1.   BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the ‘OPCW’) is the implementing body of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the ‘CWC’). The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997 and there are currently 193 States Parties reflecting nearly universal membership.

The mission of the OPCW is to achieve a world free of chemical weapons through the verified destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and the prevention of re-emergence of the production and use of chemical weapons. Since 1997, the OPCW has verified the destruction of all stockpiled chemical weapons declared by countries around the world corresponding to 72 304 metric tonnes.

The OPCW has consistently received support from the European Union (EU) through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget since 2004. The EU-OPCW Memorandum of Understanding of 20 February 2024 has further reinforced this crucial partnership that has been essential in promoting and implementing the OPCW’s core objectives, contributing to international peace and security. Recent developments, such as the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the ongoing war in Ukraine, underscore the importance of the OPCW’s mandates and missions.

In Syria, the Secretariat has been operating since October 2013, when Syria joined the Convention, through, inter alia, dedicated missions – the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) – in line with mandates received under the Convention and through OPCW policy-making organs decisions and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Since the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024 and the presence of an interim government willing to engage on the Syrian chemical weapons dossier, contrary to the previous authorities, there is a need and at the same time an opportunity to finally access all information not declared by the previous authorities related to their chemical weapon programme, to secure chemical weapons related sites and their content, and to have any relevant element destroyed by Syria and verified as such by the OPCW Secretariat. There is also an opportunity to continue investigations related to use of chemical weapons in Syria, including identification of perpetrators, as expressed by the Interim President of Syria during his meeting in Damascus with the OPCW Director-General on 8 February 2025.

In Ukraine, the threat of use of chemical weapons continues and the OPCW’s activities, including technical assistance as requested by Ukraine, are essential, from the provision of protective and detection equipment and training of first responders, to the provision of evaluation of samples related to allegations of use of toxic chemicals found on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Since 2021 the EU provides valuable support to the OPCW through the provision of products and services supplied by SatCen. For the operational effectiveness of OPCW, it is important that SatCen products and services support is sustained, once the Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021  (1) expires.

Therefore, this proposal is to be considered in conjunction with the Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344 of 26 June 2023  (2) and the activities under Output 3 (‘Effective responses to allegations of chemical weapons use’), as well as in conjunction with the Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1984 of 15 July 2024  (3). Activities in the Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344 are primarily in relation to OPCW’s operations within headquarters, while this proposal focuses on OPCW’s operations outside headquarters (deployments, technical visits, trainings and provision of equipment to relevant authorities in Syria and Ukraine). Activities in the Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1984 are primarily in relation to the processing of data and knowledge transfer within the Organisation, while this proposal focuses on the deployment of missions and the provision of equipment to Syria and Ukraine.

2.   OVERALL OBJECTIVE

The overall objective of this action is to contribute to international peace and security, confidence and transparency, and to the implementation of the EU strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by supporting mission activities related to Syria and Ukraine to ensure, through the OPCW, effective responses to the risks of chemical weapons proliferation and use, also empowering States Parties to ensure accountability in cases of use of chemical weapons, on the basis of the work and reports of the OPCW. The provision of SatCen products and services enhances the capacities for these OPCW-mandated activities as well as security and verification accuracy.

3.   SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of the action are:

a.	to participate to the full internationally verified elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and establish the facts and identify the perpetrators related to the use of chemical weapons, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the policy-making organs of the OPCW;

b.

to provide assistance consistent with the CWC to enable Ukraine to have the civil technical capabilities necessary to ensure they can respond effectively to incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals, including the provision of evaluation of samples related to allegations of use of toxic chemicals found on the battlefield in Ukraine;

c.	to expand the OPCW’s operational capacities through provision of SatCen products and services, in support of OPCW mandated activities.

4.   ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

a.

Syria: i. Activity: Technical team deployments (of one-month duration each) over two years to assist Syrian authorities with: — producing a detailed inventory of chemical weapons, chemical weapons sites (4), equipment, munitions and other components of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. It is estimated that the teams will need to visit and assess more than 100 locations across Syria to collect, translate, verify and analyse documents, as well as to interview relevant personnel who were involved in the former Syrian regime’s chemical weapons programme. The OPCW technical team will issue reports as needed to inform decision-making by the OPCW policy-making organs; — developing plans, modalities and detailed inventory for the verified destruction of Syria’s remaining chemical weapons, including the identification of related equipment and facilities; — determining the use of toxic chemicals as weapons and identifying the perpetrators. The OPCW technical team will issue reports to inform decision-making and action by the OPCW policy-making organs, the Syrian authorities, and other international actors (such as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism – IIIM). Outputs: — A full and complete declaration of the Syrian chemical weapons programme pursuant to the obligation that the Syrian caretaker authorities have inherited under the CWC; — Executable chemical weapons destruction plans for formal consideration by the OPCW Executive Council; — The establishment of evidentiary bases of chemical weapons use in Syria for victims to receive justice and perpetrators to be held accountable. Notes: The establishment of the necessary operating facilities (secure office facilities, storage space, communications equipment) to support safe, secure and effective extended deployments by OPCW technical teams as well as support personnel engaged to produce the Syria-related outputs of this project will be required to ensure timely and cost-effective achievement of the results envisioned. The budget will provide a maximum number of expert days, per diem and transport costs to be allotted to these deployment activities. A portion of the budget will also cover any services and equipment needed to carry out these activities, including relevant project office costs.

b.

Ukraine: i. Activity 1: Provision of tailored technical trainings and related protective and analytical equipment in Ukraine and outside of Ukraine at specialised facilities (such as the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology) for Ukrainian first responders, investigators, and other relevant experts in the areas of incident response, collection of evidence, and analysis: — Trainings: four training sessions are planned for 20 Ukrainian participants during the EU Action period. The trainings will cover expertise in Chemical Weapons (CW) and chemical agent detection, protection, decontamination, and sampling and analysis. — Equipment Types: the equipment to complement the trainings will be provided, such as ‘FirstDefender’ and related CW detection materials/devices, protective suits, protective masks, mask fit test kits, decontamination kits, sampling and analysis kits, auxiliary field work tool kits (e.g., GPS). Output: Ukrainian first responders, investigators, and relevant experts are able, through enhanced expertise and preparedness, to deal more effectively with instances and allegations of toxic chemical use, prevent loss of life and injury and promoting transparency and accountability. ii. Activity 2: Provision of technical assistance visits (TAV) if and when requested by Ukraine to receive and analyse samples, through the independent and internationally certified OPCW Designated Laboratories network, collected by Ukrainian investigators and related to allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons, including with regard to allegations of use of Riot Control Agents along the frontline. Outputs: Provision of reports to Ukrainian authorities for Ukraine to further decide on how to use such reports in their national investigations of use of toxic chemical as weapons, including provision of evaluation of samples related to allegations of use of toxic chemicals found on the battlefield in Ukraine, as well as for the international community, supporting the protection of the CWC and accountability efforts.

c.

SatCen (5): i. Activity: Provision of SatCen (6) products and services to support the safe and effective operational planning of OPCW technical teams preparing for deployments to any contingency operations, to conduct investigations, training or other activities as mandated under the Convention by the OPCW policy-making organs or requested by States Parties. Output: OPCW technical team deployments are conducted with maximum efficiency, safety and security; and products and services provide useful indications to the substantiation of evidentiary findings reported by OPCW technical teams.

5.   FINAL BENEFICIARIES

a.	CWC States Parties;

b.	Government officials and experts in Syria and Ukraine;

c.	Victims of chemical weapons use in Syria and Ukraine;

d.	OPCW personnel deploying on contingency missions.

6.   DURATION

The total estimated duration of the action is 24 months.