Rapporteur:

Jacek KRAWCZYK

Legislative procedure	EU Law Tracker
Referral	Council of the European Union, 9.7.2025 European Parliament, 8.9.2025
Legal basis	Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
European Commission documents	Summary of COM(2025) 828
Section responsible	Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society
Adopted in section	4.9.2025
Adopted at plenary session	18.9.2025
Plenary session No	599
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	88/0/7

PREAMBLE

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shook the whole world, as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries is enshrined in the basic principles of international law. In its Resolution of March 2022, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) strongly condemned the unilateral aggression against Ukraine ordered by the President of the Russian Federation (1). Russia is the main threat to European security for the foreseeable future.

1.   RECOMMENDATIONS

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC):

1.1.

Welcomes the European Commission’s (Commission) proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (2)(‘the Proposal’). The complete phase-out of Russian gas and oil is both imperative for the EU and technically feasible. The years 2023 and 2024 have shown that Europe can cover its gas and oil needs using alternative sources, existing infrastructure and the deployment of clean energy.

1.2.

Encourages European lawmakers to proceed with the Proposal promptly to allow for immediate implementation. Shortening the proposed phase-out deadlines is highly desirable.

1.3.

Realises that the EU needs to prioritise the phase-out of Russian gas and oil in 2026, ensuring full and definitive completion by the end of 2027 at the latest, and recognises the urgent need to cease funding Russia’s war effort and place the EU’s security above the perceived short-term financial gains of a handful of Member States. Russia’s budget is a war budget. The EU’s imports of Russian fossil fuels reached EUR 21,9 billion in 2024, exceeding the EUR 18,7 billion in financial aid provided to Ukraine.

1.4.

Welcomes the fact that the Proposal is based on a solid legal framework, which will be crucial as a strong basis for companies and Member States to end ongoing contracts, anticipating potential legal actions. The EESC urges the Council and the Parliament to make every effort, as they finalise the Proposal, to ensure that the legislation is as watertight as possible.

1.5.

Takes note that, regrettably, no immediate ban on new or existing oil contracts or oil derivatives is included in the Proposal. It includes measures and timelines to eliminate Russian oil imports only by 1 January 2028. The new Article 7 that the EESC proposes below would put oil imports on an equal footing with gas imports.

1.6.

Welcomes the stronger instruments proposed for monitoring energy dependencies; suggests, however, that these mechanisms should be subject to stronger parliamentary oversight. Recommends involving the social partners and organised civil society in the assessment of strategic dependencies.

1.7.

Proposes deleting the possibility of a derogation, provided for in Article 15 of the Proposal. Allowing for a derogation undermines the strategic goals of the Proposal by diluting its core objective – a complete and definitive phase-out of direct and indirect Russian gas and oil imports to the EU.

1.8.

Requests that a full review of the implementation of the proposed regulation be carried out by the Commission on the basis of the results achieved by mid-2029.

1.9.

Urges the EU to pursue a proactive and coordinated course of action to further identify and eliminate shadow fleet operations: this is of the utmost importance. Calls on the Commission to enhance tracking and supplier identification at LNG terminals so as to more closely monitor and restrict Russian illegal shipments. Dismantling the Nord Stream gas pipeline – as a potential threat to the implementation of the phase-out regulation – would be legally and strategically justified.

1.10.

Underlines that imports of Russian fossil fuels should not merely be replaced with fossil fuels from other sources (especially from countries with major human rights issues). The green transition to a carbon-neutral EU automatically reduces the dependency on fossil energy imports from Russia and other non-democratic countries. Measures to reach the EU climate targets are important steps in reducing the dependency on Russian energy imports.

1.11.

Points out that it is imperative that a just transition be ensured for all affected workers during the phase-out of Russian natural gas and oil. Accompanying measures to secure employment, retraining and socially-cushioned structural change must be made an integral part of the regulation.

1.12.

Acknowledges that it is feasible to decouple the legislative proposals for gas/oil measures from those applying to measures in the nuclear sector. However, it is important to introduce measures for uranium, its derivatives and associated technology and expertise, as soon as safely possible.

1.13.

Calls on the Commission to develop a geopolitical energy import strategy before proposing energy partnerships with politically unpredictable countries, taking into account the urgent situations regarding climate mitigation and energy. An inventory of unused gas and oil deposits in Europe needs to be prepared.

2.   EXPLANATORY NOTES

Arguments in support of the preamble

2.1.

For a long time, natural gas and oil have been a powerful geopolitical weapon for Russia. The country has used it as a foreign policy tool. Recurrent themes of Russian gas ‘diplomacy’ have included undermining EU unity and influencing the domestic politics of the Member States.

2.2.

The unlawful full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 proved again that gas, oil, coal and uranium are not just economic, but geopolitical commodities. Dependency on authoritarian regimes not only undermines EU sovereignty, but helps dictatorships to finance hostile, anti-democratic policies and ultimately terror and war. While some EU countries (such as Poland and the Baltic states) had long warned of this weaponisation, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine made the threat undeniable.

Arguments in support of recommendations 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3

2.3.

To eliminate the geopolitical risk connected to abusive Russian export practices, the EU decided to step up the diversification of energy supplies. This process is focused on reducing dependency on Russia as a single supplier, thereby increasing EU energy security, economic stability and resilience to disruptions. The REPowerEU (3) plan is the cornerstone of a new EU approach; it has substantially reduced imports of Russian gas, oil, coal and nuclear fuel, enabled the sourcing of energy from new suppliers, and redoubled efforts to deploy clean energy.

2.4.

The disruptions caused by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine resulted in the most serious gas supply crisis to hit the EU at any point in its history up until 2022, depriving EU Member States of 20 % of their gas supplies (30 % of imports). Gas disruptions also cascaded into oil-related issues. A large number of Member States were affected, and there were significant economic repercussions in several Member States (4).

2.5.

The Proposal under consideration here builds on the 2022 REPowerEU (5) Communication and the Versailles Declaration of EU Heads of State and Government which called to end Europe’s dependency on Russian energy imports. The Proposal was finally announced in the Commission Communication on the Roadmap for ending Russian energy imports of 6 May 2025.

Arguments in support of recommendations 1.4 and 1.8

2.6.

The full implementation of the Proposal faces serious risks – legal, economic, political, and logistical. Thus a full review of the implementation of the proposed regulation should be carried out by the Commission on the basis of the results achieved by mid-2029.

The transparency framework introduced by the Proposal will be the cornerstone for monitoring the EU’s exposure to gas and oil of direct or indirect Russian origin. Only then will the EU be able to close the current loopholes allowing EU Member States to import Russian oil, pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) via intermediaries and rebrand it, so that the EU stops paying billions of euros that end up in Russia’s war budget.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.5

2.7.

In 2021, total Russian gas imports to the EU (pipeline + LNG) were around 150 bcm (6) (approximately 45 % of total EU gas imports, amounting to around 336 bcm). In the first quarter of 2025, Russia still accounted for about 18 % of EU gas imports.

2.7.1.

While pipeline imports fell sharply, LNG imports from Russia after 2022 increased considerably (Russian LNG imports to the EU were 16 bcm in 2021, 22 bcm in 2022 and 21.7 bcm in 2023). Although this dependency is regrettable, it also presents an opportunity, as, from a technical perspective, LNG shipments from Russia can be substituted more rapidly with imports from other sources.

2.8.

In 2021, Russia supplied approximately 3,5 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil to the EU. Additionally, it exported around 1,2 mb/d of refined petroleum products to EU markets, totalling around 4,7 million bpd, or around 170 million tonnes/year (about 60 % of Russian exports).

2.8.1.

By the end of 2024, Russian crude oil accounted for only about 3 % of the EU’s total crude oil imports, down from 27 % in early 2022. Refined products: by March 2023, imports of these products had decreased by approximately 92 % compared to January 2022.

2.8.2.

As of 2024, three EU countries (Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia) were still importing significant amounts of Russian oil, primarily via the Druzhba pipeline. Czechia completed the TAL-PLUS pipeline project in April 2025, enabling the country to replace Russian oil supplies with alternative sources.

2.9.

Several Member States have already demonstrated that a speedy phase-out is possible and feasible through decisive action despite previous dependency:

2.9.1.

Czechia and Poland (Orlen) both announced the full cessation of Russian oil imports (Czechia via pipeline upgrades; Poland from 1 July 2025).

2.9.2.

The Baltic states disconnected from the Russian Belarusian grid and fully synchronised with the EU electricity grid in February 2025.

2.9.3.

Finland ceased imports of Russian gas, electricity, wood chips, crude oil and coal, and is adopting national legislation to ban the importing of Russian LNG until at least 2035.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.6

2.10.

The Proposal introduces a new tool to facilitate the definitive phase-out of Russian gas and oil imports: diversification plans. The Member States must submit national gas and oil (where appropriate) diversification plans by 1 March 2026. The plans are to include: — available information on the volume of imports of Russian natural gas/oil; — a description of measures in place and planned at national level to replace natural gas/oil imports from Russia; and — the identification of any potential technical, contractual or regulatory barriers to replacing natural gas/oil imports from Russia.

2.11.

The Commission, in cooperation with the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), will review the national diversification plans and issue recommendations if a Member State is likely to miss the deadline established by the Proposal. The Member States concerned must update their national diversification plans within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendations. Annual progress reports will be published. The EESC is concerned about a lack of parliamentary oversight at EU level. The deadlines proposed must not be exceeded; thus political engagement is also necessary.

2.12.

The Proposal establishes a new transparency and monitoring framework through amendments to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, requiring importers of Russian-origin natural gas and oil to provide detailed contractual information to the Commission and national competent authorities. Comprehensive information on supply dependencies is crucial to assessing the security of gas and oil supply in the EU. The conclusions from this analysis should be shared with the European Parliament.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.7

2.13.

Article 15 of the Proposal allows the Commission to grant individual Member States the possibility to continue Russian energy imports in contradiction with the Proposal. The conditions for this are not specified in clear and measurable metrics, which creates a possible loophole in the legislation. Therefore, the EESC proposes deleting the possibility to grant exemptions and focus the Article on monitoring.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.9

2.14.

Despite the bans introduced, Russian gas and oil continue to enter the EU market indirectly:

2.14.1.

Refineries in countries such as India, Turkey and China process Russian crude oil and export refined products to the EU.

2.14.2.

Russia has employed a ‘shadow fleet’ – an unregulated, opaque network of ageing tankers to circumvent sanctions and transport sanctioned oil. In addition to sanctions avoidance, this ‘shadow fleet’ represents a significant risk for naval and environmental security. It also poses a significant risk to the EU’s geopolitical interests.

2.14.3.

A significant volume of Russian gas continues to enter the EU market through TurkStream pipeline flows and LNG imports, bolstered by strategic exemptions and logistical loopholes.

2.15.

The Proposal recognises the essential role that LNG will play in securing future gas supplies. The gas import ban is therefore complemented by a ban on providing LNG terminal services to Russian entities, in order to ensure that import infrastructure is not blocked by Russian customers. As a significant portion of LNG capacity in certain Member States is controlled by Russian entities, the Proposal eliminates the risk that Russia could obstruct alternative imports.

2.16.

Analysts confirm that Russian gas imports into the EU actually rose in 2024, contributing to financing Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian gas imports in 2024 increased by 19 % on the previous year. After it stopped transiting through Ukraine in 2025, Russian gas is estimated to represent around 13 % of the EU’s gas imports in 2025. Despite the substantial reduction in the dependency on Russia, the EU remains at risk. The volume sourced from Russia should not be considered negligible.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.10

2.17.

The green transition to a carbon-neutral EU automatically reduces the dependency on fossil energy imports from Russia and other non-democratic countries. Measures to reach the EU climate targets are important steps in reducing dependency on Russian energy imports. Accelerating the phase-out of fossil fuels, alongside the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies, constitutes a sound economic and geopolitical strategy to support and finance an expedited decarbonisation process (7). It should be carried out in such a way that the new energy sources contribute to cost reductions for households and businesses. It should also include an increase in biomethane production in the EU.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.11

2.18.

The phase-out of Russian natural gas and oil is necessary from both a geopolitical and an energy policy perspective. At the same time, a just transition must be ensured for all affected workers. Accompanying measures to secure employment, retraining and socially-cushioned structural change must be made an integral part of the regulation.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.13

2.19.

The EU needs to further strategically diversify gas and oil supply sources. As the diversification might lead to increased energy prices, the Commission should monitor the development of prices for gas, oil and electricity closely and introduce measures against unjustified price hikes, which negatively affect the competitiveness of the EU and could lead to a new cost of living crisis.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.12

2.20.

Russia also supplies the EU with various nuclear materials, which exposes the EU’s nuclear energy production sector and other nuclear sectors to economic security risks similar to those which have hit natural gas and oil. The EESC therefore acknowledges that it is feasible to decouple the legislative proposals for gas/oil measures from those applying to measures in the nuclear sector. However it is important to introduce measures for uranium, its derivatives and associated technology and expertise, as soon as safely possible.

3.   PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Amendment 1

linked to recommendations 1.3 and 1.5

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Article 1	Article 1
Subject matter	Subject matter
This Regulation provides a framework for effectively removing the Union’s exposure to the significant risks for trade and security, resulting from gas trade with the Russian Federation by laying down:	This Regulation provides a framework for effectively removing the Union’s exposure to the significant risks for trade and security, resulting from gas and oil trade with the Russian Federation by laying down:
(a) a stepwise prohibition of imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation and of the provision of LNG terminal services;	(a) a stepwise prohibition of imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation and of the provision of LNG terminal services;
(b) rules to effectively implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the phase out of oil imports from Russia;	(b) rules to effectively implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the phase out of oil imports from Russia;
(c) (c) provisions to better assess the security of energy supplies in the Union.	(c) (c) provisions to better assess the security of energy supplies in the Union.

Reason

The EU needs to prioritise the phase-out of Russian gas and oil in 2026 ensuring full and definitive completion by the end of 2027 at the latest, recognising the urgent need to cease funding Russia’s war effort and placing the EU’s security above the perceived short-term financial gains of a handful of Member States.

Amendment 2

linked to recommendation 1.5

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Chapter II	Chapter II
STEPWISE BAN OF NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION	STEPWISE BAN OF NATURAL GAS AND OIL IMPORTS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Reason

Refineries in countries such as India, Turkey and China process Russian crude oil and export refined products to the EU. Russia has employed a ‘shadow fleet’ – an unregulated, opaque network of ageing tankers to circumvent sanctions and transport sanctioned oil. Phasing out direct and indirect Russian oil exports to the EU – although challenging – is a must. The EU must not leave any space for Russia to discreetly rebuild energy supplies to Europe in the future.

Amendment 3

linked to recommendation 1.5

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
	Article 7 (new)
	Prohibition of oil imports from the Russian Federation
	The import of oil, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2027.

Reason

Refineries in countries such as India, Turkey and China process Russian crude oil and export refined products to the EU. Russia has employed a ‘shadow fleet’ – an unregulated, opaque network of ageing tankers to circumvent sanctions and transport sanctioned oil. Phasing out direct and indirect Russian oil exports to the EU – although challenging – is a must.

Amendment 4

linked to recommendation 1.8

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Article 10	Article 10
Exchange of information	Exchange of information
Customs authorities shall exchange the information received from natural gas importers with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, ACER and the Commission to the extent necessary to ensure effective assessment whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 to 6 of this Regulation are fulfilled. Customs authorities from different Member States shall exchange information received from natural gas importers to the extent necessary, and cooperate with each other in order to avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing tools and databases allowing that relevant information can be effectively exchanged between national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such tools in place where necessary.	Customs authorities shall exchange the information received from natural gas importers with regulatory authorities, competent authorities, ACER and the Commission to the extent necessary to ensure effective assessment whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 to 6 of this Regulation are fulfilled. Customs authorities from different Member States shall exchange information received from natural gas importers to the extent necessary, and cooperate with each other in order to avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing tools and databases allowing that relevant information can be effectively exchanged between national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such tools in place where necessary.
By 31 August 2026 and 31 August 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this Regulation and own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts on the supply of gas originating in or directly or indirectly exported from Russia, and assessing the impact of diversification on energy markets.	By 31 August 2026 and 31 August 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this Regulation and own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts on the supply of gas originating in or directly or indirectly exported from Russia, and assessing the impact of diversification on energy markets.
The Commission and ACER shall share relevant information on contracts on the import of Russian gas in their possession with customs authorities where appropriate to facilitate the enforcement of this Regulation.	The Commission and ACER shall share relevant information on contracts on the import of Russian gas in their possession with customs authorities where appropriate to facilitate the enforcement of this Regulation.
	On the basis of the results achieved by mid-2029, the Commission shall prepare a report on the implementation of the Regulation.
	The Commission shall provide the reports and impact assessments to the European Parliament.

Reason

The EESC is concerned about a lack of parliamentary oversight at EU level. The deadlines proposed must not be exceeded; thus political engagement in monitoring the regulation’s implementation is also needed.

The full implementation of the Proposal faces serious risks – legal, economic, political, and logistical. Thus a full review of the implementation of the proposed regulation should be carried out by the Commission on the basis of the results achieved by mid-2029.

Amendment 5

linked to recommendations 1.6 and 1.8

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Article 12	Article 12
1.   Where Member States receive imports of oil originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian federation, they shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their oil supplies, to discontinue, by 1 January 2028 , imports of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.	1.   Where Member States receive imports of oil originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian federation, they shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their oil supplies, to discontinue, by 1 January 2027 , imports of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

Reason

The Commission, in cooperation with ACER, will review the national diversification plans and issue recommendations if a Member State is likely to miss the deadline established by the proposal. The Member States concerned must update their national diversification plans, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendations. There is no reason why the rules concerning the diversification plans for gas should be different from those concerning oil imports.

Amendment 6

linked to recommendations 1.6 and 1.8

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Article 12	Article 12
5.   Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the objective of phasing out Russian oil by 1 January 2028 may not be achieved, the Commission may issue a recommendation, after assessing the plan, to the respective Member State on how to achieve the phase out in a timely manner. Following that recommendation, the Member State shall update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendation.	5.   Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the objective of phasing out Russian oil by 1 January 2027 may not be achieved, the Commission shall issue a recommendation, after assessing the plan, to the respective Member State on how to achieve the phase out in a timely manner. Following that recommendation, the Member State shall update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendation.

Reason

The Commission, in cooperation with ACER will review the national diversification plans and issue recommendations if a Member State is likely to miss the deadline established by the proposal. The Member States concerned must update their national diversification plans within three months, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendations. There is no reason why the rules concerning the diversification plans for gas should be different from those concerning oil imports.

Amendment 7

linked to recommendation 1.7

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Article 15 Monitoring and review	Article 15 Monitoring and review
The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union’s energy market, notably with respect to potential gas supply dependencies or other security of supply risks in relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation. In the case of sudden and significant developments, seriously threatening the security of supply of one or more Member States, the Commission may authorise one or more Member States to temporarily suspend the application of Chapter Two of this Regulation, in whole or in part. The Commission decision may contain certain conditions, in particular, to ensure that any suspension is strictly limited to addressing the threat.	The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union’s energy market, notably with respect to potential gas supply dependencies or other security of supply risks in relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation.

Reason

A derogation clause as originally proposed in Article 15 would weaken the collective European resilience and signal that some Member States could delay the necessary actions, leading to internal disputes and reducing pressure on Russia by undermining EU unity. The EU must not leave any space for Russia to discreetly rebuild energy supplies to Europe in the future.

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(1)  Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee: The war in Ukraine and its economic, social and environmental impact, 24 March, 2022.

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1).

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions REPowerEU Plan (COM(2022) 230 final) and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, Directive 2003/87/EC and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 (COM(2022) 231 final – 2022/0164(COD)) ( OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 185).

(4)   https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009SC0977.

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy (COM(2022) 108 final) ( OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 123).

(6)  Billion cubic meters.

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies while ensuring European competitiveness, mitigating the cost of living crisis, and promoting a just transition (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2025/3191, 2.7.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3191/oj).