(1)

By Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 430/2013 (2), the Council imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron and spheroidal graphite cast iron, excluding bodies of compression fittings using ISO DIN 13 metric thread and malleable iron threaded circular junction boxes without having a lid, currently falling under CN codes ex 7307 19 10 (TARIC code 7307 19 10 10) and ex 7307 19 90 (TARIC code 7307 19 90 10) originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the PRC’ or ‘China’) and Thailand (‘the original investigation’).

(2)

The duty, based on the elimination of dumping level, ranged between 14,9 % and 57,8 %. The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

(3)

On 12 June 2013, the Chinese exporting producer Jinan Meide Castings Co., Ltd (‘Jinan Meide’) lodged an application at the General Court of the European Union seeking the annulment of Regulation (EU) No 430/2013 in so far as it applied to it. On 30 June 2016, the General Court in its judgement found that the rights of defence of Jinan Meide were breached and annulled the contested Regulation in so far as it imposed an anti-dumping duty on imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron, manufactured by Jinan Meide.

(4)

Following the above-mentioned judgement, by Notice of 28 October 2016 (3), the European Commission (‘the Commission’) reopened the anti-dumping investigation concerning threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron, manufactured by Jinan Meide.

(5)

By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1146 (4), the Commission re-imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty of 39,2 % on imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron, originating in the PRC, manufactured by Jinan Meide.

(6)

On 25 November 2015, the Commission initiated a partial interim review, following the request of Metpro Limited, concerning certain types of threaded tube or pipe case fitting of malleable cast iron originating in PRC and Thailand in order to determine whether they fell within the scope of applicable anti-dumping measures. The Commission terminated this partial interim review on 18 July 2016, by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1176 (5) following the applicant's withdrawal of his request.

(7)

On 23 May 2017, the Commission initiated a partial interim review, following the request of Hebei Yulong Casting Co., Ltd, concerning certain types of threaded tube or pipe case fitting of malleable cast iron originating in PRC and Thailand in order to determine whether they fall within the scope of applicable anti-dumping measures. The Commission terminated this partial interim review by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/52 (6) following the applicant's withdrawal of their request.

(8)

On 12 July 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (7) decided that fittings, made of spheroidal graphite cast iron (also known as ductile cast iron) do not correspond to the concept of ‘malleable cast iron’ as defined within CN subheading 7307 19 10 . The Court concluded that fittings made of spheroidal graphite cast iron must be classified under the residual CN subheading 7307 19 90 (as other articles of other iron).

(9)

On 14 February 2019, the Commission published Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/262 (8) amending the references to TARIC codes in order to align them with the Court's conclusions. Because anti-dumping measures are imposed according to the product definition irrespective of the tariff classification, this amendment did not have any impact on the product scope of the current measures.

(10)

By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1259 (9) the European Commission reimposed the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron and spheroidal graphite cast iron originating in the People’s Republic of China and Thailand following an expiry review (‘the previous expiry review’).

(11)

Jinan Meide challenged Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1146 before the General Court. On 20 September 2019 the General Court issued its judgment in case T-650/17 (10) regarding Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1146.

(12)

By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1210 (11), the Commission re-imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty of 36,0 % on imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron, originating in the PRC, manufactured by Jinan Meide.

(13)

By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2202 (12) the Commission decided to exclude the following products from the scope of the anti-dumping measures:

(14)

The anti-dumping duties currently in force range between 24,6 % and 57,8 % on imports from China and between 14,9 % and 15,5 % on imports from Thailand.

(15)

Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry (13), the Commission received a request for a review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(16)

The request for review was lodged on 25 April 2024 by the Ad Hoc Defence Committee of Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings industry of the European Union (‘the applicant’) on behalf of the Union industry of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron and spheroidal graphite cast iron in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation of dumping and continuation or recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

(17)

Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 24 July 2024 the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports into the Union of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron and spheroidal graphite cast iron originating in China and Thailand (‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (14) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(18)

The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 (‘review investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(19)

In the Notice of Initiation, interested parties were invited to contact the Commission to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicants, other known Union producers, the known producers in China and Thailand, the authorities of the People’s Republic of China and Thailand, and known importers, as well as users and traders about the initiation of the expiry review investigation and invited them to participate.

(20)

Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. No interested party requested a hearing.

(21)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(22)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample based on representativity in terms of size of the production and sales volume of the product under investigation during the review investigation period.

(23)

The sample consisted of two Union producers which accounted for around 70 % of the estimated total Union production and sales volume of the like product in the Union. The sample also ensured a good geographical spread.

(24)

In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the sample was representative of the Union industry.

(25)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(26)

No unrelated importers provided the requested information or agreed to be included in the sample. In view of this the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary.

(27)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all producers in China to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(28)

No producer in China provided the requested information or agreed to be included in the sample. The Commission therefore considered that no producers in China cooperated with the investigation.

(29)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all producers in Thailand to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of Thailand to the European Union to identify and/or contact other producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(30)

No producer in Thailand provided the requested information or agreed to be included in the sample. The Commission therefore considered that no producers in Thailand cooperated with the investigation.

(31)

The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in China within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’). The Commission did not receive any reply to this questionnaire. Therefore, there was no cooperation from the GOC.

(32)

The Commission requested the sampled Union producers to complete the questionnaires, which were made available on its website on the day of initiation.

(33)

Questionnaire replies were received from the two sampled Union producers: Berg Montana Fittings EAD and Georg Fischer Fittings GmbH.

(34)

The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and of the Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

(35)

On 10 July 2025, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping duties in force. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

(36)

The Commission received comments from the applicant, in which they agreed with its findings. No other comments or requests for hearings were received.

(37)

The product under review is the same as in the original investigation and previous expiry review, namely threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron and spheroidal graphite cast iron, currently falling under CN code ex 7307 19 10 (TARIC code 7307 19 10 10 and 7307 19 10 20) (‘the product under review’ or ‘MTF’).

(38)

The following products are excluded: bodies of compression fittings using ISO DIN 13 metric thread; malleable iron threaded circular junction boxes without having a lid; ductile iron clamp tees with rubber sealing and an outlet hole; ductile iron grooved end caps for use on grooved steel pipe with a threaded outlet; ductile iron grooved reducers with threaded end; ductile iron grooved reducing tees with a threaded outlet; ductile iron blanking saddles without threaded outlets used to seal a hole in a tube or pipe.

(39)

The main input raw materials are metal scrap, coke/electricity/gas, sand (for moulding) and zinc (for galvanisation). The first step of the manufacturing process is the melting of metal scrap. This is followed by the moulding process and the casting of various shapes which are then separated into single pieces. The products have to go through a lengthy annealing process to ensure that they are sufficiently malleable to be used in applications where e.g. shock and vibration resistance are required and to withstand rapid temperature changes. Subsequently, fittings can be galvanized. Then the threading and other machining takes place.

(40)

The product under review is used in a wide range of applications, for example for connecting two or more pipes or tubes, connecting a pipe to an apparatus, changing the direction of a fluid flow, or closing a pipe. Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings are mainly used in the gas, water and heating systems of residential and non-residential buildings. They are also used in the pipe systems of oil refineries. These fittings are available in many configurations, the most common being 90-degree elbows, tees, couplings, crosses, and unions. They are produced in both black (non-galvanized) and galvanized form.

(41)

The product concerned by this investigation is the product under review originating in China and Thailand.

(42)

As established in the original investigation as well as in the previous expiry review, this expiry review investigation confirmed that the following products have the same basic physical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

(43)

These products are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(44)

During the review investigation period, imports of MTF from China continued to enter the Union market.

(45)

According to Eurostat and information from the Union industry imports of MTF from China accounted for about 19 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 47 % market share during the original investigation and 21 % during the previous expiry review.

(46)

As mentioned in recitals (28) and (30), none of the exporting producers from China cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, the Commission informed the authorities of China that due to the absence of cooperation the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation concerning the findings regarding China. The Commission did not receive any comments or requests for an intervention of the Hearing Officer in this regard.

(47)

Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation of dumping regarding China were based on facts available, i.e. information in the request for review, the statistics collected, and other public sources identified where applicable.

(48)

Given the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation tending to show, with regard to China, the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission initiated the investigation on the basis of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(49)

In order to obtain information, it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(50)

No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in China.

(51)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that in view of the evidence available it may need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The applicant made use of Brazil as a representative country in their request for review.

(52)

The Commission further stated that it would examine other possibly appropriate countries in accordance with the criteria set out in first indent of Article 2(6a) of the Basic regulation.

(53)

On 10 February 2025 the Commission published a Note to inform interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value.

(54)

In that Note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of the product under review. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified Thailand as an appropriate representative country.

(55)

The Commission also informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A costs’) and profits based on available data from three profitable Thai companies.

(56)

The Commission received comments on the Note from the applicant, setting out that it accepted Thailand as an appropriate representative country.

(57)

According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, “the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country”.

(58)

However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, if “it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks” , and “shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits” ( “administrative, selling and general costs” is referred to below as ‘SG&A costs’).

(59)

As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that based on the evidence available and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC and the Chinese producers, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

(60)

The Commission examined the evidence on the file to decide whether significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation exist in China, rendering the use of domestic prices and costs in that country inappropriate. That analysis covered the following evidentiary elements on the various criteria relevant to establish the existence of significant distortions.

(61)

First, the evidence contained in the request included the following elements below pointing to the existence of significant distortions.

(62)

The applicant argued that the Chinese market of the product under review is served by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the Chinese authorities. The applicant noted the existence of State ownership in the iron and steel sector, in particular through the tight links between the enterprises and the CCP. Such ownership is particularly evident in the MTF sector, through the guidance provided in the objectives of the Chinese Iron and Steel Association (‘CISA’) (15).

(63)

According to Article 3 of CISA's Articles of Association, the association ‘shall serve enterprises, shall serve the sector and shall serve the government (…) and shall strive to ensure a bridging role between government and involved enterprises’. In addition, Article 24 provides for CISA to ‘perform any other task as entrusted by the government and the relevant administration’ , while Article 26 stipulates that CISA ‘duly stick to the Party's line, guidelines, policies, political governance’.

(64)

The applicant also argued that Chinese State presence in MTF producers allows the State to interfere with prices and costs. The applicant submitted that this is the case for both SOEs and private companies. In fact, the applicant noted the constitutional obligation, according to Article 33 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, that “[p]rimary-level Party organisations in non-public sector entities shall implement the Party’s principles and policies, guide and oversee their enterprises’ observance of state laws and regulations”. Article 19 of the Chinese Company law highlights the duty for companies “to provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the Party” and the requirement to designate within the company, “an organisation of the Communist Party of China […] to carry out the activities of the Party”.

(65)

The request for review noted the heavy State presence in the steel sector both on a national and municipal level. The applicant mentioned the recent antidumping investigation on imports of steel bulb flats from China (16), where the Commission quoted the Hebei Tangshan Municipality 2022 Iron and Steel action plan, in which different municipal entities are tasked to “seek[s] and guide[s] financial institutions to provide iron and steel enterprises with low-interest loans to allow them to switch to new industries, and at the same time […] provide subsidies in the form of interest rate discounts”. The applicant noted that such State presence steel companies, is reflected also in those in the MTF sector.

(66)

The applicant indicated that the Chinese authorities maintain public policies or measures, discriminating in favour of suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces. The applicant noted that the steel sector in China is subject to numerous national and municipal plans, in particular regarding the optimization and development of the steel industry and the modernization on the level of the supply chain.

(67)

The applicant also underlines the lack, discriminatory or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws. According to the applicant, this is clear from the influence of the Government of China (‘GOC’) in insolvency proceedings. Given the subordination of the courts to the GOC, many insolvent firms benefit from restructuring plans stemming from de facto governmental guarantees to SOEs. In addition, the applicant referred to lack of transparency of rules on land provision and acquisition.

(68)

With regard to the iron and steel sector, and MTF producers specifically, the applicant highlighted the conclusion of the previous expiry review, in which it was established that distortions exist since “there was discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws in the iron and steel sector, including with respect to the product under review.”

(69)

The request underlined that wage costs are being distorted in China and specifically in the MTF sector. With regard to this, the applicant remarked what was established in the First Expiry Review (17): “The tube or pipe cast fittings sector is thus affected by the distortions of wage costs both directly (when making the product under review) as well as indirectly (when having access to capital or inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC)”. According to the applicant, the situation has not changed insofar as distortions on wage costs are concerned and confirmed that significant distortions on wage costs, both directly and indirectly, in the tube or pipe cast fitting sector are still present.

(70)

Second, in recent investigations concerning the iron and steel sector in China (18), the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present. In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in China resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (19).

(71)

In particular, the Commission concluded that in the iron and steel sector, not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persists in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation (20) but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation (21).

(72)

The Commission found further that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs further have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in China results in resources being driven to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces. (22)

(73)

The Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in China (23).

(74)

The Commission found distortions of wage costs in the iron and steel sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation (24), as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in China. (25)

(75)

In the most recent expiry review concerning the product under review (26) the Commission concluded that significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation were present. No major structural changes in China in general and/or in the relevant sector in particular, capable of affecting that conclusion, are known to the Commission.

(76)

Additional evidence available in the Report on Significant Distortions in the Economy of China (‘Report’) (27), prepared by the Commission pursuant to Article 2(6a)(c) of the basic Regulation, pointed to the existence of significant distortions also during the review investigation period.

(77)

No evidence or arguments to the contrary have been presented by the GOC or the producers in the present investigation.

(78)

In view of the above, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under review, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein.

(79)

On that basis, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case.

(80)

Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(81)

The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation:

(82)

As explained in recital (53) above, the Commission issued a Note on 10 February 2025 on the sources for the determination of the normal value. This Note informed interested parties of its intention to consider Thailand as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

(83)

In the Note on production factors, the Commission identified Argentina, Brazil, Türkiye, and Thailand as countries with a similar level of economic development as China according to the World Bank, i.e. they are all classified by the World Bank as ‘upper-middle income’ countries on a gross national income basis where production of the product under review was known to take place.

(84)

In the Note the Commission analysed the availability of relevant public data in the four possible representative countries as follows.

(85)

For Argentina, there was no readily available financial data for the only known manufacturer of MTF and Argentina did not import steel scrap, the main raw material.

(86)

For Türkiye, the only known producer of MTF was not profitable in 2023.

(87)

For both Thailand and Brazil, the Commission found data for manufacturers in both countries, namely three companies in Thailand and one in Brazil. However, the Thai companies were MTF manufacturers, while the Brazilian company was a large group with consolidated financial information.

(88)

In the light of the above considerations, the Commission informed the interested parties that it intended to use Thailand as an appropriate representative country and the three Thai manufacturers, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a), first ident of the basic Regulation in order to source undistorted prices or benchmarks for the calculation of normal value.

(89)

Having established that Thailand was an appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

(90)

In view of the above analysis, Thailand met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country.

(91)

In the Note, the Commission stated that to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’) to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials. The Note also set out the sources that the Commission would use for other factors of production, which are set out below.

(92)

In the absence of cooperation by Chinese producers, the Commission relied on the applicant in order to specify the factors of production used in the production of MTF.

(93)

Considering all the information based on the request the following factors of production and their sources have been identified to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

Table 1

Factors of production

(94)

The applicant indicated that the raw materials used for the production of MTF changed compared to the previous expiry review. In recital (134) to (135) of the previous expiry review the Commission found that the largest Chinese producer produced MTF in a cupola furnace, which uses coke to melt the raw materials. However, the applicant found information that during the review investigation period the largest two producers in China used electric furnaces to produce the product under review which uses different raw materials in the heating process.

(95)

To establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the factory gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price into Thailand as reported in GTA to which import duties were added. An import price into Thailand was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding China and countries which are not members of the WTO and which are listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council (31).

(96)

The Commission decided to exclude imports from China into Thailand as it concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in China due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation.

(97)

Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices. After excluding imports from China into the representative country, the volume of imports from other third countries remained representative.

(98)

With regard to import duties the Commission noted that Thailand imported relevant raw materials from many countries with a varying level of import duty rates and significant differences in quantities. Although in an expiry review it is not necessary to calculate an exact margin of dumping, but rather to establish the likelihood of continuation of dumping, the Commission took the import duties as extracted from GTA for each country of origin.

(99)

The Commission used the last publicly available data from Bank of Thailand for the average wages in Thailand during the review investigation period (32). These were adjusted to include social charges (33). Finally, the total annual labour cost was divided by the number of hours in the year (i.e. 8 hours per day, multiplied by 5 working days a week and by the number of weeks in a year).

(100)

The Commission used the industrial electricity prices in the corresponding consumption band in kWh published by the Thai Provincial Electricity Authority (34). This energy charge has been unchanged since 2018 and is updated on a monthly basis using the instrument called Ft surcharge. Electricity charges billed for each month are therefore calculated as:

(101)

When calculating the benchmark, the Commission added the average energy adjusted charge to the electricity base charge, for the review investigation period.

(102)

To establish the benchmark for gas, the Commission used the prices of gas for companies (industrial users) in Thailand published by the Energy Policy and Planning Office of the Ministry of Energy (36). The prices differed per consumption volume. The Commission used the corresponding prices from Table 7.2-4: Final Energy Consumption Per Capita. The Commission used as benchmark the most recent data relating to 2023.

(103)

According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, “the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits”. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

(104)

To establish an undistorted value of the manufacturing overheads and given the absence of cooperation from the producers, the Commission used facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. Therefore, based on the data provided by the applicant, the Commission established the ratio of manufacturing overheads to the total manufacturing and labour costs. This percentage was then applied to the undistorted value of the cost of manufacturing to obtain the undistorted value of manufacturing overheads, depending on the model produced.

(105)

On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed an average normal value on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(106)

First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. In the absence of cooperation by the Chinese producers, the Commission relied on the information provided by the applicant in the review request on the usage of each factor (materials and labour) for the production of MTF.

(107)

Once the undistorted manufacturing cost was established, the Commission added the manufacturing overheads as above, and then SG&A costs and profit. SG&A costs and profit were determined based on the financial statements of three Thai manufacturers of MTF for 2023 as reported in the accounts of the companies concerned:

(108)

The Commission added the following items to the undistorted costs of manufacturing:

(109)

On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(110)

In the absence of cooperation by producers from China, the export price was determined based on Eurostat data corrected to ex-works level. The CIF price reported by Eurostat was reduced by an estimation of sea freight and insurance cost and domestic transport cost, based on the information provided by the applicant in the request for review.

(111)

The Commission compared the normal value and the export price on an ex-works basis as established above.

(112)

In the absence of cooperation from Chinese exporting producers, no adjustments were made in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.

(113)

Dumping margins were calculated for imports from China at 65 %.

(114)

During the review investigation period, imports of malleable tube or pipe fittings (‘MTF’) from Thailand continued to enter the Union market.

(115)

According to Eurostat and information from the Union industry imports of MTF from Thailand accounted for about 4 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 5,2 % market share during the original investigation and 5 % during the previous expiry review.

(116)

As mentioned in recitals (28) and (30), none of the producers from Thailand cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, the Commission informed the authorities of Thailand that due to the absence of cooperation the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation concerning the findings regarding Thailand. The Commission did not receive any comments or requests for an intervention of the Hearing Officer in this regard.

(117)

Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation of dumping regarding Thailand were based on facts available, i.e. information in the request for review, the statistics collected, and other public sources identified where applicable.

(118)

No Thai producers of MTF cooperated with the investigation and therefore the normal value was based on Thai domestic price information contained in the request for review and updated by the applicant to cover the review investigation period.

(119)

Information provided by the applicant showed that these domestic sales were made in the ordinary course of trade and therefore used as the source of normal value.

(120)

In the absence of cooperation by producers from Thailand, the export price was determined based on Eurostat data corrected to ex-works level. The CIF price reported by Eurostat was reduced by an estimation of sea freight and insurance cost and domestic transport cost, based on the information provided by the applicant in the request for review.

(121)

The Commission compared the normal value and the export price on an ex-works basis as established above.

(122)

In the absence of cooperation from Thai producers, no adjustments were made in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.

(123)

Dumping margins were calculated for imports from Thailand at 70 %.

(124)

Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation the likelihood of continuation of dumping from China should the measures be repealed.

(125)

The following additional elements were analysed:

(126)

As a consequence of non-cooperation of producers from China, this examination was based on the information available to the Commission, that is information supplied in the request for review and information from other independent available sources, such as official import statistics and information obtained in the original investigation and the previous expiry review.

(127)

The request did not contain information on the precise production and spare capacity of the product under review in China. (37) The previous expiry review found that the Chinese market is fragmented with many small producers and a number of large ones. The request, however, provided information based on publicly available information. In particular, it indicated that Jinan Meide Casting Co. Ltd. increased its production capacity in 2022 and produces more than 150 000 tonnes per year. The request further indicated that Jianzhi Group, one of China’s leading manufacturers, alone has an annual production capacity of over 400 000 tonnes of MTF (38).

(128)

The request also referred to a 2022 Argentinian anti-dumping investigation on imports of malleable tube or pipe fittings from China and Brazil, which allegedly determined that China has an annual production capacity of 500 000 tonnes for MTF.

(129)

According to the request for review, the Chinese domestic consumption is largely below the Chinese production capacity, which was confirmed in the anti-dumping investigation carried out by Argentina.

(130)

The previous expiry review confirmed that substantial excess capacities existed in China. There has been no indication of any significant increase in domestic demand, nor of any third-country markets capable of absorbing this surplus since the previous expiry review. Similarly, there was no evidence that the production capacities in China have decreased.

(131)

The Commission therefore concluded based on facts available that there is spare capacity in China that could be used to supply the Union market at dumped prices should the measures lapse.

(132)

In order to establish the possible development of imports if measures were repealed, the Commission considered the attractiveness of the Union market with regard to prices.

(133)

Despite the anti-dumping duties in place, China still exported to the Union during the review investigation period, with a market share of 19 %, showing that the Union remained an attractive market and an attractive export destination for China.

(134)

Given the finding of dumping from China, and that imports are still entering the Union market, the Commission considered that the Union market continued to be attractive to the Chinese producers and if the measures were to lapse, dumped imports into the Union would increase.

(135)

As set out in recital (166), the Commission found that the imports from China continued to undercut the Union industry prices, indicating that the price level in the Union was attractive to the Chinese exporting producers, even with the anti-dumping measures in place.

(136)

The investigation showed that Chinese exports continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the review investigation period. The Commission also concluded that if the measures lapsed it is highly likely that Chinese producers would export significant quantities of the product concerned to the Union at dumped prices. Thus, the Commission concluded that there was a strong likelihood of continuation of dumping should the measures lapse.

(137)

Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation the likelihood of continuation of dumping should the measures be repealed.

(138)

The following additional elements were analysed:

(139)

As a consequence of non-cooperation of producers from Thailand, this examination was based on the information available to the Commission, that is information supplied in the request for review and information from other independent available sources, such as official import statistics and information obtained in the original investigation and the previous expiry review.

(140)

The request did not provide specific information on the production and spare capacity of the product under review in Thailand. However, it noted that Thai exporters remained heavily dependent on the Union market for exports and that its market share has grown over the period considered at undercutting prices.

(141)

The previous expiry review confirmed that substantial excess capacities existed in Thailand. There has been no indication of any significant increase in domestic demand, nor of any third-country markets capable of absorbing this surplus since the previous expiry review. Similarly, there was no evidence that the production capacities in Thailand have decreased.

(142)

The Commission therefore concluded that there is spare capacity in Thailand that could be used to supply the Union market at dumped prices should the measures lapse.

(143)

In order to establish the possible development of imports if measures were repealed, the Commission considered the attractiveness of the Union market with regard to prices.

(144)

Despite the anti-dumping duties in place, Thailand still exported to the Union during the review investigation period, with a market share of 4 %, showing that the Union remained an attractive market and an attractive export destination.

(145)

Given the finding of dumping from Thailand, and that imports are still entering the Union market, the Commission considered that the Union market continued to be attractive to the Thai producers and if the measures were to lapse, Thai dumped imports into the Union would increase.

(146)

As set out in recital (166), the Commission found that the imports from Thailand continued to undercut the Union industry prices, indicating that the price level in the Union was attractive to the Thai exporting producers, even with the anti-dumping measures in place.

(147)

The investigation showed that Thai exports continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the review investigation period. The Commission also concluded that if the measures lapsed it is highly likely that Thai producers would export significant quantities of the product concerned to the Union at dumped prices. Thus, the Commission concluded that there was a strong likelihood of continuation of dumping should the measures lapse.

(148)

The like product was manufactured by five producers in the Union during the period considered. The request for review indicated that one of the producers, Odlewnia Zawiercie S.A., was solely processing imported unthreaded tube or pipe fittings by threading them and should therefore not be considered to be part of the Union industry within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(149)

Since unthreaded tube or pipe fittings are not part of the product under review and fall within a different TARIC code, the Commission did consider the threading of these products to be a production step constituting the manufacture of the product under review and therefore Odlewnia Zawiercie S.A. to be part of the Union industry for the current investigation.

(150)

The Commission thus concluded that the five companies constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(151)

The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 20 774 tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of data provided by the applicant and the sampled Union producers. Two Union producers were sampled, which were found to represent around 60 % of the verified total EU production and sales volumes of the like product.

(152)

It has to be noted that the Commission contacted Odlewnia Zawiercie S.A. to provide the company’s data related to the macroeconomic indicators set out in section 5.5.2 below, but that the company decided not to cooperate with this investigation. The data related to this company were therefore based on estimates provided by the applicant in the macro questionnaire.

(153)

The Commission established the Union consumption by adding the Union industry’s sales volume in the Union market and the imports of the product concerned, as reported in Eurostat. The source of information was the reply to the macro questionnaire by the applicant and the official data by Eurostat.

(154)

Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (tonnes)

(155)

The total Union consumption of the product concerned experienced a noticeable decline from 2021 to the end of the RIP.. In 2022 the Union consumption was reduced by 8 % in relation to the previous year. In 2023, where the Union economy experienced slower growth compared to 2022, the Union consumption declined further by 14 percentage points, while in the review investigation period there was no substantial change.

(156)

The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of data from Eurostat. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of the import volume and total Union consumption.

(157)

Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import quantity (tonnes) and market share

(158)

Regarding imports from China, in 2022 these imports increased by 14 % from 2021, even though the Union consumption decreased by 8 % during the same period. For the same year, China's market share grew to 22 %, indicating a significant further penetration into the Union market. However, in 2023, a year when the Union consumption fell by 14 percentage points, the Chinese imports declined by 26 percentage points. Nevertheless, in 2023 the market share of China remained relatively high at 19 %. In the review investigation period imports from China slightly increased to 5 420 tonnes, a marginal rise from 2023, while the market share stayed constant at 19 %, indicating a stability in China's relative market presence.

(159)

Regarding imports from Thailand, there was a significant increase in 2022 in comparison to the previous year by 25 %. The market share of Thai imports also increased from 3 % to 4 % at the same period. In 2023, similar to the Chinese imports, the Thai imports dropped by 26 percentage points returning close to the levels of 2021. The market share remained unchanged to 4 % suggesting resilience in Thailand's market presence despite a decline in consumption over the period considered. During the RIP the Thai imports increased by 11 percentage points in comparison to 2023 with a market share unchanged at 4 %.

(160)

The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. Price undercutting of the imports was established on the basis of questionnaire replies provided by the sampled exporting producers and sampled Union producers.

(161)

The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 4

Import prices (EUR/tonne)

(162)

The import prices from China experienced an increase by 29 % from 2021 to 2022, followed by a decrease by 17 percentage points in 2023 and an increase by 5 percentage points during the review investigation period. Overall, the trend shows volatility with a peak in prices in 2022. For the period considered the import prices from China increased by 17 %.

(163)

On the contrary, import prices from Thailand showed a more stable trend with a modest increase in 2022, followed by decreases in 2023 and the review investigation period. For the period considered the prices from Thailand decreased by 1 %.

(164)

The Commission determined the price undercutting during the review investigation period by comparing:

(165)

The price comparison was made using data from the Union industry at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts.

(166)

The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period. It showed significant undercutting by the imports from both China (at 26 %) and Thailand (at 48 %) on the Union market.

(167)

Imports of MTF from countries other than China and Thailand were mainly from Indonesia and Brazil.

(168)

The quantity of imports into the Union as well as the market share and price trends for imports of MTF from other countries developed as follows:

Table 5

Imports from third countries

(169)

Regarding imports from Indonesia, the data showed an overall volatile but increasing trend. Indonesia's import quantity experienced a significant rise in 2022, increasing from 1 391 tonnes in 2021 to 2 233 tonnes, before declining to 1 451 tonnes in 2023. Despite these fluctuations, Indonesia's market share consistently grew, reaching 7,2 % during the review period. The average price per tonne of imports from Indonesia displayed considerable variability, with a peak at 4 105 EUR in 2022 followed by a decrease to 2 837 EUR in 2023, before stabilizing at 2 783 EUR during the review investigation period.

(170)

Regarding the imports from Brazil, the data indicated a gradual decrease in import quantities, dropping from 525 tonnes in 2021 to 405 tonnes in 2023, with a slight recovery to 523 tonnes during the review investigation period. Despite the reduction in volume, Brazil's market share saw a small increase, from 1,5 % in 2021 to 1,9 % during the review investigation period. A notable trend for Brazil is the significant increase in the average price per tonne, which soared to 5 720 EUR in 2023 before slightly decreasing to 5 119 EUR during the review investigation period.

(171)

The import data for other countries, excluding Indonesia and Brazil as well as China and Thailand, showed a steady increase in both import quantity and market share over the observed period. The import quantities rose consistently from 515 tonnes in 2021 to 835 tonnes during the review investigation period, resulting in a market share increase from 1,4 % to 3 %. The average price per tonne saw a decline from EUR 4 476 in 2022 to EUR 3 776 during the review investigation period.

(172)

The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(173)

As mentioned in recital (22), sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(174)

For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of verified data contained in the reply to the macro-questionnaire submitted by the applicant.

(175)

The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data related to the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(176)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(177)

The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(178)

The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(179)

Regarding the production quantity of Union producers, the data showed a consistent decline from 2021 to the end of the RIP.. Starting at 29 432 tonnes in 2021, production fell to 25 166 tonnes in 2022, i.e. a 14 % decrease. This downward trend continued into 2023, with production reducing further to 22 151 tonnes (i.e. a 9-percentage point decrease from 2022), and then to 20 774 tonnes in the review investigation period, marking an overall 29 % drop from 2021 levels.

(180)

Throughout this period, production capacity remained constant at 61 500 tonnes. Consequently, capacity utilization also decreased over the years. It started at 48 % in 2021, dropped to 41 % in 2022, declined further to 36 % in 2023, and reached 34 % during the review investigation period. The decline in capacity utilization reflected the reduction in production quantities relative to the unchanged production capacity.

(181)

The Union industry’s sales quantity and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Sales quantity and market share

(182)

Regarding the Union industry sales volume, the data indicated that there is a consistent decline from 2021 to the end of the RIP., with a total reduction of 30 % during the period considered. This decline is noticeably faster than the decrease of consumption that decreased by 22 % during the same period. At the same time, the Union industry market share fell from 72 % in 2021 to 64 % during the review investigation period, i.e. a decrease of 8 percentage points.

(183)

In a context of decreasing consumption, the Union industry not only lost sales volumes in the Union but also market share, contrary to Chinese and Thai imports which gained market share in the Union during the period considered.

(184)

Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity

(185)

Regarding employment, there is a clear declining trend in employment numbers from 2021 to the end of the RIP., with a total reduction of approximately 15 % from 2021. From 1 226 employees in 2021, the workforce was reduced to 1 039 employees in the review investigation period.

(186)

Moreover, the data indicated that productivity measured in tonnes per employee saw a noticeable decline during the period considered; overall falling by 17 %. In particular, from 24 tonnes per employee in 2021 the productivity dropped to 20 tonnes per employee in the review investigation period.

(187)

Both the Chinese and Thai dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The effect of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from China and Thailand.

(188)

Continuous unfair pricing by exporters from China and Thailand made it also impossible for the Union industry to recover from the past dumping practices.

(189)

The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonne)

(190)

The evolution of average unit sales prices in the Union from 2021 to the end of the RIP. showed a clear upward trend. Starting at [EUR 4 100 – EUR 4 300] in 2021, prices rose substantially in 2022 to [EUR 5 100 - EUR 5 300] and continued increasing in 2023 to [EUR 5 600 - EUR 5 800], with a slight further rise during the review investigation period. Overall, the average unit sales prices rose by 36 % during the period considered.

(191)

In line with the trend of Union sales prices, the unit cost of production also experienced a significant rise over the same period. The costs increased by 28 % in 2022, by a further 6 percentage points in 2023, and marginally increasing further during the review investigation period. Overall, the production costs increased by 35 % during the period considered.

(192)

The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee

(193)

Regarding the labour costs, the data indicated a consistent upward trend in average labour costs per employee over the period from 2021 to the end of the RIP.. Starting at [EUR 36 000 - EUR 37 000] in 2021, the costs increased by 6 % in 2022, followed by a significant rise by 13 percentage points in 2023, and finally reaching [EUR 47 000 - EUR 48 000] during the review period. During the period considered the labour costs increased by 31 %.

(194)

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Stocks

(195)

Regarding the closing stocks data, the data indicated a fluctuating trend in closing stock levels over the period from 2021 to the end of the RIP.. In 2022, there was an increase in closing stocks, rising by 30 % in relation to 2021. However, 2023 saw a reduction by 11 percentage points with a recovery by 4 percentage points in the review investigation period.

(196)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

(197)

The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

(198)

The data illustrates challenging trends in profitability, cash flow, investments, and return on investments from 2021 to the end of the RIP.. Profitability started around breakeven in 2021 but worsened in 2022 to [-4 % - -2 %] and stayed at the same level in 2023, before slightly improving during the review investigation period to a still lossmaking level of [-3 % - -1 %]. The negative indices associated with profitability indicate deteriorating performance compared to 2021.

(199)

The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow fluctuated significantly during the period considered: it plunged to a negative amount in in 2022 of [EUR -4 350 000 - EUR -4 050 000], reflecting significant cash outflows in relation to 2021. However, in 2023, the net cash flow recovered substantially to [EUR 6 600 000 – EUR 6 900 000], before stabilizing during the review investigation period to [EUR 5 000 000 - EUR 5 300 000].

(200)

Investment amounts remained relatively stable across the years, at [EUR 3 750 000 - EUR 3 850 000] in 2021 and experiencing slight fluctuations, ending at increasing to [EUR 4 100 000 - EUR 4 200 000] during the review investigation period, i.e. suggesting a moderate increase by 9 % in investment activity during the period considered. These investments were found to be mainly related to compliance with labour and environmental legislation.

(201)

The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It started positively in 2021 at [14 % - 18 %]; held steady in 2022; then dramatically fell in 2023 to [-4 % - -2 %] and stabilised in the review investigation period to [-3 % - 1 %], reflecting sharply reduced investment returns despite consistent investment levels. Overall, the data pointed out to financial instability, with prolonged periods of unprofitability, fluctuating cash flow, steady investments, and declining returns on investments, suggesting the Union producers faced significant operational challenges throughout the period considered.

(202)

Most injury indicators showed a negative trend during the period considered.

(203)

The production of the Union industry declined over the period considered. This decline was attributable to a reduction in sales on the Union market. Overall, production declined by 29 %, while sales decreased by 30 % over the period considered. This decline was reflected in a loss of market share, which fell from 72 % in 2021 to 64 % in the review investigation period, representing a total decrease of 8 percentage points. This loss in market share benefited imports from China and Thailand over the period considered.

(204)

The Union industry was unable to compensate for the lost sales volumes in the Union market through increased exports, as exports declined by 20 % in the period considered.

(205)

Production capacity of the Union industry remained stable over the period considered. Production capacity utilisation declined by 29 % in the period considered in line with an equivalent decrease in production.

(206)

Employment decreased by 15 % over the period considered. Productivity developed in line with the changes in production and employment, i.e. it decreased by 17 % over the period considered.

(207)

The average cost of production increased significantly in 2022 (by 28 % from 2021) and peaked in the review investigation period (by 35 % from 2021).

(208)

The average price of Union producers increased by 36 % over the period considered, to match the increase in production costs.

(209)

The profitability of the Union industry declined over the period considered, decreasing significantly in 2022 and 2023 and slightly improving in the review investigation period, with negative indices indicating a decline in performance compared to 2021.

(210)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period despite the anti-dumping measures in place.

(211)

In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: the imports from countries other than China and Thailand, the export performance of the Union industry, consumption decline and increase in cost.

(212)

The Commission examined whether there was a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. During the period considered the imports of the dumped like product from China and Thailand increased their market share. China’s market share was 19 % in the review investigation period in comparison to 18 % in 2021; while Thailand’s market share was 4 % in the review investigation period in comparison to 3 % in 2021. This increase occurred despite the anti-dumping measures in place and the significantly declined consumption in the Union by 22 %.

(213)

The absolute quantity of the Chinese imports was reduced by 15 %, i.e. at a lower level in comparison to the decreasing Union consumption. The absolute quantity of the Thai imports was increased by 10 %. At the same time, the quantity of sales of the Union producers was reduced by 30 % despite the anti-dumping measures in place.

(214)

The import prices from China increased by 17 % during the period considered, while the import prices from Thailand experienced a decrease by 1 % in the same period. In contrast, the Union industry’s sales prices increased by 36 % during the period considered.

(215)

The injury analysis showed that Chinese and Thai imports into the Union increased their market share despite existing anti-dumping measures and declining Union consumption. This coincided in time with the deterioration of the Union industry’s financial performance indicators, like a decrease in profitability, resulting in significant losses during the period considered. The increase in market share of the Chinese and Thai imports was at the expense of the Union industry, which lost sales volume and market share.

(216)

The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.

(217)

The Union market contracted by 22 % during the period considered, attributed to slower economic growth and high energy prices. However, the Union producers' market share decreased disproportionally compared to gains by Chinese, Thai, and other imports.

(218)

Additionally, the Union producers faced a significant 35 % increase in production costs. Even though they managed to raise their sales prices proportionately they were not able to cover costs throughout most of the period considered.

(219)

Aside from having increased imports from China and Thailand, this was mainly caused by imports from other third countries, notably from Indonesia, which increased significantly during the period considered (from 3,9 % to 7,2 % market share) at undercutting price levels.

(220)

Moreover, the Union producers' export performance showed a 20 % decline over the period considered. Since the export sales accounted for only 9 % of their total sales, there was a negative but limited impact on the industry's injury from reduced exports.

(221)

For this reason, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from China and Thailand contributed to the material injury to the Union industry during the review investigation period; however, other factors, in particular imports from Indonesia and a deteriorating export performance of the Union industry, might have had also an effect on the injurious situation of the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission decided to further assess whether injury caused by the dumped imports from China and Thailand would likely continue if measures were allowed to lapse.

(222)

The Commission concluded in recital (210) that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period. Therefore, the Commission assessed in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation whether there would be a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury caused by the dumped imports from China and Thailand if the measures were allowed to lapse.

(223)

In this respect the following elements were analysed by the Commission:

(224)

As shown in sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 above, the Commission relied on information from the request and the previous expiry review and found that both China and Thailand had significant production capacities that could be directed to the Union market in even larger quantities at dumped prices if anti-dumping measures ceased.

(225)

As shown in sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.2 above, the Commission concluded that due to the persistent presence of dumped imports from China and Thailand and their increased market share in the Union market during the period considered, the Union market remains attractive to producers from China and Thailand.

(226)

The average import prices into the Union from China and Thailand during the review investigation period were significantly lower than the average sales price of the Union industry. As set out in recital (166), during the review investigation period Chinese and Thai prices undercut the Union industry’s prices with 26 % and 48 %, respectively, with the anti-dumping duties paid.

(227)

If measures were allowed to lapse, the level of undercutting would increase to 47 % for Chinese imports and 55 % for Thai imports.

(228)

In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China and Thailand at injurious price levels, and therefore further aggravating the injury suffered by the Union industry. As a consequence, the viability of the Union industry would be at serious risk.

(229)

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(230)

The investigation showed that should the measures expire; this would likely have a significant negative effect on the Union industry. The Union industry's situation would quickly deteriorate in terms of lower sales volumes and sales prices resulting in a strong decrease in profitability. The continuation of measures would allow the Union industry to fully exploit its potential on the Union market that is a level-playing field.

(231)

Therefore, maintaining the anti-dumping measures in force is in the interest of the Union industry.

(232)

The Commission contacted all known unrelated importers and invited them to cooperate in this investigation. No importer cooperated.

(233)

In the original investigation it was found that, given the importers' profits and sources of supply, any negative impact of the imposition of measures on importers, if any, would not be disproportionate.

(234)

In the current investigation, as it was the case in the previous expiry review, there is no evidence available to the Commission suggesting the opposite, and it can thus accordingly be confirmed that the measures currently in force had no substantial negative effect on the financial situation of importers and that the continuation of the measures would not unduly affect them.

(235)

The Commission contacted all known users in this investigation and invited to cooperate. No user cooperated.

(236)

In the current investigation there is no evidence on file suggesting that the measures in force affected users in any negative way. The share of the product under review on the total costs of the new construction or installation is limited.

(237)

On that basis it is confirmed that the measures currently in force had no substantial negative effect on the financial situation of users and that the continuation of the measures would not unduly affect them.

(238)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons under Article 21 of the basic Regulation that it would not be in the interest of the Union to maintain the existing measures on imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron and spheroidal graphite cast iron originating in China and Thailand.

(239)

On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation of dumping, continuation of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron and spheroidal graphite cast iron originating in China and Thailand should be maintained.

(240)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties and exemptions from extensions of the measures after anti-circumvention investigations.

(241)

The application of individual anti-dumping duties or exemptions is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports’.

(242)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty and exemptions to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities.

(243)

Even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty or exemption is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(244)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in quantity after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in quantity could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(245)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in China and Thailand and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(246)

A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (39). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(247)

All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. No comments were received.

(248)

An exporter or producer that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the period that was used to set the level of the duty currently applicable to its exports may request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request, provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the period that was used to set the level of the duty applicable to its exports; (ii) it is not related to a company that did so and thus is subject to the anti-dumping duties; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

(249)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (40) when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(250)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.