1.

Understanding the local and cultural context

(t)

ensure that the EU’s conflict Early Warning System is sufficiently proactive, provided with the necessary resources and based on forward-looking, comprehensive and robust analysis of risk factors that frequently correlate with the outburst of violence, as well as management tools that identify, assess and help to prioritise situations at risk of violent conflict;

(u)

closely and systematically involve the EU delegations in countries and regions at risk of conflict or dealing with frozen and unresolved conflicts in monitoring the situation on the ground and regularly contributing to the EU conflict Early Warning System; advocate for full and unimpeded humanitarian access and respect for international law when exercising preventive diplomacy in frozen conflicts;

(v)

assess the results achieved by the EU conflict Early Warning System and propose adjustments to make it more effective so that it can identify structural risk factors and enable policymakers to develop timely strategic responses to mitigate risks and identify opportunities for conflict prevention;

(w)

ensure that this mechanism collaborates closely with the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN), the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the Satellite Centre owing to the need for a pertinent flow of information in this regard; strengthen the EU INTCEN and the EEAS Crisis Response Centre by increasing their staff, financial resources and capabilities;

(x)

establish close cooperation with relevant UN offices and agencies and other international actors, most notably NATO, on the ground to pool information in the context of early warning efforts;

(y)

constantly improve the security protocols of the services working on intelligence and/or with sensible information;

(z)

consider local, cultural and historical backgrounds when appointing special representatives and envoys in order to avoid sparking controversy in conflict regions should the appointment come from a Member State with historical ties to the region concerned that could threaten their perception as honest broker; take into account the crucial importance of these representatives being properly familiarised with and trained in the area they will assess;

(aa)

thoroughly assess, including scrutiny in Parliament, the initiatives undertaken by EU special representatives and envoys, as well as their results and how they are contributing to preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution processes or the implementation of EU-brokered ceasefire agreements, where relevant;

(ab)

provide regular and thorough assessments on the accountability of the EU special representatives and envoys pursuant to their mandates, and an overview of the initiatives they have undertaken and the results they have achieved in the conflict resolution processes, as well as mediation of the implementation of the EU-brokered ceasefire agreements;

(ac)

improve the transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of the work of the EU special representatives and envoys by providing Parliament with regular and detailed reports on their activities and achievements pursuant to their mandates; promote closer relations between EU special representatives and envoys and Parliament in the light of the inter-parliamentary diplomatic efforts;

(ad)

ensure that the appointment of EU special representatives, special envoys and ambassadors can only be confirmed after a positive assessment by Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs;

(ae)

conduct a study into the lessons learnt from the EU’s prior actions, missed opportunities for preventive diplomacy and its achievements in the process of peaceful conflict resolution, for example, in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Moldova and Ukraine;

(af)

prevent, in the future, the possible negative consequences of the premature suspension of EU missions in conflict regions, as well the continuation of highly ineffective missions or those that have the potential to have negative political and security effects;

(ag)

expand the preventive diplomacy toolbox of the EU’s civilian and military missions and operations, as well as their capacity and staff training in order to anticipate and react more quickly to developing situations on the ground;

(ah)

ensure that the EU assumes a more active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process on the Cyprus problem, with all appropriate means at its disposal, including through the appointment of an EU envoy, with a view to reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis;

(ai)

draw on the lessons learnt from the lack of progress in the implementation of the EU-brokered ceasefire agreements, including the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement between Russia and Georgia;

(aj)

stress the need for the EU to play an active role wherever there are breaches of international humanitarian law;

(ak)

ensure a coordinated approach between the EU and its Member States in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as opposed to what occurred in Afghanistan where they were working in parallel in different regions;

(al)

enhance the EU’s ability to rigorously and continuously analyse and predict the political and security situation in crisis regions and adapt the EU’s response to shifting realities on the ground, including by ensuring there is a responsible focal point for conflict analysis in every EU delegation; ensure complementarity between efforts on the ground and diplomatic efforts between governments, representatives and other relevant actors at state level;

(am)

assess what has been lacking in the EU’s preventive diplomacy efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to avert the tensions owing to inflammatory rhetoric and secessionist acts that undermine its European aspirations; urge Bosnia and Herzegovina to urgently find a common political agreement in order to comply with the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023 and to be able to open accession negotiations before March 2024, also taking into account the volatile geopolitical situation and efforts to prevent external malign influences in the region, thus paving the way for permanent peace and stability in the country and region; welcome the European Council’s decision of 14-15 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina upon its compliance with the EU membership criteria; eagerly await eagerly the Commission’s report on progress and expects it by no later than March 2024;

(an)

expand the mission EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and strengthen its conflict prevention toolbox; note that it is the most successful EU peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission to date that has maintained stability in the region and contributed to a safe and secure environment in the country;

(ao)

set up a mechanism to verify and ensure the implementation of all agreements reached between Serbia and Kosovo so far, and to report to Parliament periodically in order to ensure that further tensions are averted and to provide more effective mediation and facilitation efforts between the parties, including by allocating more resources to the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and making the dialogue process more citizen-oriented, with the goal of overcoming the current stalemate;

(ap)

aim to come up with lessons learnt from the failed preventive diplomacy efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan that resulted in Azerbaijan’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh and situations similar to the one during and after the 2020 war when, after the OSCE international dialogue framework had failed, the EU’s passive stance was insufficient to prevent the return to violent conflict and left the EU less impactful than other regional actors, such as Russia, Iran and Türkiye, who also continue to exert their influence and diminish that of the EU in the region and prevent the spillover effect in Armenia; respond to the instability in the wider South Caucasus region and strengthen the EU’s diplomatic efforts in the context of the Geneva International Discussions and otherwise, with the aim of ensuring that Russia fulfils its obligations under the EU-brokered ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in particular to withdraw its occupying forces from the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia;

(aq)

address the root causes of the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was further exacerbated by the despicable terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, leading to a counter-attack by Israel, which have both led to thousands of casualties on both sides and the immense suffering of innocent civilians; intensify efforts, in coordination with its partners in the region and the international community, for the negotiated two-state solution in the internationally shared understanding that this offers the best chance for a viable peace settlement, with the aim of ending the recurring violence and enabling people on the Israeli and Palestinian sides to live in security, freedom, dignity and with equal rights; ensure that the EU is seen as mediator and honest broker, upholding international law in order to have a more effective role in the international arena;

(ar)

promote the EU’s participation in mediation, peacebuilding and conflict resolution such as in Colombia’s peace process, where the Union’s support focused on addressing the root causes of the conflict, including inequalities and human rights violations, through reconciliation efforts, economic territorial development through rural integration and multilevel political dialogue;

(as)

prioritise quiet diplomacy as the tool of choice when undertaking prevention initiatives, overcome the early warning-early action gap, increase the effectiveness of cooperation with other international partners and improve intra-EU coordination, including on civil-military matters and increase local ownership of EU initiatives;

(at)

draw from the EU’s experience and non-EU countries’ best practices on cross-border cooperation as a highly useful instrument for sustainable peacebuilding and conflict resolution between neighbours, especially after the stabilisation of conflicts;

(au)

develop an EU agenda/compact/guidelines for peace and diplomacy under the auspices of the VP / HR;

(av)

designate Peace and Conflict Advisors who will coordinate the work of the political, press and information and cooperation sections of the delegations;

(aw)

create a Council working party on prevention and mediation to discuss the prioritisation of opportunities for preventive engagement, as well as resulting analysis, follow-up and monitoring;

(ax)

propose an institutional upgrade through a new Peace and Prevention Hub that acts as a single-entry point for matters of prevention within the EEAS, enhanced regional cooperation and increased capacity to engage on topics of conflict, peace, prevention and diplomacy;

(ay)

strengthen partnerships and coordination on preventive diplomacy with international, regional and sub-regional actors, such as the UN, the OSCE and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, NATO, the African Union and its regional components, African regional organisations (such as ECOWAS), the Organization of American States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; notes that a closer partnership with the UN and its bodies, notably the Peacebuilding Commission, can lead to strengthened coordination in conflict prevention globally;

(az)

ensure a coordinated, dynamic and multilateral approach to early warning, conflict prevention and mediation between the EU and other international organisations, such as the UN, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Council of Europe, OECD and the OSCE; ensure that EU delegations continuously liaise with UN field mechanisms such as the UN Resident Coordinator on the ground when pertinent;

(ba)

use diplomatic means and cooperate with multilateral platforms for peace to strengthen and consolidate anticipatory relationships before conflicts arise, especially the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, OECD’s International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre;

(bb)

reiterate that the EU-UN partnership should use existing resolutions and lessons learnt for conflict prevention and work together to create new policies through regular consultations and exchanges of practices; emphasise the vital role that this coordination can play for conflict prevention strategies;

(bc)

welcome the UN’s New Agenda for Peace and the Peacebuilding Commission’s role and actions in human rights protection and peacebuilding efforts; propose to coordinate national conflict prevention strategies with the EEAS and their presentation on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda as well as stronger collaboration with the UN; note that these exchanges and better partnership with international and regional financial institutions could contribute significantly to conflict prevention in the areas of EU interest, as well as through smaller preventive missions that could assess instabilities after civilian missions withdraw from conflict-affected countries or countries with a potential risk of conflict, with a mission to remove factors that threaten security and safety;

(bd)

ensure that the EU is the single largest contributor to the UN system and takes leading positions at the UN in proportion to the size of its contributions to the organisation, which cover 30 % of its costs and 33 % of the expenses for UN peacekeeping missions;

(be)

use the EU’s representation at the UN headquarters in New York, Vienna, Geneva and Nairobi to actively engage with other UN member states to promote and protect the diplomatic rules-based international order founded on the UN Charter, along with a well-functioning, reformed multilateral system with an inclusive and effective UN at its core;

(bf)

pursue structured information exchanges, joint horizon scanning, strategic foresight and gender-responsive conflict analyses to ensure alignment between the EU and its partners within and outside of the EU; note that these actions could potentially bring the EU closer to becoming a leading actor in conflict prevention and resolution around the world;

(bg)

acknowledge the importance of faith-based organisations as players in conflict resolution and mediation, which makes them partners for preventive diplomacy; condemn, in this context, attacks on faith-based actors, in particular the imprisonment of bishops and priests in Nicaragua, including Sakharov Prize finalist Monsignor Rolando Álvarez;

(bh)

recognise the role of relevant regional organisations, stakeholders in Member States, like-minded partners and other involved actors including civil society and other non-governmental actors as key players in effective prevention and mediation and resolution, including women and youth, and as peace actors by using their historical relationships and individuals of distinguished record to mitigate the possible crises;

(bi)

actively and inclusively engage young people in efforts and cooperation to prevent conflicts and maintain peace, and implement the EU Youth Action Plan in EU external action, which supports the implementation of the UN Youth, Peace and Security Agenda;

(bj)

guarantee that EU delegations operate with a focal point on conflict prevention and peacebuilding; ensure that EU delegations, and particularly the abovementioned focal points, provide constant ground information to the EU conflict Early Warning System, the EU INTCEN and the EEAS Crisis Response Centre;

(bk)

step up efforts in fighting disinformation, misinformation and foreign interference operations from malicious actors seeking to foment conflicts and polarise communities, which can lead to the destabilisation of entire regions; reinforce cooperation with like-minded partners, such as NATO, on countering disinformation, hybrid threats and foreign interference coming from non-EU countries, which represents an essential part of preventive diplomacy;

(bl)

recognise the specific vulnerabilities in conflict situations of at-risk groups including women, children, people with disabilities, people in jail – in particular political prisoners – human rights defenders, journalists and LGBTI people;

(bm)

ensure that the EU’s preventive diplomatic efforts are sufficiently sensitised to these vulnerabilities and address the particular concerns and needs of at-risk groups;

(bn)

recognise the specific vulnerabilities in conflict situations faced by non-governmental organisations on the ground, especially the ones working with at-risk populations and on sexual and reproductive rights;

(bo)

enhance the EU’s capacity to act in situations where there are no like-minded partners in order to increase its standing and geopolitical leverage in conflict prevention and resolution, and strengthen the EU’s role as a more proactive and resilient actor in the international order;

(bp)

strengthen the Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention thematic programme of the NDICI – Global Europe instrument to enable the EU to better fund actions to promote peace, stability and conflict prevention; increase the funds available for conflict prevention under the NDICI – Global Europe thematic programme for the period until 2027, and increase the relevant administrative capacities (ISP.2) as this would reflect the profound changes to the security environment, in particular, since February 2022; swiftly implement the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (‘triple nexus’) approach in order to support conflict prevention efforts and strengthen the resilience of communities in areas affected by frozen conflicts that have varying levels of fragility, insecurity and poverty;

(bq)

recall that conflict prevention cannot be instrumentalised for security and geopolitical purposes, thus risking counterproductive peace and security repercussions in the long-term;

(br)

strengthen the EU’s ability to speak with one voice and to act as a truly global player in response to crises by implementing the necessary reforms to the decision-making processes;

(bs)

recognise the role of EU climate diplomacy in achieving the EU’s ambition for preventive diplomacy; invest more in supporting communities globally that are on the front lines of the climate emergency, and prepare for the now unavoidable increase in extreme weather events in order to mitigate the consequent increase in the preconditions for conflict and violence; address the role of climate-related resource scarcity and natural disaster response in exacerbating conflict, and provide inclusive solutions to climate and resource-related insecurity; use the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28), and in particular the inclusion of ‘Peace’ as a theme for the first time this year, as an opportunity to lead the international community in integrating and aligning diplomacy for peace and the climate;

(bt)

work towards ensuring that the EU takes up a prominent leadership position in peacekeeping operations, peacemaking and mediation, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security around the world by fostering more resilient and enduring connections with other countries through its instruments and mechanisms, such as the Global Gateway;

(bu)

recall that greater focus on protecting and preserving cultural heritage after conflicts and crises can help to protect identities, develop mutual understanding and create foundations for sustainable recovery, reconciliation and lasting peace in post-conflict environments; note that these practices can lay the foundations for successful preventive diplomacy actions;

(bv)

engage with the Commission, the Council and Parliament with the aim of strengthening the financial and staff resources of the EEAS, both at its headquarters and EU delegations, in order to enable the service to reinforce its preventive diplomacy capabilities, among other things, and to be better prepared to tackle current and emerging global challenges and conflicts;

(bw)

deploy the Jean Monnet Dialogue, the Inter-parliamentary Dialogue and the Parliamentary Dialogue Process, which can contribute to building democratic parliamentary culture and preventing conflict in the accession countries, especially in the de-escalation of Serbia-Kosovo relations;

(bx)

insist on the budgetary increase for CFSP actions and other appropriate conflict and crisis response instruments in order to fully match the EU’s activities and capabilities with current challenges and conflicts worldwide;

(by)

develop a comprehensive EU strategy for preventive diplomacy that includes long-term commitment actions and initiatives for non-EU countries in conflicts; foster the development of multi-tier governance structures for non-EU countries in conflict, as well as their integration within regional organisations and structures, contributing to the removal of triggers of violence or escalation of conflict and to their sustainable resolution; take stock, in this regard, of best practices worldwide and support domestic prevention actors and mechanisms by providing the necessary political, technical and financial support;

(bz)

strengthen and update the EU’s 2018 Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises with special attention to conflict prevention and resolution that combines human rights promotion and protection, humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and security assistance, sanctions and diplomatic engagement, fully addressing all aspects of the conflict, including in partnership with local and international partners;

(ca)

stress the need to establish a European Civil Peace Corps that brings together the expertise of institutional and non-institutional actors on conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation, with a view to making EU civilian crisis management more credible, coherent, effective, flexible and visible;

(cb)

consider the use, notwithstanding the political dimension and solutions to conflicts, of litigation through an international court or tribunal, such as the International Criminal Court or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, as a method of preventive diplomacy;

(cc)

step up its public diplomacy and visibility efforts and communication campaigns in order to ensure that the EU is seen as a global peace actor and a key stakeholder in preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding, including the prevention of conflicts dimension of its missions and operations, and that its actions and success stories are not undermined by false narratives spread or claimed by other global actors present in conflict regions; allocate the necessary resources to the EEAS, and particularly the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the EEAS and EU delegations to ensure the inclusivity and coherence of their cooperation activities with partner countries;

(cd)

continue to professionalise preventive diplomacy by ensuring that it is part of the training programme of the permanent structure of Parliament’s pilot project on the creation of the European Diplomatic Academy;

(ce)

build on existing well-functioning cooperation mechanisms in the EU, such as the Civil Protection Mechanism and CSDP missions and operations, in order to make use of the Member States’ expertise and avoid the duplication of efforts and resources; believe that the Member States should be more involved in the identification of prevention priorities and options for action, which should lead to improved sharing and coordination among them;

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2.