(1)

By Regulation (EU) No 1072/2012 (2), the Eurpean Commission (‘the Commission’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’ or ‘the PRC’).

(2)

By Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 (3), the Council imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, originating in the PRC (‘the original measures’). The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

(3)

By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1932 (4), the Commission amended the product scope as defined in the original measures, leading to the exclusion of imports of ceramic condiment or spice mills and their ceramic grinding parts, ceramic coffee mills, ceramic knife sharpeners, ceramic sharpeners, ceramic kitchen tools to be used for cutting, grinding, grating, slicing, scraping and peeling, and cordierite ceramic pizza-stones of a kind used for baking pizza or bread following a partial interim review of the product scope.

(4)

By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1198 (5), the Commission re-imposed the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review (the ‘previous expiry review’).

(5)

By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2131 (6), the Commission amended the existing measures pursuant to an anti-circumvention investigation, extending the residual duty rate of 36,1 % to imports declared by 33 companies previously benefiting from reduced duty rates, and repealing their TARIC additional codes.

(6)

The individual anti-dumping duty rates currently in force range from 13,1 % to 18,3 %. All non-sampled cooperating exporting producers in the investigation leading to the original measures (‘the original investigation’) received a duty rate of 17,9 % and all other companies are subject to the residual duty rate of 36,1 % (‘the original measures’).

(7)

Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry (7), the Commission received a request for a review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(8)

The request for review was submitted on 14 April 2024 by Cerame Unie / The European Federation of Ceramic Table and Ornamentalware (‘FEPF’) and an individual Czech company (‘the applicants’) on behalf of the Union industry of ceramic tableware and kitchenware in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

(9)

Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 12 July 2024 the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports into the Union of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the country concerned’) on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (8) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(10)

On 19 December 2024, the Commission initiated a partial interim review concerning imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, originating in the People’s Republic of China, pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation. That partial interim review was requested by Cerame-Unie/The European Federation of Ceramic Table and Ornamentalware (‘FEPF’) and it is limited in scope to the examination of dumping.

(11)

The China Chamber of Commerce for Exports and Imports of Light Industrial Products and Art Crafts (‘CCCLA’) submitted comments upon initiation of the expiry review investigation. CCCLA drew attention to the length of time that the initial measures had been in place, since they were first imposed back in 2012. Consequently, in CCCLA’s view, the Union industry had already been benefiting from market protection for almost 12 years, and, should the present expiry review lead to an extension of the measures for another 5-five year period, it would result in nearly 18 years of continuous protection of the Union market from imports of Chinese ceramic tableware and kitchenware. CCCLA made reference to Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’), which states that anti-dumping measures should be terminated after five years unless there is evidence to suggest that they should be continued. CCCLA claimed that an extension of the measures against imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from China would serve merely a protectionist purpose and would be unwarranted, unlawful and harmful to Union market as a whole.

(12)

CCCLA further argued that the Union industry is in a sound state, as confirmed by the Regulation imposing provisional measures, the Regulation extending the measures and the present request for an expiry review investigation, demonstrating that the Union industry has, except for 2010 followed by full-scale economic crisis in the EU, been profitable at a rate of between 2 % and 5 % since 2008. Therefore, there is no injury that needs to be counteracted.

(13)

This claim had to be dismissed. The Commission recalls that Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’) and Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation allow for an exception of the five-year expiry rule if it is determined in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.

(14)

As regards the situation of the Union industry, the Commission noted that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition by having a positive effect on the state of the Union industry. Even if the Union industry had not suffered material injury in the period considered by the request, one would need to assess whether resulting from the Chinese imports injury may recur if measures would be allowed to lapse. In addition, the Notice of Initiation stated in point 4.2 that the applicants alleged the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury from the PRC. In this respect, the applicants have provided sufficient evidence that, should measures be allowed to lapse, the current import level of the product under review from the country concerned to the Union would likely increase significantly and cause further injury to the Union industry. Therefore, this claim was dismissed.

(15)

At initiation, CCCLA requested the Commission to reject the applicants’ claim on the alleged significant distortions and accept the domestic prices and costs reported by the cooperating Chinese exporters. To support this claim, CCCLA further argued that:

(16)

Finally, the CCCLA pointed to WTO jurisprudence (11) (12) stablishing that investigating authorities must use the product costs actually incurred by producers or exporters for the calculation of constructed normal values. It also argued that WTO jurisprudence supports its claim that Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation appears to be inconsistent with Article 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the WTO ADA.

(17)

The Commission recalled that its Report constitutes a body of evidence placed on the file of the investigation that the Commission can rely upon to find existence of significant distortions, as provided by Article 2(6a)(c) of the basic Regulation. The Report has been published on 21 December 2017 and updated on 10 April 2024, after providing the opportunity for everybody (that is, not only the parties to a particular anti-dumping investigation) to submit comments, rebut, and supplement the evidence contained in the Report. To date, the Commission has received no contribution on the Report questioning the objectivity thereof. Moreover, the CCCLA itself did not provide any specific elements rebutting the evidence or the legal conclusions contained in the Report. Accordingly, it has not been shown why the Report would lack objectivity and the claim that the Report could not be relied on in this investigation was rejected.

(18)

The claim that Five-Year Plans are merely guiding documents is already demerited in the ‘Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations’, mentioned above.

(19)

The report foresees this argument and considers that ‘However, the fact that the FYPs (or the overarching strategies) do not have a precisely defined status within the Chinese legal order does not […] put in question their binding nature which transpires from other pieces of legislation, such as the Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the PRC. This law unequivocally obliges said authorities to implement the FYPs […].In view of the above, it is apparent that the implementation and reference to higher level plans is resolutely addressed across plans at every level, often in the introductory part or the final chapters of the respective FYPs and other planning documents. This cannot be dismissed as simply aspirational language since the implementation of plans is mandated by law, including by the Constitution. In addition, the implementation and fulfilment of targets set by various plans are regularly monitored and evaluated […]’ (13) .

(20)

With regard to point (c) and to the further claims related to the compliance of the normal value construction with WTO jurisprudence, the Commission noted that, in the case at hand, the Commission had applied the relevant rules contained in Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission considered that the provision of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation is fully consistent with the European Union’s WTO obligations and the jurisprudence. Indeed, the existence of significant distortions renders costs and prices in the exporting country inappropriate for the construction of normal value. In these circumstances, Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation envisages the construction of costs of production and sale on the basis of undistorted prices or benchmarks, including those in an appropriate representative country with a similar level of development as the exporting country. As explicitly clarified by the Appellate Body in DS473 (14), WTO law permits the use of data from a third country, duly adjusted when such adjustment is necessary and substantiated. The Commission recalled in this connection that once it is determined that due to the existence of significant distortions in the exporting country in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country, the normal value is constructed by reference to undistorted prices or benchmarks in an appropriate representative country for each exporting producer according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. The same provision of the basic Regulation also allows the use of domestic costs if they are positively established not to be distorted. In that context, the exporting producers had the possibility to provide evidence that their individual costs were undistorted. However, no positive evidence as to the factors of production of individual exporting producers being undistorted was submitted.

(21)

On the construction of the Normal Value proposed in the expiry review request, CCCLA argued that by disclosing cost structure and prices in ranges, the applicants were infringing CCCLA’s right of defence and not complying with WTO practice. Additionally, the CCCLA claimed that the level of SG & A costs and profit found by the applicants proved that the constructed normal value (‘CNV’) established in the expiry review request cannot be compared to the price of sales by Chinese producers/exporters.

(22)

Moreover, CCCLA noted that while in previous investigations the applicants split up the product concerned into different product types for its calculation of the CNV, in the present proceeding they used a simplified approach and aggregated values, leading to an unrepresentative CNV. To support this claim, CCCLA further argued that:

(23)

Therefore, the CCCLA qualified the applicants’ approach as unacceptable, and argues that the data used in the dumping margin assessment section of the review request should not have been accepted by the Commission.

(24)

Regarding the CCCLA’s right to defence, the Commission considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data provided under confidential cover to let the interested parties exercise their right of defence throughout the proceeding. These summaries were therefore sufficiently detailed to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence pursuant to Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation.

(25)

It is further recalled that Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation and Article 6(5) of the WTO ADA allow for the safeguarding of confidential information in circumstances where disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person has acquired the information. The information provided under confidential cover falls under these categories. Therefore, the bracketing of relevant numerical data was considered appropriate and sufficient to ensure the right to defence of interested parties. Consequently, this claim was rejected.

(26)

As regards the level of SG & A costs and profit employed in the construction of the Normal value in the expiry review request, the CCCLA provided no explanation as to why this would render the comparison of the CNV and the export price of the product concerned from China unrepresentative. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(27)

Finally, concerning the claims that the use of a single product type for the construction of the normal value of the product concerned in the complaint was intolerable and should have not been accepted by the Commission, it is recalled that, according to Article 5(3) of the basic Regulation, the Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the complaint, to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. In this context, the Commission reminded the CCCLA that complainants are not subject to the same standard of proof as the Commission is during an investigation. Moreover, the applicants cannot be required to use information that is not available to them. In this case, the Commission analysed the expiry review request thoroughly and confirmed that sufficient evidence of a likelihood of dumping and injury existed to justify the initiation of an expiry review. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(28)

The investigation of a continuation of dumping covered the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of continuation of recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2020 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(29)

CCCLA criticised the selection of both the period considered and the RIP as it would not meet the legal standard prescribed by Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation and strongly distorts potential findings by pushing them towards positive determinations on dumping and injury recurrence due to two main factors.

(30)

Firstly, setting the RIP from the first to the fourth quarter of 2023 would be unacceptably distant, given that the request for a review investigation was lodged on 27 May 2024, and proceedings were initiated on 12 July. Furthermore, using 2020 as a benchmark for analysing import trends and the current state of the Union industry would produce a distorted picture due to the heavy impact of the administrative measures adopted in response to the pandemic in 2020, and would impede an objective examination of this case based on positive evidence. The CCCLA concluded that the applicants should have been invited to resubmit the request based on a non-distorted period considered, i.e. as of 1 January 2019, excluding the year 2020, with the end date as close as possible to the initiation date.

(31)

In determining the investigation period, the Commission’s general approach aligns with Article 6(1), second subparagraph of the basic Regulation (applicable to reviews pursuant to Article 11(5), first subparagraph of the basic Regulation), which states that the ‘investigation period shall be selected which in the case of dumping shall, normally, cover a period of no less than six months immediately prior to the initiation of proceedings’. In the present review, by contrast to a normal case, exceptional circumstances had to be taken into account in view of the Union industry’s composition, which is high fragmented, with a very high proportion of SMEs. In order to ensure access to this trade defence instrument for such a diverse and fragmented industry, the Commission used the last full calendar year preceding the year in which the investigation was initiated. It is common practice for small and medium-sized enterprises to have a financial year that corresponds to the calendar year. By letting the review investigation period coincide with the calendar year, and consequently with the financial year, as set out in Article 6(9), last sentence of the basic Regulation, the Commission sought to reduce the burden on SMEs in providing information in the investigation. CCCLA’s claim was therefore rejected.

(32)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to participate in the investigation. In particular, it advised the following parties of the initiation of the expiry review: the applicants, the known producers in the Union and their relevant associations, the known exporting producers in the PRC, the known unrelated importers in the Union and the authorities of the PRC.

(33)

Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

(34)

The Commission received, together with the request for review dated 14 April 2024, a request for anonymity from six Union producers supporting the expiry review request. All those who requested anonymity brought forward their reasoning for not revealing their identity. The companies claimed concerns of retaliation from their customers in China, as well as indirectly from Chinese competitors through the customers and distributors they have in common in the European Union and in other parts of the world. To avoid risk of retaliation from private Chinese actors, which could potentially have a severe negative impact on their business activities, the companies requested the Commission to keep their identity confidential.

(35)

The Commission assessed these requests, and the supporting evidence provided. The Commission concluded that indeed the alleged risk of retaliation exists and, on this basis, granted confidential treatment to the identity of the companies in question (15).

(36)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(37)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of the producers’ production volumes of the like product, size, geographic location in the Union and product segment. The sample consisted of three Union producers located in three Member States, including Portugal and Romania (16), and covered all major product types. Out of these three producers, one was a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME (17)). The provisional sample accounted for [19 to 24] % of the estimated total volume of production and for [41 to 52] % of the estimated total sales of the like product in the Union in 2023.

(38)

Following the establishment of the provisional sample, the selected SME informed the Commission that organisational and financial circumstances made it objectively unfeasible for this company to participate in the investigation as a sampled Union producer. Having reviewed the arguments raised in the comments received by Cerame-Unie/FEPF, the Commission amended its provisional sample to include another SME in order to maintain a representative sample (18). Consequently, the resulting final sample included three Union producers located in three Member States, including Portugal and Romania, out of which one was an SME, and covering all major product types (19). That sample represented [16–21] % of estimated total EU production and [35–46] % of estimated total EU sales volume of the like product on the Union market in 2023.

(39)

CCCLA provided comments on the sample of the Union industry and raised concerns about potential self-selection strategies within the Union industry, as demonstrated by the abovementioned SME’s refusal to cooperate under the pretext of organisational and financial circumstances rather than the substance of the sample (i.e. production volumes, product mix, scale of company, geographical scope). This exercise could be repeated with an aim that companies performing below the average for the entire industry in the Union be included in the sample by the Commission, which would distort the injury determination. In this context, CCCLA referred to the Appellate Body Report in European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (Article 21.5) which would state that investigating authority shall not define the domestic industry in a way that it would include, exclusively or predominantly, producers considering themselves injured by allegedly dumped imports (20).

(40)

According to Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation the Commission has to select a sample that is statistically valid according to the information available at the time of the selection and, in case of non-cooperation of one of the sampled entities that is likely to materially affect the outcome of the investigation, in accordance with Article 17(4) of the basic Regulation, a new sample may be selected. The revised sample was very similar to the original sample in terms of coverage of production and sales. Furthermore, according to the provision of Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation the final selection of parties made under the sampling provisions rest with the Commission and not with the parties involved. The claim was therefore dismissed.

(41)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(42)

The European Commission did not receive a reply containing the information requested in the Annex to the Notice of Initiation from any unrelated importer within the deadline set in the Notice of Initiation. Therefore, no sample of unrelated importers was selected.

(43)

To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all known exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, it asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(44)

One hundred and one (101) Chinese exporting producers / groups of exporting producers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. These cooperating Chinese exporting producers together represented around 21 % of the total imports from China during the RIP and around 8 % of the total production and production capacity in China. After analysing the information supplied by the Chinese exporting producers, the Commission decided to limit its investigation to a reasonable number of exporting producers by using a sample in accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation. On 8 August 2024 the Commission selected a sample of three groups of exporting producers based on the largest sales volume to the Union during the review investigation period. The three sampled groups covered around 21 % of the total import volumes from China and around 8 % of the total production in China during the RIP (21).

(45)

The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’). The GOC did not submit any responses to the questionnaire.

(46)

The Commission sent questionnaires to the three sampled groups of Chinese exporting producers and to the GOC and to the three sampled Union producers, as well as to Cerame-Unie/FEPF.

(47)

Only one of the Chinese exporting producers provided a complete questionnaire reply. The three sampled Union producers and Cerame-Unie/FEPF also provided complete questionnaire replies.

(48)

The only exporting producer that provided a complete questionnaire reply accounted for around [1–2] % of the total volume of imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from the PRC into the European Union during the RIP. The Commission services considered that such a low level of imports would have not provided sufficient information to assess the export price and the existence of dumping during the review investigation period and could not be considered as representative of the total imports from the People’s Republic of China. In view of the insufficient level of cooperation, the Commission informed the interested parties that it may base its findings on facts available as provided for in Article 18 of the basic Regulation (22).

(49)

The Commission sought and verified all the information it deemed necessary for a determination of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and of the Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 were carried out at the premises of the following Union producers/associations.

(50)

Similar to the requests made by the supporting Union producers at initiation as outlined in recital (35), above, both SMEs, one of which was selected for the preliminary sample and the other which was selection for the final sample, respectively, requested that their identities be kept confidential for fear that they could face retaliation by customers or competitors concerned by this investigation, in accordance with Article 19(1) of the basic Regulation. Following an individual examination of their merits, the Commission found all confidentiality requests to be justified and accepted that the identities of those companies should not be disclosed (23). Moreover, the Commission considered that it was not appropriate to disclose the Member State(s) where these SMEs are located since this could also disclose the identity of the companies concerned.

(51)

The CCCLA claimed that the non-disclosure of the identities of Union producers who either supported the request for the investigation or cooperated by agreeing to be included in the sample constituted a severe breach of the rights of defence of other interested parties. Firstly, CCCLA argued that, if the identity of certain sampled/preliminary sampled Union producers are not disclosed, interested parties are prevented from providing meaningful comments on the representativeness of this sample. Secondly, the Commission’s injury findings always include an analysis of certain ‘microeconomic indicators’, which are solely related to the sampled EU producers. If any of these producers remain anonymous throughout the proceedings, interested parties would not be able to verify or comment on the validity of the Commission’s injury findings. Thirdly, in view of a correct determination of the margin of injury, if the Commission withholds the identity of the Union producer included in the sample, interested parties would also be prevented from verifying whether that producer produces branded or generic products.

(52)

According to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice the protection of rights of defence must be, where necessary, reconciled with the duty to respect confidential information, which is specifically laid down in Article 19 of the basic Regulation, even though that duty cannot deprive the rights of the defence of their essential content (24). This reconciliation permits the receipt of non-confidential summaries of such information (carried out, for instance, in the form of ranges and/or indexed elements of information). However, it must always be ensured that, even in summarised form, the information would not result in the disclosure of business secrets.

(53)

Following the reconciliation indicated in the case law recalled above, the Commission has ensured throughout the current investigation that all relevant issues could be verified and dealt with in the files available for inspection by interested parties. These files included notes on the sample selection and its representativeness, open submissions of the sampled Union producers including ranges and/or indexed information and other relevant communication with those companies and their representatives, such as on the percentage of branded products produced by the different sampled companies. No information, other than that of which an open version was disclosed to the interested parties, was used in the choice of sampled companies or the determination of the Commission’s injury findings. The disclosure of the identity of these companies would therefore not have provided the interested parties with any additional information that would have been relevant to verifying the correctness of the Commission’s findings. Hence, the Commission deemed the information provided in the documents disclosed to the interested parties sufficient to satisfy the rights of defence of interested parties, while disclosing the identities of the Union producers would have likely caused irreparable and disproportionate economic harm to them. The claim was therefore rejected.

(54)

The product under review is the same as defined in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1932 following a product scope review initiated on 12 April 2017 (25), that is ceramic tableware and kitchenware, excluding ceramic condiment or spice mills and their ceramic grinding parts, ceramic coffee mills, ceramic knife sharpeners, ceramic sharpeners, ceramic kitchen tools to be used for cutting, grinding, grating, slicing, scraping and peeling, and cordierite ceramic pizza-stones of a kind used for baking pizza or bread (‘the product under review’), currently falling under CN codes ex 6911 10 00 , ex 6912 00 21 , ex 6912 00 23 , ex 6912 00 25 and ex 6912 00 29 (TARIC codes 6911 10 00 90, 6912 00 21 11, 6912 00 21 91, 6912 00 23 10, 6912 00 25 10 and 6912 00 29 10) and originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the product concerned’ or ‘ceramic tableware and kitchenware’).

(55)

Ceramic tableware and kitchenware can be made of porcelain (including China/bone China), of common pottery, stoneware, earthenware or fine pottery or other materials. The final ceramic product depends on the type and composition of the main raw materials such as clay, kaolin, feldspar and quartz.

(56)

Ceramic tableware and kitchenware products are commercialised in a large variety of forms that have been evolving over time. They are used in a wide range of places, e.g. households, hotels, restaurants or care establishments and are principally intended to come into contact with food.

(57)

The product concerned by this investigation is the product under review originating in the People’s Republic of China currently falling under CN codes 6911 10 00 , ex 6912 00 21 , ex 6912 00 23 , ex 6912 00 25 and ex 6912 00 29 (TARIC codes 6911 10 00 90, 6912 00 21 11, 6912 00 21 91, 6912 00 23 10, 6912 00 25 10 and 6912 00 29 10).

(58)

As established in the original investigation, as well as in the previous expiry review investigation, this expiry review investigation confirmed that the following products have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics, and the same basic uses.

(59)

They are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(60)

In view of the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation tending to show the existence in the PRC of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission considered it appropriate to initiate the investigation on the basis of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(61)

Consequently, in order to collect the necessary data for the eventual application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, in the Notice of Initiation the Commission invited all known producers in the PRC to provide the information requested in Annex III to the Notice of the Initiation regarding the inputs used for producing the product under review.

(62)

In order to obtain the information that it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also sent a questionnaire to the GOC. No reply was received from the GOC.

(63)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of this Notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(64)

In the Notice of Initiation the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it might need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks.

(65)

On 6 June 2025, the Commission published a note to the file (26) (‘the Note of 6 June’) seeking the views of the interested parties on the relevant sources that the Commission might use for the determination of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(e) second indent of the basic Regulation. Based on the information contained in the expiry review request updated where available, combined with other sources of available information deemed appropriate according to the relevant criteria laid down in Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in accordance with Article 18(5) of the basic Regulation the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of ceramic tableware and kitchenware by the exporting producers. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified three potential representative countries: Brazil, Thailand and Türkiye and concluded that, at that stage, Türkiye was the most appropriate representative country under Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation.

(66)

The Commission gave the opportunity to all interested parties to comment. The Commission received comments from the applicants.

(67)

The present Regulation has addressed these comments in Section 5.1.2 below.

(68)

On 1 August 2025, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping duties (‘final disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

(69)

The comments made by interested parties were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate. The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard.

(70)

According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

(71)

However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is referred to hereinafter as ‘SG & A costs’).

(72)

As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

(73)

The Commission examined the evidence on the file to decide whether significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation exist in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’), rendering the use of domestic prices and costs in that country inappropriate. That analysis covered the following evidentiary elements on the various criteria relevant to establish the existence of significant distortions.

(74)

First, the evidence contained in the request included the following elements pointing to the existence of significant distortions.

(75)

In the request, the applicants highlighted – as an important feature of the ‘socialist market economy’ – the active guidance of the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) in both the public and private sector of the economy. In addition, the applicants underlined the existence of cross-cutting systemic distortions in China and analysed government interventions at various levels of the economy, in particular in the ceramic sector and the market of ceramic tableware and kitchenware.

(76)

The request further noted that the Chinese ceramic sector, including the market of the product under review are served by enterprises that operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of Chinese authorities. In this regard, the applicants pointed out the interference of the Government of China (‘GOC’) in the economy through tight links with both public and private entities and stated that the GOC’s policy goals are achieved through several measures, among which the national economic plans.

(77)

The request in particular mentioned the 13th Five-Year Development Plan for 2016-2020 – the Light Industry Development Plan – and the related Guiding Opinions, which aim at strengthening and improving fiscal and financial support policies for the sector and encouraging local governments to pursue the goals set for the sector also at provincial and municipal level (27). The applicants noted that given its importance within the Chinese light industries, the ceramic industry is under ongoing policy oversight and guidance from the GOC to ensure adherence to these plans. The Work Plan for Steady Growth of Light Industry (2023-2024), which includes also the ceramic sector, represents another policy document put in place by the GOC to guide the functioning of the sector, through the adoption of ‘more powerful measures […] to enhance development momentum, optimize the economics structure, and promote the continued recovery of the economy’ (28).

(78)

The request also noted that the presence of the state in firms allows it to interfere with respect to prices and costs of the product under review. The applicants reiterated the Commission’s conclusions in the first expiry review, in particular with regard to the continuous Chinese interference through the establishment CCP cells in both State-owned and private enterprises. The applicants referred to the CCP presence in companies such as Great Wall Group and Guandong Sitong, with CCP members in managerial positions. Moreover, the request highlighted the inclusion of ceramic raw materials in provincial plans such as in the Jiangxi Comprehensive Plan for Mineral Resources (2016-2020) and the Guangdong Provincial Mineral Resources Master Plan (2021-2025).

(79)

Moreover, the applicants underlined the existence of public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces. It highlighted findings of previous antidumping investigations, in which the Commission established that resources are allocated to sectors designated as strategic, or otherwise economically important, including the ceramic sector, and recalled that the GOC has been implementing an ‘industrial cluster developing strategy’ to provide strategic infrastructure and specialised facilities. Therefore, the applicants concluded that the Chinese state allocates resources to the Chinese ceramic sector while requiring companies to adhere to State policies, influencing free market forces in such sector.

(80)

The request also examined the lack, discriminatory application, or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws within the ceramic sector and in the market of the product under review. The applicants noted the important role of the GOC in insolvency proceedings, including the fact the Chinese People’s Court is subordinated to the Chinese government. The court later has to give prior approval to decide whether to accept or reject the applications of listed companies in. With regards to property laws in China, the applicants indicated that all land is owned by the state, therefore its allocation is solely dependent on the GOC. It also reiterated the findings of the first expiry review, in which the Commission established that despite the existence of legal provisions for the allocation of land use in a transparent manner, these are regularly not respected.

(81)

Lastly, the request underlined that the wage costs are distorted in China and specifically in the ceramic sector and in the market of the product under review. Such distortions were already established in the first expiry review and the applicants found no evidence that the ceramic tableware and kitchenware sector is shielded from the wage costs’ distortions.

(82)

Second, in a recent investigation concerning the ceramic sector in the PRC (29), the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present. In this investigation, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (30). In particular, the Commission concluded that in the ceramic sector, not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persists in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation (31) but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation (32). The Commission found further that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs further have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being driven to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (33). Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC (34). In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the ceramic sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation (35), as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC (36).

(83)

Third, in the first expiry review concerning the product under review (37) the Commission concluded that significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation were present. No major structural changes in the PRC in general and/or in the relevant sector in particular, capable of affecting that conclusion, are known to the Commission.

(84)

Fourth, additional evidence available in the Report on Significant Distortions in the Economy of China (‘Report’) (38), prepared by the Commission pursuant to Article 2(6a)(c) of the basic Regulation and recalled above, pointed to the existence of significant distortions also during the review investigation period.

(85)

Fifth, no evidence or arguments to the contrary have been adduced by the GOC or the exporting producers in the present investigation.

(86)

In view of the above, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under review, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein. On that basis, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(87)

Upon disclosure, CCCLA urged the Commission to accept the domestic prices and costs reported by the cooperating Chinese exporters and reverse its decision on significant distortions. To support this claim, CCCLA further argued that:

(88)

The Commission remits interested parties to the assessment made in recitals (17) to (19). Based on this, and as CCCLA did not provide any new evidence, the claim was dismissed.

(89)

Having determined that significant distortions affect prices and/or costs in the Chinese ceramic tableware and kitchenware sector, pursuant to Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, the Commission constructed the normal value on the basis of costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(90)

The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation:

(91)

As explained in recital (65), the Commission issued one note for the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value, i.e. the Note of 6 June. This Note described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria. In this Note, the Commission informed interested parties of its intention to consider Türkiye as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

(92)

Both the CCCLA and the applicants submitted comments.

(93)

Brazil, Thailand and Türkiye are all classified as countries with a similar level of economic development as the PRC, that is they are all classified as ‘upper-middle income’ countries by the World Bank.

(94)

No comments were received concerning the selection of countries identified in the note.

(95)

Practically all countries of the world produce some quantities of the product under review. Following the analysis of the available data and in particular data from the Global Trade Atlas (42) (‘GTA’) and Orbis Bureau van Dijk (43) (‘Orbis’), the Commission identified Brazil, Thailand and Türkiye as possible representative countries for this investigation.

(96)

The Commission carefully analysed all relevant data available on the file on all factors of productions in all three potential representative countries and noted the following:

(97)

The producer identified in Türkiye has its recent audited financial reports publicly available, while this is not the case of the companies identified in Brazil and in Thailand. The financial reports, though not a pre-requisite for this type of analysis, still constitute an advantage, as they enable the Commission to ascertain that the most appropriate figures are used and that the effects of eventual extraordinary events are excluded.

(98)

Türkiye has detailed, publicly available information on labour costs in the country as well as details on hours worked in the relevant sector (non-metallic mineral sector including ceramic, glass, cement, and lime production). The data in Türkiye includes social security payments and other labour cost expenses payable by companies. Labour costs are an important factor in the case at hand as they represent on average 45 %–55 % of the total cost of production.

(99)

On initiation, the CCCLA argued that the selection of Türkiye as an appropriate representative country in the present case would lead to artificially inflated dumping margins. The CCCLA notes that energy prices increased significantly in Türkiye during 2023, to an extent that they did not in China, which would prove that energy costs, being among the main cost drivers, were subject to major economic shocks. This claim was reiterated during a hearing at a later stage.

(100)

The Commission would like to point out that while energy is indeed an important input in the manufacture of ceramic tableware, it is by far, not the main cost driver, that being labour. Additionally, the CCCLA provided supporting data on electricity prices to sustain its claim, however, electricity makes up a minor part of the energy mix employed in the manufacture of the product under investigation which, due to the insufficient cooperation by exporting producers from the PRC, had to be based on facts available. In fact, energy costs are driven by natural gas prices, which increased significantly in 2022, but were already decreasing at the start of the RIP (44).

(101)

Regarding the argument that energy prices should be considered as distorted because China did not suffer similar increases, and that for that reason, Türkiye does not fulfil the condition of appropriateness to be selected as the representative country, the Commission notes that in view of the established existence of significant distortions in China within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, the evolution of prices in China is not relevant for the assessment of distortions in potential representative countries. Therefore, the comment was rejected.

(102)

Based on the combined effect of all these factors the Commission considered Türkiye to be the most appropriate representative country for this investigation. In the Note of 6 June, the Commission informed the interested parties of its intention to use Türkiye as representative country and invited them to comment thereon.

(103)

The applicants welcomed the choice of representative country, noting that out of the three possible representative countries, Türkiye imported the largest quantities of the main raw materials needed to manufacture the product concerned, while having a minimal share of imports from China. The applicants added that, of all three possible representative countries, Türkiye had the most complete set of information concerning labour, as well as readily available audited financial statements.

(104)

Having established that Türkiye was the only available appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

(105)

In view of the above analysis, and the data available on the file, the Commission used the data of and the Turkish company Kutahya Porselen Sanayii A.S. for establishing corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(106)

In the First Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under review by the exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose publicly available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that note.

(107)

Subsequently, in the Second Note, the Commission stated that, in order to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use GTA to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials. In addition, the Commission stated that it would use the information provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (‘Turkstat’) (45) on labour and the information published by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority of Türkiye (46) for establishing undistorted costs of labour and energy. The Commission also informed interested parties that it would use the financial data of the Turkish company Kutahya Porselen Sanayii A.S for SG & A costs and profit as available in its audited accounts made public in their own website.

(108)

Considering all the information based on the previous expiry review investigation, the following factors of production and their sources have been identified in order to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

Table 2

Factors of production for ceramic tableware and kitchenware

(109)

In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA. To establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission would have normally added the import duty of the representative country to the import price and an estimation of transport costs. In this case, however, given that the dumping margins, as explained in recital (145) below were already so high as to confirm the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, an increase of the dumping margin as a result of this adjustment is therefore not relevant for the outcome of this review

(110)

The import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council (52). The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded in Section 3.4 above that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices. After excluding imports from the PRC into the representative country, the volume of imports from other third countries remained representative.

(111)

The Turkish Statistical Institute publishes detailed information on wages in different economic sectors in Türkiye. The Commission used the wages reported in the manufacturing sector for 2022, for the economic activity C.23 (Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products) (53) according to NACE Rev.2 classification (54) which are the most recent statistics available. The values have been properly adjusted for inflation using the producer price index published by the Turkish statistical institute (55). The average hourly labour cost per FTE (56) amounted to 59,96 CNY per hour (57).

(112)

The Commission intends used the electricity price statistics published by the Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) (58) in its regular press releases covering tariff tables based on electricity bills, which are published quarterly or bi-annually (59). The Commission used the data of the industrial electricity prices in Kuruş/kWh for the industrial sector for 2023 covering the review investigation period, i.e. 0,93 CNY/KWh.

(113)

The Commission used the price of gas for industrial users in Türkiye as published by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) (60) in its 2023 Natural Gas Market Sector Report (61). The Commission intends to use the data of the industrial gas prices in the corresponding consumption band in TRY/Sm3 covering the review investigation period. The applicable unit cost is estimated to amount to 3,40 CNY per sm3 (62).

(114)

In the comments to the note of 6 June, the applicants noted that the link to the source provided for gas prices wasn’t functional. The Commission has updated the link, which can now be accessed.

(115)

The Commission intends to use applicable prices for water for industrial use published by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Investment Office based on sources from the Istanbul water and Sewerage administration, the Eskișehir Water and Sewerage Administration and the Antalya Water and Sewerage Administration (63). The Commission intends to use the data of Eskisehir region since the Turkish company used for SG & A costs and profit is located in this region. The applicable unit cost is estimated to amount to 1,63 CNY/m3 (64).

(116)

According to Article 2(6a)(a), second paragraph of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above..

(117)

The level of manufacturing overheads was adjusted to the benchmarks calculated above from the information used in the previous expiry review investigation.

(118)

In order to establish an undistorted value, for SG & A costs and profit, the Commission used the financial data from the Turkish company Kutahya Porselen Sanayi A.S. More precisely, the Commission used the SG & A costs and profit figures as reported in the company’s audited accounts for the year 2023. Based on available company information the majority of the business activity concerned the product concerned. Financial statements were adjusted by the company according to the standards set by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) requiring Turkish companies to apply inflation adjustments to their financial statements. The percentage of SG & A costs and profits was corrected to an ex-works level by deducting the packaging costs and transportation cost from the total SG & A costs and from the turnover.

(119)

On the basis of the above the Commission constructed the normal value on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(120)

In order to establish the constructed normal value, the Commission followed the following two steps. First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. To this end, and due to the insufficient level of cooperation, the Commission multiplied the usage factors as observed in the previous expiry review for materials, labour, electricity and water by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country Türkiye.

(121)

Second, to the manufacturing costs identified above the Commission applied, the aforementioned overheads margin, and Kutahya Porselen Sanayi A.S.’s SG & A costs and profit.

(122)

As a result, the following items were added to the undistorted cost of manufacturing:

(123)

In the absence of sufficient cooperation, the Commission calculated the export price on the basis of import statistics available in Eurostat adjusted to ex-works level so as to represent the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. Thus, the CIF price was reduced by the (sea) freight and insurance cost and domestic transport cost as estimated in the expiry review request.

(124)

At initiation, CCCLA argued that, due to the complexity and wide variety of product types included under the definition of the product concerned, and that are blended in official trade statistics, the prices reported in the official trade statistics does not constitute an adequate assumption of what the dumping margin might be.

(125)

The Commission reminded CCCLA that the insufficient cooperation received from exporting producers of the product under investigation in the PRC didn’t allow for any differentiation by PCN on the construction of the Normal Value. Accordingly, the Commission had no alternative than to calculate the dumping margin as a comparison of averages, for which the level of specification of the official trade statistics employed was perfectly reasonable. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(126)

After disclosure, CCCLA argued that prices reported in trade statistics tools (e.g., Eurostat) do not differentiate by PCN and, therefore, prices reported do ‘not constitute an adequate assumption of what the dumping margin might be’.

(127)

Ceramie-Unie pointed out that the Commission relied on this method only due to the insufficient cooperation from Chinese exporting producers. The Commission contacted one hundred and one (101) Chinese exporting producers/groups of exporting producers of which only one provided a complete questionnaire reply.

(128)

This single exporting producer amounted to approximately [1-2 %] of the total volume of imports of the product concerned into the Union during the RIP.

(129)

As rightly determined by the Commission, such a low level of imports could not be considered representative of the total imports from China.

(130)

Ceramie-Unie pointed out that Article 18(6) of the basic Regulation is unambiguous: in cases of non-cooperation ‘the result of the investigation may be less favourable to the party’. Therefore, the Commission’s calculation of the dumping margin as a comparison of averages is perfectly reasonable and within the boundaries of the Union law, given the circumstances of the case.

(131)

In conducting this analysis, Ceramie-Unie highlights the Commission’s findings that the dumping margin during the RIP was found to be ‘more than 100 %’. The Commission further noted that such dumping margin was ‘significantly undervalued, as the normal value was not adjusted for transportation and custom duties on the import price of raw materials (see recital (106)) and the export price was not adjusted for VAT refunds (see recital (125))’.

(132)

In light of the above, Ceramie-Unie stressed that the data demonstrating the continuation of dumping during the RIP is supporting the need to extend the continuation of the anti-dumping measures.

(133)

Upon disclosure, CCCLA insisted on its claim that prices reported in trade statistics tools (e.g. Eurostat) do not differentiate by PCN and, therefore, prices reported do ‘not constitute an adequate assumption of what the dumping margin might be’. Because no new information or evidence was brought forward to support the claim, the Commission refers all parties to its previous assessment of the issue stated also in recital (125).

(134)

Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability.

(135)

As explained in recitals (119) to (122), the normal value was established at the ex-works level of trade by using costs of production together with amounts for SG & A costs and profit, which were considered to be reasonable for that level of trade.

(136)

The question whether to adjust the normal value for VAT refunds on exports was not assessed, since, as it will be demonstrated in the following section, the dumping margins already established during the review investigation period are high enough (more than 100 %) to confirm the likely continuation of dumping. An increase of the dumping margin as a result of the VAT adjustment is therefore not relevant for the outcome of this review, as it would not contradict that conclusion.

(137)

As explained in recital (123), in order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of: the (sea) freight and insurance cost and domestic transport cost as estimated in the expiry review request.

(138)

On this basis, the weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was above 100 %. It must be noted that the dumping margin obtained was significantly undervalued, as the normal value was not adjusted for transportation and custom duties on the import price of raw materials (see recital (109)) and the export price was not adjusted for VAT refunds (see recital (136)).

(139)

It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

(140)

Upon disclosure, CCCLA manifested surprise at the level of dumping found, and claimed that it was the result of inflated benchmark prices, and exaggerated SG & A cost and profit ratios, deeming the choice of Kütahya Porselen inappropriate. To this effect, CCCLA compared the prices of raw materials in the previous expiry review and in the current investigation, noting a generalized increase. CCCLA alluded to the cost of labour being one of the principal cost drivers of the production of ceramic tableware and kitchenware and suggested that the increase of labour costs between the previous expiry review and the current investigation does not reflect the actual labour cost increase in China.

(141)

The Commission noted that, as presented in Annex II to the FOP Note of 6 June, import prices into Türkiye were in line with the prices of imports into Brazil and Thailand. Additionally, the Commission pointed out that not all factors of production have the same weight in the cost structure of the PUI. In this regard, the use of Gypsum Materials for moulds, mentioned by CCCLA for having increased its price by 37 times, is minimal and had virtually no impact on the calculation. Moreover, the main raw material used in the production of the PUI is kaolin, for which, again, the benchmark price used is consistent to that of Brazil and Thailand.

(142)

Regarding the level of SG & A costs and profit used in the construction of the normal value, the Commission noted that the SG & A costs and profit reported in Kütahya Porselen’s audited reports are in line with the levels of the wider sector (NACE C-234) reported by the Turkish government.

(143)

Finally, regarding the claim that labour cost increases are not representative of the situation in China, the Commission noted that according to the available sources, labour costs in Turkey went up as a result of recent increases of the minimal wage by the Turkish government, which aimed to restore Turkish citizens’ purchasing power. This means that the Turkish government aimed to restore labour costs to the level that would be commensurate with the level of the overall economic development in the country, a level similar to the one of China. In view of this, there is no reason to consider that the increase in labour costs was exaggerated. Moreover, the development of labour costs in China, which were found to be affected by significant distortions found in this investigation is irrelevant.

(144)

Furthermore, in the first note on Factors of production, the Commission invited all parties to suggest other appropriate representative countries, but no suggestions were brought forward by CCCLA. Based on the above, the Commission dismissed CCCLA’s claims.

(145)

Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures be repealed. Accordingly, the Commission analysed the following additional elements: the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC, pricing behaviour of Chinese exporting producers in other markets, and the attractiveness of the Union market.

(146)

China is the world’s largest exporter of ceramic tableware and kitchenware and has thousands of active producers (65). In the annexes of the expiry review request, the applicants brought forward sources indicating that China had a daily production capacity of 87,03 billion pieces of daily ceramics during the RIP, with a spare capacity of 18,7 % (66). Production capacity of daily ceramics has increased steadily since the last review, while maintaining a stable capacity utilization level of around 81 %. This has allowed spare capacity to increase from 12,9 billion pieces in 2019 to over 16 billion pieces during the RIP. Spare production capacity of such magnitude means that China alone could cover multiple times the total Union consumption, that was estimated at roughly 491 264 tonnes during the review investigation period (see recital (161) below). The problem of overcapacity was acknowledged in the financial reports of some of the big Chinese producers (67), as well as in several pieces of market intelligence (68) (69).

(147)

Since the imposition of the measures, exports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from China have entered the Union in big quantities and were still representing almost 60 % of the Union consumption in the RIP as it is explained more in detail in Section 4.3.1 below. This also indicates that Chinese exporting producers of ceramic tableware and kitchenware have strong business relations with their clients in the Union.

(148)

Based on the above, the Commission concluded that China was among the biggest producers of ceramic tableware and kitchenware in the world and had significant spare capacity which, facilitated by the strong business relationships, could be easily exported at even higher volumes to the Union should measures be repealed.

(149)

According to GTA, China (70) exported 2 094 958 tonnes amounting to 53 393 909 510 RMB or an average CIF value of 25,48 RMB/kg.

(150)

The Commission compared the average export prices at CIF level of the main export markets of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from China, as reported in the GTA database with the export price to the Union at the same level of trade. It found that, Chinese export prices to their main export markets (US, Russia) are similar or lower than those to the EU, reinforcing the attractiveness of the Union market for Chinese exporters of the product concerned.

(151)

The Union is one of the biggest markets of ceramic tableware and kitchenware in the world. As already mentioned in recital (147) above, following the imposition of the anti-dumping measures in 2012, Chinese exports of the product concerned continued to enter the Union in significant quantities. During the review investigation period, Chinese exports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware to the Union represented almost 60 % of the Union consumption (see recital (181)). This clearly demonstrates that the Union remained an attractive and important market destination for Chinese ceramic tableware and kitchenware.

(152)

Additionally, the market intelligence brought up by the applicants, as well as company reports, claim that the growth domestic market of daily use ceramics is slowing down. As production capacity and daily output continue to grow, companies will face higher pressure to increase their export volumes, and the Union’s market attractiveness will increase.

(153)

Finally, trade defence measures concerning Chinese ceramic tableware and kitchenware imports are in place in other third countries, illustrating the same type of pricing behaviour as observed in the Union (71). These trade defence measures will make it more difficult for Chinese exporting producers to export to these markets and further increase the attractiveness of the Union market where these exports may be redirected.

(154)

Another element demonstrating the attractiveness of the Union market is the pricing strategy of Chinese exporting producers. Export prices of Chinese exporting producers of the product concerned are significantly below the prices of the Union industry on the Union market. In fact, Chinese imports have the lowest prices on the Union market. The few third countries which export at lower prices account for only a fraction of the total imports into the Union, with a growth potential which is not comparable with the size of the production facilities in the PRC. Therefore, it can be reasonably expected that the Chinese imports will enter the Union market at lower prices should the measures be allowed to lapse, even taking into account the amount of current anti-dumping duties.

(155)

Indeed, during the period considered, the average import price from China increased by 17 %. Despite this increase, it still remains below Union industry average sales price by 18 %. Without the anti-dumping duties, the difference would amount to 38 % (see recital (169)).

(156)

Chinese imports of the product concerned continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the review investigation period. The Commission also found that the PRC was the biggest producer and exporter of ceramic tableware and kitchenware in the world and had significant spare capacities.

(157)

In addition, the Commission found that the pricing behaviour of the Chinese exporting producers in third markets supports the finding of a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping to the Union, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(158)

Finally, the Commission established that the Union market remained an attractive market for Chinese exporting producers of ceramic tableware and kitchenware even after the impositions of measures.

(159)

Given the above, the Commission concluded that there was a strong likelihood that the repeal of the anti-dumping measures would result in increased imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from the PRC into the Union at dumped prices.

(160)

During the review investigation period, the like product was manufactured in the Union by more than 140 known producers. Production is concentrated in the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Romania. The total Union production was established at 226 147 tonnes during the RIP on the basis of verified questionnaire responses submitted by the sampled Union producers and Cerame-Unie/FEPF. The Union producers accounting for the total Union production constitute the Union industry within the meaning of Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic Regulation.

(161)

The Union consumption was established on the basis of Eurostat import statistics and sales volumes of the Union industry in the Union, as submitted by Cerame-Unie/FEPF and information from sampled Union producers, which was duly verified.

(162)

During the period considered the Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 3

(163)

During the period considered, Union consumption increased by 23 %, due to the ongoing post-COVID effect of renewed interest among European consumers in ceramic tableware and kitchenware. It increased steadily from 2020 to 2022, where it reached a peak of 555 832 tonnes, but dropping to 491 264 tonnes in the RIP.

(164)

Based on Eurostat data and macro data provided by Cerame-Unie/FEPF, the volume of imports, market share and average prices of imports of the product concerned developed as set out below:

Table 4

(165)

While the anti-dumping measures were in place, the total volume of imports from the PRC rose by 26 % during the period considered. It followed the increasing Union consumption steadily up to 2022, decreasing to 285 513 tonnes during the RIP. In the context of a growing market, the share of Chinese imports in total Union consumption (see Table 3) increased at the expense of the Union industry, reaching 58,1 % during the RIP.

(166)

Over the period considered the price of imports from the PRC into the Union developed as follows:

Table 5

(167)

Over the period considered the prices of Chinese imports increased by 17 %, from 1 871/tonne to 2 188 EUR/tonne. This is the average import price per tonne of all imports of the product concerned and therefore, the trend could be affected by further imports.

(168)

The Commission determined the price undercutting during the review investigation period by comparing:

(169)

The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period. On the basis of the above methodology, the comparison showed that during the review investigation period the imports of the product concerned undercut the Union industry’s prices by 18 %. Without the anti-dumping duties, the undercutting would have amounted to 38 %.

(170)

In its comments on anonymous treatment of certain sampled and non-sampled Union producers by the Commission (see recital (51)), CCCLA also claimed that Chinese producers sell only generic products while Union producers sell high end and branded products. Therefore, comparing potentially branded products produced in the EU with generic products produced in China would inevitably lead to an inflated undercutting calculation.

(171)

However, the investigation showed that virtually no branded products were sold by the sampled Union producers, representing a significant proportion of the Union sales volume in the period considered. If there was any impact on the undercutting calculation, it would be very limited. Consequently, this claim was rejected.

(172)

The aggregated volume of imports into the Union, as well as the market share and price trends for imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from other third countries other than the PRC developed as follows:

Table 6

(173)

In the RIP, 69 802 tonnes of ceramic tableware and kitchenware were imported from third countries excluding China. The main exporters of the product concerned into the Union were Türkiye and Thailand, representing 4,4 % and 2,6 % in the RIP, respectively. The total import volume from third countries represented however only 14,2 % of the Union market, which was a slight increase from 13,6 % at the beginning of the considered period. Consequently, it can be concluded that China was by far the largest exporter of the product under review to the EU during the period considered, representing more than four times the total import volume of all other third countries taken together in the RIP.

(174)

The average import prices of other third countries were consistently and significantly above the Chinese average import price during the period considered.

(175)

Pursuant to Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(176)

The macroeconomic indicators (production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, employment, productivity, magnitude of dumping margins and recovery from the effects of past dumping) were assessed at the level of the whole Union industry. The assessment was based on the verified information provided by Cerame-Unie/FEPF, the verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers and import statistics.

(177)

The analysis of microeconomic indicators (stocks, sale prices, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, ability to raise capital, wages and cost of production) was carried out at the level of the sampled Union producers. The assessment was based on their information which was duly verified during on-spot verification visits.

(178)

The Union industry is highly fragmented and can largely be divided into two segments: SMEs and larger companies. For some microeconomic indicators (sales price, cash flow, investments, average wage per employee, stocks, profitability and cost of production) the results of the sampled companies have been weighted in accordance with the share of the segment to which that specific company belonged. As in the original investigation and the last expiry review investigation, for this purpose the specific weight in terms of production volumes of each segment in the total ceramic tableware and kitchenware sector were used (42 % SMEs, 58 % large companies). This ensured that the situation of the smaller companies was properly reflected to prevent an imbalance in the overall injury analysis due to the results of large companies.

(179)

Over the period considered, the production, the production capacity and the capacity utilisation of the Union industry developed as follows:

Table 7

(180)

It follows that, in line with the growing Union consumption during the period considered, there was an increase in production volume (by 13 %). As for consumption, it peaked in 2022 and decreased in the RIP. As a result from efficiency gains due to investments in production equipment (see recital (193)), production capacity rose by 7 %. However, despite a growing market, due to the high volumes of Chinese imports, capacity utilisation decreased over the period considered, from 73 % to 68 %.

(181)

Over the period considered sales in the Union by the Union industry developed as follows:

Table 8

(182)

The sales by the Union industry on the Union market followed the development in consumption and increased in 2021 and 2022, when they reached a peak of 150 875 tonnes. As for consumption, sales volumes decreased again during the RIP. Overall, they increased by only 15 % during the period considered. However, at the same time, the market share of the Union industry decreased from 29,7 % to 27,7 %, as the Union industry could not benefit from the growing Union market and lost sales to the advantage of Chinese dumped imports.

(183)

Over the period considered the employment level and productivity within the Union industry developed as follows:

Table 9

(184)

In line with the increasing Union industry production, the employment rose throughout the period considered by 13 %. Productivity of the Union producers’ workforce, measured as output (tonnes) per person employed per year, remained stable during the period considered.

(185)

During the period considered, the production of the Union industry increased by 13 % while the volume of sales in the Union increased by 15 % in response to the growing Union consumption. With a Union consumption growing by 23 %, the Union industry was not able to benefit from it due to the dumped Chinese imports, and hence unable to fully utilise the increases in production capacity of its production facilities achieved through efficiency gains resulting from investments.

(186)

Dumping continued during the review investigation period at a significant level, as explained under Section 3 above. It is noted that Chinese producers undercut Union industry’s sales prices to a significant extent.

(187)

During the period considered, the Union industry could not take full advantage of increase in Union consumption, which was not followed by the same extent by production and sales of the Union industry. Moreover, despite rising production and sales, Union producers’ market shares even decreased in the period considered. By contrast, the volume of imports from the PRC grew at a stronger rate than Union consumption, allowing for increasing market shares in the same period. The Commission, therefore, concluded that the Union industry has in fact been unable to gain, in the presence of Chinese imports, more economic space in a growing Union market.

(188)

Over the period considered, average unit sales prices to unrelated customers in the Union and average unit cost of production of the sampled Union producers developed as follows:

Table 10

(189)

Over the period considered, Union industry prices were overall constant in 2020 and 2021. They increased as of 2022, following the increasing cost of production, explained by higher energy costs and inflation. Yet, the Union industry prices were overall below the cost of production during the entire period considered due to the constant price pressure imposed by Chinese imports.

(190)

Over the period considered stocks levels of the sampled Union producers developed as follows:

Table 11

(191)

The level of closing stocks of the Union industry increased in absolute terms by 85 % over the period considered. The steep upward trend, particularly between 2022 and the RIP, is a cause for concern given that the industry normally operates on an order basis, as was found in the original investigation and confirmed for the sampled Union producers in the current review investigation.

(192)

The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. During the period considered, the Union industry was constantly loss-making, progressively declining from –7,9 % to –6,2 %. This was still below the small level of profitability achieved during the original investigation (3,5 %), and thus well below the target profit considered acceptable in the original investigation (i.e. 6,0 %).

(193)

During the period considered the cash flow of the Union industry went down to almost zero. By contrast, at the same time the level of investments increased by 489 %. However, it should be noted that this investment was mainly financed by public support funds granted to mitigate the impact of the COVID crisis in 2020 and 2021 and the sharp rise in energy costs in 2022. These one-off state subsidies, tied to the modernisation of production equipment, enabled the companies to upgrade their production equipment significantly, as demonstrated by the increase in production.

(194)

During the period considered, return on investment, defined as the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments, was consistently negative.

(195)

During the same period, the average wage levels increased by 25 %, i.e. at a higher rate than the overall increase in unit cost of production.

(196)

The injury analysis shows that the situation of the Union industry deteriorated during the period considered, despite efforts to keep pace with rising consumption. Although production capacity and production volumes increased in line with sales volumes, market shares could not be maintained. In the face of mounting production costs, most notably the energy, the Union industry found itself unable to adequately raise its sales prices. This was largely due to the low prices of Chinese imports, which, in spite of the measures in place, significantly undercut the prices of the Union industry. On the basis of the above, the Commission therefore concluded that the Union industry did suffer material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

(197)

Therefore, it is evident that the Union industry was unable to recover from past injury during the period considered. The continued significant import volumes from the PRC at prices undercutting those of the Union industry, which were already below cost of production, have put the Union industry again in an injurious situation.

(198)

After disclosure, Ceramie-Unie pointed out that on 2 April 2025 the US Administration announced a general tariff increase on most trading partners. For the case of Chinese goods, US duties initially amounted to 67 %. Although this percentage value has been reduced through negotiations, China is currently subject to a total 55 % tariff rate (not yet in force). Since the Commission found that the US is one of China’s main export markets of the product concerned, should the US tariff rate be effectively implemented, even more massive exportations from China to the Union would follow, resulting in further injury to Union ceramic tableware producers. Ceramie-Unie therefore argued that the US’s so-called reciprocal tariffs could have the effect of further reinforcing the attractiveness of the Union market for Chinese exporters of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, notably in view of the significant spare capacities of the Chinese tableware industry.

(199)

The Commission examined this claim and agreed that, indeed, the imposition of such tariffs could increase the attractiveness of the Union market.

(200)

After disclosure, CCCLA contested the Commission’s conclusions on injury claiming that causal link between Chinese imports and the injury observed during the review investigation period is not supported by positive evidence.

(201)

In CCCLA’s view the Commission’s injury findings lean almost entirely on the indicator of profitability, while several key macroeconomic indicators – including Union consumption, production, sales volume, employment and investments – showed an improvement over the period considered.

(202)

Furthermore, the CCCLA claimed that also some microeconomic indicators such as unit cost of production, investments and labour cost are the main causes that depressed the profitability, and not the Chinese imports.

(203)

This claim had to be dismissed. It is true that following the increase in Union consumption, production and sales volume of the Union industry increased due to the ongoing post-Covid effect and, in order to benefit from the renewed interest among European consumers, the Union industry invested in increased capacity. However, as explained in recital (182), despite these efforts, the Union industry could not benefit from the growing Union market and lost market share to the advantage of Chinese imports, as demonstrated by the increase in stocks and the decrease in capacity utilisation.

(204)

As regards the microeconomic indicators, the Commission agrees that the increase in unit cost of production of the Union industry cannot be attributed to the effects of imports from China. However, as acknowledged by the CCCLA itself in its submission, the average price of the Union industry remained below its costs throughout the whole period considered. As explained in recital (189) the constant price pressure of the Chinese dumped imports did not allow the Union industry to raise its prices to a sustainable level to cover for the increase in costs, such as labour and energy, and for the recovery of the investments made. Therefore, this claim has been rejected.

(205)

In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the impact of the dumped imports. These factors are imports from other third countries and export performance of the Union industry.

(206)

The volume of imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from the PRC increased by 26 % over the period considered, reaching a 58,1 % market share in the Union in the RIP. At the same time, sales of the Union industry, albeit increasing, lost market share to Chinese imports. The average import price from China remained constant, and significantly, below prices and costs of the Union industry throughout the period considered. Average import prices undercut Union industry average sales price by 18 %. Without the anti-dumping duties, the difference would amount to 38 % (see recital (169)).

(207)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the imports from China were significant and were exerting a downward pressure on the Union industry prices and sales volumes, thus determining the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(208)

Moreover, the Commission considered that there was a clear coincidence in time between the upward movement in Chinese imports and the injurious situation of the Union industry.

(209)

The volume of imports from other third countries increased only marginally over the period considered, as shown in recital (173) above. These imports came mainly from Türkiye (4,4 % market share in the RIP), Thailand (2,6 %), United Kingdom (1,4 %), Bangladesh (1,3 %), and United Arab Emirates (1,3 %).

(210)

In the case of Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates, these imports were made at prices significantly lower than those of Union producers throughout the period considered, albeit, well above Chinese prices. Only in the RIP, import prices of Bangladesh were lower than Union producers’ sales prices, but always higher than prices of Chinese imports during the period considered. Imports from other countries, on the contrary, were at much higher prices compared to Union producers’ prices.

(211)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the prices observed for Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Bangladesh, which were below the average prices of the Union industry, could have contributed to the injury. However, given the low volumes of these imports, such effects would have been limited.

(212)

After disclosure the CCCLA argued that the Commission failed to properly analyse the effect of the imports from other third countries as, in its view, even small-volume suppliers can influence market prices, especially in niche segments or geographic sub-markets. However, the CCCLA did not provide any evidence to substantiate its claim that was, therefore, dismissed.

(213)

The exports of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 14

(214)

Export sales accounted for around 40 % of the total sales of the Union producers. While there was a significant rise in export sales by Union producers of 29 % in 2021, the growth figures were smaller compared to those in the Union market in 2022 and the RIP (see Table 8, 2022: 27 %, RIP: 15 %, respectively). Overall, during the period considered, export sales increased by 8 % compared to 15 % in the Union market. Furthermore, insufficient capacity utilisation (see Table 7) and mounting stock levels (see Table 10) point to no redirection towards export sales during this period. Therefore, it was concluded that the export performance did not contribute to the injury suffered.

(215)

After disclosure the CCCLA claimed that the increased export performance of the Union industry contradicts the Commission’s conclusion of a weakened industry whose difficulties are primarily driven by import competition from China. The Commission disagrees with this assessment. As explained in the previous recital above during the period considered, export sales increased by a far lesser extent than sales in the Union market, i.e. by 8 % compared to 15 %. Therefore, the export performance of the Union industry did not break the causal link.

(216)

An increase in the costs of energy due to the war in Ukraine had an impact on production costs. However, during the RIP, this trend reversed. Despite this, the Union industry was still unable to even maintain its market share nor increase sales prices above production costs, due the pricing and volume pressure of Chinese dumped imports in the RIP.

(217)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports originating in the PRC materially injured the Union industry.

(218)

The other identified factors such as the imports from other third countries, the export sales performance of the Union producers and the increase in the costs of energy, whether considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury.

(219)

As determined in Section 3 above, Chinese imports were made at dumped price levels during the review investigation period and a likelihood of continuation of dumping was found should the measures be allowed to lapse. In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission therefore examined the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury should measures be allowed to lapse.

(220)

To establish the likelihood of continuation of injury, the following elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacities in the PRC, the attractiveness of the Union market, including the existence of anti-dumping or countervailing measures on ceramic tableware and kitchenware in other third countries, the price behaviour of Chinese exporting producers in other third-country markets, and the effects on the Union industry’s situation.

(221)

The PRC is by far the largest global exporter of ceramic table- and kitchenware in the world. It accounts for around 65 % of the world’s overall exports (72). The EU is the PRC’s second most important export market, based on total value exported during the RIP (73).

(222)

As explained in recitals (146) to (148) above, producers in the PRC have significant production capacities which largely exceed the total Union consumption during the review investigation period.

(223)

As stated in recitals (151) to (153) above, increasing consumption levels in the Union market, as well as the imposition of measures on ceramic tableware and kitchenware from China in third markets, have contributed to the attractiveness of the Union market.

(224)

The fact that market share of Chinese imports increased during the period considered, and that there are significant imports, even with the existing measures, confirms that Chinese exporting producers find the Union market attractive and will continue selling on the Union market.

(225)

The pricing strategy of Chinese producers, as summarised in recital (154), showing lower prices on the main markets of Chinese imports, makes it so that it can be reasonably expected that Chinese imports will enter the Union market at lower prices should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(226)

Given the high spare capacities in the PRC, the slowdown of the Chinese internal market, the attractiveness of the Union market and the pricing behaviour of Chinese exporting producers as summarised above in recitals (154) to (155), it is likely that significant volumes of low-priced ceramic tableware and kitchenware would be available for sale/redirection to the Union already in the short term should the measures be allowed to lapse, as demonstrated by the level of undercutting found without taking into account the anti-dumping duties, i.e. 38 % (see recital (169)) which is the most likely indication of the price behaviour of Chines exporters in the absence of the measures.

(227)

In view of the above findings, namely the massive spare capacity in the PRC, the attractiveness of the Union market, the price levels of imports from the PRC in the absence of anti-dumping measures and their likely impact on the Union industry, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the PRC at injurious prices and injury would be likely to continue.

(228)

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the maintenance of the measures would not be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of the various interests involved, that is those of the Union industry on the one hand, and those of importers and other parties on the other hand.

(229)

The Commission recalled that, in the original investigation, the adoption of measures was considered not to be against the interest of the Union. Furthermore, the fact that the present investigation is a review, thus analysing a situation in which anti-dumping measures have already been in place, allows for the assessment of any undue negative impact on the parties concerned by the current anti-dumping measures.

(230)

On that basis, it was examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of a continuation of dumping and injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it is not in the Union interest to maintain measures in this particular case.

(231)

The investigation showed that should the measures expire, this would likely have a significant negative effect on the Union industry. The Union industry’s situation would further deteriorate in terms of volumes and prices resulting in a strong decrease in profitability. On the other hand, the continuation of measures would allow the Union industry to recover from past injury caused by dumped imports, and to exploit its potential on a Union market that is not affected by unfair trading practices.

(232)

CCCLA stated, and reiterated after disclosure, that imports from China do have certain complementary effects on Union production, resulting in a mixture of interest within the Union industry. Therefore, prolonging the measures would not appear to be in the interest of EU producers, given that their economic indicators (imports, production, domestic and export sales) show a sound state. Moreover, according to CCCLA, certain EU producers do not manufacture all types of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, meaning that these items need to be imported from third countries, including China. The anti-dumping duties have increased the price of products sourced from producers in China, which has had a continuous negative effect on these EU producers.

(233)

However, the injury analysis in Section 4 above (recitals (160) to (197)) has shown that in fact, the Union industry continued to suffer, despite the measures, from the injurious effects of the dumped imports from the PRC. Indeed, Union industry had experienced a decrease in market share during the period considered, while not able to increase their sales prices to profitable levels. Furthermore, CCCLA’s above assertion to the contrary lacked substantiating evidence that could be further analysed, leading the Commission to reject this claim.

(234)

Based on the above it was concluded that maintaining the anti-dumping measures in force is in the interest of the Union industry.

(235)

At the initiation stage of this investigation, 51 known unrelated importers were contacted and invited to cooperate. No one came forward at the sampling stage. Only one importer at a later stage spontaneously submitted some limited information on imports, not raising any objections to the possible extension of the current measures.

(236)

Based on this, and in line with the findings of the previous expiry review that revealed healthy profit margins of importers of the product concerned (74), it was concluded that maintaining the existing measures would not have a significant adverse effect on the activity of unrelated importers of the product concerned.

(237)

Like in the previous expiry review investigation, no parties representing the interests of end-users, such as associations of consumers, came forward or cooperated in any way in the investigation. In the continued absence of cooperation from users in the present expiry review investigation, the Commission considered that its findings in the original investigation are still valid, and that the continuation of measures would not negatively affect consumers such as households, or at least not to any significant extent.

(238)

The CCCLA brought forward and reiterated after definitive disclosure, that as ceramic tableware and kitchenware is a final product, the anti-dumping duties would hit Union consumers directly as there is no intermediate industry to absorb the costs.

(239)

Cerame-Unie/FEPF responded to above claim that despite the anti-dumping measures currently in force, imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from China have continued entering the Union in large quantities and at very low prices.

(240)

The Commission considered it very unlikely that the repeal of the measures would result in the lowering of prices with the full amount of the duties. Even in the unlikely scenario where consumer prices would be lowered with the full amount of the current anti-dumping duties, the yearly cost of consumers would be reduced by less than EUR 1 (75). As the measures cannot be deemed to have had a significant impact on consumers, the Commission rejected these claims.

(241)

In balancing the different competing interests in the Union, the Commission gave special consideration to the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to ensure effective fair competition. On the one hand the continuation of measures would protect an important Union industry, including many small and medium enterprises, against a likely continuation of injury. On the other hand, the assessment of the situation of importers and users based on the information available due to the lack of cooperation shows that the continuation of measures would clearly not have a disproportionate negative impact on them.

(242)

Therefore, the Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of tableware and kitchenware originating in the PRC.

(243)

It follows from the above that the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in China should be maintained.

(244)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

(245)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(246)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(247)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in China and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(248)

A company may request the application of individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (76). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a notice informing about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(249)

All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure.

(250)

An exporter or producer that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the period that was used to set the level of the duty currently applicable to its exports may request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request, provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the period that was used to set the level of the duty applicable to its exports; (ii) it is not related to a company that did so and thus is subject to the anti-dumping duties; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

(251)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (77), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(252)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,