ORDER OF THE COURT (Seventh Chamber)

19 July 2024 (*)

(Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Economic and monetary policy – Banking union – Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) – Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 – Article 18 – Resolution procedure – Adoption of a resolution scheme by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – No objection from the European Commission or the Council of the European Union – Endorsement of that scheme by the European Commission – Action for annulment – Inadmissibility of the action in so far as it is directed against the Council – Appeal manifestly unfounded)

In Case C‑709/23 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 20 November 2023,

MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, in liquidation, established in Vienna (Austria), represented by O. Behrends, Rechtsanwalt,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

Council of the European Union,

European Commission,

Single Resolution Board (SRB),

defendants at first instance,

THE COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of F. Biltgen, President of the Chamber, N. Wahl (Rapporteur) and J. Passer, Judges,

Advocate General: A. Rantos,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to rule by reasoned order, pursuant to Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice,

makes the following

Order

1        By its appeal, MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, in liquidation, asks the Court of Justice to set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 8 September 2023, MeSoFa v Council and Others (T‑524/22, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2023:558), by which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible, in so far as it is directed against the Council of the European Union, the appellant’s action seeking the annulment of Decision SRB/EES/2022/21 of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) of 1 March 2022 concerning the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Sberbank d.d. (‘the decision at issue’), in accordance with Article 18(6) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1) and, as a precaution ‘[the annulment of] the [European] Commission’s and the Council’s approval of [the decision at issue]’.

 Legal context

 Regulation No 806/2014

2        Recitals 24, 26, 60 and 61 of Regulation No 806/2014 are worded as follows:

‘(24)      Since only institutions of the [European] Union may establish the resolution policy of the Union and since a margin of discretion remains in the adoption of each specific resolution scheme, it is necessary to provide for the adequate involvement of the Council and the Commission, as institutions which may exercise implementing powers, in accordance with Article 291 TFEU. The assessment of the discretionary aspects of the resolution decisions taken by the Board should be exercised by the Commission. Given the considerable impact of the resolution decisions on the financial stability of Member States and on the Union as such, as well as on the fiscal sovereignty of Member States, it is important that implementing power to take certain decisions relating to resolution be conferred on the Council. It should therefore be for the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, to exercise effective control on the assessment by the Board of the existence of a public interest and to assess any material change to the amount of the [single resolution fund (“the Fund”)] to be used in a specific resolution action. Moreover, the Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify further criteria or conditions to be taken into account by the Board in the exercise of its different powers. Such a conferral of resolution tasks should not in any way hamper the functioning of the internal market for financial services. [The European Banking Union (EBA)] should therefore maintain its role and retain its existing powers and tasks: it should develop and contribute to the consistent application of the Union legislation applicable to all Member States and enhance convergence of resolution practices across the Union as a whole.

…

(26)      The [European Central Bank (ECB)], as the supervisor within the [Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)], and the Board, should be able to assess whether a credit institution is failing or is likely to fail and whether there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe. The Board, if it considers all the criteria relating to the triggering of resolutions to be met, should adopt the resolution scheme. The procedure relating to the adoption of the resolution scheme, which involves the Commission and the Council, strengthens the necessary operational independence of the Board while respecting the principle of delegation of powers to agencies as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union … Therefore, this Regulation provides that the resolution scheme adopted by the Board enters into force only if, within 24 hours after its adoption by the Board, there are no objections from the Council or the Commission or the resolution scheme is approved by the Commission. The grounds on which the Council is permitted to object, on a proposal by the Commission, to the Board’s resolution scheme should be strictly limited to the existence of a public interest and to material modifications by the Commission of the amount of the use of the Fund as proposed by the Board.

A change of 5% or more to the amount of the Fund compared with the original proposal of the Board should be considered to be material. The Council should approve or object to the Commission’s proposal without amending it. As an observer to the meetings of the Board, the Commission should, on an ongoing basis, check that the resolution scheme adopted by the Board complies fully with this Regulation, balances appropriately the different objectives and interests at stake, respects the public interest and that the integrity of the internal market is preserved. Considering that the resolution action requires a very speedy decision-making process, the Council and the Commission should cooperate closely and the Council should not duplicate the preparatory work already undertaken by the Commission. The Board should instruct the national resolution authorities which should take all necessary measures to implement the resolution scheme.

…

(60)      When taking or preparing decisions relating to resolution powers, the Board, the Council and the Commission should ensure that resolution action is taken in accordance with certain principles, including that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the management should in principle be replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the entity are minimised, and that creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner. In particular, where creditors within the same class are treated differently in the context of resolution action, such distinctions should be justified in the public interest and should be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of nationality.

(61)      The limitations on the rights of shareholders and creditors should comply with Article 52 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]. The resolution tools should therefore be applied only to those entities that are failing or likely to fail, and only where necessary to pursue the objective of financial stability in the general interest. In particular, resolution tools should be applied where the entity cannot be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings without destabilising the financial system and the measures are necessary in order to ensure the rapid transfer and continuation of systemically important functions and where there is no reasonable prospect for any alternative private solution, including any increase of capital by the existing shareholders or by any third party, sufficient to restore the full viability of the entity.’

3        Article 18 of that regulation, entitled ‘Resolution Procedure’, provides, in paragraphs 6 to 10 thereof:

‘6.      If the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 are met, the Board shall adopt a resolution scheme. The resolution scheme shall:

(a)      place the entity under resolution;

(b)      determine the application of the resolution tools to the institution under resolution referred to in Article 22(2), in particular any exclusions from the application of the bail-in in accordance with Article 27(5) and (14);

(c)      determine the use of the Fund to support the resolution action in accordance with Article 76 and in accordance with a Commission decision taken in accordance with Article 19.

7.      Immediately after the adoption of the resolution scheme, the Board shall transmit it to the Commission.

Within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the Commission shall either endorse the resolution scheme, or object to it with regard to the discretionary aspects of the resolution scheme in the cases not covered in the third subparagraph of this paragraph.

Within 12 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the Commission may propose to the Council:

(a)      to object to the resolution scheme on the ground that the resolution scheme adopted by the Board does not fulfil the criterion of public interest referred to in paragraph 1(c);

(b)      to approve or object to a material modification of the amount of the Fund provided for in the resolution scheme of the Board.

For the purposes of the third subparagraph, the Council shall act by simple majority.

The resolution scheme may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the Council or by the Commission within a period of 24 hours after its transmission by the Board.

The Council or the Commission, as the case may be, shall provide reasons for the exercise of their power of objection.

Where, within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the Council has approved the proposal of the Commission for modification of the resolution scheme on the ground referred to in point (b) of the third subparagraph or the Commission has objected in accordance with the second subparagraph, the Board shall, within eight hours modify the resolution scheme in accordance with the reasons expressed.

Where the resolution scheme adopted by the Board provides for the exclusion of certain liabilities in the exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 27(5), and where such exclusion requires a contribution by the Fund or an alternative financing source, in order to protect the integrity of the internal market, the Commission may prohibit or require amendments to the proposed exclusion setting out adequate reasons based on an infringement of the requirements laid down in Article 27 and in the delegated act adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 44(11) of [Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190)].

8.      Where the Council objects to the placing of an institution under resolution on the ground that the public interest criterion referred to in paragraph 1(c) is not fulfilled, the relevant entity shall be wound up in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law.

9.      The Board shall ensure that the necessary resolution action is taken to carry out the resolution scheme by the relevant national resolution authorities. The resolution scheme shall be addressed to the relevant national resolution authorities and shall instruct those authorities, which shall take all necessary measures to implement it in accordance with Article 29, by exercising resolution powers. Where State aid or Fund aid is present, the Board shall act in conformity with a decision on that aid taken by the Commission.

10.      The Commission shall have the power to obtain from the Board any information which it deems to be relevant for performing its tasks under this Regulation. The Board shall have the power to obtain from any person, in accordance with Chapter 5 of this Title, any information necessary for it to prepare and decide upon a resolution action, including updates and supplements of information provided in the resolution plans.’

 Decision (EU) 2022/948

4        Recitals 1, 4 and 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2022/948 of 1 March 2022 endorsing the resolution scheme for Sberbank d.d. (OJ 2022 L 164, p. 65), state:

‘(1)      On 1 March 2022 at 17:26, the [SRB] transmitted a resolution scheme for Sberbank d.d. [(“Sberbank Croatia”)], established in Croatia, to the Commission in accordance with Article 18(7) of Regulation [No 806/2014].

…

(4)      The Commission agrees with the resolution scheme. In particular, it agrees with the reasons provided by the SRB of why resolution is necessary in the public interest in accordance with Article 18(5) of Regulation [No 806/2014].

(5)      The resolution scheme as submitted by the SRB should therefore be endorsed …’

5        Under Article 1 of that decision:

‘The resolution scheme for [Sberbank Croatia] is endorsed.’

 Background to the dispute

6        The background to the dispute was set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the order under appeal, as follows:

‘2      The [appellant] was a credit institution established in Austria. It held 100% of the shares in [Sberbank Croatia], a credit institution established in Croatia …

3      As a result of geopolitical tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, which culminated in the former invading the latter’s territory on 24 February 2022, the liquidity situation of the [appellant] and Sberbank Croatia deteriorated.

4      On 1 March 2022, the SRB adopted [the decision at issue] concerning the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Sberbank Croatia, in accordance with Article 18(6) of [Regulation No 806/2014] [(“the resolution scheme at issue”)]. The resolution scheme provided inter alia for the transfer of the shares in Sberbank Croatia to Hrvatska Poštanska Banka d.d.

5      Also on 1 March 2022, the … Commission adopted Decision [2022/948], in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014.’

 The procedure before the General Court and the order under appeal

7        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 19 August 2022, the appellant brought the action referred to in paragraph 1 above.

8        By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 16 December 2022, the Council raised an objection of inadmissibility alleging that the action had to be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it was directed against it, since it was not the author of any measure relating to the resolution procedure concerning Sberbank Croatia that may be challenged under Article 263 TFEU.

9        The appellant lodged its observations on the objection of inadmissibility on 6 March 2023.

10      The General Court upheld the objection of inadmissibility and, accordingly, dismissed the action as inadmissible in so far as it was directed against the Council.

11      In that regard, the General Court, first, recalled that, according to settled case-law, actions must, as a general rule, be directed against the body which enacted the contested measure and that an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU must be declared inadmissible in so far as it concerns a defendant which is not the author of the contested measure. Next, it noted that, under the third subparagraph of Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, the Council’s participation in the resolution procedure is not automatic and that it is limited to two situations exhaustively defined in that provision. It held, however, that, in the present case, neither of the two situations defined in the third subparagraph of Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014 had arisen, since the Commission had endorsed the resolution scheme at issue and had, accordingly, not proposed to the Council to object to that scheme or to approve or object to a material modification to the amount of the Fund provided for in that scheme. Lastly, as regards the appellant’s contention that the action against the Council was brought ‘as a precaution’, should the latter be the ‘ultimate decision-maker’ and the real author of the decision at issue, the General Court considered that the appellant had not identified any specific measure allegedly adopted by the Council in the present case or demonstrated the existence, in the present case, of a measure adopted by that institution that may be the subject of an action for annulment.

 Forms of order sought by the appellant

12      By its appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should:

–        set aside the order under appeal;

–        declare admissible the action for annulment;

–        declare void pursuant to Article 264 TFEU the decision at issue;

–        refer the case back to the General Court to the extent that the Court of Justice is not in a position to rule on the substance; and

–        order the defendants to pay the costs.

 The appeal

13      Under Article 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court of Justice may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part.

14      It is appropriate to apply that provision in the present case.

15      The appellant relies on four grounds in support of its appeal, alleging respectively, first, incorrect interpretation of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014; secondly, breach of fundamental principles in the context of composite procedures; thirdly, failure to state reasons in the order under appeal and inappropriateness of the General Court’s reasoning for a decision on an objection of inadmissibility; and, fourthly, a failure to address the lack of transparency and lack of an orderly procedure.

 The first ground of appeal

 The appellant’s arguments

16      The first ground of appeal, alleging incorrect interpretation of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014, consists of 10 limbs.

17      By the first limb, the appellant claims that the General Court interpreted Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 without carrying out the literal, systematic and teleological analysis of that provision, thereby infringing the case-law of the Court of Justice.

18      The second limb alleges that, in paragraph 16 of the order under appeal, the General Court indirectly acknowledged that Regulation No 806/2014 provides for the adoption of decisions by way of a non-objection procedure without requiring any action or positive decision from the Council.

19      By the third limb, the appellant claims that the General Court disregarded the fifth subparagraph of Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, from which it follows that the entry into force of the resolution scheme is based on the absence of an objection from either the Council or the Commission.

20      The fourth limb alleges that the General Court did not take into account Article 18(8) of Regulation No 806/2014 which the appellant claims grants the Council the power, independent of any proposal from the Commission, to ensure that the ordinary course of events under national law is not modified by any interference on a European level.

21      In the fifth limb, the appellant submits that the General Court, in paragraph 18 of the order under appeal, erred in its interpretation of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014. According to the appellant, in any composite procedure, the challengeable act is necessarily the final one and, in the present case, Article 18(7) of that regulation is based on a ‘non-objection’ mechanism with the result that it is the Council’s inaction which brings about the entry into force of the resolution scheme.

22      By the sixth limb, the appellant criticises the General Court for failing to consider the compromise concerning the wording of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 brokered by the EU legislature during the legislative procedure. That compromise, it argues, involves the intervention of both the Council and the Commission, since the absence of an objection from the former is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the resolution scheme.

23      The seventh limb alleges that the General Court erred in its determination of the reviewable act.

24      In support of the eighth limb, the appellant submits that the General Court failed to interpret Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 in the light of its purpose, namely to deal with a financial crisis which may potentially endanger the financial stability of the relevant Member States.

25      By the ninth limb, the appellant criticises the General Court for failing to consider the fact that it is apparent from recitals 60 and 61 of Regulation No 806/2014 that the Council must safeguard the rights of the shareholders. According to the appellant, it is impossible for the Council to fulfil that obligation unless it is a co-author of the resolution schemes.

26      By the tenth limb, the appellant claims that it must be concluded that the General Court erred in its interpretation of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 by not recognising that the Council and the Commission are, based on the joint non-objection mechanism, co-authors of the resolution scheme.

 Findings of the Court of Justice

27      The 10 limbs of the first ground of appeal should be examined together since, as the appellant concluded in the tenth limb, they are all intended to demonstrate that the General Court infringed the scope of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 by not regarding the Council and Commission as co-authors of the resolution scheme on the basis of the alleged joint non-objection mechanism.

28      In that regard and in the first place, it should be noted that, in the present case, as the General Court stated in paragraph 17 of the order under appeal, by Decision 2022/948, the Commission endorsed the resolution scheme at issue and did not propose to the Council to object to that scheme or to approve or object to a material modification to the amount of the Fund provided for in that scheme. Indeed, it follows from recitals 1, 4 and 5 of that decision that on 1 March 2022 at 17:26, the SRB transmitted the resolution scheme at issue to the Commission in accordance with Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014, and that the Commission agreed with that resolution scheme and so endorsed it.

29      As regards the interpretation of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014, it must be recalled that paragraph 7 of that article provides, in its first subparagraph, that the SRB is required to transmit the resolution scheme to the Commission immediately after its adoption and, in its second and third subparagraphs, that, within 24 hours from that transmission, the Commission is to either endorse the resolution scheme, or object to it with regard to the discretionary aspects of that scheme, excluding those relating to compliance with the criterion of public interest and the amount earmarked for the use of the Fund. As for those discretionary aspects, the third subparagraph of Article 18(7) specifies that the Commission may, within 12 hours from that transmission, propose to the Council to object. Lastly, the fifth subparagraph of Article 18(7) of that regulation provides that the resolution scheme may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the Council or by the Commission within a period of 24 hours after its transmission by the SRB.

30      It thus follows clearly from the wording of Article 18(7) of Regulation No 806/2014 that that regulation provides for the participation of the Commission and the Council in the procedure leading to the adoption of a resolution scheme, which, in order to enter into force, must be endorsed by the Commission and, where relevant, the Council.

31      It also follows from that wording that the fifth subparagraph of Article 18(7) of that regulation cannot be interpreted as establishing a non-objection mechanism in which the Council would be a co-author of the resolution scheme. Indeed, that provision merely states that the resolution scheme may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the Commission or, where relevant, the Council within a period of 24 hours after its transmission by the SRB. Moreover, contrary to the third subparagraph of Article 18(7), the fifth subparagraph of that provision does not concern the conditions in which the Council may express objections, nor does it designate the institution which should be regarded as the author of the resolution scheme.

32      Furthermore, by providing that the relevant entity must be wound up in an orderly manner in accordance with national law if the Council objects to the placing of that entity under resolution on the ground that the public interest criterion is not fulfilled, Article 18(8) of Regulation No 806/2014 merely gives due effect to an objection from the Council. That provision does not grant the Council any power other than that which it has under the third subparagraph of Article 18(7) of that regulation.

33      In the same way, neither the purpose which the appellant attributes to Regulation No 806/2014 – namely to deal with a financial crisis similar to or worse than the crisis which gave rise to the preparation of that regulation and which may potentially endanger the financial stability of the relevant Member States – nor the Council’s responsibility to safeguard the rights of shareholders requires that that institution necessarily have the final say as regards the resolution scheme for a credit institution.

34      Lastly, the evolution of the wording of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 during the legislative procedure is clearly incapable of calling into question the interpretation of that provision referred to in paragraphs 29 to 33 above.

35      It should also be observed that, in order to declare the action inadmissible in so far as it was directed against the Council, the General Court was in no way required to determine which measure, be it the decision at issue or the endorsement decision, ought to have been regarded as the challengeable measure in the present case.

36      It follows that the first ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.

 The third ground of appeal

 The appellant’s arguments

37      The third ground of appeal, which should be examined before the second ground, alleges infringement of the duty to state reasons.

38      By the first argument put forward in support of its third ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the order under appeal is vitiated by a failure to state reasons, since the General Court failed, in that order, to identify the author of the resolution scheme at issue, to state the reasons why the Council may not be regarded as its author and to specify what the reviewable act was in the present case.

39      By the second to fourth arguments of the third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the order under appeal is vitiated by a failure to state reasons in so far as the General Court failed to interpret the fifth subparagraph of Article 18(7) and Article 18(8) of Regulation No 806/2014, engaged in contradictory reasoning and prejudged the examination of the merits by excluding a potential author of a reviewable act.

 Findings of the Court of Justice

40      First, it must be stated that the appellant’s first argument is based on a manifestly incorrect reading of the order under appeal.

41      Indeed, after having recalled, in paragraphs 12 to 15 above, the content of the provisions of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014, the General Court stated, first of all, in paragraph 16 of that order, that it was apparent from the third subparagraph of paragraph 7 of that article that the Council’s participation in the resolution procedure was not automatic and that it is limited to two situations exhaustively defined in that provision. Then, it found, in paragraph 17 of that order, that neither of the two situations arose, since the Commission had endorsed the resolution scheme at issue without proposing to the Council to object to that scheme or to approve or object to a material modification to the amount of the Fund provided for in that scheme. Lastly, the General Court added, in paragraph 18 of that order, that, even though the appellant had stated that the action was brought against the Council ‘as a precaution’, should the latter be the ‘ultimate decision-maker’ and the real author of the decision at issue, the appellant had not identified any specific measure allegedly adopted by the Council in the present case or demonstrated the existence of a measure adopted, in the present case, by that institution which could be the subject of an action for annulment.

42      It follows that, contrary to the appellant’s submissions, the General Court did state the reasons why the action was inadmissible in so far as it was directed against the Council and provided grounds making it possible to understand the reasoning underlying that assessment.

43      Secondly, the appellant’s arguments that it is not able to identify, by reading the order under appeal, the author of the resolution scheme at issue and the reviewable act in the present case must be disregarded since they are manifestly unfounded.

44      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the obligation to state reasons requires the General Court clearly and unequivocally to disclose the reasoning followed by it in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review (judgment of 24 February 2022, Bernis and Others v SRB, C‑364/20 P, EU:C:2022:115, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

45      In addition, it must be recalled that, in accordance with equally settled case-law of the Court of Justice in relation to appeals, the reasoning in a judgment of the General Court may be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review. Thus, the duty to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case (judgment of 24 February 2022, Bernis and Others v SRB, C‑364/20 P, EU:C:2022:115, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).

46      In the present case, the order under appeal is an order of inadmissibility in part, dismissing the action as inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the Council. Accordingly, it must be held that the General Court has complied with its duty to state reasons since it stated to the requisite legal standard the reasons why the action is, to that extent, inadmissible.

47      As regards an order of that type, the duty to state reasons in no way requires the General Court to identify the challengeable measure or measures and the authors thereof or to comment on provisions of EU law other than those on which the decision it adopts is based.

48      It follows from paragraph 42 above that the General Court stated to the requisite legal standard the reasons why the action was inadmissible in so far as it was directed against the Council.

49      Thirdly, the appellant’s second to fourth arguments must be rejected as ineffective. Since it follows from the response to the first ground of appeal and the response to the first argument of the third ground of appeal that, first, the General Court did not err in its interpretation of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014 by holding that, in the present case, the action was inadmissible in so far as it was directed against the Council and, secondly, that the order under appeal was sufficiently reasoned in that regard, none of those arguments is capable of leading to the order under appeal being set aside.

50      The third ground of appeal must, therefore, be rejected as being, in part, manifestly unfounded and, in part, ineffective.

 The second and fourth grounds of appeal

 The appellant’s arguments

51      The second ground of appeal alleges breach, by the General Court, of fundamental principles in the context of composite procedures.

52      By the fourth ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for failing to consider, in the order under appeal, the fact that the resolution procedure was not transparent.

 Findings of the Court of Justice

53      Since none of the arguments put forward by the appellant in support of the second and fourth grounds of appeal is capable of calling into question the General Court’s assessment that the action at first instance had to be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it was directed against the Council, those grounds must be rejected as ineffective.

54      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety as manifestly unfounded.

 Costs

55      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

56      Since the present order has been adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties to the proceedings and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Seventh Chamber) hereby orders:

1.      The appeal is dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

2.      MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, in liquidation, shall bear its own costs.

Luxembourg, 19 July 2024.

*      Language of the case: English.