| 11.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 105/1 | 11.4.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 105/1 |
| MNENJE EVROPSKE CENTRALNE BANKE | OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK |
| z dne 25. januarja 2012 | of 25 January 2012 |
| o predlogu direktive o dostopu do dejavnosti kreditnih institucij in bonitetnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij in investicijskih družb ter o predlogu uredbe o bonitetnih zahtevah za kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja | on a proposal for a Directive on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and a proposal for a Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms |
| (CON/2012/5) | (CON/2012/5) |
| 2012/C 105/01 | 2012/C 105/01 |
| Uvod in pravna podlaga | Introduction and legal basis |
| Evropska centralna banka (ECB) je dne 20. septembra 2011 prejela zahtevo Sveta Evropske unije za mnenje o predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o dostopu do dejavnosti kreditnih institucij in bonitetnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij in investicijskih družb ter spremembi Direktive 2002/87/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o dopolnilnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij, zavarovalnic in investicijskih družb v finančnem konglomeratu (1) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: predlagana direktiva). ECB je dne 30. novembra 2011 prejela zahtevo Sveta za mnenje o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o bonitetnih zahtevah za kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja (2) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: predlagana uredba). | On 20 September 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Council of the European Union for an opinion on a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (1) (hereinafter the ‘proposed directive’). On 30 November 2011, the ECB received a request from the Council for an opinion on a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (2) (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation’). |
| Pristojnost ECB, da poda mnenje o predlagani direktivi in predlagani uredbi, izhaja iz členov 127(4) in 282(5) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, saj predlagana direktiva in predlagana uredba vsebujeta določbe, ki vplivajo na temeljne naloge Evropskega sistema centralnih bank (ESCB), tj. opredelitev in izvajanje denarne politike Unije, podpiranje nemotenega delovanja plačilnih sistemov ter prispevanje k nemotenemu vodenju politik pristojnih organov glede bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih institucij in stabilnosti finančnega sistema. ECB je zaradi učinkovitosti in jasnosti sklenila izdati eno mnenje o teh dveh zakonodajnih predlogih. V skladu s prvim stavkom člena 17.5 Poslovnika Evropske centralne banke je to mnenje sprejel Svet ECB. | The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion on the proposed directive and regulation is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union since the proposed directive and proposed regulation contain provisions affecting the basic tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), i.e. to define and implement the monetary policy of the Union, to promote the smooth operation of payment systems and to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. For reasons of efficiency and clarity, the ECB has decided to issue a single opinion on these two legislative proposals. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. |
| Splošne pripombe | General observations |
| 1. Cilji predlagane uredbe in predlagane direktive | 1. Objectives of the proposed regulation and proposed directive |
| Evropska komisija je dne 20. julija 2011 sprejela predlagano direktivo in predlagano uredbo, ki naj bi nadomestili direktivi 2006/48/ES (3) in 2006/49/ES (4). Predloga pomenita pomemben korak h krepitvi ureditve sektorja bank in investicijskih podjetij ter vzpostavitvi zanesljivejšega in varnejšega finančnega sistema v Uniji. ECB pozdravlja trdno zavezo Unije, da bo uvedla mednarodne standarde in sporazume s področja finančne ureditve, pri tem pa, kjer je ustrezno, upoštevala posebne značilnosti pravnega in finančnega sistema Unije. ECB močno podpira pravočasno in učinkovito uvedbo baselskih standardov za kapital in likvidnost (5). V tej zvezi ECB izpostavlja vodilno vlogo, ki jo je prevzela Komisija pri izpolnjevanju zaveze držav skupine G-20, da bodo »te standarde sprejele in v celoti uvedle v dogovorjenem časovnem okviru, ki je skladen z okrevanjem gospodarstva in finančno stabilnostjo« (6), s tem, ko je med prvimi predlagala uvedbo okvira Basel III (7) ter sporazumov skupine guvernerjev in vodij nadzornih organov (GHOS) (8) v zakonodajo Unije. Predlagani ukrepi bodo bistveno povečali sistemsko odpornost, prispevali k nemotenemu delovanju finančnega sistema ter zagotovili stabilen in vzdržen okvir za opravljanje finančnih storitev v Uniji. | On 20 July 2011, the European Commission adopted the proposed directive and proposed regulation, which are to replace Directives 2006/48/EC (3) and 2006/49/EC (4). The proposals represent an important step towards strengthening regulation of the banking and investment firms sector and creating a sounder and safer financial system in the Union. The ECB welcomes the Union’s strong commitment to implement international standards and agreements in the field of financial regulation, while taking into consideration, where relevant, specific features of the Union’s legal and financial system. The ECB strongly supports the timely and effective implementation of the Basel capital and liquidity standards (5). To this end, the ECB notes the leading role taken by the Commission in delivering on the G20 commitment ‘to adopt and implement fully these standards within the agreed timeframe that is consistent with economic recovery and financial stability’ (6) by being among the first to propose implementation of the Basel III framework (7) and the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) agreements (8) into Union legislation. The proposed measures will substantially increase systemic resilience, contribute to the smooth functioning of the financial system and ensure a stable and sustainable framework for the provision of financial services in the Union. |
| 2. Reforma bančne zakonodaje Unije | 2. Reform of Union banking legislation |
| ECB pozdravlja inovativen pristop Komisije, zlasti pri predlagani uredbi, ki vključuje večino tehničnih prilog k direktivama 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES ter omejuje možnosti in diskrecijske pravice držav članic. Predlagani okvir bo povečal pravno varnost, pri tem pa zmanjšal tveganje podvajanja na ravni držav članic. V finančni krizi se je pokazala tudi potreba po hitrem in učinkovitem ukrepanju. Pri pripravi bančne zakonodaje Unije je pomembno zagotoviti primerno raven prilagodljivosti. Kar zadeva bodoče preglede predlagane uredbe in kakor je bilo že izpostavljeno v predhodnih mnenjih (9), ECB priporoča, da se zagotovi, da bodo predmet rednega zakonodajnega postopka samo okvirna načela predlagane uredbe, ki odražajo osnovne politične odločitve in vsebinska vprašanja. Tehnična pravila, vključno s tistimi v predlagani uredbi, je treba sprejeti v obliki delegiranih ali izvedbenih aktov v skladu s členoma 290 in 291 Pogodbe, ki se bodo tako razvili v osrednjo celoto pravil, ki se uporabljajo za finančne institucije v Uniji. | The ECB welcomes the innovative approach taken by the Commission, in particular with regard to the proposed regulation, which incorporates most of the technical Annexes to Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC and limits Member State options and discretion. The proposed framework will lead to increased legal certainty, while reducing duplication risks at Member State level. The financial crisis also demonstrated the need to act rapidly and efficiently. It is important to ensure the appropriate level of flexibility for the development of Union banking regulation. As regards future reviews of the proposed regulation and as pointed out in previous opinions (9), the ECB recommends ensuring that only framework principles contained in the proposed regulation reflecting basic political choices and substantive matters remain subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. Technical rules, including those in the proposed regulation, should be adopted as delegated or implementing acts in accordance with Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty, which will thereby emerge as the main body of rules applying to Union financial institutions. |
| 3. Enotni evropski pravilnik v finančnem sektorju | 3. Single European rulebook in the financial sector |
| 3.1 | Kakor je navedeno v predhodnih mnenjih (10), ECB močno podpira pripravo enotnega evropskega pravilnika za vse finančne institucije (11), saj bo spodbujal nemoteno delovanje enotnega trga v Uniji in omogočal večjo finančno integracijo v Evropi. Enotni evropski pravilnik zagotavlja, da finančne institucije, ki opravljajo finančne storitve na enotnem trgu, izpolnjujejo en niz bonitetnih pravil. S tem se zmanjšujejo možnosti za regulativno arbitražo in izkrivljanje konkurence. Poleg tega se z usklajenimi pravili izboljšuje preglednost ter zmanjšujejo stroški urejanja in izpolnjevanja pravil. | 3.1 | As stated in previous opinions (10), the ECB strongly supports the development of a single European rulebook for all financial institutions (11) as it promotes the smooth functioning of the single market within the Union and facilitates greater financial integration in Europe. A single European rulebook ensures that financial institutions providing financial services in the single market comply with one set of prudential rules. This mitigates regulatory arbitrage opportunities and distortions to competition. Furthermore, harmonised rules improve transparency and reduce regulatory and compliance costs. |
| 3.2 | Enotni evropski pravilnik zahteva: (a) jasno in ustrezno identifikacijo zadevnih področij za delegirane in izvedbene akte; (b) primerno vključenost evropskih nadzornih organov (ESA), da se izkoristi strokovno znanje organov pri pripravi osnutkov tehničnih standardov; (c) dosleden in usklajen pristop v vseh finančnih sektorjih; (d) skladna merila za sprejemanje delegiranih ali izvedbenih aktov v vsej finančni zakonodaji Unije, pri čemer ESA predhodno pripravijo osnutke regulativnih ali izvedbenih tehničnih standardov ali ne (12). V bančnem sektorju se bo s tem, ko bo Evropski bančni organ (EBA) sistematično vključen v sprejemanje izvedbene zakonodaje Unije, ker bo pripravljal osnutke tehničnih standardov, zlasti kadar je potrebna predhodna tehnična analiza, zagotovil prilagodljiv regulativni okvir na ravni Unije, ki bo učinkovito podprl enotni trg finančnih storitev v Uniji. | 3.2 | The single European rulebook requires: (a) clear and appropriate identification of relevant areas for delegated and implementing acts; (b) adequate involvement of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), thereby using the expertise of authorities in developing draft technical standards; (c) a consistent and coordinated approach across financial sectors; (d) coherent criteria across all Union financial legislation for recourse to delegated acts or implementing acts, with or without the prior development of draft regulatory or draft implementing technical standards by the ESAs (12). In the banking sector, the systematic involvement of the European Banking Authority (EBA) in the adoption of implementing Union legislation through the development of draft technical standards, especially when prior technical analysis is required, will ensure a flexible regulatory framework at Union level that will effectively underpin the single market in financial services within the Union. |
| 4. Svetovalna vloga ECB glede osnutkov delegiranih in izvedbenih aktov | 4. ECB’s advisory role regarding draft delegated and implementing acts |
| 4.1 | Glede na pomembnost delegiranih in izvedbenih aktov kot bistvenega elementa enotnega evropskega pravilnika ima ECB naslednje pripombe v zvezi z izvrševanjem svoje svetovalne vloge po členih 127(4) in 282(5) Pogodbe. | 4.1 | Given the importance of delegated and implementing acts as a substantial component of the single European rulebook, the ECB makes the following observations with regard to the exercise of its own advisory role under Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty. |
| 4.2 | Osnutki delegiranih in izvedbenih aktov Komisije štejejo za »predlagane akte Unije« oziroma »osnutke aktov Unije« v smislu členov 127(4) in 282(5) Pogodbe. Tako delegirani kot izvedbeni akti pomenijo pravne akte Unije. Kar je pomembno, večina jezikovnih različic člena 282(5) Pogodbe se sklicuje na »osnutke« pravnih aktov Unije, glede katerih se je treba posvetovati z ECB (13). Zato se obseg dolžnosti posvetovanja z ECB ne more omejiti samo na tiste osnutke aktov, ki temeljijo na predlogu Komisije. | 4.2 | Commission draft delegated and implementing acts qualify as ‘proposed Union acts’ within the meaning of Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty. Both delegated and implementing acts constitute Union legal acts. Significantly, the majority of the language versions of Article 282(5) of the Treaty refer to ‘draft’ Union legal acts on which the ECB is required to be consulted (13). Therefore, the scope of the duty to consult the ECB cannot be confined only to those draft acts based on a Commission proposal. |
| 4.3 | Sodišče je v zadevi C-11/00 (14) pojasnilo, da je obveznost posvetovanja z ECB namenjena »predvsem zagotovitvi, da avtor tak akt sprejme šele, ko je mnenje izrazil organ, ki je zaradi posebnih pooblastil, ki jih izvaja v Skupnostnem okviru na zadevnem področju, in zaradi svoje visoke ravni strokovnosti še posebej primeren za koristno prispevanje k predvidenemu postopku sprejetja«. | 4.3 | In Case C-11/00 (14), the Court of Justice clarified that the obligation to consult the ECB is intended ‘essentially to ensure that the legislature adopts the act only when the body has been heard, which, by virtue of the specific functions that it exercises in the Community framework in the area concerned and by virtue of the high degree of expertise that it enjoys, is particularly well placed to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged’. |
| 4.4 | Glede na navedeno bi se bilo za pridobitev vseh prednosti izvrševanja svetovalne vloge ECB treba z ECB pravočasno posvetovati glede vseh osnutkov aktov Unije, vključno z osnutki delegiranih in izvedbenih aktov, ki spadajo na področja iz pristojnosti ECB. Poleg tega bo ECB ob upoštevanju pomembnosti osnutkov tehničnih standardov kot dela razvoja zakonodaje Unije o finančnih storitvah svojo svetovalno vlogo v zadevah iz svoje pristojnosti izvrševala ob največjem možnem upoštevanju časovnega okvira za sprejetje teh aktov in potrebe po zagotovitvi nemotenega sprejetja izvedbene zakonodaje. | 4.4 | Against this backdrop, in order to deploy the full benefits of the exercise by the ECB of its advisory role, the ECB should be consulted in due time on any draft Union acts, including draft delegated and implementing acts, falling within its fields of competence. Furthermore, having regard to the importance of draft technical standards as part of the development of Union financial services legislation, the ECB will exercise its advisory role on matters within the ECB’s competence taking into utmost account the timelines for adoption of these acts and the need to ensure the smooth adoption of implementing legislation. |
| Posamezne pripombe | Specific observations |
| 5. Makrobonitetni nadzor in obseg uporabe strožjih pravil | 5. Macro-prudential supervision and scope for stricter rules |
| 5.1 | Predlagana uredba določa bonitetne standarde, ki se bodo neposredno uporabljali v vsej Uniji. Kakor je navedeno zgoraj, ECB močno podpira pristop Komisije, ki dejansko vzpostavlja enotni evropski pravilnik za finančne institucije. Poleg tega ECB v celoti podpira cilj, da se posamezne izpostavljenosti tveganjem, ki med drugim zadevajo določene sektorje, regije ali države članice, obravnavajo z delegiranimi akti, ki dajejo Komisiji pooblastilo za uvedbo strožjih bonitetnih zahtev, kadar je to potrebno za obravnavo sprememb intenzivnosti mikrobonitetnih in makrobonitetnih tveganj, ki so posledica razvoja trga (15). Ne glede na to bi morala vsebina delegiranih aktov, ki jih lahko sprejme Komisija, zajemati tako bonitetne zahteve glede velikih izpostavljenosti in zahteve po razkritju kot tudi zahteve glede finančnega vzvoda in likvidnosti, ko bodo zahteve glede finančnega vzvoda in likvidnosti dejansko postale del regulativnega okvira Unije. Vendar pa ECB izpostavlja, da bo obdobje šestih mesecev ali manj, ko se lahko uporabljajo strožje zahteve za obravnavo teh tveganj, v mnogih primerih prekratko in bi bilo potrebno veliko daljše obdobje, npr. dve leti ali več, da bi zahteve učinkovale in dosegle želeni cilj (16). | 5.1 | The proposed regulation lays down the prudential standards that will have direct application across the Union. As stated above, the ECB strongly supports the Commission’s approach, which effectively establishes a single European rulebook for financial institutions. In addition, the ECB fully supports the aim of addressing targeted risk exposures concerning, inter alia, certain sectors, regions or Member States through delegated acts that empower the Commission to impose stricter prudential requirements, where necessary to address changes in the intensity of micro- or macro-prudential risks which arise from market developments (15). Nonetheless, the delegated acts the Commission can adopt should extend to prudential requirements on large exposures and disclosure requirements as well as to leverage and liquidity requirements, once leverage and liquidity requirements effectively become part of the applicable Union regulatory framework. The ECB notes, however, that a timeframe of six months or less for the imposition of stricter requirements to address such risks will be insufficient in many cases and would require a much longer timeframe, e.g. two years or more, to be effective and to achieve the desired objective (16). |
| 5.2 | ECB tudi šteje za pomembno, da predlagana uredba državam članicam omogoča uporabo strožjih bonitetnih zahtev, kadar nastanejo sistemska tveganja za finančno stabilnost. Potrebo po takšni ureditvi utemeljuje med drugim dejstvo, da gospodarski in finančni cikli niso popolnoma usklajeni v vseh državah članicah, in da se države članice lahko soočajo z različnimi oblikami sistemskega tveganja. Poleg tega so med državami članicami tudi velike razlike v strukturnih značilnostih finančnih sektorjev. Zato bi organi z makrobonitetnimi pristojnostmi morda morali pri določenih instrumentih politike, ki jih vsebuje predlagana uredba, zaostriti kvantitativne stopnje in omejitve, da bi bonitetne zahteve bolje prilagodili svojim posebnim cikličnim razmeram in učinkovito obravnavali s tem povezana sistemska tveganja (17). | 5.2 | Moreover, the ECB considers it important that the proposed regulation makes it possible for Member States to apply more stringent prudential requirements where systemic risks to financial stability arise. The need for such an arrangement is justified, inter alia, by the fact that economic and financial cycles are not completely harmonised across Member States, and Member States may face different types of systemic risk. Furthermore, there are also significant differences in the structural features of the financial sectors across Member States. Authorities with a macro-prudential mandate may therefore need to tighten the quantitative ratios and limits of certain prudential policy instruments contained in the proposed regulation to better adjust prudential requirements to their specific cyclical situation and to effectively address associated systemic risks (17). |
| 5.3 | V povezavi z navedenim nekatere določbe predlagane ureditve omogočajo nekaj prilagoditev bonitetnih zahtev na nacionalni ravni. Prva je uvedba okvira za proticiklične kapitalske rezerve (18). Druga je predlagana razširitev obsega postopka nadzorniškega pregleda, ki nacionalnim organom omogoča uporabo strožjih ukrepov za posamezne institucije (19). Vendar pa ECB ugotavlja, da predlagana razširitev vsebuje predvsem mikrobonitetno orodje, zasnovano za obravnavo tveganj, ki nastajajo v posameznih institucijah ali skupinah institucij, in ne za uporabo kot orodje makrobonitetne politike za obravnavo sistemskih tveganj. Kot tretjo predlagana uredba uvaja možnost, da nacionalni organi za izpostavljenosti, zavarovane s stanovanjskimi ali poslovnimi nepremičninami, prilagodijo uteži tveganja ali določijo strožja merila, npr. razmerje med posojilom in vrednostjo zastavljenih nepremičnin, če je to upravičeno zaradi značilnosti tveganj v tem segmentu trga v posamezni državi članici (20). | 5.3 | Against this background, certain provisions in the proposed regulation allow for some adjustment of prudential requirements at national level. The first is the introduction of a counter-cyclical capital buffer framework (18). The second is the proposed extension of the scope of the supervisory review process to allow national authorities to apply more stringent prudential rules to certain institutions (19). The ECB notes, however, that this proposed extension consists primarily of a micro-prudential tool designed to address risks originating from individual institutions or groups of institutions and not for use as a macro-prudential policy tool to address systemic risks. Third, the proposed regulation introduces the possibility for national authorities to adjust risk weights or set stricter criteria, e.g. loan-to-value ratio, for exposures secured on residential or commercial real estate if the risk characteristics of that specific market segment so justify in a given Member State (20). |
| 5.4 | ECB podpira omenjeni okvir, ki nacionalnim organom omogoča, da prilagodijo nekatere bonitetne zahteve, in meni, da bi ga bilo treba razširiti, da bi nacionalnim organom omogočal uvedbo strožjih bonitetnih zahtev za makrobonitetne namene na nacionalni ravni. To je potrebno, da bi se vprašanja glede finančne stabilnosti, ki izhajajo iz strukturnih značilnosti nacionalnega finančnega sistema, ali sistemskih tveganj obravnavala celovito in učinkovito. Zato bi lahko obseg predlaganega okvira razširili, da bi zajemal strožje zahteve glede: (a) kapitala; (b) omejitev velikih izpostavljenosti; (c) likvidnostnih zahtev in stopnje finančnega vzvoda, ko bodo uvedene v regulativni okvir Unije. V tem okviru bi morali nacionalnim organom omogočiti, da v svoji nacionalni zakonodaji uvedejo strožje zahteve, tj. da zaostrijo kvantitativne stopnje in omejitve za postavke (a), (b) in (c), potem ko o predlaganih ukrepih obvestijo Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja (ESRB); te zahteve pa bi se morale uporabiti tako, da bi se v celoti upoštevali drugi vidiki določb predlagane uredbe, ki bi ostali nespremenjeni. | 5.4 | The ECB supports the abovementioned framework, which allows national authorities to adjust certain prudential requirements and considers that it should be expanded to allow national authorities to impose stricter prudential requirements for macro-prudential purposes at national level. This is necessary in order to address financial stability concerns stemming from the structural features of a national financial system or systemic risks in a comprehensive and effective manner. Therefore, the scope of the proposed framework could be extended to cover stricter requirements for: (a) capital; (b) limits on large exposures; (c) liquidity requirements and leverage ratio, once introduced into the Union regulatory framework. In this context, national authorities should be allowed to impose stricter requirements in their national legislation, i.e. to tighten the quantitative ratios and limits for items (a), (b) and (c), following a notification of the proposed measures to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB); however, such requirements should be applied in full compliance with the other aspects of the provisions of the proposed regulation which would remain unchanged. |
| 5.5 | Da bi ohranili preglednost in zagotovili skladnost ukrepov, ki se sprejmejo znotraj Unije, ECB priporoča varovala v zvezi z uporabo strožjih zahtev s strani nacionalnih organov. ESRB bi lahko imel pri tem pomembno usklajevalno vlogo, da bi ocenil vprašanja glede finančne stabilnosti ter možne neželene posledice in čezmejne učinke teh ukrepov na druge države članice. Poleg tega bi morala EBA in ESRB na svojih spletnih straneh objavljati redne posodobitve ukrepov, ki so jih sprejele države članice in so strožji od ukrepov v predlagani uredbi. Ko pa vprašanj glede finančne stabilnosti, ki so bila razlog za uporabo strožjih bonitetnih ukrepov, ni več, bi se morale kvantitativne stopnje in omejitve vrniti na usklajeno raven, določeno s predlagano uredbo. | 5.5 | With a view to maintaining transparency and ensuring the consistency of measures adopted within the Union, the ECB recommends that the possible application of more stringent requirements by national authorities be subject to safeguards. In this regard, the ESRB could play an important coordinating role in assessing financial stability concerns and possible unintended consequences and spill-over effects from such measures on other Member States. Moreover, the EBA and the ESRB should publish regular updates on their respective websites of measures adopted by Member States that are more stringent than those in the proposed regulation. Lastly, where the financial stability concerns that triggered the application of more stringent prudential measures cease to exist, the quantitative ratios and limits should return to the harmonised level set by the proposed regulation. |
| 5.6 | Na splošno bi z možnostjo uvedbe strožjih bonitetnih ukrepov v državah članicah lahko izboljšali finančno stabilnost in finančno integracijo v Uniji. Konkretno lahko organi s tem, ko zmanjšujejo sistemska tveganja in ščitijo enotni trg pred kopičenjem prekomernih sistemskih tveganj na usklajen način, učinkovito prispevajo k nemotenemu delovanju finančnega sistema v Uniji in podpirajo vzdržno opravljanje finančnih storitev na enotnem trgu na srednji do dolgi rok. | 5.6 | Overall, the possible application of more stringent prudential measures by specific Member States may enhance both financial stability and financial integration in the Union. Concretely, by mitigating systemic risks and protecting the single market from the build-up of excessive systemic risks in a coordinated way, authorities may effectively contribute to the smooth functioning of the Union financial system and promote the sustainable provision of financial services in the single market in the medium to long term. |
| 6. Lastna sredstva | 6. Own funds |
| 6.1 | ECB močno podpira predlagano poostritev meril primernosti za regulatorna lastna sredstva in dodatno uskladitev odbitkov. Zahteve po lastnih sredstvih so temelj mednarodno dogovorjene reforme kapitala. Z vidika finančne stabilnosti je zato bistveno, da se z zahtevami po lastnih sredstvih v predlagani uredbi zagotovi, da bo imel bančni sektor v Uniji kapital najvišje kakovosti, zlasti kar zadeva navaden lastniški kapital prvega reda, zaradi česar bo zmožnost absorbiranja izgub večja. Zaradi krize je pri novi reformi kapitala poseben poudarek na navadnem lastniškem kapitalu prvega reda. Namen je, da se zagotovi, da bodo imele evropske kreditne institucije navaden lastniški kapital prvega reda enako visoke kakovosti kakor istovrstni subjekti v drugih državah, in da se zagotovi popolna skladnost s sporazumom Basel III, ki ga je potrdila skupina GHOS (21). V tej zvezi je treba izpostaviti naslednja vprašanja. | 6.1 | The ECB strongly supports the proposed strengthening of the eligibility criteria for regulatory own funds as well as the further harmonisation of deductions. Own funds requirements represent a cornerstone of the internationally agreed reform of capital. Therefore, from a financial stability perspective, it is essential that the requirements for own funds in the proposed regulation ensure that the Union banking sector will hold capital of the highest quality in particular with regard to common equity tier 1 capital, which will result in a high degree of loss absorbency. The crisis has led the new reform of capital to place particular emphasis on common equity tier 1 capital. The aim is to ensure European credit institutions hold common equity tier 1 capital which is as high in quality as their international peers and also to ensure full consistency with the Basel III agreement as endorsed by the GHOS (21). In this respect, the following issues should be highlighted. |
| 6.2 | ECB podpira seznam pogojev, ki morajo biti izpolnjeni za uvrstitev med postavke navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda in odražajo osnovne značilnosti lastniškega kapitala z vidika trajnosti, zmožnosti absorbiranja izgub in prilagodljivosti plačil. V skladu s sporazumom Basel III bi morali »kapitalski instrumenti« v predlagani uredbi vključevati izključno deleže v podjetjih, kakor so opredeljeni v nacionalnih predpisih držav članic (z izjemo kapitalskih instrumentov, ki jih izdajo vzajemna podjetja, zadruge in podobne institucije (22)), in bi se morali šteti za postavke navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda le, če izpolnjujejo vse pogoje, določene v predlagani uredbi (23). ECB tudi priporoča, da Komisija s sprejetjem izvedbenega akta potrdi seznam oblik deležev, primernih za navaden lastniški kapital prvega reda, ki ga oblikuje EBA, in tako da temu seznamu zavezujoč učinek. Poleg tega bi bilo treba pripraviti osnutke tehničnih standardov, v katerih se podrobneje opredelijo zgoraj omenjeni pogoji. Pristojni organi bi morali v sodelovanju z EBA stalno zagotavljati izpolnjevanje teh pogojev. S temi varovali bi prispevali k večji skladnosti v Uniji in zmanjšanju obsega finančnega inženiringa. | 6.2 | The ECB supports the list of conditions to be met to qualify as common equity tier 1 items, which reflect the basic features of equity in terms of permanence, loss absorbency and flexibility of payments. In line with the Basel III agreement, the ‘capital instruments’ referred to in the proposed regulation should consist solely of shares in companies as defined under the respective national laws in the Member States (with the exception of capital instruments issued by mutuals, cooperative societies and similar institutions (22)) and should qualify as common equity tier 1 items only if they meet all the conditions defined in the proposed regulation (23). The ECB also recommends that the Commission, through the adoption of an implementing act, endorse the list of forms of the shares eligible as common equity tier 1 capital established by the EBA in order to give the list a binding effect. In addition, draft technical standards further specifying the above conditions should be developed. Compliance with these conditions should be ensured by competent authorities in cooperation with the EBA on an ongoing basis. These safeguards would contribute to further ensuring consistency in the Union and reducing the scope for financial engineering. |
| 6.3 | V zvezi s pomembnimi naložbami v zavarovalnicah, pozavarovalnicah in zavarovalnih holdingih sporazum Basel III zahteva, da se te naložbe nad določeno mejo odbijejo od navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda, tj. pristop z ustreznimi odbitki (24). Sporazum Basel III upošteva, da so ti subjekti zunaj obsega regulativne konsolidacije, in ima za cilj preprečiti dvojno štetje regulatornega kapitala. Predlagana uredba ohranja možnost, ki je obstajala že v Direktivi 2006/48/ES, da pristojni organi dovolijo uporabo metod, določenih v Direktivi 2002/87/ES (25), namesto odbitkov (26). | 6.3 | As regards significant investments in insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings and insurance holding companies, the Basel III agreement requires that, over a certain threshold, these investments be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital, i.e. the corresponding deduction approach (24). The Basel III agreement takes into account that these entities are outside the scope of regulatory consolidation and aims at avoiding double counting of regulatory capital. The proposed regulation maintains the possibility, already existing in Directive 2006/48/EC, for competent authorities to authorise the application of the methods set out in Directive 2002/87/EC (25) as an alternative to ‘deduction’ (26). |
| 6.4 | ECB se na splošno strinja s stališčem, da bi se morala regulatorna lastna sredstva uporabiti samo za kritje izgub zaradi bančnih tveganj. ECB tako podpira, da se vprašanje dvakratne uporabe regulatornih lastnih sredstev obravnava na ravni bančne skupine, tj. s konsolidacijo vseh podrejenih podjetij, ki so institucije in finančne institucije (27), ter na ravni finančnega konglomerata, tj. da se v okvir regulativne konsolidacije vključijo tudi podrejena podjetja, ki so zavarovalnice. V tem okviru uporaba metod, določenih v Prilogi I k Direktivi 2002/87/ES, ne bi smela nikoli privesti do zneskov regulatornih lastnih sredstev za skupine institucij in finančnih institucij, kakor so navedene v predlagani uredbi (28), ki bi bili višji od zneskov regulatornih lastnih sredstev v primeru uporabe pristopa z odbitki. | 6.4 | The ECB generally shares the view that regulatory own funds within a banking group should be used only to cover losses arising from banking risks. Thus, the ECB supports addressing the issue of double use of regulatory own funds both at the banking group level, i.e. consolidation of all subsidiaries that are institutions and financial institutions (27), and at the financial conglomerate level, i.e. also including insurance subsidiaries in the scope of regulatory consolidation. In this context, application of the methods set out in Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC should not at any time result in higher regulatory own funds for groups of institutions and financial institutions as referred to in the proposed regulation (28) vis-à-vis what would be the regulatory own funds if the deduction approach applied. |
| 6.5 | ECB ob upoštevanju sporazuma Basel III in, kjer je to ustrezno, tudi mednarodnih načel Skupnega foruma za finančne konglomerate priporoča, da se zagotovi popolna skladnost teh besedil med sektorji (29), zaradi česar je treba predlagano uredbo uskladiti z ustreznimi določbami direktiv 2009/138/ES (30) in 2002/87/ES (31). ECB podpira, da Skupni odbor ESA pripravi osnutke tehničnih standardov v zvezi z metodami, določenimi v Direktivi 2002/87/ES, vendar priporoča, da se zaradi pravne jasnosti in v izogib neskladjem zakonodaje o finančnih storitvah med sektorji to pooblastilo določi samo v Direktivi 2002/87/ES (32). | 6.5 | Taking into account the Basel III agreement and also, as appropriate, the international principles of the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, the ECB recommends ensuring full cross-sectoral consistency among these texts (29), which requires aligning the proposed regulation with the corresponding provisions of Directives 2009/138/EC (30) and 2002/87/EC (31). Moreover, while the ECB supports the development by the Joint Committee of ESAs of draft technical standards with regard to the methods set out in Directive 2002/87/EC, it recommends, for the sake of legal clarity and to avoid cross-sectoral inconsistencies in financial services legislation, introducing this empowerment only in Directive 2002/87/EC (32). |
| 6.6 | Januarja 2011 je skupina GHOS objavila sporazum, po katerem bi moralo biti možno vse dodatne instrumente prvega reda in instrumente drugega reda institucije v celoti in trajno odpisati ali v celoti pretvoriti v navaden lastniški kapital prvega reda, ko institucija ni več sposobna delovati (33). Predlagana uredba potrjuje namero zakonodajalca, da ta sporazum vključi v celoti (34). ECB razume, da bo Komisija takšno zahtevo za instrumente prvega reda in instrumente drugega reda vključila v povezavi z bodočim predlogom Komisije o reševanju bank in obvladovanju krize v finančnem sektorju. | 6.6 | In January 2011, the GHOS made public their agreement that all additional tier 1 and tier 2 instruments of an institution should be capable of being fully and permanently written down or converted fully into common equity tier 1 capital at the point of non-viability of the institution (33). The proposed regulation confirms the legislator’s intent to incorporate this agreement in full (34). The ECB understands that the Commission will incorporate such a requirement for both additional tier 1 and tier 2 instruments in conjunction with the Commission’s forthcoming proposal on bank resolution and crisis management in the financial sector. |
| 7. Kapitalske rezerve | 7. Capital buffers |
| 7.1 | ECB pozdravlja izbiro, da se okvir za kapitalske rezerve uvede s predlagano direktivo, saj bo ta pristop organom omogočil učinkovito in prilagojeno obravnavo sistemskih tveganj v vseh državah članicah. ECB meni, da so zlasti proticiklične kapitalske rezerve ključen element širšega nabora makrobonitetnih orodij (35), in močno podpira uvedbo izrecnega proticikličnega elementa v finančno ureditev. | 7.1 | The ECB welcomes the choice of the proposed directive for the introduction of the framework for capital buffers since this approach will allow authorities to address systemic risks in an effective and flexible way across Member States. The ECB considers, in particular, the counter-cyclical capital buffers to be a key element of a wider macro-prudential toolkit (35) and strongly supports the introduction of an explicit counter-cyclical element in financial regulation. |
| 7.2 | Proticiklične kapitalske rezerve lahko bistveno izboljšajo odpornost bančnega sektorja in tako prispevajo k nemotenemu opravljanju finančnih storitev skozi ves poslovni cikel. Pri tem ECB poudarja, da mora za odločitev nacionalnih organov glede proticikličnih kapitalskih rezerv veljati neomejena zahteva po vzajemnosti do vključno 2,5 % tveganju prilagojenih sredstev, nad to mejo pa bi morala veljati prostovoljna vzajemnost. ECB tudi podpira predlog, po katerem bodo nacionalni organi lahko določili proticiklične kapitalske rezerve, ki bodo upoštevale finančne in ekonomske spremenljivke, ki štejejo za pomembne za oceno prekomerne rasti posojil in kopičenja sistemskih tveganj. Toda te spremenljivke po naravi ne bi smele biti strukturne, kajti proticiklične kapitalske rezerve naj ne bi bile namenjene obravnavi strukturnih tveganj v finančnem sistemu. Zato ECB predlaga, da se vključitev spremenljivk neciklične narave v mehanizem proticikličnih kapitalskih rezerv umakne iz predlagane direktive (36). | 7.2 | A counter-cyclical capital buffer can substantially improve the resilience of the banking sector and may thus contribute to the smooth provision of financial services throughout the business cycle. In this regard, the ECB emphasises that a decision with regard to a counter-cyclical capital buffer by national authorities should be subject to unconstrained reciprocity requirements up to 2,5 % of risk-weighted assets, while voluntary reciprocity should apply above this threshold. In addition, the ECB supports the proposal that national authorities have the ability to set a counter-cyclical capital buffer that takes into account any financial and economic variables considered relevant for the assessment of excessive credit growth and the build-up of systemic risks. However, these variables should not be structural in nature as the counter-cyclical capital buffer should not aim at addressing structural risks in the financial system. Therefore, the ECB proposes that the inclusion of variables of a non-cyclical nature in the counter-cyclical capital buffer mechanism be withdrawn from the proposed directive (36). |
| 8. Likvidnost | 8. Liquidity |
| 8.1 | ECB pozdravlja jasno zavezo Komisije, da v zakonodajo Unije uvede zahtevo glede likvidnostnega kritja in stopnjo neto stabilnega financiranja v skladu s sporazumi Basel III (37). Uvedba okvira za likvidnostno tveganje v predlagani uredbi bo prinesla znatne mikrobonitetne in makrobonitetne koristi. Likvidnostne zahteve bodo povečale likvidnostne rezerve kreditnih institucij in zmanjšale pretvorbe tveganja zapadlosti, s čimer se bo zmanjšala prekomerna medsebojna povezanost v finančnem sistemu in omejilo sistemsko likvidnostno tveganje. Poleg tega bi morala usklajena pravila o likvidnostnem tveganju pomagati pri doseganju enakih konkurenčnih pogojev z ustreznimi praksami upravljanja z likvidnostnim tveganjem in pozitivno učinkovati na splošno blaginjo v evropskem gospodarstvu. | 8.1 | The ECB welcomes the Commission’s unequivocal commitment to introduce into Union legislation both a liquidity coverage requirement (LCR) and a net stable funding ratio (NSFR), in line with the Basel III agreements (37). The introduction of a liquidity risk framework in the proposed legislation will yield substantial micro- and macro-prudential benefits. The liquidity requirements will increase credit institutions’ liquidity buffers and lower maturity risk transformation, reducing excessive interconnectedness in the financial system and mitigating systemic liquidity risk. Moreover, harmonised liquidity risk rules should help to achieve a level playing field with sound liquidity risk management practices and have an overall welfare-enhancing effect on the European economy. |
| 8.2 | V zvezi s predlaganim okvirom za likvidnost želi ECB izpostaviti naslednja vprašanja. | 8.2.1 | Kar zadeva poročanje o likvidnih sredstvih, se postavke, ki so v predlagani uredbi navedene pri »poročanju o likvidnih sredstvih« (38), v več primerih prekrivajo s postavkami, za katere se izvaja dopolnilno poročanje o likvidnih sredstvih (39). ECB zato priporoča, da se določi enoten in pregleden seznam postavk, ki jih je treba poročati. Pri obravnavi delnic ali enot kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov (CIU) kot likvidnih sredstev je pomembno poleg določitve absolutne omejitve na 250 milijonov EUR omejiti tudi relativni delež teh instrumentov v celotni zahtevi glede likvidnostnega kritja, da se omejijo tveganja koncentracije v majhnih institucijah (40). | 8.2.2 | Centralne banke bi morale biti vključene v določanje, v kolikšni meri se lahko rezerve pri centralni banki štejejo v stanje likvidnih sredstev v času težav (41). | 8.2.3 | Glede na pričakovane znatne medsebojne vplive med likvidnostnimi zahtevami in operacijami denarne politike ECB priporoča, da se EBA z njo posvetuje pri oblikovanju enotne opredelitve visokokakovostnih sredstev in v zvezi z oceno, ki jo mora izvesti do 31. decembra 2015 o tem, kako zagotoviti, da bodo institucije uporabljale stabilne vire financiranja (42). Kljub pozitivnim učinkom, ki jih ima urejanje likvidnosti na izvajanje denarne politike, tj. z višjimi likvidnostnimi rezervami institucij in stabilnejšim financiranjem se zmanjšuje delež kreditnih institucij, ki so stalno odvisne od centralnobančnih operacij, lahko nastanejo tudi negativni učinki, npr. v obliki zniževanja povprečne likvidnosti finančnega premoženja za zavarovanje in bonitete nasprotnih strank ter vpliva na nemoteno izvajanje denarne politike. | 8.2.4 | Posebej pomembno je oblikovati ustrezen okvir za izpolnjevanje zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja, tj. pravila o tem, kako se lahko likvidna sredstva uporabijo v težkih razmerah in kako bi morali pristojni organi ravnati ob kršitvah. Zaradi pomembnosti zahtev glede likvidnostnega kritja z vidika mikrobonitetnega in makrobonitetnega nadzora ECB meni, da bi morala biti EBA v sodelovanju z ESRB vključena v oblikovanje smernic o možni sprostitvi in ponovni vzpostavitvi likvidnostnih rezerv v času težav (43). | 8.2 | With regard to the proposed liquidity framework, the ECB would like to highlight the following points. | 8.2.1 | Regarding reporting on liquid assets, there are a number of overlaps between the items presented in the proposed regulation regarding ‘Reporting on liquid assets’ (38) and the items subject to supplementary reporting of liquid assets (39). Accordingly, the ECB recommends the adoption of a single and transparent list of the items to be reported. As regards the treatment of shares or units in collective investment undertakings (CIUs) as liquid assets, it is important to limit the relative amount of these instruments in the total LCR, in addition to setting an absolute amount threshold of EUR 250 million, in order to limit concentration risks in small institutions (40). | 8.2.2 | Central banks should be involved in determining the extent to which central bank reserves may count towards the stock of liquid assets in times of stress (41). | 8.2.3 | In view of the significant interaction expected between liquidity requirements and monetary policy operations, the ECB recommends being consulted by the EBA when developing a uniform definition of high quality assets as well as on the assessment by 31 December 2015 on how to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding (42). Despite the positive effects of liquidity regulation on monetary policy implementation, i.e. credit institutions’ increased liquidity buffers and more stable funding reduce the share of persistent credit institutions in central bank operations, potential adverse effects could also arise, e.g. by lowering the average collateral liquidity and counterparty credit quality and impacting the smooth implementation of monetary policy. | 8.2.4 | The development of an adequate compliance framework for the LCR, i.e. rules on the use of the stock of liquid assets in a stress scenario and how competent authorities should react in case of a breach, is of particular importance. Given the relevance of the LCR both from the perspective of micro- and macro-prudential supervision, the ECB considers that the EBA, in cooperation with the ESRB, should be involved in formulating guidance on the possible release and subsequent build-up of the liquidity buffer in times of stress (43). |
| 8.3 | Z uvedbo stopnje neto stabilnega financiranja (44) se bo zagotovilo, da bodo imele kreditne institucije stabilne vire financiranja za izpolnitev svojih obveznosti. Ena od ključnih težav, ki so jih imele finančne institucije v krizi, je bila nujna potreba po financiranju, ki je izhajala iz visoke stopnje zapadlostnega neskladja. Zato so morale stalno obnavljati kratkoročne obveznosti na medbančnih denarnih trgih, kar je povzročilo težave s financiranjem, ki so se prelile na finančne trge. V tej zvezi ECB predlaga spremembe besedila, s katerimi bi se izognili možnim nejasnostim pri izvajanju te zahteve. Res je, da bo morda treba model stopnje neto stabilnega financiranja še izpopolniti, vendar se pričakuje, da bo v obdobju opazovanja, ki bo trajalo do 1. januarja 2018, dovolj časa za dodatno kalibracijo stopnje v izogib tveganju morebitnih neželenih posledic. | 8.3 | Introduction of the NSFR (44) will ensure that credit institutions have stable funding to meet their obligations. One of the key problems that financial institutions faced in the crisis was the urgent funding need that resulted from a high degree of maturity mismatch. This implied a need to rely continuously on the roll-over of short-term liabilities in the wholesale money markets, resulting in funding problems that spilled over to the financial markets. In this regard, the ECB suggests drafting changes to avoid any possible ambiguity in the implementation of this requirement. While acknowledging that the design of the NSFR may warrant some fine-tuning, the long observation period lasting until 1 January 2018 is expected to provide the necessary time to further calibrate the ratio in order to avoid the risk of possible unintended consequences. |
| 9. Finančni vzvod | 9. Leverage |
| V finančni krizi se je jasno pokazala potreba po omejevanju prekomernih finančnih vzvodov v finančnem sektorju. ECB zato nadvse pozdravlja zavezo Komisije, da uvede stopnjo finančnega vzvoda, ki ne temelji na tveganju, kot zavezujočo zahtevo, potem ko opravi ustrezen pregled in kalibracijo in s tem kar najbolj izkoristi dogovorjeno obdobje za pregled (45). Glede na navedeno ECB predlaga, da se v predlagani uredbi razjasni zaveza zakonodajalca, da bo to zahtevo uvedel (46). | The financial crisis clearly demonstrated the need to contain excessive leverage within the financial sector. The ECB therefore very much welcomes the Commission’s commitment to introduce a non-risk based leverage ratio as a binding requirement, subject to appropriate review and calibration by making maximum use of the agreed review period (45). Against this background, the ECB suggests clarifying in the proposed regulation the legislator’s commitment to introducing this requirement (46). |
| 10. Poročanje nadzornim organom | 10. Supervisory reporting |
| Okvira za finančno poročanje (FINREP) in splošno poročanje (COREP) nadzornim organom je nazadnje pripravil Odbor evropskih bančnih nadzornikov (47). Ta dva okvira trenutno temeljita na nezavezujočih smernicah in obrazcih za poročanje. V zvezi s tem ECB priporoča: (a) da se v predlagani uredbi pojasni okvir za poročanje COREP; (b) da se določi jasna pravna podlaga za poročanje FINREP; in (c) da se podrobneje določi obseg osnutkov tehničnih standardov, ki jih na tem področju pripravi EBA (48). Zlasti se predlaga, naj EBA in ESRB sodelujeta, da bi opredelila obseg finančnih informacij, ki so potrebne za makrobonitetni nadzor. Da bi zbrali informacije, ki so potrebne za izvajanje nalog makrobonitetnega nadzora, v povezavi z zahtevami za poročanje o velikih izpostavljenostih, likvidnosti in stopnji finančnega vzvoda (49), ECB tudi predlaga, da se uvede najmanj četrtletno poročanje in v pripravo osnutkov izvedbenih tehničnih standardov vključi ESRB. | The supervisory reporting frameworks of financial reporting (FINREP) and common reporting (COREP) have been last developed by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (47). These frameworks are currently based on non-binding guidelines and reporting templates. In this context, the ECB recommends: (a) clarifying in the proposed regulation the COREP reporting framework; (b) introducing a clear legal basis for FINREP; and (c) further specifying the scope of the draft technical standards to be developed by the EBA in this field (48). In particular, it is proposed that EBA and ESRB should cooperate to define the scope of financial information necessary for the purposes of macro-prudential oversight. With a view to collecting the information necessary for the performance of macro-prudential oversight tasks with regard to the reporting requirements related to large exposures, liquidity reporting and leverage ratio (49), the ECB also suggests introducing quarterly reporting at a minimum and involving the ESRB for the development of the draft implementing technical standards. |
| 11. Izboljšanje ureditve izmenjave informacij | 11. Enhancement of information-sharing arrangements |
| 11.1 | Nedavna reforma finančnega nadzora v Evropi je že prinesla izboljšanje ureditve izmenjave informacij (50), finančna kriza pa je poudarila potrebo po zagotovitvi ustrezne ureditve izmenjave informacij med javnimi organi ter zlasti med centralnimi bankami, vključno z ECB, in nadzornimi organi. ECB predlaga, da se v predlagani direktivi odrazijo spremembe, uvedene z reformo nadzora, in dodatno izboljša izmenjava informacij med nadzornimi organi in centralnimi bankami ESCB, vključno z ECB, kadar so te informacije pomembne za izvajanje njihovih nalog (51). ECB tudi priporoča, da Komisija ob pomoči ustreznih institucij in organov (vključno z ECB, ESRB in EBA) v dveh letih od začetka veljavnosti predlagane direktive celovito preveri učinkovitost te ureditve in po potrebi oblikuje predloge za dodatno izboljšanje tega okvira na ravni Unije, pri čemer upošteva izrazito sinergijo, ki obstaja v zvezi z informacijami med funkcijama centralnega bančništva in bonitetnega nadzora, v normalnih razmerah in v času težav (52). | 11.1 | Whilst the recent reform of European financial supervision has already provided enhancements as regards information-sharing arrangements (50), the financial crisis has underlined the importance of ensuring appropriate information sharing arrangements between public authorities and in particular between central banks, including the ECB, and supervisory authorities. The ECB suggests reflecting the changes introduced by the supervisory reform in the proposed directive and further improving the exchange of information between supervisory authorities and ESCB central banks, including the ECB, when this information is relevant for the performance of their respective tasks (51). The ECB would also recommend that the Commission, with the assistance of the relevant institutions and authorities (including the ECB, the ESRB and the EBA) undertake, within two years following the entry into force of the proposed directive, a full review of the effectiveness of these arrangements and, where appropriate, formulate proposals to further enhance this framework at Union level, taking in particular into account the significant information-related synergies between the central banking and the prudential supervisory functions, in both normal times and during times of stress (52). |
| 11.2 | ECB tudi priporoča, da Komisija na podlagi poročila EBA temeljito oceni izvajanje predlagane direktive in predlagane uredbe glede sodelovanja Unije in držav članic s tretjimi državami. Ob upoštevanju naukov, ki izhajajo iz finančne krize, bi s takšnim preverjanjem ugotovili vrzeli in področja, kjer je treba dodatno izboljšati ureditev sodelovanja, izmenjave informacij in vzajemnosti, vključno z izvrševanjem nadzornih predpisov v tretjih državah. V okviru tega bi bilo treba oceniti tudi potrebo po dodatnem izboljšanju sporazumov o sodelovanju med državami članicami in EBA na eni strani ter mednarodnimi finančnimi institucijami ali organi, kot je Mednarodni denarni sklad (MDS) ali Odbor za finančno stabilnost, na drugi strani. | Natančneje, ECB priporoča tudi celovit pregled določb predlagane direktive o pogojih dostopa za podružnice institucij, ustanovljenih v tretjih državah, da se izboljša usklajenost pravil držav članic, ki urejajo ustanavljanje podružnic kreditnih institucij s sedežem zunaj Unije, in zagotovi skladnost zakonodaje Unije o finančnih storitvah med sektorji (53). | 11.2 | The ECB also recommends an in-depth assessment by the Commission, based on a report of the EBA, of the application of the proposed directive and regulation with regard to Union and Member State cooperation with third countries. Taking into account lessons drawn from the financial crisis, such review would identify lacunae and assess areas requiring further enhancements of cooperation, information sharing and reciprocity arrangements, including enforcement of supervisory rules in third countries. This assessment should also include the need to further improve cooperation agreements between Member States and the EBA on the one hand and international financial institutions or bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Financial Stability Board on the other hand. | More specifically, the ECB also recommends a full review of the provisions of the proposed directive relating to the conditions of access for branches of institutions established in third countries in order to improve the harmonisation of rules within Member States governing the establishment of branches of credit institutions having their head office outside the Union and to ensure the cross-sectoral consistency of Union financial services legislation (53). |
| 12. Druga vprašanja | 12. Other issues |
| V Prilogi k temu mnenju so obravnavana tudi različna druga vprašanja, ki so razlog za posebne predlagane spremembe in se nanašajo na: (a) sodelovanje med pristojnimi organi za nadzor in pregled centralnih nasprotnih strank; (b) pooblastila za nadzor; (c) vprašanja glede upravljanja; (d) pravila in pojme, ki se uporabljajo v zvezi z zunanjimi bonitetnimi institucijami (ECAI); (e) listinjenje. | Various other issues related to: (a) cooperation between competent authorities for supervision and oversight of central counterparties; (b) supervisory powers; (c) governance issues; (d) rules and terminology applicable to external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs); (e) securitisation, are also addressed in the Annex to the opinion and give rise to specific proposed amendments. |
| Kadar ECB priporoča, da se predlagana direktiva in predlagana uredba spremenita, so konkretni predlogi sprememb besedila s pripadajočimi pojasnili navedeni v Prilogi. | Where the ECB recommends that the proposed directive and regulation are amended, specific drafting proposals are set out in the Annex accompanied by explanatory text to this effect. |
| V Frankfurtu na Majni, 25. januarja 2012 | Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 January 2012. |
| Podpredsednik ECB | The Vice-President of the ECB |
| Vítor CONSTÂNCIO | Vítor CONSTÂNCIO |
| (1) COM(2011) 453 konč. | (1) COM(2011) 453 final. |
| (2) COM(2011) 452 konč. | (2) COM(2011) 452 final. |
| (3) Direktiva 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti kreditnih institucij (UL L 177, 30.6.2006, str. 1). | (3) Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1). |
| (4) Direktiva 2006/49/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o kapitalski ustreznosti investicijskih podjetij in kreditnih institucij (UL L 177, 30.6.2006, str. 201). | (4) Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 201). |
| (5) Glej točko 29 izjave voditeljev držav skupine G-20 na vrhu v Seulu 11. in 12. novembra 2010, kjer je navedeno: »Novi okvir bo prenesen v nacionalne zakone in druge predpise, njegovo uvajanje pa se bo začelo 1. januarja 2013 in v celoti zaključilo do 1. januarja 2019.« | (5) See point 29 of the G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration of 11 and 12 November 2010 stating that: ‘The new framework will be translated into our national laws and regulations, and will be implemented starting on January 1, 2013 and fully phased in by January 1, 2019’. |
| (6) Točka 29 izjave voditeljev držav skupine G-20 na vrhu v Seulu 11. in 12. novembra 2010. | (6) Point 29 of the G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration of 11 and 12 November 2010. |
| (7) Glej Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor, december 2010, revidirana verzija iz junija 2011 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporazum Basel III). | (7) See ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, December 2010, revised version June 2011 (hereinafter the ‘Basel III agreement’). |
| (8) Glej sporočili za javnost skupine GHOS z dne 26. julija in 12. septembra 2010, dostopni na spletni strani BIS na naslovu www.bis.org. | (8) See the GHOS press releases of 26 July and 12 September 2010, available on the BIS’s website at www.bis.org |
| (9) Glej na primer odstavek 2 Mnenja ECB CON/2009/17 z dne 5. marca 2009 na zahtevo Sveta Evropske unije o predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES glede bank, pridruženih centralnim institucijam, nekaterih postavk lastnih sredstev, velikih izpostavljenosti, nadzornih režimov in kriznega upravljanja (UL C 93, 22.4.2009, str. 3). Vsa mnenja ECB so objavljena na spletni strani ECB na naslovu www.ecb.europa.eu. | (9) See, for instance, paragraph 2 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/17 of 5 March 2009 at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management (OJ C 93, 22.4.2009, p. 3). All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu |
| (10) Glej na primer odstavek 3 Mnenja ECB CON/2011/42 z dne 4. maja 2011 o predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktive 2003/71/ES in Direktive 2009/138/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega organa za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine ter Evropskega organa za vrednostne papirje in trge (UL C 159, 28.5.2011, str. 10). | (10) See, for instance, paragraph 3 of ECB Opinion CON/2011/42 of 4 May 2011 on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2003/71/EC and 2009/138/EC in respect of the powers of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority (OJ C 159, 28.5.2011, p. 10). |
| (11) Glej odstavek 20 sklepov Evropskega sveta z dne 18. in 19. junija 2009. | (11) See paragraph 20 of the European Council conclusions of 18 and 19 June 2009. |
| (12) Uredba (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o ustanovitvi Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ) in o spremembi Sklepa št. 716/2009/ES ter razveljavitvi Sklepa Komisije 2009/78/ES (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 12), Uredba (EU) št. 1094/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o ustanovitvi Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) in o spremembi Sklepa št. 716/2009/ES ter razveljavitvi Sklepa Komisije 2009/79/ES (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 48) in Uredba (EU) št. 1095/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o ustanovitvi Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) in o spremembi Sklepa št. 716/2009/ES ter razveljavitvi Sklepa Komisije 2009/77/ES (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 84). Uredbe o ustanovitvi ESA uvajajo postopek, po katerem ESA pripravijo osnutke tehničnih regulativnih in izvedbenih standardov, ki jih nato sprejme Komisija v obliki delegiranih oziroma izvedbenih aktov. | (12) Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12), Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48) and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84). The Regulations establishing the ESAs introduce a procedure for the development by the ESAs of draft technical regulatory and implementing standards prior to their endorsement by the Commission under the form of delegated and implementing acts, respectively. |
| (13) Člen 282(5) Pogodbe se sklicuje na osnutke pravnih aktov Unije v naslednjih jezikovnih različicah: bolgarska (»проект на акт на Съюза«); španska (»proyecto de acto de la Unión«); danska (»udkast«); nemška (»Entwurf für Rechtsakte der Union«); estonska (»ettepanekute«); grška (»σχέδιο πράξης της Ένωσης«); francoska (»projet d'acte de l'Union«); italijanska (»progetto di atto dell'Unione»); latvijska (»projektiem«); litovska (»Sąjungos aktų projektų«); nizozemska (»ontwerp van een handeling van de Unie«); portugalska (»projectos de acto da União«); romunska (»proiect de act al Uniunii«); slovaška (»navrhovaných aktoch Únie«); slovenska (»osnutki aktov Unije«); finska (»esityksistä«); švedska (»utkast«). Irska različica se glasi »gniomh Aontais arna bheartu«, kar ustreza pojmu »načrtovanih« aktov Unije. | (13) Article 282(5) of the Treaty refers to draft Union acts in the following language versions: Bulgarian (‘проект на акт на Съюза’); Spanish (‘proyecto de acto de la Unión’); Danish (‘udkast’); German (‘Entwurf für Rechtsakte der Union’); Estonian (‘ettepanekute’); Greek (‘σχέδιο πράξης της Ένωσης’); French (‘projet d'acte de l'Union’); Italian (‘progetto di atto dell'Unione’); Latvian (‘projektiem’); Lithuanian (‘Sąjungos aktų projektų’); Dutch (‘ontwerp van een handeling van de Unie’); Portuguese (‘projectos de acto da União’); Romanian (‘proiect de act al Uniunii’); Slovak (‘navrhovaných aktoch Únie’); Slovenian (‘osnutki aktov Unije’); Finnish (‘esityksistä’); Swedish (‘utkast’). The Irish version reads ‘gniomh Aontais arna bheartu’, which corresponds to the concept of ‘planned’ Union acts. |
| (14) Sodba z dne 10. julija 2003 v zadevi C-11/00, Komisija Evropskih skupnosti proti Evropski centralni banki ([2003] PSES 2003, str. I-7147, zlasti točki 110 in 111). | (14) Judgment of 10 July 2003 in Case C-11/00, Commission of the European Communities v European Central Bank ([2003] ECR 2003, p. I-7147, in particular paragraphs 110 and 111). |
| (15) Člen 443 predlagane uredbe. | (15) Article 443 of the proposed regulation. |
| (16) Glej uvodno izjavo 87 predlagane uredbe. | (16) See recital 87 of the proposed regulation. |
| (17) Glej skupno poročilo o napredku Odbora za finančno stabilnost, Mednarodnega denarnega sklada in Banke za mednarodne poravnave skupini G-20 o orodjih in okvirih makrobonitetne politike z dne 27. oktobra 2011, dostopno na spletni strani Odbora za finančno stabilnost na naslovu www.financialstabilityboard.org. | (17) See the joint Financial Stability Board, International Monetary Fund and Bank for International Settlements progress report to the G20 on macro-prudential policy tools and frameworks of 27 October 2011, available on the FSB’s website at www.financialstabilityboard.org |
| (18) Glej poglavje 4 naslova VII predlagane direktive. | (18) See Title VII, Chapter 4 of the proposed directive. |
| (19) Člen 95 predlagane direktive. | (19) Article 95 of the proposed directive. |
| (20) Člen 119(2) predlagane uredbe. | (20) Article 119(2) of the proposed regulation. |
| (21) Glej sporočili za javnost skupine GHOS z dne 26. julija in 12. septembra 2010. | (21) See the GHOS press releases of 26 July and 12 September 2010. |
| (22) Glej člen 27 predlagane uredbe. | (22) See Article 27 of the proposed regulation. |
| (23) Glej člen 26(1) predlagane uredbe. | (23) See Article 26(1) of the proposed regulation. |
| (24) Glej odstavek 84 sporazuma Basel III. | (24) See paragraph 84 of the Basel III agreement. |
| (25) Direktiva 2002/87/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. decembra 2002 o dopolnilnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij, zavarovalnic in investicijskih družb v finančnem konglomeratu, ki spreminja direktive Sveta 73/239/EGS, 79/267/EGS, 92/49/EGS, 92/96/EGS, 93/6/EGS in 93/22/EGS ter direktivi 98/78/ES in 2000/12/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (UL L 35, 11.2.2003, str. 1). | (25) Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1). |
| (26) Glej člen 46 predlagane uredbe. | (26) See Article 46 of the proposed regulation. |
| (27) V skladu s členom 16 predlagane uredbe. | (27) In accordance with Article 16 of the proposed regulation. |
| (28) V skladu s členom 16 predlagane uredbe. | (28) In accordance with Article 16 of the proposed regulation. |
| (29) Glej odstavek 6.1 Mnenja CON/2011/42. | (29) See paragraph 6.1 of Opinion CON/2011/42. |
| (30) Direktiva 2009/138/ES Evropskega Parlamenta in Sveta z dne 25. novembra 2009 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti zavarovanja in pozavarovanja (Solventnost II) (UL L 335, 17.12.2009, str. 1). | (30) Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1). |
| (31) Ob primerjavi teh besedil se pokaže več razlik glede obravnave medsektorskih udeležb na individualni ravni in ravni skupine. Na primer, po Direktivi 2009/138/ES se udeležbe zavarovalnice v institucijah ali finančnih institucijah odbijejo na individualni ravni, ne glede na to, ali so zavarovalnica in institucije del istega finančnega konglomerata. V nasprotju s tem predlagana uredba omogoča opustitev, tj. pristojni organi lahko odločijo, da deležev, ki jih ima institucija v drugih institucijah, finančnih institucijah ali zavarovalnicah, na individualni ravni ne bodo odbili, če so subjekti del istega finančnega konglomerata ali pa niso del finančnega konglomerata, vendar se uporablja ena od treh metod iz Priloge I k Direktivi 2002/87/ES. Kar zadeva obseg nadzora skupin, so kreditne institucije, investicijska podjetja in finančne institucije vključeni v nadzor skupin po Direktivi 2009/138/ES. V nasprotju s tem je obseg nadzora po predlagani uredbi omejen na institucije in finančne institucije, ki so podrejena podjetja institucije, oziroma na finančni holding ali mešan finančni holding, kjer to pride v poštev (člen 16 predlagane uredbe). | (31) A comparison of these texts reveals a number of differences regarding the treatment of cross-sectoral participations at individual and group level. For example, under Directive 2009/138/EC, insurance undertaking’s participations in institutions or financial institutions are deducted at individual level irrespective of whether the insurance undertaking and institutions are part of the same financial conglomerate. By contrast, the proposed regulation provides for a waiver, i.e. competent authorities can decide not to deduct institution’s holdings in other institutions, financial institutions or insurance undertakings at individual level where: the entities are part of the same financial conglomerate; or where they are not part of a financial conglomerate but one of the three methods as set out in Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC is used. As regards the scope of group supervision, credit institutions, investment firms and financial institutions are included in the scope of group supervision under Directive 2009/138/EC. Conversely, the scope of supervision under the proposed regulation is limited to institutions and financial institutions that are subsidiaries of an institution, or if applicable the financial holding company or mixed financial holding company (Article 16 of the proposed regulation). |
| (32) Glej člen 139 predlagane direktive, ki spreminja člen 21 Direktive 2002/87/ES. Zaradi tega bi bilo treba črtati člen 46(4) predlagane uredbe. | (32) See Article 139 of the proposed directive amending Article 21 of Directive 2002/87/EC. This would require the deletion of Article 46(4) of the proposed regulation. |
| (33) Glej uvodno izjavo 27 predlagane uredbe in sporočilo za javnost skupine GHOS z dne 13. januarja 2011. | (33) See recital 27 of the proposed regulation and the GHOS press release of 13 January 2011. |
| (34) Glej uvodno izjavo 27 predlagane uredbe. | (34) See recital 27 of the proposed regulation. |
| (35) Proticiklične kapitalske rezerve naj bi se oblikovale v obdobjih prekomerne rasti posojil, povezanih s kopičenjem sistemskih tveganj, in sprostile v času težav. | (35) The counter-cyclical capital buffer is to be activated in periods of excessive credit growth associated with the build-up of systemic risks and released in stress situations. |
| (36) Glej člen 126(3)(c) in člen 126(4) predlagane direktive. | (36) See Article 126(3)(c) and Article 126(4) of the proposed directive. |
| (37) Glej uvodni izjavi 75 in 76 predlagane uredbe. | (37) See recital 75 and 76 of the proposed regulation. |
| (38) Člen 404 predlagane uredbe. | (38) Article 404 of the proposed regulation. |
| (39) Priloga III k predlagani uredbi. | (39) Annex III of the proposed regulation. |
| (40) Člen 404(5) predlagane uredbe. | (40) Article 404(5) of the proposed regulation. |
| (41) Glej zlasti člena 403 in 404 ter Prilogo III k predlagani uredbi. | (41) See in particular Articles 403 and 404 of and Annex III to the proposed regulation. |
| (42) Glej člen 481 predlagane uredbe. | (42) See Article 481 of the proposed regulation. |
| (43) Glej člen 402 predlagane uredbe. | (43) See Article 402 of the proposed regulation. |
| (44) Glej uvodno izjavo 76 in člen 481(3) predlagane uredbe. | (44) See recital 76 and Article 481(3) of the proposed regulation. |
| (45) Glej uvodne izjave 64 do 70 predlagane uredbe. | (45) See recitals 64 to 70 of the proposed regulation. |
| (46) Glej člen 482 predlagane uredbe. | (46) See Article 482 of the proposed regulation. |
| (47) Glej zbornik standardov in smernic Odbora evropskih bančnih nadzornikov, str. 448–473. | (47) See the Committee of European Banking Supervisor’s compendium of standards and guidelines, pp. 448-473. |
| (48) Glej člen 94 predlagane uredbe. | (48) See Article 94 of the proposed regulation. |
| (49) Členi 383, 403 in 417 predlagane uredbe. | (49) Articles 383, 403 and 417 of the proposed regulation. |
| (50) Glej Uredbo (EU) št. 1093/2010, Uredbo (EU) št. 1092/2010, Uredbo Sveta (EU) št. 1096/2010 z dne 17. novembra 2010 o dodelitvi posebnih nalog Evropski centralni banki v zvezi z delovanjem Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 162). | (50) See Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 of 17 November 2010 conferring specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 162). |
| (51) Glej na primer odstavke 13 do 15 Mnenja CON/2009/17, odstavek 2.2 Mnenja ECB CON/2010/23 z dne 18. marca 2010 o predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktiv 1998/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega bančnega organa, Evropskega organa za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine ter Evropskega organa za vrednostne papirje in trge (UL C 87, 1.4.2010, str. 1) in odstavek 5 Mnenja CON/2011/42. | (51) See, for instance, paragraphs 13 to 15 of Opinion CON/2009/17, paragraph 2.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2010/23 of 18 March 2010 on a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 1998/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC, and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority (OJ C 87, 1.4.2010, p. 1) and paragraph 5 of Opinion CON/2011/42. |
| (52) Glej odstavek 15 Mnenja CON/2009/17. | (52) See paragraph 15 of Opinion CON/2009/17. |
| (53) Glej na primer predlog direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o trgih finančnih instrumentov in razveljavitvi Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (COM(2011) 656 konč.). | (53) See for example the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2011) 656 final). |
| PRILOGA | ANNEX |
| Predlagane spremembe besedila predlagane direktive | Drafting proposals for the proposed directive |
| Besedilo, ki ga predlaga Komisija | Spremembe, ki jih predlaga ECB (1) | Text proposed by the Commission | Amendments proposed by the ECB (1) |
| Sprememba 1 | Amendment 1 |
| Uvodna izjava 3 predlagane direktive | Recital 3 of the proposed directive |
| „(3) | Splošne bonitetne zahteve iz Uredbe [vstavi OP] so dopolnjene z individualnimi ureditvami, o katerih odločajo pristojni organi po rednem nadzorniškem pregledu posamezne kreditne institucije in investicijske družbe. Obseg takšnih nadzornih ureditev se določi v tej direktivi in pristojni organi bi morali biti sposobni presoditi, katere ureditve bi bilo treba uporabiti. Kar zadeva takšne individualne ureditve v zvezi z likvidnostjo, morajo pristojni organi upoštevati načela, določena v smernicah o likvidnosti, ki jih je objavil Odbor evropskih bančnih nadzornikov [opomba].“ | „(3) | Splošne bonitetne zahteve iz Uredbe [vstavi OP] so dopolnjene z individualnimi ureditvami, o katerih odločajo pristojni organi po rednem nadzorniškem pregledu posamezne kreditne institucije in investicijske družbe. Obseg takšnih nadzornih ureditev se določi v tej direktivi in pristojni organi bi morali biti sposobni presoditi, katere ureditve bi bilo treba uporabiti. “ | ‘(3) | The general prudential requirements laid down in Regulation [inserted by OP] are supplemented by individual arrangements to be decided by the competent authorities as a result of their ongoing supervisory review of each individual credit institution and investment firm. The range of such supervisory arrangements should be set out in this Directive and the competent authorities should be able to exert their judgment as to which arrangements should be imposed. With regard to such individual arrangements concerning liquidity, competent authorities should take into account the principles set out in the guidelines on liquidity published by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors [footnote].’ | ‘(3) | The general prudential requirements laid down in Regulation [inserted by OP] are supplemented by individual arrangements to be decided by the competent authorities as a result of their ongoing supervisory review of each individual credit institution and investment firm. The range of such supervisory arrangements should be set out in this Directive and the competent authorities should be able to exert their judgment as to which arrangements should be imposed. ’ |
| Pojasnilo | ESA nadomeščajo odbore na Lamfalussyjevi ravni tri ter prevzemajo vse naloge in odgovornosti teh odborov, vključno z nadaljevanjem tekočega dela in projektov, npr. v skladu z uvodno izjavo 10 in členom 8(1)(l) Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010. Zato je treba sklicevanje na te smernice v uvodni izjavi črtati. | Explanation | The ESAs replace the Lamfalussy Level 3 committees and assume all of the tasks and responsibilities of those committees including the continuation of on-going work and projects, e.g. recital 10 and Article 8(1)(l) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. Therefore, the reference to these guidelines in the recital should be deleted. |
| Sprememba 2 | Amendment 2 |
| Člen 2(4) predlagane direktive (novo) | Article 2(4) of the proposed directive (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „4. EBA pripravi osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov za dodatno opredelitev meril za vključitev institucije na seznam v odstavku 3 in za vrste primerov, za katere lahko velja nacionalna zakonodaja, kakor je navedeno v členu 3(2). | Na Komisijo se prenese pooblastilo za sprejetje osnutkov regulativnih tehničnih standardov iz prvega pododstavka v skladu s členi 10 do 14 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010.“ | No text. | ‘4. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to further define the criteria for including an institution on the list in paragraph 3 and for the types of cases that can be covered by national legislation as referred to in Article 3(2). | Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Trenutno ni mogoče določiti, po katerih merilih so izbrani subjekti, navedeni na seznamu v členu 2(3) predlagane direktive. Da bi zmanjšali nacionalne možnosti in diskrecijske pravice, ECB predlaga, da EBA pripravi objektivna merila, po katerih bo mogoče ob bodočih spremembah predlagane direktive oceniti, ali bi bilo treba seznam iz člena 2(3)(3) do (22) spremeniti. Predlaga se, da se enak postopek uporabi za vrste primerov, zajete v členu 3(2) predlagane direktive. To spremembo je treba brati v povezavi s členom 136(a) predlagane direktive, ki daje Komisiji pooblastilo za tehnične prilagoditve seznama iz člena 2 predlagane direktive. | Explanation | Currently, it is not possible to determine the criteria by which the entities listed in Article 2(3) of the proposed directive are selected. In order to reduce national options and discretion, the ECB proposes that EBA develop objective criteria against which it can be assessed in future amendments to the proposed directive whether the list contained in Article 2(3)(3) to (22) should be amended. One suggestion is to apply the same procedure to the types of cases covered under Article 3(2) of the proposed directive. This amendment should be read in conjunction with Article 136(a) of the proposed directive, which gives the Commission the power to make technical adjustments to the list in Article 2 of the proposed directive. |
| Sprememba 3 | Amendment 3 |
| Člen 7 predlagane direktive | Article 7 of the proposed directive |
| „Člen 7 | Sodelovanje z EBA | Pristojni organi pri opravljanju svojih nalog upoštevajo konvergenco glede nadzornih orodij in nadzornih praks pri uporabi zakonov in drugih predpisov, sprejetih na podlagi te direktive. Zato države članice zagotovijo, da: | (a) | pristojni organi sodelujejo pri dejavnostih EBA; | (b) | si pristojni organi prizadevajo za upoštevanje smernic in priporočil, ki jih izda EBA v skladu s členom 16 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010; | (c) | nacionalne pristojnosti, podeljene pristojnim organom, ne ovirajo izvajanja njihovih nalog, ki jih imajo kot člani EBA ali v skladu s to direktivo in Uredbo [vstavi OP].“ | „Člen 7 | Sodelovanje z EBA in znotraj Evropskega sistema finančnega nadzora (ESFS) | Pristojni organi pri opravljanju svojih nalog upoštevajo konvergenco glede nadzornih orodij in nadzornih praks pri uporabi zakonov in drugih predpisov, sprejetih na podlagi te direktive in Uredbe [vstavi OP]. Zato države članice zagotovijo, da: | (a) | pristojni organi kot udeleženci v ESFS sodelujejo z zaupanjem in popolnim vzajemnim spoštovanjem, zlasti pri zagotavljanju pretoka ustreznih in zanesljivih informacij med njimi in drugimi udeleženci v ESFS v skladu z načelom lojalnega sodelovanja iz člena 4(3) Pogodbe o Evropski uniji; | (b) | pristojni organi sodelujejo pri dejavnostih EBA in, kjer je to ustrezno, v kolegijih nadzornikov; | (c) | si pristojni organi prizadevajo za upoštevanje smernic in priporočil, ki jih izda EBA v skladu s členom 16 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010, ter opozoril in priporočil, ki jih izda ESRB v skladu s členom 16 Uredbe (EU) št. 1092/2010; | (d) | pristojni organi tesno sodelujejo z ESRB; | (e) | nacionalne pristojnosti, podeljene pristojnim organom, ne ovirajo izvajanja njihovih nalog, ki jih imajo kot člani EBA, kot člani ESRB, kjer je to ustrezno, ali v skladu s to direktivo in Uredbo [vstavi OP].“ | ‘Article 7 | Cooperation with EBA | In the exercise of their duties, the competent authorities shall take into account the convergence in respect of supervisory tools and supervisory practices in the application of the laws, regulations and administrative requirements adopted pursuant to this Directive. For that purpose, Member States shall ensure that: | (a) | the competent authorities participate in the activities of EBA; | (b) | competent authorities make every effort to comply with those guidelines and recommendations issued by EBA in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010; | (c) | national mandates conferred on the competent authorities do not inhibit the performance of their duties as members of EBA or under this Directive and Regulation [inserted by OP].’ | ‘Article 7 | Cooperation with EBA and within the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) | In the exercise of their duties, the competent authorities shall take into account the convergence in respect of supervisory tools and supervisory practices in the application of the laws, regulations and administrative requirements adopted pursuant to this Directive and Regulation [inserted by OP]. For that purpose, Member States shall ensure that: | (a) | competent authorities, as parties to the ESFS, cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular when ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliable information between them and other parties to the ESFS in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation pursuant to Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union; | (b) | competent authorities participate in the activities of EBA and, as appropriate, in the colleges of supervisors; | (c) | competent authorities make every effort to comply with those guidelines and recommendations issued by EBA in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and with the warnings and recommendations issued by the ESRB pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010; | (d) | competent authorities cooperate closely with the ESRB; | (e) | national mandates conferred on the competent authorities do not inhibit the performance of their duties as members of EBA, of the ESRB where appropriate or under this Directive and Regulation [inserted by OP].’ |
| Pojasnilo | Spremembe bodo za potrebe jasnosti in pravne varnosti zagotovile, da bodo v predlagani direktivi upoštevana načela sodelovanja, določena v Uredbi (EU) št. 1092/2010 (2) , Uredbi (EU) št. 1096/2010 in uredbah o ustanovitvi ESA. ECB priporoča, da se podobne spremembe uvedejo v druge direktive za finančne sektorje, kjer je to ustrezno. | Explanation | For the sake of clarity and legal certainty, the amendments will ensure that the proposed directive reflects the principles of cooperation set out in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 (2) , Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 and in the Regulations establishing the ESAs. The ECB recommends introducing similar amendments in other relevant financial sector directives as appropriate. |
| Sprememba 4 | Amendment 4 |
| Člen 8 predlagane direktive | Article 8 of the proposed directive |
| „Člen 8 | Evropska razsežnost nadzora | Pristojni organi v eni državi članici pri opravljanju svojih splošnih nalog na podlagi informacij, ki so na voljo v tistem trenutku, ustrezno upoštevajo možen vpliv svojih odločitev na stabilnost finančnega sistema v vseh drugih zadevnih državah članicah in zlasti v izrednih razmerah.“ | „Člen 8 | Evropska razsežnost nadzora | Pristojni organi v eni državi članici pri opravljanju svojih splošnih nalog na podlagi informacij, ki so na voljo v tistem trenutku, ustrezno upoštevajo možen vpliv svojih odločitev na stabilnost finančnega sistema v vseh drugih zadevnih državah članicah in zlasti v izrednih razmerah, pri tem pa upoštevajo potrebo po izboljšanju delovanja notranjega trga in okrepitvi integracije evropskih finančnih trgov.“ | ‘Article 8 | European dimension of supervision | The competent authorities in one Member State shall, in the exercise of their general duties, duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned and, in particular, in emergency situations, based on the information available at the relevant time.’ | ‘Article 8 | European dimension of supervision | The competent authorities in one Member State shall, in the exercise of their general duties, duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned and, in particular, in emergency situations, based on the information available at the relevant time, taking into account the need to improve the functioning of the internal market and to enhance the integration of European financial markets.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen predlagane spremembe je, da se podrobneje pojasnijo cilji, ki naj bi jim pristojni organi sledili v povezavi z evropsko razsežnostjo svojih dejavnosti. Ustrezno temu bi bilo treba spremeniti tudi uvodno izjavo 42 predlagane direktive. | Explanation | The proposed amendment aims at further clarifying the objectives to be pursued by competent authorities as regards the European dimension of their activities. Recital 42 of the proposed directive should also be amended accordingly. |
| Sprememba 5 | Amendment 5 |
| Členi 49 do 51 predlagane direktive | Articles 49 to 51 of the proposed directive |
| „NASLOV VII | BONITETNI NADZOR | POGLAVJE 1 | Načela bonitetnega nadzora | ODDELEK I | Pristojnost matične države članice in države članice gostiteljice | Člen 49 | Pristojnost matične države članice za nadzor | 1. Za bonitetni nadzor institucije, vključno z dejavnostmi, ki jih opravlja v skladu s členoma 33 in 34, so odgovorni pristojni organi matične države članice, brez poseganja v tiste določbe te direktive, ki to odgovornost nalagajo pristojnim organom države članice gostiteljice. | 2. Odstavek 1 ne preprečuje nadzora na konsolidirani podlagi. | Člen 50 | Pristojnost države članice gostiteljice | Ukrepi države članice gostiteljice ne smejo določati diskriminatorne ali omejevalne obravnave na podlagi dejstva, da je institucija pridobila dovoljenje v drugi državi članici. | Člen 51 | Sodelovanje pri nadzoru | […]“ | „NASLOV VII | BONITETNI NADZOR | POGLAVJE 1 | Načela bonitetnega nadzora | ODDELEK I | matična država članica in država članica gostiteljica | Člen 49 | Pristojnost matične države članice za nadzor | 1. Za bonitetni nadzor institucije, vključno z dejavnostmi, ki jih opravlja v skladu s členoma 33 in 34, so odgovorni pristojni organi matične države članice, brez poseganja v tiste določbe te direktive, ki to odgovornost nalagajo pristojnim organom države članice gostiteljice. | 2. Odstavek 1 ne preprečuje nadzora na konsolidirani podlagi. | Člen 50 | Sodelovanje med matično državo članico in državo članico gostiteljico | […]“ | ‘TITLE VII | PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION | CHAPTER 1 | Principles of prudential supervision | SECTION I | Competence of home and host Member State | Article 49 | Competence of control of the home Member State | 1. The prudential supervision of an institution, including that of the activities it carries on in accordance with Articles 33 and 34, shall be the responsibility of the competent authorities of the home Member State, without prejudice to those provisions of this Directive which give responsibility to the competent authorities of the host Member State. | 2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent supervision on a consolidated basis. | Article 50 | Competence of the host Member State | Measures taken by the host Member State may not provide for discriminatory or restrictive treatment based on the fact that an institution is authorised in another Member State. | Article 51 | Collaboration concerning supervision | […]’ | ‘TITLE VII | PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION | CHAPTER 1 | Principles of prudential supervision | SECTION I | home and host Member State | Article 49 | Competence of control of the home Member State | 1. The prudential supervision of an institution, including that of the activities it carries on in accordance with Articles 33 and 34, shall be the responsibility of the competent authorities of the home Member State, without prejudice to those provisions of this Directive which give responsibility to the competent authorities of the host Member State. | 2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent supervision on a consolidated basis. | Article 50 | Cooperation between home and host Member State | […]’ |
| Pojasnilo | Člen 50 predlagane direktive je enak tretjemu odstavku člena 41 Direktive 2006/48/ES. Ta tretji odstavek se sklicuje na drugi odstavek člena 41, ki ureja nadzor likvidnosti podružnic in ukrepe, ki jih lahko izvedejo države članice gostiteljice za potrebe izvajanja svoje denarne politike (3) . Ta tretji odstavek, ki je zaradi sklicevanja na zgoraj navedene ukrepe zastarel, bi bilo treba odstraniti, kakor sta bila odstranjena tudi prvi in drugi odstavek istega člena Direktive 2006/48/ES (4). | Namen predlagane spremembe je, da se izboljša pravna jasnost glede vlog organov matične države članice in države članice gostiteljice v naslovih zgornjih določb. Prvič, člen 49(1) določa načelo pristojnosti matične države članice. To ne posega v določbe predlagane direktive, ki nalagajo odgovornost pristojnim organom države članice gostiteljice. Zato je navedba pristojnosti države članice gostiteljice v naslovu člena 50 zavajajoča, saj je ta vidik urejen že v prejšnjem odstavku. Drugič, člen 50 je nepotreben, saj načelo nediskriminacije izhaja že iz določb Pogodbe. | Explanation | Article 50 of the proposed directive replicates the third paragraph of Article 41 of Directive 2006/48/EC. This third paragraph refers to the second paragraph of Article 41, which addresses supervision of liquidity of branches and the measures which could be taken by host Member States resulting from the implementation of their monetary policies (3) . This third paragraph, which is obsolete since it referred to the above measures, should be also removed as was done for the first and second paragraphs of the same Article of Directive 2006/48/EC (4). | The proposed amendment is aimed at improving legal clarity with respect to the roles of home and host authorities in the titles of the above provisions. First, Article 49(1) sets out the principle of the competence of the home Member State. This is without prejudice to the provisions of the proposed directive that give responsibility to the competent authorities of the host Member State. Therefore, the reference to the competence of the host Member State in the title of Article 50 is misleading since this aspect is already addressed in the previous article. Second, Article 50 is unnecessary as the principle of non-discrimination arises out of the provisions of the Treaty itself. |
| Sprememba 6 | Amendment 6 |
| Člen 54(2) predlagane direktive | Article 54(2) of the proposed directive |
| „2. Odstavek 1 pristojnim organom različnih držav članic ne preprečuje izmenjave informacij ali posredovanja informacij EBA v skladu s to direktivo, Uredbo [vstavi OP], drugimi direktivami, ki se uporabljajo za kreditne institucije, ter členoma 31 in 35 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010. Za te informacije veljajo pogoji v zvezi s varovanjem poklicne skrivnosti v skladu z odstavkom 1.“ | „2. Odstavek 1 pristojnim organom različnih držav članic ne preprečuje izmenjave informacij ali posredovanja informacij EBA v skladu s to direktivo, Uredbo [vstavi OP], drugimi direktivami, ki se uporabljajo za kreditne institucije, ter členi 31, 35 in 36 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010 in členom 15 Uredbe (EU) št. 1092/2010. Za te informacije veljajo pogoji v zvezi s varovanjem poklicne skrivnosti v skladu z odstavkom 1.“ | ‘2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the competent authorities of the various Member States from exchanging information or transmitting information to EBA in accordance with this Directive, Regulation [inserted by OP], with other Directives applicable to credit institutions, and with Articles 31 and 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. That information shall be subject to the conditions relating to professional secrecy set out in paragraph 1.’ | ‘2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the competent authorities of the various Member States from exchanging information or transmitting information to EBA in accordance with this Directive, Regulation [inserted by OP], with other Directives applicable to credit institutions, and with Articles 31, 35 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010. That information shall be subject to the conditions relating to professional secrecy set out in paragraph 1.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Predlagana sprememba pojasnjuje, da lahko pristojni organi in EBA posredujejo ESRB vse informacije, ki jih ESRB potrebuje za izvajanje svojih nalog, v skladu s pogoji, določenimi v členu 36 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010 in členu 15 Uredbe (EU) št. 1092/2010. ECB priporoča, da se podobne spremembe uvedejo v druge direktive za finančne sektorje, kjer je to ustrezno. | Explanation | The proposed amendment clarifies that the competent authorities and the EBA may transmit to the ESRB all the information necessary for the ESRB to perform its tasks in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 36 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010. The ECB recommends introducing similar amendments in other relevant financial sector directives, as appropriate. |
| Sprememba 7 | Amendment 7 |
| Člen 59 predlagane direktive | Article 59 of the proposed directive |
| „Člen 59 | Posredovanje informacij o monetarnih, sistemskih in plačilnih vidikih | 1. Nobena določba tega poglavja pristojnemu organu ne preprečuje, da bi posredoval informacije naslednjim subjektom za opravljanje njihovih nalog: | […] | 4. V izrednih razmerah iz člena 109(1) države članice pristojnim organom dovolijo, da nemudoma sporočijo […].“ | „Člen 59 | Posredovanje informacij o monetarnih, sistemskih in plačilnih vidikih | 1. Države članice sprejmejo ustrezne ukrepe za odpravo ovir, ki pristojnim organom preprečujejo, da bi posredovali informacije naslednjim subjektom za opravljanje njihovih nalog: | […] | 4. Države članice sprejmejo ukrepe, potrebne za zagotovitev, da pristojni organi v izrednih razmerah iz člena 109(1) nemudoma sporočijo […].“ | ‘Article 59 | Transmission of information concerning monetary, systemic and payment aspects | 1. Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent a competent authority from transmitting information to the following for the purposes of their tasks: | […] | 4. In an emergency situation as referred to in Article 109(1), Member States shall allow the competent authorities to communicate, without delay […].’ | ‘Article 59 | Transmission of information concerning monetary, systemic and payment aspects | 1. Member States shall take the appropriate measures to remove obstacles preventing competent authorities from transmitting information to the following for the purposes of their respective tasks: | […] | 4. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, in an emergency situation as referred to in Article 109(1), the competent authorities to communicate, without delay […].’ |
| Pojasnilo | V finančni krizi se je potrdilo, da je izredno pomembno zagotoviti ustrezno ureditev izmenjave informacij med javnimi organi ter zlasti med centralnimi bankami in nadzornimi organi. ECB zato predlaga, da se dodatno izboljšajo načini izmenjave informacij med nadzornimi organi in centralnimi bankami ESCB, vključno z ECB, v zvezi z informacijami, ki so pomembne za izvajanje njihovih zakonsko predpisanih nalog, zlasti v izrednih razmerah (glej tudi spremembo 12). | Explanation | The financial crisis has confirmed that it is of the utmost importance to ensure appropriate information-sharing arrangements between public authorities and in particular between central banks and supervisory authorities. Therefore, the ECB suggests further improving methods for the exchange of information between supervisory authorities and central banks of the ESCB, including the ECB, relating to the information relevant to the performance of their statutory tasks, especially in emergency situations (see also Amendment 12). |
| Sprememba 8 | Amendment 8 |
| Člen 64 predlagane direktive | Article 64 of the proposed directive |
| „Člen 64 | Pooblastila za nadzor | Za namene člena 99 in uporabe Uredbe [vstavi OP] imajo pristojni organi vsaj naslednja pooblastila: | […].“ | „Člen 64 | Pooblastila za nadzor | Za namene člena 99 in uporabe Uredbe [vstavi OP] imajo pristojni organi vsaj naslednja pooblastila: | […] | (k) | da razrešijo enega ali več članov uprave, kadar ne izpolnjujejo zahtev iz člena 87.“ | ‘Article 64 | Supervisory powers | For the purposes of Article 99 and the application of Regulation [inserted by OP], competent authorities shall have at least the following powers: | […].’ | ‘Article 64 | Supervisory powers | For the purposes of Article 99 and the application of Regulation [inserted by OP], competent authorities shall have at least the following powers: | […] | (k) | to remove one or more members of the management body, where they do not fulfil the requirements imposed under Article 87.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen predlagane spremembe je, da se zagotovi, da bodo imeli pristojni organi po nacionalnih predpisih pravico sprejeti ustrezne ukrepe, vključno z razrešitvijo članov uprave in glavnih direktorjev, ki ne izpolnjujejo zahtev iz člena 87 predlagane direktive, v skladu z mednarodnimi standardi (5). | Explanation | The proposed amendment is aimed at ensuring that national laws entitle competent authorities to take appropriate measures, including the removal of members of the management body and main directors who do not fulfil the requirements defined in Article 87 of the proposed directive, in line with international standards (5). |
| Sprememba 9 | Amendment 9 |
| Člen 67(1) predlagane direktive | Article 67(1) of the proposed directive |
| „1. Ta člen se uporablja v vseh naslednjih primerih: | […].“ | „1. Ta člen se uporablja v vseh naslednjih primerih: | […] | (n) | institucija je bila spoznana za odgovorno za hudo kršitev nacionalnih predpisov, sprejetih na podlagi Direktive 2005/60/ES o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma [opomba]“. | ‘1. This Article shall apply in all the following circumstances: | […].’ | ‘1. This Article shall apply in all the following circumstances: | […] | (n) | an institution has been found liable for a serious infringement of the national provisions adopted pursuant to Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing [footnote]’. |
| Pojasnilo | Pristojni organi bi morali imeti možnost, da instituciji odvzamejo dovoljenje v skladu s členom 18(f) predlagane direktive, če je storila hudo kršitev pravil Unije o preprečevanju pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma. | Explanation | Competent authorities should have the possibility to withdraw the authorisation of an institution pursuant to Article 18(f) of the proposed directive, where it has committed serious infringements of the Union rules on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. |
| Sprememba 10 | Amendment 10 |
| Člen 75(5) predlagane direktive | Article 75(5) of the proposed directive |
| „5. […] | Oddelek za upravljanje tveganja po potrebi poroča neposredno upravi v okviru njene nadzorne funkcije neodvisno od višjega vodstva. | Vodja oddelka za upravljanje tveganja je neodvisen višji vodstveni delavec, ki je jasno odgovoren za to funkcijo. | […].“ | „5. […] | Oddelek za upravljanje tveganja po potrebi poroča neposredno upravi v okviru njene nadzorne funkcije neodvisno od višjega vodstva ter, kjer je to ustrezno, izpostavi pomisleke in opozori upravo v primeru posebnih sprememb pri tveganjih, ki vplivajo ali bi lahko vplivala na institucijo, brez poseganja v odgovornosti uprave v okviru njene nadzorne in/ali upravne funkcije v skladu s to direktivo in Uredbo [vstavi OP]. | Vodja oddelka za upravljanje tveganja je neodvisen višji vodstveni delavec, ki je jasno odgovoren za to funkcijo. | […].“ | ‘5. […] | The risk management function shall be able to report directly to the management body in its supervisory function when necessary, independent from senior management. | The head of the risk management function shall be an independent senior executive with distinct responsibility for the risk management function. | […].’ | ‘5. […] | The risk management function shall be able to report directly to the management body in its supervisory function when necessary, independent from senior management and to raise concerns and warn this body, where appropriate, in case of specific risk developments that affect or may affect the institution, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in both its supervisory and/or managerial functions pursuant to this Directive and Regulation [inserted by OP]. | The head of the risk management function shall be an independent senior executive with distinct responsibility for the risk management function. | […].’ |
| Pojasnilo | ECB priporoča to predlagano spremembo, s katero se natančneje določi, da ima oddelek za upravljanje tveganja tudi nalogo, da izpostavlja pomisleke in opozarja upravo v njeni nadzorni vlogi v primeru spremembe izpostavljenosti institucije tveganjem. | Explanation | The ECB recommends this proposed amendment in order to further specify that the risk management function includes the task of raising concerns and warning the management body in its supervisory capacity in case of developments regarding an institution’s risk exposures. |
| Sprememba 11 | Amendment 11 |
| Člen 87 predlagane direktive | Article 87 of the proposed directive |
| „Člen 87 | Uprava | 1. Pristojni organi zahtevajo, da imajo vsi člani uprave katere koli institucije vedno zadosten ugled, ustrezno znanje, spretnosti in izkušnje ter da opravljanju svojih nalog namenijo dovolj časa. Člani uprave izpolnjujejo zlasti naslednje zahteve: | […] | (b) | uprava ima ustrezno skupno znanje, spretnosti in izkušnje, da lahko razume dejavnosti institucije, vključno z glavnimi tveganji; | […] | 5. EBA pripravi osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov za določitev: | […] | (b) | pojma ustreznega skupnega znanja, spretnosti in izkušenj uprave v skladu z odstavkom 1(b); | […].“ | „Člen 87 | Uprava | 1. Pristojni organi zahtevajo, da imajo vsi člani uprave katere koli institucije vedno zadosten ugled, ustrezno znanje, spretnosti in izkušnje ter da opravljanju svojih nalog namenijo dovolj časa. Člani uprave izpolnjujejo zlasti naslednje zahteve: | […] | (b) | uprava ima individualno in skupaj ustrezno znanje, spretnosti in izkušnje, da lahko razume dejavnosti institucije, vključno z glavnimi tveganji; | […] | 5. EBA pripravi osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov za določitev: | […] | (b) | pojma ustreznega individualnega in skupnega znanja, spretnosti in izkušenj uprave v skladu z odstavkom 1(b); | […].“ | ‘Article 87 | Management body | 1. Competent authorities shall require that all members of the management body of any institution shall at all times be of sufficiently good repute, possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience and commit sufficient time to perform their duties. Members of the management body shall, in particular, fulfil the following requirements: | […] | (b) | The management body shall possess adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience to be able to understand the institution's activities, including the main risks. | […] | 5. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: | […] | (b) | the notion of adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience of the management body as referred to in paragraph 1(b); | […].’ | ‘Article 87 | Management body | 1. Competent authorities shall require that all members of the management body of any institution shall at all times be of sufficiently good repute, possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience and commit sufficient time to perform their duties. Members of the management body shall, in particular, fulfil the following requirements: | […] | (b) | The management body shall possess individually and collectively adequate knowledge, skills and experience to be able to understand the institution's activities, including the main risks. | […] | 5. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: | […] | (b) | the notion of adequate individual and collective knowledge, skills and experience of the management body as referred to in paragraph 1(b); | […].’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen spremembe je, da se zagotovi, da bo imel poleg uprave skupaj tudi vsak posamezen član uprave ustrezno znanje in zahtevane spretnosti (glej odstavek 5.1 zelene knjige Komisije Korporativno upravljanje finančnih institucij in politika prejemkov (6) ). V zvezi s tem se predlaga, da se EBA pooblasti tudi za pripravo osnutkov regulativnih tehničnih standardov za določitev pojma ustreznega individualnega znanja, spretnosti in izkušenj članov uprave. | Explanation | The amendment is aimed at ensuring that not only the management body collectively, but also each individual member of the management body has the appropriate knowledge and required skills (see paragraph 5.1 of the Commission’s Green Paper on Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies (6) . In this respect, it is proposed that the EBA should also be entrusted with the task of developing draft regulatory technical standards to specify the notion of adequate individual knowledge, skills and experience of members of the management body. |
| Sprememba 12 | Amendment 12 |
| Člen 109(1) predlagane direktive | Article 109(1) of the proposed directive |
| „1. V primeru izrednih razmer, vključno z razmerami, opredeljenimi v členu 18 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010, ali ob neugodnem razvoju na trgih, ki bi lahko ogrozile likvidnost trga in stabilnost finančnega sistema v kateri koli državi članici, v kateri so subjekti skupine pridobili dovoljenje ali v kateri imajo sedež pomembne podružnice iz člena 52, konsolidacijski nadzornik ob upoštevanju oddelka 2 poglavja 1 in po potrebi členov 54 in 58 Direktive 2004/39/ES čim prej obvesti EBA, ESRB in organe iz člena 59(4) in člena 60 ter sporoči vse informacije, bistvene za opravljanje njihovih nalog. Te obveznosti veljajo za vse pristojne organe. Če je organ iz člena 59(4) obveščen o razmerah, opisanih v prvem pododstavku, o tem čim prej obvesti pristojne organe iz člena 107 in EBA. | Pristojni organi in organ iz člena 59(4) uporabljajo obstoječe načine obveščanja, kadar je to mogoče.“ | „1. V primeru izrednih razmer, vključno z razmerami, opredeljenimi v členu 18 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010, ali ob neugodnem razvoju na trgih, ki bi lahko ogrozile likvidnost trga in stabilnost finančnega sistema v kateri koli državi članici, v kateri so subjekti skupine pridobili dovoljenje ali v kateri imajo sedež pomembne podružnice iz člena 52, konsolidacijski nadzornik ob upoštevanju oddelka 2 poglavja 1 in po potrebi členov 54 in 58 Direktive 2004/39/ES čim prej obvesti EBA, ESRB, centralne bankein organe iz člena 60 ter sporoči vse informacije, pomembne za opravljanje njihovih nalog. Če je centralna banka ali ESRB obveščen o razmerah, opisanih v prvem pododstavku, o tem čim prej obvesti pristojne organe iz člena 107 in EBA. | Pristojni organi, centralne banke in ESRB uporabljajo obstoječe načine obveščanja, kadar je to mogoče.“ | ‘1. Where an emergency situation, including a situation as defined in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 or a situation of adverse developments in markets, arises, which potentially jeopardises the market liquidity and the stability of the financial system in any of the Member State where entities of a group have been authorised or where significant branches referred to in Article 52 are established, the consolidating supervisor shall, subject to Chapter 1, Section 2, and where applicable Articles 54 and 58 of Directive 2004/39/EC, alert as soon as is practicable, EBA, ESRB and the authorities referred to in Article 59(4) and in Article 60 and shall communicate all information essential for the pursuance of their tasks. Those obligations shall apply to all competent authorities if the authority referred to in Article 59(4) becomes aware of a situation described in the first subparagraph, it shall alert as soon as is practicable the competent authorities referred to in Article 107, and EBA. | Where possible, the competent authority and the authority referred to in Article 59(4) shall use existing defined channels of communication.’ | ‘1. Where an emergency situation, including a situation as defined in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 or a situation of adverse developments in markets, arises, which potentially jeopardises the market liquidity and the stability of the financial system in any of the Member States where entities of a group have been authorised or where significant branches referred to in Article 52 are established, the consolidating supervisor shall, subject to Chapter 1, Section 2, and where applicable Articles 54 and 58 of Directive 2004/39/EC, alert as soon as is practicable, EBA, ESRB,central banks and the authorities referred to in Article 60 and shall communicate all information relevant for the pursuance of their tasks. If a central bank or the ESRB becomes aware of a situation described in the first subparagraph, it shall alert as soon as is practicable the competent authorities referred to in Article 107, and EBA. | Where possible, the competent authorities, central banks and the ESRB shall use existing defined channels of communication.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Kakor je bilo izpostavljeno v spremembah 4 in 5 v Mnenju CON/2009/17, je namen predlaganih sprememb, da se pojasni pojem „organi“ v tem členu. Zlasti je pomembno pojasniti, da so organi iz člena 59(4) centralne banke in ESRB in ne pristojni organi. Sklicevanjem na ta pojem „organi“ bi se bilo treba v celotnem besedilu izogniti, da se olajša branje predlagane direktive in poveča pravna varnost. | Namen drugih predlaganih sprememb je, da se pojasni narava informacij, ki se posredujejo, v skladu s členom 59 predlagane direktive. Zlasti informacije, ki se posredujejo, ne bi smele biti opredeljene zgolj kot „bistvene“ informacije, temveč bi morale vključevati tudi vse „pomembne“ informacije za izvajanje nalog centralnih bank in ESRB (7). | Explanation | As pointed out in Amendments 4 and 5 of Opinion CON/2009/17, the proposed amendments aim to clarify the notion of ‘authorities’ in this Article. In particular, it is important to make it clear that the authorities referred to in Article 59(4) correspond to central banks and to the ESRB and not to competent authorities. Cross-references throughout the text to this notion of ‘authorities’ should be avoided in order to facilitate the reading of the proposed directive and to bring further legal certainty. | The other proposed amendments aim to clarify the nature of information to be transmitted, in line with Article 59 of the proposed directive. In particular, transmitted information should not only be defined as ‘essential’ information, but should also include any ‘relevant’ information for the performance of central banks’ and the ESRB’s tasks (7). |
| Sprememba 13 | Amendment 13 |
| Člen 126(4) predlagane direktive | Article 126(4) of the proposed directive |
| „4. Spremenljivke iz točke (c) odstavka 3 lahko vključujejo […].“ | „ “ | ‘4. The variables referred to in point (c) of paragraph 3 may include […].’ | ‘ ’ |
| Pojasnilo | S to spremembo je povezan odstavek 7 tega mnenja. Predlagana sprememba (črtanje odstavka 4 člena 126 predlagane direktive) bo iz proticikličnih kapitalskih rezerv izločila strukturno sestavino in predlagano direktivo uskladila z operativnimi značilnostmi sporazuma Basel III. Ustrezno temu bi bilo treba črtati člen 126(8)(h) predlagane direktive, omembo „strukturnih spremenljivk“ v uvodni izjavi 58 predlagane direktive ter drugi in tretji stavek uvodne izjave 60 predlagane direktive. | Explanation | Reference is made to paragraph 7 of the opinion. The proposed amendment (deletion of paragraph 4 of Article 126 of the proposed directive) will eliminate the structural element from the counter-cyclical capital buffer, aligning the proposed directive with the operational features of the Basel III agreement. In this context, Article 126(8)(h) of the proposed directive should be deleted accordingly as should the reference to ‘structural variables’ in recital 58 of the proposed directive as well as the second and third sentences of recital 60 of the proposed directive. |
| Sprememba 14 | Amendment 14 |
| Člen 149(6) predlagane direktive | Article 149(6) of the proposed directive |
| „6. Države članice lahko uvedejo krajše prehodno obdobje, kot je obdobje iz odstavka 1, kadar je to upravičeno s prekomerno rastjo posojil kadar koli v navedenem obdobju. Kadar država članica ukrepa tako, se krajše obdobje uporablja le za namene izračuna proticiklične kapitalske rezerve za posamezno institucijo s strani institucij z dovoljenjem v državi članici, za katero je imenovani organ pristojen.“ | „6. Države članice lahko za uvedbo rezerv za ohranitev kapitala in proticikličnih kapitalskih rezerv določijo krajše prehodno obdobje, kot je obdobje iz odstavka 1, kadar je to upravičeno s prekomerno rastjo posojil kadar koli v navedenem obdobju. Kadar država članica ukrepa tako, lahko krajše obdobje, določeno za proticiklične kapitalske rezerve, priznajo druge države članice za namene izračuna proticikličnih kapitalskih rezerv za posamezno institucijo pri institucijah, ki so pridobile dovoljenje v matični državi članici.“ | ‘6. Member States may impose a shorter transitional period than that specified in paragraph 1 where that is justified by excessive credit growth at any time during that period. Where a Member States does so, the shorter period shall apply only for the purposes of the calculation of the institution specific Countercyclical Capital Buffer by institutions that are authorised in the Member State for which the designated authority is responsible.’ | ‘6. Member States may impose a shorter transitional period than that specified in paragraph 1 for the implementation of the capital conservation buffer and the counter-cyclical capital buffer where that is justified by excessive credit growth at any time during that period. Where a Member States does so, the shorter period set for the counter-cyclical capital buffer may be recognised by other Member States for the purposes of the calculation by domestically authorised institutions of their institution specific counter-cyclical capital buffer requirement’ |
| Pojasnilo | Države članice, ki se v prehodnem obdobju, določenem v členu 149(1) predlagane direktive, soočijo s prekomerno rastjo posojil, lahko preučijo možnost pospešitve oblikovanja rezerv za ohranitev kapitala in proticikličnih kapitalskih rezerv (8) . Da bi se izognili regulativni arbitraži, bi morali drugim državam članicam omogočiti, da priznajo predčasno uporabo proticikličnih kapitalskih rezerv. | Explanation | Member States experiencing excessive credit growth during the transition period as specified in Article 149(1) of the proposed directive may consider accelerating the build-up of the capital conservation buffer and the counter-cyclical capital buffer (8) . To avoid regulatory arbitrage, other Member States should be allowed to recognise the early application of the counter-cyclical capital buffer. |
| Sprememba 15 | Amendment 15 |
| Člen 150(5) predlagane direktive (novo) | Article 150(5) of the proposed directive (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „5. Komisija se do 31. decembra 2014 posvetuje z ESA, ESCB, ESRB in drugimi ustreznimi subjekti, da bi preverila učinkovitost ureditve izmenjave informacij v skladu s to direktivo, zlasti v skladu z oddelkom 2 poglavja 1 naslova VII, ter po potrebi oblikuje predloge za dodatno izboljšanje teh določb in/ali ureditve, pri čemer upošteva zlasti izrazito sinergijo, ki obstaja v zvezi z informacijami med funkcijama centralnega bančništva in bonitetnega nadzora, v normalnih razmerah in v času težav.“ | No text. | ‘5. By 31 December 2014, the Commission shall consult the ESAs, the ESCB, the ESRB and other relevant parties to review the effectiveness of information-sharing arrangements under this Directive, in particular under Title VII, Chapter 1, Section 2 and will formulate proposals, as appropriate, to further develop these provisions and/or arrangements, in particular, taking into account the significant information-related synergies between the central banking and the prudential supervisory functions, both in normal times and during times of stress.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Glej odstavek 11 tega mnenja. | Explanation | See paragraph 11 of the opinion. |
| Sprememba 16 | Amendment 16 |
| Člen 150(6) predlagane direktive (novo) | Article 150(6) of the proposed directive (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „6. EBA do 31. decembra 2014 preveri izvajanje določb te direktive in Uredbe [vstavi OP] o sodelovanju Unije in držav članic s tretjimi državami ter o tem poroča. S tem preverjanjem se ugotovijo morebitne vrzeli in ocenijo področja, kjer je treba dodatno izboljšati ureditev sodelovanja, izmenjave informacij in vzajemnosti, vključno z izvrševanjem nadzornih predpisov v tretjih državah. | EBA oceni tudi potrebo po dodatnem izboljšanju sporazumov o sodelovanju med državami članicami in EBA na eni strani ter mednarodnimi finančnimi institucijami ali organi, kot je MDS ali Odbor za finančno stabilnost, na drugi strani. | Komisija preuči oceno v poročilu EBA, da ugotovi, ali so potrebni zakonodajni predlogi.“ | No text. | ‘6. By 31 December 2014, EBA shall review and report on the application of the provisions in this Directive and Regulation [inserted by OP], on the cooperation of the Union and Member States with third countries. That review shall identify any lacunae and assess the areas which require further development as regards cooperation, information sharing and reciprocity arrangements, including enforcement of supervisory rules in third countries. | EBA shall also assess the need to further develop cooperation agreements between Member States and EBA on the one hand and international financial institutions or bodies such as the IMF or the Financial Stability Board on the other hand. | The Commission shall examine the assessment contained in the EBA report to determine whether legislative proposals are necessary.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Da bi zagotovili učinkovito sodelovanje in izmenjavo informacij med organi Unije in držav članic ter organi iz tretjih držav, da bi zagotovili izvrševanje nadzornih predpisov v teh državah ter ob upoštevanju poročila, predvidenega v členu 33 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010, mora EBA temeljito preučiti te zadeve in o tem poročati do 31. decembra 2014. To poročilo bi moralo zajemati tudi vidike ureditve sodelovanja in izmenjave informacij z mednarodnimi finančnimi institucijami. Na podlagi vprašanj, ugotovljenih v tem poročilu, bo Komisija ocenila, ali je za izboljšanje tega okvira potreben zakonodajni predlog. | Explanation | To ensure effective cooperation and information sharing between Union and Member States authorities with authorities from third countries, to ensure the enforcement of supervisory rules in these countries and taking also into account the report established under Article 33 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, it is necessary that EBA thoroughly examines and reports on this matter by 31 December 2014. This report should also cover the aspects related to the cooperation and information sharing arrangements with international financial institutions. Based on the issues identified by this report, the Commission will assess whether a legislative proposal is necessary in order to improve this framework. |
| Sprememba 17 | Amendment 17 |
| Člen 150(7) predlagane direktive (novo) | Article 150(7) of the proposed directive (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „7. EBA na podlagi pooblastila, ki jih ga podeli Komisija, razišče, ali so subjekti finančnega sektorja, ki razglašajo, da opravljajo svoje dejavnosti po načelih islamskega bančništva, ustrezno zajeti z določbami te direktive in Uredbe [vstavi OP]. | Komisija pregleda poročilo, ki ga pripravi EBA, in po potrebi predloži zakonodajni predlog Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu.“ | No text. | ‘7. Upon receiving a mandate from the Commission, EBA shall explore whether financial sector entities which declare that they carry out their activities in accordance with Islamic banking principles are adequately covered by the provisions of this Directive and Regulation [inserted by OP]. | The Commission shall review the report prepared by EBA and if appropriate submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the Council.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Glede na to, da je v zadnjem času naraslo število subjektov finančnega sektorja v Evropi, ki opravljajo svoje dejavnosti po načelih islamskega bančništva, ECB priporoča, da EBA dobi pooblastilo za izvedbo celovitega pregleda te vrste finančne dejavnosti in preuči potrebo po ustreznih prilagoditvah bančnega okvira Unije. | Explanation | In view of the recent growth in the number of financial sector entities in Europe carrying out their activities in accordance with Islamic banking principles, the ECB recommends that the EBA be entrusted with the task of undertaking a full review of this type of financial activity and examining the need for appropriate adjustments of the Union banking framework. |
| Predlagane spremembe besedila predlagane uredbe | Drafting proposals of the proposed regulation |
| Besedilo, ki ga predlaga Komisija | Spremembe, ki jih predlaga ECB (9) | Text proposed by the Commission | Amendments proposed by the ECB (9) |
| Sprememba 1 | Amendment 1 |
| Preambula predlagane uredbe (novo sklicevanje) | Preamble of the proposed regulation (new citation) |
| „ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, zlasti člena 114 Pogodbe, | ob upoštevanju predloga Evropske komisije, | po predložitvi osnutka zakonodajnega akta nacionalnim parlamentom, | ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega ekonomsko-socialnega odbora, | v skladu z rednim zakonodajnim postopkom,“ | „ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, zlasti člena 114 Pogodbe, | ob upoštevanju predloga Evropske komisije, | po predložitvi osnutka zakonodajnega akta nacionalnim parlamentom, | ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropske centralne banke, | ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega ekonomsko-socialnega odbora, | v skladu z rednim zakonodajnim postopkom,“ | ‘Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof, | Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, | After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national Parliaments, | Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, | Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,’ | ‘Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof, | Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, | After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national Parliaments, | Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,, | Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, | Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,’ |
| Pojasnilo | V skladu s členom 296 Pogodbe, ki določa, da se v pravnih aktih navedejo mnenja, predvidena v Pogodbah, je predlagana sprememba potrebna, da bi se odrazilo dejstvo, da je akt Unije sprejet v skladu s členoma 127(4) in 282(5) Pogodbe, ki določata obveznost posvetovanja z ECB glede vseh predlaganih aktov Unije oziroma osnutkov aktov Unije, ki spadajo na področja iz njene pristojnosti. | Explanation | In accordance with Article 296 of the Treaty, which provides that legal acts shall refer to any opinions required by the Treaties, the proposed amendment is necessary in order to reflect the fact that the Union act is adopted in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty which provide for the obligation to consult the ECB on any proposed Union act falling within its fields of competence. |
| Sprememba 2 | Amendment 2 |
| Uvodna izjava 16a predlagane uredbe (novo) | Recital 16a of the proposed regulation (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „(16a) | V poročilu skupine na visoki ravni za finančni nadzor v Evropski uniji pod predsedstvom Jacquesa de Larosièra je navedeno, da mikrobonitetni nadzor ne more učinkovito varovati finančne stabilnosti brez ustreznega upoštevanja razvoja na makro ravni, medtem ko makrobonitetni nadzor ni smiseln, če ne more nekako vplivati na nadzor na mikro ravni. | Tesno sodelovanje med EBA in ESRB je bistveno za popolnoma učinkovito delovanje ESRB ter spremljanje nadaljnjega ukrepanja na podlagi njegovih opozoril in priporočil. Zlasti bi bilo treba EBA omogočiti, da posreduje ESRB vse pomembne informacije, ki jih zberejo pristojni organi v skladu z obveznostmi poročanja po tej uredbi.“ | No text. | ‘(16a) | The report from the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the European Union, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, stated that micro-prudential supervision cannot effectively safeguard financial stability without adequately taking account of macro-level developments, while macro-prudential oversight is not meaningful unless it can somehow impact on supervision at the micro level. | Close cooperation between EBA and the ESRB is essential to give full effectiveness to the functioning of the ESRB and the follow-up to its warnings and recommendations. In particular, EBA should be able to transmit to the ESRB all relevant information gathered by competent authorities in accordance with the reporting obligations set out in this Regulation.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Predlagana uvodna izjava obravnava pomembnost makrobonitetnega nadzora v vsej Uniji ter pojasnjuje, da imajo informacije, ki so predmet zahtev za poročanje, mikrobonitetni in makrobonitetni namen. Enako uvodno izjavo bi lahko vnesli v predlagano direktivo. | Explanation | The proposed recital addresses the importance of macro-prudential oversight across the Union and clarifies that information subject to reporting requirements has both micro- and macro-prudential purposes. An identical recital could be introduced in the proposed directive. |
| Sprememba 3 | Amendment 3 |
| Uvodna izjava 56a predlagane uredbe (novo) | Recital 56a of the proposed regulation (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „(56a) | Pomemben nauk, ki izhaja iz krize, je, da je treba bistveno okrepiti zmožnost regulatornega kapitala, da absorbira izgube. S tem namenom sporazum Basel III v zvezi z delniškimi družbami zahteva, da ‚mora instrument za uvrstitev med navaden lastniški kapital prvega reda izpolnjevati vsa merila, določena v sporazumu, in merila morajo biti izpolnjena izključno z navadnimi delnicami‘. Uredba uvaja ta stroga merila, da bi ‚zajela instrumente lastnih sredstev najvišje kakovosti za mednarodno dejavne banke, ki so delniške družbe‘.“ | No text. | ‘(56a) | An important lesson stemming from the crisis is the need to significantly strengthen the loss absorption capacity of regulatory capital. With this aim, the Basel III agreement requires with respect to joint stock companies that, “for an instrument to be included in Common Equity Tier 1 capital, it must meet all the criteria defined in the agreement and the criteria must be met solely with common shares”. The Regulation implements these strict criteria in order “to cover the highest quality own funds instruments for internationally active banks that are joint stock companies”.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen predloga je, da se poudarijo zadevne določbe sporazuma Basel III glede meril primernosti deležev za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda (glej tudi spremembe 6, 7, 8 in 9). | Explanation | The proposal aims at underlining the relevant provisions of the Basel III agreement with respect to the eligibility criteria for shares as common equity tier 1 instruments (see also Amendments 6, 7, 8 and 9). |
| Sprememba 4 | Amendment 4 |
| Uvodna izjava 68 predlagane uredbe | Recital 68 of the proposed regulation |
| „(68) | Stopnja finančnega vzvoda je novo regulativno in nadzorno orodje Unije. V skladu z mednarodnimi dogovori je treba to orodje najprej uvesti kot dodaten element, ki ga je mogoče uporabiti za posamezne institucije po presoji nadzornih organov. Ustrezen pregled in kalibracija z namenom prehoda na zavezujoč ukrep leta 2018 bi se omogočila z obveznostjo poročanja za institucije.“ | „(68) | Stopnja finančnega vzvoda je novo regulativno in nadzorno orodje Unije. v skladu s sporazumom Basel III. To orodje je treba najprej uvesti kot dodaten element, ki ga je mogoče uporabiti za posamezne institucije po presoji nadzornih organov. Ustrezen pregled in kalibracija z namenom zagotovitve obvezne uporabe stopnje finančnega vzvoda od leta 2018 bi se omogočila z obveznostjo poročanja za institucije.“ | ‘(68) | A leverage ratio is a new regulatory and supervisory tool for the Union. In line with international agreements, it should be introduced first as an additional feature that can be applied on individual institutions at the discretion of supervisory authorities. Reporting obligations for institutions would allow appropriate review and calibration, with a view to migrating to a binding measure in 2018.’ | ‘(68) | A leverage ratio is a new regulatory and supervisory tool for the Union, n line with the Basel III agreement. It should be introduced first as an additional feature that can be applied on individual institutions at the discretion of supervisory authorities. Reporting obligations for institutions would allow appropriate review and calibration, in order to ensure the compulsory application of the leverage ratio from 2018.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Ta sprememba pojasnjuje, da se bo stopnja finančnega vzvoda uporabljala od 1. januarja 2018. | Explanation | This amendment clarifies that the leverage ratio will apply from 1 January 2018. |
| Sprememba 5 | Amendment 5 |
| Člen 4 predlagane uredbe (novi opredelitvi) | Article 4 of the proposed regulation (new definitions) |
| Ni besedila. | „ ‚zunanja bonitetna institucija‘ (ECAI) pomeni bonitetno agencijo, ki je registrirana ali certificirana v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009, ali centralno banko, ki izdaja bonitetne ocene, za katere se Uredba (ES) št. 1060/2009 ne uporablja.“ | „ ‚imenovana ECAI‘ pomeni ECAI, ki jo je imenovala institucija.“ | No text. | ‘ “External Credit Assessment Institution”(ECAI) means a credit rating agency that is registered or certified in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 or a central bank issuing credit ratings which are exempt from the application of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.’ | ‘ “Nominated ECAI”means an ECAI nominated by an institution.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Predlagana sprememba za potrebe jasnosti opredeljuje pojma „ECAI“ in „imenovana ECAI“ ter ju dodaja na seznam opredelitev pojmov v predlagani uredbi in predlagani direktivi. Ker Uredba (ES) št. 1060/2009 (10) opredeljuje ECAI kot vse bonitetne agencije, ki so bile registrirane ali certificirane v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009, ali centralne banke, ki izdajajo bonitetne ocene in so izvzete iz Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009, v predlagani uredbi in predlagani direktivi ni treba opredeliti pojmov „primerna“ in/ali „priznana“ ECAI. Iz istega razloga bi bilo treba ustrezno spremeniti druge določbe, ki se sklicujejo na ta pojma. Za potrebe medsektorske skladnosti ECB tudi priporoča, da se zagotovi, da se bodo določbe ujemale z določbami v zvezi z ECAI v predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktive 2003/71/ES in Direktive 2009/138/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega organa za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine ter Evropskega organa za vrednostne papirje in trge (11) , ki je v obravnavi. To velja tudi za pravila glede vzporejanja bonitetnih ocen ECAI in možnost vključitve Skupnega odbora ESA (12). | Explanation | For the sake of clarity, the proposed amendment defines ‘ECAI’ and ‘nominated ECAI’ and adds them to the list of definitions of the proposed regulation and directive. Since Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 defines ECAIs as all credit rating agencies that have been registered or certified in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 or central banks issuing credit ratings which are exempt from Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, there is no need to define ‘eligible’ and/or ‘recognised’ ECAIs in the proposed regulation and directive. For the same reason, the other provisions refer to these terms should be amended accordingly. For the sake of cross-sectoral consistency, the ECB also recommends ensuring that the provisions correspond to those in the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2003/71/EC and 2009/138/EC in respect of the powers of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority (11) under discussion which relate to ECAIs. This also applies to the rules related to the mapping of ECAI’s credit assessment and the possibility of involving the Joint Committee of ESAs (12). |
| Sprememba 6 | Amendment 6 |
| Člen 24(4) predlagane uredbe | Article 24(4) of the proposed regulation |
| „4. EBA pripravi, posodablja in objavi seznam oblik kapitalskih instrumentov v posamezni državi članici, ki se štejejo za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda. EBA pripravi in objavi ta seznam do 1. januarja 2013.“ | „4. Pristojni organi sporočijo EBA oblike deležev, ki jih štejejo za primerne za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda v skladu s svojim nacionalnim pravom. EBA redno preverja te oblike deležev in oblikuje osnutek seznama oblik deležev v posamezni državi članici, ki se štejejo za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda, v skladu z odstavkom 5. | EBA lahko na zahtevo države članice ali na lastno pobudo odloči, da za potrebe ugotavljanja, ali so oblike deležev, ki jih sporočijo države članice, primerne glede na pogoje iz člena 26, zaprosi za pravna mnenja.“ | ‘4. EBA shall establish, maintain and publish a list of the forms of capital instrument in each Member State that qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 instruments. EBA shall establish and publish this list by 1 January 2013.’ | ‘4. Competent authorities shall notify EBA of the forms of shares they deem eligible as Common Equity Tier 1 instruments according to their national law. EBA shall evaluate these forms of shares on an on-going basis and develop a draft list of the forms of shares in each Member State that qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 instruments in accordance with paragraph 5. | Upon a Member State’s request or on its own initiative, the EBA may decide to request legal opinions in order to ascertain the eligibility of the forms of shares notified by Member States against the conditions defined in Article 26.’ |
| Pojasnilo | EBA bi morala biti pristojna za preverjanje oblik deležev, ki se štejejo za primerne za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda, na podlagi informacij, ki jih prejme od pristojnih organov, in v skladu s pravili, določenimi v predlagani uredbi, zlasti v členu 26(1) predlagane uredbe. V ta namen lahko EBA zaprosi tudi za zunanja pravna mnenja, da se oceni primernost posameznih oblik deležev, ki jih sporočijo države članice. | Explanation | EBA should be competent to evaluate the forms of shares deemed eligible as common equity tier 1 instruments on the basis of the information received from competent authorities and in accordance with the rules defined in the proposed regulation, in particular Article 26(1) of the proposed regulation. For this purpose, EBA may also request external legal opinions to assess the eligibility of certain notified forms of shares by Member States. |
| Sprememba 7 | Amendment 7 |
| Člen 24(5) in (6) predlagane uredbe (novo) | Article 24(5) and (6) of the proposed regulation (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „5. EBA pripravi osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov, v katerih navede oblike deležev, ki izpolnjujejo pogoje iz člena 26. | EBA predloži Komisiji navedene osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov do 1. januarja 2013. | Komisiji se podeli pooblastilo za sprejetje osnutkov izvedbenih tehničnih standardov iz prvega pododstavka v skladu s členom 15 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010. | 6. Samo oblike deležev, ki so uvrščene v izvedbeni akt, ki ga sprejme Komisija v skladu z odstavkom 5, so primerne za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda. | Pristojni organi redno spremljajo izpolnjevanje pogojev za navaden lastniški kapital prvega reda, ki so določeni v poglavju 2.“ | No text. | ‘5. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards listing the forms of shares meeting the conditions defined in Article 26. | EBA shall submit the draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2013. | Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the draft implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. | 6. Only the forms of shares included in the implementing act adopted by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 5 shall be considered eligible as Common Equity Tier 1 instruments. | Competent authorities shall monitor compliance with the conditions for Common Equity Tier 1 capital defined in Chapter 2 on an ongoing basis.’ |
| Pojasnilo | EBA bi morala biti pristojna za preverjanje oblik deležev, ki so primerne za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda, na podlagi informacij, ki jih prejme od pristojnih organov, in v skladu s pravili, določenimi v predlagani uredbi, zlasti v členu 26(1). ECB predlaga, da se osnutek seznama, ki ga pripravi EBA, pretvori v izvedbeni akt Komisije. | Explanation | EBA should be competent to evaluate the forms of shares eligible as common equity tier 1 instruments on the basis of the information received from competent authorities and in accordance with the rules defined in the proposed regulation, in particular Article 26(1). The ECB proposes that the draft list established by EBA be converted into a Commission implementing act. |
| Sprememba 8 | Amendment 8 |
| Člen 26(1) predlagane uredbe | Article 26(1) of the proposed regulation |
| „1. Kapitalski instrumenti se štejejo za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda le, če so izpolnjeni vsi naslednji pogoji: | […].“ | „1. Kapitalski instrumenti, ki jih izdajo institucije, ki niso navedene v členu 27, zajemajo deleže v podjetjih, navedene na seznamu iz člena 24(4), in se štejejo za instrumente navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda le, če so izpolnjeni vsi naslednji pogoji: | […].“ | ‘1. Capital instruments shall qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 instruments only if all the following conditions are met: | […].’ | ‘1. Capital instruments issued by other institutions than those referred to in Article 27 shall consist of shares of undertakings referred to in the list in Article 24(4) and qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 instruments only if all the following conditions are met: | […].’ |
| Pojasnilo | Predlagana uredba navaja „kapitalske instrumente“ kot sestavine postavk navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda. Sporazum Basel III navaja „navadne delnice“ kot prevladujočo obliko navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda. ECB priporoča, da se pojasni, da zajemajo instrumenti navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda izključno deleže, ki izpolnjujejo merila iz člena 26(1) predlagane uredbe. | Explanation | The proposed regulation refers to ‘capital instruments’ as components of common equity tier 1 items. The Basel III agreement refers to ‘common shares’ as a predominant form of common equity tier 1 capital. The ECB recommends clarifying that common equity tier 1 instruments will consist solely of shares meeting the criteria in Article 26(1) of the proposed regulation. |
| Sprememba 9 | Amendment 9 |
| Člen 26(3) predlagane uredbe | Article 26(3) of the proposed regulation |
| „3. EBA pripravi osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov, da se opredelijo: | (a) | veljavne oblike in narava posrednega financiranja kapitalskih instrumentov; | (b) | pomen bilančnih postavk za namen določanja zneska, ki se lahko razdeli imetnikom instrumentov lastnih sredstev institucije.“ | „3. EBA pripravi osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov, da se opredelijo: | (a) | veljavne oblike in narava posrednega financiranja kapitalskih instrumentov; | (b) | pomen bilančnih postavk za namen določanja zneska, ki se lahko razdeli imetnikom instrumentov lastnih sredstev institucije; | (c) | pomen prednostnih razdelitev; | (d) | pomen in posledice ‚absorbiranja prvega in sorazmerno največjega deleža nastalih izgub‘; | (e) | značilnosti zgornje meje ali druge omejitve najvišje ravni bilančnih postavk.“ | ‘3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: | (a) | the applicable forms and nature of indirect funding of capital instruments; | (b) | the meaning of distributable items for the purposes of determining the amount available to be distributed to the holders of own funds instruments of an institution.’ | ‘3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: | (a) | the applicable forms and nature of indirect funding of capital instruments; | (b) | the meaning of distributable items for the purposes of determining the amount available to be distributed to the holders of own funds instruments of an institution; | (c) | the meaning of preferential distributions; | (d) | the definition and implications of ‘absorbing the first and proportionately greatest share of losses as they occur’; | (e) | the nature of a cap or other restriction on the maximum level of distributable items.’ |
| Pojasnilo | ECB meni, da bi morala EBA pripraviti osnutke regulativnih tehničnih standardov na zgoraj navedenih področjih, da se izboljša usklajenost uporabe meril za primernost deležev za postavke navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda v vseh državah članicah. | Explanation | The ECB considers that the EBA should develop draft regulatory technical standards in the above areas to improve the harmonised application of the criteria for eligibility of shares as common equity tier 1 items across Member States. |
| Sprememba 10 | Amendment 10 |
| Člen 46 predlagane uredbe | Article 46 of the proposed regulation |
| „Člen 46 | Druge izjeme pri odbitku, kadar se uporablja konsolidacija, in druge možnosti | 1. Kot druga možnost odbitka deležev institucije v instrumentih navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda zavarovalnic, pozavarovalnic in zavarovalnih holdingov, v katerih ima institucija pomembno naložbo, lahko pristojni organi institucijam dovolijo, da uporabijo metode 1, 2 ali 3 iz Priloge I k Direktivi 2002/87/ES. Institucija izbrano metodo v določenem obdobju uporablja dosledno. Institucija lahko uporablja metodo 1 (računovodska konsolidacija) le, če je dobila predhodno soglasje pristojnega organa. Pristojni organ lahko podeli takšno soglasje le, če se mu zdi raven integracije upravljanja in notranjih kontrol za subjekte, ki bi bili zajeti v konsolidacijo v skladu z metodo 1, ustrezna. | […] | 3. Pristojni organi lahko institucijam dovolijo, da ne odbijejo deleža postavke iz člena 33(1)(h) in (i) v naslednjih primerih: | (a) | v primeru deleža v zadevnem subjektu, ki je predmet enakega dopolnilnega nadzora kot institucija v skladu z Direktivo 2002/87/ES; | (b) | kadar ima institucija iz člena 25 delež v drugi takšni instituciji ali njegovi centralni ali regionalni kreditni instituciji in so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji: | […].“ | „Člen 46 | Druge izjeme pri odbitku, kadar se uporablja konsolidacija, in druge možnosti | 1. Kot druga možnost odbitka deležev institucije v instrumentih navadnega lastniškega kapitala prvega reda zavarovalnic, pozavarovalnic in zavarovalnih holdingov, v katerih ima institucija pomembno naložbo, lahko pristojni organi institucijam dovolijo, da uporabijo metode 1, 2 ali 3 iz Priloge I k Direktivi 2002/87/ES, pod pogojem, da uporaba teh metod ne privede do višjega zneska lastnih sredstev kot v primeru pristopa z odbitki na ravni institucij in finančnih institucij iz člena 16. Institucija izbrano metodo v določenem obdobju uporablja dosledno. Institucija lahko uporablja metodo 1 (računovodska konsolidacija) le, če je dobila predhodno soglasje pristojnega organa. Pristojni organ lahko podeli takšno soglasje le, če se mu zdi raven integracije upravljanja in notranjih kontrol za subjekte, ki bi bili zajeti v konsolidacijo v skladu z metodo 1, ustrezna. | […] | 3. Pristojni organi lahko institucijam dovolijo, da ne odbijejo deleža postavke iz člena 33(1)(h) in (i) v naslednjih primerih: | (a) | v primeru deleža v zadevnem subjektu, ki je predmet enakega dopolnilnega nadzora kot institucija v skladu z Direktivo 2002/87/ES; | (b) | kadar druga možnost namesto odbitka ne privede do višjega zneska lastnih sredstev kot v primeru pristopa z odbitki na ravni institucij in finančnih institucij iz člena 16; | (c) | kadar ima institucija iz člena 25 delež v drugi takšni instituciji ali njeni centralni ali regionalni kreditni instituciji in so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji: | […].“ | ‘Article 46 | Other exemptions from, and alternatives to, deduction where consolidation is applied | 1. As an alternative to the deduction of holdings of an institution in the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings and insurance holding companies in which the institution has a significant investment, competent authorities may allow institutions to apply methods 1, 2 or 3 of Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC. The institution shall apply the method chosen in a consistent manner over time. An institution may apply method 1 (accounting consolidation) only if it has received the prior consent of the competent authority. The competent authority may grant such consent only if it is satisfied that the level of integrated management and internal control regarding the entities that would be included in the scope of consolidation under method 1 is adequate. | […] | 3. Competent authorities may permit institutions not to deduct a holding of an item referred to in points (h) and (i) of Article 33 (1) in the following cases: | (a) | where the holding is in a relevant entity which is included in the same supplementary supervision as the institution in accordance with Directive 2002/87/EC; | (b) | where an institution referred to in Article 25 has a holding in another such institution, or in its central or regional credit institution, and the following conditions are met: | […].’ | ‘Article 46 | Other exemptions from, and alternatives to, deduction where consolidation is applied | 1. As an alternative to the deduction of holdings of an institution in the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings and insurance holding companies in which the institution has a significant investment, competent authorities may allow institutions to apply methods 1, 2 or 3 of Annex I to Directive 2002/87/ECprovided that the application of these methods does not result in higher own funds vis-à-vis the deduction approach at the level of the institutions and financial institutions referred to in Article 16. The institution shall apply the method chosen in a consistent manner over time. An institution may apply method 1 (accounting consolidation) only if it has received the prior consent of the competent authority. The competent authority may grant such consent only if it is satisfied that the level of integrated management and internal control regarding the entities that would be included in the scope of consolidation under method 1 is adequate. | […] | 3. Competent authorities may permit institutions not to deduct a holding of an item referred to in points (h) and (i) of Article 33 (1) in the following cases: | (a) | where the holding is in a relevant entity which is included in the same supplementary supervision as the institution in accordance with Directive 2002/87/EC; | (b) | where the alternative to deduction does not result in higher own funds vis-à-vis the deduction approach at the level of the institutions and financial institutions referred to in Article 16; | (c) | a holding in another such institution, or in its central or regional credit institution, and the following conditions are met: | […].’ |
| Pojasnilo | ECB razume, da se odprava dvakratne uporabe regulatornih lastnih sredstev na sektorski ravni (z odbitki pomembnih naložb v zavarovalnice) in določitev dodatnih zahtev po lastnih sredstvih na ravni finančnega konglomerata (z uporabo ene od treh metod, določenih v Prilogi I k Direktivi 2002/87/ES) med seboj ne izključujeta. Posledično nobena druga možnost namesto pristopa z odbitki, dogovorjenega s strani skupine GHOS, ne bi smela privesti do višjega zneska regulatornih lastnih sredstev na ravni skupine institucij in finančnih institucij iz člena 16 predlagane uredbe. | Explanation | The ECB understands that eliminating the double use of regulatory own funds at the sectoral level (by deducting significant investments in insurance undertakings) and determining additional own funds requirements at the level of the financial conglomerate (by using one of the three methods as laid down in Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC) are not mutually exclusive. As a consequence, any alternative to the deduction approach as agreed by the GHOS should not result in higher regulatory own funds at the level of the group of institutions and financial institutions as referred to in Article 16 of the proposed regulation. |
| Sprememba 11 | Amendment 11 |
| Člen 95 predlagane uredbe | Article 95 of the proposed regulation |
| „Člen 95 | Poročanje o zahtevah po lastnih sredstvih | 1. Institucije, ki opravljajo izračune zahtev po lastnih sredstvih za pozicijsko tveganje, poročajo o teh zahtevah po lastnih sredstvih najmanj vsake 3 mesece. | To poročanje vključuje finančne informacije, pripravljene v skladu z računovodskim okvirom, ki se za institucijo uporablja na podlagi Uredbe (ES) št. 1606/2002 in Direktive 86/635/EGS, če je to potrebno za celovit pregled nad profilom tveganja dejavnosti institucije. | Institucije o obveznostih iz člena 87 poročajo najmanj dvakrat na leto. | Institucije sporočijo pristojnim organom rezultate in kakršne koli zahtevane podrobnejše podatke. | 2. EBA pripravi osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov, da se opredelijo enotni obrazci, pogostost in datumi poročanja ter rešitve IT, ki se uporabljajo v Uniji za takšno poročanje. Obrazci za poročanje so skladni z naravo, obsegom in zapletenostjo dejavnosti institucij. EBA predloži Komisiji navedene osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov do 1. januarja 2013. | Na Komisijo se prenese pooblastilo za sprejetje izvedbenih standardov iz prvega pododstavka v skladu s postopkom iz člena 15 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010.“ | „Člen 95 | Poročanje o zahtevah po lastnih sredstvih in finančnih informacijah | 1. Institucije poročajo o obveznostih iz člena 87 najmanj četrtletno. | 1a. To poročanje vključuje tudi finančne informacije, pripravljene v skladu z računovodskim okvirom, ki se za institucijo uporablja na podlagi Uredbe (ES) št. 1606/2002 in Direktive 86/635/EGS, če : | (a) | EBA oceni, da so te informacije potrebne za celovit pregled nad profilom tveganja dejavnosti institucije; | (b) | EBA v sodelovanju z ESRB oceni, da so te informacije potrebne za izvajanje nalog makrobonitetnega nadzora v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 1092/2010 in Uredbo (EU) št. 1093/2010. | Institucije pravočasno sporočijo pristojnim organom rezultate in kakršne koli zahtevane podrobnejše podatke. | 2. EBA pripravi osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov, da se opredelijo pojmi, merila za razvrščanje, enotni obrazci, pogostost in datumi poročanja ter rešitve IT, ki se uporabljajo v Uniji za takšno poročanje. Obrazci za poročanje in pogostost so skladni z naravo, obsegom in zapletenostjo dejavnosti institucij. EBA se posvetuje z ESRB o pripravi osnutkov izvedbenih tehničnih standardov, ki se nanašajo na informacije iz odstavka 1a(b). | EBA predloži Komisiji navedene osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov do 1. januarja 2013. | Na Komisijo se prenese pooblastilo za sprejetje izvedbenih standardov iz prvega pododstavka v skladu s postopkom iz člena 15 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010.“ | ‘Article 95 | Reporting on own funds requirements | 1. Institutions that calculate own funds requirements for position risk shall report these own funds requirements at least every 3 months. | This reporting shall include financial information drawn up in accordance with the accounting framework to which the institution is subject under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 and Directive 86/635/EEC to the extent this is necessary to obtain a comprehensive view of the risk profile of an institution’s activities. | Reporting by institutions on the obligations laid down in 87 shall be carried out at least twice each year. | Institutions shall communicate the results and any component data required to the competent authorities. | 2. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the uniform formats, frequencies and dates of reporting and the IT solutions to be applied in the Union for such reporting. The reporting formats shall be proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institutions. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2013. | Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the implementing standards referred to in the first sub-paragraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ | ‘Article 95 | Reporting on own funds requirements and financial information | 1. Reporting by institutions on the obligations laid down in Article 87 shall be carried out at least on aquarterly basis. | 1a. This reporting shall also include financial information drawn up in accordance with the accounting framework to which the institution is subject under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 and Directive 86/635/EEC to the extent that: | (a) | EBA considers this information necessary to obtain a comprehensive view of the risk profile of an institution’s activities; | (b) | EBA, in cooperation with the ESRB, considers this information necessary for the performance of macro-prudential oversight tasks, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. | Institutions shall communicate the results and any component data required to the competent authorities in a timely manner. | 2. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the definitions, classification criteria, uniform formats, frequencies and dates of reporting and the IT solutions to be applied in the Union for such reporting. The reporting formats and frequency shall be proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institutions. EBA shall consult the ESRB on the development of draft implementing technical standards related to the information referred to in paragraph 1a(b). | EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2013. | Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the implementing standards referred to in the first sub-paragraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Ta sprememba pojasnjuje trenutno pravno podlago za sprejetje obrazcev za poročanje COREP in uvaja pravno podlago za obrazce za poročanje FINREP (13) . Poleg tega ECB priporoča, da se poročanje izvaja četrtletno, v dveh mesecih po izteku referenčnega četrtletja, da se zagotovi boljši pretok informacij. Pojasniti bi bilo treba tudi, da je treba pri informacijah, ki se zagotavljajo za potrebe makrobonitetnega nadzora, upoštevati skupne opredelitve pojmov in merila za razvrščanje. EBA in ESRB bi morala sodelovati, da bi opredelila obseg potrebnih finančnih informacij za namene makrobonitetnega nadzora. Pomembno bo zagotoviti, da bodo obrazci za poročanje in pogostost prilagojeni glede na velikost institucij. Da bi zbrali informacije, ki so potrebne za izvajanje nalog makrobonitetnega nadzora, v povezavi z zahtevami za poročanje o velikih izpostavljenostih, likvidnosti in stopnji finančnega vzvoda (14) , ECB predlaga, da se uvede najmanj četrtletno poročanje in v pripravo osnutkov izvedbenih tehničnih standardov vključi ESRB. Poleg tega bi lahko v skladu z načelom sorazmernosti osnutki izvedbenih tehničnih standardov vsebovali posebne zahteve glede pogostosti poročanja v odvisnosti od narave, obsega in zapletenosti dejavnosti institucij. | Explanation | This amendment clarifies the current legal basis for the adoption of the COREP reporting formats and introduces a legal basis for FINREP reporting formats (13) . Moreover, the ECB recommends that reporting take place on a quarterly basis, within two months after the quarter in reference to ensure better information flow. It should also be clarified that the information provided for macro-prudential oversight purposes should follow common definitions and classification criteria. The EBA and ESRB should cooperate to define the scope of financial information necessary for the purposes of macro-prudential oversight. It will be important to ensure that the reporting formats and frequencies are adjusted according to the size of the institutions. In order to collect necessary information for the performance of macro-prudential oversight tasks with regard to the reporting requirements for large exposures, liquidity reporting and leverage ratio (14) , the ECB suggests introducing at least quarterly reporting and involving the ESRB in the development of the draft implementing technical standards. Lastly, in line with the principle of proportionality, the draft implementing technical standards could include specific requirements in terms of frequency of the reporting depending on the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institutions. |
| Sprememba 12 | Amendment 12 |
| Člen 130 predlagane uredbe | Article 130 of the proposed regulation |
| „Oddelek 3 | Priznanje in vzporejanje ocene kreditnega tveganja | Pododdelek 1 | Priznanje ECAI | Člen 130 | ECAI | 1. Zunanja bonitetna ocena se lahko za določanje uteži tveganja izpostavljenosti v skladu s tem poglavjem uporabi le, če jo je izdala primerna ECAI ali potrdila primerna ECAI v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009. | 2. Primerne ECAI so vse bonitetne agencije, ki so bile registrirane ali certificirane v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009, ter centralne banke, ki izdajajo bonitetne ocene in so izvzete iz Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009. | 3. EBA objavi seznam primernih ECAI.“ | „Oddelek 3 | Uporaba bonitetnih ocen in vzporejanje ocene kreditnega tveganja | Pododdelek 1 | ECAI | Člen 130 | Uporaba bonitetnih ocen ECAI | 1. Zunanja bonitetna ocena se lahko za določanje uteži tveganja izpostavljenosti v skladu s tem poglavjem uporabi le, če jo je izdala ali potrdila ECAI v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009. | 2. | EBA objavi seznam ECAI v skladu s členoma 2(4) in 18(3) Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 na svoji spletni strani.“ | ‘Section 3 | Recognition and mapping of credit risk assessment | Sub-section 1 | Recognition of ECAIs | Article 130 | ECAIs | 1. An external credit assessment may be used to determine the risk weight of an exposure under this Chapter only if it has been issued by an eligible ECAI or has been endorsed by an eligible ECAI in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. | 2. Eligible ECAIs are all credit rating agencies that have been registered or certified in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 and central banks issuing credit ratings which are exempt from Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. | 3. EBA shall publish a list of eligible ECAIs.’ | ‘Section 3 | Use of credit assessments and mapping of credit risk assessment | Sub-section 1 | ECAIs | Article 130 | Use of credit assessments by ECAIs | 1. An external credit assessment may be used to determine the risk weight of an exposure under this Chapter only if it has been issued or endorsed by an ECAI in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. | 2. | EBA shall publish the list of ECAIs in accordance with Article 2(4) and 18(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on its website.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen predlagane spremembe je, da se predlagana uredba uskladi z obstoječim postopkom iz Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009, po katerem ESMA določi seznam bonitetnih agencij, Komisija pa seznam centralnih bank, za katere se Uredba (ES) št. 1060/2009 ne uporablja (glej tudi spremembe 5, 14 in 15). | Explanation | The proposed amendment aims to align the proposed regulation with the procedure currently in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 where ESMA and the Commission respectively determine the lists of credit rating agencies and central banks that are exempt from the application of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 (see also Amendments 5, 14 and 15). |
| Sprememba 13 | Amendment 13 |
| Člen 238(6) predlagane uredbe | Articles 238(6) of the proposed regulation |
| „6. Pristojni organi obveščajo EBA o posebnih primerih iz odstavka 2, če morebitno zmanjšanje tveganju prilagojenih zneskov izpostavljenosti ni upravičeno s sorazmernim prenosom kreditnega tveganja na tretje osebe ter z uporabo člena 4 s strani institucij. EBA spremlja prakse na tem področju in pripravi smernice v skladu s členom 16 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010.“ | „6. Pristojni organi obveščajo EBA o posebnih primerih iz odstavka 2, če morebitno zmanjšanje tveganju prilagojenih zneskov izpostavljenosti ni upravičeno s sorazmernim prenosom kreditnega tveganja na tretje osebe ter z uporabo člena 4 s strani institucij. EBA spremlja prakse na tem področju in ob upoštevanju ugotovljenih najboljših praks pripravi osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov v skladu s členom 15 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010.“ | ‘6. The competent authorities shall keep EBA informed about the specific cases, referred to in paragraph 2, where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, and the use institutions make of paragraph 4. EBA shall monitor the range of practices in this area and shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, issue guidelines.’ | ‘6. The competent authorities shall keep EBA informed about the specific cases, referred to in paragraph 2, where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, and the use institutions make of paragraph 4. EBA shall monitor the range of practices in this area and shall, in the light of the observed best practices in accordance with Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, develop draft implementing technical standards.’ |
| Pojasnilo | ECB meni, da bi morala EBA za zagotovitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev na področju listinjenja in povečanje preglednosti in jasnosti zadevnih pravil namesto smernic pripraviti osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov za priznanje prenosa pomembnega deleža kreditnega tveganja, zaradi česar se lahko zmanjšajo tveganju prilagojeni zneski izpostavljenosti. Z izboljšanjem preglednosti in jasnosti pravil na tem področju bi prispevali tako k zagotovitvi enakih konkurenčnih pogojev med državami in tržnimi udeleženci kot tudi k vzpostavitvi pogojev za oživitev trgov listinjenja. Podobna sprememba se predlaga v členu 239(6) predlagane uredbe. | Explanation | The ECB considers that, to ensure a level playing field in the area of securitisation and increase the transparency and clarity of the applicable rules, the EBA should develop draft implementing technical standards, rather than guidelines, with regard to the recognition of significant credit risk transfer, allowing a reduction in risk-weighed exposure amounts. Improving transparency and clarity of the rules in this area would contribute not only to ensuring a level playing field across borders and market participants, but also to setting the conditions for revitalising securitisation markets. A similar amendment is proposed for Article 239(6) of the proposed regulation. |
| Sprememba 14 | Amendment 14 |
| Člen 262 predlagane uredbe | Article 262 of the proposed regulation |
| „Člen 262 | Priznanje ECAI | 1. Institucije lahko uporabljajo bonitetne ocene ECAI za določanje uteži tveganja izpostavljenosti, samo če je bonitetno oceno izdala priznana ECAI ali potrdila priznana ECAI v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009. | 2. Priznane ECAI so vse bonitetne agencije, ki so bile registrirane ali certificirane v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009, ter centralne banke, ki izdajajo bonitetne ocene in so izvzete iz Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009. | 3. EBA objavi seznam priznanih ECAI.“ | „Člen 262 | Uporaba bonitetnih ocen ECAI | Institucije lahko uporabljajo bonitetne ocene za določanje uteži tveganja pozicije listinjenja, samo če je bonitetno oceno izdala ali potrdila ECAI v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009. | | “ | ‘Article 262 | Recognition of ECAIs | 1. Institutions may use ECAI credit assessments to determine the risk weight of a securitisation position only where the credit assessment has been issued by an ECAI or has been endorsed by an eligible ECAI in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. | 2. Eligible ECAIs are all credit rating agencies that have been registered or certified in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 and central banks issuing credit ratings which are exempt from Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. | 3. EBA shall publish a list of eligible ECAIs.’ | ‘Article 262 | Use of credit assessments by ECAIs | Institutions may use credit assessments to determine the risk weight of a securitisation position only where the credit assessment has been issued or endorsed by an eligible ECAI in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. | | 3. ’ |
| Pojasnilo | Glej spremembe 5, 12 in 15. | Explanation | See Amendments 5,12 and 15. |
| Sprememba 15 | Amendment 15 |
| Člen 263 predlagane uredbe | Article 263 of the proposed regulation |
| „Člen 263 | Zahteve, ki jih morajo izpolniti bonitetne ocene ECAI | Za namene izračuna tveganju prilagojenih izpostavljenosti v skladu z oddelkom 3, lahko institucije uporabijo bonitetne ocene priznane ECAI, samo če so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji: | […] | (b) | ECAI je objavila bonitetne ocene, postopke, metodologije, predpostavke in ključne elemente, ki so temelj ocene. ECAI objavi tudi analizo izgub in denarnih tokov ter občutljivost ocen na spremembe v osnovnih predpostavkah glede ocen, vključno s kakovostjoskupine izpostavljenosti. Šteje se, da informacije niso objavljene, če so dostopne samo omejenemu številu subjektov. Bonitetne ocene se vključijo v matriko prehodov ECAI; | […].“ | „Člen 263 | Zahteve, ki jih morajo izpolniti bonitetne ocene ECAI | Za namene izračuna tveganju prilagojenih izpostavljenosti v skladu z oddelkom 3, lahko institucije uporabijo bonitetne ocene ECAI, samo če so izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji: | […] | (b) | ECAI objavi analizo izgub in denarnih tokov, občutljivost ocen na spremembe v osnovnih predpostavkah glede ocen, vključno s kakovostjoskupine izpostavljenosti, ter bonitetne ocene, postopke, metodologije, predpostavke in ključne elemente, na katerih temeljijo ocene v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009. Šteje se, da informacije niso objavljene, če so dostopne samo omejenemu številu subjektov. Bonitetne ocene se vključijo v matriko prehodov ECAI; | […].“ | ‘Article 263 | Requirements to be met by the credit assessments of ECAIs | For the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts according to Section 3, institutions shall only use a credit assessment of an eligible ECAI if the following conditions are met: | […] | (b) | the credit assessments, procedures, methodologies assumptions and the key elements underpinning the assessments shall have been published by the ECAI. Also, loss and cashflow analysis as well as sensitivity of ratings to changes in the underlying ratings assumptions, including the performance of pool assets, shall bepublished by the ECAI. Information that is made available only to a limited number of entities shall not be considered to have been published. The credit assessments shall be included in the ECAI's transition matrix; | […].’ | ‘Article 263 | Requirements to be met by the credit assessments of ECAIs | For the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts according to Section 3, institutions shall only use a credit assessment of an ECAI if the following conditions are met: | […] | (b) | loss and cashflow analysis as well as sensitivity of ratings to changes in the underlying ratings assumptions, including the performance of pool assets, shall bepublished by the ECAI, as well as the credit assessments, procedures, methodologies, assumptions and the key elements underpinning the assessments in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. Information that is made available only to a limited number of entities shall not be considered to have been published. The credit assessments shall be included in the ECAI's transition matrix; | […].’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen sprememb je, da se pojasni, da zahteve v predlagani uredbi dopolnjujejo zahteve, ki so že določene v Uredbi (ES) št. 1060/2009. | Explanation | The amendments aim to clarify that the requirements in the proposed regulation are supplementary to those already provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. |
| Sprememba 16 | Amendment 16 |
| Člen 295(2)(b) predlagane uredbe | Article 295(2)(b) of the proposed regulation |
| „(b) | pristojni organ CCP iz točke (a) je objavil dokument, v katerem potrjuje, da ta CCP izpolnjuje vsa priporočila za centralne nasprotne stranke, ki jih je objavil odbor za plačilne sisteme in sisteme poravnave ter tehnični odbor Mednarodnega združenja nadzornikov trga vrednostnih papirjev;“ | „(b) | pristojni organi za nadzor in pregled CCP iz točke (a) so objavili dokument, v katerem potrjujejo, da ta CCP izpolnjuje vse zadevne mednarodne standarde za centralne nasprotne stranke, ki jih je objavil odbor za plačilne sisteme in sisteme poravnave ter tehnični odbor Mednarodnega združenja nadzornikov trga vrednostnih papirjev;“ | ‘(b) | the competent authority of the CCP referred to in point (a) has published a document confirming that that CCP complies with all the recommendations for central counterparties published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions;’ | ‘(b) | the competent authorities for supervision and oversight of the CCP referred to in point (a) have published a document confirming that CCP complies with applicable international standards for CCPs published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions;’ |
| Pojasnilo | Ta člen določa pogoje, pod katerimi „pristojni organ“ potrdi, da centralna nasprotna stranka (CCP) izpolnjuje vsa priporočila za centralne nasprotne stranke, ki sta jih objavila Odbor za plačilne in poravnalne sisteme ter Mednarodno združenje nadzornikov trga vrednostnih papirjev (CPSS-IOSCO). „Pristojni organ“ sam morda ne more ustrezno izvrševati skupnih pristojnosti regulatorjev trga vrednostnih papirjev in preglednikov. Zato bi se bilo treba namesto nanj sklicevati na „pristojne organe za nadzor in pregled CCP“, v skladu z Mnenjem CON/2011/1 (15) . To bi bilo tudi skladno z osnutkom načel CPSS-IOSCO za infrastrukture za finančni trg, ki določa, da „se pričakuje, da bodo ustrezni organi skladno z njihovimi pristojnostmi za urejanje, nadzor in pregled infrastrukture za finančni trg izvedli lastne ocene te infrastrukture za finančni trg“ (16) . Poleg tega bo morda sklicevanje na priporočila CPSS-IOSCO za CCP kmalu zastarelo, saj bodo ta priporočila nadomeščena z načeli za infrastrukture za finančni trg. Zato bi bilo ustrezneje uporabiti splošnejši pojem, da bi se izognili nesporazumom in pripravili na prihajajoče spremembe. | Explanation | This article sets conditions under which the ‘competent authority’ confirms that the central counterparty (CCP) complies with all recommendations for CCPs published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (CPSS-IOSCO). The ‘competent authority’ on its own may not adequately address the joint competencies of securities regulators and overseers. Therefore, reference should instead be made to ‘the competent authorities for supervision and oversight of the CCP’, in line with Opinion CON/2011/1 (15) . This would be also in line with the draft CPSS-IOSCO principles for financial market infrastructures (FMIs) which provide that ‘the relevant authorities, consistent with their respective responsibilities for regulation, supervision, and oversight of an FMI, are expected to perform their own assessments of the FMI’ (16) . Furthermore, the reference to CPSS-IOSCO recommendations for CCPs may be obsolete soon, because the recommendations will be replaced by principles for FMIs. The use of a more general term would therefore be more appropriate to avoid misunderstandings and prepare for upcoming developments. |
| Sprememba 17 | Amendment 17 |
| Člen 296(5)(b) predlagane uredbe | Article 296(5)(b) of the proposed regulation |
| „(b) | zadevni zakoni in drugi predpisi ter pogodbeni dogovori, ki se uporabljajo za to institucijo ali CCP oziroma so zanju zavezujoči, zagotavljajo, da se v primeru neplačila ali nesolventnosti klirinškega člana pozicije institucije v zvezi s temi pogodbami in posli ter zadevno zavarovanje s premoženjem prenesejo na drugega klirinškega člana znotraj zadevnega obdobja kritja za tveganje.“ | „(b) | zadevni zakoni in drugi predpisi ter pogodbeni dogovori, ki se uporabljajo za to institucijo ali CCP oziroma so zanju zavezujoči, olajšujejo, da se v primeru neplačila ali nesolventnosti klirinškega člana pozicije institucije v zvezi s temi pogodbami in posli ter zadevno zavarovanje s premoženjem prenesejo na drugega klirinškega člana znotraj zadevnega obdobja kritja za tveganje.“ | ‘(b) | relevant laws, regulations, rules and contractual arrangements applicable to or binding that institution or the CCP ensure that in the event of default or insolvency of the clearing member, the transfer of the institution’s positions relating to those contracts and transactions and of the corresponding collateral to another clearing member within the relevant margin period of risk.’ | ‘(b) | relevant laws, regulations, rules and contractual arrangements applicable to or binding that institution or the CCP facilitate that in the event of default or insolvency of the clearing member, the transfer of the institution’s positions relating to those contracts and transactions and of the corresponding collateral to another clearing member within the relevant margin period of risk.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Predlagana uredba določa, da se nižje kapitalske zahteve za neposredne udeležence uporabijo za portfelje strank samo takrat, kadar so ti v celoti ločeni od portfeljev klirinškega člana stranke in kadar je zagotovljeno, da se pozicije v primeru neplačila strankinega klirinškega člana lahko „prenesejo“ na drugega klirinškega člana. V drugih primerih bi za stranke veljale veliko višje kapitalske zahteve, ki so povezane s čistimi dvostranskimi transakcijami. Medtem ko je prvi pogoj v praksi uresničljiv (in bo k temu spodbujalo predlagano načelo CPSS-IOSCO o ločitv (17) , bo pravno zagotovitev prenosljivosti morda težko ali celo nemogoče doseči v vseh primerih. A CCP si pogosto že prizadevajo za olajšanje prenosljivosti, k čemur bodo zavezane po predlaganih načelih CPSS-IOSCO. Zato ECB predlaga, da se pojem „zagotavljajo“ nadomesti s pojmom „olajšujejo“, s čimer bi se zmanjšala kapitalska zahteva, kadar ukrepi CCP prenosljivost podpirajo, je pa dejansko ne „zagotavljajo“. V tem okviru se je treba zavedati, da je že zanesljiva ločitev pozicij in premoženja za zavarovanje koristna z vidika finančne stabilnosti, saj ščiti stranko pred kreditnim tveganjem v povezavi z neplačilom njenega klirinškega člana. Glede na to, da so se države skupine G-20 zavezale k razširitvi izvajanja centralnega kliringa na vse standardizirane produkte izvedenih finančnih instrumentov na prostem trgu (18) , in da bo imelo v praksi veliko majhnih udeležencev samo posreden dostop do takšnega kliringa, bi bila ta sprememba koristna za dejansko uresničitev zaveze držav skupine G-20 in spodbujanje finančne stabilnosti. | Explanation | The proposed regulation provides that the lower capital charges for direct participants would only be applied to client portfolios where they are both fully segregated from the portfolios of the client’s clearing member and it is ensured that the positions could be ‘ported’ to another clearing member in the event of the default of the client’s clearing member. In other circumstances, clients would face much higher capital charges associated with purely bilateral transactions. In practice, while the first condition is achievable (and will be encouraged by the proposed CPSS/IOSCO principle on segregation (17) , providing legal assurance of portability in all circumstances may prove difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve. However, CCPs often already seek to facilitate portability, which they will be required to do under the proposed CPSS/IOSCO principles. The ECB would therefore suggest replacing the term ‘ensure’ with ‘facilitate,’ which would provide a reduction in the capital requirement in the presence of measures taken by CCPs that support portability, but which do not actually ‘ensure’ it. In this context, it should be kept in mind that sound segregation of positions and collateral is already beneficial from a financial stability viewpoint as it protects the client against credit risk in relation to the default of its clearing member. Given the G20 commitment to extend central clearing to all standardised over-the-counter derivatives products (18) , and that in practice many smaller participants will only have to access such clearing indirectly, this amendment would be beneficial for the effective implementation of the G20 commitment and for the promotion of financial stability. |
| Sprememba 18 | Amendment 18 |
| Člen 299(7) predlagane uredbe | Article 299(7) of the proposed regulation |
| „7. EBA razvije izvedbene tehnične standarde, da se opredelijo: | (a) | pogostost in datumi izračunov iz odstavka 1; | (b) | pogostost, datumi in enotna oblika obvestila, določena v odstavku 4; | (c) | situacije, v katerih lahko pristojni organ institucije, ki deluje kot klirinški član, zahteva pogostejše izračunavanje in poročanje kot je tisto, določeno v skladu s točkama a in b. | EBA predloži Komisiji navedene osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov do 1. januarja 2014.“ | „7. EBA v tesnem sodelovanju s pristojnimi organi za nadzor in pregled CCP razvije izvedbene tehnične standarde, da se opredelijo: | (a) | pogostost in datumi izračunov iz odstavka 1; | (b) | pogostost, datumi in enotna oblika obvestila, določena v odstavku 4; | (c) | situacije, v katerih lahko pristojni organ institucije, ki deluje kot klirinški član, zahteva pogostejše izračunavanje in poročanje kot je tisto, določeno v skladu s točkama a in b. | EBA v tesnem sodelovanju s pristojnimi organi za nadzor in pregled CCP predloži Komisiji navedene osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov do 1. januarja 2014.“ | ‘7. EBA shall develop implementing technical standards to specify the following: | (a) | the frequency and dates of the calculations specified in paragraph 1; | (b) | the frequency, dates and uniform format of the notification specified in paragraph 4; | (c) | the situations in which the competent authority of an institution acting as a clearing member may require higher frequencies of calculation and reporting than the ones set out following points a and b. | EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.’ | ‘7. EBA, in close cooperation with the competent authorities for supervision and oversight of CCPs, shall develop implementing technical standards to specify the following: | (a) | the frequency and dates of the calculations specified in paragraph 1; | (b) | the frequency, dates and uniform format of the notification specified in paragraph 4; | (c) | the situations in which the competent authority of an institution acting as a clearing member may require higher frequencies of calculation and reporting than the ones set out following points a and b. | EBA, in close cooperation with the competent authorities for supervision and oversight of CCPs, shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Ustrezna raven kapitalskih zahtev je bistvena za finančno stabilnost. Regulatorji trga vrednostnih papirjev, bančni nadzorniki in centralne banke v vlogi preglednikov se morajo dobro usklajevati, da se izognejo prekrivanju predpisov in pravnim prazninam. V priporočilih CPSS-IOSCO so regulatorji, nadzorniki in pregledniki obravnavani enakopravno. Zato bi moral organ Unije kakršne koli osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov in zahtev za CCP pripraviti v sodelovanju s članicami ESCB. | Explanation | An adequate level of capital requirements is essential for financial stability. Close coordination between securities regulators, banking supervisors and central banks as overseers is needed to avoid overlapping regulation or creating loopholes. Under the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations, regulators, supervisors and overseers are placed on an equal footing. Therefore, the development of any draft implementing technical standards and requirements for CCPs by a Union authority should be conducted in cooperation with ESCB members. |
| Sprememba 19 | Amendment 19 |
| Člen 402 predlagane uredbe | Article 402 of the proposed regulation |
| „Člen 402 | Izpolnjevanje likvidnostnih zahtev | Kadar institucija ne izpolnjuje zahteve iz člena 401(1) ali se pričakuje, da je ne bo izpolnila, nemudoma obvesti pristojne organe in jim brez nepotrebne zamude predloži načrt za hitro ponovno vzpostavitev skladnosti s členom 401. Dokler se taka skladnost ponovno ne vzpostavi, institucija dnevno poroča postavke ob koncu vsakega delovnega dne, razen če pristojni organ odobri manjšo pogostost in daljši odlog. Pristojni organi taka dovoljenja izdajo samo na podlagi individualnega položaja institucije. Spremljajo izvajanje načrta za ponovno vzpostavitev skladnosti in po potrebi zahtevajo, da se ta izvede hitreje.“ | „Člen 402 | Izpolnjevanje likvidnostnih zahtev | Kadar institucija ne izpolnjuje zahteve iz člena 401(1) ali se pričakuje, da je ne bo izpolnila, nemudoma obvesti pristojne organe in jim brez nepotrebne zamude predloži načrt za hitro ponovno vzpostavitev skladnosti s členom 401. Dokler se taka skladnost ponovno ne vzpostavi, institucija dnevno poroča postavke ob koncu vsakega delovnega dne, razen če pristojni organ odobri manjšo pogostost in daljši odlog. Pristojni organi taka dovoljenja izdajo samo na podlagi individualnega položaja institucije. Spremljajo izvajanje načrta za ponovno vzpostavitev skladnosti in po potrebi zahtevajo, da se ta izvede hitreje. | EBA v sodelovanju z ESRB izda smernice o izpolnjevanju likvidnostnih zahtev, vključno z načeli v zvezi z možnostjo uporabe likvidnih sredstev v težkih razmerah in načini obravnave neizpolnjevanja.“ | ‘Article 402 | Compliance with liquidity requirements | Where a credit institution does not meet, or is expected not to meet the requirement set out in Article 401(1), it shall immediately notify the competent authorities and shall submit without undue delay to the competent authority a plan for the timely restoration of compliance with Article 401. Until such compliance has been restored, the credit institution shall report the items daily by the end of each business day unless the competent authority authorises a lower frequency and a longer delay. Competent authorities shall only grant such authorisations based on the individual situation of a credit institution. They shall monitor the implementation of the restoration plan and shall require a more timely restoration if appropriate.’ | ‘Article 402 | Compliance with liquidity requirements | Where an institution does not meet, or is expected not to meet the requirement set out in Article 401(1), it shall immediately notify the competent authorities and shall submit without undue delay to the competent authority a plan for the timely restoration of compliance with Article 401. Until such compliance has been restored, the institution shall report the items daily by the end of each business day unless the competent authority authorises a lower frequency and a longer delay. Competent authorities shall only grant such authorisations based on the individual situation of an institution. They shall monitor the implementation of the restoration plan and shall require a more timely restoration if appropriate. | EBA, in cooperation with the ESRB, shall issue guidance on compliance with liquidity requirements, including principles for the possible use of the stock of liquid assets in a stress scenario and how to address non-compliance.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Ustrezen okvir za izpolnjevanje zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja bi moral institucijam omogočati, da v težkih razmerah zmanjšajo stanje likvidnih sredstev. Tak okvir je zelo pomemben za mikrobonitetne namene in tudi s širšega vidika celotnega trga in sistema. Če zahteva glede likvidnostnega kritja postane stalna obvezna omejitev, lahko poveča učinek procikličnosti in negativen vpliv likvidnostnih pretresov, saj kreditne institucije v odziv na pretres ne bi mogle uporabiti svojih likvidnih sredstev. To bi lahko povzročilo prodaje po zelo nizkih cenah, kopičenje likvidnosti in omejevanje dajanja posojil. | Člen 402 predlagane uredbe uvaja osnovni okvir za izpolnjevanje likvidnostnih zahtev, po katerem pristojni organi po lastni presoji zagotavljajo ustrezno uporabo in ponovno vzpostavitev sklada likvidnih sredstev. Po mnenju ECB bi morala biti EBA v sodelovanju z ESRB vključena v oblikovanje smernic o možni sprostitvi in ponovni vzpostavitvi sklada likvidnih sredstev v času težav. | V skladu z uvodnima izjavama 74 in 75 ECB razume, da bi se morala ta določba uporabljati tudi za investicijska podjetja, zato priporoča, da se sklicevanje na „kreditne institucije“ v celotnem členu nadomesti s sklicevanjem na „institucije“. | Explanation | An adequate compliance framework for the liquidity coverage requirement should allow institutions to run down the stock of liquid assets in a stress scenario. Such a framework is not only very important for micro-prudential purposes but also from a broader market- and system-wide perspective. If the liquidity coverage requirement becomes a binding constraint at all times, the requirement may increase the pro-cyclical effect and worsen the impact of liquidity shocks, as credit institutions would be unable to use their liquid assets to respond to a shock. This could lead to ‘fire sales’, liquidity hoarding and the restriction of credit. | Article 402 of the proposed regulation introduces a basic framework for compliance with liquidity requirements, granting competent authorities discretion to ensure adequate use and restoration of the pool of liquid assets. In the ECB’s view, the EBA, in cooperation with the ESRB, should be involved in the formulation of guidance on the possible release and build-up of the pool of liquid assets in times of stress. | In line with recitals 74 and 75 of the proposed regulation, the ECB understands that this provision should also apply to investment firms and would therefore recommend substituting the reference to ‘credit institutions’ by the notion of ‘institutions’ throughout the Article. |
| Sprememba 20 | Amendment 20 |
| Člen 404(1) predlagane uredbe | Article 404(1) of the proposed regulation |
| „1. Institucije kot likvidna sredstva poročajo naslednje, razen če je izključeno v skladu z odstavkom 2, in samo če likvidna sredstva izpolnjujejo pogoje iz odstavka 3: | (a) | gotovino in depozite pri centralnih bankah, če je te depozite možno dvigniti v času težav; | (b) | prenosljiva sredstva, katerih likvidnost in kreditna kvaliteta sta izjemno visoki; | (c) | prenosljiva sredstva, ki predstavljajo terjatve do enot centralne ravni države članice ali tretje države ali te zanje jamčijo, če je institucija predmet likvidnostnega tveganja v zadevni državi članici ali tretji državi, ki jih krije z zadržanjem zadevnih likvidnih sredstev; | (d) | prenosljiva sredstva, katerih likvidnost in kreditna kvaliteta sta visoki. | […].“ | „1. Institucije kot likvidna sredstva poročajo naslednje, razen če je izključeno v skladu z odstavkom 2, in samo če likvidna sredstva izpolnjujejo pogoje iz odstavka 3: | (a) | gotovino; | (b) | depozite pri centralnih bankah, če je te depozite možno dvigniti v času težav; | (c) | prenosljiva sredstva, katerih likvidnost in kreditna kvaliteta sta izjemno visoki; | (d) | prenosljiva sredstva, ki predstavljajo terjatve do enot centralne ravni države članice ali tretje države ali te zanje jamčijo, če je institucija predmet likvidnostnega tveganja v zadevni državi članici ali tretji državi, ki jih krije z zadržanjem zadevnih likvidnih sredstev; | (e) | prenosljiva sredstva, katerih likvidnost in kreditna kvaliteta sta visoki. | V zvezi z depoziti pri centralnih bankah, navedenimi v členu 404(1)(b), si pristojni organ in centralna banka prizadevata doseči soglasje o tem, koliko od teh depozitov je možno dvigniti v času težav. | […].“ | ‘1. Institutions shall report the following as liquid assets unless excluded by paragraph 2 and only if the liquid assets fulfil the conditions in paragraph 3: | (a) | cash and deposits held with central banks to the extent that these deposits can be withdrawn in times of stress; | (b) | transferable assets that are of extremely high liquidity and credit quality; | (c) | transferable assets representing claims on or guaranteed by the central government of a Member State or a third country if the institution incurs a liquidity risk in that Member State or third country that it covers by holding those liquid assets; | (d) | transferable assets that are of high liquidity and credit quality. | […].’ | ‘1. Institutions shall report the following as liquid assets unless excluded by paragraph 2 and only if the liquid assets fulfil the conditions in paragraph 3: | (a) | cash; | (b) | deposits held with central banks to the extent that these deposits can be withdrawn in times of stress; | (c) | transferable assets that are of extremely high liquidity and credit quality; | (c)(d) | transferable assets representing claims on or guaranteed by the central government of a Member State or a third country if the institution incurs a liquidity risk in that Member State or third country that it covers by holding those liquid assets; | (e) | transferable assets that are of high liquidity and credit quality. | As regards deposits held with central banks as referred to in Article 404(1)(b), the competent authority and the central bank shall aim at reaching a common understanding regarding the extent to which these deposits can be withdrawn in times of stress. | […].’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen predlagane spremembe je, da se pojasni, da bi morale biti centralne banke vključene v določanje vrst sredstev pri centralnih bankah, ki se lahko štejejo za likvidna sredstva. To je skladno s sporazumom Basel III, v katerem je izpostavljeno, da bi morali pristojni nadzorni organi z ustrezno centralno banko razpravljati in se dogovoriti, v kolikšni meri naj se rezerve pri centralni banki štejejo v stanje likvidnih sredstev. Povedano drugače, morali bi določiti, koliko od teh rezerv pri centralni banki je mogoče črpati v času težav (19). | Člen 404 predlagane uredbe navaja „depozite pri centralnih bankah, če je te depozite možno dvigniti v času težav“ Priloga III predlagane uredbe pa navaja „rezerve centralne banke, v kolikor je te rezerve mogoče črpati v času težav“. Ker gre za enako vsebino, bi lahko pojme uskladili (glej tudi spremembo 30). | V zvezi z depoziti pri Eurosistemu ECB meni, da bi se morali med likvidna sredstva šteti depoziti čez noč, tj. deponirana sredstva v okviru odprte ponudbe mejnega depozita in stanja na tekočih računih kreditnih institucij, zmanjšana za povprečne obvezne rezerve v obdobju 30 dni. | Explanation | The proposed amendment is aimed at clarifying that central banks should be involved in determining the types of assets held with central banks that should be considered as liquid assets. This is in line with the Basel III agreement, which notes that competent supervisory authorities should discuss and agree with the relevant central bank the extent to which central bank reserves should count towards the stock of liquid assets. In other words, they should determine the extent to which the central bank reserves can be drawn down in times of stress (19). | While Article 404 of the proposed regulation refers to ‘deposits held with central banks to the extent that these deposits can be withdrawn in times of stress’, Annex III of the proposed regulation refers to ‘central bank reserves to the extent that these reserves can be drawn down in times of stress’. Given that these are equivalent concepts, the terminology could be harmonised (see also Amendment 30). | With regard to deposits held with the Eurosystem, the ECB is of the view that overnight deposits, i.e. funds deposited at the deposit facility and the current account holdings of credit institutions minus the average reserve requirement over the 30-day period should count towards liquid assets. |
| Sprememba 21 | Amendment 21 |
| Člen 404(5) predlagane uredbe | Article 404(5) of the proposed regulation |
| „5. Delnice ali enote CIU se lahko obravnavajo kot likvidna sredstva do absolutnega zneska 250 milijonov EUR, če so zahteve iz člena 127(3) izpolnjene in CIU, z izjemo izvedenih finančnih instrumentov za zmanjševanje obrestnega ali kreditnega tveganja, vlaga izključno v likvidna sredstva.“ | „5. Delnice ali enote CIU se lahko obravnavajo kot likvidna sredstva do absolutnega zneska 250 milijonov EUR, če njihov delež v zahtevi glede likvidnostnega kritja ne presega omejitve, določene v skladu z odstavkom 5a, če so zahteve iz člena 127(3) izpolnjene in CIU, z izjemo izvedenih finančnih instrumentov za zmanjševanje obrestnega ali kreditnega tveganja, vlaga izključno v likvidna sredstva.“ | ‘5. Shares or units in CIUs may be treated as liquid assets up to an absolute amount of 250 million EUR provided that the requirements in Article 127 (3) are met and that the CIU, apart from derivatives to mitigate interest rate or credit risk, only invests in liquid assets.’ | ‘5. Shares or units in CIUs may be treated as liquid assets up to an absolute amount of 250 million EUR provided that their share in the total liquidity coverage requirement does not exceed the threshold determined in accordance with paragraph 5a, that the requirements in Article 127(3) are met and that the CIU, apart from derivatives to mitigate interest rate or credit risk, only invests in liquid assets.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Kar zadeva obravnavo delnic ali enot CIU kot likvidnih sredstev, je ECB zaskrbljena glede tega, ali je primerno določiti samo absolutno omejitev v znesku 250 milijonov EUR, saj bi s tem majhnim institucijam omogočili, da izpolnijo zahtevo glede likvidnostnega kritja zgolj s temi instrumenti. Namesto tega bi lahko za omejitev tveganja koncentracije uvedli omejitev na npr. 10 % celotne zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja. ECB meni, da bi morala EBA to omejitev podrobneje oceniti in ustrezno kalibrirati v okviru celovite analize opredelitve likvidnih sredstev. | Poleg tega je obravnava delnic ali enot CIU kot likvidnih sredstev v predlagani uredbi nedosledna, najmanj za Eurosistem, s tem ko člen 404(3)(b) predlagane uredbe določa, da morajo biti likvidna sredstva ustrezno zavarovanje s premoženjem v običajnih obdobjih za likvidnostne potrebe znotraj enega dne in likvidnostna posojila čez noč centralne banke v državi članici. Delnice ali enote CIU dejansko niso primerno premoženje za zavarovanje pri operacijah denarne politike Eurosistema, ne glede na to, v kakšno vrsto sredstev CIU vlagajo. Poleg tega delnice ali enote CIU niso uvrščene na podroben seznam likvidnih sredstev v sporazumu Basel III. | Explanation | As regards the treatment of shares or units in CIUs as liquid assets, the ECB is concerned about the appropriateness of setting only an absolute limit of EUR 250 million, as this could allow smaller institutions to fulfil the liquidity coverage requirement with only these instruments. Instead, in order to limit concentration risk, a limit of, e.g. 10 % of the total liquidity coverage requirement could be introduced. The ECB is of the view that the EBA should further assess and adequately calibrate this limit as part of its overall analysis on the definition of liquid assets. | In addition, the treatment of shares or units in CIUs as liquid assets in the proposed regulation is inconsistent, at least for the Eurosystem with the requirement in Article 404(3)(b) of the proposed regulation that liquid assets must be eligible collateral in normal times for intraday liquidity needs and overnight liquidity facilities of a central bank in a Member State. In fact, shares or units in CIUs are not eligible collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy operations, regardless of the type of underlying assets in which the CIUs invest. In addition, shares or units in CIUs are not included on the detailed list of liquid assets in the Basel III agreement. |
| Sprememba 22 | Amendment 22 |
| Člen 404(5a) predlagane uredbe (novo) | Article 404(5a) of the proposed regulation (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „5a. EBA pripravi osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov, v katerih določi omejitev iz odstavka 5. | EBA predloži Komisiji navedene osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov do 1. januarja 2014. | Komisiji se podeli pooblastilo za sprejetje osnutkov izvedbenih tehničnih standardov iz prvega pododstavka v skladu s postopkom iz člena 15 Uredbe (EU) št. 1093/2010.“ | No text. | ‘5a. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards specifying the threshold referred to in paragraph 5. | EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. | Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the draft implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ |
| Pojasnilo | ECB predlaga, da EBA v obliki osnutkov izvedbenih tehničnih standardov postavi omejitev iz člena 404(5) predlagane uredbe, s katero določi najvišji delež delnic ali enot CIU v celotni zahtevi glede likvidnostnega kritja. | Explanation | The ECB suggests that EBA establish, by way of draft implementing technical standards, the threshold referred to in Article 404(5) of the proposed regulation to determine the maximum share of shares/units of CIUs in the total LCR. |
| Sprememba 23 | Amendment 23 |
| Člen 443 predlagane uredbe | Article 443 of the proposed regulation |
| „Člen 443 | Bonitetne zahteve | Komisija se pooblasti za sprejemanje delegiranih aktov v skladu s členom 445, s katerim bi za omejeno obdobje uvedla strožje bonitetne zahteve za vse izpostavljenosti ali za izpostavljenosti do enega ali več sektorjev, regij ali držav članic, kadar je to potrebno za obravnavo sprememb intenzivnosti mikrobonitetnih in makrobonitetnih tveganj, ki so posledica razvoja trga po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe, zlasti na podlagi priporočila ali mnenja ESRB o: | […].“ | „Člen 443 | Bonitetne zahteve | 1. Komisija se pooblasti za sprejemanje delegiranih aktov v skladu s členom 445, s katerim bi za omejeno obdobje uvedla strožje bonitetne zahteve za vse izpostavljenosti ali za izpostavljenosti do enega ali več sektorjev, regij ali držav članic, kadar je to potrebno za obravnavo sprememb intenzivnosti mikrobonitetnih in makrobonitetnih tveganj, ki so posledica razvoja trga po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe, zlasti na podlagi priporočila ali mnenja ESRB o: | […] | (l) | zahtevah glede velikih izpostavljenosti, določenih v členu 381 in členih 384 do 392; | (m) | zahtevah glede razkritja, določenih v členih 419 do 420 in členih 422 do 436; | (n) | likvidnostnih zahtevah in stopnji finančnega vzvoda [ko bodo uvedene v regulativni okvir Unije]. | Ta prenos pooblastila se izvede po postopku iz člena 446. | 2. ESRB lahko priporoči, da se seznam bonitetnih zahtev iz odstavka 1 razširi.“ | ‘Article 443 | Prudential requirements | The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 445, to impose stricter prudential requirements, for a limited period of time, for all exposures or for exposures to one or more sectors, regions or Member States, where this is necessary to address changes in the intensity of micro-prudential and macro-prudential risks which arise from market developments emerging after the entry into force of this Regulation, in particular upon the recommendation or opinion of the ESRB, concerning | […]’. | ‘Article 443 | Prudential requirements | 1. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 445, to impose stricter prudential requirements, for a limited period of time, for all exposures or for exposures to one or more sectors, regions or Member States, where this is necessary to address changes in the intensity of micro-prudential and macro-prudential risks which arise from market developments emerging after the entry into force of this Regulation, in particular upon the recommendation or opinion of the ESRB concerning | […] | (l) | the requirements for large exposures, laid down in Article 381 and Articles 384 to 392; | (m) | the disclosure requirements, laid down in Articles 419 to 420 and Articles 422 to 436; | (n) | the liquidity requirements and the leverage ratio [once introduced into the Union regulatory framework]. | This delegation of power shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 446. | 2. The ESRB may recommend an extension of the list of prudential requirements set out in paragraph 1.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Obseg delegiranih aktov, ki jih lahko sprejme Komisija, bi bilo treba razširiti, da bo zajemal bonitetne zahteve glede velikih izpostavljenosti in zahteve glede razkritja ter zahteve glede finančnega vzvoda in likvidnosti, ko bodo te postale del veljavnega regulativnega okvira Unije. | ECB tudi predlaga, da se ESRB omogoči dajanje priporočil Komisiji za razširitev seznama bonitetnih zahtev. | Explanation | The scope of the delegated acts which the Commission may adopt should be extended to cover prudential requirements on large exposures and disclosure requirements as well as, once they become part of the applicable Union regulatory framework, leverage and liquidity requirements. | The ECB also suggests that the ESRB could issue recommendations to the Commission regarding the extension of the list of prudential requirements. |
| Sprememba 24 | Amendment 24 |
| Del devet a predlagane uredbe (novo) | Part Nine a of the proposed regulation (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „DEL DEVET a | UPORABA STROŽJIH BONITETNIH ZAHTEV S STRANI NACIONALNIH ORGANOV | Člen 443a | Uporaba strožjih bonitetnih zahtev s strani nacionalnih organov | 1. Nacionalni organi lahko na lastno pobudo ali na podlagi priporočila ESRB v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 1092/2010 v primeru ugotovljenih makrobonitetnih tveganj, ki ogrožajo finančno stabilnost na nacionalni ravni, uvedejo strožje bonitetne zahteve za institucije na naslednjih področjih: | (a) | raven lastnih sredstev, določena v členu 87(1); | (b) | zahteve glede velikih izpostavljenosti, določene v členu 381 in členih 384 do 392; | (c) | likvidnostne zahteve in stopnja finančnega vzvoda [ko bodo uvedene v regulativni okvir Unije]. | 2. Nacionalni organi obvestijo ESRB o svojem predlogu za uvedbo strožjih bonitetnih zahtev v skladu z odstavkom 1(a) do (c) najpozneje v dveh delovnih dneh od datuma predloga v zvezi z ugotovljenimi makrobonitetnimi tveganji za finančno stabilnost. ESRB ima v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 1092/2010 in ob upoštevanju zahtev glede zaupnosti usklajevalno vlogo, da na zahtevo Komisije ali najmanj treh držav članic oceni vprašanja glede finančne stabilnosti ter možne neželene posledice in čezmejne učinke na druge države članice, ki bi lahko nastali zaradi uvedbe strožjih zahtev. | 3. Strožje bonitetne zahteve iz odstavka 1 se uporabijo samo tako, da se zaostrijo kvantitativne stopnje in omejitve za točke (a), (b) in (c) odstavka 1, in da se v celoti upoštevajo vsi drugi vidiki določb te uredbe. | 4. ESRB in EBA objavita strožje bonitetne zahteve, ki jih sprejmejo nacionalni organi, na svojih spletnih straneh. | 5. Kadar ESRB ugotovi, da makrobonitetnih tveganj za finančno stabilnost, ki so bila ocenjena v skladu z odstavkom 2 in so bila razlog za strožje bonitetne zahteve, ni več, nacionalni organi razveljavijo strožje zahteve in se uporabljajo izvirne določbe te uredbe. Če se to ne zgodi, ESRB izda Komisiji priporočilo, naj ukrepa proti državi članici, kadar ta ne ravna primerno z vidika sistemskega tveganja. | 6. ESRB lahko v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. 1092/2010 priporoči, da se seznam bonitetnih zahtev iz odstavka 1 razširi.“ | No text. | ‘PART NINEa | APPLICATION OF STRICTER PRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES | Article 443a | Application of stricter prudential requirements by national authorities | 1. National authorities, either on their own initiative or based on an ESRB recommendation pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, may impose stricter prudential requirements on institutions where macro-prudential risks are identified as posing a threat to financial stability at national level in the following areas: | (a) | the level of own funds laid, down in Article 87(1); | (b) | the requirements for large exposures, laid down in Article 381 and Articles 384 to 392; | (c) | the liquidity requirements and the leverage ratio [once introduced into the Union regulatory framework]. | 2. National authorities shall notify the ESRB of their proposal to impose stricter prudential requirements in accordance with paragraph 1(a) to (c) no later than two working days from the date of their proposal in view of the identified macro-prudential risks to financial stability. In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 and taking into account confidentiality requirements, the ESRB shall play a coordination role by assessing, upon request of the Commission or of at least three Member States, the financial stability concerns and possible unintended consequences and spillover effects on other Member States that could result from the imposition of the stricter requirements. | 3. The stricter prudential requirements referred to in paragraph 1 shall be applied only by tightening the quantitative ratios and limits for points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1, and in full compliance with all other aspects of the provisions of this Regulation. | 4. The ESRB and the EBA shall publish the stricter prudential requirements adopted by national authorities on their respective websites. | 5. Where the ESRB determines that the identified macro-prudential risks to financial stability, as assessed in accordance with paragraph 2, that led to stricter prudential requirements cease to exist, the national authorities shall repeal the stricter requirements and the original provisions of this Regulation shall apply. If this does not occur, the ESRB shall issue a recommendation to the Commission to take action against a Member State where the Member State concerned does not act appropriately from a systemic risk perspective. | 6. The ESRB may, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, recommend the extension of the list of prudential requirements specified in paragraph 1.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen te spremembe je, da se opredelijo postopki in pogoji, po katerih lahko nacionalni organi uporabijo strožje bonitetne zahteve, kadar v državah članicah nastanejo sistemska tveganja za finančno stabilnost, in da se določi vloga ESRB v tem okviru (za podrobnejšo utemeljitev te določbe glej odstavke 5.4 do 5.6 tega mnenja). | ECB tudi predlaga, da se ESRB omogoči dajanje priporočil Komisiji za razširitev seznama bonitetnih zahtev. | Explanation | This amendment is aimed at defining the procedures and the conditions under which national authorities may apply more stringent prudential requirements where systemic risks to financial stability arise in the Member States and at specifying the role of the ESRB in this context (for more details regarding the rationale for this provision, see paragraphs 5.4 to 5.6 of the Opinion). | The ECB also suggests that the ESRB could issue recommendations to the Commission regarding the extension of the list of prudential requirements. |
| Sprememba 25 | Amendment 25 |
| Člen 444(3) predlagane uredbe | Article 444(3) of the proposed regulation |
| „3. Komisija sprejme prvi delegiran akt iz odstavka 1 najpozneje 31. decembra 2015. Delegiran akt, sprejet v skladu s tem členom, se ne uporablja pred 1. januarjem 2015.“ | „3. Komisija sprejme prvi delegiran akt iz odstavka 1 najpozneje 31. decembra 2014. Delegiran akt, sprejet v skladu s tem členom, se ne uporablja pred 1. januarjem 2015.“ | ‘3. The Commission shall adopt the first delegated act referred to in paragraph 1 at the latest by 31 December 2015. A delegated act adopted in accordance with this Article shall, however, not apply before 1 January 2015.’ | ‘3. The Commission shall adopt the first delegated act referred to in paragraph 1 at the latest by 31 December 201. A delegated act adopted in accordance with this Article shall, however, not apply before 1 January 2015.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Za potrebe skladnosti z zavezo Komisije, da bo uvedla zahtevo glede stopnje finančnega vzvoda do 1. januarja 2015, je treba delegiran akt, s katerim se zahteva natančno določi, sprejeti najpozneje 31. decembra 2014. | Explanation | In order to be consistent with the Commission’s commitment to implement the liquidity coverage requirement by 1 January 2015, the delegated act specifying the requirement in detail should be adopted, at the latest, by 31 December 2014. |
| Sprememba 26 | Amendment 26 |
| Člen 473(1) predlagane uredbe (novo) | Article 473(1)(c) of the proposed regulation (new) |
| Ni besedila. | „(c) | te prednostne enote izpolnjujejo pogoje za stopnjo kreditne kvalitete 1.“ | No text. | ‘(c) | those senior units qualify for credit quality step 1.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Člen 124 predlagane uredbe določa, da so določene kategorije kritih obveznic primerne za prednostno obravnavo, če izpolnjujejo določene pogoje. Ena od teh kategorij so krite obveznice, zavarovane s prednostnimi enotami, ki so jih izdali francoski skladi Fonds Communs de Créances (FCC) ali podobne ustanove za listinjenje, ki jih ureja zakonodaja države članice in listinijo stanovanjske nepremičninske izpostavljenosti. Ena od zahtev, ki jih člen 124 določa za to kategorijo kritih obveznic, je, da prednostne enote, ki so jih izdali francoski skladi Fonds Communs de Créances (FCC) ali podobne ustanove za listinjenje, ne presegajo 10 % nominalne vrednosti zastavljenih nepremičnin. | Člen 473(1) predlagane uredbe določa, da se do 31. decembra 2014 zgornja meja 10 % za prednostne enote, ki so jih izdali FCC ali podobne ustanove za listinjenje, v skladu s členom 124(1)(d) in (e), pod določenimi pogoji ne uporablja. Do 31. decembra 2014 tako ne velja nobena omejitev glede odstotka prednostnih enot, ki so jih izdali FCC ali podobne ustanove za listinjenje, v skladu s členom 124(1)(d) in (e) predlagane uredbe. | Kakor je bilo izraženo v Mnenju ECB/2010/65 (20) , ECB meni, da bi moral biti cilj regulatorjev v bližnji prihodnosti, da se 10-odstotna omejitev za opustitev za FCC ali podobne ustanove za listinjenje, v skladu s členom 124(1)(d) in (e), ukine in razvije strog nabor meril za vključitev finančnega premoženja v sklad za kritje kritih obveznic, ki (a) ne bodo temeljila na zunanjih bonitetnih ocenah; (b) bodo dovolj močna, da bodo zavarovala zaupanje trga v krite obveznice, hkrati pa se da finančnim institucijam na voljo dovolj časa za prilagoditev njihovih ustreznih poslovnih modelov; (c) bodo omogočala listinjenje samo znotraj skupine; (d) bodo od nadzornih organov zahtevala pristop pregledovanja premoženja, ki je podlaga za listinjenje. ECB pozdravlja regulativne ukrepe, s katerimi se v zakonodaji zmanjšuje vezanost na zunanje bonitetne ocene. Vendar pa ECB predlaga ohranitev navedbe, da se za te enote zahteva najboljša kreditna kvaliteta, dokler se uporablja odstopanje iz člena 473(1), ter tako zagotovi verodostojnost in preglednost trga kritih obveznic. | Explanation | Article 124 of the proposed regulation provides that certain categories of covered bonds are eligible for preferential treatment where they meet certain requirements. One of these categories is covered bonds secured by senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Créances (FCCs) or by equivalent securitisation entities governed by the laws of a Member State securitising residential property exposures. One of the requirements provided by Article 124 to this category of covered bonds is that the senior units issued by FCCs or by equivalent securitisation entities do not exceed 10 % of the nominal amount of the outstanding issue. | Article 473(1) of the proposed regulation provides that, until 31 December 2014, the 10 % limit for senior units issued by FCCs or by equivalent securitisation entities laid down in Article 124(1)(d) and (e) do not apply under certain conditions. Thus, until 31 December 2014, no limit is imposed regarding the percentage of senior units issued by FCCs or by equivalent securitisation entities laid down in Article 124(1)(d) and (e) of the proposed regulation. | As expressed in Opinion CON/2010/65 (20) , the ECB is of the view that the aim for the regulators in the near future should be to remove the 10 % waiver limit for FCCs or equivalent securitisation entities laid down in Article 124(1) (d) and (e) and to develop a rigorous set of criteria for assets to be included in the cover pool of covered bonds which: (a) do not rely on external ratings; (b) are strong enough to secure market confidence in covered bonds, while allowing financial institutions sufficient time to adjust their respective business model; (c) allow only securitisation within a group; (d) require from the supervisory authorities a ‘look-through’ approach for the assets underlying the securitisation. The ECB welcomes regulatory steps which mitigate the reliance of legislation on external ratings. Nonetheless, the ECB proposes to maintain a reference to the most favourable credit quality required for these units as long as the derogation provided for in Article 473(1) applies in order to provide credibility and transparency regarding the covered bonds market. |
| Sprememba 27 | Amendment 27 |
| Člen 473(2) predlagane uredbe | Article 473(2) of the proposed regulation |
| „2. Komisija do 1. januarja 2013 preveri ustreznost odstopanja iz prvega odstavka in, če je primerno, ustreznost razširitve podobne obravnave na vse druge oblike kritih obveznic. Glede na ta pregled lahko Komisija po potrebi sprejme delegirane akte v skladu s členom 445, da postane to odstopanje trajno, ali sprejme zakonodajne predloge za njegovo razširitev na druge oblike zajetih obveznic.“ | „2. Komisija do 1. januarja 2013 preveri ustreznost odstopanja iz prvega odstavka . Glede na ta pregled lahko Komisija po potrebi sprejme delegirane akte v skladu s členom 445, da postane to odstopanje trajno, ali da ga odpravi.“ | ‘2. By 1 January 2013, the Commission shall review the appropriateness of the derogation set out in paragraph 1 and, if relevant, the appropriateness of extending similar treatment to any other form of covered bond. In the light of that review, the Commission may, if appropriate, adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 445 to make that derogation permanent or make legislative proposals to extend it to other forms of covered bonds.’ | ‘2. By 1 January 2013, the Commission shall review the appropriateness of the derogation set out in paragraph 1. In the light of that review, the Commission may, if appropriate, adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 445 to make that derogation permanent or to abrogate it. .’ |
| Pojasnilo | Glej pojasnilo k spremembi 26. | Explanation | See the explanation to Amendment 26. |
| Sprememba 28 | Amendment 28 |
| Člen 481 predlagane uredbe | Article 481 of the proposed regulation |
| „Člen 481 | Likvidnostne zahteve | 1. […] | EBA v svojem poročilu pregleda zlasti ustreznost kalibracije naslednjega: […] | 2. EBA do 31. decembra 2013 poroča Komisiji o ustreznih enotnih opredelitvah visoke in izjemno visoke likvidnosti ter kreditne kakovosti prenosljivih sredstev za namene člena 404. […] | 3. Do 31. decembra 2015 EBA poroča Komisiji, ali in kako bi bilo primerno zagotoviti, da institucije uporabljajo stabilne vire financiranja […] | Do 31. decembra 2016 Komisija na podlagi teh poročil predloži Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu poročilo in po potrebi zakonodajni predlog.“ | „Člen 481 | Likvidnostne zahteve | 1. […] | EBA po posvetovanju z ECB v svojem poročilu pregleda zlasti ustreznost kalibracije naslednjega: […] | (d) | ustreznih omejitev za delnice ali enote CIU v odstotkih od celotne zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja za namene člena 404(5). | 2. EBA po posvetovanju z ECB do 31. decembra 2013 poroča Komisiji o ustreznih enotnih opredelitvah visoke in izjemno visoke likvidnosti ter kreditne kakovosti prenosljivih sredstev za namene člena 404. […] | 3. Do 31. decembra 2015 EBA po posvetovanju z ECB poroča Komisiji, kako bi bilo primerno zagotoviti, da institucije uporabljajo stabilne vire financiranja […] | Do 31. decembra 2016 Komisija na podlagi teh poročil predloži Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu poročilo in zakonodajni predlog.“ | ‘Article 481 | Liquidity requirements | 1. […] | EBA shall in its report review in particular the appropriateness of the calibration of the following: […] | 2. EBA shall, by 31 December 2013, report to the Commission on appropriate uniform definitions of high and of extremely high liquidity and credit quality of transferable assets for purposes of Article 404. | 3. By 31 December 2015, EBA shall report to the Commission on whether and how it would be appropriate to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding […] | By 31 December 2016, the Commission shall, on the basis of these reports, submit a report, and if appropriate a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and Council.’ | ‘Article 481 | Liquidity requirements | 1. […] | EBA shall, after consulting the ECB, in its report review in particular the appropriateness of the calibration of the following: […] | (d) | the appropriate limit as percentage of the total of the liquidity coverage requirement for shares or units in CIUs for the purposes of Article 404(5). | 2. EBA shall, by 31 December 2013, report, after consulting the ECB, to the Commission on appropriate uniform definitions of high and of extremely high liquidity and credit quality of transferable assets for purposes of Article 404 […] | 3. By 31 December 2015, EBA shall, after consulting the ECB, report to the Commission on whether and how it would be appropriate to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding […] | By 31 December 2016, the Commission shall, on the basis of these reports, submit a report and a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and Council.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen predlagane spremembe glede posvetovanja z ECB je, da se pojasni, da bi morala ECB zaradi svojih pristojnosti in strokovnega znanja na tem področju prispevati k pripravi poročil. Pričakovani medsebojni vplivi med urejanjem likvidnosti in operacijami denarne politike so znatni in zapleteni, zato je pomembno zagotoviti, da urejanje ne povzroči neželenih posledic glede uporabe centralnobančnega financiranja in povezanih finančnih trgov. Kakor je navedeno v spremembi 24, bi lahko EBA pripravila osnutke izvedbenih tehničnih standardov za kalibracijo omejitev naložb v delnice ali enote CIU v odstotkih od celotne zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja. | Namen predlaganih sprememb glede uvedbe stopnje neto stabilnega financiranja je, da bi se izognili vsem morebitnim nejasnostim v zvezi z uvedbo te zahteve, četudi natančna vsebina stopnje neto stabilnega financiranja še ni določena. Sporazum Basel III določa, da bo stopnja neto stabilnega financiranja postala minimalni standard do 1. januarja 2018, po obdobju opazovanja, ki vključuje klavzulo o pregledu za obravnavo kakršnih koli neželenih posledic. | Explanation | The proposed amendment relating to the consultation of the ECB aims to clarify that the ECB should contribute to the development of the reports owing to its competence and expertise in the area. The interaction between liquidity regulation and monetary policy operations is expected to be significant and complex and it is therefore important to ensure that regulation does not lead to unintended consequences with regard to recourse to central bank funding and related financial markets. As noted in Amendment 24, the EBA could prepare draft implementing technical standards on calibration of the limit for investments in shares or units in CIUs as a percentage of the total liquidity coverage requirement. | The proposed amendments relating to the implementation of the NSFR are aimed at avoiding any possible ambiguity, even if the exact content of the NSFR is not yet determined, with respect to the implementation of this requirement. The Basel III agreement provides that the NSFR will move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018, after an observation period that includes a review clause to address any unintended consequences. |
| Sprememba 29 | Amendment 29 |
| Člen 482(1) predlagane uredbe | Article 482(1) of the proposed regulation |
| „1. Komisija do 31. decembra 2016 predloži poročilo o vplivu in učinkovitosti stopnje finančnega vzvoda Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu. Po potrebi se poročilu priloži zakonodajni predlog o uvedbi ene ali več ravni za stopnje finančnega vzvoda, ki bi jih institucije morale doseči, pri čemer predlaga ustrezno kalibracijo za te stopnje in vse ustrezne prilagoditve za merilo kapitala in merilo celotne izpostavljenosti, kot je opredeljeno v členu 416.“ | „1. Komisija do 31. decembra 2016 predloži poročilo o vplivu in učinkovitosti stopnje finančnega vzvoda Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu. Poročilu se priloži zakonodajni predlog o uvedbi ene ali več ravni za stopnje finančnega vzvoda, ki bi jih morajo institucije doseči, pri čemer predlaga ustrezno kalibracijo za te stopnje in vse ustrezne prilagoditve za merilo kapitala in merilo celotne izpostavljenosti, kot je opredeljeno v členu 416.“ | ‘1. The Commission shall submit by 31 December 2016 a report on the impact and effectiveness of the leverage ratio to the European Parliament and the Council. Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal on the introduction of one ore more levels for the leverage ratio that institutions would be required to meet, suggesting and adequate calibration for those levels and any appropriate adjustments to the capital measure and the total exposure measure as defined in Article 416.’ | ‘1. The Commission shall submit by 31 December 2016 a report on the impact and effectiveness of the leverage ratio to the European Parliament and the Council. The report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal on the introduction of one or more levels for the leverage ratio that institutions shall be required to meet, suggesting and adequate calibration for those levels and any appropriate adjustments to the capital measure and the total exposure measure as defined in Article 416.’ |
| Pojasnilo | Namen predlagane spremembe je, da se odpravi vsak dvom glede zaveze, da bo po obdobju opazovanja in ob ustrezni kalibraciji uvedena stopnja finančnega vzvoda. | Explanation | The proposed amendment aims to dispel any concerns with regard to the commitment to introduce a leverage ratio, subject to appropriate calibration, following the observation period. |
| Sprememba 30 | Amendment 30 |
| Priloga III k predlagani uredbi | Annex III of the proposed regulation |
| „PRILOGA III | Postavke, za katere se izvaja dopolnilno poročanje o likvidnih sredstvih […].“ | „ | “ | ‘ANNEX III | Items subject to supplementary reporting of liquid assets […].’ | ‘ | ’ |
| Pojasnilo | Da bi se izognili nejasnostim in poenostavili poročanje institucij o likvidnih sredstvih, ECB priporoča, da se Priloga III črta, njena vsebina pa ob ustreznih prilagoditvah in spremembah združi s seznamom likvidnih sredstev, določenim v členu 404(1) predlagane uredbe. Sklicevanja na Prilogo III v drugih določbah predlagane uredbe bi bilo treba temu ustrezno črtati. Če bo Priloga III ostala del predlagane uredbe, je treba pojasniti pomen postavk, za katere se izvaja „dopolnilno“ poročanje, da bi se izognili težavam z razlago. | Explanation | To avoid ambiguities and to simplify the reporting of liquid assets by institutions, the ECB recommends deleting Annex III and merging its content, with appropriate adjustments and amendments, with the list of liquid assets put forward in Article 404(1) of the proposed regulation. The references to Annex III in other provisions of the proposed regulation should be deleted accordingly. In the case of Annex III remaining as part of the proposed regulation, the meaning of items subject to ‘supplementary’ reporting in the heading should be clarified in order to avoid issues of interpretation. |
| (1) Krepki tisk v besedilu členov označuje, kje ECB predlaga vstavitev novega besedila. Prečrtani tisk v besedilu členov označuje, kje ECB predlaga črtanje besedila. | (1) Bold in the body of the text indicates where the ECB proposes inserting new text. Strikethrough in the body of the text indicates where the ECB proposes deleting text. |
| (2) Uredba (EU) št. 1092/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o makrobonitetnem nadzoru nad finančnim sistemom Evropske unije in ustanovitvi Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 1). | (2) Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1). |
| (3) V zvezi s tem glej odstavek 11 Mnenja CON/2009/17 in spremembo 3 v tem mnenju. | (3) See in this respect paragraph 11 of Opinion CON/2009/17 and its Amendment 3. |
| (4) V zvezi s tem glej prehodne določbe v členu 145 predlagane direktive. | (4) See in this respect the transitional provisions of Article 145 of the proposed directive. |
| (5) Glej na primer Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor, Core Principles Methodology, oktober 2006, str. 38. | (5) See, for instance, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles Methodology, October 2006, p. 38. |
| (6) COM(2010) 284 konč. | (6) COM(2010) 284 final. |
| (7) Glej tudi spremembo 5 v Mnenju CON/2009/17. | (7) See also Amendment 5 of Opinion CON/2009/17. |
| (8) Odstavka 133 in 150 sporazuma Basel III. | (8) Paragraphs 133 and 150 of the Basel III agreement. |
| (9) Krepki tisk v besedilu členov označuje, kje ECB predlaga vstavitev novega besedila. Prečrtani tisk v besedilu členov označuje, kje ECB predlaga črtanje besedila. | (9) Bold in the body of the text indicates where the ECB proposes inserting new text. Strikethrough in the body of the text indicates where the ECB proposes deleting text. |
| (10) Uredba (ES) št. 1060/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o bonitetnih agencijah (UL L 302, 17.11.2009, str. 1). | (10) Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 1). |
| (11) COM(2011) 8 konč. | (11) COM(2011) 8 final. |
| (12) Glej odstavek 6.4 Mnenja CON/2011/42. | (12) See paragraph 6.4 of Opinion CON/2011/42. |
| (13) Obrazci COREP in FINREP, ki so veljavni na datum poročanja in so pripravljeni v obliki smernic EBA, objavljenih na spletni strani EBA na naslovu http://www.eba.europa.eu, ali, kjer je primerno, v obliki osnutkov tehničnih standardov, ki jih pripravi EBA in sprejme Komisija, v skladu s členom 74(2) Direktive 2006/48/ES. | (13) COREP and FINREP templates, in force on the reporting date, as produced in the form of EBA guidelines published on EBA’s website at www.eba.europa.eu or, as appropriate, in the form of draft technical standards developed by EBA and adopted by the Commission under Article 74(2) of Directive 2006/48/EC. |
| (14) Členi 383, 403 in 417 predlagane uredbe. | (14) Articles 383, 403 and 417 of the proposed regulation. |
| (15) Mnenje ECB CON/2011/1 z dne 13. januarja 2011 o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih OTC, centralnih nasprotnih strankah in repozitorijih sklenjenih poslov (UL C 57, 23.2.2011, str. 1). | (15) ECB Opinion CON/2011/1 of 13 January 2011 on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ C 57, 23.2.2011, p. 1). |
| (16) Glej odstavek 1.27 poročila za posvetovanje Odbora za plačilne in poravnalne sisteme ter tehničnega odbora Mednarodnega združenja nadzornikov trga vrednostnih papirjev Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, marec 2011, dostopno na spletni strani IOSCO na naslovu www.iosco.org. | (16) See paragraph 1.27 of ‘Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures’, consultative report, March 2011, by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, available on IOSCO’s website at www.iosco.org |
| (17) Glej poročilo za posvetovanje Odbora za plačilne in poravnalne sisteme ter tehničnega odbora Mednarodnega združenja nadzornikov trga vrednostnih papirjev Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, marec 2011. | (17) See ‘Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures’, consultative report, March 2011, by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions. |
| (18) Glej zaveze držav skupine G-20 iz septembra 2009 in junija 2010. | (18) See the commitments of G20 of September 2009 and June 2010. |
| (19) Opomba 9 v odstavku 40 sporazuma Basel III. | (19) Paragraph 40, footnote 9 of the Basel III agreement. |
| (20) Mnenje ECB CON/2010/65 z dne 6. avgusta 2010 o predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES v zvezi s kapitalskimi zahtevami za trgovalno knjigo in za dodatna listinjenja ter v zvezi z nadzorniškim pregledom politik prejemkov (UL C 223, 18.8.2010, str. 1). | (20) ECB Opinion CON/2010/65 of 6 August 2010 on a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for resecuritisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies (OJ C 223, 18.8.2010, p. 1). |
