This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52011SC1479
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
/* SEC/2011/1479 final - COD 2011/0412 */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT /* SEC/2011/1479 final - COD 2011/0412 */
1.
Problem definition
Human rights are
universal and indivisible. The
European Union therefore actively promotes and defends them both within its
borders and in its relations with third countries, living up to its commitments
under the EU Fundamental Rights Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in line with the Treaty mandates
under Art. 2 and 21 TEU. They
are also integral to effective work on poverty alleviation and conflict
prevention and resolution. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR) is the concrete expression of the EU’s commitment to promote and
support democracy and human rights worldwide and a key element of the EU’s
wide-ranging toolbox of policy instruments to this effect. Therefore,
maintaining for the period 2014-2020 a self-standing, dedicated democracy and
human rights instrument remains essential, as else EU’s capacity of promoting
and supporting these values worldwide in a concrete and tangible manner would
be seriously jeopardized and the EU’s international profile negatively affected. Moreover, the large
number of country situations where basic rights and freedoms continue to be
violated and repressed, as well as the need and interest to back emerging
democracies and trends towards greater respect for human rights, not least in
the wake of the Arab Spring, makes it even more important for the EU to
maintain a specific capacity of action with improved delivery mechanisms to
support democracy and human rights worldwide. Launched in 2007, and
endowed with an annual budget of approximately € 157 million a year, the EIDHR is currently funding
more than 1200 projects in over 100 countries. Despite difficult operational
contexts and constraints linked to the nature of the instrument and the often
complex environments in which it operates, concrete results and success stories
exist in numbers, supported by a large number of evaluations and reviews. While the comparative
advantage of the EIDHR as such does not seem controversial at EU level, it is
essential to base the future instrument on lessons learnt. This implies, on the
one hand, to keep the proven added values and recognised working principles and
specificities of the EIDHR. It also implies, on the other hand, to introduce
amendments and changes to the delivery mechanisms of the instrument, in order
to further improve its reactivity, its flexibility and impact on the ground.
2.
Analysis of subsidiarity
On the background of
its own accomplishments in conflict solution, peace building and prosperity
creation, the EU would seem to be in an excellent position to deliver on
external action, on behalf of and with its Member States, generally enjoying
high credibility in the countries where it works in. With
27 Member States acting with common policies and strategies, the EU has a
critical weight to respond to global challenges. The EU
is well placed to take on the role of a global leader on behalf of its
citizens, in particular in its support and promotion of democracy and human
rights.
3.
Objectives of EU initiative
The goal pursued by the EIDHR is to
contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of
law and to promoting respect for fundamental freedoms and all human rights,
within the overall framework of the EU’s policy on development cooperation and
economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries and
consistent with the EU’s foreign policy and external action as a whole. This
objective is to be maintained. It is deemed important
to maintain the EIDHR’s added values which lie in its complementarity: Its
independence of action allows it to intervene in the most difficult country
situations (worldwide) without consent of the host government, creating
synergies and complementarity where geographical instruments could not act. ·
It allows for unique actions not covered by
other instruments, such as in cases of serious human rights violations or
urgent protection need, thematic advocacy such as the fight against torture,
death penalty or discrimination, election observation, support to the International
Criminal Court (ICC), etc. ·
While limited in financial scope, its flexible
tools have worked very well and are essential (e.g. direct support to human
rights defenders, direct small grants, working with informal partners, re-granting). ·
A pragmatic combination of targeted projects and
calls for proposals, management by both HQ and Delegations, global, regional
and local actions, has allowed maintaining a largely comprehensive and coherent
implementation involving all actors: civil society (main target) as well as
international and regional organisations. The revised Instrument should also address the following
challenges identified in light of lessons learnt and its flexibility should be
enhanced: ·
Broadly defined objectives and strategies have
caused some degree of fragmentation of approaches and lack of legibility of the
Instrument, creating risks of duplication, difficulties in measuring its impact
and a certain weakening of the complementarity; thus the need for making the
Instrument more process oriented ·
Limited budget considering the vast geographical
and thematic scope with the result that qualitatively acceptable, yet
unsatisfied requests represent 2-3 times more than the funding capacity allows
to cover, proving a high relevant absorption capacity. ·
Necessity to further increase the flexibility of
the Instrument to enhance its reactivity in serious and urgent situations of
human rights violations or threats, applying a similar methodology for a
limited part of the budget as used under the Instrument for Stability and the
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Regulations.
4.
Policy options
Discontinuing
the EIDHR (option 0) as well as maintaining
the EIDHR without any amendment (option 1) were the first options considered. Option 2 would consist of building a better enabling regulation
entailing the following five components: ·
Establishing a process oriented tool focusing on
four different windows: (i) thematic campaigns and
addressing serious violations of rights as well as providing core support to
key actors and related civic education, (ii) targeted support to the
development of thriving civil societies, (iii) reinforced capacity for the EU
to be able to react quickly to human rights urgencies and establishment of a
comprehensive EU Human Rights Defender mechanism, (iv) strengthened and better
integrated approach to democratic cycles through election observation and other
types of support to democratic and electoral processes. ·
Maintaining the insertion of EU Election
Observation Missions (EOMs). ·
Maintaining the exclusion of political parties. ·
Further untying. ·
Adding new flexibilities for most difficult
countries/situations.
5.
Assessment of impacts
Many stakeholders would view the option 0 (no regulation)
as a renouncement by the EU of promoting its own core values and relevant
international standards. It would certainly have a very negative impact in
terms of the EU’s image both at home and on the international scene. While the
option 1 (no change) will allow for the existing economies of scale of a
self-standing instrument, it will miss those resulting from the proposed
rationalisation of the process and its improved rapidity through additional
flexibility, which would be rendered possible under option 2 (enabling
regulation). Indeed, a faster and more reactive mechanism can make a difference
when saving the life of a victim is a question of days or even hours. Option 2 would
also allow to better impact on the other policies and reduce transaction costs since
the revised EIDHR would benefit from enhanced flexibility.
6.
Comparison of options
Option 0 (no regulation) will integrate Human Rights
activities within other instruments as a positive sign of mainstreaming.
Nevertheless, the suppression of a self standing instrument will suppress specific
working principles, such as the absence consent of the host country, there for
impeding most activities and reduce the delivery to easiest or show case
activities. It will lower efficiency of operational delivery and create a
strong visibility problem. Option 1 (no change) maintains the key elements of an EIDHR
added value i.e. its working principles. It will allow benefiting from a
rolling experience and helping outreach through a cumulative identification
over the year. It will avoid cost of reform and focus on day to day
improvements. On the other hand, it will not allow addressing the identified
drivers of problem in a structural manner. Option 2 (enabling regulation) will keep the existing added
values, but in addition will allow for faster reactivity, in particular in
cases of serious human rights violations and cases of urgency. It is
nevertheless important that the Instrument remains involved in long term
support and in depth activities that have grass root level impact and a lasting
effect and does not focus exclusively on day to day crisis management. Increased
coordination with Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection and the Instrument for
Stability will have to be set up. This option would thus be chosen knowing that
the EIDHR would benefit from an increased budget.
7.
Monitoring and evaluation
The EIDHR would be structured around the four axes of work
mentioned under paragraph 4. The following indicators would be used: i) Number of campaigns launched, including number of
advocacies, number of international conventions ratification, number of
specific field operations, ii) Number
of citizens, professionals and students trained, iii) Number
of key actors supported, iv) Number
of civil society project conducted, at global and at local level, v) Number
of Human Rights Defender cases followed, vi) Number
of project in most difficult countries and situations, vii) Number
of electoral process and democratic cycles supported, observed, and followed.