EUR-Lex Access to European Union law
This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52011SC1473
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT /* SEC/2011/1473 final - CNS 2011/0414 */
The Chernobyl
accident in 1986 and the Fukushima-Daiichi accident in
2011 highlighted the global importance
of nuclear safety. In order to fulfil the objective of the Euratom Treaty to create the conditions of safety
necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public, the
European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Community’) should
be able to support nuclear safety in third countries. There is also a particular need for the
Community to continue its efforts in support of the application of effective
safeguards of nuclear material in third countries, building on its own safeguard activities within the
European Union. The above objectives were supported in the past by the
TACIS and PHARE nuclear safety programmes and, since 2007, by the INSC in
'third countries' and the Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance (IPA) for the countries engaged in the process of accession to the
EU.
1.
Problem definition
The promotion and enforcement of the
highest standards of nuclear safety and radiation protection within the
boundaries of the EU may not be sufficient to suitably protect the general
public and the environment. Recent history has clearly confirmed that the
consequences of a nuclear accident on public health, social life, the
environment and economy may extend their impact well beyond national borders
and, potentially, worldwide. Therefore action with third countries,
particularly those in the EU Neighbourhood, needs to be envisaged with the
overall objective of promoting a high level of nuclear safety and radiation
protection worldwide. In parallel, action is also required to help ensure
effective nuclear safeguards in third countries. Review of lessons learnt and evolution
of the international situation The root causes of the major nuclear
accidents have been mainly lack of nuclear safety culture, design safety
(safety aspects of the plant design) and operational safety. The EU nuclear
safety cooperation programmes provided for assistance/cooperation with the operators
of nuclear installations, to improve the situation on the ground, and with the
nuclear regulators to ensure that they had the required technical capability
and independence to enforce adherence to appropriate nuclear safety standards.
Cooperation with nuclear regulators should remain at the centre of the nuclear
safety cooperation. In specific situations, the possibility for cooperation
with nuclear operators should also be maintained for the performance and
results of the comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessments
('stress tests'), developed in the EU after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident.. Cooperation on spent fuel and radioactive
waste management and disposal as well as on the restoration of former nuclear
sites to an environmentally safe situation, for which international cooperation
is required, have been an important part of the programme and should be among
the instrument’s priorities in the future. The promotion of international cooperation,
notably through the IAEA will remain essential to ensure coordination of activities
by the different actors and the best use of resources.
2.
Analysis of subsidiarity
With 27 Member States acting within common
policies and strategies, the EU alone has the critical weight to respond to
global challenges, while the action of Member States can be limited and
fragmented, with projects which are often too small to make a sustainable
difference in the field. This critical mass also puts the EU in a better
position to conduct policy dialogue with partner governments. This is
reflected, for example in the strong position of the EU in discussions and
negotiations with the G8 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), which manages large nuclear safety funds on behalf of
international donors. Furthermore, the EU is a natural coordinator and can
influence almost all fields of international relations, which individual Member
States, in general, cannot do alone.
3.
Objectives of EU initiative
The current INSC provides for the promotion
of a high level of nuclear safety and radiation protection, as well as the
implementation of effective nuclear safeguards in third countries. It is proposed that the general objective
and scope of the new instrument be identical to the current INSC: The
Community shall finance measures to support the promotion of a high level of
nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and
effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries. This will be
pursued through the following specific objectives: ·
Support the promotion and implementation of the
highest standards of nuclear safety and radiation protection in nuclear
installations and radiological practices in third countries. ·
Support the development and implementation of
responsible strategies concerning the disposal of spent fuel, waste management,
decommissioning of installations and restoration of former nuclear sites. ·
Support the promotion and implementation of
effective frameworks and methodologies for the improvement of nuclear
safeguards worldwide. However, the priorities and the criteria
for the EU actions will be redefined in more specific terms in the context of
the new instrument.
4.
Policy Options
The impact assessment reviews four options:
i) no further EU action (no Nuclear Safety Instrument); ii) ’no change’ (cooperation
with third countries would continue in the framework of the existing INSC
Regulation); iii) amend the INSC Regulation and iv) a new Instrument, which
could include the current INSC scope plus part of the scope of the existing Instrument
for Stability (IFS). The amended regulation was the option
assessed in greater detail. It could provide for taking into account the
evolution of the international situation on nuclear safety and incorporating
the lessons learnt, and would also allow clarification of the criteria for
cooperation and the priorities. The geographic scope could be revised to cover all
‘third countries’ (non EU Member States) which satisfy the criteria for
cooperation, including countries covered by the Instrument for Pre-Accession
(IPA) as well as industrialized / high income countries. The legal basis of the current INSC
Regulation is the Euratom Treaty. Considering the legislative framework for
nuclear safety at EU level, this should remain the case with the future
Regulation, unless an enlarged scope would require a multiple legal basis.
5.
Assessment of impacts
Nuclear accidents may have dramatic health,
social, environmental and economic impacts as demonstrated by the Chernobyl
accident (1986) and the Fukushima accident (2011). Both accidents produced
large contaminated areas, fatalities and displacement / resettlement of the affected
population and resulted in the need to decommission / dismantle very expensive
nuclear power plants and to replace the lost power generating capacity. Such accidents
also affect the choices concerning the energy mix in some countries (moratorium
or phasing out nuclear energy) with possible consequential impact on the
environment as the replacement power plants may require, for example, the use
of fossil fuels or hydropower. The EU proposed actions are intended to
help prevent the occurrence of nuclear accidents, minimize their consequences
(through emergency preparedness measures) and mitigate the consequences of
accidents should they occur. Each of the options considered pursues these
objectives. However, the 'no further EU action' (no Nuclear Safety Instrument)
would likely discontinue most of the on-going external actions undertaken by
the EU on nuclear safety.
6.
Comparison of options
The option to amend the Regulation would
allow the present uncertainties and inconsistencies to be resolved and provide
the opportunity to clearly establish the focus of EU cooperation on nuclear
safety and safeguards. The clearer definition of geographic and thematic
objectives and priorities in the regulation itself would improve the efficiency
of the implementation of the instrument. A more effective and timely management
of the project cycle could therefore be expected. In comparison with options 'no change' and 'a
new Instrument', it would allow for continuity and the use of the experience of
a well tried system, while resolving a number of issues which have been
identified. This, as well as the utilization of a single legal basis (as
compared with the 'new Instrument' option), would simplify the approach and discussions.
This appears to more than compensate for a possible greater coherence to be
gained by a 'new instrument' covering nuclear safety, security and safeguards. A redefinition of the geographic scope as
well as the criteria and priorities for cooperation in the context of the
'amended INSC' would permit a clearer understanding of the limits of
intervention.
7.
Monitoring and evaluation
The INSC is an enabling Regulation
establishing the essential elements and the basis for the EU intervention. The
annual action programmes detail the activities to be carried out by the EU,
including the objectives pursued by the respective actions and the expected
results. Specific indicators are defined prior to implementation, having in mind
the particularities of each action. The implementation of the actions complies
with performance-based
management, which serves the following purposes: –
making the most of limited resources; –
improving decision making processes and
decisions; –
achieving transparency and accountability. The European Commission's Monitoring and
Evaluation systems are increasingly focussed on results (Result Oriented
Monitoring). They involve internal staff as well as external expertise. Task
Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the
implementation of projects and programmes in various ways, including wherever
possible through field visits. External, independent experts are contracted to
assess the performance of EU external actions through three different systems.
These assessments contribute to accountability, and to the improvement of
ongoing interventions; they also draw lessons from past experience to inform
future policies and actions. The tools all use the internationally-recognised
OECD-DAC evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. The Commission also conducts strategic
evaluations of its policies, from programming and strategy to the
implementation of interventions in a specific sector. These evaluations are an
important input to the formulation of policies and the design of instruments
and projects. These evaluations are all published on the Commission's website
and a summary of the findings is included in the Annual Report to the Council
and the European Parliament.