findings of the Panel in DS618 are not final, as the European Union has appealed the Panel’s report, and therefore cannot put into question the findings in this investigation.

(158)

In view of the above, the arguments of the GOI were rejected.

(159)

In accordance with Article 31 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing countervailing measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(160)

The Union industry is composed of approximately 60 producers across the Union and provides direct employment to around 5 500 people.

(161)

The Commission determined that, if measures were allowed to lapse, the situation of the Union industry would deteriorate further, due to a surge of low-priced imports biodiesel from Indonesia.

(162)

On the other hand, the continuation of the existing measures would enable the Union industry to pursue its recovery process and eventually achieve sustainable profitability levels up to its target profit enabling further investments in the sector.

(163)

The Commission therefore concluded that the renewal of the measures would be in the interest of the Union industry.

(164)

The Commission contacted all known users and unrelated importers. No users or unrelated importers came forward and cooperated in this investigation. Two traders active in the Union registered as interested party in the proceeding but made no representations. Given the lack of cooperation of users and unrelated importers and in the absence of any indications to the contrary, the continuation of the measures is not considered against the interest of users and importers.

(165)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the existing countervailing measures on imports of biodiesel originating in Indonesia.

(166)

On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on the likelihood of both the continuation of subsidisation and recurrence of injury caused by subsidized imports from Indonesia as well as Union interest, the countervailing measures on biodiesel from Indonesia should be maintained.

(167)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual countervailing duties. The application of individual countervailing duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the countervailing duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in Indonesia’.

(168)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of countervailing duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(169)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, and provided the conditions are met, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(170)

The individual company countervailing duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in Indonesia and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of biodiesel produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in Indonesia’. They should not be subject to any of the individual countervailing duty rates.

(171)

A company may request the application of these individual countervailing duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(172)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (112) when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(173)

The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,