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Pomembno pravno obvestilo	Important legal notice

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52005SC0805	52005SC0805
	Report from the Commission - Report on Competition Policy 2004 /* SEC/2005/0805 final */






[pic] \| KOMISIJA EVROPSKIH SKUPNOSTI \|	[pic] \| COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES \|
Bruselj, 17.6.2005	Brussels, 17.6.2005
SEK(2005) 805 koncno	SEC(2005) 805 final
POROČILO KOMISIJE	REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004	Report on Competition Policy 2004
VSEBINA	TABLE OF CONTENTS
Uvod 9	Introduction 9
Uvodna beseda generalnega direktorja za konkurenco ……………………………………….9	Introduction by the Director-General for Competition 9
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES 16	I – Antitrust – Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC 16
A – Zakonodajna in razlagalna pravila 16	A - Legislative and interpretative rules 16
1. Posodobitev protimonopolne zakonodaje: Izvedbena uredba št. 773/2004, smernice in obvestila 16	1. Antitrust modernisation: Implementing Regulation 773/2004, guidelines and notices 16
2. Uredba in smernice o skupinskih izjemah za prenos tehnologije 18	2. Technology transfer block exemption Regulation and guidelines 18
3. Uredbe o skupinskih izjemah za promet 20	3. Transport block exemption Regulations 20
3.1 Pomorski promet 20	3.1 Maritime transport 20
3.2 Zračni promet 21	3.2 Air transport 21
4. Pregled postopkovnih pravil: novo obvestilo o dostopu do spisa 22	4. Review of procedural rules: New access to file notice 22
B – Uporaba členov 81, 82 in 86 24	B – Application of Articles 81, 82 and 86 24
1. Zloraba prevladujočega položaja (člen 82 ES) 24	1. Abuse of dominant positions (Article 82 EC) 24
1.1 Odločbe 24	1.1 Decisions 24
1.2 Razvoj drugih primerov in zavrnitve pritožb 28	1.2 Other case developments and rejections of complaints 28
2. Karteli 31	2. Cartels 31
3. Drugi sporazumi in usklajena ravnanja 37	3. Other agreements and concerted practices 37
3.1 Odločbe Komisije 37	3.1 Commission decisions 37
3.2 Razvoj drugih primerov 41	3.2 Other case developments 41
3.3 Preiskave sektorjev 43	3.3 Sector inquiries 43
4. Državni ukrepi (javna podjetja/podjetja z izključnimi in posebnimi pravicami) 46	4. State measures (public undertakings/undertakings with exclusive and special rights) 46
4.1 Odločbe 46	4.1 Decisions 46
4.2 Zavrnitve pritožb 47	4.2 Rejections of complaints 47
C – EVROPSKA MREŽA ZA KONKURENCO (ECN): pregled sodelovanja 48	C – ECN: Overview of cooperation 48
1. Splošni pregled 48	1. General overview 48
2. Uporaba pravil konkurence EU v nacionalnih sodiščih EU: poročilo o izvajanju člena 15 Uredbe št. 1/2003 49	2. Application of EU competition rules by national courts in the EU: Report on the implementation of Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 49
3. Energetika 51	3. Energy 51
4. Promet 51	4. Transport 51
5. Finančne storitve 52	5. Financial services 52
D – Izbrani sodni primeri 53	D – Selected court cases 53
E – Statistika………………………………………………………………………………….58	E - Statistics 58
II – Nadzor združevanja 61	II – Merger control 61
A – Zakonodajna in razlagalna pravila 62	A – Legislative and interpretative rules 62
1. Preoblikovana uredba o združitvah, nova obvestila in spremenjena izvedbena uredba 62	1. Recast Merger Regulation, new notices and amended Implementing Regulation 62
1.1. Nova uredba o združitvah: Uredba št. 139/2004 62	1.1. New Merger Regulation: Regulation 139/2004 62
1.2. Popravljena izvedbena uredba 62	1.2. Revised Implementing Regulation 62
1.3. Popravljeno obvestilo o poenostavljenem postopku 66	1.3. Revised notice on a simplified procedure 66
1.4. Novo obvestilo o pomožnih omejitvah 69	1.4. New notice on ancillary restraints 69
1.5. Obvestilo o presoji horizontalnih združitev 70	1.5. Notice on the assessment of horizontal mergers 70
B – Primeri Komisije 72	B – Commission cases 72
1. Odločbe, sprejete v skladu s členom 8 72	1. Decisions taken under Article 8 72
2. Odločbe, sprejete v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) in 6(2) 80	2. Decisions taken under Article 6(1)(b) and 6(2) 80
3. Napotitve 90	3. Referrals 90
4. Preklicane priglasitve 92	4. Notifications withdrawn 92
C – Izbrani sodni primeri 94	C – Selected court cases 94
D – Statistika………………………………………………………………………………….98	D Statistics 98
III – Razvoj dogodkov po sektorjih 100	III – Sector developments 100
A – Liberalizirani sektorji 100	A - Liberalised sectors 100
1. Energetika 100	1. Energy 100
2. Elektronske komunikacije 101	2. Electronic communications 101
3. Promet 103	3. Transport 103
3.1 Zračni promet 103	3.1 Air transport 103
3.2 Železniški promet 104	3.2 Railways 104
4. Finančne storitve 104	4. Financial services 104
B – Drugi sektorji 106	B - Other sectors 106
1. Svobodni poklici 106	1. Liberal Professions 106
IV – Nadzor državnih pomoči 110	IV – State aid control 110
A – Zakonodajna in razlagalna pravila 110	A – Legislative and interpretative rules 110
1. Uredbe, smernice in sporočila 110	1. Regulations, guidelines and communications 110
1.1. Postopkovna pravila 110	1.1. Procedural rules 110
1.2. Raziskave in razvoj 113	1.2. Research and development 113
1.3. Pomoč za usposabljanje 114	1.3. Training aid 114
1.4. Reševanje in prestrukturiranje 114	1.4. Rescue and restructuring 114
2. Ladjedelništvo 116	2. Shipbuilding 116
3. Kmetijstvo: razvoj politik in zakonodajne pobude v letu 2004 117	3. Agriculture: Policy developments and legislative initiatives in 2004 117
4. Ribištvo 120	4. Fisheries 120
5. Premog in promet 120	5. Coal and transport 120
6. Javne storitve/storitve splošnega (gospodarskega) pomena 121	6. Public services/services of general (economic) interest 121
7. Preglednost 123	7. Transparency 123
B – Primeri 125	B – Cases 125
1. Liberalizirani trgi 125	1. Liberalised markets 125
2. Pomoč za reševanje in prestrukturiranje 128	2. Rescue and restructuring aid 128
3. Regionalna pomoč 137	3. Regional aid 137
4. Odločba o ukrepu, ki ne pomeni pomoči 141	4. Non-aid decision 141
5. Davčna pomoč 142	5. Fiscal aid 142
6. Pomoč za raziskave in razvoj 145	6. Research and development aid 145
7. Okoljska pomoč 148	7. Environmental aid 148
8. Širitev 151	8. Enlargement 151
9. Ladjedelništvo 153	9. Shipbuilding 153
10. Kmetijstvo 155	10. Agriculture 155
11. Ribištvo 161	11. Fisheries 161
12. Premog in promet 161	12. Coal and transport 161
13. Javna radiotelevizija, širokopasovne storitve, filmska industrija 166	13. Public broadcasting, broadband, film industry 166
C – Izvrševanje odločb o državni pomoči 170	C – Enforcement of state aid decisions 170
1. Uvod 170	1. Introduction 170
2. Posamezni primeri 171	2. Individual cases 171
D – Izbrani sodni primeri 173	D – Selected court cases 173
E – Statistika………………………………………………………………………………176	E Statistics 176
V – Mednarodne dejavnosti 178	V – International activities 178
A – Širitev in zahodni Balkan 178	A - Enlargement and Western Balkans 178
B – Sosedska politika 179	B - Neighbourhood policy 179
C – Dvostransko sodelovanje 180	C – Bilateral cooperation 180
1. Uvod 180	1. Introduction 180
2. Sporazumi z ZDA, Kanado in Japonsko 180	2. Agreements with the US, Canada and Japan 180
3. Sodelovanje z drugimi državami in regijami 183	3. Cooperation with other countries and regions 183
D – Večstransko sodelovanje 185	D – Multilateral cooperation 185
1. Mednarodna mreža za konkurenco 185	1. International Competition Network 185
2. Organizacija za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj (OECD) 187	2. OECD 187
VI – Predvidevanja za leto 2005 190	VI – Outlook for 2005 190
1. Protimonopolna zakonodaja 190	1. Antitrust 190
2. Združitve 190	2. Mergers 190
3. Državna pomoč 190	3. State aid 190
4. Mednarodne dejavnosti 191	4. International activities 191
Priloga – Primeri, obravnavani v poročilu 192	Annex – Cases discussed in the Report 192
1. Členi 81, 82 in 86 192	1. Articles 81, 82 and 86 192
2. Nadzor združevanja 192	2. Merger control 192
3. Državna pomoč 193	3. State aid 193
Uvod	Introduction
UVODNA BESEDA GENERALNEGA DIREKTORJA ZA KONKURENCO	INTRODUCTION BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR COMPETITION
Uvodna beseda generalnega direktorja za konkurenco	Introduction by the Director-General for Competition
Leta 2004 so na delo Generalnega direktorata za konkurenco (GD za konkurenco) vplivale velike spremembe: širitev EU na 25 držav članic, posodobitev pravil konkurence, prihod nove Komisije novembra ter, kot posledica posodobitve, notranja reorganizacija GD za konkurenco. Omenjeni razvoj se kaže v splošnih ciljih politike konkurence Komisije za leto 2005 in naslednja leta, ki temeljijo na sklepu Komisije o Letni strategiji politik (LSP) za leto 2005 in na političnih prednostnih nalogah, ki jih je določila nova Komisija. Letno poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2004 daje zato primerno priložnost, da se širši javnosti pojasni, kako bo na srednji rok usmerjeno delo Komisije na področju politike konkurence.	In 2004 the work of the Directorate-General for Competition (DG Competition) was affected by major changes: enlargement of the EU to 25 members, the modernization of competition rules, the arrival in November of a new Commission, and the internal reorganization of the DG as a consequence of modernization. These developments are reflected in the general objectives of the Commission’s competition policy for 2005 and subsequent years, which are based on the Commission’s Annual Policy Strategy Strategy (APS) decision for 2005 and the political priorities established by the new Commission. The 2004 Annual Competition Report therefore provides the appropriate occasion to set out for a wider public the direction that the will be taken by the Commission’s work in the competition policy field in the medium term.
Medsebojno delovanje politike konkurence in drugih politik Komisije	The interaction of competition policy and other Commission policies
Komisija je v svojem sklepu o LSP za leto 2005, ki sta ga pozdravila Evropski parlament in Svet, poudarila dvig rasti kot osrednji politični cilj, s katerim si prizadeva izboljšati konkurenčnost evropskega modela ter obenem ohraniti blaginjo, zaposlenost, kohezijo in varstvo okolja. Pristop desetih novih držav članic je prispeval dodatno geografsko razsežnost cilju izboljšanja gospodarske rasti na notranjem trgu. Ključni cilj na političnem dnevnem redu nove Komisije je oživitev lizbonskega procesa, ki ga je leta 2000 sprožil Evropski svet in katerega splošni cilj je, da EU postane najbolj dinamično in konkurenčno, na znanju temelječe gospodarstvo na svetu. Komisija bo pri doseganju lizbonskih ciljev upoštevala priporočila skupine na visoki ravni, ki ji predseduje g. Wim Kok.	In its APS 2005 decision, which was welcomed by the European Parliament and the Council, the Commission highlighted an upturn in growth as the central policy objective, striving to improve the competitiveness of the European model while maintaining prosperity, employment, cohesion and environmental protection. The accession of ten new Member States has added a further geographical dimension to the goal of improving economic growth in the internal market. The key objective on the political agenda of the new Commission is to reinvigorate the Lisbon process launched by the European Council in 2000, the overall aim of which is to make the EU the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world. The Commission will take into account the recommendations made by the High Level Group chaired by Mr Wim Kok regarding the attainment of the Lisbon objectives.
V podporo okviru konkurenčnosti, določenem v LSN za leto 2005, bo Komisija nadaljevala svoj velik zakonodajni postopek pregleda področja politike konkurence, zlasti kar zadeva državne pomoči, ter si prizadevala za posodobitev protimonopolnih pravil in za večje reforme pri nadzoru združevanja, ki so se začele leta 2004. V tem okviru namerava Komisija spodbujati proaktivno izvrševanje pravil konkurence po vsej EU.	In support of the competitiveness framework laid down in APS 2005, the Commission will make progress with its ambitious legislative review process in the competition policy field, with special reference to state aid, and will pursue the modernization of antitrust rules and the substantial merger control reforms started in 2004. In this context, the Commission intends to promote proactive enforcement of competition rules across the EU.
Skupaj s strogim izvajanjem politike konkurence lahko pregled evropske zakonodaje po različnih gospodarskih sektorjih, kot so liberalizirane omrežne panoge in finančne storitve, zato da se meri njen konkurenčni vpliv, zelo pozitivno vpliva na konkurenčnost in rast evropskega gospodarstva ter na delovanje notranjega trga, s čimer se krepijo interesi in zaupanje potrošnikov.	Together with the rigorous application of competition policy, the screening of European legislation in various economic sectors, such as liberalized network industries and financial services, in order to gauge its competitive impact, can have a very positive influence on the competitiveness and growth of the European economy and on the functioning of the internal market, reinforcing the interests and confidence of consumers.
Med prednostnimi področji, določenimi v Kokovem poročilu, ki naj bi bila ključna za uresničitev lizbonskih ciljev, lahko politika konkurence pomembno prispeva v treh pogledih:	Among the priority policy areas identified in the Kok report as being key to the achievement of the Lisbon objectives, competition policy can make important contributions in three respects:
Spodbujanje na znanju temelječe družbe. Močan konkurenčni pritisk zagotavlja krepke spodbude za podjetja, tako da se ta stalno ukvarjajo z inovacijami ter raziskavami in razvojem. Politika konkurence lahko s krepitvijo spodbud za inovacije ob osredotočanju na tiste omejitve, ki lahko resno ovirajo konkurenco, prispeva k temu, da postanejo gospodarstva EU bolj dinamična, in tako pomaga pri uresničitvi lizbonskih ciljev. Politika državne pomoči lahko z boljšo usmeritvijo na vire javnih pomoči na področjih, kot so raziskave in razvoj, inovacije in usposabljanje, še posebej prispeva k na znanju temelječi družbi.	Promoting the knowledge-based society . Strong competitive pressure provides powerful incentives for companies to continuously engage in innovation and research and development (R&D). By strengthening the incentives for innovation while focusing on those restrictions that can seriously hinder competition, competition policy can contribute to making the EU economies more dynamic and thus help to deliver the Lisbon objectives. In particular, state aid policy may contribute to the knowledge-based society by better targeting the resources available for public support in fields such as research and development, innovation and training.
Pospeševanje notranjega trga. Notranji trg dvanajst let po dokončni uresničitvi na papirju še ni izkoristil vseh svojih možnosti. Eden od razlogov za to je, da med odstranitvijo ovir za čezmejno trgovino in učinkovito konkurenco še ni avtomatične povezave. Ureditveni okvir in njegovo izvrševanje morata ustvariti okolje, ki dejansko spodbuja ter daje prednost konkurenci, novemu vstopu in inovacijam. Uveljavljanje konkurence in tudi zavzemanje zanjo lahko izboljšata delovanje notranjega trga, zlasti v sektorjih, ključnih za lizbonsko agendo, saj so povezane s pomembnimi vložki za evropsko gospodarstvo. Odprti in konkurenčni evropski trgi bodo povečali mednarodno konkurenčnost evropskih podjetij v korist evropskih potrošnikov in evropskega zaposlovanja. Samo uveljavljanje pravil konkurence, ki naj bi odstranilo glavne ovire konkurenci na trgu, pomaga oblikovati zdrave razmere za rast.	Fostering the internal market . Twelve years after its completion on paper, the internal market has not yet realized its full potential. One reason is that there is no automatic link between removal of barriers to cross-border trade and effective competition. Both the regulatory framework and its enforcement have to create an environment which actually induces and favours competition, new entry and innovation. Both competition enforcement and advocacy can contribute to better functioning of the internal market, particularly in sectors which are key to the Lisbon agenda, because they concern essential inputs for the European economy. Open and competitive European markets will make European companies more competitive internationally, to the benefit of European consumers and European employment. The very enforcement of competition rules, which is intended to remove the major obstacles to market competition, helps to create sound conditions for growth.
Spodbujanje ugodnega poslovnega okolja. Politika konkurence lahko pomembno prispeva k ustvarjanju pogojev, ugodnih za podjetja. Pravila o državni pomoči zelo vplivajo na prizadevanja za povečanje razpoložljivosti tveganega kapitala za podjetja na začetku poslovanja ter za majhna in srednje velika podjetja. Mednarodna politika konkurence pomaga tudi pri razvoju splošne povezanosti in predvidljivosti, ki ju podjetja potrebujejo. Končno lahko načela konkurence omogočijo pregled novih in obstoječih ureditvenih okvirov na drugih pomembnih področjih ter tako zagotovijo, da ureditev po nepotrebnem ne omejuje konkurence. Zavzemanje za konkurenco lahko tako pomaga oblikovati ureditvene okvire EU in nacionalne ureditvene okvire za spodbujanje ureditve, ugodne za konkurenco in konkurenčnost.	Promoting a favorable business climate . Competition policy can make a significant contribution to creating conditions that are favourable to business. State aid rules play an important role in the efforts to increase the availability of risk capital for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises. Also, international competition policy helps develop global coherence and the predictability that business needs. Finally, competition principles can allow screening of new and existing regulatory frameworks in other important policy areas, so as to ensure that regulation does not unnecessarily curb competition. Competition advocacy can thus help shape EU and national regulatory frameworks to promote a regime favorable to competition and competitiveness.
Splošni cilji politike konkurence	General competition policy objectives
Prednostne naloge izvrševanja: usmerjanje ukrepov izvrševanja na za evropsko gospodarstvo najbolj škodljive protikonkurenčne prakse. Nova uredba boja proti monopolom in uredba o združitvah bosta GD za konkurenco omogočili, da bo lažje določil prednostne naloge svoje dejavnosti izvrševanja ter se tako osredotočil na za blaginjo potrošnikov najbolj škodljive prakse in združitve.	Enforcement priorities: focusing enforcement actions on the most harmful anticompetitive practices for the European economy . The new Antitrust and Merger Regulations will allow DG Competition to better prioritise its enforcement activity, in order to focus on the most harmful practices and mergers in terms of impact on consumer welfare.
Na področju protimonopolne zakonodaje je Uredba št. 1/2003 vzpostavila nov sistem uveljavljanja, v katerem so Komisija in države članice vse pristojne, da v celoti uporabljajo pravila konkurence EU. V ta namen je Komisija skupaj s 25 državami članicami oblikovala Evropsko mrežo za konkurenco (ECN), v kateri ima osrednjo vlogo GD za konkurenco. To ustvarja veliko možnost za učinkovitejše in proaktivno uveljavljanje pravil konkurence EU. Vendar bo za določitev tistih praks, ki bi lahko naredile največ škode konkurenci in potrošniku, treba izboljšati nadzor trgov. Nova uredba je bila tudi prvi korak h krepitvi zasebnega uveljavljanja zakonodaje pred nacionalnimi sodišči, s tem da je bila sodiščem dana pristojnost za uporabo člena 81(3). Izvrševanje bo še naprej osredotočeno na kartele, zlorabe prevladujočega položaja, nezdružljivo državno pomoč in uveljavljanje pravil konkurence v pred kratkim liberaliziranih in drugih reguliranih gospodarskih sektorjih.	In the antitrust field, Regulation No 1/2003 has created a new enforcement system in which the Commission and Member States are all competent to fully apply EU competition rules. To that end, the Commission and the 25 Member States have created a European Competition Network (ECN) in which DG Competition plays a central role. This creates substantial potential for more effective and proactive enforcement of the EU competition rules. However, it will require a better surveillance of markets in order to identify those practices which are likely to create the greatest harm to competition and the consumer. The new Regulation was also the first step in strengthening private enforcement before national courts by giving the latter the power to also apply Article 81(3). Enforcement will continue to concentrate on cartels, abuses of dominant positions, incompatible state aid and enforcement of competition rules in recently liberalised and other regulated sectors of the economy.
Pri nadzoru združevanja je nova uredba povečala možnosti, da se primeri lahko predajo od držav članic h Komisiji in obratno, kar bi moralo Komisiji pomagati, da svoje dejavnosti izvrševanja usmeri na primere z jasnim čezmejnim vplivom. Poleg tega je nov vsebinski preizkus „pomembnega oviranja učinkovite konkurence“ pokazal, da nova uredba zajema vsa protikonkurenčna združevanja.	In the field of merger control, the new Regulation has enhanced the possibilities for referring cases from Member States to the Commission and vice versa, which should help the Commission to focus its enforcement activities on cases that have a clear cross-border impact. Moreover, the new substantive test of “significant impediment to effective competition” has made it clear that all anticompetitive mergers are covered by the new Regulation.
Na področju državne pomoči se bo GD za konkurenco zlasti osredotočil na izvrševanje negativnih odločb in vračanje nezdružljive državne pomoči. Poleg tega bo izboljšano mednarodno sodelovanje, dvo- in večstransko, še naprej ključno za zagotavljanje učinkovitosti evropske politike konkurence v boju proti protikonkurenčnim praksam, ki imajo mednarodni obseg.	In the state aid field, DG Competition will focus more particularly on the enforcement of negative decisions and the reimbursement on incompatible state aid. Moreover, improved international cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, will continue to be crucial to guaranteeing the effectiveness of European competition policy in combating anticompetitive practices with international scope.
Povečanje konkurenčnosti v EU z oblikovanjem ureditvenega okvira. Ureditev na ravni Skupnosti in nacionalni ravni lahko po nepotrebnem in nenamerno ovira konkurenco ter omeji možnosti notranjega trga. V nekaterih sektorjih, kot so liberalizirane omrežne panoge in zlasti energetika, obstaja potreba po spodbujanju ureditvenega okvira, ki bo ustvaril razmere za vstop na trg in spodbujal konkurenco. Z zavzemanjem za konkurenco in pregledom politik bi bilo treba vplivati na nacionalno zakonodajo in zakonodajo EU, da bi se tako ustrezno upoštevala zaščita konkurenčnih trgov.	Enhancing competitiveness within the EU by helping to shape the regulatory framework. Regulation, at both Community and national level, may unnecessarily and unintentionally hold back competition and curb the potential of the internal market. In certain sectors, such as the liberalised network industries, and in particular in the energy sector, there is a need to promote a regulatory framework creating the conditions for market entry and promoting competition. Competition advocacy and policy screening should therefore be used to influence national and EU legislation in order to ensure that safeguarding competitive markets is given due consideration.
Pravila konkurence pri nadzoru državne pomoči bi bilo treba pregledati in tako zagotoviti boljše upoštevanje posebnih tržnih nepopolnosti, ki na eni strani vplivajo na raven naložb EU v razvoj in raziskave in na dostop do tveganega kapitala ter na drugi na vztrajnost razlik v regionalnem razvoju. Prilagoditev ureditvenega režima za nadzor državne pomoči bo neposredno prispevala k prizadevanjem Komisije za podporo inovacijam.	Competition rules on monitoring state aid should be reviewed to ensure that they take more account of the specific market failures affecting the level of EU investment in R&D and access to risk capital, on the one hand, and the persistence of disparities in regional development, on the other. Adaptation of the regulatory regime for monitoring state aid will provide a direct contribution to the Commission’s efforts to favour innovation.
Usmerjanje delovanja na ključne sektorje za notranji trg in lizbonsko agendo. Treba se je osredotočiti na odstranjevanje ovir za konkurenco v pred kratkim liberaliziranih sektorjih in tudi v nekaterih drugih reguliranih sektorjih, zlasti v telekomunikacijah, poštnih storitvah, energetiki in prometu. Ti sektorji zagotavljajo pomemben vložek za številne druge gospodarske sektorje in so izredno pomembne za konkurenčnost Evrope. Ustvarjanje možnosti za konkuriranje povečanega števila ponudnikov storitev bi moralo voditi k širši izbiri, večji kakovosti in nižjim cenam za potrošnike. Razvoj telekomunikacij v zadnjih 10 letih je dober primer koristi, ki jih prinaša liberalizacija.	Focusing action on key sectors for the internal market and the Lisbon agenda . Emphasis should be put on removing obstacles to competition in the recently liberalised sectors as well as certain other regulated sectors, notably telecommunications, postal services, energy and transport. These sectors provide essential inputs to many other economic sectors and are of key importance for Europe’s competitiveness. Opening up the possibilities for an increased number of service providers to compete should lead to wider choice, better quality and lower prices for consumers. The evolution of the telecommunications sector in the last ten years is a good example of the benefits of liberalisation.
Na pred kratkim liberalizirane sektorje pa vplivajo različna izkrivljanja konkurence, ki segajo od škodljivega gospodarskega obnašanja dela zadevnih podjetij do neustrezne ureditve ali celo do državnih pomoči. Ustrezno je treba upoštevati dejstvo, da so za te sektorje lahko značilne obveznosti iz opravljanja javnih storitev, kar zadeva izvajanje storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena (SGEI), ki morajo biti izpolnjene. Vseeno mora Komisija zagotoviti, da subvencije za delovanje teh javnih storitev ne presegajo potrebnega. Poleg tega je treba biti jasnejši pri določanju težav, ki jih je najprimernejše rešiti z uporabo konkurečnega prava. Pri tem je pomembno prizadevati si za celostno panožno regulativno politiko in politiko izvrševanja.	The recently liberalised sectors are, however, affected by various distortions of competition, ranging from harmful commercial behaviour on the part of the undertakings concerned to inadequate regulation or even state aid. Due consideration should be given to the fact that these sectors may be characterised by public service obligations, as regards the provision of services of general economic interest (SGEI), which must be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the Commission has to ensure that subsidies granted for the functioning of these public services do not exceed what is needed. Moreover, it is necessary to be more explicit in identifying which problems are most appropriately solved through the application of competition law. In this regard it is important to strive for an integrated sectoral regulatory and enforcement policy.
Za številne druge sektorje, pomembne za svetovno konkurenčnost evropskega gospodarstva, je značilna velika samoregulacija ali mešanica samoregulacije in regulacije s strani države. To velja zlasti za finančne storitve. Oblikovanje učinkovitega in likvidnega kapitalskega trga je eden ključnih ciljev akcijskega načrta za finančne storitve. Številne spodbude v politikah za notranji trg, ki so dosegle višek z novo direktivo o investicijskih storitvah, so bile uvedene med zadnjim mandatom Komisije zaradi odstranitve ovir za čezmejno trgovino z vrednostnimi papirji in pospešitve konkurence med investicijskimi podjetji. Politika konkurence je pomembno dopolnilo tega procesa liberalizacije. Poleg tega maloprodajne finančne storitve pomembno vplivajo na vsakdanje življenje državljanov Evropske unije. Te storitve je treba ponujati v konkurenčnih pogojih, kar pomeni večjo izbiro, boljšo kakovost ter najboljšo možno ceno proizvodov in storitev za potrošnika.	A number of other sectors that are important for the global competitiveness of Europe's economy feature considerable self-regulation or a mix of self-regulation and regulation by the State. This is the case in particular of financial services. Creating an efficient and liquid capital market is one of the key objectives of the Financial Services Action Plan. A number of internal market policy initiatives, culminating in the new Investment Services Directive, were launched during the last Commission’s term of office to remove barriers to cross-border securities trading and facilitate competition between investment firms. Competition policy constitutes an important complement to this liberalisation process. In addition, retail financial services play a major role in the everyday life of European Union citizens. These services must be provided under competitive conditions, which mean that the individual consumer has a larger choice of products and services of a higher quality at the best possible price.
Polje 1: Glavni ekonomist za konkurenco pri GD za konkurenco leta 2004 Skupina glavnega ekonomista (CET) je posebna enota, ki neposredno poroča generalnemu direktorju. V skupini je 10 članov, ki so vsi doktorji znanosti na področju ekonomike podjetij. Naloge in vloga CET so naslednje: smernice o metodoloških vprašanjih ekonomije in ekonometrije pri uporabi pravil konkurence EU; splošne smernice v posameznih primerih konkurence od njihovih zgodnjih stopenj; podrobne smernice v najpomembnejših primerih konkurence, ki vključujejo zapletena gospodarska vprašanja, zlasti tista, ki zahtevajo visoko razvito kvantitativno analizo; to pa lahko vključuje dodelitev člana CET skupini, ki se ukvarja s primerom; prispevek k razvoju splošnih instrumentov politike z ekonomsko vsebino. Prispevek k primerom in smernicam Leta 2004 je bil CET vključen v skupno 33 primerov (11 združitev, 15 primerov monopolov in 7 primerov državne pomoči). Poleg tega je CET pomembno prispeval k smernicam in vprašanjem splošne politike. Primeri so izbrani v soglasju z generalnim direktorjem na podlagi potrebe po naprednejši ekonomski analizi, zlasti kvantitativni analizi. V takih primerih je član CET dodeljen skupini, ki se ukvarja s primerom in ki ima dostop do vseh informacij ter sodeluje na vseh sestankih z zunanjimi strokovnjaki in strankami. V skupini, ki se ukvarja s primerom, imajo člani, ki jih imenuje CET, poseben in neodvisen status ter o svojih ravnanjih neposredno poročajo glavnemu ekonomistu za konkurenco. Glede na pomembnost oblikovanja ekonomske analize primera si CET prizadeva za čimprejšnjo vključenost. Skupina glavnega ekonomista se udeležuje tudi ustnih zaslišanj in sodeluje v razpravah odbora za notranji pregled. Glavni ekonomist za konkurenco se udeležuje tedenskih sestankov s komisarjem. Poleg tega pripravi pisni nasvet v vseh primerih, pri katerih je sodeloval. Prispevek k razvoju strokovnega znanja in izkušenj na področju ekonomije v generalnem direktoratu Glavni ekonomist za konkurenco z organizacijo usposabljanj, seminarjev in razprav prispeva k splošni razpravi o gospodarskih vprašanjih v celotnem GD za konkurenco. Poleg tega vzdržuje in krepi povezave z akademskim svetom. Prestrukturiral je ekonomskosvetovalno skupino za politiko konkurence (ESSPK). ESSPK je skupina vodilnih akademikov, ki deluje na področju ekonomike podjetij. Pomembna naloga ESSPK je zagotoviti neodvisno mnenje o širših političnih vprašanjih. ESSPK je organiziran v tri podskupine: združitve, boj proti monopolom in državne pomoči. \|	Box 1: The Chief Competition Economist at DG Competition in 2004 The Chief Economist Team (CET) is a separate unit directly reporting to the Director-General. It has 10 members, all of whom have a PhD in industrial economics. The tasks and role of the CET can be described as follows: guidance on methodological issues of economics and econometrics in the application of EU competition rules general guidance in individual competition cases from their early stages detailed guidance in the most important competition cases involving complex economic issues, in particular those requiring sophisticated quantitative analysis; this could include the secondment of a member of the CET to work in the case team contribution to the development of general policy instruments with an economic content. Contribution to cases and guidelines In 2004, the CET was involved in a total of 33 cases (11 mergers, 15 antitrust, and 7 state aid cases). In addition, the CET has made significant contributions to guidelines and general policy issues. Cases are selected in agreement with the Director-General on the basis of the need for more sophisticated economic analysis, in particular quantitative analysis. In such cases, a member of the CET is placed on the case team, having access to all information and participating in all meetings with out side experts and parties. Within the case team the members seconded from the CET have specific and independent status and report directly to the Chief Competition Economist on the line they take. Given the importance of shaping the economic analysis of a case, the CET tends to become involved as early as possible. The CET also attends the oral hearing and participates in the internal review panel debates. The Chief Competition Economist attends the weekly meeting with the Commissioner. In addition, he provides written advice in all cases where he has been involved. Contribution to the development of economic expertise in the DG The Chief Competition Economist contributes to the overall debate on economic issues throughout DG Competition organising training, seminars and discussions. In addition, he maintains and strengthens links with the academic world. He has restructured the Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy (EAGCP). The EAGCP is a group of leading academics working in the area of industrial economics. An important function of the EAGCP is to provide an independent opinion on broad policy issues. The EAGCP is organised in three subgroups: mergers, antitrust and state aid. \|
- Sporočilo pooblaščenca za zaslišanje	- Message from the Hearing Officer
Komisija je oblikovala funkcijo pooblaščenca za zaslišanje, da bi zaupala vodenje upravnih postopkov v primerih boja proti monopolom in primerih združitve neodvisni osebi, ki ima izkušnje v zadevah konkurence in integriteto, ki je nujna za objektivnost, preglednost in učinkovitost teh postopkov. Mandat pooblaščenca za zaslišanje določa številne mehanizme, prek katerih se bo ta funkcija izvajala. To med drugim vključuje obveznost pripraviti končno poročilo o vsakem osnutku odločbe, ki se predloži kolegiju komisarjev in ki navaja, ali se je upoštevala pravica do zaslišanja. Zaradi tega v vseh primerih, v katerih je formalni postopek sprožen in končan na ta način, formalno sodelujeta dva pooblaščenca za zaslišanje. Od maja 2004 je to vključevalo tako imenovane „odločbe o zavezah“ v skladu s členom 9 Uredbe št. 1/2003, od katerih je bila prva zadeva Nemška nogometna zveza ( DFB) , o kateri se je odločalo januarja 2005. Izjemoma se je na pooblaščence za zaslišanje mogoče obrniti tudi, preden je sprožen formalni postopek, na primer, kadar se pojavijo vprašanja zaupnosti o informacijah, ki jih je treba vključiti v obvestilo o nasprotovanju, ali v zvezi z objavljeno različico odločbe. Če povzamemo, so tako pooblaščenci za zaslišanje v letu 2004 formalno sodelovali v okoli 40 primerih. Nekateri ključni elementi teh izkušenj so navedeni spodaj.	The Commission created the post of Hearing Officer in order to entrust the conduct of administrative proceedings in antitrust and merger cases to an independent person experienced in competition matters with the integrity necessary to contribute to objectivity, transparency and efficiency of those proceedings. The Hearing Officers’ mandate sets out a number of mechanisms by which this function is to be performed. This includes, inter alia , the obligation to produce a final report on every draft decision submitted to the college of Commissioners stating whether the right to be heard has been respected. As a result, the two Hearing Officers are formally involved in all cases where a formal procedure is initiated and terminated in this manner. Since May 2004, this has included so-called “commitment decisions” under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, the first of which was the DFB case decided in January 2005. Exceptionally, the Hearing Officers may also be approached before a formal procedure is initiated, for example where confidentiality issues arise in relation to information to be included in a statement of objections, or in relation to the published version of a decision. Taken together, the Hearing Officers were thus formally involved in some 40 cases in the course of 2004. Some key elements of these experiences are set out below.
Zagotavljanje pravice do zaslišanja z dodelitvijo ustreznega dostopa do spisa	Ensuring the right to be heard through granting appropriate access to the file
Ob upoštevanju zakonitih interesov posredovalcev podatkov pri varovanju zaupnih informacij, javnega interesa pri izpolnjevanju pravil konkurence ter pravice do obrambe naslovnikov obvestila o nasprotovanju so pooblaščenci za zaslišanje sprejeli številne odločitve, s katerimi so strankam odobrili ali zavrnili dostop do dokumentov v sodnem spisu.	Taking account of the information providers’ legitimate interest in the protection of confidential information, the public interest in the competition rules being respected and the rights of defence of the addressees of a statement of objections, the Hearing Officers have taken a number of decisions by which they have granted or refused parties access to documents in the case file.
Med takimi odločitvami iz leta 2004 so se obravnavale tudi pravice strank do dostopa, ki so prejele tako imenovano „pismo dejstev“, s katerim so bile obveščene o dodatnih informacijah, ki jih je treba upoštevati pri dokončni odločbi. Odločitvi v zadevah Microsoft in Clearstream sta primera, ko je bil strankam v takih okoliščinah odobren dostop do dodatnih informacij.	Amongst such decisions in 2004 consideration was given to the access rights of parties receiving a so-called “letter of facts” by which they were informed of additional information to be taken into account in the final decision. The Microsoft and Clearstream decisions are examples of cases where, in such circumstances, the parties were granted access to further information.
Zagotavljanje zaščite poslovnih skrivnosti podjetij in zakonitih interesov podjetij po zaupnosti	Ensuring protection of the undertakings’ business secrets and legitimate interest in confidentiality
V primeru nesporazuma med pristojno službo Komisije in zadevnimi strankami morajo o varstvu poslovnih skrivnosti in zakonitih interesov podjetij po zaupnosti odločati pooblaščenci za zaslišanje. Ta interes mora biti uravnotežen z interesi strank pri razkritju ali, kadar vprašanje zadeva objavo odločitve, z javnim interesom pri obveščanju pravne in poslovne skupnosti o rezultatu postopka.	In case of disagreement between the relevant Commission department and the parties concerned, decisions on the protection of the companies’ business secrets and legitimate interest in confidentiality fall to the Hearing Officers to decide. This interest has to be balanced against the parties’ interests in disclosure or, where the issue concerns the publication of a decision, against the public interest in informing the legal and business community of the outcome of the proceedings.
V primeru Združenja belgijskih arhitektov ( Belgian Architects Association) so pooblaščenci za zaslišanje zaradi nevarnosti povračilnih ukrepov zavrnili dostop do dokumenta v spisu, ki bi strankam omogočil identifikacijo informanta.	In the Belgian Architects Association case, the danger of retaliation led the Hearing Officers to refuse access to a document in the file which would have allowed the parties to identify the informant.
Leta 2004 je bila večina odločitev pooblaščencev za zaslišanje o razkritju potencialno zaupnih informacij povezana z zakonitostjo objav dokončnih odločb Komisije. Te odločitve so pomagale oblikovati številna načela, ki se bodo uporabljala v prihodnjih primerih.	In 2004, most decisions of the Hearing Officers on the disclosure of potentially confidential information concerned the lawfulness of publication of the Commission’s final decisions. These decisions helped to establish a number of principles which will be applied in future cases
Prvič, v skladu s sodno prakso mora vsaka zahteva po zaupnosti utemeljiti, zakaj bi objava domnevno zaupnih informacij lahko resno škodila podjetju[1]. Drugič, nevarnost zasebnega spora, ki bi ga povzročila objava informacij, sama po sebi ni utemeljena obramba. Odškodnine, utemeljene na podlagi kršitve konkurenčnega prava, bi pomenile upravičeno in zaželeno posledico tega protikonkurenčnega vedenja[2]. Tretjič, pooblaščenec za zaslišanje ni dolžan odločati, ali je objava delov dokončne odločbe, da bi tako zagotovili njihovo ustrezno razumevanje, neizogibna. Pomembnost posameznega podatka za celotno razumevanje odločbe se bo preučila samo, če bo zadevni del besedila zaupna informacija.	Firstly, in accordance with the case law, any request for confidentiality is required to substantiate why the disclosure of the supposedly confidential information could seriously harm the company[1]. Secondly, the risk of private litigation induced by the publication of information is not in itself a valid defence. Damages warranted further to a breach of competition law would constitute the rightful and desirable consequences of this anticompetitive behaviour[2]. Thirdly, it is not for the Hearing Officers to decide whether it is indispensable to publish parts of the final decisions to ensure their proper understanding. The relevance of a piece of information for the comprehensive understanding of the decision will only be examined if the passage in question constitutes confidential information.
Poleg tega je bil med letom 2004 uveden postopek, ki ga je treba uporabiti pred sprejetjem pravno zavezujočih odločb o razkritju zaupnih informacij, da bi se tako izognili pravnim sporom, kadar je le mogoče. Pooblaščenci za zaslišanje lahko najprej predlagajo predhodno mnenje. Samo če se ta predlog izpodbija v danem časovnem obdobju, bodo pooblaščenci za zaslišanje prešli na zavezujočo odločbo, ki se lahko izpodbija pred Sodiščem prve stopnje. V mnogo primerih je ta nova praksa pomagala pri izogibanju tako imenovanim „postopkom Akzo“. Pri teh postopkih pooblaščenci za zaslišanje v imenu Komisije sprejmejo formalno in zavezujočo odločbo o razkritju potencialno zaupnih informacij, odločbo, ki jo pregleda Sodišče prve stopnje.	In addition, in the course of 2004 a procedure to be applied before taking legally binding decisions on the disclosure of confidential information was introduced with a view to avoiding legal disputes wherever possible. The Hearing Officers may in the first place propose a preliminary view. Only if this proposal is contested within a given time period will the Hearing Officers proceed to a binding decision which can be challenged before the Court of First Instance. In many cases, this new practice has helped to avoid so-called “Akzo procedures”. In the course of the latter, the Hearing Officers take a formal and binding decision on behalf of the Commission to disclose potentially confidential information, decision which is subject to review by the Court of First Instance.
Organizacija in vodenje ustnih zaslišanj	Organisation and conduct of oral hearings
Ustna zaslišanja dajejo strankam priložnost, da dopolnijo svoj pisni odgovor na pomisleke Komisije o konkurenci, tako da ustno pred širšim občinstvom predstavijo najpomembnejša vprašanja, imajo možnost odgovarjati na vprašanja ter sodelovati v neposredni razpravi s pristojnimi službami Komisije in predstavniki držav članic. To je lahko tudi edinstvena priložnost za tožnika ali druge tretje stranke, ki sodelujejo v postopku, da poslušajo in neposredno komentirajo obravnavane točke. To se je dejansko zgodilo v primeru družbe Microsoft , kjer so se po petih letih preiskave in pisnega postopka, vključno s tremi obvestili o nasprotovanju, pisnimi odgovori in pisnimi izjavami številnih tretjih strank, predstavniki vseh vpletenih strank prvič sestali in tri dni predstavljali svoja stališča ter komentirali stališča drugih v korist vseh vpletenih.	Oral hearings provide the parties with the opportunity to supplement their written reply to the Commission’s competition concerns by presenting the main issues orally before a wide audience with the opportunity to respond to questions and engage in direct discussion with relevant Commission departments and representatives from the Member States. It may also be a unique occasion for the complainants or other third parties involved in the procedure to listen to and comment directly on the points addressed. This was indeed the situation in the Microsoft case where, after five years’ investigation and written procedure including three statements of objections, written responses and written observations from numerous third parties, representatives of all parties involved sat together for the first time and for three days presented their own views and commented on others for the benefit of all concerned.
Izkušnje pooblaščencev za zaslišanje so takšne, da predstavitve na ustnih zaslišanjih skupaj s postavljenimi vprašanji vedno vodijo do boljšega razumevanja vključenih vprašanj. Zato je naloga pooblaščencev za zaslišanje, da organizirajo in vodijo ustna zaslišanja v postopkih boja proti monopolom in postopkih združitev, pomembna glede na njihovo pomembnost v celotnem postopku. Organizacija ustnih zaslišanj je izvedena v tesnem sodelovanju z zadevnimi strankami. K sodelovanju so vabljeni organi za konkurenco držav članic in vse povezane službe Komisije. Pooblaščenci za zaslišanje so postavili zahtevo, da se mora direktor, odgovoren za preiskavo primera, udeležiti ustnih zaslišanj, kar je potrdil tudi komisar.	It is the Hearing Officers’ experience that the presentations made in the oral hearing together with the questions raised invariably leads to a better understanding of the issues involved. Therefore, the Hearing Officers’ task of organising and conducting oral hearings in antitrust and merger proceedings is significant in view of their importance in the context of the overall procedure. The organisation itself is carried out in close contact with the parties concerned. In terms of participation, the competition authorities of the Member States and all associated Commission departments are invited. The Hearing Officers established a requirement that the director responsible for investigating the case should attend the oral hearing, a point that was confirmed by the Commissioner.
Med zaslišanjem lahko pooblaščenec za zaslišanje, na zahtevo pristojnih služb Komisije, strank ali zadevnih tretjih strank, dovoli predložitev novih dokumentov. Nova zakonodaja, uvedena v letu 2004 na področju primerov združitev in boja proti monopolom, izrecno predvideva vprašanja, ki jih morajo po pooblastilu pooblaščencev za zaslišanje postaviti vse zadevne stranke. Čeprav se ta nova praksa še vedno preizkuša, je zagotovila dodatno medsebojno delovanje.	During the hearing new documents may be admitted by the Hearing Officers, at the request of the relevant Commission department, the parties or third parties concerned. The new legislation introduced in the course of 2004 in both merger and antitrust cases explicitly provides for questions to be asked by all parties concerned under the authority of the Hearing Officers. Although it continues to be used on an experimental basis, this new practice has provided for additional interaction.
V nekaterih primerih, kot je zadeva Holin klorid , so se pooblaščenci za zaslišanje strinjali, da se pri ustnem zaslišanju v postopek vključijo novi dokazi. Kot kažejo končna poročila, objavljena leta 2004, se je po nekaterih ustnih zaslišanjih, kot je primer združitve družb Sony/BMG , spremenil pristop do primerov.	In some instances, such as the Choline chloride case, the Hearing Officers accepted that fresh evidence could be admitted to the procedure at the oral hearing. As the final reports published in 2004 illustrate, subsequent to some oral hearings, such as in the Sony/BMG merger case, changes in the approach to cases have taken place.
Poleg tega ustna zaslišanja pooblaščence za zaslišanje ozaveščajo o kritičnih vidikih primera in jim omogočajo dejavnejše sodelovanje v poznejših stopnjah postopka, po možnosti z dajanjem pripomb o nadaljnjem poteku postopka v skladu z njihovim mandatom.	In addition, oral hearings raise the Hearing Officers’ awareness of the critical aspects of a case and allow them to become more actively engaged in the subsequent stages of the procedure, potentially by making observations on the further progress of the proceeding in accordance with their Mandate.
Delovanje kot svetovalec komisarja za politiko konkurence	Acting as advisor to the Commissioner for competition policy
Glavna dolžnost pooblaščencev za zaslišanje je zagotoviti spoštovanje pravic strank do obrambe in predpisan postopek za vse zadevne stranke. Vendar pa lahko pooblaščenci za zaslišanje v okviru svojega vmesnega poročila oziroma, splošneje, poročanja komisarju, s posebnim poudarkom na vsebini zaslišanja, uporabijo svojo zmožnost in komisarja opozorijo na vsebinsko vprašanje, ki ga je sprožil primer, kadar menijo, da bi to povečalo kakovost dokončne odločbe. Leta 2004 so si pooblaščenci za zaslišanje prizadevali jasneje pripraviti dokončne odločbe. V številnih primerih so izrazili svoja stališča, zlasti v primerih kartelov, kar je pomagalo izboljšati postopek odločanja in končno tudi kakovost dokončnih odločb.	The Hearing Officers’ primary duty is to ensure that the parties’ rights of defence are respected and that due process is achieved for all parties concerned. However, in the framework of their interim report, or more generally when they report to the Commissioner, with special reference to the content of the hearing, the Hearing Officers may make use of their ability to alert the Commissioner on a substantive issue raised by the case where they consider this would enhance the quality of the final decision. In 2004, the Hearing Officers worked towards clearer drafting of final decisions. They made observations in a number of cases, and notably cartel cases, which helped improve the decision-making process and ultimately the quality of the final decisions.
Pooblaščenci za zaslišanje so z GD za konkurenco razpravljali tudi o številnih političnih vprašanjih. Takšne razprave so med drugim vključevale revizijo obvestila Komisije o dostopu do spisov, prilagajanje pravil o izjavah v okviru programa Komisije o prizanesljivosti k pravilom tujih jurisdikcij o razkritju, ob upoštevanju pravice dostopa do spisa, ter vlogo pooblaščencev za zaslišanje kot potencialnih posrednikov v sporih med GD za konkurenco in podjetji o tem, ali dokument pokrivajo posebne zakonske pravice.	The Hearing Officers also discussed a number of policy issues with the Directorate-General for Competition. Such discussions included, inter alia , the revision of the Commission’s notice on access to the file, adapting the rules on statements under the Commission’s leniency programme to the discovery rules of foreign jurisdictions whilst respecting the right to access to the file, and the Hearing Officers’ role as potential mediators in disputes between DG Competition and companies over whether a document is covered by legal privilege.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES	I – Antitrust – Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC
A – Zakonodajna in razlagalna pravila	A - Legislative and interpretative rules
1. POSODOBITEV PROTIMONOPOLNE ZAKONODAJE: IZVEDBENA UREDBA šT. 773/2004, SMERNICE IN OBVESTILA	1. ANTITRUST MODERNISATION: IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 773/2004, GUIDELINES AND NOTICES
1. Prvega maja je začel veljati nov sistem uveljavljanja za člena 81 in 82 Pogodbe, Uredba št. 17/62 pa je bila razveljavljena. Da bi Komisija dopolnila Uredbo št. 1/2003[3], je po obsežnih posvetovanjih sprejela „posodobitveni sveženj“, sestavljen iz nove uredbe Komisije o podrobnostih postopkov boja proti monopolom ter šestih novih obvestil Komisije, ki naj bi zagotavljala smernice o vrsti vidikov, ki so v novem sistemu uveljavljanja posebej pomembni. Ta sveženj sestavljajo naslednji elementi:	1. On 1 May, the new enforcement system for Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty entered into force and Regulation 17/62 was repealed. In order to complement Regulation 1/2003[3] and following extensive consultations, the Commission adopted the “Modernisation Package” consisting of a new Commission Regulation on details of its antitrust procedures as well as six new Commission notices aimed at providing guidance on a range of aspects that are of particular significance under the new enforcement system. This package consists of the following elements:
Izvedbena uredba[4]	Implementing Regulation[4]
2. Izvedbena uredba vsebuje podrobna pravila zlasti o sprožitvi postopkov, ustnih izjavah, pritožbah, zaslišanjih strank, dostopu do spisa in ravnanju z zaupnimi informacijami v postopkih boja proti monopolom, ki jih vodi Komisija.	2. The Implementing Regulation contains detailed rules regarding, in particular, the initiation of proceedings, oral statements, complaints, hearings of parties, access to the file and the handling of confidential information in antitrust procedures conducted by the Commission.
Obvestilo o mreži za konkurenco[5]	Network notice[5]
3. To obvestilo postavlja glavne stebre sodelovanja med Komisijo in organi za konkurenco držav članic znotraj Evropske mreže za konkurenco (ECN). Obvestilo določa načela delitve dela v zvezi s primerom med člani mreže. V tem pogledu obvestilo sledi skupni izjavi Sveta in Komisije[6], izdani na dan sprejetja Uredbe št. 1/2003. Ugotovljeni so bili posebni načini povezave med izmenjavo informacij med organi na podlagi členov 11(2) in (3) ter 12 Uredbe št. 1/2003 ter delovanjem programov o prizanesljivosti. Nacionalni organi držav članic[7] so podpisali izjavo o upoštevanju načel, določenih v obvestilu Komisije.	3. This notice establishes the main pillars of cooperation between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States within the European Competition Network (ECN). The notice sets out the principles for sharing case work between the members of the network. In this respect the notice follows the joint statement of the Council and the Commission[6] which was issued on the day when Regulation 1/2003 was adopted. Particular arrangements have been found for the interface between exchanges of information between authorities pursuant to Article 11(2) and (3) and Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 and the operation of leniency programmes. National authorities of the Member States[7] have signed a statement in which they declare that they will abide by the principles set out in the Commission notice.
Obvestilo o sodelovanju z nacionalnimi sodišči[8]	Notice on cooperation with national courts[8]
4. Obvestilo naj bi se uporabljalo kot praktično orodje za nacionalne sodnike, ki uporabljajo člena 81 in 82 v skladu z Uredbo št. 1/2003. Obvestilo združuje ustrezno sodno prakso Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti ter s tem pojasni postopkovni okvir, v katerem delujejo nacionalni sodniki. Posebna pozornost je namenjena položaju, v katerem nacionalno sodišče obravnava primer vzporedno s Komisijo ali potem ko ga obravnava Komisija. Poleg tega Uredba št. 1/2003 vzpostavlja trdno pravno podlago za nacionalne sodnike, da zaprosijo Komisijo za mnenje ali informacije, s katerimi razpolaga, in Komisiji zagotavlja možnost, da nacionalnim sodiščem pod posebnimi pogoji predloži pisna ali ustna stališča. Obvestilo pojasnjuje delovanje teh mehanizmov sodelovanja.	4. The notice is intended to serve as a practical tool for national judges who apply Articles 81 and 82 in conformity with Regulation 1/2003. It assembles the relevant case law of the Court of Justice, thus clarifying the procedural context in which national judges are operating. Particular attention is given to the situation in which the national court deals with a case in parallel with or subsequent to the Commission. Furthermore, Regulation 1/2003 establishes an express legal basis for international judges to ask the Commission for an opinion or for information it holds, and provides for the possibility for the Commission, under certain conditions, to submit written and oral observations to the national courts. The notice explains the functioning of those cooperation mechanisms.
Obvestilo o pritožbah[9]	Notice on complaints[9]
5. To obvestilo se začenja s splošnimi informacijami o različnih vlogah organov za konkurenco in sodišč ter potencialnim tožnikom omogoča, da ozaveščeni izberejo, ali bodo z vidika danih smernic pristopili h Komisiji, nacionalnemu organu za konkurenco ali nacionalnemu sodišču. Največji del obvestila vsebuje razlage o Komisijini oceni pritožb na področju protimonopolne zakonodaje in veljavnih postopkov. Obvestilo zajema tudi okvirni rok štirih mesecev, v katerem naj bi si Komisija prizadevala tožnike obvestiti o svoji nameri o izvajanju oziroma neizvajanju celotne preiskave zaradi pritožbe.	5. This notice starts by giving general information on the different roles of competition authorities and courts and invites potential complainants to make an informed choice about whether to approach the Commission, a national competition authority or a national court in the light of the guidance given. The largest part of the notice contains explanations on the Commission’s assessment of complaints in the antitrust field and the procedures applicable. The notice also includes an indicative deadline of four months, within which the Commission endeavours to inform complainants whether or not it intends to conduct a full investigation on a complaint.
Obvestilo o usmerjevalnih pismih[10]	Notice on guidance letters[10]
6. Cilj Uredbe št. 1/2003 je, da Komisija preusmeri svoje ukrepe izvrševanja na ugotavljanje resnih kršitev. Odprava sistema priglasitve je tukaj ključni element. Vendar se zdi smiselno tudi, da lahko Komisija v omejenem številu primerov, ko se pojavi popolnoma novo vprašanje o členih 81 ali 82, ob upoštevanju svojih drugih prednostnih nalog izvrševanja, družbam zagotovi pisne smernice (usmerjevalno pismo). Obvestilo zagotavlja podrobnosti o tem instrumentu.	6. Regulation 1/2003 pursues the objective that the Commission should refocus its enforcement action on the detection of serious infringements. The abolition of the notification system is a crucial element in this context. However, it also seems reasonable that in a limited number of cases, where a genuinely novel question concerning Article 81 or 82 arises, the Commission may, subject to its other enforcement priorities, provide guidance to undertakings in writing (guidance letter). The notice provides details about this instrument.
Obvestilo o učinku na trgovino[11]	Notice on effect on trade[11]
7. Pojem učinka na trgovino je merilo pristojnosti, ki določa obseg členov 81 in 82. Prav tako določa področje uporabe člena 3 Uredbe št. 1/2003. Ob upoštevanju navedenega so države članice izrazile močno željo po pojasnjevalnem obvestilu tega pojma. Obvestilo opisuje sedanjo sodno prakso in nikakor ne skuša omejiti obsega pristojnosti členov 81 in 82. Obvestilo določa tudi kvantitativni prag, ki ga bo Komisija v svojih postopkih obravnavala kot ovrgljivo domnevo, če skupni letni promet zadevnih podjetij v Skupnosti s proizvodi, ki jih vključuje sporazum, ne presega 40 milijonov EUR in (skupni) tržni delež strank na katerem koli upoštevnem trgu v Skupnosti, ki ga vključuje sporazum, ne presega petih odstotkov.	7. The effect on trade concept is a jurisdictional criterion, which determines the reach of Article 81 and 82. It also determines the scope of application of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. Against this background, Member States expressed a strong desire for an interpretative notice on this concept. The notice describes the current case law and does not in any way seek to limit the jurisdictional reach of Articles 81 and 82. It also sets out a quantitative threshold which the Commission, in its own proceedings, will consider to be a rebuttable presumption when the aggregate annual Community turnover of the undertakings concerned in the products covered by the agreement does not exceed EUR 40 million and the (aggregate) market share of the parties on any relevant market within the Community affected by the agreement does not exceed 5%.
Smernice o členu 81(3)[12]	Guidelines on Article 81(3)[12]
8. Pooblastilo sodišč in organov za konkurenco držav članic za uporabo člena 81(3) je eden glavnih stebrov posodobitvene reforme. Obvestilo oblikuje okvir za uporabo člena 81(3) in zagotavlja smernice o uporabi vsakega od štirih kumulativnih pogojev iz te pogodbene določbe. Obvestilo navaja različne vrste učinkovitosti, ki bi lahko pomenile objektivne gospodarske koristi v smislu prvega pogoja. Prav tako obvestilo pojasnjuje pojem potrošnikov in zahtevo, da morajo prejeti pravični delež izboljšanja učinkovitosti, ki izhaja iz sporazuma. Protikonkurenčni vidiki sporazuma se analizirajo po členu 81(1), elementi za konkurenco pa so analizirani in uravnoteženi s protikonkurenčnimi elementi iz člena 81(3).	8. The power for the courts and competition authorities of the Member States to apply Article 81(3) is one of the main pillars of the modernisation reform. The notice develops a framework for the application of Article 81(3) and provides guidance on the application of each of the four cumulative conditions contained in this Treaty provision. The notice lists various types of efficiencies that may constitute objective economic benefits within the meaning of the first condition. It also explains the notion of consumers and the requirement that they must receive a fair share of the efficiency gains resulting from the agreement. The anticompetitive aspects of the agreement are analysed under Article 81(1) and the procompetitive elements are analysed and balanced against the anticompetitive elements under Article 81(3).
2. Uredba in smernice o skupinskih izjemah za prenos tehnologije	2. Technology transfer block exemption Regulation and guidelines
9. Komisija je 7. aprila kot del temeljne reforme uveljavljanja protimonopolnih pravil EU sprejela nova pravila v obliki nove uredbe Komisije o skupinskih izjemah, Uredba (ES) št. 772/2004 (TTBER)[13], ter sklop smernic[14] o licenciranju patentov, znanja in avtorskih pravic programske opreme. Sporazumi o licenciranju od 1. maja 2004 uživajo ugodnosti boljšega varnega pristana, ki mnogo sporazumov rešuje pred individualnim nadzorom. Nova pravila spodbujajo licenciranje in zmanjšujejo regulativno obremenitev za podjetja, medtem ko zagotavljajo učinkovit nadzor licenciranja med podjetji s precejšnjo stopnjo tržne moči. Nova pravila bi morala prispevati k razširjanju tehnologije v EU in s tem k lizbonskim ciljem.	9. As part of the fundamental reform of EU antitrust enforcement rules, the Commission adopted on 7 April new rules in the form of a new Commission block exemption regulation, Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 (the TTBER)[13], and a set of guidelines[14] concerning the licensing of patents, know-how and software copyright. As of 1 May 2004 licensing agreements benefit from an improved safe harbour, saving many agreements from individual scrutiny. The new rules facilitate licensing and reduce the regulatory burden for companies, while ensuring effective control of licensing between companies holding a significant degree of market power. The new rules should contribute to the dissemination of technology within the EU and thereby contribute to the Lisbon objectives.
10. Nova pravila so imela koristi od obsežnih posvetovanj[15], za katera so interesne skupine pokazale goreč interes ter zagotovile podroben in visokokakovosten prispevek. Ta pravila nadomeščajo Uredbo št. 240/96[16], ki so jo kritizirali zaradi njenega omejenega obsega in formalistične narave. Nova pravila so dobro usklajena z novo generacijo uredb Komisije o skupinskih izjemah in imajo naslednje splošne značilnosti:	10. The new rules benefited from an extensive consultation exercise[15] in which stakeholders showed keen interest and submitted detailed and high quality input. They replace Regulation 240/96[16], which has been criticised for its narrow scope and its formalistic character. The new rules are firmly aligned on the Commission’s new generation of block exemption regulations and have the following general characteristics:
- TTBER vsebuje samo črn seznam[17]: kar ni izrecno izključeno iz skupinske izjeme, je sedaj izvzeto. Zaradi tega so podjetja svobodnejša, ko v skladu s svojimi tržnimi potrebami oblikujejo svoje licenčne sporazume.	- The TTBER contains only a black list[17]: anything that is not explicitly excluded from the block exemption is now exempted. This leaves companies more freedom to devise their licensing agreements according to their commercial needs.
- Obseg novih pravil zajema vse vrste sporazumov o prenosu tehnologije za proizvodnjo blaga in storitev: ne samo licenciranja patentov ter znanja in izkušenj, ampak tudi modelov in avtorskih pravic programske opreme. Kjer Komisija nima pooblastil za sprejetje uredbe o skupinskih izjemah[18], kot pri patentnih združenjih in licenciranju avtorskih pravic na splošno, dajejo smernice jasna navodila o prihodnji politiki izvrševanja.	- The scope of the new rules covers all types of technology transfer agreements for the production of goods or services: not only patent and know-how licensing, but also designs and software copyright licensing. Where the Commission does not have the powers to adopt a block exemption regulation[18], as in the case of patent pools and copyright licensing in general, the guidelines give clear guidance as to future enforcement policy;
- Nova pravila jasno ločijo licenciranje med tekmeci (ki bi lahko bolj škodovalo konkurenci) od licenciranja med podjetji, ki med seboj ne tekmujejo. Predvsem se razlikujejo veljavni seznami nedopustnih omejitev.	- The new rules clearly distinguish licensing between competitors (which is more likely to harm competition) from licensing between non-competitors. In particular, the applicable hardcore lists differ;
- TTBER zagotavlja varni pristan samo pod določenimi pragi tržnega deleža, in sicer 20 % kumulativnega praga za licenčne sporazume med tekmeci in 30 % posameznega praga za sporazume med podjetji, ki med seboj ne tekmujejo. Tržne deleže je treba izračunati za ustrezen(-ne) prizadet(-e) proizvodni(-ne) trg(-e) in tudi za tehnološki trg[19].	- The TTBER provides the safe harbour only below certain market share thresholds, namely a cumulative 20% for licensing agreements between competitors and 30% each for agreements between non-competitors. Market shares need to be calculated both for the relevant affected product market(s) and the technology market[19];
- Licenčni sporazum ne more uživati ugodnosti skupinske izjeme, če vsebuje tako imenovano eksplicitno omejitev konkurence.	- A licence agreement cannot benefit from the block exemption if it contains a so-called hardcore restriction of competition;
- Nekatere omejitve so izvzete iz skupinske izjeme, medtem ko lahko ostanek sporazuma še naprej uživa ugodnosti skupinske izjeme[20].	- Some restrictions do not qualify for the block exemption while the remainder of the agreement can continue to benefit from the block exemption[20].
11. Eksplicitni seznam v členu 4 TTBER določa omejitve, zaradi katerih celoten sporazum ne more uživati ugodnosti skupinske izjeme in za katere ni verjetna niti posamezna uporaba člena 81(3)[21].	11. The hardcore list in Article 4 of the TTBER specifies the restraints which mean that the entire agreement cannot benefit from the block exemption and for which individual application of Article 81(3) is also unlikely[21].
12. Za licenciranje med tekmeci so eksplicitne omejitve a) določanje cen, b) omejevanje proizvodnje, c) porazdelitev trgov ali potrošnikov, d) omejevanje pridobitelja licence pri izkoriščanju lastne tehnologije ter e) omejevanje strank pri izvajanju raziskav in razvoja (razen če je to neizogibno, da bi tako preprečili razkritje licenciranega znanja in izkušenj), medtem ko so eksplicitne omejitve za licenciranje med podjetji, ki med seboj ne tekmujejo, a) navpično določanje cen, b) omejevanje pasivnih prodaj pridobitelja licence, c) omejevanje aktivnih in pasivnih prodaj pridobitelja licence znotraj selektivnega sistema dobave. Za licenciranje med tekmeci in podjetji, ki med seboj ne tekmujejo, vsebuje člen 4 posebne izjeme od eksplicitnih seznamov.	12. For licensing between competitors, (a) price fixing, (b) output limitation, (c) allocation of markets or customers, (d) restricting the licensee to exploit his own technology and (e) restricting the parties to carry out R&D (unless indispensable to prevent disclosure of licensed know-how) are hardcore restrictions, while for licensing between non-competitors the hardcore restrictions are (a) vertical price fixing, (b) restriction of the licensee’s passive sales and (c) restriction of the licensee’s active and passive sales inside a selective distribution system. For both licensing between competitors and non-competitors Article 4 contains specific exceptions to the hardcore lists.
13. Smernice jasno določajo, da zunaj varnega pristana skupinske izjeme ni domneve o nezakonitosti, če sporazum ne vsebuje eksplicitne omejitve. Zlasti ni domneve, da velja člen 81(1) samo zaradi prekoračitve pragov tržnega deleža. Zahteva se individualna ocena na podlagi načel, opisanih v smernicah.	13. The guidelines make it clear that there is no presumption of illegality outside the safe harbour of the block exemption provided that the agreement does not contain a hardcore restriction. In particular, there is no presumption that Article 81(1) applies merely because the market share thresholds are exceeded. Individual assessment based on the principles described in the guidelines is required.
14. Komisija je za spodbujanje predvidljivosti, ki presega uporabo TTBER, in za omejitev podrobne analize na primere, ki bi lahko bili resnični pomisleki o konkurenci, znotraj smernic vzpostavila drugi varni pristan. Zavzema stališče, da zunaj področja eksplicitnih omejitev kršitev člena 81 ni verjetna, kadar obstajajo štiri ali več neodvisno nadzorovane tehnologije – poleg tehnologij, ki jih nadzirajo stranke sporazuma –, ki so lahko ob primerljivih stroških za uporabnika zamenljive za licenčno tehnologijo.	14. In order to promote predictability beyond the application of the TTBER and to confine detailed analysis to cases that are likely to present real competition concerns, the Commission has created a second safe harbour within the guidelines. It takes the view that outside the area of hardcore restrictions Article 81 is unlikely to be infringed where there are four or more independently controlled technologies - in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties to the agreement - that may be substitutable for the licensed technology at a comparable cost to the user.
15. Smernice ne dajejo samo splošnega okvira za analizo licenčnih sporazumov, ampak vsebujejo tudi posebne oddelke o uporabi člena 81 za različne vrste licenčnih omejitev, zlasti obveznosti plačevanja nadomestil, izključne licenčne in prodajne omejitve, omejitve proizvodnje, omejitve področja uporabe, omejitve lastne uporabe, spajanje in povezovanje ter obveznosti o nekonkuriranju. Smernice vsebujejo tudi oddelek o ocenjevanju tehnoloških združenj[22].	15. The guidelines not only provide a general framework for analysing licence agreements, but also contain specific sections on the application of Article 81 to various types of licensing restraints, in particular royalty obligations, exclusive licensing and sales restrictions, output restrictions, field of use restrictions, captive use restrictions, tying and bundling and non-compete obligations. They also contain a section on the assessment of technology pools[22].
3. Uredbe o skupinskih izjemah za promet	3. Transport block exemption Regulations
3.1 Pomorski promet	3.1 Maritime transport
Pregled Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 4056/86	Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86
16. Komisija je opazno napredovala pri pregledu Uredbe št. 4056/86, ki je bil uveden marca 2003. Uredba št. 4056/86 uporablja pravila konkurence EU v pomorskem prometu, eno glavnih vprašanj pregleda pa je, ali so pogoji za izjemo od določanja cen in urejanja zmogljivosti z linijskimi ladijskimi konferencami po členu 81(3) Pogodbe še vedno upravičeni.	16. The Commission made considerable progress in its review of Regulation 4056/86, an exercise that was launched in March 2003. Regulation 4056/86 applies the EU competition rules to maritime transport and one of the main issues of the review is whether the conditions for exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty for price fixing and capacity regulation by liner shipping conferences is still justified.
17. Komisija je 28. maja na podlagi temeljitega posvetovalnega postopka (kot odgovor na posvetovalni dokument je prišlo 36 predlogov, potekalo pa je tudi javno zaslišanje) na neformalnem sestanku z organi za konkurenco in promet držav članic razpravljala o dotedanjih rezultatih pregledovanja. Kot rezultat tega je Komisija 13. oktobra sprejela belo knjigo[23], v kateri je sklenila, da ni prepričljivega ekonomskega dokaza, da so domneve, na podlagi katerih je bila skupinska izjema upravičena ob svojem sprejetju leta 1986, v teh tržnih okoliščinah in na podlagi štirih kumulativnih pogojev člena 81(3) Pogodbe še upravičene. Na tej podlagi je Komisija obravnavala predlog o razveljavitvi te skupinske izjeme za konference za linijski promet. Komisija pa je v svoji beli knjigi pustila odprto možnost za alternativo sedanjemu sistemu linijskih konferenc na plovnih poteh v EU in iz nje. Ponudniki storitev linijskega prevoza, ki jih predstavlja Evropsko združenje za linijske zadeve (EZLZ), so že ponudili konkretne zamisli o takem okviru. Vendar je Komisija, preden je izrazila stališče o teh zamislih, zainteresirane tretje stranke povabila, da predložijo svoje pripombe in druge možnosti.	17. On the basis of a thorough consultation process (36 submissions were received in response to a consultation paper and a public hearing was held) the Commission discussed on 28 May in an informal meeting with competition and transport authorities from the Member States the outcome of the review process so far. This resulted in the adoption, on 13 October, of a White Paper[23], in which the Commission concluded that there is no conclusive economic evidence that the assumptions on which the block exemption was justified at the time of its adoption in 1986 are, in the present market circumstances and on the basis of the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, still justified. On that basis, the Commission considered proposing to repeal the present block exemption for liner shipping conferences. In its White Paper the Commission however left the door open to possible alternatives to the present liner conference system on routes to and from the EU. Suppliers of liner shipping services, represented by the European Liners Affairs Association (ELAA), have already put forward concrete ideas about such a framework. However, before adopting its position on those ideas, the Commission has invited interested third parties to submit their comments, as well as to provide alternative options.
Posodobitev Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 823/2000 (konzorciji)	Modernisation of Commission Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 (consortia)
18. Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 823/2000 o uporabi člena 81(3) Pogodbe za nekatere vrste sporazumov, sklepov in usklajenih ravnanj med ladjarskimi družbami za linijske prevoze (konzorciji) zagotavlja skupinsko izjemo za konzorcijske pogodbe v pomorskem prometu. Cilj konzorcijske pogodbe med dvema ali več ladjarskimi podjetji, ki zagotavljajo mednarodne storitve za linijski prevoz, je vzpostaviti sodelovanje pri skupnem izvajanju storitev pomorskega prometa, da bi tako izboljšali produktivnost in kakovost storitev linijskega prevoza ter spodbujali večjo izkoriščenost zabojnikov in učinkovitejšo uporabo zmogljivosti plovil.	18. Commission Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia) provides a block exemption in relation to consortium agreements in maritime transport. The objective of a consortium agreement between two or more vessel operating companies which provide international liner shipping services is to bring about cooperation in the joint operation of a maritime transport service so as to improve the productivity and quality of the liner shipping service, and to encourage greater utilisation of the containers and the more efficient use of vessel capacity.
19. Ker ta uredba preneha veljati 25. aprila 2005, je Komisija junija sprožila javno posvetovanje[24] o različnih političnih možnostih za prihodnjo zakonodajo na tem področju ter zlasti, da bi pridobila stališča panoge, držav članic in drugih zainteresiranih tretjih strank. To posvetovanje je potekalo ob stalnem preverjanju skupinske izjeme za sporazume med linijskimi konferencami iz Uredbe št. 4056/86. Komisija je 23. decembra objavila predhodni predlog uredbe o spremembi Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 823/2000 in zainteresirane stranke pozvala, da predložijo pripombe[25].	19. Given that this Regulation expires on 25 April 2005, the Commission launched a public consultation[24] in June on the various policy options for future legislation in this area and in particular to seek the views of the industry, Member States and other interested third parties. This consultation took place against the background of the ongoing review of block exemption for agreements between liner conferences contained in Regulation 4056/86. On 23 December, the Commission published a preliminary draft Regulation amending Commission Regulation (EC) 823/2000, inviting interested parties to send their comments[25].
3.2 Zračni promet	3.2 Air transport
Razširitev pooblastil za uveljavitev konkurence v mednarodnem letalskem prometu – spremembe uredb št. 3975/87 in 3976/87	Extension of competition enforcement powers in international air transport - Amendments to Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87
20. Svet je 26. februarja sprejel Uredbo (ES) št. 411/2004[26] o spremembi dveh obstoječih uredb v letalskem prometu[27] in Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003. Uredba št. 1/2003 bo tako veljala tudi za letalski promet med Evropsko skupnostjo in tretjimi državami. Poleg tega je bilo razširjeno področje uporabe uredbe Sveta, ki Komisiji omogoča izdajo uredb o skupinskih izjemah za določene navedene dejavnosti letalskega prometa (vpliva tudi na poti z daljšimi razdaljami). Komisija do sprejetja te uredbe na področju letalskega prometa med EU in tretjimi državami ni imela učinkovitih pooblastil za izvrševanje, čeprav so pravila konkurence nedvomno veljala tudi za te poti[28]. Uporaba Uredbe št. 1/2003 za ves letalski promet, ne glede na vključene poti, končno postavlja letalski promet v splošen okvir uveljavljanja protimonopolnih pravil. Uredba št. 411/2004 je začela veljati 1. maja, skupaj s posodobitvenim svežnjem.	20. On 26 February, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 411/2004[26] amending two existing Regulations in the air transport sector[27] and Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. In essence, Regulation 1/2003 will thus apply also to air transport between the European Community and third countries. Furthermore, the scope of the Council Regulation enabling the Commission to issue block exemption Regulations on certain listed air transport activities (affecting also long-haul routes) is broadened. Until the adoption of this Regulation, the Commission lacked effective enforcement powers in this field of air transport between the EU and third countries, although there was no doubt that the competition rules applied also to these routes[28]. The application of Regulation 1/2003 to all air transport, irrespective of the routes involved, finally brings air transport under the general framework of antitrust enforcement. Regulation 411/2004 entered into force on 1 May, together with the modernisation package.
Pregled Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 1617/93	Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93
21. Osrednji element Uredbe Komisije (EGS) št. 1617/93, ki preneha veljati 30. junija 2005, je trenutno veljavna izjema za konference Mednarodnega združenja letalskih prevoznikov (IATA) o tarifah v zvezi s potmi v EU. Letos je Komisija začela s spremembo Uredbe št. 1617/93 ter 30. junija objavila posvetovalni dokument, v katerem je vlade, gospodarsko panogo in potrošnike pozvala, da predložijo pripombe in dokaze o najpomembnejših vprašanjih, povezanih z oceno teh konferenc o tarifah po členu 81(3) ES.	21. The central element of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93, which expires on 30 June 2005, is the exemption currently in place for IATA Tariff Conferences in respect of intra-EU routes. This year, the Commission embarked on the revision of Regulation 1617/93 and published a consultation paper on 30 June inviting comments and evidence from governments, industry and consumers on essential issues relating to the assessment under Article 81(3) EC of these Tariff Conferences.
22. Skupaj je Komisija prejela in analizirala 52 odgovorov. Ta analiza je pokazala potrebo po nadaljnji poglobljeni raziskavi nekaterih vprašanj. Za to je bil pripravljen dokument za razpravo, katerega cilj je, da se zagotovi pregledno odločanje ter javnim organom in panogi omogoči predložitev končnih pripomb.	22. A total of 52 responses were received and analysed by the Commission. That analysis showed a need for further in-depth exploration of certain issues. To that end, a discussion paper was prepared with a view to ensuring transparent decision making and enabling public authorities and the industry to submit a final round of comments.
4. Pregled postopkovnih pravil: novo obvestilo o dostopu do spisa	4. Review of procedural rules: New access to file notice
23. Dostop do spisa je pomemben korak v postopku in pomeni varstvo pravice do obrambe v vseh spornih primerih boja proti primerom monopolov in združitev. Kadar Komisija izda obvestilo o nasprotovanju, naslovnikom teh obvestil o nasprotovanju omogoča seznanitev z dokazi v spisu Komisije, da bi tako učinkovito izrazili svoja stališča o sklepih Komisije v obvestilu o nasprotovanju[29]. Zato da bi Komisija povečala preglednost in jasnost svojega postopka pri obdelavi zahtev za dostop do spisa[30], je začela pregled trenutnega obvestila o dostopu do spisa iz leta 1997[31]. Po izkušnjah, pridobljenih pri uporabi obvestila iz leta 1997, pregled upošteva razvoj prakse Komisije[32] in tudi razvoj najnovejše sodne prakse[33]. Pregled si prizadeva tudi za združljivost pravil dostopa do spisa s posodobljenimi protimonopolnimi pravili in pravili o združitvah ter tudi s trenutnim mandatom pooblaščencev za zaslišanje[34].	23. Access to the file is an important procedural step and safeguard for the rights of defence in all contentious antitrust and merger cases. When the Commission has issued a statement of objection (SO), access to the file enables the addressees to acquaint themselves with the evidence in the Commission’s file with a view to effectively expressing their views on the conclusions reached by the Commission in the SO[29]. In order to enhance transparency and clarity of the Commission’s procedure in processing requests for access to the file[30], the Commission embarked on a revision of the current access to file notice dating from 1997[31]. Following the experience gained in applying the 1997 notice, the revision takes account of developments both in Commission practice[32] and in recent case law[33]. The review also seeks to ensure that the access to file rules are compatible with the modernised antitrust and merger rules, as well as the current Mandate of the Hearing Officers[34].
24. Komisija je po razpravi z državami članicami 21. oktobra objavila osnutek obvestila o pravilih glede dostopa do spisa Komisije v postopkih boja proti monopolom in postopkih združitev[35] ter sprožila javno posvetovanje o osnutku. Kot odgovor na posvetovanje je bilo predloženih 20 prispevkov, zlasti od oseb, ki se ukvarjajo s pravom, pa tudi potrošniških združenj in združenj sindikatov.	24. After discussion with Member States, the Commission published on 21 October a draft notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in antitrust and merger proceedings[35] and launched a public consultation on the draft. Some 20 contributions were submitted in reply to this consultation, mostly by legal practitioners, but also by consumer and trade union associations.
25. Najpomembnejše značilnosti osnutka so:	25. The key features of the draft are:
- razlikovanje med pravico dostopa do spisa (za naslovnike obvestila o nasprotovanju) in dostopa do posebnih dokumentov (za tožnike v postopkih boja proti monopolom in za druge vpletene stranke v postopkih združitev);	- a distinction between the right to access to the file (of addressees of an SO) and the access to certain documents provided for (for complainants in antitrust proceedings and for other involved parties in merger proceedings)
- definicija tega, kar sestavlja „spis Komisije“, ter jasno razlikovanje med dostopnimi in nedostopnimi dokumenti;	- a definition of what constitutes the “Commission file” and a clear distinction between accessible and non-accessible documents
- razlikovanje med postopki boja proti monopolom in postopki združitev glede trenutka odobritve dostopa do spisa;	- a distinction between antitrust and merger proceedings as to the moment when access to the file is granted
- opis postopkov za obravnavo zaupnih informacij in za izvedbo dostopa do spisa, pa tudi postopka za reševanje nesporazumov pri zahtevkih za zaupnost, vključno z vlogo pooblaščenca za zaslišanje.	- a description of procedures for treatment of confidential information and for implementing access to the file, as well as of the procedure for resolution of disagreements on confidentiality claims, including the role of the Hearing Officer.
- B – UPORABA čLENOV 81, 82 IN 86	B – APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 81, 82 AND 86
1. ZLORABA PREVLADUJOčEGA POLOžAJA (čLEN 82 ES)	1. ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITIONS (ARTICLE 82 EC)
1.1 Odločbe	1.1 Decisions
CEWAL	CEWAL
26. Komisija je 30. aprila sprejela odločbo o naložitvi denarne kazni v višini 3,4 milijona EUR belgijski ladjarski družbi Compagnie Maritime Belge („CMB“). Komisija je denarno kazen naložila zaradi vloge, ki jo je družba CMB imela konec 80-ih let pri zlorabi, ki jo je povzročila linijska konferenca Associated Central West Africa Lines (Cewal), katere članica je bila[36].	26. On 30 April, the Commission adopted a decision imposing a fine of EUR 3.4 million on Compagnie Maritime Belge (“CMB”), a Belgian shipping company. The fine was imposed because of CMB’s role in the abusive behaviour committed by the liner conference Associated Central West Africa Lines (Cewal), of which CMB was a member, at the end of the 1980s[36].
27. Prejšnjo odločbo[37], s katero je Komisija že naložila denarno kazen štirim članom linijske konference Cewal, vključno z družbo CMB, je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti (SES) glede denarnih kazni delno razveljavilo[38]. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je menilo, da je Komisija kršila določbe postopka, ker v obvestilu o nasprotovanju, ki je nastalo pred odločbo, ni jasno navedla, da namerava naložiti denarne kazni posameznim članom linijske konference Cewal.	27. A previous decision[37], whereby the Commission had already imposed fines on four Cewal members, including CMB, had been partly annulled by the Court of Justice (ECJ) with respect to the fines[38]. The ECJ considered that the Commission had made a procedural error by failing to indicate clearly in the statement of objections which preceded the decision that it intended to impose fines on the individual members of Cewal.
28. Da kršitve ne bi ostale nekaznovane (pritožbo proti ugotovitvam kršitev sta zavrnili Sodišče prve stopnje in tudi SES), je Komisija po novem postopku v skladu z ugotovitvami SES sprejela novo odločbo o naložitvi denarnih kazni družbi CMB[39]. Ta odločba v celoti temelji na vsebinskih ugotovitvah prvotne odločbe.	28. In order not to let the infringements go unpunished (the appeal against the findings of the infringements had been rejected by both the CFI and the ECJ), the Commission adopted a new decision imposing a fine on CMB following a fresh procedure in line with the ECJ’s findings[39].This decision is entirely based on the substantive findings of the original decision.
29. Izračun denarne kazni temelji na oceni vpliva kaznivega ravnanja družbe CMB v primerjavi z vpletenostjo drugih članov konference Cewal. Naložena je bila nižja denarna kazen od prvotne, saj nekatere oteževalne okoliščine, ki so prevladovale v času prvotne odločbe, niso bile več upoštevane.	29. The calculation of the fine is based on an assessment of the impact of the offending conduct by CMB as compared with the involvement of other members of Cewal. A lower fine than in the original decision was imposed, as certain aggravating circumstances prevailing at the time of that decision were no longer taken into account.
Clearstream [40]	Clearstream [40]
30. Komisija je 2. junija sprejela odločbo, ki ugotavlja, da sta družba Clearstream Banking AG in njena matična družba Clearstream International SA („Clearstream“) kršila člen 82 ES, s tem ko sta za družbo Euroclear Bank SA („Euroclear Bank“) zavrnila opravljanje čezmejnih klirinških storitev in poravnave vrednostnih papirjev[41] ter uporabljala diskriminatorne cene v škodo te stranke.	30. On 2 June, the Commission adopted a decision finding that Clearstream Banking AG and its parent company Clearstream International SA (“Clearstream”) infringed Article 82 EC by refusing to supply cross-border securities clearing and settlement services[41] to Euroclear Bank SA (“Euroclear Bank”) and by applying discriminatory prices to the detriment of this customer.
31. Družba Clearstream Banking AG je edini centralni register vrednostnih papirjev v Nemčiji[42]. Komisija je menila, da je imela med zadevnim referenčnim obdobjem, od leta 1997 do konca leta 2001, družba Clearstream prevladujoč položaj za zagotavljanje čezmejnih klirinških storitev in poravnave posrednikom v drugih državah članicah.	31. Clearstream Banking AG is Germany’s only Wertpapiersammelbank (Central Securities Depository[42]). The Commission considered that during the reference period concerned, 1997 to end 2001, Clearstream held a dominant position for providing cross-border clearing and settlement services to intermediaries situated in other Member States.
32. Zavrnitev opravljanja je zadevala imenske delnice[43], izdane po nemški zakonodaji. Medtem ko konkurenčno pravo priznava svobodo podjetij, da prosto izberejo svoje trgovinske partnerje, imajo podjetja s prevladujočim položajem posebno odgovornost. V tem primeru je bilo vedenje družbe Clearstream označeno kot zavračanje opravljanja storitev, ker:	32. The refusal to supply concerned registered shares[43] issued under German law. While competition law recognises the freedom of companies to freely choose their trading partners, companies in a dominant position have a special responsibility. In the present case, Clearstream’s behaviour qualified as refusal to supply because:
- je družba Clearstream Banking AG edini končni skrbnik nemških vrednostnih papirjev na skupnem skrbniškem računu, ki je danes edina pomembna oblika varstva za trgovane vrednostne papirje. Nov vstop v to dejavnost v napovedljivi prihodnosti ni stvaren. Zato je mogoče družbo Clearstream Banking AG označiti kot neizogibnega trgovinskega partnerja;	- Clearstream Banking AG is the only final custodian of German securities kept in collective safe custody, which is the only significant form of custody today for securities traded. New entry into this activity is unrealistic for the foreseeable future. Therefore, Clearstream Banking AG can be regarded as an unavoidable trading partner;
- družba Euroclear Bank ni mogla podvajati storitev, ki jih je zahtevala; in	- Euroclear Bank could not duplicate the services that it was requesting; and
- je vedenje družbe Clearstream oviralo zmožnost družbe Euroclear Bank, da zagotovi učinkovite čezmejne klirinške storitve in poravnave strankam na enotnem trgu.	- Clearstream’s behaviour had the effect of impairing Euroclear Bank’s ability to provide efficient cross-border clearing and settlement services to clients in the single market.
33. Družba Euroclear Bank je storitve, ki jih je zahtevala, prejela novembra 2001, kar je več kot dve leti po zahtevi. Med celotnim obdobjem je družba Clearstream Banking AG zavračala opravljanje klirinških storitev in poravnave za družbo Euroclear Bank za imenske delnice. Zamudno vedenje družbe Clearstream proti družbi Euroclear Bank je v nasprotju z običajnim obdobjem največ štirih mesecev, v katerem so bile za druge primerljive stranke opravljene klirinške storitve in poravnave.	33. Euroclear Bank obtained the services it was seeking in November 2001, more than two years after it requested them. During the entire period Clearstream Banking AG denied Euroclear Bank clearing and settlement services for registered shares. The dilatory behaviour of Clearstream vis-à-vis Euroclear Bank contrasts with the usual period of not more than four months within which other comparable customers were supplied with clearing and settlement services.
34. Kar zadeva cenovno diskriminacijo, je Komisija ugotovila, da je med januarjem 1997 in januarjem 2002 družba Clearstream za enakovredne storitve družbi Euroclear Bank zaračunala višjo ceno na transakcijo kot drugim depozitarjem vrednostnih papirjev zunaj Nemčije. Komisija je podrobno preučila vsebino storitev in stroške njihovega opravljanja, da bi tako določila, ali je razlika v ceni upravičena, ter sklenila, da ni tako.	34. As regards price discrimination, the Commission found that, between January 1997 and January 2002, Clearstream charged, for equivalent services, a higher per transaction price to Euroclear Bank than to other securities depositories outside Germany. The Commission examined in detail the content of the services and the costs of providing them in order to establish whether the price difference could be justified, and concluded that this was not the case.
35. Komisija se je odločila, da ne bo naložila denarne kazni. Med drugim je Komisija upoštevala dejstvo, da ni sodne prakse Skupnosti, ki bi se ukvarjala z analizo konkurence kliringa in poravnave. Poleg tega obstaja obsežna razprava o kliringu in poravnavi v različnih institucijah in forumih, da bi tako bolje opredelili vlogo različnih protagonistov v panogi.	35. The Commission decided not to impose fines. Among other things, the Commission took into account the fact that there is no Community case law or jurisprudence dealing with the competition analysis of clearing and settlement. In addition, there is a wide-ranging debate on clearing and settlement within different institutions and fora in order to better define the role of the different protagonists in the industry.
Microsoft	Microsoft
36. Komisija je 24. marca v skladu s členom 82 ES proti družbi Microsoft („Microsoft“) sprejela odločbo o prepovedi, ki predvideva naložitev denarne kazni[44]. Ta odločba je sklenila, da je družba Microsoft zlorabila svoj prevladujoči položaj na trgu operacijskega sistema za osebne računalnike[45] na dva načina.	36. On 24 March, the Commission adopted a prohibition decision with fines against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) in pursuance of Article 82 EC[44]. This decision concluded that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in the PC operating system market[45] in two ways.
(1) Zavrnitev dajanja informacij o interoperabilnosti	(1) Refusal to supply interoperability information
37. Družba Microsoft je tekmecem na trgu operacijskega sistema za skupinske strežnike prikrivala informacije, potrebne, da bi bili lahko njihovi izdelki v celoti interoperabilni s prevladujočim operacijskim sistemom družbe Microsoft za osebne računalnike, Windows. Medtem ko je družba Microsoft v preteklosti, ko je vstopila na trg operacijskega sistema za skupinske strežnike, razkrivala te vrste informacij o interoperabilnosti, je potem sprejela politiko zavrnitve takšnega razkrivanja svojim tekmecem in tako ovirala prejšnjo raven ponudbe. Leta 1998 je družba Microsoft zavrnila formalno zahtevo družbe Sun, ki je zahtevala informacije o interoperabilnosti. Na podlagi obsežne tržne raziskave je Komisija sklenila, da so bile zadevne informacije neizogibne za konkuriranje na trgu operacijskega sistema za skupinske strežnike ter da je družba Microsoft s prikrivanjem teh informacij pridobila prevladujoč položaj in bi lahko celo izključila vso ostalo konkurenco na tem trgu. Komisija je nadalje sklenila, da je zavrnitev dajanja informacij s strani družbe Microsoft omejevala tehnični razvoj v škodo potrošnikov: če bi imeli tekmeci dostop do prikritih informacij, bi lahko potrošnikom zagotovili nove in boljše proizvode, ne da bi pri tem posnemali ponudbo družbe Microsoft.	37. Microsoft withheld from competitors in the work group server operating system market information necessary for their products to fully interoperate with Microsoft’s dominant PC operating system, Windows. While Microsoft had previously disclosed this type of interoperability information when it entered the work group server operating system market, it then adopted a policy of refusing to make such disclosure to its competitors, thereby disrupting previous levels of supply. In 1998, Microsoft turned down a formal request by Sun for such interoperability information. On the basis of an extensive market enquiry, the Commission concluded that the information in question was indispensable to compete in the work group server operating system market and that, by withholding it, Microsoft had been able to establish a dominant position, and risked eliminating all remaining competition in that market. The Commission further concluded that Microsoft’s refusal to supply limited technical development, to the detriment of consumers: if competitors had access to the information withheld, they would be able to provide consumers with new and enhanced products without copying Microsoft’s own offering.
(2) Vezava predvajalnika Windows Media Player na operacijski sistem Windows	(2) Tying of Windows Media Player with Windows
38. Družba Microsoft je na trgu streaming predvajalnikov z vezavo svojega ločenega proizvoda – predvajalnika Windows Media Player – na prevladujoč operacijski sistem za osebne računalnike Windows škodila konkurenci. Ta praksa vezave je povzročila, da je predvajalnik Windows Media Player, tako kot operacijski sistem Windows, prisoten povsod, kar je umetno povzročilo, da se morajo ponudniki vsebin in razvijalci programske opreme zanašati na tehnologijo predvajalnika Windows Media, ter drugim tekmecem na trgu streaming predvajalnikov ni dovolilo konkuriranja na podlagi lastnih proizvodov. Odločba kaže, da je družba Microsoft pridobila občutno prednost pred svojimi tekmeci, odkar je sredi leta 1999 začel s strategijo vezave.	38. Microsoft harmed competition in the streaming media player market by tying with its dominant Windows PC operating system a separate product - its Windows Media Player. This tying practice conferred upon Windows Media Player the same ubiquitous presence as Windows, which artificially induced content providers and software developers to rely on Windows Media technology, and did not allow rival streaming media players to compete on the merits of their own products. The Decision shows that Microsoft has achieved a distinct lead over its competitors since it started its tying strategy in mid-1999.
39. Komisija je sklenila, da je zloraba, ki jo je naredila družba Microsoft, zelo resna kršitev pravil konkurence EU, ter družbi naložila denarno kazen v višini 497,196 milijona EUR[46].	39. The Commission concluded that Microsoft’s abusive behaviour constituted a very serious infringement of EU competition rules and imposed on Microsoft a fine of EUR 497.196 million[46].
40. Da bi Komisija ustavila kršitev, je od družbe Microsoft zahtevala sprejetje naslednjih glavnih popravnih ukrepov:	40. In order to put an end to the infringement, the Commission required Microsoft to take the following main remedial actions:
- da razkrije ustrezne informacije o interoperabilnosti in omogoči njihovo uporabo za razvoj kompatibilnih proizvodov operacijskega sistema za skupinske strežnike („protiukrep interoperabilnosti“);	- to disclose the relevant interoperability information and allow its use for the development of compatible work group server operating systems products (“the interoperability remedy”);
- da zagotovi različico operacijskega sistema za osebne računalnike Windows, ki ne vsebuje predvajalnika Windows Media Player („protiukrep nevezanosti“). Proizvajalci in uporabniki osebnih računalnikov lahko tako dobijo operacijski sistem Windows s predvajalnikom, ki si ga izberejo sami;	- to make available a version of the Windows PC operating system which does not include Windows Media Player (“the untying remedy”). PC manufacturers and consumers can thus obtain Windows with the media player of their choice;
- poleg tega mora družba Microsoft predložiti predlog za vzpostavitev mehanizma spremljanja v obliki skrbnika spremljanja. Družba Microsoft je ta predlog sprejela.	- in addition, Microsoft had to submit a proposal for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism in the form of a monitoring trustee. Microsoft submitted such a proposal.
41. Družba Microsoft je pred Sodiščem prve stopnje vložila zahtevo za razveljavitev odločbe[47] in tudi zahtevo po začasnih ukrepih za zadržanje protiukrepov interoperabilnosti in nevezanosti med čakanjem na rezultat na svojo zahtevo po razveljavitvi[48]. Komisija se je odločila, da ne bo poskušala izvrševati teh protiukrepov pred odredbo predsednika Sodišča prve stopnje v zvezi z zahtevo družbe Microsoft po začasnih ukrepih[49]. Predsednik je 22. decembra v celoti zavrnil zahtevo družbe Microsoft po začasnih ukrepih[50].	41. Microsoft submitted an application for annulment of the decision before the Court of First Instance (“CFI”)[47], as well as an application for interim measures seeking the suspension of the interoperability remedy and the untying remedy pending the outcome of its application for annulment[48]. The Commission decided not to seek to enforce these remedies pending the order of the President of the CFI concerning Microsoft’s application for interim measures[49]. On 22 December, the President dismissed Microsoft’s application for interim measure in its entirety[50].
Polje 2: Uporaba pravil konkurence EU za mobilne in širokopasovne medmrežne storitve Leta 2004 se je konkurenca v elektronskih komunikacijah zaostrila in na nekaterih tržnih segmentih je bila rast močna[51]. V razširjeni EU s 25 državami članicami sta bila dva ključna dejavnika rasti tega področja fiksne širokopasovne storitve in mobilne storitve. Rast v širokopasovnem sektorju je prehitela rast v mobilnem sektorju. Kar zadeva dejavnosti boja proti monopolom, se je Komisija osredotočila na ta dva pomembna segmenta. V okviru novega ureditvenega okvira za elektronske komunikacije, ki velja od 25. julija 2003, je politika konkurence še vedno zelo vplivna pri usklajevanju pravne ureditve področja z načeli konkurenčnega prava. V okviru storitev širokopasovnega dostopa do medmrežja je ukrep Komisije o domnevnem razkoraku povzročil, da je družba Deutsche Telekom – prvotni operater fiksnih linij v Nemčiji – precej znižala svoje pristojbine za delitev linij[52]. Z vidika teh tarifnih znižanj je Komisija lahko zaključila svojo preiskavo o domnevni zlorabi prevladujočega položaja družbe Deutsche Telekom na trgu širokopasovnega dostopa do njenega fiksnega telekomunikacijskega omrežja. Komisija je sprejela zavezo družbe Deutsche Telekom, da bo od 1. aprila 2004 na trajni podlagi odpravila razkorak.[53] Kar zadeva mobilne komunikacije, je Komisija 26. julija predložila dve obestili o nasprotovanju v zvezi z mednarodnim sledenjem v Veliki Britaniji. Ugovori se nanašajo na stopnje, ki sta jih družbi O2 in Vodafone zaračunala drugim mobilnim operaterjem za mednarodno sledenje v trgovini na debelo. Komisija je na podlagi svojih raziskav ugotovila, da sta obe družbi zaračunavali nepoštene in previsoke cene, družba Vodafone med letoma 1997 in najmanj septembrom 2003 ter družba O2 med letoma 1998 in najmanj septembrom 2003[54]. Končno, kar zadeva storitve mednarodnega mobilnega sledenja, Komisija preučuje tudi učinke na konkurenco, ki izhajajo iz nedavne vzpostavitve strateških mobilnih povezav (kot sta „Freemove“ ali „Starmap“). \|	Box 2: Application of EU competition rules to mobile and broadband Internet services In 2004, competition in the electronic communications sector intensified and growth was strong in some market segments[51]. In the enlarged EU of 25 Member States, the sector’s two key drivers of growth were fixed broadband services and mobile services. Growth in the broadband sector overtook growth in the mobile sector. As regards antitrust activities, the Commission focused on these two segments of major importance. In the context of the new regulatory framework for electronic communications, which has been in force since 25 July 2003, competition policy continues to play a prominent role in bringing sector regulation more closely into line with competition law principles. In the context of broadband Internet access services, the Commission’s action regarding a presumed margin squeeze led Deutsche Telekom - the incumbent operator of fixed lines in Germany - to reduce its line sharing fees[52] significantly. In the light of these tariff reductions, the Commission was in a position to close its investigation into the alleged abuse of Deutsche Telekom’s dominant position on the market for the provision of broadband access to its fixed telecommunications network. The Commission accepted Deutsche Telekom's commitments to bring the margin squeeze to an end on a lasting basis from 1 April 2004.[53] As regards mobile communications, the Commission issued two statements of objections on 26 July concerning international roaming in the United Kingdom. The objections relate to the rates that O2 and Vodafone charged other mobile network operators for international roaming at wholesale level. On the basis of its investigation, the Commission considered that both had charged unfair and excessive prices, Vodafone between 1997 and at least September 2003 and O2 between 1998 and at least September 2003[54]. Finally, as far as international mobile roaming services are concerned, the Commission is also looking at the competitive effects resulting from the recent creation of strategic mobile alliances (such as “Freemove” or “Starmap”). \|
1.2 Razvoj drugih primerov in zavrnitve pritožb	1.2 Other case developments and rejections of complaints
Interbrew (zloraba)[55]	Interbrew (abuse)[55]
42. Komisija je 30. aprila zaključila preiskave v okviru člena 82, ki jih je na lastno pobudo začela leta 1999, o ravnanju družbe Interbrew NV (sedaj Inbev NV) do belgijskih trgovcev na debelo s pivom, potem ko je družba prevzela številne zaveze. Družba Interbrew se je še posebej obvezala, da bo spremenila svoje sisteme popustov ter svoje partnerske in trgovinske sporazume s trgovci na debelo tako, da bodo lahko konkurenčni ponudniki v Belgiji z njo učinkovito tekmovali.	42. On 30 April, the Commission closed the Article 82 investigations that it had started in 1999 on its own initiative into the behaviour of Interbrew NV (now Inbev NV) towards Belgian beer wholesalers, after Interbrew made a number of commitments. Interbrew has in particular undertaken to amend its rebates systems and its partnership and commercial agreements with wholesalers in such a way that rival suppliers are no longer prevented from competing effectively with Interbrew in Belgium.
43. Družba Interbrew je najprej soglašala, da bo svoj standardiziran sistem količinskih popustov preoblikovala tako, da bo v celoti pregleden za vse trgovce na debelo, namesto zagotavljanja samo stopnje popusta, ki ustreza razponu količine, v katero spadajo njihovi nakupi različnih vrst piva, in stopenj, ki ustrezajo razponom količine tik nad tem razponom in pod njim. Drug sistem popustov, narejen posebej za trgovce na debelo, ki so pripravljeni prodajati različne vrste Interbrewovega piva na svojih vezanih maloprodajnih mestih, bo prav tako spremenjen tako, da se popusti ne bodo več zviševali s številom vezanih prodajnih mest trgovcev na debelo, ampak bodo pomenili fiksni znesek na hektoliter določene vrste piva, ne glede na število vezanih prodajnih mest.	43. Interbrew first agreed to make its standardised volume rebate system entirely transparent to all wholesalers rather than just providing them with the rebate rate corresponding to the volume range in which their own purchases for the various types of beer fall and the rates corresponding to the volume ranges situated just above and just below that range. Another rebate system, specifically designed for wholesalers who are prepared to sell the various types of Interbrew beer in their own tied retail outlets, will also be amended in such a way that the rebates will no longer increase with the number of the wholesaler’s tied outlets but represent a fixed amount per hectolitre of a particular type of beer, whatever the number of tied outlets.
44. Družba Interbrew v okviru svojih partnerskih sporazumov ne bo imela več dostopa do zaupnih poslovnih podatkov trgovcev na debelo ter ne bo imela več pravice blokirati tekmečeve ponudbe za odkup dejavnosti trgovca na debelo in namesto tega predložiti lastne ponudbe (odprava „pravice prve zavrnitve“). Končno je družba Interbrew v zvezi s trgovinskimi sporazumi, s katerimi zagotavlja trgovcem na debelo številne pobude, kot so finančna podpora ali naprave, večinoma v zameno za promocijske dejavnosti, soglašala, da bo (a) odpravila vsako zahtevo po ekskluzivnosti proizvoda, (b) omogočila popolno preglednost meril upravičenosti ter (c) jasno navedla, da so iste pobude odprte za vse trgovce na debelo, brez izjeme.	44. Under Interbrew’s partnership agreements, Interbrew will no longer have access to the wholesalers’ confidential business data and it will no longer have the right to block a competitor’s bid for the purchase of the wholesaler’s business and to make its own bid instead (abolition of the “right of first refusal”). Finally, regarding the commercial agreements by which Interbrew grants wholesalers a number of incentives such as financial support or gadgets mainly in return for promotional activities, Interbrew has accepted to (a) abolish any product exclusivity requirement, (b) make the eligibility criteria fully transparent and (c) make it clear that the same incentives are open to all wholesalers without exception.
Scandlines proti pristanišču Helsingborg[56] in Sundbusserne proti pristanišču Helsingborg[57]	Scandlines v Port of Helsingborg[56] and Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg[57]
45. Komisija je 23. julija sprejela dve odločbi[58], ki zavračata dve pritožbi operaterjev trajektov – Scandlines Sverige AB in Sundbusserne AS – proti pristanišču Helsingborg na Švedskem. Ti dve vzporedni pritožbi sta se nanašali na domnevne zlorabe v smislu člena 82 ES, ki vključujejo pretirane pristaniške pristojbine, ki jih je za storitve operaterjem trajektov zaračunalo pristanišče Helsingborg na progi Helsingborg–Elsinore med Švedsko in Dansko.	45. On 23 July, the Commission took two decisions[58] rejecting two complaints lodged by ferry operators - Scandlines Sverige AB and Sundbusserne AS - against the Port of Helsingborg in Sweden. These two parallel complaints related to alleged abuses within the meaning of Article 82 EC involving excessive port fees charged by the port of Helsingborg for services provided to ferry operators active on the Helsingborg–Elsinore route between Sweden and Denmark.
46. Po obsežni preiskavi je Komisija sklenila, da razpoložljivi dokazi ne zadostujejo, da bi se z zahtevano pravno natančnostjo dokazalo, da so bile zadevne cene pretirane. Odločbi kažeta na splošnejše težave pri uporabi člena 82 ES v primerih pretiranih cen, zlasti kjer ni na voljo nobenih koristnih kazalcev. Ker je sodna praksa pri tem vprašanju precej omejena[59], lahko odločbi zagotovita koristne smernice pri določanju ekonomske vrednosti storitve ter pretirane/nepoštene cene, ki tako pomeni zlorabo prevladujočega položaja v smislu člena 82 ES.	46. After extensive investigation, the Commission came to the conclusion that the available evidence was insufficient to demonstrate to the requisite legal standard that the prices at issue were excessive. The decisions point to more general difficulties in applying Article 82 EC to excessive pricing cases, particularly in cases where no useful benchmarks are available. Given that existing case law on this issue is rather limited[59], the decisions may provide useful guidance when determining the economic value of a service and whether a price is excessive/unfair and thus constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC.
Deleži priključkov družbe KPN Mobile[60]	KPN mobile termination rates[60]
47. Komisija je tožene stranke obvestila, da je družba MCI 21. oktobra umaknila svojo pritožbo in da Komisija v tem primeru ne predvideva nadaljnjih ukrepov. Dne 22. marca 2002 je bilo predloženo obvestilo o nasprotovanju, ki vsebuje trditve, da je družba KPN Mobile zavrnila ponudbo neposredne medsebojne povezave neodvisnim operaterjem ter povzročil razkorak med svojimi deleži mobilnih priključkov na debelo in drobnoprodajnimi cenami za storitve mobilnega virtualnega zasebnega omrežja (MVZO). Komisija je pri odločitvi, da ne bo nadaljevala primera po uradni dolžnosti, upoštevala dejstvo, da je ukrep nizozemskega regulatorja OPTA medtem spodbudil družbo KPN Mobile, da je dala sprejemljivo ponudbo o neposredni medsebojni povezavi. Deleži mobilnih medsebojnih povezav na debelo na Nizozemskem so se prav tako znižali in regulator OPTA je bil v postopku nadaljnje analize trgov za priključitev na posamezna mobilna omrežja na Nizozemskem v okviru novega ureditvenega okvira za elektronske komunikacije, ki je bil na Nizozemskem uveden spomladi 2004. Končno je Komisija v svoji preiskavi sklenila, da v posebnem okviru storitev MVZO obstoja razkoraka po členu 82 ES ni mogoče ustrezno določiti.	47. The Commission has informed the defendants that MCI withdrew its complaint on 21 October, and that the Commission does not envisage further action in this case. A statement of objections had been issued on 22 March 2002 alleging that KPN Mobile had refused to supply direct interconnection to independent operators and had engaged in a margin squeeze between its wholesale mobile termination rates and the retail prices for mobile virtual private network (MVPN) services. In deciding not to continue the case ex officio the Commission took into account the fact that action by the Dutch regulator OPTA had in the meantime prompted a reasonable direct interconnection offer by KPN Mobile. The wholesale mobile interconnection rates in the Netherlands had also decreased and the OPTA was in the process of further analysing the markets for termination on individual mobile networks in the Netherlands in the context of the new regulatory framework for electronic communications introduced in the Netherlands in spring 2004. Finally, the Commission had come to the conclusion in its investigation that in the specific context of the MVPN services the existence of a margin squeeze under Article 82 EC could not be properly established.
B2/Telia[61]	B2/Telia[61]
48. Novembra je družba B2 Bredband AB (B2) umaknila svojo pritožbo proti družbi TeliaSonera AB, prvotnemu telekomunikacijskemu operaterju na Švedskem. Komisija je posledično zaključila primer. Decembra 2003 je Komisija na družbo TeliaSonera naslovila obvestilo o nasprotovanju, ki vsebuje domnevne trditve, da je podjetje zlorabilo prevladujoč položaj s sodelovanjem v določanju pretiranih cen, ko se je potegovalo za veliko pogodbo za gradnjo in upravljanje širokopasovnega omrežja optičnih vlaken za zagotavljanje visokohitrostnega dostopa do spleta v Malmöju. Komisija je trdila, da je bila ponudba družbe TeliaSonera za to pogodbo namerno določena pod stroški ter operaterju ni omogočala povračila naložb in stroškov, ki izhajajo iz zagotavljanja infrastrukture in storitev iz te pogodbe ter da je telekomunikacijski operater TeilaSonera z določitvijo tako nizke cene preprečil razvoj alternativne infrastrukture in vstop konkurenčnim ponudnikom storitev na trg. Vendar pa je Komisija po dodatni preiskavi, ki je sledila izdaji obvestila o nasprotovanju, sklenila, da ni mogoče z zadostno gotovostjo določiti, da je imela družba TeliaSonera ob predložitvi ponudbe na upoštevnih trgih prevladujoč položaj.	48. In November, B2 Bredband AB (B2) withdrew its complaint against TeliaSonera AB, the incumbent telecommunications operator in Sweden. The Commission subsequently closed its case. In December 2003, the Commission had addressed a statement of objections to TeliaSonera, alleging that the company had abused its dominant position by engaging in predatory pricing when it bid for a major contract for the construction and operation of a fibre-optic broadband network for the provision of high-speed Internet access in Malmö. The Commission argued that TeliaSonera’s bid for that contract was intentionally set below cost and did not allow the operator to recover the investments and expenses derived from the provision of infrastructures and services contained in the contract and that by setting such a low price, TeliaSonera prevented the development of alternative infrastructure and the entry of competing service providers. However, additional investigation following the issue of the statement of objections led the Commission to the conclusion that it could not be established with sufficient certainty that TeliaSonera held a dominant position in the relevant markets at the time when the bid was submitted.
2. KARTELI Polje 3: Pregled izvrševanja ukrepov proti kartelnim dogovorom Med letom 2004 je Komisija nadaljevala svojo protikartelno dejavnost, vzpostavljeno v prejšnjih treh letih, tako da je izdala nadaljnjih šest odločb proti nezakonitim horizontalnim sporazumom, ki so vključevali okoli 30 podjetij. Ti primeri so bili: bakrene vodovodne cevi, natrijev glukonat, francosko pivo, surov tobak v Španiji, trda galanterija – šivanke in holin klorid[62]. V teh odločbah so bile izrečene denarne kazni v višini 390 milijonov EUR. Med letom je prišlo do številnih dogodkov v boju proti kartelom. Treba je omeniti zlasti tri vidike, in sicer razvoj na področju prizanesljivosti, posledice uvedbe Uredbe št. 1/2003 za uveljavljanje protikartelnih pravil ter pojasnitev pravil, ki urejajo posebne zakonske pravice. Prizanesljivost Obvestilo o prizanesljivosti iz leta 2002[63] je še vedno pomembno orodje izvrševanja. Veliko število primerov, ki jih je sprožilo obvestilo o prizanesljivosti iz leta 2002, kaže, da je le-to zelo učinkovito, celo bolj kot obvestilo iz leta 1996. Večina primerov, ki so prišli do stopnje odločanja, se obravnava v okviru obvestila iz leta 2002[64]. Uredba (ES) št. 1/2003 Začetek veljavnosti Uredbe št. 1/2003[65], ki je postala veljavna maja, je pomembno okrepil pooblastila Komisije za vodenje preiskav. Treba je poudariti tri ključne vidike. Prvič, Uredba razširja pooblastila Komisije za preiskave, ki bodo poleg poslovnih prostorov zajemale tudi druge prostore, vključno z zasebnimi stanovanji uslužbencev podjetja, če obstaja utemeljen sum, da je v teh prostorih shranjena poslovna dokumentacija[66]. Takšen ukrep se lahko izvaja samo s predhodnim pooblastilom nacionalnega sodnega organa zadevne države članice. Drugič, pooblastila Komisije za preiskavo so razširjena zaradi njene zmožnosti, da za čas, potreben za izvedbo preiskave, poslovne prostore zapre[67]. Tretjič, Komisiji so bila dodeljena posebna pooblastila, da za namene preiskave opravi intervju z vsako fizično ali pravno osebo, ki se s tem strinja[68]. Posebne zakonske pravice Po pozivu Komisije je predsednik Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti z odredbo iz dne 27. septembra[69] razveljavil (delno) zadržanje izvajanja odločbe Komisije o zavrnitvi zahtevka po posebnih zakonskih pravicah, ki ga je v tem primeru pred tem odredil predsednik Sodišča prve stopnje[70]. Ovojnica, v kateri so bili nekateri dokumenti, zaplenjeni v preiskavi, za katere pa so stranke trdile, da zanje veljajo posebne zakonske pravice[71], in ki so bili hranjeni v registru Sodišča prve stopnje, je bila vrnjena Komisiji. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je poudarilo zavezo Komisije, da tretjim strankam do zaključka glavnega sodnega postopka ne bo razkrila spornih dokumentov. Ker sodišča novega pristopa strank v zvezi z obsegom posebnih zakonskih pravic niso potrdila, Komisija še naprej izvaja preiskave kot pred tem, na podlagi uveljavljene sodne prakse[72], ki je po mnenju Komisije veljavna in ustrezna. \|	2. CARTELS Box 3: Overview of enforcement against hardcore cartels During 2004, the Commission maintained its emphasis on anti-cartel activity established during the previous three years by issuing another 6 decisions against unlawful horizontal agreements, involving some 30 companies. These cases were: copper plumbing tubes, sodium gluconate, French beer, raw tobacco in Spain, hard haberdashery - needles and choline chloride[62]. Fines totalling over EUR 390 million were imposed in these decisions. In the course of the year there were a number of developments in the fight against cartels. Three aspects are in particular worth mentioning, namely developments in the field of leniency, the consequences for anti-cartel enforcement of the introduction of Regulation 1/2003 and the clarification of the rules governing legal privilege. Leniency The leniency notice of 2002[63] continued to be an important enforcement tool. The high number of cases generated by the 2002 leniency notice demonstrates that it is extremely effective, and even more so than the 1996 leniency notice. The majority of cases now reaching decision stage are dealt with under the 2002 notice[64]. Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 The entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 in May[65] notably reinforced the Commission’s powers of investigation. Three key aspects are worth highlighting. First, the Regulation extends the Commission’s powers of search to include premises other than business premises, including the private residences of staff members of an undertaking, on reasonable suspicion that business records are being kept at such premises[66]. Such action can be carried out only with prior authorisation by the national judicial authority of the Member State concerned. Second, the Commission’s search powers are strengthened by its ability to seal business premises for the time necessary to conduct the inspection[67]. Third, the Commission has been granted express powers to interview any natural or legal person, who consents to be interviewed, for the purpose of an investigation[68]. Legal privilege Following an appeal by the Commission, the President of the Court of Justice annulled by order of 27 September[69] the (partial) suspension of the operation of a Commission decision rejecting a claim of legal privilege which had previously been ordered by the President of the Court of First Instance[70] in the case. An envelope containing some of the documents seized in the inspection but which the parties claimed to be covered by legal privilege[71] and which had been retained in the Registry of the Court of First Instance was returned to the Commission. The ECJ noted the Commission’s commitment not to disclose the documents under dispute to third parties until the conclusion of the main proceedings. As the novel approach put forward by the parties in regard to the scope of legal privilege has not been confirmed by the Courts, the Commission continues to handle inspections as before on the basis of the established case law[72], which in the Commission’s view remains valid and appropriate. \|
Bakrene vodovodne cevi[73]	Copper plumbing tubes[73]
49. Komisija je 3. septembra sprejela odločbo, ki ugotavlja, da so vodilni evropski proizvajalci bakrenih vodovodnih cevi, Boliden AB (skupaj s svojima nekdanjima hčerinskima družbama Boliden Fabrication AB in Boliden Cuivre & Zinc SA), Halcor SA, HME Nederland BV, IMI plc (skupaj s svojima (nekdanjima) hčerinskima družbama IMI Kynoch Ltd. in IMI Yorkshire Copper Tube Ltd.), KM Europa Metal AG (skupaj s svojima hčerinskima družbama v celotni lasti, Europa Metalli SpA in Tréfimétaux SA), Mueller Industries, Inc. (skupaj s svojimi hčerinskimi družbami v celotni lasti, WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd., DENO Holding Company, Inc., in DENO Acquisition EURL), Outokumpu Oyj (skupaj s svojo hčerinsko družbo v celotni lasti, Outokumpu Copper Products Oy) in Wieland Werke AG (skupaj s svojima hčerinskima družbama Austria Buntmetall AG in Buntmetall Amstetten Ges.m.b.H.), kršili pravila konkurence Evropske skupnosti s skrivnim dogovarjanjem o določanju cen in delitvi trgov na trgu EGP za bakrene vodovodne cevi. Po preiskavi, ki se je začela leta 2001, je Komisija ugotovila, da je kršitev trajala od sredine leta 1988 do začetka leta 2001.	49. On 3 September, the Commission adopted a decision finding that the leading European copper plumbing tubes producers, Boliden AB (together with its former subsidiaries Boliden Fabrication AB and Boliden Cuivre & Zinc SA), Halcor SA, HME Nederland BV, IMI plc (together with its (former) subsidiaries IMI Kynoch Ltd. and IMI Yorkshire Copper Tube Ltd.), KM Europa Metal AG (together with its wholly-owned subsidiaries Europa Metalli SpA and Tréfimétaux SA), Mueller Industries, Inc. (together with its subsidiaries WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd., DENO Holding Company, Inc. and DENO Acquisition EURL), Outokumpu Oyj (together with its wholly-owned subsidiary Outokumpu Copper Products Oy) and Wieland Werke AG (together with its subsidiaries Austria Buntmetall AG and Buntmetall Amstetten Ges.m.b.H.), had breached European Community competition rules by colluding to fix prices and share markets in the EEA market for copper plumbing tubes. Following an investigation which started in 2001, the Commission established that the infringement lasted from mid-1988 to early 2001.
50. Zadevni proizvod se uporablja predvsem za vodne, naftne, plinske in ogrevalne naprave v gradbeništvu. Glavne stranke za vodovodne cevi so dobavitelji, trgovci na debelo in drobno, ki prodajajo vodovodne cevi monterjem in drugim končnim uporabnikom. Skupna tržna vrednost nelegiranih (970,1 milijona EUR) in s plastiko prevlečenih (180,9 milijona EUR) bakrenih vodovodnih cevi znaša 1151 milijona EUR (EGP v letu 2000).	50. The relevant product is used primarily for water, oil, gas and heating installations in the construction industry. The main customers for plumbing tubes are distributors, wholesalers and retailers that sell the plumbing tubes to installers and other end consumers. The aggregated market value of plain (EUR 970.1 million) and plastic-coated (EUR 180.9 million) copper plumbing tubes amounts to EUR 1 151 million (EEA in 2000).
51. Celotna količina izrečenih denarnih kazni za podjetja je bila v tem primeru približno 222,3 milijona EUR. Razen družbe HME Nederland BV so vsi naslovniki odločbe sodelovali s Komisijo v njenih preiskavah v okviru obvestila o prizanesljivosti iz leta 1996. Komisija je za sodelovanje v preiskavi skupini Mueller dodelila imuniteto pred denarno kaznijo, družbi Outokumpu 50-odstotno znižanje kazni, skupinama KME in Wieland 35-odstotno znižanje kazni, družbi Halcor 15-odstotno znižanje ter 10-odstotno znižanje za skupini IMI in Boliden. Najvišja kazen je bila izrečena podjetjem skupine KME, in sicer v višini 67,08 milijona EUR. Skupina Wieland je prejela denarno kazen v višini 27,8411 milijona EUR, skupina IMI 44,98 milijona EUR, družba Outokumpu 36,14 milijona EUR, družba Boliden 32,6 milijona EUR, družba Halcor 9,16 milijona EUR in družba HME 4,49 milijona EUR. Zaradi sodelovanja zunaj obvestila o prizanesljivosti iz leta 1996 sta bili družbi Outokumpu in KME nagrajeni z nižjo denarno kaznijo. Družba Outokumpu je bilo prvo podjetje, ki je razkrilo trajanje kartela, ki je deloval več kot 12 let, družba KME pa prvo podjetje, ki je razkrilo odločilne dokaze o sodelovanju pri s plastiko prevlečenih bakrenih vodovodnih ceveh. Na drugi strani je bila družba Outokumpu kaznovana z oteževalnim dejavnikom zaradi ponavljajočih kršitev, saj je bila naslovnik druge odločbe Komisije iz leta 1990, ki obsoja kartele v sektorju nerjavnega jekla, ter prejela zvišanje denarne kazni zaradi odvračanja.	51. The total amount of fines imposed on the undertakings in this case was some EUR 222.3 million. With the exception of HME Nederland BV, all the addressees of the decision cooperated with the Commission in its investigation under the 1996 leniency notice. The Commission granted immunity from fines to the Mueller group, a 50% reduction of the fine to Outokumpu, 35% to the KME group and the Wieland group, 15% to Halcor and 10% to the IMI group and the Boliden group for their cooperation. The highest fine was imposed on the companies of the KME group, totalling EUR 67.08 million. The Wieland group received a fine of EUR 27.8411 million, the IMI group EUR 44.98 million, Outokumpu EUR 36.14 million, Boliden EUR 32.6 million, Halcor EUR 9.16 million and HME EUR 4.49 million. Outokumpu and KME were rewarded by a mitigating factor for their cooperation outside the 1996 leniency notice. Outokumpu was the first undertaking to disclose the whole duration of the cartel extending over more than 12 years, KME the first to disclose decisive evidence with respect to cooperation concerning plastic-coated copper plumbing tubes. On the other hand, Outokumpu was penalised by an aggravating factor for a repeat infringement, since it had been an addressee of another Commission decision condemning a cartel in the stainless steel sector in 1990, and received an increase for deterrence.
Natrijev glukonat[74]	Sodium gluconate[74]
52. Komisija je 29. septembra štirim podjetjem skupine Jungbunzlauer naložila denarno kazen v višini 19,04 milijona EUR zaradi sodelovanja pri določanju cen in delitvi trga za natrijev glukonat, kemično sestavino za čiščenje jekla in stekla.	52. On 29 September, the Commission fined four companies of the Jungbunzlauer Group EUR 19.04 million for their part in fixing the price and sharing the market for sodium gluconate, a chemical mainly used to clean metal and glass.
53. Odločba dopolnjuje prvo odločbo, sprejeto leta 2001[75], ki je ugotovila, da je šest podjetij, vključno s podjetjem skupine Jungbunzlauer, med letoma 1987 in 1995 poslovalo v skrivnem kartelu. Kar zadeva podjetje skupine Jungbunzlauer, je bila odločba, sprejeta leta 2001, leta 2002 umaknjena zaradi dejanske napake, ugotovljene z odločbo o odgovornosti za kršitev.	53. The decision supplements a first decision adopted in 2001[75] which established that six undertakings, including one company of the Jungbunzlauer Group, operated a secret cartel from 1987 until 1995. As to the company of the Jungbunzlauer Group, the decision adopted in 2001 was withdrawn in 2002 on account of a factual mistake in the grounds of the decision regarding its liability for the infringement.
54. Stranke kartela na področju natrijevega glukonata so predstavljale skoraj celotno svetovno proizvodnjo. Kršitev je bila zelo resna, skupina Jungbunzlauer pa je sedem let kršila pravila konkurence Skupnosti. Pri opredelitvi zneska denarne kazni je Komisija upoštevala omejeno velikost trga natrijevega glukonata. Poleg tega so skupini Jungbunzlauer za 20 % znižali denarno kazen, ker je sodelovala s Komisijo v okviru obvestila o prizanesljivosti iz leta 1996.	54. The parties to the sodium gluconate cartel accounted for almost the whole of worldwide production. The infringement was very serious and Jungbunzlauer infringed the Community competition rules for seven years. In defining the amount of the fine, the Commission took into account the limited size of the sodium gluconate market. Moreover, Jungbunzlauer received a 20% reduction in its fine because it cooperated with the Commission under the 1996 leniency notice.
Francosko pivo[76]	French beer[76]
55. Komisija je 29. septembra na podlagi člena 81(1) ES sprejela odločbo o prepovedi z denarno kaznijo proti dvema skupinama pivovarn, Brasseries Kronenbourg in njenim takratnim matičnim podjetjem Groupe Danone na eni strani ter družbi Heineken France (pred tem Sogebra) in njenim matičnim podjetjem Heineken NV na drugi, zaradi vstopa v sporazum „o premirju“ s ciljem uravnoteženja sektorja zunaj doma[77] med dvema skupinama v Franciji in končanja vojne med obema skupinama v zvezi z nakupom pijače pri trgovcih na debelo. Vendar sporazum nikoli ni bil izveden.	55. On 29 September, the Commission adopted a prohibition decision with fines on the basis of Article 81(1) EC against two brewery groups, Brasseries Kronenbourg and its then parent company, Groupe Danone, on the one hand and Heineken France (formerly Sogebra) and its parent company Heineken NV on the other, for entering into an “armistice” agreement with the aim of balancing the away-from-home[77] sector in France between the two groups and putting an end to an acquisition war regarding drinks wholesalers between the two groups. The agreement was, however, never implemented.
56. V celoti je bila kršitev obravnavana kot resna. Komisija je družbama Heineken France in Heineken NV odredila kazen 1 milijona EUR. Družbi Groupe Danone in Brasseries Kronenbourg sta dobili denarno kazen 1,5 milijona EUR, ob upoštevanju oteževalne okoliščine ponavljajoče kršitve pri določanju te kazni.	56. Overall, the infringement was considered to be serious. The Commission imposed a fine of EUR 1 million on Heineken France and Heineken NV. A fine of EUR 1.5 million was imposed on Groupe Danone and Brasseries Kronenbourg, the aggravating circumstance of a repeat infringement having been taken into account in determining this fine.
Surovi tobak v Španiji[78]	Raw tobacco in Spain[78]
57. Komisija je 20. oktobra štirim španskim predelovalcem tobaka (Cetarsa, Agroexpansión, World Wide Tobacco España in Taes) in tudi italijanskemu predelovalcu (Deltafina) naložila skupno 20 milijonov EUR denarne kazni zaradi sklenitve protikonkurenčnega sporazuma, katerega cilj je bil določitev najvišje povprečne cene, ki bi jo plačali proizvajalcem surovega tobaka v Španiji, in tudi količin surovega tobaka za nakup. Kartel je deloval med letoma 1996 in 2001. Od leta 1998 so predelovalci vzpostavili visoko razvit sistem izvrševanja in spremljanja. Od leta 1999 so se med seboj sporazumeli tudi o razponu cen za surovi tobak, o katerih so se potem pogajali s predstavniki proizvajalcev o njihovi vključitvi v standardne pogodbe o pridelavi, ki zagotavljajo okvir za določitev končne cene surovega tobaka v trenutku dobave. Matični podjetji Agroexpansión in WWTE sta bili skupno in solidarno odgovorni za ravnanje svojih hčerinskih družb.	57. On 20 October, the Commission imposed fines totalling EUR 20 million on four Spanish raw tobacco processors (Cetarsa, Agroexpansión, World Wide Tobacco España and Taes) as well as on an Italian processor (Deltafina) for entering into an anticompetitive agreement aimed at fixing the maximum average price they would pay to raw tobacco producers in Spain as well as the quantities of raw tobacco they would buy. The cartel lasted from 1996 to 2001. As of 1998, the processors put in place a sophisticated enforcement and monitoring system. As of 1999, they also agreed between themselves the price ranges for raw tobacco they would then negotiate with the producer representatives for inclusion in the standard cultivation contracts, which provide a framework for the establishment of the final price of raw tobacco at the moment of delivery. The parent companies of Agroexpansión and WWTE were considered jointly and severally liable for their subsidiaries’ behaviour.
58. V isti odločbi je Komisija prepovedala tudi kartel med združenji, ki so predstavljala proizvajalce surovega tobaka (ASAJA, UPA, COAG in CCAE). Komisija je ugotovila, da so se združenja v istem obdobju skrivno dogovarjala o razponu cen in najnižjih cenah za surovi tobak, o katerih so se potem v razpravah o standardnih pogodbah o pridelavi skupno pogajala s predelovalci, ter vsakemu od njih naložila simbolično denarno kazen v višini 1000 EUR, da bi tako upoštevala vlogo, ki jo je imel nacionalni ureditveni okvir pri njihovem ravnanju. Ta okoliščina je bila upoštevana tudi kot olajševalna okoliščina pri določanju denarnih kazni za predelovalce.	58. In the same decision, the Commission also prohibited a cartel involving the associations representing the raw tobacco producers (ASAJA, UPA, COAG and CCAE). The Commission found that they colluded during the same period on the price ranges and minimum prices of raw tobacco they would then collectively negotiate with the processors when discussing the standard cultivation contracts and imposed on them a symbolic fine of EUR 1 000 each to take account of the role played by the national regulatory framework on their behaviour. This circumstance was also taken into account as a mitigating circumstance in determining the processors’ fines.
Trda galanterija – šivanke[79]	Hard haberdashery - needles[79]
59. Komisija je v odločbi, sprejeti 26. oktobra, ugotovila, da so tri družbe in njihova hčerinska podjetja, in sicer William Prym GmbH & Co. KG in Prym Consumer GmbH & Co. KG, Coats Holdings Ltd in J & P Coats Ltd ter Entaco Ltd in Entaco Group Ltd, med 10. septembrom 1994 in 31. decembrom 1999 sklenila vrsto pisnih, formalno dvostranskih sporazumov, ki so bili v praksi tristranski sporazumi, v okviru katerih so si ta podjetja delila proizvodne trge (proizvodov trde galanterije) in geografske trge (za šivanke) oziroma prispevala k njihovi delitvi. Poleg tega so družbe med 10. majem 1993 in 8. novembrom 2001 sodelovale na dvo- in tristranskih sestankih.	59. The Commission found in the Decision it adopted on 26 October that three undertakings and their respective subsidiaries, namely William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Consumer GmbH & Co. KG, Coats Holdings Ltd and J & P Coats Ltd, and Entaco Ltd and Entaco Group Ltd, had entered into a series of written, formally bilateral, agreements between 10 September 1994 and 31 December 1999, amounting in practice to a tripartite agreement under which those undertakings shared or contributed to sharing product markets (for hard haberdashery products) and geographic markets (for needles). In addition, the undertakings participated in bilateral or trilateral meetings between 10 May 1993 and 8 November 2001.
60. Komisija je svojo odločbo zlasti utemeljila na obstoju klavzul o medsebojnem pogojevanju, ki so jih vsebovale zgoraj omenjene vrste sporazumov. Te klavzule so bile čez čas obnovljene.	60. The Commission based its decision in particular on the existence of inter-conditional clauses contained in the above-mentioned series of agreements. These clauses were renewed over time.
61. Komisija je določila tri upoštevne proizvodne trge: (i) evropski trg šivank za ročno šivanje in obrt (vključno s posebnimi šivankami), na katerem je prišlo do delitve proizvodnih in geografskih trgov, (ii) evropski trg za „druge proizvode za šivanje in pletenje, vključno z iglami in pletilkami“ ter (iii) evropski trg za druge proizvode trde galanterije, vključno z zadrgami in drugimi zaponkami, kjer je na obeh delitev proizvodnega trga potekala samo od 10. septembra 1994 do 13. marca 1997.	61. The Commission identified three relevant product markets: (i) the European market for hand sewing and craft needles (including special needles), in which the product and geographic market sharing took place, (ii) the European market in “other sewing and knitting products including pins, knitting pins/knitting needles” and (iii) the European market for other hard haberdashery products including zips and other fasteners, in both of which the product market sharing only took place from 10 September 1994 to 13 March 1997.
62. Kršitev je bila po naravi zelo resna, saj je zadevala delitev proizvodnega in geografskega trga med različnimi trgi. Sporazumi o delitvi proizvodnega trga so posegali na različne stopnje trga, tj. v proizvodnjo in distribucijo (na stopnjah prodaje na debelo in drobno), saj je bila družba Coats večinoma dobavitelj šivank, vendar je na ravni prodaje na drobno s svojo blagovno znamko šivank „Milward“ tekmoval z družbama Prym in Entaco.	62. The infringement was very serious by nature given that it concerned product and geographic market sharing between different markets. The product market sharing agreements intervened at different market levels, i.e. manufacturing and distribution (at both the wholesale and retail levels) as Coats was mainly a distributor of needles but competed at the retail level with Prym and Entaco with its retailer’s needle brand “Milward”.
63. Po obvestilu o prizanesljivosti iz leta 1996 je Komisija Entacu dodelila popolno izvzetje iz denarne kazni, ki bi bila drugače uvedena, ker je podjetje Komisijo obvestilo o obstoju sporazumov o delitvi trga in zagotovilo odločilne dokaze, brez katerih ti ne bi mogli biti sklenjeni. Družbi Coats in Prym, ki sta s svojimi hčerinskimi podjetji skupno in solidarno odgovorna, sta prejeli denarno kazen v višini 30 milijonov EUR vsak.	63. Under the 1996 leniency notice, the Commission granted Entaco full exemption from the fine that would otherwise have been imposed for having informed the Commission of the existence of the market sharing agreements and providing decisive evidence without which they might not have been established. Coats and Prym, jointly and severally liable with their respective subsidiaries, each received a fine of EUR 30 million.
Holin klorid[80]	Choline chloride[80]
64. Komisija je 9. decembra sprejela odločbo proti družbam Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Nederland BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals International BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals BV in Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals BV, skupno in solidarno odgovorni, Chinook Group Limited Partnership in Chinook Group Limited, skupno in solidarno odgovorni, BASF AG, Bioproducts Incorporated, DuCoa LP in UCB SA.	64. On 9 December, the Commission adopted a decision finding against Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Nederland BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals International BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals BV and Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals BV, jointly and severally, Chinook Group Limited Partnership and Chinook Group Limited, jointly and severally, BASF AG, Bioproducts Incorporated, DuCoa LP and UCB SA.
65. Te družbe so s sodelovanjem v kartelu industrije holin klorida kršile evropska pravila konkurence. Kar zadeva EGP je kartel industrije holin klorida deloval na dveh različnih, vendar tesno povezanih ravneh, na svetovni in evropski ravni. Na svetovni ravni so vsi proizvajalci, ki so predmet tega postopka, med junijem 1992 in aprilom 1994 sodelovali v protikonkurenčnih dejavnostih glede EGP. Te dejavnosti so vključevale določanje in dviganje globalnih cen, razdeljevanje svetovnih trgov, nadzor dobaviteljev in predelovalcev ter izmenjavo poslovno občutljivih informacij.	65. These undertakings infringed the European competition rules by participating in a cartel in the choline chloride industry. As far as the EEA is concerned, the choline chloride cartel operated at two different, but closely related levels, the global level and the European level. At the global level, all producers subject to this proceeding participated in anticompetitive activities concerning the EEA between June 1992 and April 1994. These activities included the setting and raising of worldwide prices, the allocation of worldwide markets, the control of distributors and converters and the exchange of commercially sensitive information.
66. Severnoameriški proizvajalci se niso udeležili vrste nadaljnjih protikonkurenčnih sestankov, ki so strogo potekali samo med evropskimi proizvajalci, zato da so uskladili svoje ravnanje na evropskem trgu. Ti sestanki so potekali med marcem 1994 in oktobrom 1998. Dejavnosti so zajemale določanje in dviganje cen (za EGP kot celoto, za določene nacionalne trge in posamezne stranke), razdeljevanje posameznih strank med udeležene družbe, razdeljevanje tržnih deležev za vsako družbo na celotnem trgu EGP, nadzor nad dobavitelji in predelovalci ter izmenjavo poslovno občutljivih informacij.	66. The North American producers did not participate in a series of further anticompetitive meetings held strictly among the European producers in order to coordinate their behaviour on the European market. These meetings took place in the period between March 1994 and October 1998. Activities included the setting and raising of prices (both for the EEA as a whole, for particular national markets and for individual customers), the allocation of individual customers among the participating undertakings, the allocation of market shares for each undertaking on the EEA market as a whole, the control of distributors and converters and the exchange of commercially sensitive information.
67. Velikost svetovnega trga za holin klorid, ki se večinoma uporablja v industriji živalske krme, je bila leta 1997, ki je bilo zadnje leto, v katerem je kršitev potekala vse leto, ocenjena na 183,7 milijona, od tega pa je EGP znašal 52,6 milijona EUR. Med obdobjem preiskave so proizvajalci, vpleteni v kršitev, nadzirali več kot 80 % svetovnega trga. Zadevni evropski proizvajalci so nadzirali blizu 80 % območja EGP.	67. The size of the worldwide market for choline chloride, mainly used in the animal feed industry, was estimated at EUR 183.7 million in 1997, the last full year of the infringement, the EEA accounting for EUR 52.6 million. During the period under investigation, the producers involved in the infringement controlled more than 80% of the world market. The European producers concerned controlled close to 80% of the EEA area.
68. Severnoameriški proizvajalci so ob koncu svetovnega srečanja, ki je potekalo med 14. in 20. aprilom 1994, prenehali sodelovati v kršitvi. Prvi ukrep Komisije za preiskavo kršitve je bil uveden 26. maja 1999. Ker je bilo to več kot pet let po prenehanju sodelovanja ameriških proizvajalcev v kršitvi, Komisija ameriškim proizvajalcem Bioproducts, Chinook in DuCoa ni naložila denarnih kazni.	68. The North American producers ended their participation in the infringement at the end of the global meeting which took place between 14 and 20 April 1994. The first action taken by the Commission to investigate the infringement was on 26 May 1999. As this took place more than five years after the North American producers had ended their participation in the infringement, no fines were imposed on the North American producers, Bioproducts, Chinook and DuCoa.
69. Komisija je evropskim proizvajalcem naložila naslednje kazni: 20,99 milijona EUR za skupno in solidarno odgovornost družbam Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Nederland BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals International BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals BV in Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals BV, 34,97 milijona EUR družbi BASF AG in 10,38 milijona EUR družbi UCB SA.	69. The Commission imposed the following fines on the European producers: EUR 20.99 million jointly and severally on Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Nederland BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals International BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals BV and Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals BV, EUR 34.97 million on BASF AG and EUR 10.38 million on UCB SA.
3. Drugi sporazumi in usklajena ravnanja	3. Other agreements and concerted practices
3.1 Odločbe Komisije	3.1 Commission decisions
Air France/Alitalia[81]	Air France/Alitalia[81]
70. Komisija je 7. aprila odobrila povezavo med družbama Air France in Alitalia, pod pogojem pomembnih obvez s strani obeh pogodbenic. Pogoji v odločbi si prizadevajo za znižanje vstopnih ovir in novim tekmecem ponujajo dejansko možnost, da se uveljavijo kot verodostojni tekmeci. Komisija je določila sedem poti, ki se prekrivajo ter kjer bi lahko kombinacija sil družb Air France in Alitalia izključila ali pomembno zmanjšala konkurenco. To so Pariz–Milano, Pariz–Rim, Pariz–Benetke, Pariz–Firence, Pariz–Bologna, Pariz–Neapelj in Milano–Lyon, kjer sta bili družbi Air France in Alitalia pred povezavo dva glavna tekmeca. Ko sta se družbi dogovorili zlasti o tem, da se bosta odpovedali zadostnemu številu vzletnih in pristajalnih stez na letališčih ter odobrili različne druge protiukrepe za vzpostavitev učinkovite konkurence na teh poteh, je Komisija ta posel lahko potrdila[82].	70. On 7 April, the Commission approved the alliance between Air France and Alitalia, subject to substantive undertakings from the parties. The conditions imposed in the decision aim to reduce entry barriers and offer new entrants a real chance to establish themselves as credible competitors. The Commission identified seven overlap routes where the combination of the forces of Air France and Alitalia would eliminate or significantly reduce competition. These are Paris-Milan, Paris-Rome, Paris-Venice, Paris-Florence, Paris-Bologna, Paris-Naples and Milan-Lyon, where, prior to the alliance, Air France and Alitalia were the two main competitors. After the companies agreed in particular to surrender a sufficient number of take-off and landing slots at airports and to grant various other remedies to restore effective competition on these routes, the Commission was in a position to clear this transaction[82].
Topps[83]	Topps [83]
71. Komisija je 26. maja sprejela odločbo[84] o naložitvi denarne kazni 1,59 milijona EUR družbi The Topps Company Inc in njenim hčerinskim podjetjem, Topps Europe Ltd, Topps International Ltd, Topps UK Ltd in Topps Italia SRL („Topps“), zaradi kršitve člena 81(1) Pogodbe. Skupina Topps proizvaja zbirateljske proizvode, kot so nalepke ali kartice z nogometaši ali junaki iz risank.	71. On 26 May, the Commission adopted a decision[84] imposing a fine of EUR 1.59 million on The Topps Company Inc and its European subsidiaries, Topps Europe Ltd, Topps International Ltd, Topps UK Ltd and Topps Italia SRL (“Topps”) for infringing Article 81(1) of the Treaty. The Topps group produces collectible products such as stickers or trading cards featuring soccer players or cartoon characters.
72. Komisija je ugotovila, da je družba Topps sklenila vrsto sporazumov in usklajenih ravnanj z nekaterimi svojimi posredniki v Veliki Britaniji, Italiji, na Finskem, v Nemčiji, Franciji in Španiji, zato da bi omejil vzporeden uvoz zbirateljskega proizvoda Pokémon. Pokémon je ime za vrsto junakov, ki so bili najprej izdelani za videoigro Nintenda „Game Boy“, vendar jih je pod licenco uporabljala tudi družba Topps, ki je te zbirateljske proizvode oblikoval kot nalepke ali kartice. Leta 2000 je obstajalo veliko povpraševanje po zbirateljskih proizvodih Pokémon, medtem ko so se cene med državami članicami močno razlikovale. Družine v državah z visokimi cenami, kot je Finska, so morale plačevati več kot dvakrat več za enako nalepko Pokémon kot družina na Portugalskem.	72. The Commission found that Topps entered into a series of agreements and concerted practices with several of its intermediaries in the United Kingdom, Italy, Finland, Germany, France and Spain with the object of restricting parallel imports of Pokémon collectibles. Pokémon is the name for a whole range of characters originally developed for the Nintendo ‘Game Boy’ videogame but also used, under a licence, by Topps to illustrate collectible products like stickers or trading cards. In 2000, there was a huge demand for such Pokémon collectibles while prices between Member States differed significantly. Families in high-price countries like Finland had to pay more than twice as much for the same Pokémon stickers as families in Portugal.
73. Takšne omejitve vzporedne trgovine so Komisija in sodišča Skupnosti v preteklosti večkrat nedvoumno obsodili. Pomenijo zelo resno kršitev člena 81(1) ES, saj ogrožajo temeljno načelo notranjega trga. Z zgoraj opisanimi ukrepi je družba Topps dobaviteljem in končno potrošnikom preprečila, da bi uživali ugodnosti očitnih razlik v cenah, ki so obstajale med državami članicami.	73. Such restrictions on parallel trade have been unequivocally condemned by the Commission and the Community Courts many times in the past. They constitute very serious violations of Article 81(1) EC jeopardising a fundamental principle of the internal market. Through the measures described above, Topps prevented distributors and ultimately consumers from benefiting from the significant price differences existing between Member States.
74. Odločba je bila naslovljena na vsa štiri evropska hčerinska podjetja družbe Topps, ki so sodelovala v protikonkurenčnih sporazumih in usklajenih ravnanjih, ter na končno matično podjetje v ZDA zaradi njegovega odločilnega vpliva na vodenje hčerinskih podjetij, ki so popolnoma v njegovi lasti. Odločba ni bila naslovljena na posrednike družbe Topps, ker je bila njihova odgovornost za kršitve manj pomembna. Pri določanju zneska denarne kazni je Komisija obravnavala kršitev, ki jo je povzročila družba Topps, kljub njeni zelo resni naravi, kot resno predvsem zato, ker dokazi v spisu Komisije niso pokazali, da so bile omejitve vzporednih uvozov načrtno uporabljene za vse posrednike.	74. The decision was addressed to all four European Topps subsidiaries which participated in the anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices and to the ultimate US parent company in view of its decisive influence on the conduct of its wholly owned subsidiaries. The decision was not addressed to Topps’s intermediaries because their responsibility for the infringement was less significant. In fixing the amount of the fine, the Commission considered the infringement committed by Topps, in spite of its very serious nature, as serious mainly because the evidence in the Commission file did not show that that the restrictions on parallel imports were applied systematically to all intermediaries.
Polje 4: Trgi za upravljanje pravic v EU Razvoj velike raznolikosti evropske glasbe in kulture na novih vseevropskih internetnih trgih je v splošnem okviru lizbonskih ciljev izredno pomemben. To pomeni, da je potrebna nova dinamika pri trženju evropskih glasbenih pravic uporabnikom teh pravic, ki lahko razširijo evropsko navzočnost v teh medijih, ob ohranjanju ustreznih okoliščin za razvoj lokalne vsebine. Kar zadeva uporabo pravil konkurence pri storitvah upravljanja pravic, zahtevajo protikonkurenčne omejitve v sektorju, pa tudi konkurenčne spodbude za učinkovito zagotavljanje teh storitev posebno pozornost. Komisija je na tem področju v svoji odločbi IFPI[85] predložila nekatere smernice. V tem času je bilo preverjeno izvajanje nekaterih načel, ki se izražajo v tej odločbi, in se tudi sedaj precej na splošno uporabljajo, kadar člani IFPI izdajajo vseevropska dovoljenja za spletno predvajanje glasbe, glede na pravice, ki jih imajo.Kar zadeva tako imenovani „Sporazum iz Santiaga“[86] v zvezi z upravljanjem avtorskih glasbenih pravic prek medmrežja, je Komisija k sedanjemu sporazumu dala formalno obvestilo o nasprotovanju[87], ki opozarja podjetja, vpletena v upravljanje kolektivnih pravic, na pomisleke glede konkurence, ki jih navaja ta sporazum, zlasti na drobljenje trgov zaradi omejitve gospodarskega bivanja. Sporočilo, izdano aprila, določa prihodnja načela upravljanja, ki jih je Komisija predlagala za sektor.[88] Z vidika konkurence so zlasti pomembna naslednja vprašanja: ozemeljske omejitve ne bi smele ovirati vzpostavitve novih vseevropskih ureditev „vse na enem mestu“, ki se zahtevajo za doseganje učinkovitosti za vseevropsko in svetovno podeljevanje dovoljenj na novih glasbenih trgih v Evropski uniji. V okviru zakonodaje o konkurenci bo Komisija podpirala sporazume „vse na enem mestu“ ter s tem povezane vzajemne sporazume med sistemi za kolektivno upravljanje pravic. Vendar Komisija ne more dovoliti, da se omejitve iz preteklosti še naprej ohranijo tam, kjer niso več nujno potrebne. Lastniki pravic morajo biti sposobni določiti ustrezno mešanico med individualnim in kolektivnim upravljanjem svojih glasbenih pravic. Ureditve ne smejo po nepotrebnem združevati ponudb za upravljanje pravic. Omogočen mora biti razvoj individualnega upravljanja pravic. Ob upoštevanju sposobnosti preživetja sistemov za kolektivno upravljanje bi morali imeti lastniki pravic možnost, da nove digitalne tehnike upravljanja pravic uporabijo za individualno upravljanje. \|	Box 4: Rights management markets in the EU The development of a strong presence of the diversity of European music and European culture in the new Europe-wide online markets is of vital concern in the overall context of the Lisbon objectives. This means that a new dynamism is needed in marketing European music rights to the users of the rights who can expand European presence in those media while maintaining suitable conditions for the development of local content. As regards the application of competition rules to rights management services, anticompetitive restrictions in the sector, as well as competitive incentives for the efficient provision of such services, require special attention. The Commission has given some guidance in this area in its IFPI decision[85]. Some of the principles reflected in that decision have been proven in the meantime in implementation and are now also applied quite generally when EU-wide licences for webcasting of music are issued by the members of IFPI concerning the rights they hold. As regards the so-called “Santiago agreement”[86] concerning the management of copyright for music via the Internet, the Commission has issued a formal statement of objections[87] to the current agreement, pointing the collective rights management companies involved to the competition concerns raised by this agreement, notably market partitioning due to an economic residence restriction. A communication issued in April sets out the future governance principles the Commission proposes for the sector.[88] From a competition perspective, the following issues are particularly important: The creation of new EU-wide one-stop-shop arrangements that are required for gaining efficiencies for EU-wide and global rights licensing in the new music markets in the European Union should not be hampered by territorial restrictions. Under competition law, the Commission will look favourably at one–stop-shop agreements and the related reciprocal agreements between collective rights management systems. However, the Commission cannot allow past restrictions to be perpetuated where they are no longer indispensable. Rights owners must be able to determine themselves the proper mix between individual rights management and collective management of their music rights. Arrangements must not bundle unnecessarily rights management offerings. Individual administration of rights must be allowed to develop. Bearing the viability of collective management systems in mind, rights owners should have the option of using new digital rights management techniques to manage rights individually. \|
- Združenje belgijskih arhitektov[89]	- Belgian Architects’ Association[89]
75. Komisija je 24. junija obsodila priporočeno lestvico minimalnih honorarjev Združenja belgijskih arhitektov.	75. On 24 June, the Commission condemned the recommended minimum fee scale operated by the Belgian Architects’ Association.
76. Nacionalni svet Združenja belgijskih arhitektov je leta 1967 sprejel lestvico minimalnih honorarjev, ki je bila potem večkrat spremenjena. Zadnja sprememba iz junija 2002 je to lestvico opisala kot „smernico“ ( indicatif/leidraad ). Lestvica je določala minimalne honorarje, ki jih je treba plačati arhitektu za individualne storitve, opravljene v Belgiji.	76. The minimum fee scale was adopted by the National Council of the Belgian Architects’ Association in 1967, and was amended several times thereafter. Its most recent amendment, in June 2002, described it as a “guideline” ( indicatif/leidraad ). The scale laid down the minimum fees due to an architect for services performed in independent practice in Belgium.
77. Komisija je menila, da je bila odločitev o sprejetju lestvice honorarjev neodvisno dejanje na podlagi predpisa, za katerega je Združenje, ki deluje kot združenje podjetij, v celoti odgovorno. Poleg tega je Komisija sklenila, da je Združenje s svojimi odločbami o določitvi in spremembi lestvice poskušalo usklajevati vedenje svojih članov na trgu. Komisija je tudi ugotovila, da je bila lestvica vsaj do neke mere uporabljena.	77. The Commission considered that the decision adopting the fee scale was an independent act of a prescriptive character for which the Association, acting as an association of undertakings, was wholly responsible. Furthermore, the Commission concluded that the Association intended to coordinate its members’ behaviour in the market through its decisions laying down and amending the scale. The Commission also found that the scale was applied at least to some extent.
78. Dokazi, da je lestvica skušala omejiti konkurenco, so zajemali naslov in izjave v preambuli, ki so namerno zvenele kot pravilo, dejstvo, da je Združenje 18 let pripravljalo in naokrog razpošiljalo standardno pogodbo, v kateri je bila edina možnost za določitev honorarjev sklicevanje na lestvico, ter dejstvo, da je Združenje naredilo več, kot samo obveščalo svoje člane, stranke in sodišča.	78. The evidence indicating that the scale sought to restrict competition included the intentionally rule-making tone of the title and of the recitals in the preamble, the fact that for 18 years the Association drew up and circulated a standard contract in which the only option for determining fees was a reference to the scale, and the fact that the Association went far beyond merely circulating information to its members, to clients and to the courts.
79. Čeprav je odločba o določitvi ali priporočitvi minimalnih honorarjev po naravi zelo resna, je Komisija kršitev z vidika okoliščin, da lestvice honorarjev verjetno niso uporabljali vsi arhitekti in da je bil geografski obseg odločbe omejen na eno državo članico, v celoti označila kot resno.	79. Although a decision fixing or recommending minimum fees is by nature a very serious infringement, the Commission classified the infringement overall as serious in the light of the circumstances that the fee scale had probably not been applied universally by all architects and that the geographic scope of the decision was limited to one Member State.
80. Pri naložitvi denarne kazni 100 000 EUR je Komisija kot olajševalno okoliščino upoštevala dejstvo, da je na strani Združenja lahko obstajal upravičen dvom o tem, ali so njegove pristojbine dejansko pomenile kršitev, preden je Komisija leta 1993 sprejela svojo odločbo CNSD [90] . Poleg tega je politika Komisije, določena v njenem poročilu z dne 9. februarja 2004, spodbuditi nacionalne regulativne organe in poklicna združenja k reviziji in spremembi njihovih omejevalnih pravil ter jim za to dati možnost. Znesek denarne kazni kaže tudi postopnost[91] Komisije pri kaznovanju protikonkurenčnih praks v poklicih.	80. In imposing a fine of EUR 100 000, the Commission regarded as a mitigating circumstance the fact that reasonable doubt may have existed on the part of the Association as to whether its fee scale did indeed constitute an infringement before the Commission adopted its CNSD decision in 1993[90]. Furthermore, the Commission’s policy, set out in its Report of 9 February 2004, is to encourage the national regulatory authorities and professional bodies to revise and amend their restrictive rules, and give them the opportunity to do so. The amount of the fine also reflects a gradual approach[91] by the Commission in fining anticompetitive practices in the professions.
Gaz de France[92]	Gaz de France[92]
81. Komisija je 26. oktobra sprejela dve odločbi o pogodbah, ki ju je leta 1997 sklenila družba Gaz de France (GDF), eno z italijansko plinsko družbo ENI in drugo z italijansko elektroenergetsko družbo ENEL. Predmet pogodbe med družbama GDF in ENI je bil transport zemeljskega plina, ki ga je izvedla družba GDF čez francosko ozemlje do švicarske meje in družba ENI načrpala v severni Evropi. Pogodba je vsebovala klavzulo, ki je od družbe ENI zahtevala, da trži zemeljski plin izključno „pod točko ponovne dobave“, to je po zapustitvi Francije. Pogodba med družbama GDF in ENEL je zadevala zamenjavo utekočinjenega zemeljskega plina, ki ga je družba ENEL pridobila v Nigeriji, in je vsebovala klavzulo, ki od družbe ENEL zahteva, da uporablja plin v Italiji.	81. On 26 October, the Commission adopted two decisions concerning two contracts concluded by Gaz de France (GDF) in 1997, one with the Italian gas company ENI, the other with the Italian electricity company ENEL. The subject of the contract between GDF and ENI was the transport by GDF over French territory to the Swiss border of natural gas acquired by ENI in northern Europe. The contract contained a clause requiring ENI to market the gas exclusively “downstream of the redelivery point”, that is after leaving France. The GDF-ENEL contract concerned the swap of liquefied natural gas acquired by ENEL in Nigeria and contained a clause requiring ENEL to use the gas in Italy.
82. Komisija je sklenila, da sta obe klavzuli omejevali ozemlje, na katerem bi lahko pogodbenice uporabljale plin, in sta bili usmerjeni v drobljenje nacionalnih trgov tako, da sta potrošnikom zemeljskega plina v Franciji preprečevali, da bi prejeli dobave družb ENEL in ENI. Zato klavzuli pomenita omejevanje konkurence v smislu člena 81 ES in pomembno oviro za uresničitev resnično konkurenčnega in vseevropskega trga s plinom.	82. The Commission concluded that the two clauses restricted the territory in which the parties could use the gas and were designed to partition national markets by preventing consumers of natural gas established in France from obtaining supplies from ENEL and ENI. They therefore constituted a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81 EC and a considerable obstacle to the creation of a truly competitive and Europe-wide gas market.
83. Ti dve odločbi sta toliko pomembnejši z vidika liberalizacije, ki se je v zadnjih letih začela v evropskem sektorju plina, katerega koristi se uresničujejo le počasi. Ozemeljske omejitve so eden ključnih elementov v sklopu praks, ki ohranjajo drobljenje evropskega trga in prispevajo k pomanjkanju pretočnosti v sektorju. Ob upoštevanju posebnosti evropskega sektorja plina in okoliščin primera se je Komisija vseeno odločila, da ne bo naložila denarnih kazni.	83. These two decisions are all the more important in view of the liberalisation process that has started in the European gas sector in recent years, the benefits of which are only slowly materialising. Territorial restrictions are one of the key elements in a set of practices which perpetuate the partitioning of the European market and contribute to a lack of fluidity in the sector. Taking account of the specificities of the European gas sector and the circumstances of the case, the Commission decided, nevertheless, not to impose fines.
3.2 Razvoj drugih primerov	3.2 Other case developments
Prvovrstna vsebina za medijske trge	Premium content for media markets
84. Komisija še naprej daje posebno prednost konkurenci glede prvovrstne vsebine kot dejavniku inovacij na medijskih trgih, da bi tako prispevala k na znanju temelječi družbi. Pomemben sklop primerov je povezan s pravicami za športne dogodke, kjer je Komisija sprejela uravnotežen pristop: boj proti koncentracijskim in omejevalnim učinkom politike trženja, ki se na eni strani opira na široke in izključne posle enega prodajalca, medtem ko na drugi strani upošteva možne učinkovitosti, povezane z združevanjem vsebin.	84. The Commission continues to give high priority to competition over premium content as a driver for innovation in the media markets with a view to contributing to the knowledge-based society. One important set of cases concerns rights for sport events, where the Commission has taken a balanced line: fighting the concentrative and restrictive effects of a marketing policy relying on broad and exclusive deals by a single seller on the one hand while taking into account possible efficiencies associated with the aggregation of content on the other.
85. V primeru nemške nogometne lige Bundesliga , ki zadeva skupno trženje medijskih pravic do izkoriščanja v zvezi s tekmami v prvi in drugi nemški nacionalni nogometni ligi za moške, je Komisija menila, da bi lahko izključna prodaja komercialnih pravic radiodifuznega oddajanja ligaškega združenja omejila konkurenco med klubi ter podjetji v prvi in drugi ligi.	85. In the Bundesliga case, which concerns joint marketing of the media exploitation rights in respect of matches in the German first and second national football divisions for men, the Commission considered that the exclusive selling of the commercial broadcasting rights by the league association could restrict competition between the clubs and companies in the first and second divisions.
86. Po obvestilu o predhodni oceni na začetku leta 2004 je ligaško združenje ponudilo izpolnitev zavez, ki so bile tržno preizkušene[93] septembra[94].	86. Following notification of a preliminary assessment earlier in 2004, the league association offered commitments which were market-tested[93] in September[94].
87. Komisija je tudi nadaljevala postopek v zvezi z angleško nogometno ligo English Premier League (FAPL)[95] z objavo sporočila o izpolnjevanju zavez, ki jih je ponudil FAPL[96]. Postopki v zvezi s sistemom Eurovision so se nadaljevali s preiskavo o ugotavljanju dejstev glede nekaterih vidikov skupne nabave in delitve športnih programov med javnimi radijskimi in televizijskimi postajami – člani Evropske zveze za radiodifuzijo, vključno s pravicami za olimpijske igre leta 2010/2012. Predlogi in nasveti Evropske zveze za radiodifuzijo za zagotovitev združljivosti sistema Eurovision s pravili konkurence EU bodo morali za ta primer upoštevati smernice sodišča[97].	87. The Commission also further pursued its procedure with regard to the English Premier League (FAPL)[95] by publishing a communication on the commitments offered by FAPL[96]. The ongoing proceedings concerning the Eurovision system continued with a fact-finding investigation concerning several aspects of the joint purchasing and sharing of sport programmes, including the rights for the 2010/2012 Olympic Games, by public broadcasters – members of EBU. EBU’s proposals and suggestions to ensure that the Eurovision system is compatible with the EU competition rules will need to follow the Courts’ guidance in the case[97].
88. Komisija je 26. oktobra razglasila zaključek svoje preiskave[98] tako imenovanih klavzul o državi z največjimi ugodnostmi[99] iz pogodb, sklenjenih med hollywoodskimi filmskimi studii in družbami naročniških televizij, razen kar zadeva dva studia.	88. On 26 October, the Commission announced the closure of its investigation[98] into the so-called Most Favoured Nation (MFN[99]) clauses found in the contracts of Hollywood film studios with pay television companies, except with regard to two studios.
89. Klavzule o državi z največjimi ugodnostmi se čutijo v večini „dogovorov o produkciji“ med hollywoodskimi filmskimi studii in evropskimi naročniškimi radiodifuznimi hišami. Dogovori o produkciji so v hollywoodski filmski industriji običajni, značilno je, da se studii sporazumejo o prodaji svoje celotne filmske produkcije radiodifuznim hišam za določeno obdobje. Klavzule o državi z največjimi ugodnostmi so dale studiem pravico do uživanja najugodnejših pogojev, dogovorjenih med družbo naročniške televizije in katerim koli od njih.	89. MFN clauses featured in most of the “Output deals” between the Hollywood film studios and the European pay-TV broadcasters. Output deals are common in the Hollywood film industry, where the studios typically agree to sell to broadcasters their entire film production for a given period of years. The MFN clauses gave the studios the right to enjoy the most favourable terms agreed between a pay-TV company and any one of them.
90. Po Komisijini predhodni oceni je bil kumulativni učinek klavzul o državi z največjimi ugodnostmi uskladitev cen, plačanih studiem, saj je katero koli zvišanje, dogovorjeno z enim studiem, sprožilo pravico do vzporednega zvišanja za druge studie. Komisija meni, da je takšno določanje cen v nasprotju z osnovnim načelom cenovne konkurence.	90. According to the Commission’s preliminary assessment, the cumulative effect of MFN clauses was an alignment of the prices paid to the studios as any increase agreed with one studio triggered a right to a parallel price increase for the other studios. The Commission considers that such a way of setting prices is at odds with the basic principle of price competition.
91. Ne da bi studii priznali kršitev konkurenčnega prava, so se studii, v zvezi s katerimi so se preiskave zaključile, v obstoječih sporazumih odločili, da opustijo klavzule o državi z največjimi ugodnostmi. Če tega novega vedenja ne bodo opustili, proti njim niso predvideni nobeni ukrepi. Preiskava ostaja odprta v zvezi z družbama NPB Universal in Paramount Pictures Corp. Inc., ki tega nista upoštevali.	91. Without admitting a violation of competition law, the studios in regard of which investigations were closed decided to waive the MFN clauses in their existing agreements. Insofar as they do not deviate from this new behaviour, further action is not envisaged against them. The investigation remains open in respect of NPB Universal and Paramount Pictures Corp. Inc., which have not followed suit.
3.3 Preiskave sektorjev	3.3 Sector inquiries
Preiskava prodaje športnih pravic za uporabo v omrežjih 3G[100]	Sector inquiry into the sale of sports rights for use over 3G networks[100]
92. Uvajanje mobilne tehnologije tretje generacije (3G) se po svetu hitro razširja, saj število potrošnikov te tehnologije raste hitreje kot pri omrežju GSM na isti točki razvoja.	92. Third generation mobile technology (3G) is now being rapidly deployed around the world, with customer growth at a rate faster than that experienced by GSM at the same point in its development.
93. Komisija je pospešila prizadevanja za preprečevanje protikonkurenčnega vedenja, ki bi lahko oviralo razvoj tega ključnega, na novo nastajajočega trga.	93. The Commission stepped up its efforts to prevent anticompetitive behaviour that could hamper the development of this key emerging market.
94. Komisija je določila več vrst vedenja uveljavljenih akterjev, ki bi lahko novim medijskim operaterjem omejila dostop do ključne športne vsebine, kot so zavračanje ponudbe, povezava televizijskih pravic s pravicami do novih medijev/UMTS, prepovedi, ki dajejo prednost televizijski pokritosti pred novimi vrstami pokritosti, ali nakup pravic do novih medijev/UMTS, ki ga na ekskluzivni podlagi opravijo uveljavljeni akterji.	94. The Commission has identified several types of behaviour by established players that could restrict access to key sports content by new media operators, such as refusals to supply, the bundling of TV rights with new media/UMTS rights, embargoes favouring TV coverage over new types of coverage or the purchase of new media/UMTS rights on an exclusive basis by established players.
95. Za celotno oceno posebnosti trga ter soočenje z obstoječimi in možnimi težavami v zvezi z dostopom do vsebin za 3G je Komisija skupaj z nadzornim organom EFTA 30. januarja sprožila preiskavo sektorja prodaje športnih pravic za uporabo v omrežjih 3G.	95. To fully appraise the specifics of the market, and tackle the existing and potential problems relating to content access for 3G, the Commission initiated on 30 January a sector inquiry into the sale of sports rights for use over 3G networks, jointly with the EFTA Surveillance Authority.
96. Prva, raziskovalna faza je bila zaključena avgusta. Omogočila je zbiranje informacij o statusu uvajanja 3G, vključno s prodajo pravic 3G mobilnim operaterjem, ter zagotovila pregled vrste omejitev, uvedenih na športne pravice 3G. Zahteve po informacijah so bile naslovljene na številne, večinoma velike, televizijske kanale, mobilne operaterje in lastnike vsebin.	96. The first, exploratory, phase was completed in August. It allowed for information gathering on the status of 3G deployment, including the sale of 3G rights to mobile operators, and provided an overview of the type of restrictions imposed on 3G sports rights. Information requests were addressed to a number of, mostly large, television channels, mobile operators and content owners.
97. Druga faza, uvedena septembra, razširja preiskavo na široko vrsto akterjev na trgu, vendar vključuje tudi nadaljnje vprašalnike za akterje, vključene v prvi fazi. Ta faza mora zagotoviti podrobne informacije o pogodbah, ki vplivajo na določbo o športnih pravicah 3G.	97. The second phase launched in September extends the inquiry to a wider range of players in the market, but also includes follow-up questionnaires to players addressed in the first phase. This phase should provide detailed information on the contracts affecting 3G sports rights provision.
Polje 5: Distribucija in popravilo motornih vozil	Box 5: Motor vehicle distribution and repair
Komisija je med letom 2004 še naprej spremljala izvajanje Uredbe št. 1400/2002 in zagotavljala pomoč zainteresiranim strankam v zvezi z njeno razlago. V tem obdobju je bilo mogoče opaziti nekatere nastajajoče trende. Zlasti so cene avtomobilov povprečno rasle počasneje od cen drugega blaga ter hkrati pokazale jasne znake večje konvergence po vsej EU. Konsolidacija mrež trgovcev se je nadaljevala, vendar je veliko trgovcev, katerih pogodbe so bile prekinjene zaradi reorganizacij mrež, lahko izkoristilo prednost skupinske izjeme in ostalo na trgu v vlogi pooblaščenih serviserjev. Prišlo je tudi do novih naložb v boljšo opremo za distribucijo in popravila. Vendar je jasno, da ti dogodki ne morejo biti več kot le predhodni pokazatelj za učinke nove skupinske izjeme, katere tržni učinki se lahko v celoti ocenijo samo na dolgi rok.	During 2004, the Commission continued to monitor the implementation of Regulation 1400/2002 and to provide assistance to interested parties as to its interpretation. Over this period, it has been possible to observe some emerging trends. In particular, car prices have on average been rising more slowly than prices for other goods and, at the same time, have shown clear signs of increased convergence across the EU. Consolidation in the dealer networks has continued, but many dealers whose contracts were terminated as a result of network reorganisations have been able to take advantage of the block exemption and remain on the market as authorised repairers. There have also been new investments in improved distribution and repair facilities. It is clear, however, that such developments can provide no more than a preliminary indication as regards the effects of the new block exemption, the market effects of which can only be fully assessed over the longer term.
Komisija je v skladu s svojo dolžnostjo za redno spremljanje delovanja Uredbe št. 1400/2002 izvedla poglobljeno spremljanje sistemov, ki so jih uvedli proizvajalci avtomobilov in tovornjakov, da bi neodvisnim operaterjem omogočili dostop do tehničnih informacij, povezanih s popravilom. Poleg tega je še naprej spremljala razvoj cen avtomobilov po vsej EU ter izdala dve poročili, februarja in julija. Zadnje je zajemalo prvih šest mesecev po začetku veljavnosti nove uredbe in prvič vsebuje podatke o vseh 25 državah članicah (o podrobnostih glej spodaj).	In line with its duty to monitor the operation of Regulation 1400/2002 on a regular basis, the Commission carried out an in-depth monitoring exercise of the systems put in place by car and truck manufacturers to allow independent operators to access repair-related technical information. Moreover, it continued to monitor car price developments across the EU, issuing two reports in February and July. The latter of these covered the first six months following the entry into force of the new Regulation, and for the first time contains data covering all 25 Member States (see below for details).
Poleg tega je Komisija v obdobju, ki ga pokriva to poročilo, svoje dejavnosti izvrševanja usmerila na določene primere, ki sprožajo pomembna vprašanja o konkurenci. Ta zadevajo težave v zvezi z dostopom pooblaščenih in neodvisnih serviserjev do rezervnih delov proizvajalca originalne opreme in tekmecev, mogoč obstoj umetnih ovir vstopu do mrež pooblaščenih serviserjev, pa tudi domnevne omejitve trgovcev pri prodaji motornih vozil konkurenčnih znamk. Medtem ko se ta vprašanja znotraj okvira preiskav, ki še potekajo, še vedno preučujejo, je Komisija predstavila svoje stališče v primeru v zvezi s sporazumi družbe Porsche o distribuciji in servisiranju, s katerim je pojasnila uporabo pravila de minimis v okviru izvajanja Uredbe št. 1400/2002 (glej spodaj).	Furthermore, over the period covered by this report, the Commission refocused its enforcement activities on certain cases that raise important competition issues. These include problems concerning authorised and independent repairers’ access to OEM’s and competing spare parts, the possible existence of artificial barriers to entry to the authorised repair networks, as well as alleged restrictions on dealers’ ability to sell motor vehicles of competing makes. While these issues are still being examined within the framework of ongoing investigations, the Commission stated its position in a case concerning Porsche’s distribution and servicing agreements, in which it clarified the application of the de minimis rule in the context of the implementation of Regulation 1400/2002 (see below).
Začetek veljavnosti Uredbe št. 1/2003 ter iz tega izhajajoče pooblastilo sodišč in organov za konkurenco v državah članicah sta organom za konkurenco prav tako zagotovila možnost, da v celoti uporabijo zadevno znanje v industriji motornih vozil in izkoriščajo mehanizme sodelovanja, vzpostavljene v mejah Evropske mreže za konkurenco. V zvezi s tem je Komisija 19. oktobra gostila delavnico, na kateri so predstavniki nacionalnih organov za konkurenco izmenjali izkušnje in razpravljali o izvajanju Uredbe št. 1400/2002.	The entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 and the resulting empowerment of Member State courts and competition authorities has also provided an opportunity for the competition authorities to make full use of respective knowledge in the motor vehicle sector and to exploit cooperation mechanisms set up within the ambit of the ECN. In this regard, on 19 October, the Commission hosted a workshop at which representatives of national competition authorities met to exchange experiences and to discuss the implementation of Regulation 1400/2002.
Dostop do tehničnih informacij	Access to technical information
Komisija je oktobra objavila študijo o dostopu neodvisnih operaterjev do tehničnih informacij v avtomobilski industriji. Študija, ki jo je na prošnjo Komisije izvedla IKA (Univerza v Aachnu), je preučevala, kako so proizvajalci izvajali uredbo v smislu zagotavljanja tehničnih informacij avtomehaničnim delavnicam, proizvajalcem orodij in izdajateljem. Vse te vrste operaterjev imajo pomembno vlogo pri zagotavljanju zdrave konkurence pri popravilu avtomobilov, zlasti ker napredek tehnologije zelo zaplete celo najosnovnejša popravila. Študija kaže, da so na voljo tehnične informacije za skoraj vse modele, vpeljane v zadnjih desetih letih, bodisi prek medmrežja, na CD/DVD in/ali na papirju. Kakovost zagotavljanja informacij pa je pogosto precej nezadovoljiva, saj je informacije težko najti ali pa so na voljo samo v velikih in dragih paketih. Vsebina je prav tako pogosto nezadostna, saj nekateri proizvajalci zadržujejo veliko informacij, ki so na primer pomembne za proizvajalce diagnostičnega orodja. Nazadnje imajo izdajatelji tehničnih informacij, katerih proizvode neodvisni serviserji zelo cenijo, velike težave pri pridobivanju potrebnih informacij.	In October, the Commission published a study on access to technical information by independent operators in the car sector. The study, which IKA (University of Aachen) carried out at the Commission’s request, looked at how manufacturers have complied with the Regulation in terms of providing technical information to garages, tool manufacturers and publishers. All these types of operator have an important role to play in ensuring healthy competition in car repair, particularly as advances intechnology are making even the most basic repairs increasingly complex. The study shows that technical information for almost all models launched within the last ten years is available, either via the Internet, on CD/DVD and/or on paper. The quality of information provision is, however, often quite unsatisfactory as the information is difficult to find or may only be available in large, costly packages. The content is also often insufficient, with some manufacturers holding back a great deal of information that is vital, for example, to diagnostic-tool manufacturers. Lastly, publishers of technical information, whose products are greatly valued by independent repairers, have trouble obtaining the information they need.
Pozitivni trendi pri razlikah v cenah avtomobilov	Positive trends as regards car price differentials
Komisija je marca in julija objavila poročili o razlikah v cenah avtomobilov znotraj Evropske unije. Z vidika konkurence sta zadnji dve izdaji, ki temeljita na podatkih iz novembra oziroma maja, razkrili precej zadovoljiv trend cenovne konvergence znotraj območja eura. Medtem ko izdaja poročila iz julija 2003 kaže, da so za eno tretjino modelov razlike v cenah presegle 20 % na celotnem območju eura, se je delež v zadnji izdaji znižal na skoraj eno četrtino modelov. Poleg tega je treba opozoriti, da ta konvergenca poteka ob upoštevanju relativne cenovne stabilnosti v EU. V primerjavi z julijem 2003 je cenovni indeks za avtomobile v EU julija 2004 narasel za samo 0,6 %, v primerjavi z 2,3-odstotnim povečanjem izmerjene inflacije. Zadnja julijska izdaja poročila o cenah avtomobilov prvič zajema cene v desetih novih državah članicah, ki se ne razlikujejo zelo od držav članic EU 15: nekateri modeli so cenejši v nekaterih novih državah članicah, medtem ko drugi niso. V primerjavi z julijem 2003 je cenovni indeks za avtomobile julija 2004 pomembno narasel na Poljskem (+8,4 %) in v Latviji (+4,1 %) ter se znižal v Estoniji (–6,8 %), Litvi (–4,9 %) in Češki (–3,3 %).	In March and July, the Commission published reports on car price differentials within the European Union. From a competition perspective, the last two issues, based on November and May data respectively, revealed a rather satisfactory trend towards price convergence within the euro area. While July 2003’s issue of the Report showed that for one third of models, price differentials exceeded 20% across the euro area, the proportion fell to nearly one quarter of the models in the latest issue. Moreover, it is worth noting that this convergence is taking place against a general background of relative price stability in the EU. Compared with July 2003, the price index for cars in the EU in July 2004 has increased by only 0.6% compared to 2.3% for headline inflation. For the first time, last July’s issue of the Car Price Report includes prices in the ten new Member States, which do not appear to be very different from those in the EU-15: some models are cheaper in some new Member Sates, but others are not. Compared with July 2003, the price index for cars in July 2004 significantly increased in Poland (+8.4%) and Latvia (+4.1%) but decreased in Estonia (-6.8%), Lithuania (-4.9%) and the Czech Republic (-3.3%).
Sporazumi družbe Porsche o distribuciji in pogarancijskem vzdrževanju	Porsche distribution and after sales service agreements
Komisija je 30. aprila zaključila postopke v zvezi z novimi standardnimi sporazumi o uvozu, prodaji in pooblaščenem servisu, ki jih je priglasila družba Porsche. Proizvajalec avtomobilov se je strinjal, da bo spremenil te sporazume, ki se uporabljajo po vsej EU in EGP, da bi tako zagotovil, da ne bodo več vsebovali nobenih „nedopustnih omejitev“, določenih v členu 4 Uredbe št. 1400/2002. Zlasti spremenjeni sporazumi o distribuciji ne omejujejo več zmogljivost trgovcev družbe Porsche, da sklepajo pogodbe o opravljanju pogarancijskega vzdrževanja s katerim koli pooblaščenim servisnim centrom družbe Porsche, medtem ko za servisne centre družbe Porsche ne velja več obveza, da prodajajo nove avtomobile.	On 30 April, the Commission closed proceedings in respect of the new standard importer, dealer and authorised repairer agreements that Porsche had notified. The carmaker agreed to modify these agreements, which are used across the EU and EEA, so as to ensure that they no longer contain any of the “hardcore restrictions” set out in Article 4 of Regulation 1400/2002. In particular, the amended distribution agreements no longer restrict the ability of Porsche dealers to subcontract the provision of after-sales services to any authorised Porsche service centre, while Porsche service centres are no longer obliged to sell new cars.
Komisija se je odločila, da ne bo nadaljevala svoje preiskave o drugih določbah sporazumov družbe Porsche o distribuciji, ker se je izkazalo, da je imela družba Porsche na vseh nacionalnih trgih EU za prodajo visokokakovostnih športnih avtomobilov in športnih terenskih avtomobilov manj kot 5-odstotni delež. Treba je opozoriti, da obvestilo de minimis ugotavlja, da ponudnik, ki deluje v distribucijskem sistemu na trgu, kjer skoraj vsi operaterji uporabljajo isto vrsto omejevalnih sporazumov, ne prispeva opazno h kumulativnemu učinku, če njegov tržni delež ne preseže 5 % in če sporazumi ne vsebujejo nedopustnih omejitev.	The Commission decided not to pursue its investigation further as regards other provisions of Porsche’s distribution agreements, since it appeared that Porsche had a share of less than 5% on all national markets in the EU for the sale of high-end sports cars and sport utility vehicles. It is to be recalled that the de minimis notice explains that a supplier that operates a distribution system in a market where almost all operators use the same type of restrictive agreements does not significantly contribute to the cumulative effect if its market share does not exceed 5% and if the agreements do not contain hardcore restrictions.
Kar zadeva sporazume o pogarancijskem vzdrževanju, je družba Porsche sprejela, da uporaba kvantitativne selektivne distribucije za svojo mrežo pooblaščenih servisnih centrov mogoče ne sodi v okvir skupinske izjeme, saj je tržni delež njene mreže za popravilo avtomobilov družbe Porsche višji od 30 % in obvestilo de minimis v tem primeru jasno ne velja. Uporaba samo kakovostne selekcije odpira mrežo usposobljenim operaterjem, ki bi želeli voditi pooblaščen servisni center družbe Porsche, zato se je družba Porsche strinjala, da bo vsakemu zainteresiranemu serviserju dala na razpolago ustrezna kakovostna merila.	As regards after-sales agreements, Porsche has accepted that it may not come within the scope of the block exemption if it uses quantitative selective distribution for its network of authorised Porsche service centres, since its network’s share of the market for the repair of Porsche cars is above 30%, and the de minimis notice clearly does not apply. The use of purely qualitative selection opens the network to qualified operators who wish to run an authorised Porsche service centre, and to that end Porsche agreed to make the relevant qualitative criteria available to any interested repairer.
4. Državni ukrepi (javna podjetja/podjetja z izključnimi in posebnimi pravicami)	4. STATE MEASURES (PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS/UNDERTAKINGS WITH EXCLUSIVE AND SPECIAL RIGHTS)
4.1 Odločbe	4.1 Decisions
Omejitve pri pripravi pošte[101]	Restrictions on mail preparation[101]
98. Komisija je 20. oktobra sprejela odločbo na podlagi člena 86 o nekaterih določbah nemškega poštnega regulativnega okvira, ki komercialnim družbam za pripravo pošte prepoveduje pridobivanje popustov za predajo predhodno razvrščenih pisem v centru za razvrščanje družbe Deutsche Post AG’s (DPAG). Na podlagi pritožbe, ki jo je vložila družba BdKEP, nemško združenje ponudnikov poštnih storitev, je Komisija ugotovila, da sporne določbe nemške poštne zakonodaje družbo DPAG na dva načina napeljujejo k zlorabi njenega prevladujočega položaja in s tem kršitvi člena 82. Prvič, določbe spodbujajo družbo DPAG k širjenju tržne moči od trga (z omejeno konkurenco) za osnovne poštne storitve na začetku verige na (liberaliziran) trg storitev za pripravo pošte. Drugič, te odločbe napeljujejo družbo DPAG k diskriminaciji na eni strani pošiljateljev masovne pošte, ki imajo dostop do centrov za razvrščanje v verigi in s tem povezanih popustov, ter na drugi strani komercialnih ponudnikov takšnih storitev, ki nimajo dostopa do teh popustov. To pomeni veliko konkurenčno slabost za te družbe in nemškemu trgu za pripravo pošte preprečuje, da bi izkoristil vse svoje možnosti.	98. On 20 October, the Commission adopted a decision based on Article 86 regarding certain provisions of Germany’s postal regulatory framework which bar commercial mail preparation firms from earning discounts for handing over pre-sorted letters at Deutsche Post AG’s (DPAG) sorting centres. Based on a complaint filed by BdKEP, a German association of postal service providers, the Commission found that the contested provisions of the German Postal Law induce DPAG to abuse its dominant position, thereby infringing Article 82, in two ways. First, the provisions prompt DPAG to extend its market power from the (reserved) market for upstream basic postal services into the (liberalised) market for mail preparation services. Secondly, they induce DPAG to discriminate between, on the one hand, bulk mailers who have access to the downstream sorting centres and the related discounts and, on the other, commercial providers of such services who do not have access to these discounts. This places a major competitive disadvantage on these firms and prevents the German mail preparation market from developing its potential.
99. Priprava pošte vključuje pripravo poštnih pošiljk (tiskanje, dajanje v ovojnice, označevanje, frankiranje), njihovo zbiranje in spravljanje v poštne torbe ali zabojnike, ki so v skladu z določenimi standardi, do večje ali manjše stopnje združevanja in razvrščanja po cilju ter njihovo dostavo do točk dostopa, ki jih upravlja ponudnik univerzalnih storitev. Na tem trgu je možnost, da se dobi popust za poseben dostop, tj. prihrankov na poštnino, za stranko ključni prodajni argument.	99. Mail preparation involves the making up of postal items (printing, enveloping, labelling, franking), collecting, placing them in mailbags or containers complying with certain standards, bundling and sorting them to a greater or lesser degree by destination and delivering them to access points operated by the universal service provider. In this market, the possibility of procuring downstream access discounts, i.e. savings on postage, for clients is a key selling argument.
100. Družba DPAG ima izključno pravico za potrjevanje, razvrščanje, transport in dostavo pisem, ki tehtajo manj kot 100 gramov (tako imenovano rezervirano območje). Opravljanje storitev priprave pošte, vključno z njenim predhodnim razvrščanjem in transportom od pošiljatelja do izbrane točke dostopa do omrežja obstoječega lastnika, ne spada v področje rezerviranega območja Poštne direktive.[102]	100. DPAG has the exclusive right to clear, sort, transport and deliver letters weighing less than 100 grams (the so-called reserved area). The provision of mail preparation services, including the pre-sorting of the mail and its transport from the sender’s premises to a chosen access point to the incumbent’s network, does not fall within the ambit of the reserved area of the Postal Directive.[102]
101. Komisija je ugotovila, da nemška vlada ni dokazala, da je bila prepoved dostopa komercialnih ponudnikov do zgoraj navedenih popustov upravičena na podlagi člena 86(2), ter opozorila, da morajo, kot je določeno v njenem obvestilu iz leta 1998 o uporabi pravil konkurence v poštnem sektorju[103], imeti komercialna podjetja za pripravo pošte možnost svobodne izbire razpoložljivih točk dostopa do javnih poštnih omrežij na nediskriminacijski podlagi[104].	101. The Commission found that the German Government failed to demonstrate that barring commercial providers from the discounts mentioned above was justified on the basis of Article 86(2) and recalled that, as established in its 1998 notice on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector[103], commercial mail preparation firms should be able to choose freely from amongst available access points to the public postal network on a non-discriminatory basis[104].
4.2 Zavrnitve pritožb	4.2 Rejections of complaints
UFEX[105]	UFEX[105]
102. Komisija je 19. novembra sprejela odločbo o zavrnitvi pritožbe, ki so jo družba l’Union Française de l’Express in trije njeni člani, DHL, FedEx in Crie, vložili proti Francoski republiki, La Poste in Chronopost zaradi pomanjkanja interesa Skupnosti za nadaljnje vodenje preiskave. Zavrnitev zadeva obtožbe tožnika, da je družba La Poste skušala na neprimeren način razširiti svojo prevlado od trga z omejeno konkurenco za navadne poštne storitve na trg za storitve EMS v Franciji, kjer deluje njeno odvisno podjetje Chronopost, ter s tem kršila člena 86 in 82. Domnevna zloraba je zajemala navzkrižno subvencioniranje v času ustanovitve družbe Chronopost (1986) in po tem, kar je vključevalo zagotavljanje komercialne in logistične podpore družbi Chronopost po pretirano nizkih stroških ter družbi Chronopost omogočilo postavitev neprimerno nizkih cen z namenom izrinjanja tekmecev. Ponovni pregled pritožbe je bil narejen na podlagi tožnikove zahteve septembra 2000, potem ko je vrsta sodb Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti in Sodišča prve stopnje razveljavila prvo odločbo o zavrnitvi iz decembra 1994. V zvezi s pomanjkanjem interesa Skupnosti za nadaljnjo preiskavo primera nova odločba o zavrnitvi med drugim navaja, da je bilo sporno ravnanje – ki nikakor ni bilo dokončno ugotovljeno – odstranjeno pred več kot desetimi leti in da od takrat na upoštevnem trgu niso bili vidni nobeni trajni protikonkurenčni učinki, ki bi jih lahko pripisali temu ravnanju.	102. On 19 November, the Commission adopted a decision rejecting the complaint filed by l’Union Française de l’Express and three of its members, DHL, FedEx and Crie against the French Republic, La Poste and Chronopost, owing to the lack of Community interest in further pursuing the investigation. The rejection concerns the complainants’ allegations that La Poste had abusively sought to extend its dominance from the reserved market in ordinary postal services to the market in express mail services in France, in which its affiliate Chronopost is active, thereby infringing Articles 86 and 82. The alleged abuse involved cross-subsidisation at the time Chronopost was launched (1986) and thereafter, consisting in providing commercial and logistic assistance to Chronopost at unduly low costs, thereby enabling the latter to apply abusively low prices aimed at ousting competitors. The re-examination of the complaint was made following the complainants’ request in September 2000 after a series of judgments by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance had annulled a first rejection decision taken in December 1994. In relation to the lack of Community interest in further investigating the case, the new rejection decision notes, among other grounds, that the practices complained of - which have not in any event been duly established - were brought to an end more than ten years ago and that, since then, no lasting anticompetitive effects attributable to them had been apparent in the relevant market.
C – EVROPSKA MREŽA ZA KONKURENCO (ECN): pregled sodelovanja	C – ECN: OVERVIEW OF COOPERATION
1. SPLOšNI PREGLED	1. GENERAL OVERVIEW
Ustanovitev Evropske mreže za konkurenco (ECN)	The setting-up of the ECN
103. Eden ključnih ciljev Uredbe št. 1/2003 in posodobitvenega svežnja je bil večja vključenost nacionalnih javnih organov za izvrševanje pri uporabi pravil konkurence EU. Da bi se zagotovila skladna uporaba členov 81 in 82 v sistemu vzporednih pristojnosti, so bili oblikovani mehanizmi sodelovanja med organi. Člena 11 in 12 Uredbe št. 1/2003 ter obvestilo o mreži za konkurenco[106] so glavni stebri, ki podpirajo delovanje sistema in sodelovanje v okviru Evropske mreže za konkurenco (ECN).	103. One of the key objectives of Regulation 1/2003 and of the Modernisation Package was greater involvement of national public enforcers in the application of EU competition rules. In order to ensure consistent application of Articles 81 and 82 in a system of parallel competences, mechanisms for cooperation between the authorities were created. Articles 11 and 12 of Regulation No 1/2003 and the network notice[106] are the main pillars underpinning the functioning of the system and cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN).
104. Evropska mreža za konkurenco je sestavljena iz nacionalnih organov za konkurenco, določenih v skladu s členom 35 Uredbe št. 1/2003, in Komisije. Sodelovanje v okviru Evropske mreže za konkurenco se je začelo že leta 2003: ustanovljene so bile delovne skupine, da bi razpravljale o nekaterih ključnih vidikih obvestila o mreži za konkurenco, v navedenem forumu pa so se preučili splošni vidiki, povezani s prehodom na nov sistem uveljavljanja. Poleg tega je bilo ustanovljenih 14 podskupin za razprave o vprašanjih posameznih sektorjev. Leto 2004 je bilo prvo leto, v katerem je Evropska mreža za konkurenco v celoti delovala in je bila vključena v posamezne primere uporabe pravil konkurence EU. Razviti informacijski sistemi podpore so bili ustanovljeni pred 1. majem, da bi vsi člani imeli možnost spremljanja obravnavanih primerov v okviru mreže in izmenjave informacij.	104. The ECN is composed of the national competition authorities (NCAs) designated pursuant to Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 and the Commission. In 2003 already, cooperation started within the ECN: working groups had been set up to discuss certain key aspects of the network notice and general issues linked to the transition to the new enforcement system had been examined in that forum. In addition, 14 subgroups were set up for the purpose of discussing sector-specific issues. 2004 was the first year in which the ECN was fully operational and was involved in individual cases of applying the EU competition rules. Sophisticated IT support systems were set up before 1 May in order to provide all members with the possibility of following cases dealt with within the network and of exchanging information.
Dodelitev primerov	Case allocation
105. Da se zagotovi učinkovita dodelitev primerov, se organi v mreži med seboj obvestijo pred začetkom prvega uradnega preiskovalnega ukrepa ali nemudoma po njem v vseh primerih, ki se nanašajo na uporabo člena 81 ali 82. Leta 2004 je bilo mreži predloženih 298 primerov: 99 jih je predložila Komisija in 199 nacionalni organi za konkurenco.	105. In order to allow efficient allocation of cases, authorities within the network inform each other before or just after the first formal investigative measure in all cases involving the application of Article 81 or 82. In 2004, a total of 298 cases were submitted to the network: 99 by the Commission and 199 by the NCAs.
106. Kot je bilo pričakovano, je bila ponovna dodelitev primerov, priglašenih mreži, izredno redka (manj kot 1 % primerov). Primeri po navadi ostanejo v pristojnosti organa, ki je začel njihovo preiskavo.	106. As expected, re-allocation of cases notified to the network was extremely rare (less than 1% of the cases). Cases remain normally with the authority which started to investigate them.
107. V nekaterih primerih so med Komisijo in nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco potekale dvostranske razprave, ki so pripeljale do tega, da so slednji privolili v obravnavo pritožbe, ki je bila prvotno predložena Komisiji. V enem primeru je do ponovne dodelitve prišlo pozneje, ko je Komisija začela postopek, da bi sprejela zaveze za celotno Skupnost[107], čeprav so o primeru odločali nekateri nacionalni organi za konkurenco.	107. In some instances, bilateral discussions took place between the Commission and an NCA and resulted in the latter agreeing to deal with a complaint originally lodged with the Commission. In one instance, re-allocation occurred at a later stage when the Commission opened proceedings in order to accept commitments for the whole of the Community[107] although some NCAs were acting on the case.
Medsebojna pomoč pri poizvedbah	Mutual assistance in fact-finding
108. Uredba št. 1/2003 članom mreže zagotavlja orodja, ki jim omogočajo medsebojno pomoč z izvedbo preiskovalnih ukrepov v imenu drugega organa (člen 22) in splošneje z izmenjavo informacij (člen 12). Od prvih dni uporabe člena 1/2003 je člen 22 uporabilo več organov za konkurenco: pregledi so bili opravljeni na zahtevo več nacionalnih organov za konkurenco, zbrane informacije pa so bile poslane v skladu s členom 12. Člen 22 se je skupaj uporabil enajstkrat v osmih mesecih.	108. Regulation 1/2003 provides the network members with tools allowing them to assist each other by carrying out investigative measures on behalf of another authority (Article 22) and, more generally, by exchanging information (Article 12). From the very first days of application of Regulation 1/2003, Article 22 was used by several authorities: inspections were carried out at the request of several NCAs and the information gathered was transmitted pursuant to Article 12. In total, Article 22 was used 11 times in 8 months.
109. Poleg tega člani mreže redno uporabljajo možnost izmenjave informacij v skladu s členom 12. V vsaj dveh primerih so se informacije v primerih prizanesljivosti izmenjale s soglasjem prosilca za prizanesljivost.	109. Furthermore, network members make regular use of the possibility of exchanging information under Article 12. In at least two instances, information was exchanged in leniency cases with the consent of the leniency applicant.
Skladna uporaba zakonodaje EU	Consistent application of EU law
110. V skladu s členom 11(4) Uredbe št. 1/2003 morajo nacionalni organi za konkurenco Komisijo obvestiti najpozneje v 30 dneh pred sprejetjem negativnih odločb. V obdobju po 1. maju je bila Komisija obveščena o 33 primerih konkurence, v katerih je nacionalni organ za konkurenco predvidel sprejetje odločbe v skladu s členom 81 in/ali členom 82. 18 od teh primerov se je nanašalo na člen 81, 13 na člen 82 in 2 na oba. V nekaterih primerih je GD za konkurenco nacionalnemu organu za konkurenco predložil pripombe. Komisija v nobenem od teh primerov ni začela postopka, zato da bi nacionalni organ za konkurenco razbremenila njegove pristojnosti po členu 11(6) Uredbe št. 1/2003.	110. According to Article 11(4) of Regulation 1/2003, NCAs have to inform the Commission at the latest 30 days before adopting negative decisions. In the period after 1 May, the Commission was informed of 33 competition cases where an NCA envisaged adopting a decision pursuant to Article 81 and/or Article 82. Of these cases 18 related to Article 81, 13 to Article 82 and 2 to both articles. In some of these cases, DG Competition provided the NCA with comments. In none of these cases did the Commission open proceedings with the effect of relieving an NCA of its competence under Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003.
Splošno zbliževanje nacionalnih zakonodaj	General convergence of national laws
111. Nenazadnje je leta 2004 prišlo do večjega pregleda številnih nacionalnih zakonodaj. Skoraj vse te spremembe so povzročile večjo stopnjo zbliževanja med nacionalnimi sistemi in Uredbo št. 1/2003. Skupaj je 20 držav članic odpravilo svoje nacionalne sisteme priglasitve ali načrtuje njihovo odpravo, 17 pa jih ima v celoti ali delno skladne programe o prizanesljivosti. Ta napredek veliko prispeva k poenostavitvi skladnosti poslovanja in k boljšemu delovanju sistema.	111. Finally, 2004 saw the substantial overhaul of a number of national laws. Almost all of these changes resulted in a higher degree of convergence between national systems and Regulation 1/2003. In all, 20 Member States abolished or are planning to abolish their national notification system, and 17 have fully or partially convergent leniency programmes. These developments contribute greatly to simplification of compliance for business and to better functioning of the system.
2. Uporaba pravil konkurence ES v nacionalnih sodiščih EU: Poročilo o izvajanju člena 15 Uredbe šT. 1/2003	2. Application of EU competition rules by national courts in the EU: Report on the implementation of Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003
Zahtevki za mnenje	Requests for an opinion
112. Člen 15(1) Uredbe št. 1/2003 zagatavlja nacionalnim sodnikom možnost, da lahko zaprosijo Komisijo za informacije, s katerimi razpolaga, ali mnenje o vprašanjih glede uporabe pravil konkurence EU. Leta 2004 je Komisija prejela devet zahtevkov za mnenje; šest zahtevkov so poslala španska sodišča in so se vsa nanašala na podobno vrsto sporazumov o distribuciji na področju energetike, ki so predvsem sprožila vprašanja o razliki med zastopnikom in prodajalcem na drobno v smislu konkurenčnega prava EU ter so vsebovala klavzule o določitvi najvišje maloprodajne cene za gorivo in klavzule o nekonkuriranju za gorivo, ki bi lahko pripeljale do vnaprejšnje izključitve trga. Komisija je svoje odgovore na teh šest zahtevkov predvsem utemeljevala na svoji predhodni oceni v primeru Repsol CPP [108] .	112. Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 gives national judges the option of asking the Commission for information in its possession or for an opinion on questions concerning application of the EU competition rules. In 2004 the Commission received 9 requests for an opinion; 6 requests came from Spanish courts and all dealt with a similar type of distribution agreement in the energy sector, which mainly raised questions as to the distinction between agent and retailer within the meaning of EU competition law and contained both clauses relating to the setting of a maximum fuel retail price and non-compete clauses for fuel that might result in foreclosure of the market. The Commission’s replies to these 6 requests were largely based on its preliminary assessment in the Repsol CPP case[108].
113. Belgijsko konkurenčno pravo zahteva, da morajo belgijska sodišča na bruseljsko prizivno sodišče v predhodno odločanje napotiti vse primere, kadar dvomijo o uporabi pravil konkurence. V začetku decembra je bruseljsko prizivno sodišče Komisiji predložilo tri take napotitve kot zahtevke za mnenje. Zahtevki so se nanašali na vprašanja istočasne uporabe členov 81 in 82 ES, področja uporabe člena 82(c) ES, Uredbo Komisije o skupinskih izjemah št. 2790/1999 (o vertikalnih sporazumih) in spremljajoče smernice ter obvestilo de minimis.	113. Belgian competition law requires the Belgian courts to make a reference to the Brussels Court of Appeal for a preliminary ruling whenever they have doubts as to the application of the competition rules. In early December, the Brussels Court of Appeal forwarded three such references to the Commission as requests for an opinion. The requests raised issues concerning the simultaneous application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, the scope of Article 82(c) EC, Commission block exemption Regulation 2790/1999 (on vertical agreements) and the accompanying guidelines and the de minimis notice.
Javna zbirka podatkov za sodbe nacionalnih sodišč	A public database for judgments of national courts
114. Člen 15(2) Uredbe št. 1/2003 zahteva, da morajo države članice EU Komisiji poslati kopije vseh pisnih sodb nacionalnih sodišč o uporabi člena 81 ali člena 82 ES. Komisija je od maja 2004 prejela 36 izrečenih sodb, ki jih je objavila na spletni strani GD za konkurenco, če jih organ pošiljatelj ni razvrstil kot zaupne[109]. Povod za veliko večino teh sodb (29) so bila dejanja zasebnega uveljavljanja zakonodaje, večinoma namenjena razveljavitvi sporazuma zaradi njegove nezdružljivosti s pravili konkurence EU.	114. Article 15(2) of Regulation 1/2003 requires the EU Member States to forward to the Commission a copy of any written judgment issued by national courts deciding on the application of Article 81 or 82 EC. The Commission received 36 judgments rendered since May 2004, which were put on the website of DG Competition to the extent that the transmitting authority did not class them as confidential[109]. The overwhelming majority of those judgments (29) resulted from private enforcement action, in most cases aimed at the annulment of an agreement on the ground of its incompatibility with the EU competition rules.
Predložitev pripomb Komisije in nacionalnih organov za konkurenco	The submission of observations by the Commission and by national competition authorities
115. Člen 15(3) Uredbe št. 1/2003 Komisiji in nacionalnim organom za konkurenco dovoljuje, da nacionalnim sodiščem predložijo pripombe o vprašanjih glede uporabe člena 81 ali člena 82 EU. Komisija do sedaj te možnosti še ni izkoristila, medtem ko so jo belgijski, francoski in nemški organi za konkurenco že uporabili. Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da so ti organi za konkurenco že pred 1. majem bili pooblaščeni, da so v skladu s svojo nacionalno zakonodajo predložijo pripombe svojim nacionalnim sodiščem.	115. Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 allows the Commission and NCAs to submit observations to national courts on issues relating to the application of EU competition rules. The Commission has so far not used this possibility, but the Belgian, French and German competition authorities have. It should be noted, though, that already before 1 May 2004 these competition authorities had the power to submit observations to their national courts under their national law.
Financiranje usposabljanja nacionalnih sodnikov o konkurenčnem pravu EU	Financing the training of national judges in EU competition law
116. Od leta 2002 Komisija sofinancira projekte, katerih namen je usposabljanje nacionalnih sodnikov o konkurenčnem pravu EU. Leta 2004 je Komisija sofinancirala štiri projekte usposabljanja[110] in objavila poziv za zbiranje predlogov, kar je pripeljalo do sklenitve dodatnih 10 pogodb z dodelitvijo več kot 400 000 EUR za usposabljanje več kot 700 nacionalnih sodnikov iz vseh 25 držav članic EU leta 2005[111].	116. Since 2002, the Commission cofinances projects aimed at training national judges in EU competition law. In 2004, the Commission cofinanced 4 training projects[110] and launched a call for proposals which resulted in the conclusion of another 10 contracts, committing more than EUR 400 000, for the training of over 700 national judges from all 25 EU Member States in 2005[111].
3. Energetika	3. Energy
117. Leta 2004 je Komisija ustanovila Podskupino ECN za energetiko. Njen namen je zagotoviti forum za obravnavo ključnih vprašanj in razviti skupni pristop za uporabo pravil konkurence EU na energetskih trgih ter spodbuditi spremljanje konkurence na energetskih trgih EU. Podskupina za energetiko naj bi imela tehnične sestanke in srečanja na visoki ravni, na katere so lahko povabljeni zakonodajalci.	117. In 2004, the Commission established an ECN Energy Subgroup. Its aim is to provide a forum to discuss key issues and develop a common approach to the application of EU competition rules in the energy markets and to encourage monitoring of competition in the EU energy markets. The intention is for the Energy Subgroup to have both technical meetings and high level meetings to which regulators may be invited.
118. Septembra je bil na visoki ravni organiziran dan energije za vodje nacionalnih organov za konkurenco. Povabljeni so bili tudi nacionalni zakonodajalci na energetskem področju. Srečanje se je osredotočilo na dve vprašanji: vlogo organov za konkurenco in zakonodajalcev pri obravnavanju protikonkurenčnega vedenja ter kako odpraviti preostale ovire za vstop na trg.	118. In September a High Level Energy Day was organised for the heads of national competition authorities. National energy regulators were also invited. The meeting focused on two issues: the role of competition authorities and regulators in tackling anticompetitive behaviour; and how to tackle remaining market entry barriers.
119. Prvi tehnični sestanek Podskupine za energetiko je potekal decembra. Poleg razprav o prihodnjem programu dela Podskupine so na njem obravnavali dve temi: dolgoročne pogodbe v sektorju plina v spodnjem delu verige vrednosti in sektorske preiskave v energetiki. Dogovorjeno je bilo, da bi se morala Podskupina za energetiko osredotočiti na konkurenco v sektorju plina in električne energije, ne da bi pri tem popolnoma izključila razprave o drugih energetskih trgih (npr. bencina). Razpravljali so o dokumentu, ki ga je GD za konkurenco pripravil o dolgoročnih pogodbah v sektorju plina v spodnjem delu vrednosti verige. GD za konkurenco je objavil dokument o preiskavah sektorjev in prišlo je do zanimive izmenjave izkušenj z nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco o preiskavah v sektorju plina in električne energije.	119. The first technical meeting of the Energy Subgroup took place in December. In addition to discussing the Subgroup’s future work programme, it focused on two topics: long-term contracts in the downstream gas sector and sector inquiries in the energy sector. It was agreed that the Energy Subgroup should focus on competition in the gas and electricity sectors, without totally excluding discussion of other energy markets (e.g. petrol). A paper prepared by DG Competition on long-term contracts in the downstream gas sector was discussed. A paper on sector inquiries was circulated by DG Competition and there was an interesting exchange of experience with the national competition authorities on sector inquiries in the gas and electricity sectors.
4. Promet	4. Transport
Delovna skupina za zračni promet ECA	ECA Air Traffic Working Group
120. Evropski organi za konkurenco (ECA) so na plenarnem zasedanju aprila 2002 v Atenah ustanovili Delovno skupino za zračni promet, zato da bi izboljšali medsebojno sodelovanje pri svojih poslih z industrijo zračnega prevoza in si prizadevali okrepiti konkurenco v tem sektorju. Evropski organi za konkurenco menijo, da na konkurenco med letalskimi prevozniki vplivajo nekatere posebne lastnosti industrije zračnega prevoza, zlasti njen mrežni značaj. Delovna skupina je 13. maja objavila „poročilo o združitvah in povezovanjih v civilnem letalstvu“[112], ki ponuja pregled trenutnih praks izvrševanja, ki jih uporablja ECA ter se nanašajo na opredelitev trga, presojo konkurence in protiukrepe.	120. The ECA (European competition authorities) set up an Air Traffic Working Group during the plenary meeting in Athens in April 2002 in order to improve cooperation between them with regard to their dealings with the airline industry and seek to enhance competition in this sector. The ECA considers that competition between airlines is influenced by some specific features of the airline industry, in particular its network character. On 13 May, the working group published a “report on mergers and alliances in civil aviation[112]”, which provides an overview of the current enforcement practices of the ECA concerning market definition, competition assessment and remedies.
Železnice	Railways
121. Podskupina za železnice se je drugič sestala 29. junija in razpravljala o rezultatih tržne raziskave ovir za učinkovito konkurenco v sektorju železniškega tovornega prometa, ki so jo skupaj izvedli GD za konkurenco in nacionalni organi za konkurenco. Opozorila je, da so informacije, čeprav zelo izčrpne, zagotovili tržni akterji na neformalni podlagi in jih bo zato treba preveriti. Podskupina je tudi razpravljala o osnutku dokumenta o najboljši praksi v odnosih med nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco in železniškimi upravnimi organi (ustanovitev zadnjih je bila zahteva prvega svežnja železniških direktiv) v pripravi na pravočasno skupno zasedanje obeh skupin.	121. The Railways Subgroup met for a second time on 29 June and discussed outputs from the market survey undertaken jointly by DG Competition and the NCAs into barriers to effective competition in the rail freight transport sector. It was noted that, while extremely comprehensive, the information had been provided by market players on an informal basis and would need to be verified. The Subgroup also discussed a draft paper on best practice in relations between the NCAs and the rail regulatory bodies (the establishment of the latter being a requirement of the first package of railway directives), in preparation for a joint meeting between the two groups in due course.
5. Finančne storitve	5. Financial services
122. V sektorju finančnih storitev so bile podskupine ECN v letu 2004 dejavne na področju plačilnih kartic, zavarovanja in vrednostnih papirjev.	122. In the financial services sector, ECN subgroups were active during 2004 in the areas of payment cards, insurance and securities.
123. Podskupina ECN za mreže plačilnih kartic se je prvič sestala 17. junija v Bruslju. Glavni namen srečanja je bil, da Komisija predstavi nacionalnim organom za konkurenco rezultate svojih tržnih študij o plačilih s kreditnimi in bančnimi plačilnimi karticami v Evropi. Na tej podlagi je potekala razprava o posameznih primerih ter tudi o metodoloških vprašanjih in razvoju v panogi. Ta vrsta dejavnega usklajevanja je namenjena vzpostavitvi skupne baze znanja in enotnega razumevanja vprašanj konkurence pri plačilih s kartico. Več predstavnikov nacionalnih organov za konkurenco (Danska, Poljska in Združeno kraljestvo) je predstavilo svoje trenutne preiskave v zvezi s sporazumi o medbančni proviziji v mrežah plačilnih kartic, dejavnih v njihovih državah. Organi za konkurenco Nizozemske, Finske in Italije so predstavili svoje primere v zvezi z domačimi mrežami bančnih plačilnih kartic. Več delegatov je poudarilo, da je raven izmenjave v sistemih bančnih plačilnih kartic povezana z ravnijo konkurence na trgu pridobitve in trgu izdaje. Prav tako lokalne banke v vrsti držav EU razmišljajo o tem, da bi zapustile obstoječo domačo mrežo plačilnih kartic in se pridružile mednarodnemu sistemu plačilnih kartic, ki jim bo zagotovil dodatne prihodke iz medbančnih provizij. V državah članicah, kjer sta se kot lokalni mreži bančnih plačilnih kartic uveljavili dve mednarodni mreži plačilnih kartic Visa in MasterCard, je izmenjava prevladujoča in določena na visoki ravni. Razprava je pokazala, da v tem sektorju obstaja potreba po usklajenem uveljavljanju konkurence v vsej Evropi.	123. The ECN Subgroup for Payment Card Networks met for the first time in Brussels on 17 June. The main purpose of the meeting was for the Commission to present to national competition authorities the results of its market studies on credit and debit card payments in Europe. On this basis there was a discussion on specific cases and also on methodological issues and industry developments. This kind of active coordination aims at establishing a common knowledge base and a common understanding of competition issues on card payments. Several representatives of national competition authorities (Denmark, Poland and the UK) presented their current investigations regarding interchange fee agreements of payment card networks active in their countries. The competition authorities of the Netherlands, Finland and Italy presented their cases regarding domestic debit card networks. Several delegates pointed out that the level of interchange in debit card schemes is linked to the level of competition in the acquiring and issuing market. Also, in a number of EU countries local banks are considering leaving an existing domestic payment card network in order to join an international payment card scheme, which will provide them with additional revenues from interchange fees. In Member States where the two international payment card networks Visa and MasterCard have established themselves as the local debit card networks, interchange is prevalent and it is set at a high level. The discussion showed that there is a need for coordinated competition enforcement in this sector throughout Europe.
124. Drugo srečanje Podskupine ECN o zavarovanju je potekalo 27. oktobra v Bruslju. Med tem drugim srečanjem je postalo jasno, da so zavarovalniški posredniki in posredniške provizije osrednja točka za tržno analizo, ki jo je izvedla vrsta organov v mreži, in da iz teh preiskav izhaja vrsta mogočih vprašanj o konkurenci.	124. The second meeting of the ECN Subgroup on Insurance took place in Brussels on 27 October. During this second meeting, it became clear that insurance intermediaries and broker commissions are a focal point for market analysis carried out by a number of authorities in the network and a range of possible competition issues arise from these investigations.
125. Mreža strokovnjakov za vrednostne papirje se je drugič sestala junija. Kljub zapletenosti teme je bilo udeležencev veliko, prispevki k razpravam pa zelo aktivni. Cilj srečanja je bil, prvič, vzpostaviti medsebojno razumevanje med vsemi nacionalnimi organi v zvezi s trgovanjem z vrednostnimi papirji, kliringom in poravnavo vrednostnih papirjev v EU 25, ter, drugič, doseči izmenjavo mnenj o konkurenci in regulativnih dejavnostih v sektorju vrednostnih papirjev.	125. The securities experts’ network met for the second time in June. Despite the complexity of the subject, numbers of participants have been high and contributions to the debates very active. The aim of the meeting was, first, to establish a mutual understanding amongst all national authorities regarding securities trading, clearing and settlement in EU 25 and, secondly, to have an exchange of views on competition and regulatory activities in the securities sector.
126. Komisija je zbrala povratne informacije nacionalnih organov, da bi izboljšala prihodnja srečanja in stike med organi za konkurenco.	126. The Commission gathered feedback from national authorities with the aim of improving future meetings and contacts among the competition authorities.
D – Izbrani sodni primeri	D – SELECTED COURT CASES
Adalat	Adalat
127. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti (SES) je 6. januarja[113] izdalo svojo sodbo o dveh pritožbah, od katerih je eno vložila Komisija, zoper sodbo[114] Sodišča prve stopnje v zadevi Adalat. Sodišče prve stopnje je razveljavilo odločbo Komisije[115], ki je ugotovila kršitev člena 81 ES v obliki izvoznih prepovedi v pogodbenem razmerju med družbo Bayer in njenimi trgovci. Sodišče prve stopnje je v tem okviru trdilo, da Komisija ni pravno zadostno dokazala, da so trgovci privolili v trgovinsko politiko družbe Bayer in da se v odsotnosti sporazuma člen 81 ni uporabljal za tako vedenje. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je na podlagi dokazov, ki jih je navedla Komisija, potrdilo, da sovpadanje želja ni bilo dokazano, in pojasnilo pojem sporazuma na podlagi člena 81 ES. Vendar je treba opozoriti, da SES izrecno jasno navaja, da v teh postopkih niso bila vprašanja niti morebitna uporaba drugih vidikov člena 81 ES, niti člen 82 ES niti katere koli druge možne opredelitve upoštevnega trga.	127. On 6 January[113], the Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered its judgment on the two appeals, one of which was brought by the Commission, against the judgment[114] of the Court of First Instance (CFI) in the Adalat case. The CFI had annulled the Commission decision[115] finding an infringement of Article 81 EC in the form of export bans in the contractual relationship between Bayer and its dealers. The CFI had in this context held that the Commission had not established to the requisite legal standards that the dealers had agreed to Bayer’s commercial policy and that in the absence of an agreement Article 81 was not applicable to such conduct. Confirming that, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Commission, a concurrence of wills had not been established, the ECJ clarified the notion of agreement under Article 81 EC. It should be noted, however, that the ECJ explicitly makes clear that neither the possible application of other aspects of Article 81 EC, nor Article 82 EC, nor any other possible definitions of the relevant market were issues in those proceedings.
Kartel med proizvajalci cementa	Cement cartel
128. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je s sodbo z dne 7. januarja[116] na pritožbo znižalo kazen, ki jo je enemu od pritožnikov naložila Komisija[117] za njegovo vključenost v kartel med proizvajalci cementa. Sodišče je menilo, da za določitev prometa za namen izračuna kazni ni bilo mogoče upoštevati prometa podružnic družbe Ciments français SA, saj je nadzor nad zadevno podružnico prevzela šele po njeni vključenosti v obravnavano kršitev. Sodišče je zavrnilo preostale pritožbe in s tem zaznavno potrdilo sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje[118].	128. By judgment of 7 January[116], the ECJ reduced on appeal the fine imposed on one of the appellants by the Commission[117] for its involvement in the cement cartel. The ECJ considered that in order to establish the turnover for the purposes of calculating the fine, the turnover of Ciments français SA subsidiaries could not be taken into account, as it took control of the subsidiary in question only after its involvement in the infringement at issue. The ECJ dismissed the remainder of the appeals, largely upholding the judgment of the Court of First Instance[118].
Poštne storitve: Asempre	Postal services: Asempre
129. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je s sodbo z dne 11. marca[119] izdalo predhodno odločanje, ki je zagotovilo razlago Direktive 97/67/ES[120] o skupnih pravilih za razvoj notranjega trga poštnih storitev v Skupnosti in za izboljšanje kakovosti storitve. Sodišče je pojasnilo, da člen 7 Direktive državam članicam ne dovoljuje, da razširijo storitve, rezervirane za izvajalca univerzalne storitve, tako da za prenos z lastnimi sredstvi[121] določijo katerega koli od naslednjih pogojev:	129. By judgment of 11 March[119], the ECJ issued a preliminary ruling providing interpretation of Directive 97/67/EC[120] on the common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service. The ECJ clarified that Article 7 of the Directive does not permit Member States to extend the services reserved for the universal service provider by making self-provision[121] subject to any of the following conditions:
- prejemnik mora biti ista oseba kot pošiljatelj;	- that the receiver must be the same person as the sender;
- storitve ne smejo biti opravljene za tretje osebe v času komercialne ali poslovne dejavnosti izvajalca storitve;	- that the services must not be provided to third parties in the course of commercial or business activity of the service provider;
- storitve ne smejo biti opravljene s kurirskim sistemom ali drugimi podobnimi metodami in	- that the services must not be provided by the mailbag system or other similar methods; and
- taki posli ne smejo ovirati storitev, rezerviranih za izvajalca univerzalnih storitev.	- that such operations must not disrupt the services reserved to the universal service provider.
130. Poleg tega odločanja izhaja, da storitve denarnega nakazila (plačila prek javnega poštnega omrežja fizičnim ali pravnim osebam) ne spadajo v področje uporabe Direktive 97/67.	130. Furthermore, it transpires from this ruling that money order services (payments through the public postal network to natural or legal persons) fall outside the scope of Directive 97/67.
Kartel grafitnih elektrod	Graphite electrodes cartel
131. V sodbi, izrečeni 29. aprila[122], je Sodišče prve stopnje zmanjšalo denarne kazni, ki jih je Komisija[123] naložila članom kartela grafitnih elektrod. Sodišče prve stopnje je ugotovilo, da Komisija kategorij, ki jih je uporabila za izračun denarnih kazni v skladu s smernicami Komisije o denarnih kaznih[124], ni določila skladno, in Sodišče prve stopnje je pri nekaterih družbah v celoti uporabilo svojo pristojnost za oblikovanje nove kategorije in spremembo izhodiščnega zneska za izračun. Druga znižanja so se nanašala predvsem na vprašanje stopnje sodelovanja družb, ki bi jo morala Komisija upoštevati v obliki znižanja denarne kazni. Glede na stališče Sodišča prve stopnje je za nekaj dokazov, ki so jih predložile stranke, veljala posebna pravica glede samoobremenilnosti in jih je zato treba obravnavati kot prostovoljen prispevek strank.	131. In a judgment handed down on 29 April[122], the Court of First Instance (CFI) reduced the fines imposed by the Commission[123] on the participants in the graphite electrodes cartel. The CFI found that the Commission had not determined in a coherent way the categories which it used for the calculation of fines under the Commission guidelines on fines[124] and the CFI used its full jurisdiction to create a new category and to modify the starting amount of the calculation in respect of some companies. Other reductions related mainly to the question of the degree of cooperation by the companies which the Commission should have acknowledged in the form of reductions in the fine. In the CFI’s view certain evidence provided by the parties was covered by privilege against self-incrimination and should thus have been considered a voluntary contribution by the parties.
132. Vendar je Sodišče prve stopnje tudi potrdilo, da podjetja, ki med upravnim postopkom izrecno priznajo vsebinsko točnost dejstev, ki jih je Komisija navedla proti njim (v obvestilu o nasprotovanju), in ki jim je zato Komisija znižala denarno kazen, načeloma nimajo pravice do oporekanja tem dejstvom pred Sodiščem prve stopnje in morajo računati na to, da jim bo Sodišče prve stopnje zvišalo denarne kazni. Poleg tega je Sodišče prve stopnje potrdilo, da Komisija lahko kaznuje kartel, ki je bil sočasno kaznovan tudi v skladu z jurisdikcijami držav nečlanic EU, in da Komisiji ni treba upoštevati teh kazni pri določanju denarnih kazni, ki jih izreka[125].	132. The CFI also confirmed, however, that undertakings which in the course of the administrative procedure explicitly admit the substantive truth of the facts which the Commission alleged against them (in the statement of objections) and are granted a reduced fine by the Commission in return are in principle estopped from disputing these facts before the CFI and have to reckon with an increase in the fines by the CFI. Furthermore, the CFI confirmed that the Commission may sanction a cartel which has given rise to concurrent sanctions in non-EU jurisdictions and the Commission is not obliged to take such sanctions into account in determining the fines it imposes[125].
Kartel brezšivnih jeklenih cevi	Seamless steel tubes cartel
133. Sodišče prve stopnje je v sodbah z dne 8. julija[126] zmanjšalo denarne kazni, ki jih je Komisija[127] naložila članom kartela brezšivnih jeklenih cevi, zaradi upoštevanja kratkotrajnosti kršitve in ker je ugotovilo, da Komisija ni določila celotnega trajanja, na katerem je – poleg drugih dejavnikov – utemeljila denarne kazni. Glede na to je Sodišče prve stopnje menilo, da bi morala Komisija v tem posebnem primeru navesti dokaze o natančnem koncu sporazumov o prostem omejevanju med EU in Japonsko, ki jih je upoštevala pri določanju trajanja kršitve. Japonskim družbam je Sodišče prve stopnje tudi znižalo kazni zaradi manjše teže pri njihovi vključenosti v kartel, saj v enem delu kršitve niso sodelovali (pri dobavnih pogodbah za Corus). Kar zadeva preostalo, je Sodišče prve stopnje zavrnilo vse zahteve za razveljavitev odločbe Komisije.	133. In its judgments of 8 July[126], the CFI reduced the fines imposed by the Commission[127] on the participants in the seamless steel tubes cartel to take account of the shorter duration of the infringement, finding that the Commission had not established the entire duration on which – amongst other elements - it had based the fines. In this context the CFI held that in the particular circumstances of the case, it was for the Commission to adduce evidence of the exact end of the EU-Japan voluntary restraint agreements which the Commission had taken into account to determine the duration of the infringement. As regards the Japanese companies involved, the CFI also reduced the fines in view of the lesser gravity of their involvement in the cartel, given that they had not participated in one leg of the infringement (concerning supply contracts for Corus). For the remainder, the CFI rejected all applications for annulment of the Commission decision.
Posebne zakonske pravice: Akzo & Akros	Legal privilege: Akzo & Akros
134. Predsednik Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti je 27. septembra[128] podprl pritožbo Komisije proti začasni odredbi predsednika Sodišča prve stopnje, ki je zadržalo izvajanje odločbe Komisije, s katero je ta zavrnila zahtevke za posebne zakonske pravice, ki so jih vložile stranke, vendar je že zavrnilo začasne ukrepe proti odločbi o nadzoru, ki so jih stranke tudi zahtevale v teh vzporednih postopkih[129].	134. On 27 September[128], the President of the Court of Justice upheld the Commission’s appeal against an interim order of the President of the Court of First Instance which had suspended the operation of a Commission decision refusing claims of legal privilege made by the parties, but had already dismissed the interim measures against the inspection decision which the parties had also sought in these parallel proceedings[129].
135. Primer vključuje dokumente, zasežene med inšpekcijskim pregledom, ki je bil odrejen z odločbo Komisije[130]. Vprašanja v tem stalnem sporu – glavna zadeva je konec leta 2004 še vedno potekala – so obseg posebne zakonske pravice in njeni upravičenci. Predsednik Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti je razveljavil začasno odredbo, ker je menil, da ni nobene nujne potrebe, da bi kakršna koli dokumentacija ne bila dostopna Komisiji.	135. The case concerns documents seized during an inspection ordered by Commission decision[130]. The issues involved in this ongoing dispute – the main case was still pending at the end of 2004 - are the scope and the beneficiaries of legal privilege. The President of the ECJ annulled the suspension, holding that there was no urgency to keep any of the documents from the Commission.
136. Odredba predsednika Sodišča prve stopnje je pokazala, da je mogoče treba uveljavljeno sodno prakso glede posebnih zakonskih pravic ponovno preučiti, in je v tem smislu sprožila vrsto vprašanj: ali je treba obseg posebnih zakonskih pravic razširiti na dokumente, ki se pripravljajo, zbiranje informacij in povzetke dokumentov, namenjenih za pravno svetovanje; ali bi dovoljenje Komisiji, da kopira takšne dokumente, lahko povzročilo nepopravljivo kršitev pravic obrambe in ali bi se med upravičence posebne zakonske pravice morale prištevati tudi določene kategorije odvetnikov, zaposlenih v gospodarskih družbah. Ob upoštevanju dolgoročnih negativnih posledic takšne spremembe vsakodnevnega izvršilnega dela v protimonopolnih primerih se je Komisiji zdelo potrebno razveljaviti to odredbo, da bi zagotovila pravno varnost glede uporabe uveljavljene sodne prakse.	136. The order of the President of the CFI had indicated that the established case law on legal privilege may need to be reconsidered and had raised a number of questions in this respect: whether the scope of legal privilege should be extended to documents in preparation, information gathering and summary documents intended to seek legal advice; whether allowing the Commission to copy such documents might cause irremediable impairment to the rights of defence; and whether the beneficiaries of legal privilege should encompass certain categories of lawyers employed within companies. Given the far-reaching negative implications of such a change for day-to-day enforcement work in antitrust cases, the Commission considered it necessary to appeal this order with a view to obtaining legal certainty as regards applicability of the established case law.
Nemške banke	German banks
137. Sodišče prve stopnje je v svojih sodbah[131] z dne 14. oktobra razveljavilo odločbo[132], s katero je Komisija ugotovila, da je vrsta nemških bank sodelovala v cenovnem kartelu v zvezi z bančnimi stroški za menjavanje valut območja eura v obdobju do uvedbe eura kot enotne valute v območju eura. Sodišče prve stopnje je ugotovilo, da je odločba Komisije temeljila na nezadostnih dokazih.	137. In its judgments[131] of 14 October, the CFI annulled the decision[132] by which the Commission had found that a number of German banks had been involved in a price cartel concerning bank charges for exchanging euro-zone currencies in the period leading up to the introduction of the euro as the single currency of the euro zone. The CFI found that the Commission decision had been based on insufficient evidence.
Protidopinška pravila	Anti-doping rules
138. Sodišče prve stopnje je v primeru dopinga med plavalci[133] 30. septembra[134] odločilo, da so protidopinška pravila Mednarodnega olimpijskega komiteja popolnoma športna pravila in da nimajo gospodarskega pomena. Ta protidopinška pravila so tesno povezana s športom kot takim in se tako zanje ne uporabljajo določbe Pogodbe o ekonomskih svoboščinah in zlasti členi 49, 81 in 82. To je prva sodba, v kateri je Sodišče odločalo, ali se športna pravila prištevajo med določbe Pogodbe o konkurenci. Potrjuje politiko Komisije na področju športa.	138. In the doped swimmers case[133], the CFI decided on 30 September[134] that the anti-doping rules of the International Olympic Committee are pure sporting rules without economic considerations. These anti-doping rules are intimately linked to sport as such, and thus do not come within the scope of the Treaty provisions on the economic freedoms and in particular Articles 49, 81 and 82. This is the first judgment where the Court has ruled on whether sporting rules are subject to the Treaty provisions on competition. It confirms the Commission’s policy in the field of sports.
Eurovizija	Eurovision
139. Sodišče prve stopnje je 4. oktobra[135] zavrnilo pritožbo EBU na sodbo z dne 8. oktobra 2002[136], s katero je Sodišče prve stopnje ugotovilo, da ureditev eurovizijskega sistema za dostop tretjih strank ne izpolnjuje pogoja iz člena 81(3)(b) ES, in je razveljavilo ustrezno odločbo Komisije o izjemi[137].	139. On 4 October, the ECJ dismissed[135] the EBU’s appeal against the judgment of 8 October 2002[136] whereby the Court of First Instance had found that the third party access regime of the Eurovision system did not fulfil the condition of Article 81(3)(b) EC and had annulled the respective Commission exemption decision[137].
Microsoft	Microsoft
140. Predsednik Sodišča prve stopnje je 22. decembra v celoti zavrnil[138] zahtevo Microsofta za zadržanje protiukrepov, naloženih v zadevi družbe Microsoft[139] marca 2004. Komisija je v tej odločbi obsodila Microsoftovo zavrnitev dajanja informacij o interoperabilnosti in vezavo predvajalnika Microsoft Media Player na sistem Windows. Komisija je poleg denarne kazni naložila ukrepe za odpravo protikonkurenčnega ravnanja, poudarjenega v odločbi.	140. On 22 December, the President of the CFI dismissed[138] in its entirety Microsoft’s application to have the operation of the remedies imposed in the March 2004 decision in the Microsoft case[139] suspended. In this decision the Commission condemned Microsoft’s refusal to supply interoperability information and the tying of Windows and Windows Media Player. In addition to a fine, the Commission imposed measures to put an end to the anticompetitive practices highlighted in the decision.
141. Predsednik je menil, da se argumenti, ki jih je na to temo predložil Microsoft, v postopku za odpravo začasnih ukrepov ne morejo obravnavati kot prima facie neutemeljeni. Vendar je predsednik menil, da Microsoft ni dokazal, da bi zaradi izvajanja odločbe utrpel hudo in nepopravljivo škodo, in tako zadržanje protiukrepov v določbi ni upravičeno. Predsednik je ugotovil, da razkritje informacij, ki so bile dotlej skrite, ne povzroča nujno resne in nepopravljive škode in da v tem primeru takšne škode ni. Menil je tudi, da Microsoft v zvezi s protiukrepom nevezanosti ni izrecno dokazal, da bi lahko utrpel resno in nepopravljivo škodo zaradi vmešavanja v njegovo poslovno politiko ali škodovanja njegovemu ugledu.	141. The President considered that the arguments which Microsoft put forward on the substance could not, in the interim-relief proceedings, be regarded as prima facie unfounded. However, the President held that Microsoft had not shown that it might suffer serious and irreparable damage as a result of the implementation of the decision, and a suspension of the decision’s remedies was not therefore justified. The President found that disclosure of information previously kept secret does not necessarily entail serious and irreparable damage and that such damage was not demonstrated in the present case. He also considered that in respect of the untying remedy Microsoft had not demonstrated specifically that it might suffer serious and irreparable damage owing to interference with its business policy or to injury to its reputation.
E STATISTIKA	E STATISTICS
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II – Nadzor združevanja	II – Merger control
Uvod	Introduction
142. Za to leto je bilo značilno povečanje števila združitev in pripojitev, priglašenih Komisiji, v primerjavi z letom 2003. To je bilo prvo tako povečanje od leta 1999. Skupaj je bilo vloženih 249 priglasitev, kar pomeni 17-odstotno povečanje v primerjavi s prejšnjim letom. Rahlo se je povečalo tudi število dokončnih odločb z 231 leta 2003 na 242 leta 2004. Med dokončnimi odločbami, sprejetimi v navedenem obdobju, je bilo 64 % sprejetih v skladu z novo uredbo, ki je začela veljati 1. maja, 57 % pa po poenostavljenem postopku. Od 232 dokončnih odločb, sprejetih ob koncu preiskav faze I, je bilo 220 odločb o odobritvi brez jamstev. V preostalih 12 primerih so stranke predložile jamstva, ki so odstranila resne dvome Komisije o konkurenci.	142. The year was marked by an increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions notified to the Commission compared with 2003. This was the first such increase since 1999. In total 249 notifications were made, representing an increase of 17% over the previous year. The number of final decisions also increased slightly from 231 in 2003 to 242 in 2004. Of the final decisions adopted in the period, 64% were adopted under the new Regulation which came into force on 1 May and 57% were adopted under the simplified procedure. Of the 232 final decisions adopted at the end of Phase I investigations, 220 were clearance decisions without undertakings. In the remaining 12 cases the parties submitted undertakings that removed the Commission’s serious doubts regarding competition.
143. V primerjavi z letom 2003 se ni spremenilo število primerov, ki zbujajo resne dvome o svojem učinku na konkurenco in zato zahtevajo poglobljeno preiskavo (faza II), saj je bilo leta 2004 uvedenih osem takšnih preiskav. Izmed sedmih preiskav faze II, končanih leta 2004, je bilo šest transakcij na koncu odobrenih, ena pa prepovedana. V štirih primerih je bila dana odobritev na podlagi jamstev, ki so odstranila prvotne težave glede konkurence, v dveh primerih pa je bila transakcija odobrena brez pogojev.	143. There was no change as compared with 2003 in the number of cases giving rise to serious doubts as to their effect on competition and hence requiring an in-depth (Phase II) investigation, with 8 such investigations being opened in 2004. Of the 7 Phase II investigations completed in 2004, 6 transactions were finally approved and one resulted in a prohibition. In 4 cases approval was granted on the basis of undertakings that removed the original competition problems and in 2 cases the transaction was approved unconditionally.
144. Komisija je med letom sprejela tudi tri odločbe o napotitvi. Dva od teh primerov sta bila napotena v celoti, eden pa delno. Leta 2004 je Komisija prejela 19 obrazloženih sklepnih predlogov, v katerih je bilo zahtevano, da naj preuči koncentracijo, ki nima razsežnosti Skupnosti (v skladu s členom 4(5)). Komisija je prejela tudi dve utemeljeni zahtevi za celotno ali delno napotitev koncentracije z razsežnostjo Skupnosti na državo članico (v skladu s členom 4(4))[140].	144. The Commission also adopted 3 referral decisions during the year. Two of these cases were referred in their entirety and one partially. In 2004, the Commission received 19 reasoned submissions requesting that a concentration without a Community dimension should be examined by the Commission (pursuant to Article 4(5)). The Commission also received two reasoned requests that a concentration with a Community dimension should be referred - in whole or in part - to a Member State (pursuant to Article 4(4))[140].
A – ZAKONODAJNA IN RAZLAGALNA PRAVILA	A – LEGISLATIVE AND INTERPRETATIVE RULES
1. PREOBLIKOVANA UREDBA O ZDRUžITVAH, NOVA OBVESTILA IN SPREMENJENA IZVEDBENA UREDBA	1. RECAST MERGER REGULATION, NEW NOTICES AND AMENDED IMPLEMENTING REGULATION
1.1. Nova uredba o združitvah: Uredba št. 139/2004	1.1. New Merger Regulation: Regulation 139/2004
145. Preoblikovana uredba o združitvah[141] je bila uradno sprejeta 20. januarja, uporabljati pa se je začela 1. maja. Po sprejetju te nove uredbe o združitvah so bile 1. maja 2004 sprejete povezane in druge spremembe izvedbene uredbe. Ustrezno sta bili spremenjeni tudi obvestili o poenostavljenem postopku in o pomožnih omejitvah. Da bi Komisija zagotovila vodenje pri uporabi in razlagi novih pravil v uredbi o združitvah v zvezi z napotitvijo primerov, je sprejela tudi novo obvestilo o dodelitvi primera. Na koncu so bile sprejete nove smernice za združitve, ki usmerjajo pri presoji horizontalnih združitev.	145. The recast Merger Regulation[141] was formally adopted on 20 January and became applicable on 1 May. Following the adoption of this new Merger Regulation, related and other modifications to the Implementing Regulation were adopted on 1 May. Corresponding changes were also made to the notice on a simplified procedure as well as to the notice on ancillary restraints. To provide guidance on the application and interpretation of the new rules in the Merger Regulation concerning the referral of cases, the Commission also adopted a new notice on case allocation. Finally, new merger guidelines were adopted providing guidance on the assessment of horizontal mergers.
1.2. Popravljena izvedbena uredba	1.2. Revised Implementing Regulation
146. Popravljena izvedbena uredba (nova IU) vsebuje predvsem ukrepe, potrebne, da izražajo spremembe, uvedene v novi uredbi o združitvah. Komisija je izkoristila tudi priložnost za izboljšanje jasnosti besedila ter učinkovitosti in poštenosti postopka. Nova izvedbena uredba je bila sprejeta aprila po javnem posvetovanju Komisije, veljati pa je začela 1. maja[142].	146. The revised Implementing Regulation (new IR) contains primarily measures needed to reflect the changes made in the new Merger Regulation. However, the Commission also took the opportunity to make improvements to the clarity of the text, as well as to the efficiency and fairness of the process. The new IR was adopted in April following public consultation by the Commission and entered into force on 1 May[142].
Novi mehanizem napotitev	New referral mechanism
147. Nova uredba o združitvah uvaja možnost, da priglasitelji v fazi pred priglasitvijo zahtevajo napotitev koncentracije od Komisije na državo članico (člen 4(4)) ali od treh oziroma več držav članic na Komisijo (člen 4(5)). Za napotitev primera v fazi pred priglasitvijo morajo priglasitelji Komisiji predložiti obrazložen sklepni predlog. Zaradi obdelave in poenostavitve teh sklepnih predlogov uvaja nova izvedbena uredba obrazec za obrazložen sklepni predlog (obrazec RS), s katerim določa informacije, ki naj bi jih vseboval sklepni predlog.	147. The new Merger Regulation introduces the possibility for notifying parties to request at the pre-notification stage that a concentration be referred either from the Commission to the Member State (Article 4(4)) or from three or more Member States to the Commission (Article 4(5)). In order for the case to be referred at the pre-notification stage, the notifying parties must make a reasoned submission to the Commission. With a view to processing and simplifying these submissions, the new IR introduces a reasoned submission form (Form RS) which sets out the information which this submission should contain.
Nova obrazca za priglasitev – obrazec CO in kratki obrazec CO	New forms for notification - Form CO and Short Form CO
148. Poleg popravljenih postopkovnih pravil je bil popravljen tudi obrazec CO, poleg tega pa je bil uveden nov kratki obrazec CO.	148. In addition to revised procedural rules, revisions have been made to the Form CO and a new Short Form CO has been introduced.
149. Novi obrazec CO izraža spremembe iz nove uredbe o združitvah, osredotoča pa se tudi na določena vprašanja o konkurenci, nastala v okviru analitičnega okvira novega obvestila Komisije o presoji horizontalnih združitev (nove smernice za združitve). Glavne novosti vključujejo zahtevo po predložitvi povzetka, ki opredeljuje trge, na katerih bo čutiti učinek transakcije, ter strateške in ekonomske utemeljitve transakcije (oddelek 1); nov oddelek, ki opozarja na dejstvo, da za predlagano koncentracijo lahko veljajo predpisi Skupnosti in/ali nacionalni predpisi, ki urejajo zagotavljanje določenih informacij o predlagani transakciji zaposlenim priglasiteljev in njihovim predstavnikom (oddelek 1.7); ter zahtevo po navedbi vrednosti transakcije (oddelek 3).	149. The New Form CO reflects changes made to the new Merger Regulation and also focuses on certain competition issues raised within the analytical framework of the new Commission notice on the assessment of horizontal mergers (the new merger guidelines). The main innovations involve a requirement to provide an executive summary specifying the markets in which the transaction will have an impact and the strategic and economic rationale for the transaction (Section 1); a new section drawing attention to the fact that a proposed concentration may be subject to Community and/or national rules governing the provision of certain information regarding the proposed transaction vis-à-vis the notifying parties’ employees and their representatives (Section 1.7); and a requirement to specify the value of the transaction (Section 3).
150. Nadaljnje spremembe zadevajo: vrsto potrebne podporne dokumentacije (oddelek 5); kategorije zahtevanih informacij o neprizadetih trgih (oddelek 6); prag za zahtevo po zagotovitvi informacij o tekmecih na prizadetih trgih, ki je bil z 10 % znižan na 5 %; novo obveznost podjetij, da zagotovijo informacije o ravneh indeksa HHI na prizadetih trgih; vrsto informacij, zahtevanih v zvezi s splošnimi tržnimi pogoji (oddelek 8), ter dodatne zahteve glede informacij o predvidljivem prihodnjem razvoju dogodkov, kot so na primer cevovodi, načrti za širitev zmogljivosti in načrti za vstop na trge. Uveden je bila nov oddelek o informacijah glede učinkovitosti (oddelek 9). Oddelek določa, da je zagotavljanje informacij o učinkovitosti prostovoljno in da strankam ni treba utemeljiti, zakaj oddelka niso izpolnile. Oddelek o pomožnih omejitvah je bila odstranjen v skladu z novo določbo uredbe o združitvah, da Komisija takšnih vprašanj po navadi ne bo obravnavala. Zdaj je tudi določeno, da popolnost in točnost priglasitve potrdijo priglasitelji in ne njihovi pravni zastopniki.	150. Further amendments concern: the type of supporting documentation needed (Section 5); the categories of information required in relation to non-affected markets (Section 6); the threshold for the requirement to provide information in relation to competitors in affected markets, which was lowered from 10% to 5%; a new obligation for companies to provide information on the HHI levels in affected markets; the type of information required in relation to general market conditions (Section 8) and additional information requirements on foreseeable future developments such as, for example, pipeline products, plans to expand capacity and plans to enter markets. A new section on information relating to efficiencies (Section 9) has been introduced. The section specifies that submitting information on efficiencies is voluntary and that parties are not required to offer any justification for not completing this section. The section on ancillary restrictions has been removed in line with the new provision in the Merger Regulation to the effect that the Commission will not normally deal with such issues. Finally, it is now provided that the certification of the completeness and accuracy of the notification is to be made by the notifying parties, instead of by their legal representatives.
151. Zaradi širitve je treba od priglasiteljev zahtevati nadaljnjih 10 izvodov vsake priglasitve, predložene Komisiji, da priglasitev velja za popolno[143].	151. Enlargement also made it necessary to require the notifying parties to provide a further 10 copies of each notification to be submitted to the Commission in order for a notification to be considered complete[143].
Novi roki	New time limits
152. Nova izvedbena uredba vsebuje tudi spremembe določb o izračunu rokov, ki se v skladu z besedilom nove uredbe o združitvah ne izračunavajo na podlagi mesecev, temveč delovnih dni. Novi člen 7 določa, da začnejo časovna obdobja teči na delovni dan po dogodku, na katerega se ustrezna določba nanaša. Člen 8 vsebuje poenostavljena pravila za izračun poteka različnih rokov.	152. The new IR also contains amendments to the provisions on the calculation of time limits, which should be calculated, in line with the wording in the new Merger Regulation, on the basis of working days rather than months. The new Article 7 provides that time periods shall begin on the working day following the event to which the relevant provision refers. Article 8 contains simplified rules for the calculation of the expiry of the various time limits.
153. Člen 19(1) določa, da je rok za predložitev obveznosti v fazi I 20 delovnih dni, člen 19(2) pa, da je rok za predložitev zavez v fazi II 65 delovnih dni od datuma začetka postopka. Kadar se rok za sprejetje odločbe iz člena 8(2) podaljša na zahtevo strank v skladu s členom 10(3), se tudi rok za predložitev zavez podaljša za enako število delovnih dni. Na primer: če se rok 90 delovnih dni podaljša za 10 delovnih dni, se rok 65 delovnih dni za predložitev zavez podaljša na 75 delovnih dni.	153. Article 19(1) provides that the deadline for the submission of commitments in Phase I should be 20 working days, and Article 19(2) provides that the deadline for the submission of commitments in Phase II should be 65 working days from the date of initiation of proceedings. Where the deadline for the adoption of an Article 8(2) decision is extended at the request of the parties pursuant to Article 10(3), the deadline for the submission of commitments should also be extended by the same number of working days. For example: if the 90 working day deadline is extended by 10 working days, the deadline of 65 working days for the submission of commitments is extended to 75 workings days.
154. Člen 9 nove izvedbene uredbe uvaja možnost začasne odložitve določenih rokov. Rok v zvezi z napotitvijo in dokončnimi odločbami iz členov 9(4), 10(1) in 10(3) nove uredbe o združitvah se lahko začasno odloži v okoliščinah, za katere so odgovorne stranke, kadar mora Komisija z odločbo najprej zaprositi za informacije (oziroma sprejeti odločbo o nadzoru (člen 13(4)).	154. Article 9 of the new IR introduces the possibility of suspending certain time limits. The time limit concerning referral and final decisions in Articles 9(4), 10(1) and 10(3) of the new Merger Regulation may be suspended in circumstances for which the parties are responsible where the Commission first has to make a request for information by decision (or has to take an inspection decision (Article 13(4)).
Pravica do zaslišanja	Right to be heard
155. Nova izvedbena uredba vsebuje nove določbe o pravici do zaslišanja, ki pomembno razširjajo kategorijo fizičnih ali pravnih oseb, ki imajo takšne pravice, na združenja potrošnikov, kadar predlagana koncentracija zadeva izdelke ali storitve, ki jih uporabljajo končni potrošniki.	155. The new IR contains new provisions on the right to be heard, essentially expanding the category of natural or legal persons who have such rights to consumer associations in cases where the proposed concentration concerns products or services used by final consumers.
Zaupne informacije	Confidential information
156. Nova izvedbena uredba uvaja tudi obveznost za osebe, ki predstavijo svoja mnenja v skladu z njenimi členi 12, 13 ali 16 ali ki predložijo informacije v skladu s členom 11 nove uredbe o združitvah, da jasno opredelijo vsako gradivo, ki je po njihovem mnenju zaupno. Takšne osebe naj bi predložile tudi razlago, zakaj so informacije po njihovem mnenju zaupne, poleg tega pa do datuma, ki ga določi Komisija, zagotovile ločeno različico, ki ni zaupna.	156. The new IR also introduces an obligation on persons who make known their views pursuant to its Articles 12, 13 or 16 or who supply information pursuant to Article 11 of the new Merger Regulation to clearly identify any material which they consider to be confidential. Such persons should also provide an explanation as to why they consider the information to be confidential and should provide a separate non-confidential version by the date set by the Commission.
157. Od priglasiteljev se v skladu s členom 18(3) nove izvedbene uredbe tudi zahteva, da opredelijo poslovne skrivnosti ali druge zaupne informacije v predloženih dokumentih ali delih dokumentov. Poleg tega naj bi navedli tudi podjetja, v zvezi s katerimi takšni dokumenti veljajo za zaupne. Ta zahteva za opredelitev zaupnih informacij velja tudi za kateri koli obvestila o nasprotovanju, povzetka primera ali odločbe, ki jo je sprejela Komisija, ki po mnenju strank vsebuje poslovne skrivnosti. V primeru tretjih strank se od priglasiteljev zahteva, da zagotovijo razlago za svojo zahtevo po zaupnosti in različico zadevnega dokumenta, ki ni zaupna.	157. Notifying parties are also required, pursuant to Article 18(3) of the new IR, to identify the business secrets or other confidential information in the documents or parts of documents which they have produced. They should also identify the undertakings with regard to which such documents are to be considered confidential. This requirement to identify confidential information also applies to any part of a statement of objections, case summary or a decision adopted by the Commission which in the view of the parties contains business secrets. As in the case of third parties, notifying parties are required to provide an explanation for their claim of confidentiality and to provide a non-confidential version of the relevant document.
Dodatne spremembe	Additional amendments
158. Člen 3 določa, da je jezik začetnega postopka tudi jezik „katerega koli naknadnega postopka v zvezi z isto koncentracijo“. Namen tega ukrepa je zagotoviti, da se vsak postopek v zvezi z eno in isto koncentracijo obravnava v istem jeziku. Takšen primer je na primer, kadar je treba zadevo znova preučiti po odločitvi Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti oziroma kadar se postopki v skladu s členom 14 nove uredbe o združitvah začnejo zaradi predložitve netočnih informacij v priglasitvi.	158. Article 3 provides that the language of the original proceeding shall also be the language of “any subsequent proceedings relating to the same concentration”. The aim of this measure is to ensure that any proceedings relating to one and the same concentration are dealt with in the same language. This would be the case, for example, where a matter has to be re-examined following a ruling of the Court of Justice, or where proceedings are brought pursuant to Article 14 of the new Merger Regulation for submission of incorrect information in a notification.
159. Člen 5 je bil spremenjen, da bi pojasnili, katere informacije je treba vključiti v kategorijo informacij, ki jih je po priglasitvi „treba nemudoma sporočiti Komisiji“. Takšne informacije ne obsegajo samo „vsebinskih sprememb dejstev iz priglasitve“ kot prej, temveč tudi „nove informacije, odkrite po priglasitvi, ki jih stranke poznajo oziroma bi jih morale poznati in ki bi jih bilo treba, če bi bile znane, sporočiti ob priglasitvi“.	159. Article 5 has been amended to clarify which information should be included in the category of information which “must be communicated to the Commission without delay” after notification. Such information includes not only, as previously, “material changes in the facts contained in the notification”, but also “new information coming to light subsequent to the notification which the parties know or ought to know and which would have had to be notified if known at the time of notification”.
Novi kratki obrazec CO	New Short Form CO
160. Kratki obrazec CO je bil uveden za priglasitev koncentracij, ki najverjetneje ne bodo povzročile pomislekov o konkurenci. Ta obrazec je bil kar najbolj usklajen s popravljenim obvestilom Komisije o poenostavljenem postopku. Uporaba kratkega obrazca CO je predvidena, kadar:	160. A Short Form CO has been introduced for the notification of concentrations that are unlikely to raise competition concerns. This form has been aligned as closely as possible with the revised Commission notice on a simplified procedure. The use of the Short Form CO is envisaged where:
1. skupno podjetje ne izvaja nobene gospodarske dejavnosti v evropskem gospodarskem prostoru ali kadar je ta dejavnost zanemarljiva;	1. a joint venture has no or negligible economic activity in the European Economic Area;
2. nobeden od udeležencev koncentracije ne opravlja poslovnih dejavnosti v zvezi z istim zadevnim proizvodom in geografskim trgom (ni horizontalnega prekrivanja) ali trgom, ki je v zgornjem ali spodnjem delu verige vrednosti trga, na katerem je dejaven drugi udeleženec v koncentraciji (ni vertikalnega razmerja);	2. none of the parties to the concentration is engaged in business activities in the same relevant product and geographic market (no horizontal overlap), or in a market which is upstream or downstream of a market in which another party to the concentration is engaged (no vertical relationship);
3. skupni tržni deleži strank znašajo manj kot 15 % za horizontalna prekrivanja ali manj kot 25 % (skupaj ali posamezno) za vertikalna razmerja ali	3. the parties combined market shares are less than 15% for horizontal overlaps or less than 25% (combined or individual) for vertical relationships; or
4. stranka pridobi izključni nadzor nad podjetjem, ki ga je prej nadzirala skupaj[144].	4. a party acquires sole control over an undertaking it previously controlled jointly[144].
161. V skladu z obvestilom o poenostavljenem postopku so bile opredeljene določene vrste koncentracije, pri katerih obvestilo na kratkem obrazcu ne bi bilo primerno, čeprav so formalni pogoji morda izpolnjeni. Takšen položaj lahko nastane, kadar je na primer težko opredeliti upoštevne trge; kadar je ena od strank na novo vstopila na trg oziroma je imetnik pomembnega patenta; kadar ni mogoče ustrezno določiti tržnih deležev strank; kadar obstajajo visoke ovire za vstop na trg z visoko stopnjo koncentracije ali znanimi težavami glede konkurence; kadar se pojavi vprašanje koordinacije po členu 2(4) nove uredbe o združitvah; kadar država članica ali tretja stranka izrazi utemeljene pomisleke v okviru določenih rokov in kadar sta vsaj dva udeleženca koncentracije navzoča na tesno povezanih sosednjih trgih. Podobno se lahko zahteva celovito obvestilo na obrazcu CO, kadar stranka pridobi izključni nadzor nad skupnim podjetjem, v katerem ima trenutno skupni nadzor, kadar imata stranka, ki pridobi nadzor, in skupno podjetje skupaj močan tržni položaj ali kadar imata skupno podjetje in stranka, ki pridobi nadzor, močan položaj na vertikalno povezanih trgih.	161. In line with the notice on a simplified procedure, certain types of concentration have been identified where a notification using the Short Form would not be appropriate, even though the formal conditions may be fulfilled. Such a situation may arise where, for instance, it is difficult to define the relevant markets; where one party is a new entrant or an important patent holder; where it is not possible to adequately determine the parties’ market shares; where there are high entry barriers, with a high degree of concentration or known competition problems; where an issue of coordination under Article 2(4) of the new Merger Regulation arises; where a Member State or a third party expresses substantiated concerns within certain deadlines; and where at least two parties to the concentration are present in closely related neighbouring markets. Similarly, a full Form CO notification may be required in the case of a party acquiring sole control of a joint venture in which it currently holds joint control, where the acquiring party and the joint venture, together, have a strong market position, or where the joint venture and the acquiring party have strong positions in vertically related markets.
162. Dodani so bili zaščitni ukrepi za zagotovitev, da lahko Komisija, kadar se pokaže, da koncentracija ne izpolnjuje pogojev za obvestilo v skladu s kratkim obrazcem, je pa že bila priglašena, zahteva celovito ali delno priglasitev v skladu z obrazcem CO. Takšen položaj lahko nastane, kadar niso izpolnjeni pogoji za uporabo kratkega obrazca; kadar se izkaže, da je za ustrezno preiskavo morebitnih pomislekov o konkurenci potrebna celovita ali delna priglasitev v skladu z obrazcem CO; kadar so bile predložene netočne ali zavajajoče informacije in/ali kadar država članica oziroma tretja stranka izrazi utemeljene pomisleke o konkurenci v zvezi s priglašeno koncentracijo. Poudariti je treba, da so za zagotovitev točnih in celovitih informacij odgovorni priglasitelji. Ta in druga vprašanja, povezana z ustreznostjo uporabe priglasitve na kratkem obrazcu, se obravnavajo med stiki pred priglasitvijo.	162. Safeguards have been added to ensure that, should it emerge that the concentration does not qualify for notification under the Short Form but has already been notified, the Commission may then require full or partial notification under Form CO. Such a situation may arise where the conditions for using the Short Form are not met; where a full or partial notification under Form CO appears to be necessary for an adequate investigation of possible competition concerns; where incorrect or misleading information has been submitted; and/or where a Member State or a third party expresses substantiated competition concerns about the notified concentration. It should be emphasised that responsibility for providing correct and complete information rests with the notifying parties. These and other issues relating to the appropriateness of using the Short Form notification should be dealt with during the pre-notification contacts.
163. Informacije, ki jih zahteva sam kratki obrazec CO, morajo biti kratke, hkrati pa zagotavljati, da so predloženi vsi ustrezni podatki, zato da lahko Komisija preveri, ali je predlagana koncentracija primerna za priglasitev na kratkem obrazcu CO. Kratki obrazec CO zahteva informacije o tako imenovanih „trgih, o katerih je mogoče poročati“, ki so lahko horizontalni ali vertikalnih. Po načelu, ki je že zajeto v obvestilu o poenostavljenem postopku, je v kratkem obrazcu CO zapisano, da je treba zagotoviti podatke na podlagi vseh verodostojnih alternativnih opredelitev trga.	163. As to the information required in the Short Form CO itself, this has been kept short while, at the same time, ensuring that all relevant information is submitted in order to allow the Commission to verify that the proposed concentration is appropriate for notification using the Short Form CO. Short Form CO requires information on so-called “reportable markets”, which can be horizontal or vertical markets. Following the principle that is already in the notice on a simplified procedure, it is spelled out in the Short Form CO that data on the basis of all plausible alternative market definitions must be provided.
164. Zahtevane informacije o trgih, o katerih je mogoče poročati, so omejene na informacije o skupni velikosti trga, prodajnih podatkih priglasiteljev in tržnih deležih. Te informacije so omejene izključno na finančne podatke zadnjega leta. V primeru horizontalnih in vertikalnih razmerij je treba zagotoviti podatke o tržnih deležih treh največjih tekmecev. Te osnovne informacije bodo Komisiji omogočile, da bo zagotovila, da gre za koncentracijo, za katero je primerna priglasitev na kratkem obrazcu. Poleg tega je na kratkem obrazcu CO ohranjen oddelek za informacije o morebitnih sodelovalnih učinkih po členu 2(4) nove uredbe o združitvah.	164. The information required on the reportable markets is limited to information concerning the total market size, the notifying parties’ sales data and market shares. This information is limited to last year’s financial data only. In the case of horizontal and vertical relationships, market shares of the three largest competitors must be provided. This basic information will allow the Commission to ensure that the concentration is one for which a Short Form notification is appropriate. Furthermore, the section seeking information on possible cooperative effects under Article 2(4) of the new Merger Regulation has been retained in the Short Form CO.
165. V skladu s celovitim obrazcem CO je bila dodana določba, ki zadeva potrebo po obveščanju zaposlenih in njihovih predstavnikov. Dodana je bila tudi določba v skladu s celovitim obrazcem CO, ki od priglasiteljev zahteva, da zagotovijo povzetek koncentracije.	165. In line with the full Form CO, a provision concerning the need to inform employees and their representatives has been added. Finally, a provision has been added in line with the full Form CO requiring notifying parties to provide an executive summary of the concentration.
1.3. Popravljeno obvestilo o poenostavljenem postopku	1.3. Revised notice on a simplified procedure
166. Popravljeno obvestilo o poenostavljenem postopku nadomešča prejšnje obvestilo iz leta 2000. Popravek je zajemal eno bistveno spremembo – vključitev nove kategorije koncentracij, ki vključujejo spremembo s skupnega na izključni nadzor – in druge manjše besedilne spremembe.	166. The revised notice on a simplified procedure replaces the previous notice from 2000. The revision consisted in one substantive amendment - the inclusion of a new category of concentrations involving a change from joint to sole control – and other minor textual changes.
167. Vključitev te nove kategorije je spodbudila izkušnja Komisije, ki je pokazala, da spremembe iz skupnega nadzora dveh ali več podjetij v izključni nadzor enega samega podjetja po navadi ne povzročijo pomislekov o konkurenci. To pa zato, ker umik enega ali več obvladujočih podjetij neizogibno zmanjša število zadevnih podjetij. Lahko tudi pripelje do zelo majhne spremembe vedenja skupnega podjetja na trgu ali pa se to vedenje sploh ne spremeni. Tako bo to v primerjavi s položajem pred umikom po navadi imelo za posledico krepitev kombiniranega tržnega položaja preostalih zadevnih podjetij, tj. obvladujočega matičnega podjetja z izključnim nadzorom in nekdanjega skupnega podjetja.	167. The inclusion of this new category is motivated by the Commission’s experience which has shown that changes from joint control by two or more companies to sole control by one company do not usually give rise to competition concerns. This is because the withdrawal of one or several controlling undertakings will inevitably reduce the number of undertakings concerned. It may also lead to little or no change in the behaviour of the joint venture in the market. It will thus not normally result in a strengthening of the combined market position of the remaining undertakings concerned, i.e., the sole controlling parent and the former joint venture, as compared with the situation prior to withdrawal.
168. V izjemnih okoliščinah lahko sprememba od skupnega k izključnemu nadzoru sproži pomisleke o konkurenci. Poseben pomislek o konkurenci bi se lahko pojavil v okoliščinah, ko se nekdanje skupno podjetje integrira v skupino ali mrežo svojega preostalega imetnika deleža ter se odstranijo urejevalne omejitve, do katerih pride zaradi razlikujočih se pobud drugih nadzornih imetnikov deležev in se s tem poveča tržni položaj preostalega imetnika deleža. Oddelek obvestila o zaščitnih ukrepih in izključitvah opisuje scenarije, v katerih lahko spremembe od skupnega k izključnemu nadzoru povzročijo pomisleke o konkurenci, ter določa, da lahko Komisija v takšnih primerih opusti uporabo poenostavljenega postopka in uvede preiskavo in/ali sprejme odločitev v rednem postopku. Kot dodatni zaščitni ukrep lahko Komisija opusti uporabo poenostavljenega postopka, kadar niti Komisija niti pristojni organi držav članic niso pregledali prejšnje pridobitve skupnega nadzora nad zadevnim skupnim podjetjem. Obvestilo tudi navaja (točka 17), da si bo Komisija prizadevala izdati odločbo, takoj ko bo to izvedljivo, po izteku obdobja 15 delovnih dni, med katerim lahko države članice zahtevajo napotitev v skladu s členom 9 nove uredbe o združitvah. To je najzgodnejši rok, v katerem je sprejetje odločbe pravno mogoče.	168. In exceptional circumstances, the change from joint to sole control might raise competition concerns. A particular competition concern could arise in circumstances where the former joint venture is integrated into the group or network of its remaining shareholder and the disciplining constraints exercised by the diverging incentives of the other controlling shareholders are removed, thereby enhancing the remaining shareholder’s market position. The safeguards and exclusions section of the notice describes scenarios in which changes from joint to sole control may give rise to competition concerns and stipulates that, in such cases, the Commission may refrain from applying the simplified procedure and launch an investigation and/or adopt a full decision. As an additional safeguard the Commission may refrain from applying the simplified procedure in cases where neither the Commission nor the competent authorities of Member States have reviewed the prior acquisition of joint control of the joint venture in question. The notice also indicates (point 17) that the Commission will endeavour to issue a decision as soon as practicable following expiry of the 15 working day period during which Member States may request referral pursuant to Article 9 of the new Merger Regulation. This is the earliest point at which adoption of a decision is legally possible.
169. Glede na spremembe politike Komisije v zvezi s pomožnimi omejitvami obvestilo navaja, da postopek ni primeren za primere, v katerih zadevna podjetja zahtevajo izrecno presojo pomožnih omejitev.	169. In view of changes to the Commission’s policy concerning ancillary restrictions, the notice states that the procedure is not suited to cases in which the undertakings concerned request an express assessment of ancillary restrictions.
Polje 6: Usklajeni sistem napotitev po novi uredbi o združitvah Utemeljitev usklajenega sistema napotitev Splošni namen novega usklajenega sistema napotitev je uvesti smotrnejši korektivni mehanizem dodeljevanja primerov med Komisijo in državami članicami na podlagi subsidiarnosti ob zagotovitvi, da primer obravnava(-jo) organ ali organi, ki je(so) v najboljšem položaju za izvedbo preiskave določene združitve. Ta sistem je namenjen predvsem obravnavanju vprašanja „večkratne vložitve“, tj. priglasitve različnim organom za konkurenco v EU, medtem ko se ohranijo glavne prednosti nadzora združevanja v ES, ki so izvedba celotnega postopka na enem mestu, primernost, pravna varnost in upravna učinkovitost. V ta namen so bila pravila, ki urejajo sistem napotitev v novi uredbi o združitvah (členi 4(4), 4(5), 9 in 22), poenostavljena in narejena bolj prožna. Ključni vidik preoblikovanja je, da lahko zdaj na podlagi prostovoljne zahteve, ki jo vložijo združujoča se podjetja, pride do napotitev od Komisije k državam članicam in obratno pred uradno vložitvijo pri kateri koli sodni oblasti EU. Obvestilo o dodelitvi primera Glede na novost postopkov napotitve, določenih v novi uredbi o združitvah, so bile te spremembe dopolnjene z novim obvestilom o načelih, merilih in metodologiji, na katerih morajo temeljiti odločbe o napotitvah. Obvestilo najprej navede vodilna načela, na katerih temelji mehanizem predodelitve primerov med Komisijo in državami članicami, ki so subsidiarnost, izvedba celotnega postopka na enem mestu in pravna varnost. Subsidiarnost pomeni, da je treba pristojnost načeloma predodeliti agenciji za konkurenco, ki je v najboljšem položaju za obravnavanje združitve, ob upoštevanju učinka primera na konkurenco ter preiskovalnih orodij in strokovnega znanja, ki jih ima agencija na voljo. Napotitev združitve najprimernejšemu organu je še posebej nujna, kadar se izkaže, da lahko določena transakcija močno vpliva na konkurenco in jo je zato treba skrbno preiskati. Izvedba celotnega postopka na enem mestu zagotavlja, da bo združitev obravnavala ena sama agencija za konkurenco, s čimer se bo povečala upravna učinkovitost, izognjeno pa bo podvajanje in razdrobljenost izvrševanja več organov. Na podlagi tega načela naj bi se izognili razdrobljenosti primerov, kjer koli je to mogoče. Zaradi pravne varnosti je treba napotitve pred vložitvijo načeloma omejiti na tiste primere, ko je že od samega začetka sorazmerno enostavno ugotoviti obseg geografskega trga in/ali obstoj morebitnega učinka na konkurenco, da se je mogoče o takšnih zahtevah takoj odločiti. Ob upoštevanju združitev Skupnosti, primernih za napotitve na države članice, obvestilo navaja, da je treba pri premisleku, ali primer napotiti ali ne, upoštevati posebne značilnosti primera, posebno strokovno znanje, ki ga ima na voljo agencija, ter verjetno lokacijo kakršnega koli morebitnega učinka na konkurenco. Na koncu obvestilo določa, da se lahko upoštevajo tudi upravne posledice predlagane napotitve. Poleg tega obvestilo navaja seznam pravnih meril, ki morajo biti izpolnjena za omogočitev napotitev, ter določa druge dejavnike, ki se lahko upoštevajo pri odločanju o napotitvah. Na podlagi zgornjega navaja obvestilo tiste kategorije primerov, ki so najprimernejši za napotitev, in sicer: (i) glede napotitev od Komisije na države članice: koncentracije z razsežnostjo Skupnosti, za katere je verjetno, da bodo vplivale na konkurenco na trgih nacionalnega obsega ali obsega, ki je ožji od nacionalnega, in katerega učinki bodo verjetno omejeni na eno samo državo članico oziroma bodo imeli glavni ekonomski učinek v eni sami državi članici; (ii) glede napotitev od držav članic na Komisijo: (a) primeri, ko je(so) trg(-i), na katerem(-ih) bi lahko prišlo do morebitnega učinka na konkurenco, širši od nacionalnega geografskega okvira ali na katerih je nekaj potencialno prizadetih trgov širših od nacionalnega in je glavni ekonomski učinek koncentracije povezan s takšnimi trgi; (b) primeri, ki povzročajo pomisleke o potencialni konkurenci na vrsti nacionalnih trgov ali trgov, ožjih od nacionalnih, ki so v številnih različnih državah v EU, ter v okoliščinah, ko bi bilo zaželeno skladno obravnavanje primera (glede preiskave, pa tudi glede morebitnih protiukrepov). Obvestilo zagotavlja praktične smernice glede delovanja sistema napotitev, tako da podrobno navaja različne korake, ki so potrebni za napotitev primera od Komisije na države članice in obratno, ter pojasnjuje številne koncepte, pomembne v okviru napotitev pred priglasitvijo po členu 4(4) in (5) nove uredbe o združitvah (sprožilni dogodki za zahtevo, informacije, ki jih morajo zagotoviti vlagatelji zahteve, časovni okvir, v katerem so obravnavane zahteve). V tem oddelku obvestila so zagotovljene tudi smernice o vlogi mreže, ki so jo oblikovale Komisija in države članice ter katere namen je zagotoviti pravočasno izmenjavo informacij ter dialog in sodelovanje med njenimi člani. V okviru posledic preoblikovanja je najprej pričakovati, da se bo povečalo število primerov, primernih za predodelitev med Komisijo in nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco, ker so bile zahteve za napotitve poenostavljene. Drugič, napotitve pred vložitvijo – vsaj glede napotitev Komisiji – naj bi sčasoma nadomestile napotitve po vložitvi. Na podlagi številnih zahtev, vloženih od začetka uporabe novih pravil, se zdi, da je novi sistem napotitev na Komisijo pred vložitvijo precej uspešen. Izmed štirinajstih zahtev za napotitev na Komisijo po členu 4(5) uredbe o združitvah, za katere je bil postopek končan, so države članice odklonile soglasje le v dveh primerih. Velika večina zahtev je zadevala prave čezmejne primere. Poleg tega, da jih je bilo mogoče priglasiti velikemu številu držav članic, so te transakcije vplivale na konkurenco zunaj ozemlja ene države članice in so očitno vplivale bodisi na trge v okviru EGP bodisi na številne nacionalne trge. V teh primerih je bila Komisija najprimernejša za obravnavanje takšnih transakcij. Podjetja se jasno zavedajo prednosti, če njihov primer obravnava Komisija, saj se tako izognejo zahtevam po večkratni vložitvi ter imajo koristi od usklajene preiskave in, kjer je primerno, od skladnih protiukrepov. Le majhno število primerov je zadevalo „čiste“ transakcije z večkratnimi vložitvami in brez oprijemljivega učinka na čezmejno konkurenco. V zvezi z napotitvami združitev z razsežnostjo Skupnosti na države članice v fazi pred priglasitvijo (člen 4(4)) uredbe o združitvah sta bili doslej predloženi le dve zahtevi. To je v skladu s pričakovanji, da bo število takšnih zahtev o predodelitvi državi članici omejeno. \|	Box 6: The streamlined referral system under the new Merger Regulation Rationale for a streamlined referral system The overall purpose of the new streamlined referral system is to put in place a more rational corrective mechanism of case allocation between the Commission and Member States based on subsidiarity, by ensuring that the authority or authorities best placed to carry out a particular merger investigation should deal with the case. This system aims in particular at tackling the problem of "multiple filing", i.e. notification to various competition authorities within the EU, while preserving the major assets of EU merger control, that is one-stop-shop, expediency, legal certainty and administrative efficiency. To this end, the rules governing the referral system in the new Merger Regulation (Articles 4(4), 4(5), 9 and 22) have been simplified and rendered more flexible. A key aspect of the reform is that referrals from the Commission to Member States and vice versa can now occur before a formal filing has been made in any EU jurisdiction, based on a voluntary request submitted by the merging companies. The notice on case allocation In view of the novelty of the referral procedures set out in the new Merger Regulation, these amendments have been complemented by a new notice on the principles, criteria and methodology upon which referral decisions should be based. The notice first spells out the guiding principles upon which the mechanism of reallocation of cases between the Commission and Member states is founded, namely subsidiarity, one-stop-shop and legal certainty. Subsidiarity implies that in principle jurisdiction should be re-attributed to the competition agency that is best placed for dealing with a merger, having regard to the impact on competition of the case as well as the investigative tools and expertise available to the agency. The case for referring a merger to the most appropriate authority is particularly compelling where it appears that a particular transaction may have a significant impact on competition and thus may deserve careful scrutiny. One-stop-shop secures the handling of a merger by a single competition agency, thus increasing administrative efficiency and avoiding duplication and fragmentation of enforcement effort by multiple authorities. Based on this principle, fragmentation of cases should be avoided where possible. Legal certainty requires that pre-filing referrals should in principle be confined to those cases where it is relatively straightforward to establish, from the outset, the scope of the geographic market and/or the existence of a possible competitive impact, so as to be able to promptly decide upon such requests. With respect to Community mergers eligible for referrals to Member States, the notice indicates that, in considering whether to refer a case, regard should be had to the particular characteristics of the case, the particular expertise available to the agency as well as the probable location of any possible impact on competition. Finally, the notice stipulates that consideration may also be given to the administrative implications of a proposed referral. Moreover, the notice catalogues the legal criteria that must be fulfilled in order for referrals to be possible, and sets out the other factors which may be taken into consideration when referrals are decided upon. Based on the above, the notice identifies those categories of cases which are the best candidates for referral, namely: (i) as regards referrals from the Commission to Member states: concentrations with a Community dimension which are likely to affect competition in markets that have a national or narrower than national scope, and whose effects are likely to be confined to, or have their main economic impact in, a single Member State; (ii) as regards referrals from Member States to the Commission: (a) cases where the market/s in which there may be a potential impact on competition is/are wider than national in geographic scope, or where some of the potentially affected markets are wider than national and the main economic impact of the concentration is connected to such markets; (b) cases that give rise to potential competition concerns in a series of national or narrower than national markets located in a number of different countries in the EU, and in circumstances where coherent treatment (regarding the investigation but also regarding possible remedies) of the case would be desirable. Finally, the notice provides practical guidance regarding the mechanics of the referral system, by specifying the various steps required for a case to be referred from the Commission to Member States and vice versa, and clarifying a number of concepts relevant in the context of pre-notification referrals under Article 4(4) and (5) of the new Merger Regulation (triggering events for the request, information to be provided by the requesting parties, time frame within which the requests are treated). In this section of the notice, guidance is also provided on the role of the network formed by the Commission and the Member States, whose purpose is securing timely exchange of information as well as dialogue and cooperation between its members. As to the implications of the reform, first it is expected that the number of cases subject to re-allocation between the Commission and national competition authorities should increase as the requirements for referrals have been simplified. Second, pre-filing referrals – at least with respect to referrals to the Commission - should over time displace post-filing referrals. Based on the number of requests which have been filed since the application of the new rules, it appears that the new system of pre-filing referral to the Commission is a significant success. Of the 14 requests for referrals to the Commission under Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation for which the procedure has been completed, only two have been vetoed by Member States. The great majority of the requests concerned genuine cross-border cases. These transactions, apart from being notifiable to a large number of Member states, had effects on competition beyond the territory of one Member State, by affecting either clearly EEA-wide markets or a number of national markets. In these cases, the Commission is better placed to deal with such transactions. Businesses clearly recognize the advantage of having their case dealt with by the Commission in order to avoid multiple filing requirements, to benefit from a coordinated investigation and, where applicable, from coherent remedies. Only a small number of cases concerned “pure” multiple filing transactions with no tangible effect on cross-border competition. As regards referrals of mergers with a Community dimension to Member States during the pre-notification phase (Article 4(4)) of the Merger Regulation, so far only two requests have been submitted. This is in line with expectations that such requests for reallocation to a Member State would be limited in number. \|
1.4. Novo obvestilo o pomožnih omejitvah	1.4. New notice on ancillary restraints
170. Obstoječe obvestilo o pomožnih omejitvah je bilo popravljeno, da bi upoštevalo novo uredbo o združitvah, ki določa, da za odločbo, ki razglaša, da je koncentracija združljiva s skupnim trgom, „šteje, da zajema omejitve, ki so neposredno povezane za izvedbo koncentracije in so zanjo potrebne[145]“. Temu primerno morajo udeleženci transakcije sami presoditi, ali je mogoče klavzulo obravnavati kot pomožno za združitev ali ne.	170. The existing notice on ancillary restraints was revised to take account of the new Merger Regulation, which provides that a decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common market “shall be deemed to cover restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration[145]”. Accordingly, the parties to a transaction have to assess themselves whether a clause can be regarded as ancillary to a merger or not.
171. Vendar pa Komisija v posebnih okoliščinah ohrani preostalo funkcijo in na zahtevo zadevnih podjetij izrecno presodi pomožno naravo takšnih omejitev, če prinaša primer „nova in nerešena vprašanja, ki povzročajo resnično negotovost“, opredeljena kot vprašanja, „ki jih ustrezno veljavno obvestilo Komisije ali objavljena odločba Komisije ne obravnava“.	171. However, in specific circumstances, the Commission retains a residual function and should at the request of the undertakings concerned, expressly assess the ancillary nature of such restrictions if a case presents “novel and unresolved questions giving rise to genuine uncertainty” defined as questions “not covered by the relevant Commission notice in force or a published Commission decision.”
172. Novo obvestilo zagotavlja smernice o razlaganju obvestila o „pomožnih omejitvah“, da bi olajšalo samooceno udeležencev in izboljšalo pravno varnost. Vsebuje jasne smernice, na primer o najdaljših obdobjih, za katera je mogoče sprejeti omejitve, in zajema tudi veliko večino klavzul, ki po izkušnjah Komisije veljajo kot pomožne za koncentracije.	172. The new notice provides guidance on the interpretation of the notion of “ancillary restrictions” to facilitate the parties' self-assessment and improve legal certainty. It contains clear-cut guidance, for example on maximum periods for which restrictions can be accepted, and also covers the vast majority of clauses that, in the Commission’s experience, are claimed to be ancillary to concentrations.
173. Novo obvestilo obravnava klavzule o nekonkuriranju kot pomožne omejitve za obdobje do treh let, če sta vključeni znanje in dobro ime, in do dveh let, če gre samo za prenos dobrega imena. Pojasnjuje tudi pravila za geografski obseg omejitev ter klavzule o nesodelovanju in varovanju tajnosti. Glede licenčnih pogodb obvestilo še vedno ne zahteva nobenega roka, določa pa jasna pravila za ozemeljske omejitve in sporazume, ki ščitijo izključno dajalca licence. Najdaljše obdobje za obveznosti nakupa in dobave je bilo zaradi vertikalne narave teh omejitev podaljšano s treh na pet let.	173. The new notice considers non-competition clauses to be ancillary restrictions for up to three years if both know-how and goodwill are included, and for two years if only goodwill is transferred. It also clarifies the rules on the geographical scope of restrictions and on non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses. For licence agreements, the notice still requires no time limit but sets out clear rules for territorial limitations and agreements which protect the licensor only. The maximum period for purchase and supply obligations has been extended from three to five years given the vertical character of these restrictions.
174. V nasprotju s prejšnjim obvestilom, ki je določalo triletno časovno omejitev za klavzule o nekonkuriranju v skupnih podjetjih, dopušča novo obvestilo takšne klavzule za celotno trajanje skupnega podjetja. To pa zato, ker potreba po klavzulah o nekonkuriranju v skupnih podjetjih na splošno ni omejena na prehodno obdobje.	174. In contrast to the previous notice, which stipulated a three-year time limit for non-competition clauses in joint ventures, the new notice allows such clauses for the lifetime of a joint venture. This is because the need for non-competition clauses in joint ventures is not generally limited to a transitional period.
1.5. Obvestilo o presoji horizontalnih združitev	1.5. Notice on the assessment of horizontal mergers
175. Po obsežnem posvetovalnem postopku je Komisija januarja v skladu z novo uredbo o združitvah sprejela smernice za presojo horizontalnih združitev (smernice za horizontalne združitve), ki dopolnjujejo novo uredbo o združitvah in so začele veljati skupaj z njo. Smernice za horizontalne združitve določajo analitični pristop, ki ga ima Komisija pri presoji morebitnega konkurenčnega učinka združitev med konkurenčnimi podjetji (tako imenovane horizontalne združitve), in izražajo preoblikovano besedilo stvarnega preizkusa za presojo konkurenčnosti združitev v novi uredbi o združitvah[146].	175. Following a wide consultation process, the Commission adopted in January guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers (horizontal merger guidelines) under the new Merger Regulation which complement the new Merger Regulation and became applicable together with it. The horizontal merger guidelines set out the analytical approach the Commission takes in assessing the likely competitive impact of mergers between competing firms (so-called horizontal mergers) and reflect the re-wording of the substantive test for the competitive assessment of mergers in the new Merger Regulation[146].
176. Smernice jasno določajo, da bodo združitve in pripojitve prepovedane le, če povečujejo tržno moč podjetij na način, ki bi lahko škodljivo vplival na potrošnike, predvsem v obliki višjih cen, slabše kakovosti izdelkov ali zmanjšane izbire. V zvezi s tem smernice razlagajo, da imajo združitve lahko za posledico precejšnjo škodo za konkurenco na dva obsežna načina, bodisi zato, ker koncentracija odstrani s trga pomemben vir konkurence („neusklajeni učinki“), bodisi zato, ker povečuje verjetnost protikonkurenčnega usklajevanja med preostalimi podjetji („usklajeni učinki“).	176. The guidelines make it clear that mergers and acquisitions will only be prohibited to the extent that they enhance the market power of companies in a manner which is likely to have adverse consequences for consumers, notably in the form of higher prices, poorer quality products, or reduced choice. In this regard, the guidelines explain that mergers may result in significant harm to competition in two broad ways, either because the concentration eliminates an important source of competition from the market ("non-coordinated effects"), or because it makes anticompetitive coordination between the remaining firms more likely ("coordinated effects").
177. Smernice razlagajo okoliščine, v katerih lahko Komisija najde pomisleke o konkurenci, določajo pa tudi jasne kvantitativne navedbe glede tega, kdaj Komisija najverjetneje ne bo posegla, na primer, kadar ima združitev za posledico ravni tržne koncentracije, ki so pod določenimi opredeljenimi ravnmi, merjenimi s tržnim deležem podjetja ali s tako imenovanim „indeksom HHI“[147].	177. The guidelines explain the circumstances in which the Commission may identify competition concerns, but also provide clear quantitative indications as to when the Commission is unlikely to intervene, for example, when a merger results in market concentration levels below certain specified levels, as measured by the firms' market share or by the so-called "HHI index"[147].
178. Smernice tudi določajo dejavnike, ki lahko ublažijo začetni pomislek, da bi združitev lahko škodila konkurenci. Do tega lahko na primer pride, kadar obstaja verjetnost, da bodo na trg, na katerem delujejo združujoča se podjetja, vstopila druga podjetja. Upoštevano bo tudi dejstvo, da imajo stranke združujočih se podjetij precejšnjo „kupno moč“ in se lahko zlahka zatečejo k alternativnim dobaviteljem.	178. The guidelines also set out the factors that may mitigate an initial concern that a merger is likely to harm competition. This may, for example, be the case where other firms are likely to enter the market in which the merging companies are operating. Account will likewise be taken of the fact that customers of the merging firms may enjoy significant "buyer power" such that they can easily resort to alternative suppliers.
179. Na koncu smernice določajo, da bo Komisija pri svoji splošni presoji morebitnega učinka združitve na konkurenco pozorno preučila kakršen koli utemeljen zahtevek udeležencev glede tega, da bo imela združitev za posledico pridobitve zaradi učinkovitosti. Da bi se takšna učinkovitost upoštevala, mora koristiti potrošnikom, dosegljiva mora biti samo z združitvijo, obstajati mora verjetnost, da bo uresničena, in biti mora preverljiva.	179. Finally, the guidelines specify that the Commission will carefully consider, in its overall assessment of the likely competitive impact of a merger, any substantiated claim made by the parties that the merger will result in efficiency gains. For such efficiencies to be taken into account, they must benefit consumers, they must only be attainable via the merger, they must be likely to be realised and they must be verifiable.
B – PRIMERI KOMISIJE	B – COMMISSION CASES
1. ODLOčBE, SPREJETE V SKLADU S čLENOM 8	1. DECISIONS TAKEN UNDER ARTICLE 8
Lagardère/Natexis/VUP[148]	Lagardère/Natexis/VUP[148]
180. Komisija je 7. januarja odobrila predlagano pripojitev družbe Editis (ki se je prej imenovala Vivendi Universal Publishing ali VUP) k skupini Lagardère na podlagi odprodaje približno 60 % njenih sredstev. Pred transakcijo je bila družba Editis vodilna na področju založništva, trženja in distribucije knjig v francoskem jeziku, družba Hachette Livre, založnik družbe Lagardère, pa drugo najuspešnejše podjetje v sektorju.	180. On 7 January, the Commission authorized the proposed acquisition of Editis (formerly called Vivendi Universal Publishing, or VUP) by the Lagardère group subject to the divestment of around 60% of its assets. Before the transaction, Editis was the leader in the publishing, marketing and distribution of French-language books and Hachette Livre, the publishing arm of Lagardère, was the second player in the sector.
181. Primer, ki je bil priglašen 14. aprila 2003, je imel za posledico številne odločbe Komisije: ene na podlagi člena 6(1)(c) (začetek postopkov druge faze) z dne 5. junija 2003, ene na podlagi člena 9 (zavrnitev napotitve primera na francoske organe) z dne 23. julija 2003[149], dveh na podlagi člena 11(5) (začasna odložitev postopka) in zadnje na podlagi člena 8(2) z dne 7. januarja 2004. V tem primeru so se pojavile številne pritožbe združenj knjižnih bralcev, prodajalcev na drobno, prodajalcev na debelo, založnikov, avtorjev in ilustratorjev.	181. The case, which was notified on 14 April 2003, resulted in a number of decisions by the Commission: Article 6(1)(c) (opening of second phase proceedings) on 5 June 2003, Article 9 (refusal to refer the case to the French authorities) on 23 July 2003[149], two Article 11(5) decisions (suspending the procedure) and the final Article 8(2) decision on 7 January 2004. In this case there were numerous complaints from associations of book readers, retailers, wholesalers, publishers, authors and illustrators.
182. Preiskava in analiza Komisije sta odkrili, da bi pripojitev celotnega založniškega podjetja Editis, kot je bilo načrtovano v transakciji, ki je bila prvotno priglašena Komisiji, imela za posledico izredno prevladujočo skupino s prometom, ki bi bil vsaj sedemkrat večji od prometa njenega najbližjega tekmeca v francosko govorečih državah Evropske unije. V odziv na ugovore Komisije se je družba Lagardère strinjala, da bo odprodala skoraj vsa sredstva družbe Editis, razen nekaterih (Larousse, Dunod, Dalloz in skupine Anaya), ki prispevajo skoraj 40 % svetovnega prometa družbe, medtem ko so ohranili manj kot 25 % družbe Editis v francosko govorečih regijah EU (tj. na upoštevnih trgih).	182. The Commission's investigation and analysis revealed that the acquisition of the entire Editis publishing business, as planned in the transaction initially notified to the Commission, would have produced a heavily dominant group with a turnover at least seven times that of its nearest rival in the French-speaking countries of the European Union. In reply to the Commission's objections, Lagardère agreed to divest almost all of Editis with the exception of certain assets (Larousse, Dunod, Dalloz and the Anaya group) accounting for around 40% of the worldwide turnover of the company, while only less than 25% of Editis in the French-speaking regions of the EU (i.e. the relevant markets) was retained.
183. V francosko govorečem založniškem sektorju so različni udeleženci: (i) bolj vertikalno integrirana Hachette Livre in Editis, ki sta dejavna v celotni knjižni verigi; (ii) štiri srednje velike skupine, tj. Gallimard, Flammarion, Seuil in Albin Michel, ki so deloma vertikalno integrirane; in (iii) mnogo manjših založnikov, ki so po navadi dejavni le v proizvodnji ter se na področju trženja in distribucije naslanjajo na večja podjetja. Glede na takšno ozadje je Komisija ugotovila, da je bila konkurenca med založniki navzoča predvsem na dveh ravneh knjižne verige: prvič, na ravni dostopa do „surovin“ (tj. založniških pravic) in drugič, na ravni dostopa do „trga“ (tj. polic prodajalcev na drobno).	183. The French-speaking publishing sector is characterised by different players: (i) the more vertically integrated, Hachette Livre and Editis, active over the entire book chain; (ii) four medium-sized groups, Gallimard, Flammarion, Seuil and Albin Michel, partly vertically integrated; and (iii) many small publishers usually only active in the production part and relying on larger companies for their marketing and distribution. Against that background, the Commission found that competition between publishers essentially occurred at two levels of the book chain: first, at the level of access to the “raw material” (i.e. publishing rights), and second, at the level of access to the “market” (i.e. resellers’ shelves).
184. Potem ko je Komisija podrobno preučila predlagano transakcijo, je ugotovila številne težave glede konkurence, ki bi bile posledica združitve družb Editis in Hachette Livre, vodilnih akterjev na trgu z najvišjo stopnjo vertikalne integracije. Prvotna transakcija bi imela za posledico oziroma bi okrepila prevladujoče položaje nove pravne osebe po celotni knjižni verigi, predvsem pa v bolj industrializiranem delu založniške dejavnosti: trženju, distribuciji in izdajanju žepnega formata. Nova pravna oseba bi nadzorovala dostop do znanih avtorjev, katerih prodaje so življenjsko pomembne za založnike, in do prodajnih mest, ki ne morejo vsrkati, kaj šele promovirati, več kot omejenega deleža del, objavljenih vsako leto.	184. Following its detailed review of the proposed transaction, the Commission identified a number of competition problems that would result from the combination of Editis and Hachette Livre, the two leading market players with the highest level of vertical integration. The original transaction would have created or strengthened dominant positions of the new entity along the whole of the book chain and notably in the more industrialised part of the publishing business: marketing, distribution and pocket format publishing. The new entity would have controlled access both to well-known authors, whose sales are the lifeblood of publishers, and to sales outlets, which cannot absorb, let alone promote, more than a limited proportion of the works published each year.
185. Glede na obseg težav glede konkurence, povzročenih s kombinacijo družb Editis in Hachette Livre, bi bilo mogoče primer odobriti le na podlagi večjih protiukrepov. Takšni protiukrepi bi morali ponuditi rešitve za trge (založniške pravice, tržne in distribucijske storitve, prodaja knjig), na katerih bi združitev spojila vodilna akterja, prav tako pa tudi obravnavati številne vertikalne in konglomeratske povezave med temi trgi.	185. Given the scope of the competition problems raised by the combination of Hachette Livre and Editis, the case could only be cleared subject to very substantial remedies. Such remedies not only had to provide solutions for markets (publishing rights, marketing and distribution services, sale of books) in which the merger would bring together the two leading players, but they also had to address the numerous vertical and conglomerate links between these markets.
186. Družba Lagardère se je posledično zavezala, da bo odprodala vsa sredstva družbe Editis, razen založniške hiše Larousse, ki je dejavna predvsem na področju priročnikov, strokovnih in akademskih založnikov Dalloz in Dunod, ter španske založniške skupine Anaya, ki je dejavna predvsem na področju učbenikov in splošne literature v Španiji in Latinski Ameriki.	186. Lagardère consequently committed itself to divesting all assets of Editis except the publishing house Larousse, which is mainly active in reference books, the professional and academic publishers Dalloz and Dunod as well as the Spanish publishing group Anaya, which is active mainly in schoolbooks and general literature in Spain and Latin America.
187. Komisija je 3. avgusta sklenila, da bo v skladu s protiukrepi odločbe o odobritvi kot kupca celotnega odprodanega premoženja družbe Editis odobrila francosko podjetje Wendel Investissements.	187. On 3 August, the Commission decided to approve the French company Wendel Investissements as the purchaser of all the assets of Editis divested in accordance with the remedies in the clearance decision.
Sony/BMG[150]	Sony/BMG[150]
188. Skupno podjetje SonyBMG po vsem svetu, razen na Japonskem, združuje dejavnosti posnete glasbe podjetij Sony in Bertelsmann. Ukvarja se samo z dejavnostmi, zajetimi pod naslovom „Umetnik in repertoar“, tj. odkrivanjem in razvojem izvajalcev (pevcev), ter trženjem in prodajo nosilcev zvoka. Nasprotno pa podjetje SonyBMG ne bo dejavno na področju izdelave in fizične distribucije (logistike) nosilcev zvoka. Podobno v skupno podjetje ne bo vključena dejavnost glasbenega založništva podjetij Sony in Bertelsmann.	188. The SonyBMG joint venture combines Sony and Bertelsmann’s recorded music businesses worldwide, except for Japan. It comprises only so-called “artist and repertoire” (A&R) activities, i.e. the discovery and development of performing artists (singers), and the marketing and sale of records. By contrast, SonyBMG will not be active in the manufacturing and the physical distribution (logistics) of records. Likewise, Sony and Bertelsmann’s music publishing businesses are not integrated into the joint venture.
189. Komisija je preučila konkurenčni učinek predlagane koncentracije na trge posnete glasbe, licenc za glasbo na spletu in distribucije glasbe na spletu. Ker obe matični podjetji ostajata dejavni kot glasbena založnika, je Komisija tudi raziskala, ali bi imelo skupno podjetje za posledico uskladitev konkurenčnega vedenja podjetij Sony in Bertelsmann na trgu glasbenega založništva. Od 9. januarja 2004, ko je bilo priglašeno oblikovanje skupnega podjetja Sony BMG, je Komisija presodila primer v skladu s stvarnim preizkusom Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 4064/89[151].	189. The Commission examined the competitive impact of the proposed concentration on the markets for recorded music, licences for online music, and online music distribution. As both parent companies remain active as music publishers, the Commission also inquired whether the joint venture would result in the coordination of Sony and Bertelsmann’s competitive behaviour in the music publishing market. Since the creation of the SonyBMG joint venture was notified on 9 January, the Commission assessed the case under the substantial test of Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89[151].
190. V panogi nosilcev zvoka je pet „velikih družb“, in sicer Universal, Sony, EMI, Warner in Bertelsmann (BMG), ki so navzoče po vsem svetu in skupaj pokrivajo približno 80 % evropskega in svetovnega trga. V EGP sestavlja preostali del trga veliko število „neodvisnih udeležencev“, z večinoma nacionalnimi dejavnostmi in nizkimi tržnimi deleži. Po združitvi bosta imela Universal in Sony BMG približno 25-odstotna tržna deleža, kar bo pred družbama EMI in Warner.	190. In the record industry the five “majors”, namely Universal, Sony, EMI, Warner and Bertelsmann (BMG), all have a worldwide presence and account together for approximately 80% of the market, both in Europe and worldwide. In the EEA, the rest of the market is composed of a large number of “independents” with mostly national activities and low market shares. Following the merger, Universal and SonyBMG will both have market shares of approximately 25%, ahead of EMI and Warner.
191. Preiskava Komisije je bila osredotočena na vprašanje, ali bi koncentracija lahko okrepila oziroma ustvarila položaj skupne prevlade na nacionalnih trgih posnete glasbe. Analiza je potekala v skladu z merili, ki so jih določila evropska sodišča[152], predvsem sodba Sodišča prve stopnje v zadevi Airtours iz leta 2002[153]. V skladu s Sodiščem prve stopnje mora Komisija dokazati verjetnost skupnega dogovora podjetij, trgi pa morajo biti dovolj pregledni, da omogočijo nadzor izpolnjevanja skupnega dogovora udeleženih podjetij. Poleg tega mora obstajati odvračilni mehanizem v primeru odstopanja, stranke in tekmeci pa ne smejo biti zmožni ogroziti rezultatov, ki se pričakujejo od uskladitve.	191. The Commission’s investigation focused on the question whether the concentration would strengthen or create a position of collective dominance in the national markets for recorded music. The analysis was conducted in line with the criteria laid down by the European Courts[152], in particular in the Court of First Instance’s Airtours judgment of 2002[153]. According to the CFI, the Commission must prove the likelihood of a common understanding among the companies and the markets must be sufficiently transparent to permit monitoring of respect of the common understanding by the companies involved. In addition, there must be a deterrent mechanism in case of deviation, and customers and competitors should not be able to jeopardise the results expected from the coordination.
192. Komisija je odkrila nekatere znake možne uporabe veleprodajnih cen („objavljene cene za zastopnike“ – PPD) kot osrednjih točk in določeno vzporednost razvoja cen pri petih velikih družbah. Vendar te ugotovitve same po sebi še niso zadoščale kot dokaz za usklajevanje cen. Zato je Komisija analizirala tudi razvoj dogodkov na področju popustov velikih družb in ugotovila, da nekateri popusti niso bili popolnoma pregledni in jih je bilo težko spremljati. Poleg tega je bila preglednost trga kljub določeni meri enotnosti formata, določanja cen in trženja nosilcev zvoka zmanjšana zaradi zelo različne glasbene vsebine. Zato je Komisija posledično sklenila, da ni bilo dovolj močnih dokazov za ugotovitev obstoječega položaja prevlade petih velikih družb na trgih posnete glasbe.	192. The Commission found some indications for the possible use of wholesale prices (“published prices to dealers” - PPDs) as focal points and a certain parallelism in the price development of the five majors. However, these findings were not sufficient to establish by themselves price coordination. The Commission therefore also analysed the development of the majors’ discounts and found that certain discounts were not fully transparent and were difficult to monitor. In addition, market transparency was reduced by the largely differentiated music content, in spite of a certain homogeneity in the format, pricing and marketing of records. On balance, the Commission therefore concluded that there was not sufficiently strong evidence to establish an existing collective dominant position of the five majors in the markets for recorded music.
193. V zvezi z morebitnim oblikovanjem položaja skupne prevlade na trgih posnete glasbe ni bilo zadostnih dokazov, da bi zmanjšanje števila s petih na štiri velike družbe samo po sebi pomembno spremenilo sestavo trga. Podobno Komisija ni našla zadostnih dokazov, da bi predlagana transakcija okrepila ali oblikovala položaj skupne prevlade na grosističnem trgu licenc za glasbo na spletu. Komisija je preučila tudi vertikalna razmerja med skupnim podjetjem in njegovima matičnima podjetjema, vendar je ugotovila, da predlagana transakcija ne bi pripeljala do prevladujočega položaja niti na maloprodajnem trgu za distribucijo glasbe na spletu, na katerem deluje družba Sony, niti na trgih posnete glasbe v tistih državah, kjer je družba Bertelsmann izdajatelj televizijskega programa. V zvezi z morebitnimi učinki prelivanja po členu 2(4) uredbe o združitvah je Komisija ugotovila, da usklajevanje konkurenčnega vedenja družb Sony in BMG na trgu glasbenega založništva ni verjetno. Na podlagi teh ugotovitev je Komisija 19. julija 2004 odobrila združitev.	193. As to the possible creation of a collective dominant position in the markets for recorded music, there was insufficient evidence to prove that the reduction from five to four majors in itself would alter the market structure substantially enough. Similarly, the Commission did not find sufficient evidence that the proposed transaction would strengthen or create a position of collective dominance in the wholesale market for licences for online music. The Commission also looked at the vertical relationships between the joint venture and its parent companies but concluded that the proposed transaction would not lead to a dominant position, either in the retail market for online music distribution where Sony is active or in the recorded music markets in those countries where Bertelsmann is a broadcaster. With respect to possible spillover effects pursuant to Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation, the Commission found that a coordination of Sony and BMG’s competitive behaviour in the music publishing markets was unlikely. On the basis of these findings, the Commission approved the merger on 19 July.
AREVA/Urenco/ETC JV[154]	AREVA/Urenco/ETC JV[154]
194. AREVA, francoska jedrska skupina, ter Urenco, družba, ki so jo ustanovile vlade Združenega kraljestva, Nizozemske in Nemčije, sta vodilna evropska izvajalca storitev obogatitve urana, ki so potrebne za proizvodnjo goriva za jedrske elektrarne. S to transakcijo skupina AREVA pridobi skupni nadzor nad družbo Enrichment Technology Company (ETC ), podružnico družbe Urenco, dejavno na področju razvoja in proizvodnje centrifug, ki se uporabljajo za obogatitev urana. Centrifugalna tehnologija zagotavlja precejšnje prednosti pred starejšo tehnologijo difuzije plina, ki jo trenutno uporablja skupina AREVA. Družba ETC naj bi dobavljala centrifugalno tehnologijo svojima matičnima podjetjema in tretjim strankam.	194. AREVA, the French nuclear group, and Urenco, a company set up by the governments of the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, are the main European providers of uranium enrichment services which are needed to produce fuel for nuclear power plants. By this transaction, AREVA acquires joint control over Enrichment Technology Company (ETC ), Urenco’s subsidiary active in the development and manufacturing of centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Centrifuge technology offers significant advantages over the older gas diffusion technology currently used by AREVA. ETC is to supply both its parents and third parties with centrifuge equipment.
195. Projekt so aprila na Komisijo skupno napotile Francija, Švedska in Nemčija. Preiskava Komisije je ugotovila pomisleke o konkurenci v spodnjem delu tržne verige za obogateni uran. Komisija je imela pomisleke, da bi predlagana koncentracija lahko vodila k oblikovanju skupnega prevladujočega položaja v Evropski uniji, predvsem zaradi možnosti, da bi AREVA in Urenco lahko z uresničevanjem svojih pravic veta uporabila družbo ETC za usklajevanje razvoja svojih zmogljivosti.	195. The operation was jointly referred to the Commission by France, Sweden and Germany in April. The Commission’s investigation identified competition concerns in the downstream market for enriched uranium. The Commission was concerned that the proposed concentration could lead to the creation of a joint dominant position in the European Union, in particular given that ETC could be used by AREVA and Urenco to coordinate, through the exercise of their respective veto rights, their capacity developments .
196. Primer je bil zanimiv tudi zaradi podrobnih argumentov učinkovitosti, ki so jih predložile stranke. Ti so bili povezani s precejšnjimi prihranki stroškov, ki bi jih dosegla AREVA, če bi lahko privzela sodobno Urencovo centrifugalno tehnologijo. Komisija je dvomila o posebnosti združitve, navedene v teh argumentih. Za sprejetje odločbe pa so pomisleke Komisije odpravile zaveze, ki sta jih predložili stranki.	196. The case was also of interest in view of the detailed efficiency claims laid down by the parties. These related to the substantial cost savings that AREVA would achieve by being able to adopt the modern centrifuge technology of Urenco. The Commission had doubts on the merger specificity of these claims. However, for the purpose of the decision, the Commission’s concerns were removed by the commitments proposed by the parties.
197. S temi zavezami, predloženimi na začetku faze II, sta se AREVA in Urenco najprej zavezala, da bosta odpravila svoje zadevne pravice veta v zvezi s prihodnjimi širitvami zmogljivosti. Drugič, tok poslovno občutljivih informacij med družbo ETC in njenima matičnima podjetjema bo preprečevala vrsta skrbno nadzorovanih ukrepov. Tretjič, stranki sta se zavezali, da bosta Evropski agenciji za preskrbo (ESA) zagotavljali dodatne informacije, ki bodo ESA omogočile, da natančneje spremlja zagotavljanje in določanje cen obogatenega urana ter se po potrebi odzove.	197. By these commitments, submitted at an early stage in Phase II , AREVA and Urenco first undertook to remove their respective veto rights in relation to future capacity expansions. Secondly, the flow of commercially sensitive information between ETC and its parents will be prevented by a series of measures which will be closely monitored. Thirdly, the parties have committed themselves to supplying the European Supply Agency (ESA) with additional information , which will enable ESA to more closely monitor the provision and pricing of enriched uranium and to respond, if necessary.
Sonoco/Ahlstrom/JV[155]	Sonoco/Ahlstrom/JV[155]
198. Komisija je maja prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije, s katero dva velika akterja v dejavnosti proizvodnje kartona za tulce in tulcev, družbi Sonoco (ZDA) in Ahlstrom (Finska), nameravata oblikovati skupno podjetje, ki bo združilo njune evropske dejavnosti.	198. In May, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration by which two major players of the coreboard and cores industry, Sonoco (USA) and Ahlstrom (Finland), intend to create a joint venture which will group together their European activities.
199. Tulci so cevi, izdelane iz kartona za tulce, ki je proizveden predvsem iz recikliranega papirja. Uporabljajo se kot osnova, okoli katere so naviti različni izdelki, kot so papir, film in preja. Na področju tulcev proizvajajo zmogljive tulce za papirnice, kjer gre za izdelke visoke kakovosti, ki se uporabljajo v tiskarstvu za navijanje časopisnega papirja. Tulci nizke vrednosti so standardni izdelki, ki se uporabljajo v vseh dejavnostih.	199. Cores are tubes produced from coreboard, in turn produced mainly from recycled paper. Cores are used as the base around which various products, such as paper, film and yarn are wound. Among cores, high-end paper mill cores are high quality products used by the printing industry to roll magazine paper. Low-value cores are standard products used across all industries.
200. Poglobljena preiskava Komisije je ugotovila pomisleke na trgih tulcev visoke vrednosti, ki se uporabljajo v papirnicah po vsej Skandinaviji, ter o tulcih nizke vrednosti na Norveškem in Švedskem, kjer bi imelo skupno podjetje visoke tržne deleže in kjer bi se izgubil precejšen konkurenčni pritisk, ki ga družba Sonoco izvaja nad družbo Ahlstrom, ki je vodilna na trgu. Za odpravo teh pomislekov sta stranki predlagali odprodajo Ahlstromovega edinega norveškega obrata za proizvodnjo tulcev v Svebergu. Poleg tega sta tudi predlagali, da se združitev ne izpelje, dokler ni najden kupec.	200. The Commission’s in-depth investigation identified concerns in the markets for high-end paper-mill cores in the whole of Scandinavia and for low-value cores in Norway and Sweden, where the joint venture would have high market shares and where the significant competitive pressure exerted by Sonoco on the market leader Ahlstrom would be lost. To remedy these concerns, the parties proposed to divest Ahlstrom’s sole Norwegian cores manufacturing facility in Sveberg. They also offered not to implement the merger before a buyer is found.
201. Komisija je na tej podlagi koncentracijo odobrila, saj je menila, da bo odprodaja omogočila vstop novega dobavitelja v Skandinaviji, poleg tega pa tudi odstranila glavni del prekrivanja družb v prizadetih skandinavskih državah. Komisija je konec oktobra zares odobrila pripojitev družbe Sveberg k Abzacu, francoskemu proizvajalcu tulcev, ki je precej dejaven na celinski Evropi, medtem ko ga na skandinavskih trgih ni bilo.	201. The Commission approved the concentration on this basis, since it considered that this divestiture will allow for the entry of a new supplier in Scandinavia and will also remove the main part of the parties’ overlap in the affected Scandinavian countries. Indeed, in late October, the Commission approved the acquisition of Sveberg by Abzac, a French core manufacturer which has significant activities in Continental Europe, but which was absent from the Scandinavian markets.
Continental/Phoenix[156]	Continental/Phoenix[156]
202. Pri pripojitvi družbe Phoenix AG, Hamburg, k nemškemu podjetju Continental AG je šlo za transakcijo med gumarskima podjetjema, ki sta proizvajali predvsem izdelke za avtomobilsko industrijo. Komisija je pripojitev odobrila na podlagi zavez o odprodaji sredstev. Glede na prevladujoči položaj strank na trgu zračnih vzmeti za gospodarska vozila in tekočih trakov s težkimi jeklenimi vrvmi je bila odobritev mogoča šele po tem, ko je Komisija prejela zaveze, ki bi lahko odpravile ugotovljene težave glede konkurence.	202. The acquisition of Phoenix AG, Hamburg, by the German undertaking Continental AG concerned a transaction between two rubber companies which mainly serve the automotive industry. It was approved by the Commission subject to divestiture commitments. In view of the parties’ dominant position in the markets for air springs for commercial vehicles and for heavy steel cord conveyor belts, the approval was only possible after the Commission had received commitments which could eliminate the identified competition problems.
203. S transakcijo je družba Continental, proizvajalka pnevmatik, zavornih sistemov in tehničnih gumarskih izdelkov, pridobila izključni nadzor nad družbo Phoenix AF, ki je prav tako dejavna na področju proizvodnje tehničnih gumarskih izdelkov (npr. sistemov vzmetenja, protivibracijskih sistemov, gumijastih cevi in tekočih trakov). Phoenix skupaj nadzira nemško družbo Vibracoustic GmbH & Co KG, prek katere distribuira zračne vzmeti za tovornjake in avtomobile.	203. By the transaction, Continental, a producer of tyres, brake systems and technical rubber products, acquired sole control over Phoenix AG, also active in the production of technical rubber products (e.g. suspension systems, anti-vibration systems, hoses and conveyor belts). Phoenix jointly controls Vibracoustic GmbH & Co KG, Germany, through which it distributes air springs for trucks and cars.
204. Pripojitev bi pripeljala do precejšnjih prekrivanj na različnih trgih tehničnih gumarskih izdelkov, predvsem pa na trgih zračnih vzmeti in tekočih trakov z jeklenimi vrvmi. Zračne vzmeti se uporabljajo kot deli za vzmetenje v gospodarskih vozilih, avtomobilih in železniških vozilih. Težki tekoči trakovi z jeklenimi vrvmi se uporabljajo za prevoz težkega blaga na dolge razdalje, predvsem pri izkopavanju lignita.	204. The acquisition would have led to significant overlaps in various markets for technical rubber products, in particular in the markets for air springs and for steel cord conveyor belts. Air springs are used as suspension parts in commercial vehicles, cars and rail vehicles. Heavy steel cord conveyor belts are used for the transport of heavy goods over long distances, in particular in the field of lignite mining.
205. Združitev je Komisiji maja priglasila družba Continental. Po določitvi pomislekov o potencialni konkurenci na trgih zračnih vzmeti za gospodarska vozila, avtomobile in železniška vozila ter težkih tekočih trakov z jeklenimi vrvmi in filtrskih trakov je Komisija 29. junija začela poglobljeno preiskavo.	205. The merger was notified to the Commission by Continental in May. Having identified potential competition concerns in the markets for air springs for commercial vehicles, cars and rail vehicles as well as for heavy steel cord conveyor belts and for filter belts, the Commission started an in-depth investigation on 29 June.
206. Komisijina obsežna preiskava trga je potrdila njene pomisleke o trgih zračnih vzmeti za gospodarska vozila (prodajanih proizvajalcem in dobaviteljem originalne opreme – „OEM/OES“) in težkih tekočih trakov z jeklenimi vrvmi. Pripojitev je zares združila vodilna akterja na teh dveh trgih in bi pripeljala do skupnega tržnega deleža na obeh trgih, ki bi precej presegal 60 %, ostalo pa bi le nekaj manjših tekmecev. Komisija je nadalje našla dokaze o precejšnjih ovirah za vstop na oba trga, predvsem zaradi tega, ker proizvodnja in distribucija zračnih vzmeti in tekočih trakov vključujeta posebno proizvodnjo in strokovno znanje strank. Temu primerno so morali novi dobavitelji iti skozi dolgotrajen kvalifikacijski postopek, preden se jih je sploh lahko začelo obravnavati kot morebitne dobavitelje.	206. The Commission’s extensive market investigation confirmed its concerns in the markets for air springs for commercial vehicles (sold to original equipment manufacturers and suppliers – “OEM/OES”) and for heavy steel cord conveyor belts. Indeed, the acquisition combined the two leading players in these two markets and would have led to a combined market share in both markets of well above 60%, with only a few smaller remaining competitors. Furthermore, the Commission has found evidence of significant barriers to enter both markets, mainly because the production and distribution of air springs and conveyor belts involves specific production and customer know-how. Accordingly, new suppliers have to undergo a lengthy qualification procedure before they can even be considered potential suppliers.
207. Da bi odpravili pomisleke Komisije o konkurenci, se je družba Continental zavezala, da bo odprodala Phoenixov 50-odstotni sonadzorni delež v skupnem podjetju Vibracoustic edinemu preostalemu imetniku deleža, podjetju Freudenberg (Nemčija).	207. In order to eliminate the Commission’s competition concerns, Continental committed itself to divesting Phoenix’s 50% co-controlling stake in the joint venture Vibracoustic to the only other shareholder, Freudenberg (Germany).
208. Poleg tega se je družba Continental zavezala doseči, da bo družba Phoenix v celoti odprodala svojo proizvodnjo zračnih vzmeti za gospodarska vozila (OEM/OES), ki poteka v obratu na Madžarskem. Ti dve zavezi sta v celoti odpravili prekrivanje dejavnosti strank na področju zračnih vzmeti za gospodarska vozila (OEM/OES).	208. In addition, Continental committed itself to causing Phoenix to completely divest its production of air springs for commercial vehicles (OEM/OES), located in a plant in Hungary. These two commitments remove entirely the overlap of the parties’ activities in the field of air springs for commercial vehicles (OEM/OES).
209. Družba Continental se je tudi zavezala, da bo svojemu tekmecu, družbi Sempertrans, prodala proizvodno linijo širokih tekočih trakov z jeklenimi vrvmi. Ta odprodaja bo družbi Sempertrans omogočila, da bo konkurenčna združeni pravni osebi v celotni paleti tekočih trakov z jekleno vrvjo, ter tako odpravila pomisleke o konkurenci na področju tekočih trakov z jekleno vrvjo.	209. Continental also committed itself to selling a production line for wide steel cord conveyor belts to its competitor Sempertrans. This divesture will enable Sempertrans to compete over the full range of steel cord conveyor belts with the merged entity, thereby eliminating the competition concerns in the field of steel cord conveyor belts.
ENI/EDP/GDP[157]	ENI/EDP/GDP[157]
210. Komisija je 9. decembra sklenila prepovedati predlagano pridobitev skupnega nadzora portugalske elektroenergetske družbe Energias de Portugal (EDP) in italijanske elektroenergetske družbe ENI nad portugalsko plinsko družbo Gás de Portugal (GDP). Po poglobljeni preiskavi je Komisija ugotovila, da bi posel okrepil prevladujoči položaj družbe EDP na grosističnih in maloprodajnih trgih električne energije na Portugalskem ter prevladujoči položaj družbe GDP na portugalskih trgih plina. Tako bi koncentracija precej zmanjšala oziroma si vnaprej pridobila pravico do učinkov liberalizacije trgov električne energije in plina na Portugalskem ter povečala cene za gospodinjske in industrijske uporabnike. Protiukrepi, ki sta jih predlagali družbi EDP in ENI, niso zadoščali za odpravo pomislekov o konkurenci.	210. On 9 December, the Commission decided to prohibit the proposed acquisition of joint control over Gás de Portugal (GDP), the incumbent gas company in Portugal, by Energias de Portugal (EDP), the incumbent electricity company in Portugal, and ENI, an Italian energy company. After an in-depth investigation, the Commission concluded that the deal would strengthen EDP’s dominant position in the electricity wholesale and retail markets in Portugal and GDP’s dominant position in Portuguese gas markets. The concentration would thus significantly reduce or pre-empt the effects of liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets in Portugal, and increase prices for domestic and industrial customers. Remedies proposed by EDP and ENI were insufficient to eliminate the competition concerns.
211. Družba EDP proizvaja, distribuira in dobavlja električno energijo na Portugalskem. Prek svojih španskih podružnic (družb Hidrocantabrico in Naturcorp) je družba EDP na področju elektrike in plina precej dejavna tudi v Španiji. ENI je italijanska družba, ki je mednarodno dejavna na vseh ravneh dobavne in distribucijske verige električne energije.	211. EDP, generates, distributes and supplies electricity in Portugal. Through its Spanish affiliates (Hidrocantabrico and Naturcorp), EDP also has substantial electricity and gas activities in Spain. ENI is an Italian company active internationally at all levels of the energy supply and distribution chain.
212. Družba GDP je dejavna na vseh ravneh plinske verige na Portugalskem. Ima izključne pravice za uvoz, shranjevanje, prevoz in grosistično dobavo zemeljskega plina ter nadzira pet od šestih portugalskih lokalnih podjetij za distribucijo plina (šesto, podjetje Portgás, nadzira družba EDP).	212. GDP is active at all levels of the gas chain in Portugal. It has exclusive rights for import, storage, transportation and wholesale supply of natural gas and controls five of the six Portuguese local gas distribution companies (the sixth, Portgás, being controlled by EDP).
213. Družbi EDP in ENI sta 9. julija priglasili koncentracijo v zvezi s pridobitvijo skupnega nadzora nad družbo GDP, ki sta jo prej nadzirala portugalska država in družba ENI. V tem primeru je veljala prejšnja uredba o združitvah, saj je bil osnovni zavezujoči sporazum datiran pred začetkom veljavnosti nove uredbe o združitvah. Priglašena koncentracija je bila del širše transakcije, ki je vključevala prenos omrežja za transmisijo plina v lasti družbe GDP na družbo REN, portugalskega operaterja elektroenergetskega omrežja, v določenem časovnem okviru. Prenos omrežja je pomenil drugačno koncentracijo, ki je spadala pod pristojnost portugalskih organov.	213. On 9 July, EDP and ENI notified a concentration concerning the acquisition of joint control over GDP, previously controlled by the Portuguese State and ENI. The former Merger Regulation was applicable in this case, as the underlying binding agreement predated the entry into force of the new Merger Regulation. The notified concentration was part of a wider operation including the transfer of the gas transmission network, owned by GDP, to REN, the Portuguese electricity grid operator within a given time frame. The transfer of the network constituted a different concentration, which fell under the competence of the Portuguese authorities.
Upoštevni proizvodni trgi	Relevant product markets
214. Komisija je ugotovila, da transakcija vpliva na naslednje upoštevne proizvodne trge. Na področju električne energije: grosistična dobava električne energije, z uravnoteženjem energetskih in pomožnih storitev, dobava električne energije na drobno velikim industrijskim uporabnikom in dobava električne energije na drobno manjšim uporabnikom. Na področju plina: dobava plina proizvajalcem električne energije, dobava plina lokalnim distribucijskim podjetjem (LDP), dobava plina velikim industrijskim uporabnikom in dobava plina manjšim uporabnikom.	214. The Commission identified the following relevant product markets affected by the operation. In electricity: wholesale supply of electricity, balancing power and ancillary services, retail supply of electricity to large industrial customers and retail supply of electricity to small customers. In gas: supply of gas to power producers, supply of gas to local distribution companies (LDCs), supply of gas to large industrial customers and supply of gas to small customers.
215. Od srede leta 2004 so bili vsi trgi električne energije v celoti odprti konkurenci. Na plinskem trgu bo Portugalska zaradi njegovega statusa novo nastajajočega trga še naprej imela koristi od odstopanja od koledarja liberalizacije, ki ga določa druga direktiva za področje plina (2003/55/ES). Zato se bo odpiranje portugalskih plinskih trgov konkurenci začelo najpozneje leta 2007, končalo pa leta 2010. Portugalska vlada je navedla, da se bo liberalizacija morda začela prej.	215. Since mid-2004, all electricity markets have been fully open to competition. As for the gas markets, owing to its status of emerging market, Portugal will continue to benefit from a derogation from the liberalisation calendar established by the second gas Directive (2003/55/EC). Therefore, the opening to competition of Portuguese gas markets will start at the latest by 2007 and be completed by 2010. The Portuguese Government indicated that it may start the liberalisation process earlier.
Geografski trgi	Geographic markets
216. Komisija je ugotovila, da so bili vsi upoštevni trgi večinoma nacionalnega obsega.	216. The Commission came to the conclusion that all relevant markets were at most national in scope.
217. Stranke so uveljavljale mnenje, da bo grosistični trg električne energije kmalu zajemal celoten Pirenejski polotok, predvsem zaradi pričakovane uvedbe iberskega sistema trgovanja z električno energijo (MIBEL). Vendar pa je Komisija ugotovila, da so uvedbo sistema MIBEL v zadnjih letih večkrat preložili: preden bo sistem MIBEL dejansko lahko začel delovati, je treba odstraniti še mnoge pomembne regulativne ovire; konkurenčni pogoji med Španijo in Portugalsko se bodo verjetno še naprej precej razlikovali tudi po uvedbi sistema MIBEL; ne glede na uvedbo sistema MIBEL bo načrtovana raven medsebojnih povezav med Španijo in Portugalsko ostala omejena in ni bilo mogoče sklepati, da bi do učinkovite integracije obeh trgov dejansko prišlo v časovnem okviru, ustreznem za presojo združitve. Posledično je Komisija menila, da je grosisitični trg električne energije nacionalnega obsega in bo v prihodnjih letih takšen tudi ostal.	217. The parties had argued that the electricity wholesale market would soon be Iberian in scope, in particular owing to the impending launch of an Iberian electricity trading system (MIBEL). However, the Commission found that MIBEL has been postponed several times over the past years: many important regulatory barriers have still to be removed before MIBEL can actually start; competitive conditions between Spain and Portugal are likely to remain significantly different even after the launch of MIBEL; irrespective of the establishment of MIBEL, the projected level of interconnections between Spain and Portugal will remain limited and it was not possible to conclude that effective integration of the two markets would take place in a time frame relevant for the assessment of the merger. As a result, the Commission concluded that the electricity wholesale market was, and in the years ahead would remain, national in scope.
218. Stranke niso izpodbijale ugotovitve o nacionalnem obsegu drugih trgov, na katerih so bila ugotovljena vprašanja konkurence.	218. The parties have not challenged the finding that the other markets in which competition issues have been identified are national in scope.
Krepitev prevladujočega položaja družbe EDP na portugalskih trgih električne energije	Strengthening of EDP’s dominant position in the Portuguese electricity markets
219. Komisija je ugotovila, da ima družba EDP prevladujoč položaj na vseh zgoraj navedenih portugalskih trgih električne energije. Predvsem ima družba EDP v rokah 70 % zmogljivosti za proizvodnjo električne energije na Portugalskem in je največji uvoznik električne energije; družba EDP ima v lasti skoraj 100 % distribucije električne energije na Portugalskem; konkurenčni projekti za plinsko elektrarno (CCGT[158]) so nejasni in družba EDP ima vpliv na enega od njih (Tejo Energia); uvoz pa še naprej ne bo zadostoval za izpodbijanje prevlade družbe EDP.	219. The Commission came to the conclusion that EDP holds a dominant position in all the Portuguese electricity markets mentioned above. In particular, EDP holds 70% of generation capacity in Portugal and is the largest importer of electricity; EDP holds close to 100% of the distribution of electricity in Portugal; competitors’ gas-fired power plant (CCGT[158]) projects are uncertain and EDP has influence over one of them (Tejo Energia); and imports will remain insufficient to challenge EDP’s dominance.
220. Združitev bi okrepila prevladujoči položaj EDP, kar bi bila posledica horizontalnih in vertikalnih učinkov. Glede horizontalnih učinkov (na vseh trgih električne energije) je treba omeniti, da bi brez združitve družba GDP zelo verjetno na Portugalskem zgradila CCGT in postala eden glavnih tekmecev na trgih električne energije, zlasti ob upoštevanju dejstva, da dostop do konkurenčnih dobav plina pomeni precejšnjo prednost na področju električne energije, saj so CCTG zdaj najbolj običajen način proizvodnje nove energije, ter da bi se družba GDP lahko naslonila na svojo blagovno znamko in bazo uporabnikov plina, ki bi ji lahko ponudila skupno dobavo plina in elektrike (dvojna ponudba goriva).	220. The merger would have strengthened EDP’s dominant position as a result of both horizontal and vertical effects. As for the horizontal effects (all electricity markets), without the merger GDP would have been very likely to build a CCGT in Portugal and become one of the main competitors in the electricity markets, considering in particular that having access to competitive gas supplies confers a significant advantage in electricity as CCGTs now constitute the most common way of generating new power and that GDP could rely on its brand and gas customer base, to which it could offer a joint supply of gas and electricity (dual fuel offer).
221. Glede nehorizontalnih učinkov (grosistični trg električne energije) je treba omeniti, da bi predlagana koncentracija združeni pravni osebi zagotovila privilegiran in prednostni dostop do pravno zaščitenih informacij o stroških njenih tekmecev, kar bi ji prineslo precejšnjo prednost; dostop do portugalskih plinskih virov in infrastrukture; ter zmožnost in pobudo za nadzor cen plina in povečanje stroškov njenih tekmecev.	221. As for the non-horizontal effects (wholesale electricity market), the proposed concentration would have given the merged entity privileged and preferential access to proprietary information about its competitors’ costs, conferring on it a significant advantage; access to Portuguese gas resources and infrastructure; and the ability and the incentive to control gas prices and raise its rivals’ costs.
Krepitev prevladujočega položaja družbe GDP na portugalskih trgih plina	Strengthening of GDP’s dominant position in the Portuguese gas markets
222. Komisija je ugotovila, da ima družba GDP zaradi svojega trenutnega položaja zakonitega monopolista prevladujoč položaj na večini trgov. Prevladujoči položaj družbe GDP na teh trgih bi lahko predlagana transakcija okrepila, saj bi združeni pravni osebi omogočila, da kot posledico liberalizacije uvede nadaljnje oviranje konkurence. To je predvsem zaradi naslednjih razlogov.	222. The Commission came to the conclusion that, owing to its current position of legal monopolist, GDP holds a dominant position in most markets. GDP’s dominant position in these markets would have been strengthened by the proposed operation, allowing the merged entity to impede further the competition being introduced as a result of the liberalisation process. This is essentially for the following reasons:
223. V zvezi z dobavo plina CCGT in LDP je treba povedati, da bi priglašena transakcija vnaprej izključila celotno povpraševanje po plinu, ki ga je doslej nadzirala družba GDP, tj. kratkoročne zahteve DDGT, ki so v lasti družbe EDP, oziroma ki jih družba EDP nadzira, ter povpraševanje po plinu družbe LDP Portgás.	223. As regards the supply of gas to CCGTs and LDCs, the notified operation would have foreclosed all the gas demand which was not controlled by GDP so far, namely the short-term requirements of the CCGTs owned or participated in by EDP and the gas demand of the LDC Portgás.
224. Glede področja dobave plina velikim industrijskim uporabnikom in malim uporabnikom je treba povedati, da bi družba EDP najverjetneje vstopila na te trge, potem ko bodo liberalizirani, predvsem če se upošteva, da EDP upravlja CCGT za proizvodnjo elektrike, kar pomeni močno spodbudo za vstop na trge dobave plina; da bi se družba lahko naslonila na svoje uporabnike na področju električne energije (EDP nadzira skoraj 100 % električne distribucije na Portugalskem), katerim bi ponudila skupno dobavo plina in elektrike (dvojno gorivo); ter da bi se družba lahko naslonila tudi na izkušnje, sloves in bazo strank LDP Portgás. Pomembnost vstopa na trge plina je razvidna tudi iz nedavne pripojitve drugega največjega akterja na trgu plina v Španiji (Naturcorp) k družbi EDP. Po združitvi bi se ta pomembna potencialna konkurenca izgubila.	224. As regards the supply of gas to large industrial customers and small customers, EDP would have been the most likely entrant in these markets, once they are liberalised, considering in particular that EDP operates a CCGT for the production of electricity, which confers a strong incentive to enter the gas supply markets, that it could rely on its electricity customers (EDP controls close to 100% of electricity distribution in Portugal), to whom it could offer a joint supply of gas and electricity (dual-fuel), and that it could also rely on the experience, the reputation and the customer base of the gas LDC Portgás. The importance of entering the gas markets is also evidenced by EDP’s recent acquisition of the second-largest gas player in Spain (Naturcorp). This significant potential competition would be lost after the merger.
Protiukrepi, ki jih predlagajo stranke	Remedies proposed by the parties
225. Stranke so 28. oktobra in 17. novembra predložile protiukrepe za obravnavanje zgoraj opisanih pomislekov o konkurenci. Med drugim so predlagale odprodajo sredstev LDP (Setgás), prenos plinskih infrastruktur in uvoznih zmogljivosti na družbo REN, ki je operater električnega omrežja, ter dajanje v zakup proizvodnje energije, enakovredne tretjini proizvodnje plinske elektrarne družbe EDP. Komisija je te protiukrepe tržno preverila in ugotovila, da še zdaleč ne rešijo vseh vprašanj o konkurenci. Na primer, Komisija je opazila, da je delež družbe Setgás na maloprodajnem trgu plina le 8-odstoten, medtem ko je delež LDP Portgás, ki ga nadzira družba EDP, skoraj 30-odstoten; čeprav bi bil prenos plinske infrastrukture na REN (preoblikovanje lastništva) pozitivna poteza, ni bilo zagotovljenih zadostnih razpoložljivih zmogljivosti za uvoz tretjih strank; predlagano dajanje v zakup proizvodnje energije v plinski elektrarni EDP je predstavljalo samo 4 % proizvodnih zmogljivosti na Portugalskem in bi povzročilo visoko stopnjo odvisnosti zakupnika od EDP. Takšen zakupnik ne bi imel ne zmožnosti ne pobude za močno konkurenčno omejevanje družbe EDP.	225. On 28 October and 17 November, the parties submitted remedies in order to address the above-described competition concerns. They proposed inter alia to divest an LDC (Setgás), to transfer gas infrastructures and import capacities to REN, the electricity network operator, and to lease power production equivalent to one third of the production of EDP’s gas-fired power plant. The Commission market-tested these remedies and came to the conclusion that they fell far short of solving all competition issues. For instance, the Commission noted that Setgás accounts for only 8% of the gas retail market while the LDC controlled by EDP, Portgás, accounts for as much as about 30%; although the transfer of the gas infrastructure to REN (ownership unbundling) would have been a positive move, no sufficient available capacity for third parties’ imports was guaranteed; the proposed lease of power production in EDP’s gas-fired power plant represented only 4% of generation capacity in Portugal and would have created a high degree of dependence on the part of the lessee upon EDP. Such lessee would not have had either the ability or the incentive to exert a strong competitive constraint on EDP.
226. Nekaj časa po roku za predložitev protiukrepov so stranke predlagale popravljene zaveze, ki pa niso naravnost obravnavale pomislekov o konkurenci zaradi transakcije.	226. Some time after the deadline for submitting remedies, the parties proposed revised commitments which, however, failed to address the competition concerns resulting from the operation in a straightforward manner.
Sklep	Conclusion
227. Komisija posledično ni imela druge izbire, kot da prepove predlagano transakcijo, saj bi ta okrepila prevladujoči položaj družb EDP in GDP na trgu električne energije in plina na Portugalskem. Transakcija bi vnaprej zagotovila pozitivne učinke tekoče ali načrtovane liberalizacije trgov električne energije in plina na Portugalskem, kar bi imelo za posledico višje cene za industrijske in gospodinjske uporabnike ter izgubo konkurenčnosti za portugalsko gospodarstvo. Odvrnila bi vstop tujih tekmecev na portugalske trge energije in razvoj čezmejne konkurence ter s tem ovirala nadaljnje oblikovanje konkurenčnih paniberskih trgov energije in dolgoročno trgov energije, povezanih na evropski ravni.	227. As a result, the Commission had no choice but to prohibit the proposed operation since it would have strengthened both EDP’s and GDP’s dominant position respectively in the electricity and gas markets in Portugal. The operation would have pre-empted the positive effects of the ongoing or impending liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets in Portugal, resulting in higher prices for both industry and domestic consumers and in a loss of competitiveness for the Portuguese economy. It would have discouraged the entry of foreign competitors into the Portuguese energy markets and the development of cross-border competition and would thereby have impeded further the creation of competitive pan-Iberian energy markets and, in the longer term, of energy markets integrated at European level.
2. Odločbe, sprejete v skladu s členom 6(1)( b ) IN 6(2)	2. Decisions taken under Article 6(1)( b ) AND 6(2)
Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc[159]	Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc[159]
228. Komisija je 9. avgusta 1999 odobrila koncentracijo družb Hoechst AG in Rhône-Poulenc SA, kar je imelo za posledico oblikovanje družbe Aventis, v skladu z zavezami za odstranitev številnih pomislekov o konkurenci. Zaveze so vključevale odprodajo deleža v kemičnem podjetju Rhodia, kar je odpravilo pomisleke zaradi horizontalnih prekrivanj z dejavnostmi Aventisove podružnice Wacker Chemie.	228. On 9 August 1999, the Commission cleared the Hoechst AG and Rhône-Poulenc SA concentration resulting in the creation of Aventis, subject to commitments to remove a number of competition concerns. The commitments included the divestiture of a stake in chemical company Rhodia which eliminated the concerns originating from the horizontal overlaps with the activities of Aventis’s subsidiary Wacker Chemie.
229. Ob združitvi je imela družba Rhône-Poulenc v lasti 67,3 % družbe Rhodia in do leta 2003 je uspela prodati večino svojega deleža, a je še vedno ostala največji imetnik deleža z zakonitim lastništvom približno 15 % delnic in gospodarskim interesom v nadaljnjih 10 %. Glede na stalno slabšanje finančnega zdravja družbe Rhodia in nujno potrebo po odpravi negotovosti zaradi bližnjega finančnega preoblikovanja podjetja se je Komisija z odločbe z dne 30. januarja 2004 strinjala, da bo prvotno zavezo družbe Rhodia nadomestila z drugo, po kateri naj bi družba Aventis odprodala svoj posredni 49-odstotni delež v družbi Wacker-Chemie.	229. At the time of the merger, Rhône-Poulenc owned 67.3% of Rhodia and by 2003 had managed to sell most of its stake but nevertheless remained the largest shareholder, with legal ownership of some 15% of the shares and an economic interest in a further 10%. In view of the continuing deterioration in Rhodia’s financial health and the urgent need to remove uncertainty because of the imminent financial restructuring of the company, the Commission agreed - by its decision of 30 January 2004 - to replace the original Rhodia commitment with another one whereby Aventis would instead divest its indirectly held 49% stake in Wacker-Chemie.
GE/Amersham[160]	GE/Amersham[160]
230. Komisija se je 21. januarja odločila odobriti predlagano pripojitev družbe Amersham Plc. iz Združenega kraljestva, ki se ukvarja z diagnostičnimi farmacevtskimi izdelki in bioznanostjo, k družbi General Electric Company (GE) iz ZDA.	230. On 21 January, the Commission decided to clear the proposed acquisition by the US company General Electric Company (GE) of the UK diagnostic pharmaceuticals and biosciences company Amersham Plc.
231. Družba Amersham izdeluje diagnostične farmacevtske izdelke, ki diagnostični opremi, kot so čitalniki, omogočajo upodobitev zdravstvenega stanja telesa, proizvaja pa tudi biofarmacevtske izdelke. Družba GE je diverzificirano industrijsko podjetje, dejavno na različnih proizvodnih, tehnoloških in storitvenih področjih, vključno z zdravstvenimi sistemi. Podjetje GE Medical Systems je specializirano za tehnologijo upodabljanja medicinske diagnostike.	231. Amersham makes diagnostic pharmaceuticals that are used to enable diagnostic equipment, such as scanners, to image the body's health status and also produces biopharmaceuticals. GE is a diversified industrial company active in various manufacturing, technology and services businesses, including medical systems. GE Medical Systems specialises in medical diagnostic imaging technology.
232. Predlagana pripojitev ni pripeljala do horizontalnih prekrivanj. Ker pa se izdelki družb GE in Amersham v zdravstvu dopolnjujejo in morajo bolnišnice za nekatere aplikacije za upodabljanje kupiti strojno opremo in tudi farmacevtske izdelke, je Komisija svojo analizo usmerila v kakršne koli konglomeratske učinke, izhajajoče iz združitve. Komisijo je še zlasti skrbelo, da bi bila družba GE spodbujena k ponudbi svežnjev izdelkov po ugodnejših cenah, kot bi bil znesek posameznih izdelkov, ali pa s takšnim oblikovanjem svojih izdelkov, da bi izdelki družbe Amersham delovali bolje z opremo družbe GE kot z opremo tekmecev (tehnično povezovanje).	232. The proposed acquisition did not lead to horizontal overlaps. But as the products of GE and Amersham in the medical sector are complementary and hospitals need to purchase both the hardware and the pharmaceuticals for some imaging applications, the Commission focused its analysis on any possible conglomerate effects arising from the merger. The Commission was concerned, in particular, that GE could have incentives to offer bundles of products, at better prices than the sum of the individual products or by designing its products in such a way that Amersham's products would work better with GE than with rival equipment (technical tying).
233. Vendar pa je preiskava trga pokazala, da takšen scenarij ni bil verjeten. To pa zato, ker niti družba GE niti družba Amersham v Evropi nista imeli prevladujočega položaja na področju svojih izdelkov. Poleg tega so se tako stranke kot številni tekmeci strinjali, da je na zadevnih trgih močna konkurenca s sposobnimi proizvajalci opreme, kot so Philips, Siemens in Toshiba, ter močnimi proizvajalci farmacevtskih izdelkov, kot so Schering, Bristol Myers Squibb, Tyco/Mallinckrodt in Bracco. Zato je Komisija sklenila, da ti akterji najverjetneje ne bodo vnaprej izključeni s trga ali potisnjeni na rob. Odpravljeni so bili tudi pomisleki o tehničnem povezovanju, saj je Komisija ugotovila, da so bili različna obstoječa oprema in farmacevtski izdelki popolnoma interoperabilni ter da se takšna interoperabilnost najverjetneje ne bo zmanjšala, ko bodo na trg prišli novi izdelki.	233. However, the market investigation showed that such a scenario was unlikely. This was because neither GE nor Amersham held dominant positions in their respective products in Europe. Furthermore, both customers and a number of competitors agreed that the markets concerned enjoyed strong competition with viable equipment manufacturers such as Philips, Siemens and Toshiba, and strong pharmaceuticals makers such as Schering, Bristol Myers Squibb, Tyco/Mallinckrodt and Bracco. The Commission therefore concluded that these players were unlikely to be foreclosed from the market or to become marginalised. The technical tying concerns were also dismissed as the Commission ascertained that there was perfect interoperability between the different existing equipment and pharmaceutical products and that such interoperability was unlikely to be reduced when new products came to market.
Air Liquide/Messer[161]	Air Liquide/Messer[161]
234. 15. marca je bila v skladu s pogoji odobrena združitev francoskega koncerna Air Liquide in nemške družbe Messer Group. Družba Messser Group je imela obrate v Nemčiji, Združenem kraljestvu in Združenih državah. Komisijo je skrbelo, da bi imela pripojitev za posledico visoke cen za uporabnike plina – zlasti v Nemčiji. Vendar pa so bile ponujene precejšnje odprodaje, ki so omogočile regulativno odobritev, ne da bi bila potrebna poglobljena preiskava.	234. On 15 March, the combination of French concern Air Liquide and Germany’s Messer group was cleared subject to conditions. Messer Group had activities in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission was concerned that the acquisition would result in higher prices for gas customers - particularly in Germany. However significant divestments were offered which rendered regulatory clearance possible without the need for an in-depth investigation.
235. Družbi Air Liquide in Messer Group proizvajata in distribuirata pline za industrijske in medicinske namene (kot so kisik, dušik in argon) ter izvajata povezane storitve. S tem poslom bi si družba Air Liquide – svetovno vodilna v sektorju industrijskih plinov – pridobila dolgo iskani trden položaj v Združenem kraljestvu, kjer ni bilo nobenih prekrivanj. Vendar pa bi povzročila tudi pomisleke o konkurenci na že koncentriranem evropskem trgu tonažnega plina, ki ga po navadi uporabljajo petrokemična in jeklarska podjetja, ter trgu posebnih plinov za elektroniko. Na nacionalni ravni so poleg tega obstajali pomisleki o oblikovanju duopola v Nemčiji (skupaj z družbo Linde AG) za pline, dobavljene v razsutem stanju ter jeklenkah za rabo v industriji in medicini.	235. Air Liquide and the Messer Group produce and distribute industrial and medical gases (such as oxygen, nitrogen or argon) as well as connected services. The deal gave Air Liquide - the world leader in the industrial gases sector - a long-sought foothold in the United Kingdom, where there were no overlaps. Nevertheless, it would have also created competition concerns in the already concentrated Europe-wide tonnage gas market serving typically petrochemical and steel companies and in the market for electronic speciality gases. On a national level, it furthermore raised duopoly concerns in Germany (together with Linde AG) for gases supplied in bulk and cylinders for industrial and medical use.
236. V odziv na pomisleke Komisije se je družba Air Liquide zavezala, da bo odprodala precejšnje dele svojih obratov ali obratov družbe Messer v Nemčiji. Te odprodaje so vključevale dele cevovodnih omrežij družbe Messer in več tonažnih obratov, naprave za utekočinjanje plinov iz zraka in polnilnih središč za jeklenke ter povezane baze strank. Tudi družba Air Liquide se je zavezala, da bo odprodala udeležbo družbe Messer v njenem skupnem podjetju z družbo Nippon Sanso, ki proizvaja posebne pline za elektroniko.	236. To address the Commission’s concerns, Air Liquide committed itself to divesting significant parts of its or Messer’s activities in Germany. These divestments included parts of Messer’s pipeline networks and several tonnage plants, liquefiers for air gases and filling centres for cylinders as well as the related customer bases. Air Liquide also committed itself to divesting Messer’s participation in its joint venture with Nippon Sanso, a company which produces ESGs.
Sanofi Synthelabo/Aventis[162]	Sanofi Synthelabo/Aventis[162]
237. Farmacevtska družba Sanofi-Synthélabo SA je januarja napovedala ponudbo za prevzem družbe Aventis SA, ki jo je Komisija odobrila v skladu s pogoji. Obe družbi sta imeli sedež v Franciji. Sam Aventis je bil posledica združitve med družbama Hoechst in Rhône-Poulenc, ki je bila odobrena avgusta 1999 v skladu s pogoji. S to združitvijo bi nastala ena največjih farmacevtskih družb na svetu, sprožila pa je nekaj pomislekov o konkurenčnosti na trgih, kjer so se dejavnosti družb prekrivale. Pokazalo se je, da bi se konkurenca lahko zmanjšala v škodo bolnikov s trombozo, kolorektalnim rakom in nespečnostjo.	237. In January, pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Synthélabo SA announced a takeover bid for Aventis SA which the Commission approved subject to conditions. Both companies were based in France. Aventis was itself the result of a merger between Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc which was cleared in August 1999, subject to conditions. This combination would have created one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world and raised some competitive concerns in the markets where their activities overlapped. It appeared that competition might be reduced to the detriment of patients suffering from thrombosis, colorectal cancer and insomnia.
238. Vsa prekrivajoča se področja so zadevala medicinske proizvode za humano medicino. Takšni izdelki so se uporabljali za zdravljenje srčne kapi, slabo arterijsko cirkulacijo, vnetja ušesa, nosu in grla, nespečnost, največ prekrivanja pa je bilo na trgih heparinov in heparoidov (v 11 državah EU) ter pri zdravljenju kolorektalnega raka (v sedmih državah EU). Prizadeta področja so vključevala tudi prodajo vitaminov, mišičnih relaksantov in antibiotikov. Za pomiritev Komisijinih dvomov je družba Sanofi bodisi prodala povezane poslovne dejavnosti ali podelila licence zanje v 14 državah EU, do največjega števila prekrivanj pa je prišlo v Franciji.	238. All the overlapping areas were to do with medicinal products for human use. Such products were used for the treatment of heart failure, poor arterial circulation, ear, nose and throat infections, insomnia, with the most overlaps occurring in markets for heparins and heparoids (in 11 EU countries) and colorectal cancer treatment (in seven EU countries). Affected areas also included sales of vitamins, muscle relaxants and antibiotics. To allay the Commission’s doubts, Sanofi either sold the related business or granted licences for it across 14 EU countries with most overlaps occurring in France.
Group 4 Falck/Securicor[163]	Group 4 Falck/Securicor[163]
239. Komisija je izdala regulativno odobritev tudi za predlagano združitev med družbama Securicor in Group 4 Falck, potem ko sta družbi odpravili pomisleke o zmanjšani konkurenci na nekaterih trgih varnostnih storitev v Luksemburgu, na Nizozemskem in v Združenem kraljestvu. Anglo-danska združitev bi imela za posledico oblikovanje varnostne družbe, ki bi bila za švedsko družbo Securitas druga največja na svetu.	239. The Commission also granted regulatory clearance to the proposed merger between Securicor and Group 4 Falck after the companies resolved concerns about reduced competition in some security service markets in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The Anglo-Danish merger would create the second largest security company in the world after Securitas of Sweden.
240. Danska družba Group 4 Falck in družba Securior s sedežem v Združenem kraljestvu se ukvarjata z zagotavljanjem storitev zasebnega varovanja. Obe zagotavljata širok razpon dejavnosti, kot so prevoz, varovalne storitve, alarmni sistemi in pravosodne storitve (npr. upravljanje in prevoz zapornikov). Vsa sredstva strank naj bi združili v novo družbo, ki bi se imenovala Group 4 Securicor, razen pravosodnih dejavnosti družbe Group 4 Falck (ki bi jih pred dokončanjem združitve prodali tretjemu podjetju).	240. Group 4 Falck, a Danish company, and Securicor, a company based in the United Kingdom, are active providing private security services. They both offer a wide range of activities such as cash transportation, guarding services, alarm systems and justice services (e.g. management and transport of prisoners). All assets of the parties were to be merged into a new company named Group 4 Securicor, with the exception of Group 4 Falck’s justice activities (which were to be sold to a third company before the completion of the merger).
241. Družba Group 4 Falck je dejavna v 80, družba Securior pa v 50 državah. Skupaj bi postali resen tekmec vodilni družbi na svetovnem trgu, družbi Securitas s sedežem na Švedskem. Zaradi različnega ureditvenega okvira v vsaki državi je zagotavljanje varnostnih storitev urejeno na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni. Posledično je bila združitev analizirana od države do države. Vendar pa so se kljub svetovnemu dosegu združenih družb njune dejavnosti prekrivale samo v šestih državah Evropske unije: v Franciji, Nemčiji, na Irskem, v Luksemburgu, na Nizozemskem in v Združenem kraljestvu.	241. Group 4 Falck is active in 80 countries and Securicor in 50. Combined, they would become a close competitor to the world market leader, Sweden-based Securitas. Because of the different regulatory framework in each country, the provision of security services is on a national or regional level. Consequently, the merger was analysed country by country. However, despite the merged companies’ global reach, their activities only overlapped in six European Union countries: France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
242. Preiskava Komisije je ugotovila pomisleke o konkurenci na treh geografskih območjih: storitve prevoza gotovine, varovanja z osebjem ter nadzora alarma in odziva na alarm v Luksemburgu; storitve varovanja z osebjem na Nizozemskem ter storitve prevoza gotovine na Škotskem. V odziv na pomisleke Komisije sta družbi Group 4 Falck in Securicor odprodali poslovno dejavnost varovanja družbe Securicor v Luksemburgu, poslovno dejavnost varovanja z osebjem skupine Group 4 Falck na Nizozemskem in njene dejavnosti prevoza gotovine na Škotskem.	242. The Commission’s investigation identified competition concerns in three geographical areas: cash transportation, manned guarding and alarm monitoring & response services in Luxembourg; manned guarding services in the Netherlands and cash transportation services in Scotland. Addressing the Commission’s concerns, Group 4 Falck and Securicor divested Securicor´s security business in Luxembourg, Group 4 Falck´s manned guarding business in the Netherlands and their cash transportation activities in Scotland.
Owens-Illinois/BSN Glasspack[164]	Owens-Illinois/BSN Glasspack[164]
243. Komisija je odobrila pripojitev francoskega proizvajalca steklene embalaže BSN Glasspack SA k njegovemu tekmecu, registriranemu v ZDA, družbi Owens-Illinois Inc. Steklena embalaža, ki jo proizvajata združujoči se družbi, se uporablja za pakiranje izdelkov, kot so brezalkoholne pijače, vino, mineralna voda, olivno olje, kečap in drugi prehrambni izdelki.	243. The Commission approved the acquisition of the French glass container manufacturer BSN Glasspack SA by its US-based competitor Owens-Illinois Inc. The glass containers produced by the merging firms are used to package products such as soft drinks, wine, mineral water, olive oil, ketchup and other food products.
244. Družba Owens-Illinois je mednarodna proizvajalka steklene embalaže, strojev za izdelavo steklene embalaže in plastične embalaže ter povezane opreme. V Evropski uniji ima zmogljivosti za proizvodnjo steklenih izdelkov na Finskem, v Italiji, Španiji in Združenem kraljestvu. Družba BSN proizvaja in prodaja stekleno embalažo za pijače in hrano ter ima proizvodne zmogljivosti v Franciji, Belgiji, Nemčiji, na Nizozemskem in v Španiji. Mreža evropskih obratov obeh podjetij je precej komplementarna. Vendar pa sta družbi Owens-Illinois in BSN Glasspack neposredni tekmici na dveh regionalnih trgih, ki zajemata severovzhodno Španijo/jugozahodno Francijo ter jugovzhodno Francijo/severno Italijo. Pri stekleni embalaži gre za voluminozne pošiljke izdelkov, ki pa se po navadi dobavljajo v obsegu 300–400 km od proizvodnega obrata, zato lahko dobavno področje obrata zajema regije na obeh straneh državne meje.	244. Owens-Illinois is an international manufacturer of glass containers, machinery for manufacturing glass containers, and plastic containers and associated equipment. In the European Union it has glass manufacturing operations in Finland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. BSN manufactures and sells glass containers for beverages and food and has production facilities in France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. The two companies’ European plant networks were largely complementary. However, Owens-Illinois and BSN Glasspack are direct competitors in two regional markets comprising North-Eastern Spain/South-Western France and South-Eastern France/Northern Italy. Glass containers are bulky products but they are typically delivered within a range of 300-400 km from the production plant and the delivery area of a plant can thus encompass regions on both sides of a national frontier.
245. Prvotno priglašena transakcija bi pripeljala do visokih tržnih deležev v zadevnih regijah in bi z že tako visoko koncentriranih trgov odstranila pomembnega tekmeca. Poleg združujočih se partnerjev bi v teh regijah preostal le še en večji igralec, to je francosko podjetje St. Gobain, medtem ko so drugi tekmeci v prizadetih regijah precej majhni. Tako bi se na teh področjih število velikih dobaviteljev posledično zmanjšalo s treh na dva.	245. The transaction, as originally notified, would have led to high market shares in the regions concerned and would have removed an important competitor in what are already highly concentrated markets. Besides the merging partners, the only other major player in these regions is French company St. Gobain, the other competitors in the affected regions being rather small. Therefore, in these areas, the effect would have been to reduce the number of significant suppliers from three to two.
246. Da bi družba Owens-Illinois omilila pomisleke Komisije, je ponudila odprodajo proizvodnega obrata neodvisnemu in za preživetje sposobnemu tekmecu v vsaki od obeh prizadetih regij, tj. v Milanu v Italiji in v Barceloni v Španiji.	246. In order to alleviate the Commission’s concerns, Owens-Illinois offered to divest a production plant to an independent, viable competitor in each of the two affected regions, in Milan in Italy and in Barcelona in Spain.
247. Posel ni sprožil nobenih pomislekov v preostalem EGP, saj se prodajne dejavnosti obeh partnerjev načeloma ne prekrivajo, kjer pa se, se bo združena pravna oseba soočila s konkurenco številnih velikih tekmecev, vključno z družbami St. Gobain, Rexam, Ardagh, Weigand in Allied Glass.	247. The deal did not raise any concerns in the rest of the EEA as the two partners’ sales activities either do not overlap or, where they do, the merged entity will face competition from a number of large competitors, including St. Gobain, Rexam, Ardagh, Weigand and Allied Glass.
GIMD/Socpresse[165]	GIMD/Socpress[165]
248. Komisija je 16. junija odobrila predlagano pripojitev družbe Socpresse k skupini Marcel Dassault Industrial Group (GIMD), v skladu s pogoji.	248. On 16 June, the Commission authorised the proposed acquisition of Socpresse by the Marcel Dassault Industrial Group (GIMD), subject to conditions.
249. GIMD je francoska skupina, ki se zanima predvsem za aeronavtiko, računalništvo, vinogradništvo in revije. Naslovi, ki jih objavlja družba GIMD, vključujejo Valeurs Actuelles, Le Journal des Finances, Finances Magazine in Le Spectacle du Monde. Družba Socpresse je tudi francosko podjetje, ki izdaja nacionalne in regionalne dnevne časopise, revije in strokovne publikacije. Je matično podjetje družbe Figaro Holding, ki izdaja dnevnik Le Figaro in Figaro Magazine, in družbe Groupe L’Express–L’Expansion, ki izdaja številne revije, vključno z revijami L’Express, L’Expansion, La Vie Financière in Mieux Vivre Votre Argent.	249. GIMD is a French group with interests mainly in aeronautics, computing, wine growing and magazines. Titles published by GIMD include Valeurs Actuelles , Le Journal des Finances , Finances Magazine and Le Spectacle du Monde . Socpresse is also a French company producing national and regional daily newspapers, magazines and specialist publications. It is the parent company of Figaro Holding, which produces the daily Le Figaro and Figaro Magazine , and the Groupe L’Express–L’Expansion , which publishes a large number of magazines, including L’Express, L’Expansion, La Vie Financière and Mieux Vivre Votre Argent .
250. Preiskave Komisije so pokazale, da bi skupina GIMD/Socpresse nadzirala precej večje število gospodarskih in finančnih revij, kot njeni tekmeci, kar bi jo postavilo v privilegiran položaj, zlasti glede oglaševalcev, ki želijo doseči bralce finančnih revij. Z uporabo močne agencije Socpresse, ki prodaja oglaševalski prostor v več kot 80 revijah in dnevnikih, bi si lahko vzpostavila prevlado na trgu.	250. The Commission’s inquiries indicated that the GIMD/Socpresse group would control a significantly larger number of economic and financial magazines than its competitors, which would have put it in a privileged position, particularly as regards advertisers wishing to reach financial readers. It would have been able to dominate the market using the powerful Socpresse agency, which sells advertising space in over 80 magazines and daily newspapers.
251. Zato je transakcija sprožila pomisleke o konkurenci v Franciji na trgih za prodajo oglaševalskega prostora v ekonomskih in finančnih revijah, saj niti tekmeci niti kupci oglaševalskega prostora (oglaševalci) ne bi mogli zagotoviti protiuteži združeni moči družb Socpresse in GIMD, ki bi imeli skoraj 50-odstotni tržni delež. Na splošno se oglaševalci pogajajo individualno z založniki ali njihovimi agencijami in zato nimajo nobene resnične kupne moči.	251. The operation therefore raised competition concerns in France in the markets for the sale of advertising in economic and financial magazines, as neither competitors nor purchasers of advertising space (advertisers) would have been able to provide a counterweight to the combined power of Socpresse/GIMD, which would have enjoyed market shares of almost 50%. Generally speaking, advertisers negotiate individually with publishers or their agencies and do not therefore enjoy any real buyer power.
252. Da bi družba GIMD odpravila pomisleke o konkurenci in se tako izognila poglobljeni preiskavi, je ponudila odprodajo ekonomske in finančne revije La Vie Financière, ki jo izdaja skupina Express-Expansion Group, kar je glede na kakovost in sloves publikacije po mnenju Komisije zadoščalo za razpršitev njenih dvomov. Zaradi zagotovitve, da bo večina novinarjev, ki delajo za La Vie Financière, ostala pri tej reviji, tudi ko bo prodana, in da ne bodo uresničili svoje pravice do odhoda v skladu s clause de cession, ki jo določa francoska gospodarska zakonodaja za imetnike novinarskih izkaznic, pa bo Komisija poskusila zagotoviti, da bo kupec publikacije v založništvu dovolj verodostojen, da bo zagotovil neokrnjenost naslova in učinkovito dolgoročno konkurenco na trgu.	252. To resolve the competition concerns and hence avoid an in-depth investigation, GIMD offered to dispose of the economic and financial magazine La Vie Financière , published by the Express-Expansion Group, which, given the quality and reputation of the publication, the Commission felt was enough to dispel its doubts. However, in order to ensure that most of the journalists working on La Vie Financière stay with the magazine after it is sold and do not exercise their right to leave under the clause de cession provided for by French industrial legislation for holders of a press card, the Commission will try to ensure that the purchaser of the publication has sufficient credibility in the publishing sector to ensure the continuity of the title and effective long-term competition in the market.
Syngenta CP/Advanta[166] in Fox Paine/Advanta[167]	Syngenta CP/Advanta[166] and Fox Paine/Advanta[167]
253. Komisija je 17. avgusta v skladu s pogoji odobrila predlagano pripojitev družbe Advanta BV, na nizozemskem registrirane proizvajalke semen, k švicarski družbi Syngenta Crop Protection AG. Družba Syngenta Crop Protection AG je podružnica družbe Syngenta AG, ki se, podobno kot družba Advanta BV, ukvarja s pripravo, proizvodnjo, obdelavo in prodajo različnih vrst semen.	253. On 17 August, the Commission authorised, subject to conditions, the proposed acquisition of Dutch-based seed producer Advanta BV by Swiss-based Syngenta Crop Protection AG. Syngenta Crop Protection AG is a subsidiary of Syngenta AG which, like Advanta BV, is active in the breeding, production, processing and sale of various kinds of seeds.
254. Preiskava trga, ki jo je opravila Komisija, je pokazala na resne pomisleke o konkurenci na številnih nacionalnih trgih semen v EU. Šlo je za semena sladkorne pese v Belgiji, na Finskem, v Franciji, na Nizozemskem, Portugalskem, v Španiji, Avstriji, na Irskem in v Italiji, za koruzna semena na Danskem, Nizozemskem in v Združenem kraljestvu, sončnična semena na Madžarskem in v Španiji ter za francoski trg jarega ječmenovega semena in trg Združenega kraljestva za semena plezalnega graha (vrsta grahovega semena).	254. The Commission’s market investigation pointed to serious competition concerns in a number of national seed markets within the EU. These were sugar beet seeds in Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Ireland and Italy, maize seeds in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, sunflower seeds in Hungary and Spain as well as the French market for spring barley seeds and the UK market for vining pea seeds (a type of pea seed).
255. Transakcija bi oblikovala zelo močno vodilno podjetje na trgu, ki bi bilo pogosto dvakrat ali večkrat večje od naslednjega tekmeca. Na trgu semen sladkorne pese bi predlagana transakcija združila dva od treh velikih evropskih proizvajalcev semena sladkorne pese, ki so tudi glavni dobavitelji semen sladkorne pese v Evropi.	255. The operation would have created a very strong market leader, often twice or more the size of the next competitor. In the market for sugar beet seeds, the proposed operation would also have brought together two of the three major European sugar beet seed breeders, which are also the main suppliers of sugar beet seeds in Europe.
256. Da bi družba Syngenta odpravila pomisleke Komisije, je ponudila odprodajo celotnega evropskega posla s semeni družbe Advanta neodvisnemu kupcu ter s tem v celoti odpravila prekrivanje dejavnosti strank na vseh upoštevnih trgih v Evropski uniji.	256. In order to remove the Commission’s concerns, Syngenta offered to divest Advanta’s whole European seed business to an independent purchaser, thereby removing entirely the overlap of the parties’ operations in all relevant markets within the European Union.
257. Nekaj dni pozneje, 20. avgusta, je Komisija odobrila predlagano pripojitev Advantinih svetovnih dejavnosti na področju semen sladkorne pese, oljne repice, sirka, sončnic, trav ter dejavnosti na področju koruze in žitaric zunaj Severne Amerike k družbi Fox Paine, ameriški upraviteljici investicijskih sredstev. Na podlagi te transakcije so bile zaveze družbe Syngenta v koncentraciji Syngenta/Advanta izpolnjene.	257. A few days later, on 20 August, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition by Fox Paine, a US manager of investment funds, of Advanta’s worldwide activities in seeds for sugar beet, oilseed rape, sorghum, sunflower, grasses as well as the maize and cereals businesses outside North America. On the basis of this transaction, the commitments given by Syngenta in the Syngenta/Advanta concentration were fulfilled.
258. Komisijin pregled transakcije Fox Paine/Advanta je pokazal, da je imela družba Fox Paine interes v številnih sektorjih, vključno z večinskim deležem v družbi Seminis, proizvajalki semen iz ZDA, ki razvija, goji in prodaja semena sadja in zelenjave tudi v Evropi. Dejavnosti družb Seminis in Advanta so se prekrivale na trgih semen plezalnega graha in čebule, vendar preiskava trga ni odkrila posebnega pomisleka o konkurenci, saj se bodo stranke še naprej srečevale s konkurenco drugih pomembnih akterjev.	258. The Commission’s review of the Fox Paine/Advanta transaction showed that Fox Paine has interests in several sectors, including a majority holding in US seed producer Seminis, which develops, grows and sells fruit and vegetable seeds including in Europe. The activities of Seminis and Advanta overlapped in the markets for vining pea seeds and onion seeds, but the market investigation did not reveal any particular competition concern as the parties would continue to face competition from other important players.
Cytec/UCB Surface Specialties[168]	Cytec/UCB Surface Specialties[168]
259. Komisija je 17. decembra v skladu z zavezami odobrila predlagano pripojitev podjetja UCB’s Surface Specialties (Surface Specialties) k družbi Cytec Industries Inc. (Cytec) iz ZDA.	259. On 17 December, the Commission cleared, subject to commitments, the proposed acquisition of UCB’s Surface Specialties (Surface Specialties) business by Cytec Industries Inc. (Cytec) of the US.
260. Družba Cytec proizvaja posebne kemikalije in materiale, vključno s kemikalijami za miniranje in obdelavo voda, kemikalije za premaze, lepila in kemikalije za sestavljene materiale in gradbene sestavine. Družba Surface Specialties, ki je del belgijske kemične in farmacevtske družbe UCB, proizvaja kemikalije za premaze, lepila in kemikalije, ki se uporabljajo za grafične aplikacije.	260. Cytec produces specialty chemicals and materials, including mining and water treatment chemicals, coating chemicals, adhesives and composite materials and building block chemicals. Surface Specialties, part of the Belgian chemicals and pharmaceutical company UCB, produces coating chemicals, adhesives and chemicals used for graphic arts applications.
261. Komisija je v preiskavi trga našla resne pomisleke o konkurenci zaradi kombinacije dejavnosti združujočih se partnerjev na trgih aminosmol, ki se uporabljajo kot zamreževalci v industrijskih tekočih premazih, in pospeševalcev sprijemanja za okrepljeno gumo. Družba Cytec je odpravila to pomisleke s ponudbo odprodaje obrata Fechenheim družbe Surface Specialties (Nemčija), ki prispeva skoraj vso evropsko proizvodnjo družbe Surface Specialties.	261. The Commission’s market investigation identified serious competition concerns resulting from the combination of the merging parties’ activities in the markets for amino resins used as crosslinkers in industrial liquid coatings and for use as adhesion promoters for reinforced rubber. Cytec was able to remove these concerns by offering to divest Surface Specialties’ Fechenheim plant (Germany), which accounts for almost all of Surface Specialties' European production.
262. Komisija je tudi preverila, ali bi spojitev družbe Cytec, ki je pomemben dobavitelj akrilamida, z družbo Surface Specialties, ki uporablja akrilamid kot vložek v svoji proizvodnji lepil in aditivov k smoli, vnaprej izključila dobave akrilamida tretjim strankam. Preiskava trga ni potrdila teh pomislekov, saj se družba Cytec srečuje z verodostojnimi tekmeci za dobavo akrilamida, in je očitno, da je skupnim potrebam družbe Surface Specialties namenjen le obroben del proizvodnje družbe Cytec.	262. The Commission also verified whether the combination of Cytec, an important supplier for acrylamide, with Surface Specialties, which uses acrylamide as an input for its production of adhesives and resin additives, could foreclose acrylamide supplies for third parties. The market investigation did not confirm these concerns, since Cytec faces credible competitors for the supply of acrylamide and Surface Specialties’ total needs appear to account for only a marginal part of Cytec’s output.
Polje 7: Prvi korak pri konsolidaciji evropskega letalstva – združitev družb Air France in KLM ter povezava med družbama Air France in Alitalia Uvod Zadnja tri leta so bila še posebej plodna za zakonodajo Skupnosti na področju letalstva. Sodbe v primeru „Odprto nebo“[169] iz leta 2002 in zakonodajno prizadevanje, s katerim je v zadnjih letih začela Komisija[170], sta oblikovala pravno podlago za razvoj pravega notranjega trga za panogo civilnega letalstva. Potem so bile na vrsti evropske letalske družbe, da se odzovejo na to novo pravno okolje in oblikujejo akterje po vsej EU ter tako odpravijo razdrobljenost evropske letalske industrije[171]. Od leta 2002 sta bili družbi Air France in KLM prva evropska prevoznika, ki sta izkoristila to priložnost. Leta 2004 je morala Komisija zagotoviti, da bo ta proces konsolidacije potekal popolnoma skladno s pravili konkurence. Družbi Air France („AF“) in KLM sta napovedali svojo združitev v drugi polovici leta 2003, Komisija pa jo je odobrila 11. februarja[172]. Kmalu po odločbi o AF/KLM je bilo 7. aprila družbi AF odobreno izvzetje po členu 81(3) ES za njeno tradicionalnejšo povezavo z družbo Alitalia („AZ“)[173]. Vzporednost v smislu časa in akterjev pri obeh primerih je dobra priložnost za primerjavo obravnavanja letalskih primerov v skladu s členom 81 in uredbo o združitvah („ECMR“). Pravni okvir obeh transakcij in novi trendi v evropski letalski industriji Da bi večje letalske družbe zajele večje število namembnih krajev in izboljšale izkoriščenost zmogljivosti pri nižjih stroških, vzpostavljajo sisteme pesta in napere ter koncentrirajo promet v svojih središčih. Ta cilj se nadalje zagotavlja s sklepanjem sporazumov z drugimi letalskimi družbami, ki so lahko v obliki strateške povezave (npr. AF/AZ) ali združitve (npr. AF/KLM). V primerjavi s povezavami omogočajo združitve boljšo racionalizacijo in integracijo mrežne strukture združujočih se prevoznikov. Vendar pa so bile združitve v EU med prevozniki različnih nacionalnosti zapletene zaradi sistema dvostranskih mednarodnih sporazumov, ki urejajo prometne pravice med državami. V skladu z Mednarodno konvencijo o letalstvu z dne 7. decembra 1947 (Čikaška konvencija) je vsaka suverena država pristojna za podeljevanje prometnih pravic v svojem zračnem prostoru. Na tej podlagi so se prometne pravice prevoznikom iz tretjih držav podeljevale z dvostranskimi sporazumi, pri čemer dve državi podpisnici pogosto podelita prometne pravice samo prevoznikom z nacionalnostjo teh držav („klavzula nacionalnosti“). Čeprav je EU notranji trg na področju letalstva uresničila do leta 1997[174], kar je prevoznikom Skupnosti omogočilo konkurirati na evropskem trgu, so za mednarodne polete v EU in iz nje še vedno veljale mnoge omejitve, vključno s klavzulo nacionalnosti. Če se torej belgijski prevoznik pripoji britanski letalski družbi in tako izgubi svojo belgijsko nacionalnost, tvega, da bo izgubil svoje pravice poletov v Belgijo oziroma iz nje v tretje države, saj bi tretja država lahko postavila pod vprašaj njegovo nacionalnost in povezane prometne pravice. Tveganje izgube teh prometnih pravic je včasih veljalo za preveč pomembno in je zato ogrožalo zmožnost gospodarskega preživetja združitve. To je eden od razlogov, zakaj so bili do primera AF/KLM[175] uspešni združitveni projekti po celotni EU med prevozniki Skupnosti redki. V tem pravnem okviru so evropski prevozniki raje uporabljali strateške povezave. Sodbe v primerih „Odprto nebo“ so spremenile to pravno podlago. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je odločilo, da tiste države članice, ki so prevzele zaveze z Združenimi državami Amerike, tega niso imele pravico storiti, in so na številnih področjih prekršile izključno pristojnost Skupnosti. Sodišče je poleg tega odločilo, da pogajanje z državami članicami o dvostranskih sporazumih v imenu njihovih nacionalnih prevoznikov ob izključitvi drugih prevoznikov Skupnosti pomeni kršitev svobode ustanavljanja, ki jo določa člen 43 ES. Posledično je treba klavzulo nacionalnosti, ki jo vsebujejo dvostranski sporazumi s tretjimi državami, zamenjati s „klavzulo Skupnosti“. Sprememba obstoječih dvostranskih sporazumov in priznanje klavzule Skupnosti s strani tretjih držav sta potrebna za zagotovitev, da storitve zračnega prometa potekajo na zdravi pravni podlagi[176]. Zgoraj navedenega poslovnega tveganja potem ne bo več in večja bo verjetnost združevanja med prevozniki Skupnosti. Opis obeh transakcij Koncept koncentracije zajema „le transakcije, ki prinesejo trajno spremembo v strukturi zadevnih podjetij“[177]. Okvirni sporazum z dne 16. oktobra 2003[178], podpisan med družbama AF in KLM, določa, da se bosta dva prej neodvisna prevoznika združila in na koncu postala en sam operater na trgu (pod imenom Air France-KLM). Prejšnji delničarji družbe AF bodo obdržali 81 % delnic družbe Air France-KLM, manjšinski delničarji iz družbe KLM pa preostalih 19 %. Čeprav bi bila popolna združitev najboljši način za celovito izkoriščenje učinkov sinergije, je zaradi postopnega sprejemanja načela koncepta „prevoznika Skupnosti“ s strani tretjih držav potreben previden in stopnjujoč se pristop. Na začetku bo družba AF pridobila obsežne pravice veta nad družbo KLM, ki bo ohranila svojo nizozemsko nacionalnost. V drugi fazi se bo integracija med družbama AF in KLM povečala in združena pravna oseba bi lahko na koncu delovala kot en sam prevoznik. Pridobitev ključnih pravic veta s strani družbe AF nad družbo KLM že od začetka pomeni, da je šlo pri priglašeni transakciji za koncentracijo v smislu člena 3(1)(b) ECMR. V skladu s svojo obsežno povezavo se družbi AF in AZ strinjata, da bosta uskladili svoje operativne in poslovne politike na številnih zračnih poteh (tj. najprej pri skupku zračnih poti Francija–Italija), prek obsežne skupne uporabe kod, koordinacije omrežja in sodelovanja pri zračnih poteh, skupnih cen in skupne prodajne politike. Drugače kot v primeru AF/KLM pa družbi AF in AZ ostajata različni in neodvisni pravni osebi na trgu. Povezava ne ustvari nove pravne osebe niti de jure niti de facto, prav tako pa tudi ne spremeni strukture zadevnih podjetij, zlasti glede nadzora. Poleg tega povezava nima neodvisnega dostopa do trga, saj se vsi posli s strankami še naprej izvajajo prek družb AF in AZ. Povezava očitno ne pomeni koncentracije temveč sporazum o koordinaciji v okviru člena 81 ES[179]. Kljub temu pa povezava zagotavlja možnost prihodnje združitve med strankama. Opredelitev trga in ocena obeh transakcij Vsebinski presoji obeh primerov sta podobni. Prvič, Komisija je opredelila upoštevne trge v skladu s svojim dobro uveljavljenim pristopom s parom kraj porekla/namembni kraj (P in N), ki ga je potrdila sodna praksa[180]. Čeprav je bil v odločbi o AF/KLM na široko obravnavan pomen konkurence mreže z vidika povpraševanja, je v obeh odločbah sklenjeno, da je treba z vidika stranke vsak P in N obravnavati kot ločen trg, saj stranke zahtevajo prevozno storitev med dvema krajema. Drugič, da bi ocenila točen obseg P in N, je Komisija ocenila zamenljivost med letališči na določenem območju zajetja. V zvezi s tem je Komisija menila, da sta dve od glavnih letališč v Parizu, Milanu, Rimu in New Yorku zamenljivi. Tretji, kot v prejšnjih letalskih odločbah Komisija razlikuje med „časovno občutljivimi“ in „časovno neobčutljivimi“ strankami[181]. Četrtič, v obeh primerih so za upoštevne trge veljale zračne poti, na katerih so se dejavnosti strank dejansko prekrivale ali na katerih so bile stranke potencialne tekmice. Kljub tem podobnostim je bila zaradi različne narave in obsega obeh transakcij preiskava v primeru AF/KLM širša. Vključevala je presojo mednarodnih zračnih poti[182] ter učinek partnerstev med družbama AF in KLM pri drugih prevoznikih. Glede medcelinskih zračnih poti je Komisija menila, da so indirektni leti konkurenčni direktnim pod določenimi pogoji, na primer kadar čas do naslednjega leta ne presega 150 minut[183]. Pri presoji primera AF/KLM je bila upoštevana tudi navzočnost partnerjev združujočih se strank (npr. članov povezave Skyteam družbe AF ali ameriške povezave NorthWest družbe KLM) na vsaki pomembni zračni poti. Močan ekonomski in poslovni odnos ter obsežna povezava med družbama AF in AZ sta Komisijo pripeljala do sklepa, da po združitvi družba AZ ne bo več spodbujena k tekmovanju z družbo KLM v italijansko-nizozemskem skupku zračnih poti, zato so bile te zračne poti vključene v presojo konkurence združitve. Na koncu je odločba o AF/KLM ocenila tudi druge upoštevne trge, kot sta tovorni prevoz in vzdrževanje. Komisija je ugotovila pomisleke o konkurenci na sedmih zračnih poteh v primeru AF/AZ ter na devetih zračnih poteh znotraj Skupnosti in petih medcelinskih zračnih poteh v primeru AF/KLM. To so zračne poti, na katerih imajo stranke visok kombiniran tržni delež, ovire za vstop pa so visoke, predvsem zaradi prenatrpanosti letališč v vsaj enem od obeh krajev P in N. Podobnosti in razlike med uporabljenimi protiukrepi Težave glede konkurence, ki izhajajo iz povezav in koncentracij v letalskem sektorju, in potemtakem tudi uporabljeni protiukrepi, so podobni. Pomisleki o konkurenci v tem sektorju praviloma ne izhajajo iz omejitev fizične zmogljivosti, ki zahteva odprodajo določene dejavnosti (npr. letal ali podružnic), temveč iz ovir za vstop, to je dostopa do letaliških slotov[184]. V zvezi s tem so se stranke dogovorile, da bodo v obeh primerih dale letališka parkirna mesta (slote) na voljo tekmecem, tako da bodo ti lahko opravljali polete na zračnih poteh, kjer je imela Komisija pomisleke o konkurenci. Te protiukrepe so spremljali drugi ukrepi (zamrznitev pogostosti poletov in obveznost sklepanja sporazumov glede programa pogostega letalskega potnika (frequent-flyer programme), interlining in intermodalne prometne storitve itd.). Protiukrepi morajo izražati tudi posebnosti, ki izhajajo iz različne narave povezave in koncentracije. Kooperativna povezava ne pomeni stalne spremembe na trgu in odločba po členu 81(3) se podeli za začetno obdobje šestih let, po tem obdobju pa sledi pregled. Nasprotno ima koncentracija (in potemtakem odločba o združitvi) trajen učinek na strukturo družb in trg. Zato so strukturni protiukrepi posebej pomembni v primerih združitve, saj imajo lahko že po svoji naravi takšen trajni učinek[185]. V tem smislu pomeni odločba o AF/KLM inovativen premik v smeri bolj trajnega ali „strukturnega“ pristopa k tradicionalnim protiukrepom glede slotov. Prvič, obveznost o odstopu slota velja za nedoločen čas. Drugič, sloti, ki so jih stranke že odstopile in ki jih novi udeleženec na trgu več ne uporablja za določen par mest, bodo, kadar obveznost odstopa slotov ne velja več, vrnjene v sklad slotov na letališču. Tretjič, za zračno pot Amsterdam–Pariz je bil izbran pristop „kronskega dragulja“, zaradi česar je vstop tekmecev še posebej težaven, saj gre za povezavo zadevnih središč družb AF in KLM. Pod določenimi pogoji in po tem, ko je vsaj tri leta deloval na tem paru mest, bi lahko novi udeleženec na trgu za ta par mest celo pridobil podedovane pravice za slote, ki jih dajeta združujoči se stranki. Glede protiukrepov za medcelinske zračne poti, lastne primeru AF/KLM, je bilo treba zavarovati predvidevanje Komisije, da indirektni leti konkurenčno omejujejo direktne. V ta namen so francoski in nizozemski nacionalni organi izjavili, da se bodo vzdržali kakršnega koli posega v določanje cen indirektnih storitev pri velikem številu zračnih poti (tako imenovana „šesta svoboščina“) in da bodo zagotovili, da imajo tretji prevozniki pravico vmesnega pristanka v Amsterdamu ali Parizu, da ponudijo namembne kraje zunaj EU (peta svoboščina). Te izjave so del odločbe o AF/KLM. \|	Box 7: A first step in the consolidation of European aviation - the Air France/KLM merger and the Air France/Alitalia alliance Introduction The last three years have been particularly productive for Community law in the field of aviation. The “Open Skies” judgments[169] in 2002 and the legislative effort launched by the Commission in previous years[170] created the legal basis for the development of a truly internal market for the civil aviation industry. It was then the turn of European airline companies to respond to this new legal environment and create EU-wide players, putting an end to the fragmentation of the European aviation industry[171]. Since 2002, Air France and KLM have been the first European carriers to seize this opportunity. In 2004, the Commission had to ensure that this consolidation process takes place in full compliance with the competition rules. Air France (“AF”) and KLM announced their merger in the second half of 2003 and it was cleared by the Commission on 11 February[172]. Soon after the AF/KLM decision, on 7 April, AF was granted an exemption under Article 81(3) EC for its more traditional alliance with Alitalia (“AZ”)[173]. The parallelism in terms of time and players between the two cases provides a good opportunity to compare the treatment of aviation cases under Article 81 and the Merger Regulation (“ECMR”). Legal context of the two operations and the new trends in the European aviation industry In order to cover a greater number of destinations and improve capacity utilization at lower cost, larger airlines are establishing hub-and-spoke systems and concentrating traffic on their respective hubs. This objective is further ensured through the conclusion of agreements with other airlines which can take the form of a strategic alliance (e.g. AF/AZ) or of a merger (e.g. AF/KLM). Compared with alliances, mergers allow a better rationalisation and integration of the network structure of the merging carriers. However, mergers in the EU between carriers of different nationalities used to be difficult owing to the system of bilateral international agreements regulating traffic rights between States. Pursuant to the International Convention on Aviation of 7 December 1947 (Chicago Convention), each sovereign State has the competence to grant traffic rights over its airspace. On this basis, traffic rights were granted to carriers from third countries through bilateral agreements, whereby the two signing States often grant traffic rights only to carriers having the nationality of those States (“nationality clause”). Although the EU had completed the internal market in aviation by 1997[174] allowing Community carriers to compete within the European market, international flights to/from the EU were and are still subject to many restrictions, including the nationality clause. Therefore, if a Belgian carrier is acquired by a British airline and hence loses its Belgian nationality, the former risks losing its rights to fly to/from Belgium to third countries as the third country could question its nationality and the attached traffic rights. The risk of losing these traffic rights was sometimes considered too important and hence compromised the commercial viability of a merger. This is one of the reasons why a successful trans-EU merger project among Community carriers has rarely taken place, until, that is, the AF/KLM case[175]. In that legal context, European carriers preferred to use strategic alliances. The “Open Skies” judgments changed this legal landscape. The Court of Justice ruled that those Member States which had undertaken commitments with the United States were not entitled to do so and had breached the exclusive competence of the Community in a number of areas. Moreover, the Court ruled that the negotiation of bilateral agreements by Member States on behalf of their national carriers while excluding other Community carriers constitutes an infringement of the freedom of establishment provided for in Article 43 EC. As a result, the nationality clauses contained in bilateral agreements with third countries need to be replaced by a “Community clause”. The modification of existing bilateral agreements and the recognition by third countries of the Community clause are necessary to ensure that air transport services are operated on a sound legal basis[176]. The commercial risk mentioned above will then disappear and mergers between Community carriers will be more likely to take place. Description of the two transactions The concept of concentration covers “only operations bringing about a lasting change in the structure of the undertakings concerned”[177]. The Framework Agreement of 16 October 2003[178] signed between AF and KLM provides that two previously independent carriers will merge to become ultimately a single operator in the market (under the name Air France-KLM). Former shareholders of AF will hold 81% of Air France-KLM shares and the minority shareholders of KLM the remaining 19%. Although the best way to benefit fully from synergy effects would be a full merger, the gradual acceptance of the principle of the “Community carrier” concept by third States requires a cautious and progressive approach. Initially, AF will acquire extensive veto rights over KLM, which will keep its Dutch nationality. In a second phase, the integration between AF and KLM will be enhanced and the merged entity might ultimately operate as a single carrier. The acquisition of key veto rights by AF over KLM from the outset implies that the notified transaction constituted a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the ECMR. Under their extensive alliance, AF and AZ agree to coordinate their operational and commercial policies on a number of routes (i.e. initially the France-Italy bundle of routes), through extensive use of code-sharing, network coordination and route cooperation, share prices and a common sales policy. However, unlike the AF/KLM case, AF and AZ remain two distinct and independent entities in the market. The alliance does not create a new entity either de jure or de facto, nor has it altered the structure of the undertakings concerned, particularly as regards control. Furthermore, the alliance has no independent access to the market as all dealings with customers will continue to take place through AF and AZ. The alliance clearly does not constitute a concentration but a coordination agreement within the scope of Article 81 EC[179]. Nevertheless, the alliance provides for the possibility of a future merger between the parties. Market definition and assessment of the two transactions The substantive assessments of the two cases are similar. Firstly, the Commission defined the relevant markets in line with its well established point-of-origin/point-of-destination pair (“O&D”) approach confirmed by case law[180]. Although the AF/KLM decision largely discussed the importance of network competition from the demand viewpoint, both decisions conclude that, from the customer's perspective, every O&D should be considered a separate market as customers require a transport service between two points. Secondly, in order to assess the exact scope of an O&D, the Commission assessed the substitutability between airports within a certain catchment area. In this regard, the Commission considered that the two main airports of Paris, Milan, Rome and New York were substitutable. Thirdly, as in previous aviation decisions, the Commission distinguishes between "time-sensitive" and "non-time-sensitive" customers[181]. Fourthly, in both cases, the routes on which the parties’ activities actually overlapped or on which they were potential competitors were considered to be relevant markets. Notwithstanding these similarities, as a result of the different nature and scope of the two transactions, the investigation in the AF/KLM case was wider. It included the assessment of international routes[182] and the impact of AF’s and KLM’s partnerships with other carriers. On long-haul routes, the Commission considered that indirect flights compete with direct flights under certain conditions, for instance, where the connection time does not exceed 150 minutes[183]. The assessment in the AF/KLM case also took into consideration the presence - on each relevant route - of partners of the merging parties (e.g. members of AF’s Skyteam alliance or of NorthWest, KLM´s American ally). The strong economic and commercial relationship and the extensive alliance between AF and AZ led the Commission to conclude that, post-merger, AZ will no longer have an incentive to compete with KLM in the Italian/Dutch bundle of routes and these routes were therefore included in the competitive assessment of the merger. Finally, the AF/KLM decision also assessed other related markets such as cargo transport and maintenance. The Commission found competition concerns on seven routes in the AF/AZ case, and nine intra-Community routes and five inter-continental routes in the AF/KLM case. These are routes on which the parties have a high combined market share and barriers to entry are high, basically owing to airport congestion in at least one of the two points of O&D. Similarities and differences between the remedies applied Competition problems deriving from alliances and concentrations in the aviation sector, and therefore the remedies applied, are similar. By definition, competition concerns in this sector do not usually arise from restrictions on physical capacity requiring the divestiture of a given business (e.g. aeroplanes or subsidiaries), but rather from barriers to entry, namely access to airport slots[184]. In this regard the parties agreed to put slots at the disposal of competitors in both cases so that the latter might be able to operate flights on the routes where the Commission found competition concerns. These remedies were accompanied by other measures (frequency freeze and the obligation to enter into agreements concerning the frequent-flyer programme, interlining and inter-modal transport services, etc.). However, remedies should also reflect the particularities derived from the different nature of an alliance and a concentration. A cooperative alliance does not represent a permanent change in the market and an Article 81(3) decision is granted for an initial period of six years, subject to review after that period. By contrast, a concentration (and hence a merger decision) has a lasting impact on the structure of the companies and the market. That is why structural remedies are particularly important in merger cases, given that they are able to ensure such a permanent effect by their very nature[185]. In this sense, the AF/KLM decision constitutes an innovative shift towards a more permanent or “structural” approach to traditional slot remedies. Firstly, the slot surrender obligation applies for an unlimited duration. Secondly, slots already released by the parties and which are no longer used by an entrant on a particular city pair will be handed back to the slot pool at the airport, in cases where the obligation to release slots no longer exists. Thirdly, a “crown jewel” approach was chosen for the Amsterdam-Paris route, which competitors found particularly difficult to enter as it links AF’s and KLM’s respective hubs. Under certain conditions and once it has operated on this city pair for at least three years, an entrant on this city pair could even obtain the grandfather rights for the slots offered by the merging parties. With regard to remedies concerning long-haul routes, specific to the AF/KLM case, the Commission’s assumption that indirect flights represent a competitive constraint for direct flights needed to be ensured. To that end, the French and Dutch national authorities declared that they would refrain from any intervention into the price setting of indirect services on a large number of routes (so-called “sixth freedom”) and that they would ensure that third carriers have the right to stopover in Amsterdam or Paris in order to offer destinations outside the EU (fifth freedom). These declarations are part of the AF/KLM decision. \|
3. Napotitve	3. Refer RALS
Kabel Deutschland/ish[186]	Kabel Deutschland/ish[186]
263. Komisija je 20. aprila prejela priglasitev predlagane pripojitve podjetij ish GmbH & Co KG, Nemčija, ter ish KS NRW GmbH & Co KG, Nemčija (oba „ish“) k nemškemu podjetju Kabel Deutschland GmbH, Nemčija („KDG“).	263. On 20 April, the Commission received a notification of the proposed acquisition of the undertakings ish GmbH & Co KG, Germany, and ish KS NRW GmbH & Co KG, Germany (the latter two “ish”) by the German undertaking Kabel Deutschland GmbH, Germany (“KDG”).
264. Družba KDG je operater nekdanjega širokopasovnega kabelskega omrežja družbe Deutsche Telekom AG v vsej Nemčiji, razen dežel Hessen, Baden-Württemberg in Severno Porenje-Vestfalija. V zadnje omenjeni deželi je operater širokopasovnega kabelskega omrežja družba ish. Družbi vsaka na svojem področju zagotavljata prenos radiodifuznih signalov (TV in radio) ter dostop do spleta. Poleg pripojitve družbe ish je družba KDG nadalje načrtovala tudi nakup dveh preostalih regionalnih sistemskih širokopasovnih kabelskih operaterjev v Nemčiji, družb iesy Hessen in Kabel Baden-Württemberg. Nasprotno kot pri združitvi družb KDG in ish sta ti dve koncentraciji spadali pod pristojnost nacionalnega organa za konkurenco, Nemškega zveznega urada za kartele (FCO).	264. KDG operates the former broadband cable network of Deutsche Telekom AG in all of Germany apart from the Länder of Hessen, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. In the last-mentioned Land , ish is the operator of the broadband cable network. Both companies offer, in their respective network areas, the transmission of broadcast signals (TV and radio) as well as Internet access. Apart from the acquisition of ish, KDG further planned to buy also the two remaining regional broadband cable system operators in Germany, namely iesy Hessen and Kabel Baden-Württemberg. Contrary to the KDG/ish merger, these two concentrations fell within the competence of the national competition authority, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO).
265. FCO je 14. maja predložil Komisiji zahtevo za napotitev, v skladu s katero bi združitev lahko vodila h krepitvi prevladujočih položajev na več trgih v Nemčiji. Na trgu zagotavljanja radiodifuznih signalov, kjer izdajatelji televizijskih in radijskih programov zahtevajo prenos svojih signalov prek širokopasovnega kabla, bi takšna okrepitev po mnenju FCO lahko imela za posledico povečanje dosega, ki je posledica združevanja dveh omrežij. Poleg tega bi bila na trgu za storitve digitalne plačljive televizije, trgu za dobavo signalov iz regionalnega širokopasovnega kabla v interne kabelske sisteme in trgu za dobavo signalov končnim uporabnikom lahko po mnenju FCO konkurenca nadalje ovirana, če bi bila družba ish izločena kot tekmec družbe KDG, ki je že tako veljala za prevladujočo na nekaterih regionalnih trgih.	265. On 14 May, the FCO submitted to the Commission a request for referral according to which the merger could lead to the strengthening of dominant positions in several markets in Germany. In the market for the feeding-in of broadcast signals, where broadcasters demand the transmission of their signals via the broadband cable, such a strengthening could - according to the FCO - result from the increase of reach that follows the combination of the two networks. Moreover, in the market for services for digital pay-TV, the market for delivery of signals from the regional broadband cable to the in-house cable systems and the market for the supply of signals to end customers, competition could in the view of the FCO be further impeded if ish were eliminated as competitor to KDG, which was considered already dominant in some regional markets.
266. Komisija je sklenila, da so bili glede na nacionalni obseg trgov, prizadetih zaradi transakcije, izpolnjeni pogoji za napotitev na Zvezni urad za kartele. Obveljalo je mnenje, da je FCO v najboljšem položaju za analizo predhodnih pomislekov o konkurenci, saj je bila za to potrebna preučitev lokalnih trgov in posebnih nacionalnih okoliščin. Poleg tega so tri predlagane pripojitve k družbi KDG – tj. pripojitev družb ish, iesy Hessen in Kabel Baden-Württemberg – sprožile podobna vprašanja in bi jih zato moral enotno preučiti en sam organ za konkurenco. Zato se je Komisija 7. junija sklenila, da primer napoti na FCO.	266. The Commission came to the conclusion that the conditions for a referral to the Federal Cartel Office were met, given the national scope of the markets affected by the transaction. It believed that the FCO was best placed to analyse the preliminary competition concerns, as this required the examination of local markets and specific national circumstances. Moreover, all three proposed acquisitions by KDG – i.e. the acquisitions of ish, iesy Hessen and Kabel Baden-Württemberg – raised similar questions and should therefore be examined uniformly by a single competition authority. The Commission therefore decided on 7 June to refer the case to the FCO.
Accor/Barrière/Colony[187]	Accor/Barrière/Colony[187]
267. Komisija je 4. junija sklenila, da bo na francoske organe za konkurenco napotila del predlaganega skupnega podjetja v sektorju igralništva med družbo Accor, družinsko skupino Barrière-Desseigne in družbo Colony. Ta delna napotitev je zadevala presojo učinka na konkurenco, ki bi ga imela transakcija na trgih upravljanja igralništva v dveh francoskih regijah, na Azurni obali ter obalah dežel Basque in Landes. Isti dan je Komisija odobrila transakcijo v zvezi s preostalimi proizvodnimi in geografskimi trgi.	267. On 4 June, the Commission decided to refer to the French competition authorities part of the proposed joint venture in the casinos sector between Accor, the Barrière-Desseigne family group and Colony. This partial referral concerned the assessment of the competitive impact of the transaction on the casino management markets in two French regions, Côte d’Azur and Basque and Landes Coasts. On the same day, the Commission cleared the operation as regards the remaining product and geographic markets.
268. Preiskava Komisije je pokazala, da je imel trg za upravljanje igralnic lokalno geografsko razsežnost, ki jo je mogoče opredeliti bodisi na podlagi ustreznega uro vožnje oddaljenega geografskega poslovnega področja bodisi na podlagi področja lokalnega prebivalstva. Na podlagi te opredelitve bi transakcija sprožila težave glede konkurence v dveh zgoraj omenjenih francoskih regijah. Zato je Komisija sklenila, da so francoski organi v najboljšem položaju za presojo učinkov transakcije na te lokalne trge, in odločila, da presojo njihovega vpliva na konkurenco napoti nazaj na Francijo.	268. The Commission’s investigation showed that the market for the operation of casinos had a local geographic dimension that can be defined either based on a relevant geographical commercial area of an hour’s drive or a local population area. Based on this definition, the transaction would have raised competition problems in the two above-mentioned French regions. The Commission therefore concluded that the French authorities were best placed to assess the effects of the operation on these local markets and decided to refer their competitive assessment back to France.
269. Drugi vidiki transakcije so vključevali pridobitev igralniških licenc in hotelske trge ter so bili odobreni, saj je Komisija menila, da transakcija na teh trgih ni povzročila nobene nevarnosti glede konkurence.	269. The other aspects of the transaction involved the acquisition of casino licences and the hotel markets and were authorised as the Commission concluded that there was no risk to competition raised by the transaction in these markets.
270. Francoski organi za konkurenco so 28. julija odobrili transakcijo v skladu s protiukrepi na obeh navedenih trgih. Ti protiukrepi vključujejo odprodajo dveh igralnic s strani strank, ene na Azurni obali in druge na obali dežel Basque in Landes.	270. On 28 July, the French competition authorities cleared the transaction subject to remedies in the two referred markets. These remedies consist of the divestment by the parties of two casinos, one on the Côte d’Azur and a second one in the Basque and Landes Coasts.
4. Preklicane priglasitve	4. Notifications withdrawn
INA/AIG/SNFA[188]	INA/AIG/SNFA[188]
271. Nemški proizvajalec ležajev INA Holding Schaeffler KG („INA“) in zavarovalniška skupina AIG iz ZDA sta 22. septembra Komisiji priglasila skupno pripojitev francoskega proizvajalca preciznih ležajev SNFA. Družbi INA in SNFA sta specializirani za proizvodnjo preciznih antifrikcijskih ležajev. AIG je mednarodna zavarovalniška skupina brez kakršnih koli dejavnosti v industriji ležajev. Precizni ležaji se uporabljajo predvsem pri aplikacijah, ki zahtevajo visoko raven točnosti, predvsem v industriji strojnega orodja ter v letalskem in vesoljskem sektorju.	271. On 22 September, the German bearings manufacturer INA Holding Schaeffler KG (“INA”) and the US insurance group AIG notified to the Commission the joint acquisition of the French producer of precision bearings SNFA. INA and SNFA are specialised in the production of precision anti-friction bearings. AIG is an international insurance group without any activities in the bearings industry. Precision bearings are mainly used in applications that require a very high degree of accuracy, in particular in the machine tool industry and in the aerospace sector.
272. Komisija je 23. oktobra 2003 začela poglobljeno preiskavo predlagane transakcije zaradi pomislekov, da bi odstranitev konkurence med prvim in drugim največjim dobaviteljem preciznih ležajev za strojno orodje v zahodni Evropi postavila družbo INA v prevladujoči položaj. Po predhodnem mnenju Komisije, ki je temeljilo na preiskavi trga, bi transakcija precej zmanjšala konkurenco na trgu krogličnih ležajev za strojno orodje s kotnim stikom (ACBB) v zahodni Evropi, saj bi združila dva največja akterja, ki sta tudi na splošno najmočnejša v smislu kakovosti, zanesljivosti, inovacij in širine portfelja. Noben od preostalih tekmecev, niti švedski dobavitelj SKF, niti japonska družba NSK, niti drugi manjši akterji, ne bi bil sposoben izvajati zadostnega in učinkovitega konkurenčnega pritiska na družbo INA. Komisija je tudi ugotovila, da stranke verjetno ne bi v zadostni meri preverjale strategije oblikovanja cen družbe INA, saj je večina proizvajalcev strojnega orodja in vreten majhnih podjetij z omejeno pogajalsko pristojnostjo.	272. On 23 October 2003, the Commission had opened an in-depth inquiry into the proposed transaction owing to concerns that the elimination of competition between the first and second-largest suppliers of precision machine tool bearings in Western Europe would give INA a dominant position. The Commission’s preliminary view based on the market investigation was that the transaction would significantly reduce competition in the market for machine tool angular contact ball bearings (ACBBs) in Western Europe as it would have brought together the two largest players and the strongest overall in terms of quality, reliability, innovation and breadth of portfolio. None of the remaining competitors, whether the Swedish supplier SKF or the Japanese company NSK, or other smaller players, would have been able to exert a sufficient and effective competitive pressure on INA. The Commission also found that customers would be unlikely to exert a sufficient check on INA’s pricing strategy since most machine tool and spindle manufacturers are small businesses with limited bargaining power.
273. Glede na svoje precejšnje pomisleke se je Komisija 19. decembra 2003 odločila družbama INA in AIG poslati obvestilo o nasprotovanju. Vendar pa dokončna odločba ni bila izdana, saj so stranke januarja 2004 opustile transakcijo.	273. In view of its strong concerns the Commission decided to send a statement of objections to INA and AIG on 19 December 2003. A final decision, however, was not issued, since the parties abandoned the transaction in January 2004.
RWA/AMI[189]	RWA/AMI[189]
274. Avstrijski družbi RWA Raiffeisen-Ware Austria AG („RWA“) in AMI Agro Linz Melamine International GmbH („AMI“) sta se 11. oktobra odrekli načrtovani ustanovitvi skupnega podjetja Inter-Fert Düngemittel GmbH („Inter-Fert“) in umaknili ustrezno priglasitev pri Komisiji. Ustanovitev skupnega podjetja bi družbo AMI, vodilno avstrijsko proizvajalko gnojil, združila z družbo RWA, najpomembnejšo kmetijsko organizacijo za prodajo na debelo v Avstriji.	274. On 11 October, the Austrian companies RWA Raiffeisen-Ware Austria AG ("RWA") and AMI Agro Linz Melamine International GmbH ("AMI") gave up the planned creation of the joint venture Inter-Fert Düngemittel GmbH ("Inter-Fert") and withdrew the corresponding notification with the Commission. The establishment of the joint venture would have united the leading Austrian producer of fertilizers AMI with the most important agricultural wholesale organization in Austria, RWA.
275. V odločbi z dne 29. septembra je Komisija začela drugo fazo postopka, saj je bilo pri predhodni preučitvi nameravane združitve ugotovljeno, da bi ustanovitev skupnega podjetja okrepila prevladujoči položaj družbe RWA na grosističnem trgu gnojil v Avstriji. Na sosednjem Bavarskem je Komisija tudi ugotovila pomisleke o konkurenci v zvezi s trgovino z gnojili.	275. In a decision of 29 September the Commission had initiated the second phase of the proceedings, since the preliminary examination of the intended merger found that the creation of the joint venture would strengthen the dominant position of RWA in the wholesale market for fertilizers in Austria. In neighbouring Bavaria, the Commission also identified competition concerns regarding the trade in fertilizers.
276. Predhodni sklep Komisije je bil, da je imela sama družba RWA tržne deleže v razponu od 55 do 65 % trgov za določene posamezne vrste gnojil ali vsa gnojila skupaj ter da bi transakcija odstranila družbo AMI, ki je pomembna tekmica na avstrijskem grosističnem trgu. Poleg tega bi se prevladujoči položaj družbe RWA po združitvi z družbo AMI okrepil s posledično vertikalno integracijo. Obstajala je nevarnost, da bi transakcija pripeljala do vnaprejšnje izključitve. Transakcija bi lahko tudi okrepila prevladujoči položaj družbe BayWa, matičnega podjetja družbe RWA, na bavarskih maloprodajnih trgih gnojil, kjer ima skoraj 70-odstotni delež, kar bi lahko imelo za posledico vnaprejšnjo izključitev tekmecev družbe BayWa s trga. To bi pripeljalo do okrepitve prevladujočega položaja družbe BayWa na bavarskih maloprodajnih trgih gnojil in precejšnjega oviranja konkurence na večjem delu skupnega trga.	276. The Commission’s preliminary conclusion was that RWA alone had market shares in a range of 55% to 65% in the markets for certain types of fertiliser individually or all fertilizers together and that the operation would have removed AMI as an important competitor in the Austrian wholesale market. Furthermore, the dominant position of RWA would have been strengthened following the merger with AMI by the resulting vertical integration. There was a risk that the transaction would have led to foreclosure. The transaction might also have strengthened the dominant position of BayWa, a parent company of RWA, in the Bavarian retail markets for fertilizers where it has a market share of about 70% and could have resulted in the foreclosure of BayWa’s competitors. This would have led to a strengthening of BayWa’s dominant position in the Bavarian retail markets for fertilizers and a significant impediment of competition in a substantial part of the common market.
277. Da bi odpravili pomisleke o konkurenci v zvezi z Avstrijo in Bavarsko, sta stranki predlagali zaveze, ki pa niso veljale kot zadostne za odpravo zaskrbljenosti glede konkurence za prizadete trge v Avstriji in na Bavarskem. To je bilo potrjeno s tržnim preverjanjem zavez. Potem ko sta bili stranki obveščeni, da je Komisija uvedla drugo fazo postopka, sta svojo priglasitev umaknili.	277. In order to eliminate the competition concerns with regard to Austria and Bavaria, the parties proposed commitments which, however, were not considered sufficient to eliminate the competition concerns for the affected markets in Austria and Bavaria. This was confirmed when the commitments were market tested. After the parties were notified of the Commission’s institution of second phase proceedings they withdrew their notification.
C – Izbrani sodni primeri	C – SELECTED COURT CASES
Portugalska republika proti Komisiji (Cimpor)	Portuguese Republic v Commission (Cimpor)
278. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je 22. junija izdalo sodbo[190] v prid Komisije v primeru, povezanem z odločbo Komisije z dne 22. novembra 2000, sprejeto v skladu s členom 21(3) uredbe o združitvah[191], v okviru preučitve priglašene koncentracije v primeru Secil/Holderbank/Cimpor[192]. V členu 21(3) odločbe („odločba“) je Komisija pozvala portugalsko vlado, da naj sprejme ustrezne ukrepe za uskladitev z zakonodajo Skupnosti in prekliče dve odločbi ( despachos z dne 5. julija 2000 in 11. avgusta 2000), ki jih je navedena vlada sprejela, da bi na podlagi nacionalne privatizacijske zakonodaje nasprotovala predlagani koncentraciji, ki je bila priglašena Komisiji in je imela razsežnost Skupnosti.	278. On 22 June, the Court of Justice (ECJ) gave judgment[190] for the Commission in a case related to the Commission Decision of 22 November 2000 adopted under Article 21(3) of the Merger Regulation[191] in the context of the examination of a notified concentration in the Secil/Holderbank/Cimpor case[192]. In the Article 21(3) decision (“the decision”), the Commission called on the Portuguese Government to take the necessary measures to comply with Community law and to withdraw two decisions ( despachos of 5 July 2000 and 11 August 2000) which that Government had taken to oppose, on the basis of national privatisation legislation, the proposed concentration, which had been notified to the Commission and had a Community dimension.
279. V odločbi in svoji obrambi na Sodišču je Komisija uveljavljala mnenje, da sestava člena 21 temelji na ravnotežju med na eni strani državo članico, ki je zavezana Komisiji vnaprej sporočiti „kakršen koli drug javni interes“ in se vzdržati sprejemanja ukrepov za zaščito takšnih interesov, ter Komisijo na drugi, ki je v roku enega meseca zavezana presoditi ter odločiti glede skladnosti zahtevanega interesa s splošnimi načeli in drugimi določbami zakonodaje Skupnosti. Po mnenju Komisije bi bil členu 21(3) odvzet njegov celoten učinek, če zaradi pomanjkanja komunikacije Komisija ne bi bila upravičena presoditi, ali je ukrep, ki ga je sprejela država članica, upravičen zaradi enega od interesov, ki izrecno veljajo za legitimne po členu 21(3). Države članice bi se z lahkoto lahko izognile nadzoru Komisije, če ne bi sporočile takšnih ukrepov.	279. In the decision and in its defence before the Court, the Commission argued that the structure of Article 21 is built on the balance between, on the one hand, the Member State being under an obligation to communicate to the Commission in advance “any other public interest” and to withhold from adopting measures to protect such interests, and, on the other hand, the Commission being under an obligation to assess and take a decision on the compatibility of the claimed interest with the general principles and other provisions of Community law within a one-month deadline. The Commission held that Article 21(3) would be deprived of all its effect if, as a result of the absence of communication, the Commission was not entitled to assess whether a measure adopted by a Member State was justified by one of the interests expressly considered to be legitimate by Article 21(3). Member States could easily avoid the scrutiny of the Commission by not communicating such measures.
280. Zato je Komisija menila, da je treba člen 21 razlagati v pomenu, da je Komisija ne glede na to, ali je ukrep sporočen, upravičena sprejeti odločbo, ki presoja, ali naj se ukrep, ki ni zajet v enem od treh razlogov iz člena 21, prizna kot združljiv s Pogodbo.	280. The Commission therefore considered that Article 21 should be interpreted as meaning that, irrespective of whether a measure is communicated, the Commission is entitled to adopt a decision assessing whether a measure not covered by one of the three grounds mentioned in Article 21 should be recognised as compatible with the Treaty.
281. Komisija je navedla, da so argumenti v podporo odločitvam, ki ju je sprejela portugalska vlada proti koncentraciji, zajeti v besedilu druge odločbe, v skladu s katero je treba „zaščititi razvoj struktur deležev v podjetjih v privatizacijskem postopku zaradi krepitve korporativne zmogljivosti in učinkovitosti nacionalnega proizvodnega aparata na način, ki je skladen s smernicami gospodarske politike na Portugalskem“[193].	281. The Commission stated that the arguments underlying the two decisions taken by the Portuguese Government opposing the concentration are encapsulated in the text of the second decision, according to which it is necessary "to protect development of the shareholding structures in companies undergoing privatisation with a view to reinforcing the corporate capacity and the efficiency of the national production apparatus in a way that is consistent with the economic policy guidelines in Portugal”[193] .
282. Po mnenju Komisije ta cilj ni eden od interesov (javna varnost, pluralizem medijev in pravila nadzora), ki veljajo kot resnično legitimni za namene drugega odstavka člena 21(3) uredbe o združitvah. S sprejetjem odločb o zavrnitvi odobritve pripojitve več kot 10 % delnic družbe Cimpor je Portugalska republika po mnenju Komisije dejansko prepovedala pripojitev ter s tem postavila ovire za svobodo ustanavljanja in prost pretok kapitala, določena v Pogodbi, ki nista mogla veljati za zagotovljena po nobeni od temeljnih osnov javnega interesa, priznanih v sodni praksi Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti. Portugalska vlada nikakor ni predložila nobene od takšnih osnov. Interes v podporo obeh odločb portugalskega ministra za finance, ki v nasprotju s členom 21(3) uredbe o združitvah nista bili sporočeni Komisiji, je bil tako spoznan za nezdružljivega z zakonodajo Skupnosti[194].	282. The Commission held that this objective is not one of the interests (public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules) regarded as intrinsically legitimate for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 21(3) of the Merger Regulation. By adopting the decisions declining to authorise the acquisition of more than 10% of the shares in Cimpor, the Portuguese Republic, in the Commission’s view, in effect prohibited the acquisition and thereby raised barriers to the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital enshrined in the Treaty, which could not be considered warranted under any essential grounds of public interest recognised in the case law of the ECJ. In any event, the Portuguese Government had not advanced any such grounds. The interest underlying the two decisions of the Portuguese Minister of Finance, which were not notified to the Commission contrary to Article 21(3) of the Merger Regulation, was thus found incompatible with Community law[194].
283. Posledično je bilo v tem postopku eno glavnih vprašanj za Komisijo, ali je bila Komisija v teh okoliščinah pristojna za sprejetje odločbe po členu 21(3) oziroma ali bi se morala vrniti na postopek za ugotavljanje kršitev po členu 226 Pogodbe. Po mnenju Komisije bi bilo treba člen 21(3) razlagati v smislu, da obravnava položaj, v katerem država članica pred sprejetjem ukrepov Komisiji ni sporočila javnega interesa (razen javne varnosti, pluralizma medijev ali previdnostnih pravil), ki ga namerava zaščititi.	283. Consequently, one of the essential questions for the Commission in these proceedings was whether the Commission had the competence to adopt an Article 21(3) decision under these circumstances or whether it should have reverted to an infringement procedure under Article 226 of the Treaty. The Commission maintained that Article 21(3) should be interpreted as covering a situation where the Member State has not communicated to the Commission the public interest, other than public security, plurality of the media or prudential rules, it intends to protect prior to taking the measures.
284. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti se je strinjalo s Komisijo, da je Komisija pristojna, da z odločbo odloči glede skladnosti navedenih interesov s splošnimi načeli in drugimi določbami zakonodaje Skupnosti, ne glede na to, ali so ji bili ti interesi sporočeni ali ne. Če zaradi pomanjkanja komunikacije zadevne države članice Komisiji preostane le še možnost vložitve tožbe zaradi neizpolnjevanja obveznosti po členu 226 Pogodbe, bi bilo nemogoče dobiti odločitev Skupnosti v kratkih rokih, ki jih določa uredba o združitvah. To bi posledično povečalo nevarnost, da že sprejeti nacionalni ukrepi nepopravljivo prejudicirajo združitev z razsežnostjo Skupnosti in razglasijo pregled Komisije po členu 21(3) za neučinkovitega, kar bi državam članicam omogočilo, da se izognejo nadzorom, ki jih določa navedena določba.	284. The ECJ agreed with the Commission that the Commission has the competence to rule by decision as to the compatibility of those interests with the general principles and other provisions of Community law, irrespective of whether or not those interests have been communicated to it. If, in the absence of any communication by the Member State concerned, the sole option open to the Commission were to bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 226 of the Treaty, it would be impossible to obtain a Community decision within the short time limits laid down by the Merger Regulation. This would in turn increase the risk of national measures already taken irretrievably prejudicing a merger with a Community dimension and rendering the Commission’s review under Article 21(3) ineffective by giving the Member States the possibility of circumventing the controls laid down by that provision.
285. Naloga Komisije pri ugotavljanju interesov, zaščitenih z nacionalnimi ukrepi, lahko postane bolj negotova in zapletena, če ji ti interesi niso bili sporočeni, vendar pa ima Komisija vedno možnost, da zadevno državo članico zaprosi za informacije. Sodišče potrjuje, da je Komisija v tem primeru to tudi storila. V takšnih primerih mora Komisija nujno najprej preučiti, ali so navedeni ukrepi utemeljeni z enim od interesov, navedenih v drugem pododstavku člena 21(3) uredbe o združitvah (javna varnost/pluralizem medijev/pravila nadzora). Sodišče je tako sklenilo, da Komisija pri sprejemanju izpodbijane odločbe ni posegla v pristojnost Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti ali nacionalnih sodišč ter ni kršila člena 21(1) uredbe o združitvah, člena 220 Pogodbe in člena 226 Pogodbe, niti ni na noben način zlorabila postopka.	285. The Commission’s task in identifying the interests protected by the national measures may be made more uncertain and complex if these interests have not been communicated to it, but the Commission always has the possibility of asking the Member State concerned for information. The Court acknowledges that in this case the Commission also did so. In such cases, the Commission inevitably first needs to examine whether those measures are justified by one of the interests specified in the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of the Merger Regulation (public security/plurality of media/prudential rules). The Court thus concluded that, in adopting the contested decision, the Commission did not encroach on the jurisdiction of the ECJ or national courts and did not infringe Article 21(1) of the Merger Regulation, Article 220 of the Treaty and Article 226 of the Treaty, nor did it commit any misuse of procedure.
286. V tej sodbi je Sodišče jasno poudarilo točno dodelitev pristojnosti med nacionalnimi organi in organi Skupnosti ter posege, ki jih lahko opravijo nacionalni organi in organi Skupnosti zaradi učinkovitega nadzora združevanja ob upoštevanju zdravega upravljanja, pravne varnosti in legitimnega interesa zadevnih podjetij. Najpomembneje je, da Sodišče priznava člen 21(3) kot lex specialis, ki ima prednost pred ukrepanjem zaradi neizpolnjevanja obveznosti po členu 226 Pogodbe.	286. In this judgment, the Court clearly emphasised the precise allocation of competencies between the national and Community authorities and interventions that can be made by the national and by the Community authorities with a view to efficient merger control respecting sound administration, legal certainty and the legitimate interests of the undertakings concerned. Most importantly, the Court recognises Article 21(3) as being a lex specialis taking priority over an action for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 226 of the Treaty.
MCI proti Komisiji	MCI v Commission
287. Sodišče prve stopnje je 28. septembra po pritožbi družbe MCI izdalo sodbo[195] o razveljavitvi odločbe Komisije z dne 28. junija 2000 („odločba“) v primeru MCI/Sprint [196] zaradi postopkovnih razlogov. V odločbi je Komisija prepovedala združitev družb MCI, prej MCI WorldCom, in Sprint, ki imata sedež v ZDA ter se ukvarjata z globalnimi komunikacijami, ker naj bi ta vodila k ustvarjanju ali krepitvi prevladujočega položaja na svetovnem trgu zagotavljanja vrhunske ali univerzalne internetne povezljivosti.	287. On 28 September, the Court of First Instance (CFI) delivered a judgment[195] annulling on procedural grounds the Commission decision of 28 June 2000 (“the decision”) in the MCI/Sprint case[196] following an appeal by MCI. In the decision, the Commission had prohibited the merger between MCI, formerly MCI WorldCom, and Sprint, both US-based, global communications companies, on the ground that it would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the global market for the provision of top-level or universal Internet connectivity.
288. Sodba ne obravnava zadev presoje konkurence, temveč je omejena na vprašanja o dopustnosti, interesu za predložitev postopka in pristojnosti Komisije za sprejetje odločbe.	288. The judgment does not deal with matters of competition assessment, but is limited to questions regarding admissibility, the interest in bringing proceedings and the power of the Commission to adopt the decision.
289. Glede dopustnosti uvaja sodba nov element glede interesa, ki ga mora prosilec dokazati pri razveljavitvi izpodbijanega ukrepa. Lahko bi se pojavili dvomi o interesu družbe MCI, predvsem zato, ker je trdila, da je odstopila od združitve še pred sprejetjem odločbe. V prejšnjih primerih je Sodišče zahtevalo, da se odstop od transakcije neposredno pripiše izpodbijani odločbi, v tem primeru pa je menila, da zadošča, da je Komisija sprejela odločbo, naslovljeno na družbo MCI, kar je edina obstoječa pravna ovira za izvedbo transakcije, če bi se stranke želele združiti pod enakimi pogoji.	289. As regards admissibility, the judgment introduces a novel element as to the interest to be shown by the applicant in the annulment of the contested measure. Doubts could be raised as to MCI’s interest mainly on the ground that it claimed to have abandoned the merger even before adoption of the decision. Whereas in previous cases the Court had required that the abandonment of the transaction be directly attributable to the contested decision, in the present case it considers it sufficient that the Commission adopted a decision addressed to MCI which is the only existing legal obstacle to carrying out the transaction should the parties wish to merge under the same conditions.
290. V bistvu je družba MCI trdila, da Komisija ni imela pristojnosti za sprejetje odločbe z dne 28. junija 2000, ko sta priglasitelja 27. junija uradno preklicala svojo priglasitev v dopisu z naslednjo vsebino: „Stranki nič več ne predlagata izvršitve predlagane združitve v obliki, ki je predstavljena v priglasitvi. Če se stranki v prihodnosti odločita za združitev svojih dejavnosti v spremenjeni obliki, bosta izvedli takšne spremembe, kot so primerne v skladu z veljavnimi zakoni o združevanju.“ Komisija je utemeljevala svojo pristojnost z razlago v odločbi, da dopis z dne 27. junija 2000 ni pomenil formalnega odstopa od sporazuma o združitvi z dne 4. oktobra 1999, ki je bila predmet priglasitve, in s sklicevanjem na sporočila strank za javnost z dne 27. junija 2000, ki so navajala, da sta stranki še vedno upali, da je mogoče doseči razumno odločitev glede združitve.	290. In substance, MCI claimed that the Commission lacked the competence to adopt the decision on 28 June 2000, when the notifying parties had formally withdrawn their notification on 27 June by a letter saying: “The parties no longer propose to implement the proposed merger in the form presented in the notification. In so far as the parties decide to merge their activities in a modified form in the future, the parties will make such modifications as appropriate under the applicable merger laws.” The Commission substantiated its competence by explaining in the decision that the letter of 27 June 2000 did not amount to a formal abandoning of the merger agreement of 4 October 1999 that was the object of the notification and by referring to the parties’ press releases of 27 June 2000, stating that they still hoped that a sensible conclusion to the merger could be reached.
291. Sodišče potrjuje, da dopis strank načeloma ni zadeval odstopa od kakršne koli zamisli o združitvi med družbama Worldcom in Sprint, temveč le odstop od predlagane združitve, kot je bila dogovorjena med strankama v sporazumu o združitvi z dne 4. oktobra 1999 in priglašena Komisiji. Po mnenju Sodišča je izjavo strank z dne 27. junija 2000 mogoče razlagati v smislu, da ima za posledico prenehanje sporazuma o združitvi, priglašenega v skladu z uredbo o združitvi. Odstop od predlagane transakcije „v obliki, predstavljeni v priglasitvi“ bi neizogibno vplival na učinkovitost, če ne celo veljavnost, samega sporazuma o združitvi.	291. The Court acknowledges that the parties’ letter did not concern the abandonment, as a matter of principle, of any idea of a merger between Worldcom and Sprint, but only the abandonment of the proposed merger as agreed between the parties in the merger agreement of 4 October 1999 and as notified to the Commission. The Court considers that the parties’ statement of 27 June 2000 could only be interpreted as entailing the lapsing of the merger agreement notified under the Merger Regulation. The abandonment of the proposed transaction “in the form presented in the notification” would necessarily affect the effectiveness, if not the validity, of the merger agreement itself.
292. Končno mnenje Sodišča je, da Komisija ni imela pristojnosti za sprejetje odločbe, saj sta stranki z dopisom z dne 27. junija odstopili od sporazuma in nista le preklicali priglasitve. Nadalje navaja, da Komisija ne bi mogla utemeljiti svoje pristojnosti na svojem subjektivnem pogledu na namere strank, da uresničita združitev, in poudarja, da bi Komisija, če je dvomila o pomenu dopisa, lahko zahtevala uradno dokazilo, da se je od sporazuma o združitvi zares odstopilo, in sicer z zahtevo v skladu s členom 11 uredbe o združitvah.	292. The Court concludes that the Commission lacked the competence to adopt the decision as the parties, by letter of 27 June, had abandoned the agreement and not only withdrawn the notification. It further states that the Commission could not base its competence on its subjective view of the intentions of the parties to pursue a merger and points out that, if the Commission had doubts as to the meaning of the letter, it could have asked for formal proof that the merger agreement had really been abandoned by means of a request pursuant to Article 11 of the Merger Regulation.
D STATISTIKA	D STATISTICS
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III – RAZVOJ DOGODKOV PO SEKTORJIH	III – SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS
A – LIBERALIZIRANI SEKTORJI	A - LIBERALISED SECTORS
1. ENERGETIKA	1. ENERGY
293. Na področju energetike bo oblikovanje resnično konkurenčnih trgov energije koristilo uporabnikom energije in konkurenčnosti evropskega gospodarstva. V letu 2004 je Komisija nadaljevala delo v sodelovanju z nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco in zakonodajalci na energetskem področju, da bi izboljšala pogoje za konkurenco in nove vstope na trg. Komisija je predvsem ustanovila Podskupino ECN za energetiko in se redno povezovala z zakonodajalci na energetskem področju[197].	293. As regards the energy sector, the creation of truly competitive energy markets will benefit energy consumers and the competitiveness of the European economy. In 2004, the Commission continued to work in cooperation with national competition authorities and energy regulators in order to improve the conditions for competition and for new market entry. In particular, the Commission established an ECN Energy Subgroup and liaised regularly with Energy Regulators[197].
294. V zvezi z zakonodajnim postopkom je treba omeniti, da je bilo leto 2004 tisto leto, v katerem naj bi bile direktive, ki jih je Komisija sprejela leta 2003, da bi pospešila uresničitev notranjega trga plina in elektrike, prenesene v zakonodajo držav članic. Žal večina držav članic ni upoštevala tega roka. Zakonodajni postopek je napredoval tudi na ravni Skupnosti in precejšen napredek je bil dosežen s sprejetjem skupnega stališča Sveta za uredbo o pogojih za dostop do omrežij za transmisijo plina. Uredba bo obravnavala nekatere od preostalih ovir za uresničitev notranjega trga, predvsem glede trgovanja s plinom.	294. As far as the legislative process is concerned, 2004 was the year in which the Directives adopted by the Commission in 2003 in order to accelerate the completion of the internal gas and electricity markets were to be transposed by the Member States. Regrettably, most Member States did not respect this deadline. The legislative process advanced also at Community level and significant progress was made with the adoption of the Council common position for a Regulation on conditions for access to the gas transmission networks. The Regulation will tackle some remaining barriers to the completion of the internal market, in particular regarding trade in gas.
295. Proces liberalizacije je bil tako kot v prejšnjih letih podprt z uporabo pravil konkurence v številnih pomembnih primerih. V primeru Gaz de France[198] je Komisija z uradnim sklepom potrdila, da ozemeljske omejevalne klavzule kršijo člen 81 ES. Takšne klavzule, ki so tradicionalno vključene v pogodbe o dobavi plina ter pogodbe o transportu/nudenju storitev, uporabnikom preprečujejo, da bi jim plin dobavljali operaterji s sedežem v drugih državah članicah, ter pomenijo precejšnjo oviro pri oblikovanju resnično konkurenčnega in integriranega trga plina na evropski ravni.	295. The liberalisation process was supported – as in previous years – by the application of competition rules in a number of important cases. In the Gaz de France case[198] the Commission confirmed by formal decision that territorial restriction clauses infringe Article 81 EC. Such clauses, traditionally included in gas supply and transportation/service contracts prevent customers from obtaining gas supplies from operators established in other Member States and constitute a sizeable obstacle to the creation of a genuinely competitive and integrated gas market at European level.
296. Komisija se je 30. aprila odločila končati preiskavo primera Marathon[199] v zvezi s preostalima dobaviteljema, francosko družbo Gaz de France in nemško družbo Ruhrgas[200], potem ko je v letih 2001 in 2003 uredila primer z nemškima družbama BEB[201] in Thyssengas[202] ter z nizozemsko družbo Gasunie[203]. Primer Marathon je zadeval domnevno zavrnitev petih plinskih družb, da norveški podružnici energetskega podjetja Marathon iz ZDA zagotovijo dostop do svojih zadevnih plinskih omrežij. Zaveze, ki sta jih ponudili družbi Gaz de France in Ruhrgas, so izboljšale dostop tretje stranke do njunih omrežij in omogočile uporabnikom, da v celoti uživajo koristi odprtja plinskih trgov v Franciji in Nemčiji.	296. On 30 April, the Commission decided to close its investigation in the Marathon case[199] as regards the remaining two suppliers, the French company Gaz de France and the German company Ruhrgas[200], after settling the case in 2001 and 2003 with the German companies BEB[201] and Thyssengas[202], and the Dutch company Gasunie[203]. The Marathon case concerned the alleged refusal by five gas companies to grant the Norwegian subsidiary of the US energy company Marathon access to their respective gas networks. The commitments offered by Gaz de France and Ruhrgas improved third-party access to their networks and allowed customers to fully benefit from the opening of the gas markets in France and Germany.
297. Predvsem družba Ruhrgas se je zavezala, da bo uvedla nov režim vstopa/izstopa, ki ji omogoča ločeno evidentirati zmogljivost za transport plina na točkah vstopa in izstopa (namesto evidentiranja navidezne pogodbene poti med točko, kjer plin vstopi v transportni sistem, in točko, kjer ga zapusti). Družbi Gaz de France, ki je že uresničila sistem vstopa/izstopa, in Ruhrgas sta se nadalje zavezali, da bosta postopno zmanjšali število izravnalnih in tarifnih con v svojih omrežjih, kar bo zmanjšalo stroške transporta, povezane s prečkanjem več con. Družba Gaz de France se je tudi zavezala, da bo v treh letih uresničila program sprostitve plina na jugu Francije, da bi omogočila razvoj konkurence brez čakanja na uresničitev načrtovane nove infrastrukture sredi leta 2007, kar bi pospešilo dostop konkurenčnega plina na to področje. Poleg teh glavnih zavez sta se družbi Gaz de France in Ruhrgas zavezali, da bosta sprejeli številne druge ukrepe za izboljšanje preglednosti, obravnavanja prošenj za dostop in razreševanje prezasedenosti.	297. In particular, Ruhrgas undertook to introduce a new entry/exit regime, which makes it possible to book gas transport capacities separately at entry and exit points (rather than having to book capacity over a fictitious contractual path between the point where the gas is injected into the transport system and the point where it is withdrawn). Gaz de France, which had already implemented an entry/exit system, and Ruhrgas further undertook to gradually reduce the number of balancing and tariff zones in their respective networks, which will reduce the cost of transport related to the crossing of several zones. Gaz de France also undertook to implement a gas release programme over three years in the south of France, in order to allow the development of competition without waiting for the completion in mid-2007 of planned new infrastructure facilitating the access of competing gas to this area. In addition to these main commitments, Gaz de France and Ruhrgas undertook to take a number of other measures to improve transparency, the handling of access requests and congestion management.
298. Na področju združitev se je Komisija odločila zaustaviti predvideno pridobitev skupnega nadzora portugalske elektroenergetske družbe Energias de Portugal (EDP) in italijanske elektroenergetske družbe ENI nad portugalsko plinsko družbo Gás de Portugal (GDP). Ta transakcija bi okrepila prevladujoči položaj družbe EDP na njenih zadevnih trgih (grosistični in maloprodajni trgi električne energije ter plinski trgi na Portugalskem), kar bi bila posledica horizontalnih in vertikalnih učinkov. Predvsem pa bi odstranila potencialno konkurenco družbe GDP na trgih električne energije in zelo verjeten vstop družbe EDP na plinske trge. Poleg tega bi zaradi koncentracije postali proizvajalci električne energije, ki kot gorivo uporabljajo plin, zelo odvisni od svojega glavnega tekmeca, tj. družbe EDP, ki bi jim dobavljala plin. Nenazadnje bi transakcija vnaprej izključila s trga precejšen del povpraševanja po plinu, ki ga trenutno nadzira družba EDP. Koncentracija bi tako odvračala čezmejno konkurenco in si vnaprej pridobila pravico do učinkovitosti liberalizacije trgov elektrike in plina na Portugalskem. To bi imelo za posledico višje cene plina in elektrike za gospodinjske uporabnike in industrijo. Protiukrepi, ki sta jih predlagali družbi EDP in ENI, niso zadoščali za obravnavanje ugotovljenih vprašanj o konkurenci, zato Komisija ni imela druge izbire, kot da prepove predlagano združitev.	298. In the merger field, the Commission decided to block the envisaged acquisition of joint control over Gás de Portugal (GDP), the incumbent gas company in Portugal, by Energias de Portugal (EDP), the incumbent electricity company in Portugal, and ENI, an Italian energy company. This operation would have strengthened EDP’s dominant position in their respective markets (electricity wholesale and retail markets and gas markets in Portugal) as a result of both horizontal and vertical effects. In particular, it would have removed GDP's potential competition in the electricity markets as well as EDP's most likely entry in the gas markets. Moreover, the concentration would have made electricity producers using gas as a fuel highly dependent on their main competitor, i.e. EDP, for their gas supplies. Lastly, the operation would have foreclosed a significant part of gas demand, currently controlled by EDP. The concentration would thus have discouraged cross-border competition and pre-empted the effectiveness of the liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets in Portugal. This would have resulted in higher prices for gas and electricity for both domestic customers and industry. The remedies proposed by EDP and ENI being insufficient to address the competition issues identified, the Commission had no choice but to prohibit the proposed merger.
299. Komisija je izdala tudi uradni opomin Grčiji v primeru, ki zadeva grške trge izkopavanja lignita ter proizvodnje in dobave električne energije. Grčija podeljuje domačemu proizvajalcu električne energije izključne rudarske pravice za izkopavanje lignita brez nadomestila. Ta privilegiran dostop do lignita, ki je najcenejši vir energije za proizvodnjo elektrike v Grčiji, omogoča proizvajalcu električne energije, da ohranja svoj prevladujoči položaj na trgih proizvodnje in dobave električne energije, saj potencialnim tekmecem preprečuje vstop na trg. Po mnenju Komisije Grčija z ohranjanjem teh pravic krši člena 86(1) in 82 ES.	299. Last but not least, the Commission issued a letter of formal notice to Greece in a case concerning the Greek lignite mining and electricity generation and supply markets. Greece grants to the incumbent electricity producer exclusive mining rights to extract lignite without compensation. This privileged access to lignite, the cheapest energy source for electricity generation in Greece, enables the electricity incumbent to maintain its dominant position on the electricity generation and supply markets by preventing market entry of potential competitors. In the Commission’s view, Greece infringes Articles 86(1) and 82 EC by maintaining these rights.
2. ELEKTRONSKE KOMUNIKACIJE	2. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
300. Ena od temeljnih sprememb, ki jih je za storitve elektronskih komunikacij uvedel nov ureditveni okvir, je, da morajo nacionalni regulativni organi (NRO) opredeliti ustrezne trge elektronskih komunikacij v skladu z načeli konkurenčnega prava. Analizirati morajo upoštevne trge in določiti, ali so ti trgi učinkovito konkurenčni, kar pomeni, da na njih ni podjetja z večjo tržno močjo (ZTM, ki ustreza konkurenčnemu konceptu prevladovanja) na navedenem trgu. Če trg ni učinkovito konkurenčen, morajo NRO naložiti vsaj eno posebno regulativno obveznost izmed tistih, določenih v direktivah o dostopu ali univerzalnih storitvah. Nasprotno pa, če trg ni učinkovito konkurenčen, NRO-ji morda ne bodo ohranili ali uvedli nobenih posebnih regulativnih obveznosti.	300. One of the fundamental changes introduced by the new regulatory framework for electronic communication services is that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) are obliged to define relevant electronic communication markets in accordance with the principles of competition law. They must carry out an analysis of the relevant markets and determine whether those markets are effectively competitive, meaning that there is no undertaking with significant market power (SMP, equivalent to the competition concept of dominance) on that market. If a market is not effectively competitive, NRAs must impose at least one specific regulatory obligation among those set out in the Access or the Universal Service Directives. Conversely, if a market is effectively competitive, NRAs may not maintain or introduce any specific regulatory obligations.
301. Po postopku analize trga morajo NRO sporočiti Komisiji osnutke ureditvenih ukrepov v zvezi z opredelitvijo upoštevnih trgov, ugotovitev ali neugotovitev ZTM in predlagane ureditvene protiukrepe, če sploh. Komisija lahko bodisi izda komentarje, ki jih morajo NRO v največji meri upoštevati, bodisi zahteva od NRO, da umakne osnutek ukrepa, če opredelitev trga in/ali ugotovitev ZTM nista združljiva z zakonodajo Skupnosti. Leta 2004 so službe Komisije prejele 89 takšnih obvestil in zaključili 90 primerov. V treh primerih je Komisija zahtevala od NRO, da umakne osnutek zadevnega ukrepa.	301. Following the market analysis procedure, NRAs must notify to the Commission draft regulatory measures concerning the definition of the relevant markets, the finding or non-finding of SMP and the regulatory remedies proposed, if any. The Commission may either issue comments, which NRAs must take utmost account of, or request the NRA to withdraw the draft measure if the market definition and/or the determination of SMP is incompatible with Community law. In 2004, the Commission's departments received 89 such notifications and closed 90 cases. In three cases, the Commission requested the NRA to withdraw the draft measure concerned.
302. V združenih primerih FI/2003/0024 in FI/2003/0027[204], ki zadevata javno razpoložljive mednarodne telefonske storitve, zagotovljene na fiksni lokaciji za rezidenčne ali nerezidenčne uporabnike na Finskem, je Komisija ugotovila, da finski NRO, Ficora, pri sprejemanju sklepa, da na teh trgih ni bilo operaterjev z ZTM, ni zagotovil zadostnih dokazov in ni upošteval obstoječe ureditve. Komisija je izpodbijala ugotovitev Ficore, po kateri družba TeliaSonera kljub visokim tržnim deležem (nad 50 %) ni imela ZTM, kar je bila posledica nizkih ovir za vstop, velikega števila podjetij, ki nudijo mednarodne telefonske storitve, in dejstva, da so naročniki lahko preprosto dobili mednarodne telefonske storitve od operaterjev, ki so se razlikovali od tistih, ki so zagotavljali naročniško povezavo. Po mnenju Komisije Ficora ni zagotovila tržnih podatkov, povezanih z več dejavniki, ki so pomembni za oceno tržne moči, kot so struktura stroškov ter distribucijska in prodajna mreža podjetij na trgu. Poleg tega Ficorina ocena stopnje tržne moči podjetij na trgih ni ustrezno upoštevala obstoja ureditvenih protiukrepov in njihovega učinka na zaznano raven konkurence na trgu, kar je precej oslabilo njene sklepe. Ficora predvsem trdi, da so bile ovire za vstop na te trge nizke in da je bilo več podjetij, ki so ponujala mednarodne telefonske storitve, posledičen sklep glede pomanjkanja ZTM pa se je zato opiral na obstoječo ureditev, kot so izbira obratovalca, predizbira obratovalca in obveznost medsebojnega povezovanja. Komisija je poudarila, da je bilo ključno načelo analize trga presoditi, ali je bila učinkovita konkurenca v celoti oziroma prvenstveno rezultat obstoječe ureditve, ali ne, ter ali bi bilo stanje konkurence na opredeljenem trgu verjetno drugačno, če takšne ureditve ne bi bilo.	302. In the joint cases FI/2003/0024 and FI/2003/0027[204], concerning the publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential and non-residential customers in Finland, the Commission found that the Finnish NRA, Ficora, did not provide sufficient evidence and did not take into account existing regulation in the market when reaching the conclusion that there were no operators with SMP on these markets. The Commission contested Ficora's finding, according to which, despite the high market shares (above 50%) of TeliaSonera, the latter did not have SMP as a result of low barriers to entry, the large number of undertakings providing international telephone services and the fact that subscribers could easily acquire international telephone services from operators other than the one providing the subscriber connection. In the Commission’s view, Ficora did not provide market data related to several factors which are relevant to the assessment of market power, such as the cost structure and the distribution and sales network of the undertakings on the market. Furthermore, Ficora’s assessment of the degree of market power of the undertakings in the markets did not take appropriately into account the existence of regulatory remedies and their impact on the perceived level of competition in the market, thereby considerably undermining its conclusions. In particular, Ficora’s claims that barriers to entry into these markets were low and that there were several undertakings providing international telephone services, and the resulting conclusion of a lack of SMP relied on existing regulation, such as carrier selection, carrier-pre-selection and the obligation to interconnect. The Commission pointed out that a key principle of market analysis was to assess whether effective competition was or was not entirely or primarily a result of regulation in place, and whether the status of competition in the defined market was likely to be different in the absence of such regulation.
303. V primeru FI/2004/0082[205], ki zadeva trg za dostop in izvor klica v javnih mobilnih telefonskih omrežjih na Finskem, je Komisija sklenila, da je osnutku ukrepa, ki ga je prijavila Ficora, manjkalo dokazov v podporo sklepu, da ima družba TeliaSonera precejšnjo tržno moč na finskem trgu za dostop in izvor klica v javnih mobilnih telefonskih omrežjih. Čeprav je tržni delež družbe TeliaSonera presegal 60 %, sta bila na strani ponudbe še dva operaterja mobilnega omrežja, na strani povpraševanja na trgu pa poleg operaterjev omrežij več kot deset ponudnikov storitev. Ponudniki storitev so lahko sklepali veleprodajne pogodbe, vključno s pogodbami o operaterjih mobilnih virtualnih omrežij, na komercialni podlagi – brez kakršne koli regulativne obveznosti za operaterje mobilnih omrežij za zagotovitev dostopa – z vsemi operaterji mobilnih omrežij na upoštevnem trgu. Komisija je ugotovila, da so poleg očitne dinamike, ki je posledica maloprodajnega trga (v spodnjem delu verige vrednosti), operaterji mobilnih omrežij tekmovali in lahko sklepali pogodbe z različnimi ponudniki storitev zaradi svoje zmožnosti nudenja prožnih ponudb ali vrst storitev, ki jih drugi operaterji mobilnih omrežij niso ponujali. Poleg tega Ficora ni predložila prepričljivih dokazov, da bi stroški spremembe dobavitelja precej ovirali zmožnost ponudnika storitev, da zamenja svojega veletrgovca.	303. In case FI/2004/0082[205], concerning the market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks in Finland, the Commission concluded that the draft measure notified by Ficora lacked the evidence to support the conclusion that TeliaSonera had significant market power in the Finnish market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks. Although TeliaSonera had a market share in excess of 60%, there were two other mobile network operators on the supply side, and in addition to the network operators more than ten service providers on the demand side of the market. Service providers have been able to conclude wholesale agreements, including mobile virtual network operator agreements, on a commercial basis – without any regulatory obligation for mobile network operators to provide access – with all mobile network operators in the relevant market. The Commission found that in addition to the apparent dynamics resulting from the (downstream) retail market, mobile network operators were competing for and were able to conclude agreements with different service providers due to their ability to provide flexible offers or types of services that were not provided by other mobile network operators. Furthermore, Ficora did not provide convincing evidence that the switching costs would significantly hinder the ability of a service provider to change its wholesale provider.
304. V primeru AT/2004/0090[206] glede avstrijskega trga tranzitnih storitev v fiksnem javnem omrežju se Komisija ni strinjala s sklepom avstrijskega NRO, da so bili operaterji, ki opravljajo tranzitne storitve samim sebi, del trga tranzitnih storitev in da je bil zato tržni delež družbe Telekom Austria pod 50 % ter družba posledično ni imela ZTM. Avstrijski NRO predvsem ni v zadostni meri utemeljil svoje ugotovitve, da bi lahko operaterji omrežij, ki kupujejo tranzitne storitve, v odziv na spremembo cene nemudoma prešli na samooskrbo, saj je razvijanje omrežja povezano z visokimi naložbami ter precejšnjim načrtovanjem in časom. Poleg tega je Komisija ugotovila, da ni bilo predloženih zadostnih dokazov o zmožnosti in pripravljenosti teh operaterjev, da dejansko začnejo načrtno oskrbovati komercialni tranzitni trg, ter da je zato samooskrba izpadla iz okvira upoštevnega trga, tako da je družbi Telekom Austria ostal približno 90-odstotni tržni delež.	304. Finally, in case AT/2004/0090[206], concerning the Austrian market for transit services in the fixed public network, the Commission did not agree with the Austrian NRA’s conclusion that operators providing transit services for themselves were part of the transit market, and that therefore the market share of Telekom Austria was below 50% and consequently it did not have SMP. In particular, the Austrian NRA did not substantiate to a sufficient extent its finding that network operators purchasing transit services could promptly shift to self-provision in response to price change, in the light of the high investments and the substantial planning and time associated with network roll-out. Furthermore, the Commission found that insufficient evidence was provided as to the ability and willingness of these operators to begin actually supplying the commercial transit market on a systematic basis, and that therefore self-provision fell outside the scope of the relevant market, leaving Telekom Austria with a market share of about 90%.
3. PROMET	3. TRANSPORT
3.1 Zračni promet	3.1 Air transport
Pogajanja med EU in ZDA o odprtem letalskem prostoru	EU/US Open Aviation Area negotiations
305. Po sodnih primerih „Odprto nebo“ so se EU in ZDA začele pogajati o vzpostavitvi odprtega letalskega prostora med tema velikima trgovskima partnericama. Junija je bil ministrom EU za promet predložen izčrpen osnutek sporazuma, ki bi rešil več pravnih vprašanj in utrl pot v smeri popolne liberalizacije storitev zračnega prometa med EU in ZDA. Vendar pa je Svet menil, da je potreben nadaljnji napredek, predvsem v smislu dostopa evropskih prevoznikov na trg v Združenih državah Amerike. Cilj konkurenčnega dela osnutka sporazuma je doseči večje regulativno zbliževanje med predpisi in praksami EU in ZDA ter boljše sodelovanje med Komisijo in ameriškim Ministrstvom za promet ob obširnem upoštevanju načel, predvidenih v sporazumu ES in ZDA iz leta 1991 o sodelovanju na področju konkurence med Komisijo in Ministrstvom za pravosodje. Na junijskem srečanju na vrhu na Irskem se je od pogajalcev zahtevalo, naj nadaljujejo svoja prizadevanja v zvezi s tem pomembnim sporazumom, ki ne bo razširil priložnosti le za letalske družbe, temveč tudi za letališča, turizem, poslovne povezave in tovorni prevoz. V drugi polovici leta je prišlo do tehničnih stikov med Komisijo in ZDA.	305. Following the Open Skies court cases, the EU and the US entered into negotiations with a view to establishing an open aviation area between these two major trading partners. In June, a comprehensive draft agreement which would have resolved several legal issues and paved the way towards the full liberalisation of air services between the EU and the US was submitted to the Transport Ministers of the EU. However, the Council considered that further progress was needed particularly in terms of market access for European carriers in the United States. The competition part of the draft agreement aims at achieving greater regulatory convergence of EU and US rules and practices and better cooperation between the Commission and the US Department of Transportation (Dot), following largely the principles provided for in the 1991 EC/US competition cooperation agreement between the Commission and the Department of Justice. The EU-US Summit in June in Ireland asked the negotiators to continue their efforts on this important agreement that will expand opportunities not only for airlines, but also for airports, tourism, business links and cargo transport. Technical contacts took place between the Commission and its US counterparts during the second half of the year.
3.2 Železniški promet	3.2 Railways
306. Komisija je 3. marca predstavila predloge za tretji železniški sveženj, vključno z ukrepi za odprtje trga čezmejnih potniških storitev, ki bo veljal od leta 2010. Vključeval bi pravico železniškega prevoznika, da pobere in odloži potnike na kateri koli postaji vzdolž smeri proge, vključno med postajami, ki so v isti državi članici (kabotaža). Medtem ko bi bilo državi članici dovoljeno omejiti to pravico do dostopa za porekla in namembne kraje, ki jih že zajema javno naročilo za storitve, bi bila ta omejitev strogo sorazmerna potrebi po ohranjanju gospodarskega ravnotežja pogodbeno sklenjene storitve. Od leta 2010 bo odpravljen tudi koncept „mednarodnega združenja“. Parlament je 23. novembra obravnaval ta sveženj. Konec leta je prišlo na vrsto njegovo prvo plenarno branje.	306. On 3 March, the Commission tabled proposals for a third railway package, including measures to open up the market for cross-border passenger services with effect from 2010. This would include the right for a train operator to pick up and set down passengers at any station along the line of route, including between stations located in the same Member State (cabotage). While a Member State would be permitted to limit this right of access for origins and destinations already covered by a public service contract, this limitation would have to be strictly proportionate to the need to maintain the economic equilibrium of the contracted service. Also with effect from 2010, the concept of "international grouping" would be abolished. The package was considered by Parliament on 23 November. At the end of the year, it was awaiting its first reading in plenary.
307. Drugi železniški sveženj je bil po uskladitvi dokončno sprejet 29. aprila. Glavna ovira je bilo odprtje trga storitev tovornega železniškega prometa. Dogovorjeno je bilo, da bodo vsi trgi železniškega tovornega prometa v EU, vključno s kabotažo, v celoti odprti najpozneje 1. januarja 2007.	307. On 29 April, the second railway package was finally adopted following conciliation. The main stumbling block was market opening for rail freight transport services. It was agreed that all EU rail freight markets, including cabotage, would be fully open by no later than 1 January 2007.
4. FINANčNE STORITVE	4. FINANCIAL SERVICES
308. Oblikovanje integriranega trga in učinkovitega evropskega trga finančnih storitev je pomemben in ambiciozno zastavljen cilj, ki se uresničuje v okviru lizbonskega procesa in prek akcijskega načrta za finančne storitve. Politiki konkurence in notranjega trga sta dopolnilni orodji za dosego tega cilja. GD za konkurenco je bil še posebej dejaven pri pospeševanju liberalizacije in pravega delovanja trgov vrednostnih papirjev, vključno s poslovanjem, obračunom in poravnavo.	308. The creation of an integrated and efficient European market for financial services is an important and ambitious objective pursued in the Lisbon process and through the Financial Services Action Plan. Competition and internal market policies are complementary tools for achieving this aim. In particular, DG Competition has been active in promoting the liberalisation and proper functioning of securities markets, including trading, clearing and settlement.
309. Brez izboljšav bo razlika med donosi vlagateljev in stroški financiranja za izdajatelje višja, kot bi bilo treba. Okrepitev in zagovarjanje konkurence ima zato koristne učinke, kot je boljše dodeljevanje finančnih sredstev v korist vlagateljev in širše javnosti, saj donosnost naložb na primer vpliva na znesek pokojnin.	309. Without improvements, the margin between investors' returns and the cost of finance for issuers will be higher than it need be. Competition enforcement and advocacy therefore have beneficial effects such as better allocation of financial resources to the benefit both of investors and of the public at large, as the return on investments influences, for example, the amount of pensions.
310. Strošek obdelave poslov z vrednostnimi papirji je v EU precej višji kot v ZDA. Izračunano je bilo, da znaša strošek ureditve transakcije z navadnimi delnicami v ZDA 0,10 EUR, medtem ko lahko strošek ureditve standardnega čezmejnega posla v Evropi 35 EUR ali več. Od leta 2001 so skupine visokih predstavnikov in strokovne skupine, kot sta Lamfalussyeva skupina modrih mož in Giovanninijeva skupina, ugotovile, da so čezmejni obračun in poravnava, predvsem pa zadeve, povezane z dostopom in določanjem cen, glavni vir neučinkovitosti za primerno delovanje evropskih trgov vrednostnih papirjev. Prva odločba na tem področju je bila sprejeta 2. junija v primeru Clearstream (navedenem v zgornjem oddelku I.B.1).	310. The cost of processing securities trades in the EU is substantially higher than in the US. In the US, the cost of settling an equity transaction has been calculated at EUR 0.10, while the cost of settling a standard cross-border trade in Europe can be EUR 35 or more. Since 2001 high-level groups and expert groups, such as the Lamfalussy group of wise men and the Giovannini group, have identified cross-border clearing and settlement, and in particular issues related to access and pricing, as the main source of inefficiencies for the proper functioning of European securities markets. The first decision in this area was adopted on 2 June in the Clearstream case (referred to above in section I.B.1).
311. Komisija je objavila študijo z naslovom „Pregled veljavnih ureditev na področju poslovanja z vrednostnimi papirji, obračuna in poravnave v EU 25“. Študija opisuje infrastrukture in ureditve po posameznih državah ter na vseevropski ravni, kjer obstajajo. Ta študija je potrdila, da so po vsej Evropi široko razširjene izključne ureditve – kjer je treba posle pri določeni izmenjavi obračunati in poravnati pri vnaprej določenih družbah. Ugotovitve študije so bile razširjene za javne komentarje in obravnavane z nacionalnimi organi.	311. The Commission published a study entitled “An overview of current arrangements in securities trading, clearing and settlement in EU 25”. The study describes the infrastructures and arrangements in place in each country as well as at pan-European level, where such exists. This study confirmed that exclusive arrangements - whereby trades in a given exchange must be cleared and settled in pre-determined companies - are widespread throughout the EU. The findings of the study have been disseminated for public comment and were discussed with national authorities.
312. Nadaljuje se delo z GD za notranji trg glede plačilnih sistemov in trgov vrednostnih papirjev.	312. Work is proceeding with DG Internal Market on payment systems as well as on securities markets.
B - DRUGI SEKTORJI	B - OTHER SECTORS
1. SVOBODNI POKLICI	1. LIBERAL PROFESSIONS
Uvod	Introduction
313. Svobodni poklici so tisti poklici, ki zahtevajo posebno usposabljanje na področju svobodnih umetnosti ali znanosti. Za ta sektor je po navadi značilna visoka raven regulacije v obliki državne regulacije ali samoregulacije poklicnih organov. Delo Komisije je bilo doslej usmerjeno v omejeno število poklicev, kot so odvetniki, notarji, računovodje, arhitekti, inženirji in farmacevti.	313. Liberal professions are occupations requiring special training in the liberal arts or sciences. This sector is usually characterised by a high level of regulation, in the form of either state regulation or self-regulation by professional bodies. The work of the Commission so far has concentrated on a limited number of professions, namely lawyers, notaries, accountants, architects, engineers and pharmacists.
314. Poklicne storitve, kar v tem smislu pomeni storitve, ki jih ponujajo svobodni poklici, imajo pomembno vlogo pri izboljševanju konkurenčnosti evropskega gospodarstva. So vložki za gospodarstvo in poslovanje, njihova kakovost in konkurenčnost pa imata precejšnje učinke prelivanja. Italijanski protimonopolni organ je ocenil, da v Italiji v povprečju 6 % stroškov izvoznih podjetij odpade na poklicne storitve. Tako bi lahko večja raznolikost in kakovost ter večja inovativnost poklicnih storitev precej izboljšale konkurenčnost evropskih podjetij in pospešile rast BDP v EU. Zaradi teh razlogov je treba posodobitev poklicnih storitev obravnavati kot del lizbonske agende.	314. Professional services, meaning in this context services provided by liberal professions, have an important role to play in improving the competitiveness of the European economy. They are inputs for the economy and business, and their quality and competitiveness have substantial spillover effects. The Italian Antitrust Authority has estimated that in Italy 6% of exporting firms' costs on average are due to professional services. Thus, greater variety in prices and quality, as well as greater innovation in professional services could go a long way to improve the competitiveness of European enterprises and foster GDP growth in the EU. For these reasons the modernization of professional services should be seen as part of the Lisbon agenda.
315. Poklicne storitve so pomembne tudi zaradi svojega neposrednega učinka na uporabnike. V predvidljivi prihodnosti bo konkurenca med poklicnimi storitvami še naprej obstajala predvsem na lokalni ravni. Večja izbira razpoložljivih storitev in cen omogoča uporabnikom, da izberejo kombinacijo cene in kakovosti, ki najbolje ustreza njihovim potrebam.	315. Professional services are also important because of their direct impact on consumers. For the foreseeable future, competition for professional services will continue to take place mainly at local level. Greater choice of services available and prices empowers users to choose the combination of price and quality which best suits their needs.
Poročilo Komisije o konkurenci na področju poklicnih storitev	Commission report on competition in professional services
316. Komisija je 9. februarja sprejela poročilo o konkurenci na področju poklicnih storitev[207]. Glavni namen tega poročila je podrobno razložiti mnenje Komisije o obsegu za preoblikovanje in posodobitev posebnih poklicnih pravil.	316. On 9 February, the Commission adopted a report on competition in professional services[207]. The main purpose of this report is to set out the Commission’s thinking on the scope for reforming or modernising specific professional rules.
317. V njem je opredeljenih pet glavnih kategorij potencialno omejevalne ureditve pri poklicih v EU: (i) določanje cen, (ii) priporočene cene, (iii) predpisi o oglaševanju, (iv) zahteve za vstop in rezervirane pravice ter (v) predpisi, ki urejajo strukturo poslovanja in multidisciplinarne prakse.	317. In this report the five main categories of potentially restrictive regulation in the EU professions are identified: (i) price fixing, (ii) recommended prices, (iii) advertising regulations, (iv) entry requirements and reserved rights, and (v) regulations governing business structure and multidisciplinary practices.
318. Poročilo po eni strani ugotavlja, da pomembne empirične raziskave kažejo negativne učinke, ki jih lahko imajo na uporabnike pretirani ali zastareli omejevalni predpisi. Takšni predpisi zares lahko odpravijo ali omejijo konkurenco med ponudniki storitev in tako zmanjšajo spodbude strokovnjakom, da delajo stroškovno učinkovito po nizkih cenah, povečujejo kakovost in ponujajo inovativne storitve.	318. On the one hand, the report concludes that a significant body of empirical research shows the negative effects that excessive or outdated restrictive regulations may have for consumers. Indeed, such regulations may eliminate or limit competition between service providers and thus reduce the incentives for professionals to work cost-efficiently, at lower prices, to increase quality or to offer innovative services.
319. Po drugi strani pa poročilo ugotavlja, da pravzaprav obstajajo trije razlogi, zakaj je morebiti treba v določeni meri urediti poklicne storitve: prvič, nesorazmerje informacij med uporabniki in ponudniki storitev: za poklicne storitve je značilno, da so zanje potrebni strokovnjaki z visoko ravnijo strokovnega znanja, ki ga uporabniki morda nimajo; drugič, zunanji vplivi, ker te storitve lahko učinkujejo na tretje stranke; in tretjič, za določene poklicne storitve velja, da proizvajajo „javne dobrine“, ki so dragocene za družbo na splošno. Po mnenju zagovornikov omejevalnih ureditev so takšne ureditve namenjene ohranjanju kakovosti poklicnih storitev in varstvu uporabnikov pred malomarnim opravljanjem poklicne dolžnosti.	319. On the other hand, the report acknowledges that there are essentially three reasons why some regulation of professional services may be necessary: first, asymmetry of information between customers and service providers: a defining feature of professional services is that they require practitioners to display a high level of technical knowledge which consumers may not have; second, externalities, as these services might have an impact on third parties; and third, certain professional services are deemed to produce ‘public goods’ that are of value for society in general. Proponents of restrictive regulations argue, therefore, that such regulations are designed to maintain the quality of professional services and to protect consumers from malpractice.
320. Komisija sicer priznava, da je določena mera regulacije v tem sektorju upravičena, vendar meni, da je v nekaterih primerih namesto določenih tradicionalnih omejevalnih pravil mogoče in treba uporabiti bolj v konkurenco usmerjene mehanizme.	320. While the Commission acknowledges that some regulation in this sector is justified, it believes that in some cases more procompetitive mechanisms can and should be used instead of certain traditional restrictive rules.
321. Glede uporabe pravil konkurence EU poročilo razlikuje med potencialno odgovornostjo poklicnih organov in odgovornostjo držav članic.	321. As far as the application of EU competition rules is concerned, the report distinguishes between the potential liability of professional bodies and that of the Member States.
322. Kadar poklicni organ ureja gospodarsko vedenje svojih članov, so predpisi, ki jih sprejme, sklepi podjetniških združenj v smislu člena 81 ES. Vendar pa predpisi, ki so objektivno potrebni za zagotovitev ustreznega izvajanja poklica, kakor je organiziran v zadevni državi članici, niso zajeti v obsegu prepovedi, ki jo vsebuje navedeni člen[208].	322. When a professional body regulates the economic behaviour of its members, the regulations it adopts are decisions of associations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC. However, regulations which are objectively necessary to guarantee the proper practice of the profession, as organised in the Member State concerned, fall outside the scope of the prohibition contained in that article[208].
323. Državna regulacija, ki narekuje ali podpira protikonkurenčno vedenje oziroma krepi njegove učinke, krši člene 3(1)(g), 10(2) in 81 ES. Kadar država prenese pristojnost oblikovanja politike na poklicno združenje brez zadostnih zaščitnih ukrepov – to je brez jasne navedbe ciljev javnega interesa, ki jih je treba upošteva, brez zadržanja pristojnosti za sprejemanje odločitev kot zadnjega sredstva in brez izvajanja nadzora – lahko država članica velja za odgovorno za kakršno koli posledično kršitev.	323. State regulation which imposes or favours anticompetitive conduct or reinforces its effects, infringes Articles 3(1)(g), 10(2) and 81 EC. Where a State delegates its policy-making power to a professional association without sufficient safeguards - that is, without clearly indicating the public interest objectives to be respected, without retaining the power to take the decisions of last resort and without monitoring implementation - the Member State can also be held liable for any resulting infringement.
324. Po mnenju Komisije je treba pri celotnem nadzoru poklicnega predpisa uporabiti preizkus sorazmernosti. Pravila morajo biti objektivno potrebna za dosego jasno oblikovanega in legitimnega cilja javnega interesa, poleg tega pa morajo biti mehanizem, ki čim manj ovira konkurenco pri dosegi tega cilja. Takšna pravila morajo služiti interesom uporabnikov in strokovnjakov.	324. Ultimately, in the Commission’s view, in all scrutiny of professional regulation a proportionality test should be applied. Rules must be objectively necessary to attain a clearly articulated and legitimate public interest objective and they must be the mechanism least restrictive of competition to achieve that objective. Such rules serve the interests of users and professionals alike.
325. Poročilo Komisije vabi vse vpletene, da si skupaj prizadevajo za preoblikovanje ali odstranitev tistih pravil, ki so neutemeljena. Regulativni organi v državah članicah in poklicni organi so vabljeni k pregledu obstoječih pravil ob premisleku, ali so ta pravila potrebna za javni interes, ali so sorazmerna in ali so utemeljena. Poročilo tudi poudarja potrebo po uvedbi mehanizmov, ki podpirajo konkurenco in vodijo k večji preglednosti, da bi okrepili pooblaščenost uporabnika.	325. The Commission's report invites all involved to make a joint effort to reform or eliminate those rules which are unjustified. Regulatory authorities in the Member States and professional bodies are invited to review existing rules taking into consideration whether those rules are necessary for the public interest, whether they are proportionate and whether they are justified. The report also highlights the need to put in place mechanisms which are procompetitive and lead to greater transparency in order to strengthen consumer empowerment.
326. Z vidika izvrševanja je jasno, da so imeli od maja nacionalni organi za konkurenco in nacionalna sodišča vidnejšo vlogo pri oceni zakonitosti pravil in predpisov pri poklicih. Če imajo omejitve konkurence svoje težišče predvsem v eni državi članici, bo upravno izvrševanje pravil konkurence EU v svobodnih poklicih naloga ustreznega nacionalnega organa za konkurenco. Kjer bo primerno, pa bo Komisija še naprej opravljala svoje delo po posameznih primerih. Skladna uporaba členov 81 in 82 bo zagotovljena s koordinacijo organov za konkurenco v Evropski mreži za konkurenco.	326. From an enforcement perspective it is clear that, since May, national competition authorities and national courts have had a more prominent role to play in assessing the legality of rules and regulations in the professions. To the extent that competition restrictions have their centre of gravity in one Member State, administrative enforcement of the EU competition rules in the liberal professions will then mainly be the task of the relevant national competition authority. The Commission will, however, also continue to carry out casework where appropriate. Coherent application of Articles 81 and 82 will be ensured through coordination in the European Competition Network of competition authorities.
Pot naprej: zagovarjanje konkurence	The way forward: competition advocacy
327. Po navedbah v poročilu je Komisija povabila evropske poklicne organe odvetnikov, notarjev, računovodij, davčnih svetovalcev, arhitektov in farmacevtov na dvostranske sestanke, da bi razpravljali o utemeljenosti obstoječih poklicnih pravil. Ti sestanki Komisiji pomagajo razčistiti, katere omejitve se zdijo pretirane in bi jih bilo treba odstraniti ali utemeljiti. Evropskim poklicnim organom zagotavljajo priložnost, da razložijo, kako razumejo cilje javnega interesa na svojem področju, in da se s Komisijo dogovorijo o bolj v konkurenco usmerjenih mehanizmih za dosego navedenih ciljev. Evropski poklicni organi bi potem morali prenesti pomisleke Komisije zadevnim nacionalnim poklicnim organizacijam.	327. Following the indications in the report, the Commission has invited the European professional bodies of lawyers, notaries, accountants, tax consultants, architects, and pharmacists to bilateral meetings to discuss the justification for the existing professional rules. These meetings enable the Commission to clarify which restrictions appear to be excessive and might need to be eliminated or justified. They provide an opportunity for the European professional bodies to explain their understanding of the public interest objectives in their domain and to come to an agreement with the Commission on more procompetitive mechanisms to achieve those objectives. The European professional bodies should then relay the Commission’s concerns to the relevant national professional organisations.
328. Na splošno se je GD za konkurenco lotil tudi procesa širjenja, tako da je pustil odprta vrata poklicnim organizacijam, ki želijo razpravljati neposredno s službami Komisije. Nacionalni organi za konkurenco so spodbujeni, da naj storijo enako, zlasti kadar sestanke zahtevajo nacionalne organizacije.	328. More generally, DG Competition has also embarked on a dissemination process by keeping an open door for professional organisations that want to discuss directly with the Commission's departments. National competition authorities are encouraged to do the same, in particular when those requesting meetings are national organisations.
329. Izkušnje iz preteklih prizadevanj za posodobitev na področju poklicnih storitev v nekaterih državah članicah kažejo, da preprosta odprava protikonkurenčnih mehanizmov morda ne bo zadoščala za dosego večje konkurence v tem sektorju. Posledično sta se GD za konkurenco in GD za zdravje in varstvo potrošnikov povezala z organizacijami potrošnikov, da bi pridobila njihova mnenja glede omejitev, ki jih je določila Komisija, ter načinov, na katere bi lahko poklice najbolje organizirali in upoštevali potrebe potrošnikov.	329. Experience of past modernisation efforts in the field of professional services in some Member States shows that a simple elimination of anticompetitive mechanisms may not be enough to bring about more competition in this sector. Consequently DG Competition and DG Health and Consumer Protection have liaised with consumer organisations to obtain their views on the restrictions the Commission has identified and on the ways the professions might best be organised and take account of consumers' interests.
330. Strinjali so se, da obstaja potreba po v konkurenco usmerjenih spremljevalnih mehanizmih, ki povečujejo preglednost in pooblaščenost uporabnika. Takšni mehanizmi bi na primer lahko vključevali dejavno spremljanje s strani združenj potrošnikov, zbiranje in objavljanje na raziskavi temelječih zgodovinskih podatkov s strani neodvisnih organizacija ali javne objave opustitve tarif.	330. It has been agreed that there is a need for procompetitive accompanying mechanisms which increase transparency and enhance consumer empowerment. Such mechanisms could include, for instance, active monitoring by consumer associations, collection and publication of survey-based historical data by independent organisations or public announcements of the abolition of tariffs.
331. Poročilo Komisije je sprožilo razpravo v različnih državah članicah in nekatere poklicne organe že pripeljalo do ponovnega premisleka o obstoječih ureditvenih režimih in izboljšanja informacij za uporabnike.	331. The Commission's report has raised the debate in various Member States and has already led some professional bodies to reconsider existing regulatory arrangements and improve information to users.
332. V nekaterih državah članicah se nekoliko premika tudi na zakonodajnem področju. Komisija si je prizadevala regulativnim organom v državah članicah na široko razširiti sporočilo poročila o konkurenci pri poklicnih storitvah. Ti organi so bili povabljeni na sestanek Podskupine Evropske mreže za konkurenco za svobodne poklice, ki je bil 14. oktobra. Na sestanku so bolj poglobljeno razpravljali o značilnostih povpraševanja na trgih poklicnih storitev in o tem, kako oceniti javni interes.	332. In some Member States there is also some movement in the legislative field. The Commission has tried to disseminate widely the message of the report on competition in professional services to the regulatory authorities in the Member States. The latter were invited to a meeting of the European Competition Network Subgroup on Liberal Professions on 14 October. The meeting discussed in greater depth the characteristics of demand in the markets for professional services and how to assess the public interest.
333. Ta razvoj dogodkov zadeva tudi nove države članice. Nacionalni organi za konkurenco nekaterih od teh držav so bili v tem sektorju še posebej dejavni. Komisija je tudi iskanje dejstev glede pravil in predpisov, ki zadevajo svobodne poklice, razširila tudi na nove države članice[209].	333. These developments concern the new Member States as well. The national competition authorities of some of these have been particularly active in this sector. The Commission has also extended the fact-finding concerning the rules and regulations affecting liberal professions to the new Member States[209].
334. Komisija bo leta 2005 poročala o napredku pri odpravljanju omejevalnih in neutemeljenih pravil.	334. The Commission will report in 2005 on progress in eliminating restrictive and unjustified rules.
IV – Nadzor državnih pomoči	IV – State aid control
A – Zakonodajna in razlagalna pravila	A – Legislative and interpretative rules
1. UREDBE, SMERNICE IN SPOROčILA	1. REGULATIONS, GUIDELINES AND COMMUNICATIONS
335. Reforma nadzora državnih pomoči se je nadaljevala, da bi občutno racionalizirala načine dela in pospešila postopke odločanja.	335. The reform of state aid control continued, with a view to significantly streamlining working methods and accelerating decision-making procedures.
336. Namen te reforme je s spodbujanjem večjega dialoga in izmenjave informacij izboljšati sodelovanje z državami članicami. Njen cilj je ozaveščati nacionalne, regionalne in lokalne organe ter nacionalne sodne oblasti o vprašanjih državnih pomoči. Hkrati so se povečala prizadevanja za umestitev nadzora državnih pomoči v širši okvir politik Skupnosti, zlasti v lizbonsko agendo.	336. The reform is geared to improving cooperation with Member States by encouraging greater dialogue and exchange of information. It aims to raise awareness of state aid issues in national, regional and local authorities and national judiciaries. At the same time, efforts to situate state aid control in the broad context of Community policies, in particular the Lisbon agenda, have been increased.
337. Proces reforme bi moral pripeljati do enostavnih, predvidljivih in preglednih postopkov ter gospodarsko primernih in pravno trdnih meril za oceno ukrepov državnih pomoči. To bi moralo olajšati nadzor državnih pomoči po širitvi in Komisiji omogočiti, da se spopade s pričakovanim večjim porastom ukrepov državnih pomoči v razširjeni Uniji. Zakonodajni ukrepi, ki so bili leta 2004 za to sprejeti ali pripravljeni, so predstavljeni spodaj.	337. The reform process should result in light, predictable and transparent procedures and economically sound and legally robust criteria for the assessment of state aid measures. This should make state aid control after enlargement easier and enable the Commission to cope with the expected substantial increase in state aid measures in an enlarged Union. The legislative measures adopted or prepared in 2004 for this purpose are presented below.
1.1. Postopkovna pravila	1.1. Procedural rules
338. Komisija je 21. aprila sprejela sklop pravil, ki izvajajo in pojasnjujejo Uredbo (ES) št. 659/99[210] (postopkovna uredba) o določitvi postopka, ki ga je treba uporabiti v primeru državnih pomoči. Na podlagi člena 27 postopkovne uredbe Uredba (ES) št. 794/2004[211] (izvedbena uredba) obravnava obliko in vsebino obvestil in letnih poročil ter druge podrobnosti, kot so roki in izračuni rokov ter določitev obrestnih mer za vračilo nezakonito dodeljene pomoči.	338. On 21 April, the Commission adopted a set of rules implementing and clarifying Regulation (EC) No 659/99[210] (the procedural Regulation), which sets out the procedure to be followed in state aid cases. Based on Article 27 of the procedural Regulation, Regulation (EC) No 794/2004[211] (the implementing Regulation) concerns the form and content of notifications and annual reports, as well as other details such as time limits and their calculation and the establishment of the interest rate for the recovery of unlawfully granted aid.
339. Ključni cilj nove izvedbene uredbe je racionalizirati in poenostaviti postopke za države članice glede priglasitve in poročanja ter hkrati povečati preglednost in pravno varnost. Z izčrpnimi obrazci za priglasitev države članice prejmejo jasna navodila o vrsti informacij, ki jih Komisija potrebuje, da lahko pravilno oceni različne ukrepe pomoči. Standardni obrazec se mora uporabiti v letnih poročilih, ki jih predložijo države članice. Te izboljšave bi morale pospešiti ocenjevanje in postopek pregleda, saj bi državam članicam omogočile, da se izognejo dodatnim zahtevam po informacijah med postopki državnih pomoči.	339. The key objective of the new implementing Regulation is to streamline and simplify the procedures for notification and reporting by Member States while enhancing transparency and legal certainty. Through comprehensive notification forms, Member States are given clearer indications as to the type of information the Commission needs in order properly to assess the different aid measures. A standardised format must be used for annual reports to be submitted by the Member States. These improvements should accelerate the assessment and review process, since they will help avoid supplementary requests for information to the Member State in the course of state aid procedures.
340. Nov obvezni obrazec za priglasitev izboljšuje učinkovitost ocene načrtovanih ukrepov državnih pomoči, ki jo opravi Komisija. Obrazec vsebuje sklop vprašanj o obstoječih okvirih in smernicah o državnih pomočeh.	340. A new compulsory notification form improves the efficiency of the Commission’s assessment of planned state aid measures. The form contains a set of questions drafted along the lines of existing state aid frameworks and guidelines.
341. Ti obrazci za priglasitev so v prilogah I in II k izvedbeni uredbi ter so sestavljeni iz:	341. These notification forms are contained in Annexes I and II to the implementing Regulation and consist of:
- splošnega dela, ki ga je treba izpolniti v vseh primerih;	- a general information part to be completed for every case;
- poenostavljenega obrazca za priglasitev sprememb obstoječih ukrepov pomoči, navedenih v členu 4(2) izvedbene uredbe[212]. Podatki na tem obrazcu Komisiji omogočajo, da obstoječo pomoč spremlja v skladu s členom 88(1) ES. Spremembe popolnoma formalne ali upravne narave in povečanje začetnega proračuna odobrenega programa pomoči do 20 % se ne štejejo kot sprememba obstoječe pomoči ter jih zato ni treba priglasiti;	- a simplified notification form for the notification of the changes to existing aid measures mentioned in Article 4(2) of the implementing Regulation[212]. The information provided on this form allows the Commission to monitor existing aid under Article 88(1) EC. Changes of a purely formal or administrative nature and increases in the original budget of an authorised aid scheme below 20% are not considered to be alterations to existing aid and therefore do not require notification;
- obrazcev za povzetek informacij, ki dajo državam članicam natančna pojasnila o informacijah, potrebnih pri prijavljanju načrtovanih ukrepov pomoči, ki so lahko predvideni v okvirih ali smernicah. Obrazci za povzetek informacij nikakor ne spreminjajo okvira ali smernic, ampak jih preoblikujejo v posebna vprašanja za lažjo obdelavo prijav.	- summary information sheets to give Member States precise indications on the information needed when notifying planned aid measures which might be covered by frameworks or guidelines. The summary information sheets do not alter frameworks or guidelines in any way, but only translate them into specific questions to facilitate handling of the notification.
342. Člen 3 izvedbene uredbe določa načine pošiljanja iz držav članic Komisiji in obratno. Generalni sekretariat je edina vstopna točka za začetne stike, medtem ko je za nadzor državnih pomoči skupaj pristojnih več generalnih direktoratov Komisije (generalni direktorati za konkurenco, promet, kmetijstvo in ribištvo), ter zagotavlja, da priglasitve prejme pristojni generalni direktorat. Ko to priglasitev prejme ustrezni generalni direktorat, se vsi poznejši dopisi izmenjujejo med državo članico priglasiteljico in generalnim direktorjem pristojnega generalnega direktorata.	342. Article 3 of the implementing Regulation specifies the mailing route from Member States to the Commission and vice versa. The Secretariat-General serves as a single entry point for initial contacts while state aid control is a shared responsibility of several Directorates-General in the Commission (DGs for competition, transport, agriculture and fisheries) and ensures that notifications are allocated to the competent DG. Once this allocation has been made, all further correspondence is exchanged between the notifying Member State and the Director-General of the competent DG.
343. Člen 3 prav tako uvaja pravila za pošiljanje priglasitev, da tako nadomesti določene pomanjkljivosti v preteklosti. Obvezno elektronsko pošiljanje priglasitev je predvideno od 1. januarja 2006. Ta sorazmerno oddaljeni datum je bil določen, da se državam članicam in Komisiji omogoči, da ustvarijo varne tehnične razmere za tako pošiljanje[213]. Za pošiljke pred navedenim datumom člen 3(5) določa, da je treba telefakse pošiljati na številko, ki jo določi stranka prejemnica, in da se datum telefaksa šteje kot datum priglasitve samo, če se podpisani izvirnik prejme najpozneje deset dni po tem datumu.	343. Article 3 also introduces rules for the transmission of notifications to remedy certain shortcomings of the past. Compulsory electronic transmission of notifications is provided for as of 1 January 2006. This relatively remote date has been set in order to allow both Member States and the Commission to create safe technical conditions for such transmission[213]. For transmissions prior to that date, Article 3(5) specifies that faxes should be sent to the number indicated by the receiving party and that the date of the fax is regarded as the notification date only if the original paper document is received within ten days of the fax communication.
344. Člen 5 določa, kako bi morala biti sestavljena letna poročila o obstoječih programih pomoči. Izvedbena uredba vsebuje posebne priloge za letna poročila na področjih kmetijstva in ribištva. Datum, do katerega morajo države članice poslati letna poročila, je bil podaljšan (do najpozneje 30. junija vsako leto), da se tako omogočita sestava poročila o državnih pomočeh (glej spodaj pod „Preglednost“) in jasna analiza položaja med zadevnimi zasedanji Evropskega sveta. Na nekaterih področjih, kot je davčna pomoč, je razpoložljivost natančnih številk odvisna od davčne napovedi prejemnika. Zato se ocene v utemeljenih primerih sprejmejo, če se natančne številke sporočijo najpozneje v naslednjem poročilu.	344. Article 5 provides how annual reports on existing aid schemes should be structured. The implementing Regulation contains specific annexes for annual reports in the areas of agriculture and fisheries. The date for transmission of annual reports by Member States has been advanced (to no later than 30 June each year) to allow the composition of the state aid scoreboard (see below under “Transparency”) and a meaningful analysis of the situation in time for the European Councils concerned. In some areas, such as fiscal aid, availability of exact figures depends on the recipient’s tax declaration. Therefore, estimates are accepted in justified cases provided that exact figures are communicated at the very latest in the following reporting exercise.
345. Člen 8 pojasnjuje pravila za izračun rokov[214]. Zahtevki za podaljšanje roka se ustrezno utemeljijo ter pošljejo v pisni obliki vsaj dva delovna dneva pred iztekom roka. Poslati jih je treba na naslov, ki ga določi stranka, ki je rok postavila.	345. Article 8 clarifies the rules for calculation of time limits[214]. Requests for extension of time limits must be duly substantiated and in writing and made at least two days before the original deadline expires. They must be sent to the address designated by the party setting the time limit.
346. Poglavje V izvedbene uredbe opredeljuje metodo določitve obrestnih mer in način uporabe obrestnih mer v primerih vračila pomoči. V zvezi z vračilom nezakonite pomoči člen 11 določa, da se uporabi obrestna mera na podlagi obrestnoobrestnega računa, s katero se zagotovi popolna nevtralizacija[215] finančnih ugodnosti, ki izhajajo iz nezakonito plačane pomoči. Izbrani pristop je usklajen z nedavnim sporočilom Komisije[216] na to temo. Obrestna mera se bo izračunala na podlagi medbančne menjalne obrestne mere in kadar v državi članici ni nobene take mere ali podobnega referenčnega instrumenta, bo Komisija veljavno mero določila v tesnem sodelovanju z zadevno državo članico. Ta možnost bo zlasti veljala za nove države članice.	346. Chapter V of the implementing Regulation lays down the method of fixing the interest rate and applying interest in recovery cases. As regards recovery of illegal aid, Article 11 provides that compound interest will be applied in order to ensure full neutralization[215] of the financial advantages resulting from unlawfully paid aid. The approach chosen is in line with a recent Commission communication[216] on the subject. The interest rate will be calculated on the basis of the interbank swap rate and where no such rate or similar reference instrument exists in a Member State, the Commission will fix the applicable rate in close cooperation with the Member State concerned. This possibility will be of relevance mainly for new Member States.
347. Medtem ko je za samo izvedbeno uredbo določeno, da se pregleda vsaka štiri leta, se bodo njene priloge nenehno spreminjale glede na vzporedni zakonodajni proces pregledovanja smernic in okvirov ali sprejemanja novih predpisov, ki veljajo za ukrepe državnih pomoči v določenih sektorjih.	347. While the implementing Regulation itself is set for review within four years, its annexes will be continually amended in line with the parallel legislative process of reviewing guidelines and frameworks or adopting new regulations applicable to state aid measures in particular sectors.
348. Opozoriti je treba, da ta uredba velja tudi za kmetijstvo. Da bi lahko države članice lažje uporabljale obrazce za priglasitev in jih lažje pošiljale Komisiji, so obrazci v zvezi s kmetijstvom objavljeni na naslednjem naslovu: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/stateaid/forms/index_fr.htm. Uredba prav tako uvaja novo, poenostavljeno obliko letnih poročil o državni pomoči v kmetijstvu. Oblika je na voljo tudi na zgornjem naslovu.	348. It should be noted that this Regulation applies as well to the agricultural sector. To facilitate the use by Member States of the notification forms and their transmission to the Commission, the forms relating to the agricultural sector are published at the following address:http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/stateaid/forms/index_fr.htm.The Regulation also introduces a new, simplified format for the annual reports on state aid in agriculture. The format is also available at the above-mentioned address.
1.2. Raziskave in razvoj	1.2. Research and development
349. Komisija je 25. februarja sprejela Uredbo (ES) št. 364/2004 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 70/2001 glede povečanja področja uporabe skupinske izjeme za majhna in srednje velika podjetja, da se vključi pomoč za raziskave in razvoj[217].	349. On 25 February, the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 364/2004 which amends Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 to extend the scope of the block exemption for SMEs to include aid for research and development[217].
350. Pomoč za raziskave in razvoj lahko prispeva h gospodarski rasti, saj krepi konkurenčnost in spodbuja zaposlovanje. Taka pomoč za majhna in srednje velika podjetja je izjemno pomembna, ker so ena strukturno pogojenih slabosti majhnih in srednje velikih podjetij prav težave pri dostopanju do novih dosežkov tehnološkega razvoja in do prenosa tehnologije.	350. Aid for research and development can contribute to economic growth, strengthening competitiveness and boosting employment. Such aid for SMEs is of the utmost importance, because one of the structural disadvantages of SMEs is that it is difficult for them to gain access to new technological developments and to technology transfer.
351. Komisija je domnevala, da bo okvir Skupnosti za državno pomoč za raziskave in razvoj[218] spodbudil majhna in srednja velika podjetja, da izvedejo več raziskav in razvoja, saj majhna in srednje velika podjetja na splošno namenijo dejavnostim v zvezi z raziskavami in razvojem le majhen odstotek svojega prihodka. Pri uporabi okvira se je Komisija odločila, da pomoč za raziskave in razvoj za majhna in srednje velika podjetja izvzame iz zahteve obvezne predhodne priglasitve.	351. The Commission assumed that the Community framework for state aid for research and development[218] would encourage SMEs to conduct more research and development, since in general they spend only a small percentage of their turnover on these activities. In the light of the framework's application, the Commission decided to exempt R&D aid for SMEs from prior notification.
352. Okvir še vedno velja za to vrsto državne pomoči, kar zadeva vprašanje, ali so določeni ukrepi državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) ES, in prag, pod katerim se lahko pomoč izvzame.	352. The framework still applies to this type of state aid as regards both the question whether certain measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC and the ceiling below which aid may be exempted.
353. Zaradi spodbujanja razširjanja rezultatov raziskav lahko majhna in srednje velika podjetja prejemajo pomoč za stroške pridobivanja in potrjevanja patentov ter drugih pravic industrijske lastnine, ki izhajajo iz raziskovalnih in razvojnih dejavnosti. Za izvzetje take pomoči ni nujno, da je bila pomoč odobrena tudi za raziskave, iz katere zadevna pravica izhaja: zadošča tudi, da gre za dejavnost, ki bi bila upravičena do pomoči za raziskave in razvoj. Pod določenimi pogoji je izvzeta tudi pomoč za študije tehnične izvedljivosti kot priprava na industrijske raziskave in predkonkurenčne razvojne stopnje.	353. To promote dissemination of research results, SMEs may receive state aid for the costs of obtaining and validating patents and other industrial property rights resulting from research and development activities. For such aid to be exempted, it is not necessary for the research which led to the rights actually to have been supported by state aid: it is sufficient that the activity would have qualified for research and development aid. Aid for technical feasibility studies preparatory to the industrial research and precompetitive development stages is also exempted under certain conditions.
354. Poleg tega Uredba št. 364/2004 uvaja v uredbo o skupinskih izjemah za majhna in srednje velika podjetja iste opredelitve pojmov „temeljnih“ raziskav, „industrijskih raziskav“ in „predkonkurenčnega razvoja“, kot so v pripadajočem okviru Skupnosti, ter opredelitev pojma majhnih in srednje velikih podjetij prilagaja priporočilu o MSP[219]. Prav tako vključuje določbe o intenzivnosti pomoči glede na to, ali območje, v katerem je majhno ali srednje veliko podjetje ustanovljeno, ali sektor, v katerem deluje, upravičen do regionalne pomoči ali ne.	354. Furthermore, Regulation No 364/2004 introduces into the SME block exemption regulation the same definitions for “fundamental” research, “industrial research” and “precompetitive development” as in the corresponding Community framework and aligns the definition of SME with the SME recommendation[219]. It also includes provisions on aid intensity depending on whether or not the region in which an SME is established or the sector in which it is active qualifies for regional aid.
355. Pomoč, ki ne izpolnjuje pogojev iz uredbe o skupinskih izjemah – vključno s prilagojenimi pragovi za velike individualne pomoči –, je treba priglasiti in bo ocenjena v skladu z okvirom Skupnosti za državno pomoč za raziskave in razvoj.	355. Aid which does not comply with the conditions of the block exemption Regulation – including the adapted thresholds for large individual aid grants - has to be notified and will be assessed according to the Community framework for state aid for research and development.
1.3. Pomoč za usposabljanje	1.3. Training aid
356. Komisija je prav tako 25. februarja sprejela spremembo[220] k Uredbi (ES) št. 68/2001[221] z uvedbo nove opredelitve pojma majhnih in srednje velikih podjetij, ki je navedena v priporočilu 2003/361 z dne 6. maja 2003[222] o opredelitvi pojma mikro, majhnih in srednje velikih podjetij. Nova opredelitev pojma velja od 1. januarja 2005.	356. Also on 25 February, the Commission adopted an amendment[220] to Regulation (EC) No 68/2001[221] introducing the new definition of SMEs contained in recommendation 2003/361 of 6 May 2003[222] concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The new definition applies as of 1 January 2005.
1.4. Reševanje in prestrukturiranje	1.4. Rescue and restructuring
357. Komisija je po temeljitem pregledu smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 1999[223] 7. julija sprejela nove smernice Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah[224], da bi tako podrobneje pregledala državno pomoč za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, kot je bilo to sprejeto v sklepih zasedanj Evropskega sveta v Stockholmu leta 2001 in Barceloni leta 2002, ki so zahtevali zmanjšanje skupnega zneska državne pomoči ter njeno preusmeritev v horizontalne cilje.	357. Following a thorough review of the 1999 rescue and restructuring guidelines[223], the Commission adopted on 7 July new Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty[224] aiming at a closer scrutiny of state aid for rescue and restructuring, as prompted by the conclusions of the European Councils of Stockholm in 2001 and Barcelona in 2002, which requested a reduction of the overall amount of state aid and its redirection towards horizontal objectives.
358. Izstop neučinkovitih podjetij je običajen del delovanja trga. Pravilo ne bi smelo biti, da podjetje, ki zaide v težave, reši država. Taka pomoč je med najbolj škodljivimi oblikami državne pomoči in je v preteklosti pripeljala do zelo spornih primerov državne pomoči. Zato bi splošno načelo prepovedi državnih pomoči, kot je določeno v Pogodbi, moralo ostati pravilo, odstopanje od pravila pa bi bilo treba omejiti.	358. The exit of inefficient firms is a normal part of the operation of the market. It should not be the norm that a company which gets into difficulties is rescued by the State. Such aid is among the most distortive forms of state aid and has given rise to highly controversial state aid cases in the past. Hence, the general principle of the prohibition of state aid as laid down in the Treaty should remain the rule, and derogation from the rule should be limited.
359. Nove smernice tako uvajajo nekako strožja pravila v zvezi s pomočjo za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, saj se ta vrsta obravnava kot najbolj kritična. Vendar se Komisija dobro zaveda socialnih posledic položajev, v katerih podjetja, po svoji lastni krivdi ali ne, zaidejo v težave, ki lahko pripeljejo do te vrste pomoči.[225]	359. The new guidelines therefore introduce somewhat stricter rules as regards rescue and restructuring aid, since this category is considered the most critical one. The Commission is well aware, though, of the social implications of situations where companies, whether through their own fault or not, get into difficulties which might result in this kind of aid.[225]
360. Načelo enkratnosti pomoči je bilo okrepljeno in obravnavana so bila vprašanja o okoliščinah, v katerih je treba pomoč, dodeljeno propadajočemu podjetju, upoštevati, kadar je podjetje v stečaju in ga je prevzelo drugo podjetje.	360. The "one time, last time" principle has been reinforced, and the question has been addressed of the circumstances in which aid granted to an ailing firm has to be taken into account when the company becomes bankrupt and is taken over by another company.
361. Na novo ustanovljeno podjetje ni upravičeno do pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, kot tako pa se pojmuje tri leta po začetku obratovanja na ustreznem področju dejavnosti.	361. A newly created company is not eligible for rescue and restructuring aid and is regarded as such for three years following the start of operations in the relevant field of activity.
362. V nasprotju s prejšnjimi smernicami, ki so strogo in nejasno[226] ločevale med pomočjo za reševanje in pomočjo za prestrukturiranje, nove smernice dovoljujejo pomoč za nujne strukturne ukrepe, ki jih je treba vključiti v znesek, da se podjetje obdrži v obratovanju v obdobju, za katerega je dodeljena pomoč za reševanje. Države članice imajo možnost, da se odločijo za poenostavljen postopek za odobritev pomoči za reševanje. Prehod s pomoči za reševanje na pomoč za prestrukturiranje je tako lažje določiti: ko je načrt za prestrukturiranje pripravljen in se izvaja, se bo vsa nadaljnja pomoč štela kot pomoč za prestrukturiranje.	362. Contrary to the previous guidelines, which made a strict and problematic[226] distinction between rescue aid and restructuring aid, the new guidelines allow aid for urgent structural measures to be included in the amount to keep the firm in business during the period for which rescue aid is granted. Member States are given the opportunity to opt for a simplified procedure for the approval of rescue aid. The passage from rescue to restructuring aid is thus easier to determine: once a restructuring plan has been established and is being implemented, all further aid will be considered restructuring aid.
363. Okrepljena in pojasnjena je bila zahteva po večjemu prispevku prejemnika k postopku prestrukturiranja. Dvojni namen tega lastnega prispevka je dokazati, da trgi verjamejo v izvedljivost obnovitve sposobnosti preživetja prestrukturiranega podjetja v razumnem času in zagotoviti, da je pomoč omejena na najnižji znesek, potreben za obnovitev sposobnosti preživetja, hkrati pa omejiti izkrivljanje konkurence. V ta namen bo Komisija prav tako zahtevala izravnalne ukrepe za zmanjšanje vplivov na tekmece.	363. The requirement of a substantial contribution to the restructuring process from the recipient has been reinforced and clarified. The two-fold purpose of this own contribution is to demonstrate that the markets believe in the feasibility of a return to viability of the restructuring company within a reasonable time and to guarantee that the aid is limited to the minimum required to restore viability, while limiting the distortion of competition. To this end the Commission will also request compensatory measures to minimise the effect on competitors.
364. Nove smernice Komisije o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah veljajo od 10. oktobra 2004 do 9. oktobra 2009.	364. The new Commission guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty are applicable from 10 October 2004 until 9 October 2009.
365. Prinašajo večje poenostavitve pravil, ki veljajo za kmetijstvo:	365. They entail significant simplifications as to the rules applicable to agriculture:
- v prihodnosti bodo pravila za pomoči za prestrukturiranje podjetij, ki predelujejo in tržijo kmetijske proizvode, enaka kot za druge sektorje. To bo državam članicam omogočilo, da imajo usklajene ureditve za prestrukturiranje majhnih in srednje velikih podjetij, ki delujejo v vseh sektorjih. Prejšnje načelo, da morajo celo manjša podjetja ponuditi protistoritev za prejem pomoči za prestrukturiranje, je opuščeno. Načelo enkratnosti pomoči se bo uporabljalo deset let namesto pet;	- In future, the rules on restructuring aid for companies processing and marketing agricultural products will be exactly the same as for other sectors. This will enable Member States to have consistent restructuring regimes for SMEs operating in all sectors. The earlier principle that even small enterprises have to offer a quid pro quo for receiving restructuring aid is abandoned. The one time, last time principle will apply for ten years instead of five.
- nekatera posebna pravila se ohranijo samo za kmete. Predvsem so vsa poenostavljena, da državam članicam v vseh primerih (in ne samo, kadar je prestrukturiranje omejeno na majhna kmetijska podjetja) omogočajo, da zmanjšujejo zmogljivosti na sektorski ravni in ne na ravni kmetije, ki prejema pomoč za prestrukturiranje;	- Some special rules are maintained only for farmers. They are first of all simplified by allowing Member States in all cases (and not only where restructuring is limited to small agricultural enterprises) to implement capacity reductions at sector level rather than at the level of the farm receiving restructuring aid.
- jasno je določeno, da se morajo zmogljivosti zapreti za stalno (in ne samo za pet let). Odprta kmetijska zemljišča se lahko vrnejo v proizvodnjo po 15 letih;	- It is made clear that capacity closures have to be permanent (and not only for five years). Open farmland may be brought back into production after 15 years.
- poenostavljene so minimalne zahteve za zaprtje zmogljivosti;	- Minimum capacity closure requirements are simplified.
- kadar pride do zaprtja zmogljivosti na sektorski ravni, je to treba doseči v enem letu od dodelitve pomoči. Država članica se mora za zagotovitev, da se zaprtja ne prepreči, zavezati, da bo dodelila pomoč za naložbe v povečanje zmogljivosti za pet let;	- Where capacity closure is done at sector level, this must be achieved within a year of granting the aid. To ensure that closure is not circumvented, the Member State must undertake not to grant investment aid for increasing capacities for five years.
- prag de minimis spodaj, za katerega ni potrebno nobeno zaprtje zmogljivosti, je poenostavljen in ponovno opredeljen. Dokler se pomoč za prestrukturiranje ne dodeli za več kot 12 % proizvodne zmogljivosti določenega sektorja v katerem koli zaporednem 12-mesečnem obdobju, ne bo zahtevano nobeno zaprtje zmogljivosti.	- The de minimis threshold below which no capacity closure is required is simplified and reformulated. As long as restructuring aid is not granted for more than 1% of the production capacity of a given sector over any consecutive 12-month period, no capacity closures will be required.
366. Priglasitve pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, zabeležene pred 10. oktobrom 2004, se bodo pregledale ob upoštevanju veljavnih meril med priglasitvijo. Vendar se bo združljivost pomoči, dodeljene brez dovoljenja Komisije, preučila na podlagi novih smernic, če se nekatere ali vse pomoči dodelijo po njihovi objavi v Uradnem listu , tj. po 1. oktobru 2004.	366. Notifications of rescue and restructuring aid registered prior to 10 October 2004 will be examined in the light of the criteria in force at the time of notification. However, the compatibility of aid granted without Commission authorisation will be examined on the basis of the new guidelines if some or all of the aid is granted after their publication in the Official Journal , i.e. 1 October 2004.
2. Ladjedelništvo	2. SHIPBUILDING
367. Komisija in korejska vlada sta zaradi izkrivljanja konkurence na svetovnem trgu 22. junija 2000 podpisali sporazum za obnovitev poštenih in preglednih konkurenčnih pogojev na navedenem trgu. Tega sporazuma pa korejska vlada ni pravilno izvajala. Leta 2002 je Svet sprejel začasni obrambni mehanizem[227] kot izjemen in začasen ukrep, Komisija pa se je odločila, da bo sprožila postopek reševanja sporov[228] ter zahtevala posvetovanja po pravilih Svetovne trgovinske organizacije. Posvetovanja niso dala nobene zadovoljive rešitve. Komisija je zato zahtevala, da organ za poravnavo sporov Svetovne trgovinske organizacije ustanovi odbor za nadzor nad nepoštenimi korejskimi ladjedelniškimi praksami. V tem času je Svet, ker naj bi začasni obrambni mehanizem prenehal veljati 31. marca 2004, mehanizem podaljšal do 31. marca 2005[229].	367. Following distortion of competition on the world market, the Commission and the Korean Government had signed an agreement on 22 June 2000 with the aim of restoring fair and transparent competitive conditions on that market. This agreement was not properly implemented by the Korean Government. In 2002, the Council adopted a temporary defensive mechanism (TDM)[227] as an exceptional and temporary measure, and the Commission decided to initiate dispute settlement proceedings[228] requesting consultations according to WTO rules. The consultations did not reach any satisfactory solution. The Community therefore requested the WTO dispute settlement body to set up a panel over the unfair Korean shipbuilding practices. In the meantime, since the TDM was about to expire on 31 March 2004, the Council extended the mechanism until 31 March 2005[229].
Sheme začasnih obrambnih mehanizmov	TDM schemes
368. Leta 2003 je pet držav članic (Nemčija, Danska, Nizozemska, Francija in Španija) sprejelo nacionalne programe pomoči na podlagi uredbe iz leta 2002 o začasnih obrambnih mehanizmih, ki jih je morala odobriti Komisija. Ti programi so prenehali veljati 31. marca. Komisija je leta 2004 v skladu s spremenjenimi začasnimi obrambnimi mehanizmi odobrila podaljšanje nizozemskega[230], francoskega[231] in španskega[232] programa do 31. marca 2005 ter novega programa, ki ga je pripravila Italija[233].	368. In 2003, five Member States (Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, France and Spain) had adopted national aid schemes based on the 2002 TDM Regulation, which were subjected to approval by the Commission. These schemes expired on 31 March. In 2004, the Commission approved under the amended TDM an extension of the Dutch[230], French[231] and Spanish[232] schemes until 31 March 2005, as well as a new scheme designed by Italy[233].
369. Programi predvidevajo neposredno pomoč za tekoče poslovanje do 60 % pogodbene vrednosti pred pomočjo za proizvodnjo zabojnikov, tankerjev za prevoz izdelkov, tankerjev za prevoz kemikalij in cistern za utekočinjen zemeljski plin. Če želijo ladjedelnice pridobiti to omejeno podporo, morajo dokončne ladjedelniške pogodbe skleniti do 31. marca 2005.	369. The schemes provide for direct operating aid to shipyards of up to 6% of the contract value before aid for the production of containers, product tankers, chemical tankers and liquefied natural gas carriers. To qualify for this limited support, shipyards must have concluded the final shipbuilding contracts by 31 March 2005.
3. Kmetijstvo: razvoj politik in zakonodajne pobude v letu 2004	3. AGRICULTURE: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES IN 2004
Uredba de minimis	De minimis Regulation
370. Komisija je 6. oktobra sprejela Uredbo (ES) št. 1860/2004 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za de minimis pomoči v kmetijskem in ribiškem sektorju[234]. Uredba izvzema nacionalno pomoč do 3 000 EUR na kmeta ali ribiča v triletnem obdobju iz zahteve glede predhodne priglasitve. Pobuda bo koristno orodje, ki bo pomagalo kmetom v težavah. Da bi se države članice, ki dodelijo tako pomoč, izognile izkrivljanju konkurence, bodo morale upoštevati skupno zgornjo mejo v triletnem obdobju, ki je približno enaka 0,3 % kmetijske ali ribiške proizvodnje. Države članice lahko odobrijo pomoč, ki izpolnjuje vse pogoje iz uredbe, ne da bi morale predhodno pridobiti soglasje Komisije. Vendar bodo morale voditi registre, s čimer bodo lahko dokazale, da sta bili upoštevani obe zgornji meji.	370. On 6 October, the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) N° 1860/2004 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid in the agriculture and fisheries sectors[234]. The Regulation exempts national aid of up to EUR 3 000 per farmer or fisherman over three years from the requirement of prior notification. The initiative will be a useful tool to help farmers in crisis. To avoid distortions of competition, Member States granting such aid will have to respect an overall ceiling over three years that is roughly equal to 0.3% of agricultural or fisheries output. Member States may grant aid fulfilling all the conditions of the Regulation without prior approval by the Commission. But they will have to keep registers to show both ceilings have been respected.
371. Če bi vse države članice v celoti izkoristile to možnost, bi to pripeljalo do povprečnega zneska pomoči de minimis v višini približno 317 milijonov EUR na leto za kmetijstvo in približno 27 milijonov EUR na leto za ribištvo za celotno območje EU. Da bi uredba državam članicam zagotovila večjo prožnost, določa zneske, ki jih je treba upoštevati v triletnem obdobju (in ne na leto). Zneske, ki jih vsaka država članica lahko odobri v triletnem obdobju, je izračunala Komisija in so določeni v prilogi. Triletna obdobja so prenosljiva, tako da bi bilo za vsako novo odobritev pomoči de minimis treba določiti skupni znesek take pomoči, odobrene v predhodnih treh letih.	371. If all Member States fully avail themselves of this possibility, this would amount to an average amount of de minimis aid of approximately EUR 317 million per year for agriculture and approximately EUR 27 million per year for fisheries, for the whole of the EU. To offer more flexibility to Member States, the Regulation sets out amounts to be respected over a period of three years (and not per year). The amounts that each Member State may grant per three-year period have been calculated by the Commission and are set out in an Annex. The three-year periods are mobile, so that for each new grant of de minimis aid, the total amount of such aid granted during the previous three years needs to be determined.
372. Države članice lahko pomoč de minimis odobrijo na kakršen koli način želijo. Vendar uredba določa nekaj omejitev, s katerimi se izogne izkrivljanju: odobriti se ne sme nobena izvozna pomoč; pomoč ne sme biti povezana s ceno ali količino proizvodov, danih na trg, niti ne sme biti odvisna od uporabe domačih proizvodov.	372. Member States may grant de minimis aid in any way they like. However, the Regulation sets out a few limitations in order to avoid distortions: no export aid may be granted; aid may not be linked to price or quantity of products put on the market, nor may it be made contingent upon the use of domestic products.
373. Nova uredba bo veljala od 1. januarja 2005 do konca leta 2008.	373. The new Regulation will apply from 1 January 2005 to the end of 2008.
374. Vendar je Komisija pred sprejetjem uredbe – in glede na znižani znesek pomoči na prejemnika, način odobritve in skupne stopnje odobrene pomoči – pristop de minimis v kmetijstvu že uporabila v naslednjih primerih:	374. However, before the adoption of the Regulation - and in view of the reduced amount of aid per recipient, the method of granting and the overall level of aid granted - the Commission already applied the de minimis approach to agriculture in the following cases:
- pomoč proizvajalcem mleka (Parmalat) – Francija[235]. Komisija je 14. julija sklenila, da je bila pomoč v višini okoli 200 000 EUR za približno 120 proizvajalcev mleka, ki še niso prejeli plačila za svoje dobave mleka podjetju Parmalat, de minimis in zato zanjo ni veljal člen 87(1) ES. Intenzivnost pomoči v nobenem primeru ni bila višja od 2 000 EUR na proizvajalca. Pomoč je bila odobrena z delnim prevzemom plačila obresti in kapitala za neodplačana posojila do 10 % anuitete in nikoli več kot 2 000 EUR na prejemnika;	- Aid for milk producers (Parmalat) - France[235]. On 14 July, the Commission decided that aid of some EUR 200 000 for approximately 120 milk producers that have not been paid for their deliveries to Parmalat was de minimis and therefore not covered by Article 87(1) EC. The aid intensity was in no case more than EUR 2 000 per producer. The aid was granted through partially taking over the interest and capital payments for outstanding loans, up to 10% of the annuity and never more than EUR 2 000 per recipient.
- nujne oskrbe za kmetijstvo (Parmalat) – Italija[236]. Komisija je 14. julija sklenila, da je bila pomoč v višini okoli 995 EUR na prejemnika (skupni znesek 1327 milijonov EUR na leto in skupaj 3,98 milijona EUR) de minimis in zato zanjo ni veljal člen 87(1) ES. Pomoč je bila odobrena z 12-mesečno začasno zaustavitvijo plačil prispevkov za socialno varnost kmetov, ki so družbo Parmalat oskrbovali z mlekom, ne da bi za to dobavljeno mleko prejeli plačilo. Komisija je prav tako ugotovila, da pomožno jamstvo za sredstva, ki so bila kmetom na voljo prek posebnega sklada bančnih garancij, ni vsebovalo državne pomoči, ker je bila garancija dodeljena v skladu s tržnimi načeli;	- Urgent provisions for agriculture (Parmalat) – Italy[236].. On 14 July, the Commission decided that aid of approximately EUR 995 per recipient (overall amount EUR 1.327 million per year and a total of EUR 3.98 million) is de minimis and therefore not covered by Article 87(1) EC. The aid was granted through a 12-month suspension of social security payments for farmers who have been supplying Parmalat without having been paid for the delivered milk. The Commission also concluded that a subsidiary guarantee for credits offered to these farmers through a special bank guarantee fund did not contain state aid because the guarantee was offered in line with market principles.
- pomoč organizacijam proizvajalcev – Španija[237]. Komisija je 7. maja sprejela dokončno odločbo, da državna pomoč, ki jo je Španija nameravala odobriti organizacijam proizvajalcev oljčnega olja v Extremaduri, ni bila državna pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) ES. Pomoč se odobri za financiranje stroškov zaprositve za podporo Skupnosti proizvajalcev oljčnega olja in znaša približno 12 EUR na zahtevek. V odločbi je bilo ugotovljeno, da organizacije proizvajalcev, prejemnice pomoči, nadaljujejo svojo dejavnost v korist proizvajalcev oljčnega olja. Pomoč tako omogoča, da se prispevki članov organizaciji, ki prejema pomoč, znižajo ali celo ukinejo. Zaradi tega so dejanski upravičenci pomoči proizvajalci, ki prejemajo nizke letne prispevke. Ker je skupni proračun za program pomoči 120 200 EUR na leto in naj bi bilo število proizvajalcev, ki koristijo program, 11 500, znaša znesek pomoči na prejemnika na leto 10,4 EUR;	- Aid to producer organisations – Spain[237]. On 7 May the Commission adopted a final decision finding that state aid which Spain intended to grant to olive oil producer organisations in Extremadura was not state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC. The aid is granted to finance the costs of applying for the Community support for olive oil producers and amounts to approximately EUR 12 per application. The decision found that the producers’ organisations, the recipients of the aid, carry on their activity for the benefit of olive oil producers. The aid therefore allows members’ contributions to the organisation receiving aid to be reduced or even cancelled out. For this reason, the real beneficiaries of the aid are the producers, who benefit from lower annual contributions. As the total budget for the scheme aid is EUR 120 200 per year and the number of producers who benefit from the scheme is reported to be 11 500, the amount of aid per recipient per year is EUR 10.4.
- nadomestilo za sušo leta 2003 – Francija[238]. Komisija je 20. oktobra sklenila, da ne bo ugovarjala zoper državne pomoči kmetom, ki jih je leta 2003 prizadela suša. Subvencijski del prevzema obresti za neodplačana posojila (20 milijonov EUR) se je obravnaval kot de minimis [239] ;	- Compensation for the drought in 2003 – France[238]. On 20 October, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to state aid to farmers hit by the drought in 2003. The subsidy element in the taking over of interest on outstanding loans (EUR 20 million) was considered de minimis [239].
- pomoč za krizo BSE – Italija[240]. Komisija je 1. decembra z veljavnostjo za nazaj dovolila Italiji, da odobri državno pomoč za stroške obveznega uničenja snovi s posebnim tveganjem in skladiščenje snovi z nizkim tveganjem ter dohodkovno pomoč za sektor proizvajalcev govejega mesa, da bi odpravila posledice krize BSE leta 2001. Dohodkovna pomoč za sektor nadaljnje proizvodnje, ki jo zajema odločba, znaša okoli 103,25 EUR/na kmetijsko gospodarstvo in je bila obravnavana kot de minimis [241] .	- Aid for the BSE crisis - Italy[240]. On 1 December, the Commission retroactively authorised Italy to grant state aid for the costs of compulsory destruction of specific risk materials and the storage of low-risk material, as well as income aid for the beef producers sector to counter the effects of the 2001 BSE crisis. Income aid to the downstream sector covered by the decision amounts to around EUR 103.25/per holding and was considered de minimis [241].
Uredba o skupinskih izjemah	Block exemption Regulation
375. Nova Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1/2004, ki odobrava izvzetje za nekatere vrste državne pomoči, dodeljene majhnim in srednje velikim kmetijskim podjetjem[242], je začela veljati 24. januarja. Državam članicam ni treba teh ukrepov pomoči vnaprej priglasiti Komisiji, da jih odobri.	375. The new Commission Regulation (EC) No 1/2004 granting exemption for certain types of state aid awarded to small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises[242] entered into force on 24 January. Member States are no longer required to notify these aid measures to the Commission in advance for approval.
376. V skladu s členoma 3 in 19 Uredbe morajo države članice za izvzetje posamezne pomoči ali programa pomoči „najpozneje 10 delovnih dni pred začetkom izvajanja programa pomoči ali odobritve posamezne pomoči zunaj programa, izvzete na podlagi te uredbe, predložiti Komisiji povzetek podatkov o programu pomoči ali posamezni pomoči na obrazcu iz Priloge I, zato da se objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije“.	376. Under Articles 3 and 19 of the Regulation, for individual aid or an aid scheme to be exempted, Member States must "at the latest 10 working days before the entry into force of an aid scheme, or the granting of individual aid outside any scheme, exempted by this Regulation, … forward to the Commission, with a view to its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, a summary of the information regarding such aid scheme or individual aid in the form laid down in Annex I."
377. V skladu s tem postopkom so države članice službam Komisije že poslale povzetke okoli 70 različnih ukrepov, ki jih je Komisija objavila na internetu[243].	377. In accordance with this procedure, Member States have already communicated to the Commission's departments summaries of around 70 different measures which the Commission has published on the Internet[243].
Uporaba obstoječih smernic: promocija in oglaševanje kakovostnih proizvodov	Application of existing guidelines: Promotion and advertising of quality products
378. Komisija je določila več primerov državnih pomoči v zvezi s promocijo in oglaševanjem kmetijskih proizvodov. Ti primeri Komisiji omogočajo, da:	378. The Commission decided several state aid cases related to the promotion and advertising of agricultural products. These cases enabled the Commission:
- pojasni in razvije uporabo smernic o oglaševanju kmetijskih proizvodov za oznake kakovosti ter določitvi meril, kaj lahko pojmujemo pod izrazom „kakovostni proizvod“, s sklicevanjem na pogoje iz člena 24b(3) Uredbe (ES) št. 1257/1999, kakor je bila spremenjena z Uredbo (ES) št. 1783/2003[244];	- to clarify and develop the application of the guidelines on the advertising of agricultural products to quality labels and the establishment of criteria for the qualification of what can be considered a “quality product” by referring to the conditions of Article 24b(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1783/2003[244];
- določi omejitve za odobritev državne pomoči za t. i. „skupne promocije“, npr. omejitve za neposredno povezavo med tržno organizacijo in posameznimi podjetji. (V smislu točke 29 oglaševalskih smernic je treba oglaševalske dejavnosti, ki se skupaj financirajo prek javnih skladov in enega ali več posebnih podjetij, obravnavati kot nezdružljive s pravili zaradi dejstva, da ciljna skupina, npr. potrošnik, ne more razlikovati, ali je oglaševalski ukrep za eno ali več posebnih podjetij del javno podprte kampanje ali ne)[245];	- to set the limits for the granting of state aid for so-called “joint promotions”, e.g. the limits for a direct linkage between a marketing organisation and individual companies. (Within the meaning of point 29 of the advertising guidelines, advertising activities which are jointly financed through public funds and one or more particular firms must be considered to be incompatible with the rules due to the fact that the target group - e.g. the consumer - may not be able to tell whether an advertising measure for one or more particular firms is part of a publicly supported campaign or not)[245];
- potrdi svoje stališče o pomoči za oznake, ki se nanašajo na poreklo proizvodov[246], in o določenih splošnih zahtevah smernic[247].	- to confirm its position on aid for labels referring to the origin of products[246] and on certain general requirements of the guidelines[247].
4. Ribištvo	4. FISHERIES
379. 1. novembra je začel veljati nov sklop pravil o državni pomoči za ribištvo. Ta pravila politiko državnih pomoči usklajujejo z reformirano skupno ribiško politiko, sprejeto decembra 2002. Nova pravila določajo skupinsko izjemo za nekatere vrste pomoči, ki jih državam članicam pred začetkom izvajanja ne bo treba več priglasiti Komisiji, da jih odobri. Državno pomoč v ribištvu, ki ne spada v okvir uredbe o skupinskih izjemah[248], bo še vedno treba priglasiti Komisiji. Za tako državno pomoč bodo veljale nove smernice za pregled državne pomoči za ribištvo in ribogojstvo[249], ki so prav tako začele veljati 1. novembra.	379. On 1 November, a new set of rules on state aid to the fisheries sector came into force. These rules bring state aid policy into line with the reformed common fisheries policy, adopted in December 2002. The new rules provide for a block exemption for certain types of aid, which will no longer have to be notified to and approved by the Commission before Member States can implement them. State aid in the fisheries sector which does not fall within the block exemption Regulation[248] will still have to be notified to the Commission. Such state aid will be subject to new guidelines for the examination of state aid to fisheries and aquaculture[249], which also entered into force on 1 November.
380. Ukrepi, zajeti v skupinski izjemi, se nanašajo na pomoč, ki verjetno ne bo ogrozila ohranitve staleža ali izkrivila konkurence na način, ki ni v skladu s skupnim interesom in ki zato ni nikoli pripeljal do preiskovalnih postopkov Komisije. Zadevna pomoč mora strogo izpolnjevati merila, določena v uredbi o skupinskih izjemah, ki so enaka tistim, ki urejajo dodeljevanje sredstev EU v okviru finančnega instrumenta za usmerjanje ribištva (FIUR).	380. The measures covered by the block exemption relate to aid unlikely to threaten conservation or distort competition in a manner not in line with the common interest and which therefore has never given rise to investigation procedures by the Commission. The aid concerned has to comply strictly with the criteria set out in the block exemption Regulation, which are identical to those governing the allocation of EU funds under the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG).
381. Skupinska izjema bo veljala za pomoč, odobreno majhnim in srednje velikim podjetjem, za zneske pod 1 milijon EUR ali za pomoč, namenjeno financiranju ukrepov, z najvišjim zneskom 2 milijonov EUR.	381. The block exemption will apply to aid granted to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for amounts below EUR 1 million or to aid designed to finance measures with a maximum eligible amount of EUR 2 million.
382. Za zagotovitev pravilnega dodeljevanja take pomoči bo spremljanje potekalo s poenostavljenimi predhodnimi informacijami Komisije o pomoči, ki bo dodeljena, objavljenimi na medmrežju in v Uradnem listu , ter naknadnimi obveznostmi poročanja.	382. To ensure proper allocation of such aid, monitoring will take place through simplified ex ante information of the Commission on the aid to be granted, published on the Internet and in the Official Journal , and ex post reporting obligations.
5. Premog in promet	5. COAL AND TRANSPORT
Premog	Coal
383. S širitvijo Unije se je število držav, ki proizvajajo premog, povečalo s treh (Nemčija, Združeno kraljestvo in Španija) na sedem, saj lahko k tem prištejemo Poljsko, Češko, Slovaško in Madžarsko. Kljub nedavnemu močnemu porastu promptne tržne cene za premog, velik del evropskega premogovništva ostaja nekonkurenčen brez večjih državnih subvencij. Nemčija, Poljska in Madžarska so Komisiji priglasile svoje načrte za prestrukturiranje za naslednja leta. Komisija je uvedla formalni postopek v zvezi z načrtom za prestrukturiranje španskega premogovništva.	383. The enlargement of the Union increased the number of coal-producing countries from three (Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain) to seven, adding Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Despite the recent dramatic increase in the spot market price for coal, large parts of Europe's coal industry remain uncompetitive without heavy state subsidies. Germany, Poland and Hungary notified their restructuring plans for the coming years to the Commission. The Commission has opened the formal procedure regarding the restructuring plan for the Spanish coal industry.
Promet	Transport
384. Komisija je ohranila naklonjeno stališče do javnega financiranja, ki spodbuja okolju prijazne vrste prevoza, da bi dosegla zmanjšanje cestnega prevoza. Tako se železnice pojmujejo kot ključni element v skupni prometni politiki Skupnosti, ki želi razviti trajnostni sistem prevoza s spremembo ravnotežja med različnimi vrstami prevoza. Eden glavnih ciljev je ponovna oživitev železnic. Železniški prevoz bo treba ponovno narediti dovolj konkurenčen, da bo ostal eden ključnih akterjev v sistemu prevoza v razširjeni Evropi. Odprtje železniškega trga je ključno za ponovno oživitev železnic. Do leta 2008 bo celotno evropsko, mednarodno in nacionalno, omrežje za prevoz blaga popolnoma odprto. S prihodom novih železniških podjetij bo moral sektor postati konkurenčnejši in spodbuditi nacionalna podjetja k prestrukturiranju.	384. The Commission maintained a favourable approach towards public funding that promotes environmentally friendly modes of transport in order to achieve a reduction in road transport. The railways are therefore considered to be a key element in the Community’s common transport policy, which seeks to develop a sustainable transport system by shifting the balance between different modes of transport. Revitalising the railways is one of the major objectives. Rail transport has, once again, to be made competitive enough to remain one of the leading players in the transport system in an enlarged Europe. Opening up the railway market is crucial to revitalising the railways. By 2008, the entire European freight network, both internationally and nationally, will have been opened up completely. The arrival of new railway companies must make the sector more competitive and encourage national companies to restructure.
385. V sektorju kombiniranega prevoza se je uporabila ustaljena praksa. Komisija je zlasti odobrila različne programe pomoči, katerih namen je nadomestiti dodatne stroške kombiniranega prevoza.	385. The established practice was applied in the combined transport sector. In particular, the Commission authorised various aid schemes which aim to offset the additional costs of combined transport.
386. V zvezi s cestnim prevozom so se preučili načrti za prestrukturiranje večjih podjetij.	386. As regards road transport, the restructuring plans of large companies were examined.
387. V pomorstvu so se prvič uporabile nove smernice Skupnosti za državno pomoč v pomorskem prometu[250]. Komisija je zlasti zagotovila, da države članice sprejemajo ustrezne ukrepe, predlagane v teh smernicah.	387. In the maritime sector, the new Community guidelines on state aid to maritime transport were applied for the first time[250]. The Commission ensured in particular that Member States accept the appropriate measures proposed in these guidelines.
388. Na področju letalskega prevoza je v tem letu prišlo do pomembne odločbe Komisije v zvezi s primerom Ryanair–Charleroi . Komisija je priznala, da so lahko omejeni zneski državne pomoči upravičeni, da se zagotovi boljša izraba sekundarnih letališč ter vzpostavijo nove prometne povezave, ki bodo zagotavljale regionalne koristi in zmanjševale preobremenjenost zračnega prostora. Temu bodo sledile smernice o financiranju letališč in začetku obratovanja novih prog; te bi morale pojasniti zmožnost, da se regionalna letališča razširijo na trgu in hkrati upoštevajo pravila Skupnosti.	388. In air transport, the year saw an important decision of the Commission in the Ryanair-Charleroi case. The Commission recognised that limited amounts of state aid may be justified to ensure better use of secondary airports with a view to creating new transport links providing regional benefits and reducing air congestion. It will be followed by guidelines on the financing of airports and the start-up of new routes; these should clarify the potential for regional airports to expand in the market while respecting Community rules.
6. Javne storitve/storitve splošnega (gospodarskega) pomena	6. Public services/services of general (economic) interest
389. Pomen javnih storitev za države članice je poudarjen z nedavno obsežno javno razpravo o vseh vidikih takih storitev, vključno o načinu njihovega zagotavljanja, ter z dejstvom, da so v osnutku Ustave za Evropo izrecno navedene.	389. The importance to Member States of public services is highlighted by the recent wide public discussion of all aspects of such services, including the way in which they should be provided, as well as by the fact that the draft constitution for the EU explicitly mentions them.
390. V zvezi s politiko konkurence je Komisija obravnavala vprašanje, kako močno bi lahko nadomestilo za storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena izkrivilo konkurenco z vidika državne pomoči. Po sodbi Altmark [251] o opisu nadomestila kot državni pomoči je Komisija sestavila sklop treh predlogov, da bi merila, ki jih je določilo Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti, udejanjila v praksi:	390. As regards competition policy, the Commission dealt with the question of how far compensation for services of general economic interest (SGEIs) could distort competition from a state aid perspective. Following the Altmark judgment[251] concerning the description of compensation as state aid, the Commission drew up a set of three proposals with a view to putting the criteria set out by the ECJ into practice:
Okvir Skupnosti za nadomestilo za javne storitve	Community framework for public service compensation
391. Okvir Skupnosti za državno pomoč v obliki nadomestila za javne storitve pojasnjuje merila, v skladu s katerimi namerava Komisija oceniti nadomestilo držav članic za javne storitve v skladu s pravili o državni pomoči.	391. A Community framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation clarifies the criteria according to which the Commission intends to assess public service compensation by Member States under the state aid rules.
392. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je navedlo, da tako nadomestilo ne pomeni državne pomoči, če je bil med drugimi pogoji znesek določen v skladu s pravim in učinkovitim razpisnim postopkom ali na podlagi stroškov, ki bi jih dobro vodeno, srednje veliko podjetje imelo pri izvajanju takih storitev. Tako bi se morala učinkovitost izvajanja storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena povečati brez ogrožanja njihovega opravljanja. Drugače nadomestilo pomeni državno pomoč in jo je treba priglasiti. Taka priglašena pomoč je lahko združljiva s Pogodbo v skladu s členom 86(2) ES, če je to potrebno za izvajanje storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena in ne vpliva na razvoj trgovine v obsegu, ki bi nasprotoval interesom Skupnosti.	392. The ECJ indicated that such compensation does not constitute state aid if, among other conditions, the amount has been fixed under a genuine and effective competitive tendering procedure or on the basis of the costs which a well-run, medium-sized undertaking would encounter in providing such services. In this way, the effectiveness of providing SGEIs should increase without jeopardising their operation. Otherwise, the compensation constitutes state aid and needs to be notified. Such notified aid could be declared compatible with the Treaty under Article 86(2) EC provided that it is necessary for the operation of an SGEI and does not affect the development of trade to an extent contrary to the interests of the Community.
393. V skladu s členom 86 ES in ustrezno sodno prakso imajo države članice širok manevrski prostor pri opredelitvi storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena. Vendar pa morajo zadevne države članice podjetjem, ki zagotavljajo storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena, v zvezi s presojo v skladu s pravili o državni pomoči posebej naložiti to nalogo. Tako je dodelitev javnih storitev potrebna, da se opredelijo posamezne obveznosti podjetja in države (nacionalni, regionalni ali lokalni organ). Ta dodelitev mora podrobneje opredeliti:	393. In accordance with Article 86 EC and the corresponding case law, Member States have a wide margin of discretion in defining SGEIs. As regards the assessment under state aid rules, however, it is necessary for undertakings providing an SGEI to have been specifically entrusted with this task by the Member State concerned. Accordingly, a public service assignment is required in order to define the respective obligations of the undertaking and of the State (national, regional or local authority). This assignment must specify:
- natančno naravo obveznosti javne storitve,	- the precise nature of the public service obligation
- zadevno(-a) podjetje(-a) in ozemlje,	- the undertaking(s) and the territory concerned
- vse izključne pravice, dodeljene podjetjem,	- any exclusive rights assigned to the undertakings
- izračun in pregled nadomestila, vključno s primernim dobičkom,	- the calculation and review of the compensation, including a reasonable profit
- dogovore za povračilo preveč plačanega nadomestila in za kakršno koli posredovanje države v primeru premalo plačanega nadomestila.	- the arrangements for repaying overcompensation and for any intervention by the State in the event of undercompensation.
394. Osnutek okvira vsebuje podrobna pravila o elementih, ki bi se lahko vključili v izračun nadomestila, in pojasnjuje, da je treba vsako nadomestilo, dodeljeno podjetju za izvajanje javnih storitev, priglasiti Komisiji, preden je izplačano.	394. The draft framework contains detailed rules on the components which might be included in the calculation of the compensation and makes clear that any compensation granted to an undertaking for the provision of public services should be notified to the Commission before being disbursed.
Odločba o izvzetju	Exemption decision
395. Predlagana odločba v skladu s členom 86 ES bi določene izravnalne ukrepe izvzela iz zahteve predhodne priglasitve. Do tega bi prišlo pri nadomestilu pod določenimi pragovi ter nadomestilu, odobrenem za posebne javne storitve, zlasti bolnišnice in socialna stanovanja, pa tudi za pomorske povezave do otokov, odobrene v skladu s sektorskimi pravili in letnim prometom do 100 000 potnikov.	395. A proposed decision under Article 86 EC would exempt certain compensatory measures from the requirement of prior notification. This would be the case with compensation below certain thresholds, as well as with compensation granted for specific public services, notably hospitals and social housing, but also for maritime links to islands granted in accordance with sectoral rules and with an annual traffic not exceeding 100 000 passengers.
396. Predlagano izvzetje temelji na predvidevanju, da je nevarnost izkrivljanja konkurence z izplačilom nadomestila za take storitve zanemarljiva ali neobstoječa.	396. The proposed exemption is based on the assumption that the risk of distorting competition through compensation disbursed to such services is negligible or non-existent.
397. V skladu s tem predlogom bi morale države članice – kot je to običajno pri uredbah o izvzetju – izpolnjevati zaščitni ukrep Komisije ob upoštevanju vseh informacij, potrebnih za ocenitev združljivosti nadomestila s pravili o državni pomoči. Vendar bi bilo treba take informacije zagotoviti samo kot odgovor na pisno zahtevo Komisije.	397. Under this proposal, Member States would be obliged - as is usual with exemption Regulations – to meet Commission safeguards in respect of all information necessary to assess the compatibility of the compensation with the state aid rules. However, such information would only have to be provided in response to a written request from the Commission.
Sprememba direktive o preglednosti	Amendment of the Transparency Directive
398. Tretji del se nanaša na spremembo direktive o preglednosti[252]. Ta želi pojasniti, da mora zadevno podjetje celo takrat, ko nadomestilo za izvajanje javnih storitev ne pomeni državne pomoči, voditi ločene račune, kadar izvajajo dejavnosti zunaj obsega storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena. Taki ločeni računi so nujni, da se opredelijo zneski, ki jih lahko pripišemo storitvam splošnega gospodarskega pomena, in izračunajo ustrezni zneski nadomestila.	398. The third element concerns the amendment of the Transparency Directive[252]. This seeks to make clear that, even where compensation for the provision of public services does not constitute state aid, the undertakings concerned must maintain separate accounts when they carry out activities outside the scope of SGEIs. Such separate accounts are necessary in order to identify the amounts imputable to SGEIs and to calculate the correct amount of compensation.
399. Ti trije osnutki dokumentov so bili objavljeni za javno posvetovanje in obravnavo v drugih institucijah, da bi jih sprejeli v bližnji prihodnosti[253]. Komisiji bodo omogočali, da izpolni svojo nalogo zagotavljanja, da lahko storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena pravilno delujejo v okviru EU in prejmejo državno nadomestilo samo v takem obsegu, ki je potreben za njihovo izvajanje. Na drugi strani mora biti upravno breme preverjanja, da čezmerno nadomestilo ne izkrivlja konkurence na trgih, čim manjše.	399. These three draft documents were published for public consultation and discussed with the other institutions with a view to adopting them in the near future[253]. They will allow the Commission to fulfil its task of ensuring that SGEIs can operate properly within the EU and receive state compensation only to the extent necessary for their provision. On the other hand, the administrative burden of checking that over-compensation does not distort competition on the markets is kept to a minimum.
7. Preglednost	7 . TRANSPARENCY
400. Informacije o vseh obstoječih ukrepih državnih pomoči, zbranih vsako leto od držav članic, skupaj s primernimi gospodarskimi kazalci, ki opisujejo stanje o državni pomoči v EU, tvorijo podlago za statistični pregled državnih pomoči, uveden julija 2001[254]. Vsako leto se pripravita dve izdaji indikatorja napredka.	400. The information on all existing state aid measures gathered annually from Member States, together with suitable economic indicators that describe the state aid situation in the EU, form the basis for the state aid scoreboard launched in July 2001[254]. Two editions of the scoreboard are produced every year.
401. Do sedaj je pomladanska dopolnitev statističnega pregleda zajemala podatke za obdobje t-2, to pomeni podatke za leto 2002 v letu 2004. Komisija in države članice so se kot del novih letnih dogovorov o poročanju zavezale, da bodo zmanjšale ta časovni zamik, zaradi česar bi morali biti podatki za leto 2004 objavljeni v jesenski dopolnitvi leta 2005. Tako bo jesenski statistični pregled vsako leto vključeval najnovejše podatke, medtem ko bo pomladanski statistični pregled zagotovil bolj analitično pokrivanje izbrane teme. Prejšnji statistični pregledi vključujejo podatke o pomoči regijam, pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, pomoči za raziskave in razvoj ter pomoči majhnim in srednje velikim podjetjem.	401. So far the spring update of the scoreboard has covered data for the period t-2, i.e. 2002 data in 2004 . As part of the new annual reporting arrangements, the Commission and Member States have pledged to reduce this time-lag, with the result that 2004 data should be published in the autumn 2005 update. Thus the autumn scoreboard will each year include the latest data, while the spring scoreboard will provide more analytical coverage of a selected topic. Previous scoreboards have included features on aid to assisted regions, rescue and restructuring aid, R&D aid and SME aid.
402. Jesenska dopolnitev statističnega pregleda za leto 2004 je bila objavljena 16. novembra[255]. Glavni cilj te dopolnitve je stanje državnih pomoči v desetih novih državah članicah v štiriletnem obdobju pred pristopom (2000–2003).Drugi del vsebuje pregled ukrepov, ki so jih države članice sprejele za izvajanje lizbonske agende in nadaljevanje naknadnih sklepov Sveta o državni pomoči. Podrobneje to zajema znižanje pomoči, preusmeritev pomoči k horizontalnim ciljem in ocenitev učinkovitosti pomoči. Končni del, kot v vseh dopolnitvah statističnega pregleda, vsebuje povzetek prizadevanj Komisije na področju poenostavitev in posodobitve nadzora državnih pomoči.	402. The autumn 2004 update of the scoreboard was adopted on 16 November[255]. The main focus of this update is the state aid situation in the ten new Member States in the four years prior to accession (2000-2003). Part Two includes a review of the steps taken by Member States to implement the Lisbon agenda and follow up subsequent Council conclusions on state aid. More specifically, this comprises reduction of aid, redirection of aid towards horizontal objectives and assessing the effectiveness of aid. The final part, as in all scoreboard updates, includes a summary of the efforts undertaken by the Commission to simplify and modernise state aid control.
B – Primeri	B – CASES
1. LIBERALIZIRANI TRGI	1. LIBERALISED MARKETS
Belgija: prenos pokojninskih obveznosti iz prvega stebra od družbe Belgacom na belgijsko državo [256]	Belgium: Transfer of first pillar pension obligations from Belgacom to the Belgian State [256]
403. Oktobra 2003 so belgijski organi Komisijo obvestili o dogovoru med družbo Belgacom, belgijsko državo in zasebnimi delničarji, da prenesejo t. i. pokojninske obveznosti iz „prvega stebra“ do javnih uslužbencev družbe Belgacom na belgijsko državo (pokojnine iz „prvega stebra“ so tiste, ki so po navadi predvidene v okviru splošnega sistema socialne varnosti posamezne države).	403. In October 2003, the Belgian authorities informed the Commission about an agreement between Belgacom, the Belgian State and the private shareholders to transfer the so-called "first pillar" pension obligations towards the company’s civil servants from Belgacom to the Belgian State (“first pillar” pensions are those which are normally provided for under the general social security system of each State.)
404. V okviru ustanovitve družbe Belgacom kot družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo leta 1992 je morala le-ta upravljati in financirati pokojninske pravice iz „prvega stebra“ nekdanjih javnih uslužbencev (to je pomenilo, da je družba pokojnine dejansko plačala nekdanjim javnim uslužbencem ter da je morala zagotoviti popolno financiranje pridobljenih in prihodnjih pravic do pokojnine). Priglašeni dogovor je pomenil, da je bila družba Belgacom od 1. januarja 2004 oproščena bremena, ki je izhajal iz posebne pokojninske ureditve, veljavne za javne uslužbence. V zameno je belgijska država prejela enkratno plačilo od družbe Belgacom v znesku 5 milijard EUR ter letne redne prispevke, ki so zagotavljali financiranje prihodnjih pokojninskih obveznosti.	404. In the context of the establishment of Belgacom as a limited liability company in 1992, Belgacom was obliged to administer and finance the “first pillar” pension rights of former civil servants (this meant that pensions were actually paid by the company to former civil servants and that the company had to ensure the full financing of acquired and future pension rights). The notified agreement implied that, as of 1 January 2004, Belgacom was relieved of the burden resulting from the special pension regime applicable to civil servants. In return, the Belgian State received a one-off payment from Belgacom amounting to EUR 5 billion as well as yearly continuous contributions guaranteeing the financing of future pension obligations.
405. Komisija je v svoji odločbi z dne 21. januarja ugotovila, da je bil prenos finančno nevtralen, saj družba Belgacom v zameno za prenos svojih pokojninskih obveznosti do belgijske države tej plačuje znesek, ki ustreza neto trenutni vrednosti obveznosti, ki jih je prevzela belgijska država. Zato je Komisija menila, da ta prenos družbi Belgacom ni dal nobene večje prednosti, kot bi jih imela po običajnih tržnih pogojih, in zato ni šlo za nobeno državno pomoč.	405. In its decision of 21 January, the Commission concluded that the transfer was financially neutral because Belgacom, in exchange for transferring its pension obligations to the Belgian State, pays the latter an amount corresponding to the net present value of the obligations taken over by the Belgian State. Therefore, the Commission considered that this transaction did not give Belgacom an advantage beyond that which would have been available under normal market conditions and accordingly no state aid was involved.
Pomoč, ki jo je Francija odobrila družbi Coopérative d’exportation du livre français (Celf) [257]	Aid granted by France to the Coopérative d’exportation du livre français (Celf) [257]
406. Komisija je 20. aprila odobrila pomoč, ki jo je Francija v obdobju med letoma 1980 in 2001 dodelila družbi Coopérative d’exportation du livre français (Celf). Komisija je menila, da je bila pomoč družbi Celf za sprejemanje manjših naročil knjig v francoskem jeziku, čeprav je bila dodeljena nezakonito, združljiva s skupnim trgom v skladu s členom 87(3)(d) Pogodbe, saj je bila sorazmerna z zaželenim kulturnim ciljem. Komisija je ugotovila, da pomoč ni vplivala na trgovino in konkurenco v Skupnosti v obsegu, ki bi nasprotoval skupnemu interesu. Namen pomoči je bil ohraniti neprofitno dejavnost družbe Celf. Družba Celf je morala sprejeti vse vrste naročil od prodajalcev knjig (ki niso bili končni potrošniki), ki so delovali v tujini na nefrancosko govorečih območjih, ne glede na znesek naročila, donosnost in namembni kraj. Kot del naročila je družba prejela pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, namenjeno nadomestitvi dodatnih stroškov sprejemanja naročil, nižjih od 500 FRF (tj. približno 76 EUR).V tej odločbi je bila ustrezno upoštevana odločitev Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 28. februarja 2002, ki je delno razveljavila prejšnjo odločbo Komisije z dne 10. junija 1998 na podlagi dejstva, da bi morala Komisija razlikovati med trgom izvoznih agencij in trgom za izvoz knjig v francoskem jeziku na splošno.	406. On 20 April, the Commission approved the aid granted by France between 1980 and 2001 to the Coopérative d’exportation du livre français (Celf). The Commission considered that the aid to Celf for processing small orders of French-language books, although granted unlawfully, was however compatible with the common market under Article 87(3)(d) of the Treaty in that it is proportional to the cultural objective pursued. The Commission found that the aid did not affect trade and competition in the Community to an extent contrary to the common interest. The purpose of the aid was to maintain the non-profitable activity of Celf. Celf had to accept any type of order from booksellers (not final consumers) established abroad in non-French-speaking areas, irrespective of the amount of the order, profitability and destination. As part of the aid, it received an operating grant intended to offset the extra cost of handling orders below FRF 500 (i.e. approximately EUR 76). This decision took into proper consideration the ruling of the Court of First Instance of 28 February 2002 which partially annulled an older Commission decision of 10 June 1998 on the ground that the Commission should have distinguished the export agency market from that for the export of French-language books in general.
Sprememba licenčnine za UMTS, Francija [258]	Modification of UMTS licence fee, France [258]
407. Komisija je oktobra 2002 prejela pritožbo zoper odločitev francoske vlade, da bi znižala licenčnino za UMTS, ki sta jo prvotno plačevali družbi Orange in SFR.	407. In October 2002, the Commission received a complaint against the French Government's decision to reduce the UMTS licence fees originally payable by Orange and SFR.
408. Komisija je menila, da morajo po sedanji zakonodaji Skupnosti države članice določiti pogoje za dodelitev licenc UMTS, če izpolnjujejo pogoje, določene v Direktivi 97/13/ES, in sicer če so uporabljeni postopki in merila objektivni, pregledni in nediskriminacijski.	408. The Commission considered that in the current state of Community law it is for the Member States to lay down the conditions for awarding UMTS licences, provided that they fulfil the conditions laid down in Directive 97/13/EC, namely that the procedures and the criteria used are objective, transparent and non-discriminatory.
409. V zadevnem primeru je Komisija ugotovila, da je francoska vlada za vse operaterje uporabila enake pogoje za dodelitev licenc UMTS (trajanje, licenčnina, tehnični pogoji) ter da so bili ti pogoji objektivni in nediskriminacijski. Ker vlada ni razlikovala med operaterji, družbi Orange in SFR nista imeli nobene prednosti. Zato je Komisija 20. julija odločila, da ni šlo za državno pomoč, in zavrnila pritožbo.	409. In the case at issue, the Commission noted that the French Government applied to all operators the same conditions for the granting of UMTS licences (duration, fee, technical conditions) and that these conditions were objective and not discriminatory. Since the Government did not discriminate between operators, Orange and SFR were not given any benefits. The Commission therefore decided on 20 July that no state aid was involved and rejected the complaint.
Nasedle naložbe	Stranded costs
410. V okviru postopnega uresničevanja notranjega trga z električno energijo je Komisija odobrila dva nova primera državne pomoči za povračilo stroškov nasedlih naložb v Italiji[259] in na Portugalskem[260]. Stroški nasedlih naložb so stroški, ki so jih imeli proizvajalci na trgu z električno energijo, ko sektor ni bil liberaliziran, in katerih povračilo liberalizacija otežuje ali celo onemogoča.	410. Within the framework of the progressive completion of the internal electricity market, the Commission approved two new cases of state aid for compensation of stranded costs, in Italy[259]and Portugal[260]. Stranded costs are the costs which were incurred by electricity market incumbents when the sector was not liberalised and which liberalisation makes it difficult, if not impossible, to repay.
411. Komisija ima sedaj dobro vzpostavljeno prakso na področju nadomestila nasedlih stroškov. Julija 2001 je sprejela sporočilo, v katerem je bila opisana metodologija, ki bi jo uporabila za oceno take pomoči[261]. To metodologijo je uporabila za nadomestilo nasedlih stroškov v Avstriji, Belgiji, Grčiji, na Nizozemskem in v Španiji.	411. The Commission now has a well-established practice in the field of stranded costs compensation. In July 2001 it adopted a communication that spelled out the methodology that it would use to assess such aid[261]. It applied this methodology to stranded costs compensation in Austria, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain.
412. V Italiji se odločitev nanaša zlasti na dva vidika: stroške za obrate za proizvodnjo električne energije, zgrajene pred letom 1997, in stroške, povezane s pogodbo „vzemi ali plačaj“ za nigerijski plin, ki jo je leta 1992 podpisala družba ENEL, za del, ki se uporablja za proizvodnjo električne energije. Del, ki se nanaša na obrate za proizvodnjo električne energije, bo zajemal samo obdobje od leta 2000 do 2003, po tem roku pa proizvajalci ne bodo več upravičeni do prejema nadomestila za svoje nasedle stroške. Skupni znesek povračila bo največ 850 milijonov EUR. Dodelil se bo družbi ENEL in podjetjem, ki so podedovala nasedla sredstva družbe ENEL.	412. In Italy, the decision covers in particular two aspects: the costs for power generation plants built before 1997; and the costs linked to a “take-or-pay” contract for Nigerian gas, signed by ENEL in 1992, for the part used to produce electricity. The part concerning power generation plants will only cover the period from 2000-2003, after which generators will no longer be entitled to received compensation for their stranded costs. The total compensation granted will be at most EUR 850 million. It will be granted to ENEL and the companies that have inherited ENEL’s stranded assets.
413. Del, ki se nanaša na stroške, povezane s pogodbo „vzemi ali plačaj“, je namenjen nadomestitvi stroškov, ki jih je imela družba ENEL, ker ni mogla predelati plina v Italiji, kot je bilo prvotno načrtovano. Pokril bo stroške premestitve predelave plina zunaj Italije do leta 2009. Nadomestilo bo obsegalo največ 1465 milijonov EUR. Vendar se bo nadomestilo dodelilo samo za plin, uporabljen za proizvodnjo električne energije.	413. The part concerning costs linked to the “take-or-pay” contract is intended to compensate for the costs incurred by ENEL because the company could not process the gas in Italy, as was originally planned. It will cover the costs of relocating gas processing outside Italy until 2009. The compensation will be at most EUR 1 465 million. However, compensation will be granted solely for the gas used for electricity generation purposes.
414. Portugalski primer je nekoliko drugačen od italijanskega in drugih prejšnjih primerov. Portugalski zaprti trg je prvotno temeljil na nizu dolgoročnih pogodb med mrežnim operaterjem v državni lasti in tremi skupinami za proizvodnjo električne energije, namesto na splošnem zakonu, ki je določal cenovna pravila za sektor električne energije, kot v državah članicah, katerih primere je Komisija predhodno analizirala. Portugalska je prekinila te dolgoročne pogodbe in jih zamenjala z državnim nadomestilom.	414. The Portuguese case was slightly different from the Italian and from other previous cases. The Portuguese captive market was originally structured around a series of long-term contracts between the state-owned network operator and three electricity generation groups instead of a general law setting out the price rules for the electricity sector, as in Member States whose cases had been previously analysed by the Commission. Portugal abolished these long-term contracts and replaced them with state compensation.
415. Ker mora biti nadomestilo nasedlih stroškov v skladu z metodologijo Komisije omejeno na „minimum, ki je potreben“, je morala Komisija, celo v tem posebnem primeru, preveriti, da nadomestilo ne bo višje od povračila začetnih naložb, vključno z razumno stopnjo dobička, kadar je to potrebno. Upoštevala je tudi zmogljivost skupin, da nadomestijo izgube nekaterih obratov v primerjavi z dobički drugih. Komisija je zagotovila, da je uveden ustrezen mehanizem za redno prilagajanje nadomestila, s katerim se prepreči vsako čezmerno nadomestilo, celo kadar se nadomestilo ne razvije po pričakovanjih.	415. Since, in accordance with the Commission methodology, stranded costs compensation has to be kept to the “minimum necessary”, the Commission had to check that, even in this particular situation, compensation would not involve more than the repayment of initial investments, including where necessary a reasonable profit margin. The ability of groups to offset losses from certain plants against profits from others was also taken into account. The Commission ensured that a proper mechanism for regularly adapting compensation was introduced to prevent any overcompensation, even where competition did not evolve as expected.
2. 2. Pomoč za reševanje in prestrukturiranje	2. RESCUE AND RESTRUCTURING AID
Alstom[262]	Alstom[262]
416. Komisija je 7. julija sprejela pogojno odločbo, ki dovoljuje sveženj pomoči za prestrukturiranje v višini 3 milijard EUR za družbo Alstom v obliki jamstev, naložb za povečanje kapitala in v manjši meri posojil. Pogoji, določeni v odločbi, temeljijo na smernicah za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah. Te smernice določajo tri glavne pogoje za odobritev pomoči za prestrukturiranje.	416. On 7 July, the Commission adopted a conditional decision authorising a EUR 3 billion restructuring aid package to Alstom, in the form of guarantees, investment in capital increases, and, for a smaller part, loans. The conditions laid down by the decision are based on the rescue and restructuring guidelines for firms in difficulties. These guidelines set forth three main conditions for restructuring aid to be authorised.
417. Prvič, pomoč in skupni načrt za prestrukturiranje morata pripeljati do obnovitve dolgoročne sposobnosti za preživetje brez nadaljnje državne intervencije. Komisija je ugotovila, da bi morala zadnja različica finančnih in operativnih načrtov za prestrukturiranje, ki jo je predložila Francija, podjetju omogočati, da preživi in ponovno postane konkurenčno. Odločba zahteva, da je treba v celoti ravnati v skladu z operativnim načrtom, ki vključuje zaprtja obratov, odpuščanje in reorganizacijo. Poleg tega so bila potrebna dodatna prizadevanja v pomorskem sektorju in potrebna sklenitev industrijskih partnerstev, ki zajemajo velik del dejavnosti podjetja, za okrepitev dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja in obetov podjetja.	417. Firstly, the aid and the joint restructuring plan must lead to restoration of long-term viability without further state intervention. The Commission found that the latest version of the financial and operational restructuring plans submitted by France should allow the company to survive and become competitive again. The decision requests that the operational plan, which includes plant closures, lay-offs and reorganisation, be complied with in full. In addition, supplementary efforts were requested in the marine sector and the conclusion of industrial partnerships covering a significant part of the company’s activities was required in order to strengthen the long-term viability and prospects of the company.
418. Drugič, državna pomoč mora biti omejena na minimum, ki je potreben. Komisija je ugotovila, da je ta pogoj izpolnjen, saj načrt za prestrukturiranje, ki je bil odobren z odločbo Komisije, temelji na zelo obsežnem finančnem prispevku finančnih ustanov, zasebnih vlagateljev in samega podjetja. Poleg tega je pomoč časovno omejena, saj se lahko nova državna jamstva, prvič, izdajo v dvoletnem obdobju po sprejetju odločbe in, drugič, država mora v štirih letih prodati vse svoje imetništvo delnic v družbi Alstom, ki izhajajo iz zgoraj navedenega povečanja kapitala.	418. Secondly, the state aid has to be limited to the minimum necessary. The Commission found that this condition is satisfied since the restructuring plan authorised by the Commission’s decision is based on a very substantial financial contribution from financial institutions, private investors and the company itself. Moreover, the aid is limited in time because, in the first place, new state guarantees can only be issued over a two-year period following the adoption of the decision; and in the second place, the State is required to sell, within four years, its entire shareholding in Alstom resulting from the capital increases mentioned above.
419. Tretjič, izkrivljanja konkurence morajo biti omejena na minimum, ki je potreben. Za izpolnitev tega merila odločba zahteva, da morajo naslednji ukrepi vzpostaviti konkurenčno stanje in povrniti škodo tekmecem: (i) določene odprodaje premoženja poleg večjih, ki jih je družba Alstom izvedla leta 2003, (ii) ustanovitev skupnega podjetja in industrijskih partnerstev, ki zajemajo določene obstoječe dejavnosti, (iii) nadzor nad cenovno politiko in pripojitev podjetij v štirih letih, (iv) odprodaja lastništva države v podjetju ter (v) sprejetje ukrepov za pospeševanje odpiranja francoskega trga železniškega voznega parka.	419. Thirdly, distortions of competition have to be limited to the minimum necessary. In order to fulfil this criterion, the decision requires the following measures to restore the competitive situation and compensate competitors: (i) some divestments on top of the substantial ones already carried out by Alstom in 2003, (ii) setting up a joint venture and industrial partnerships covering certain existing activities, (iii) control on pricing policy and acquisitions of companies during four years, (iv) divesting the State’s shareholding in the company, and (v) adopting measures to foster the opening of the French rolling-stock market.
420. Komisija bo v naslednjih štirih letih spremljala usklajenost s to odločbo.	420. Over the next four years, the Commission will monitor compliance with this decision.
MobilCom[263]	MobilCom[263]
421. Komisija je 14. julija odobrila pomoč za prestrukturiranje, dodeljeno družbi MobilCom. Odobritev pomoči je bila povezana s pogojem, da morajo družba MobilCom in njene podružnice za sedem mesecev prekiniti svojo neposredno spletno prodajo pogodb za storitve mobilne telefonije MobilCom, da nadomestijo izkrivljanje konkurence, ki jo je povzročila pomoč.	421. On 14 July, the Commission approved restructuring aid granted to MobilCom. The approval of the aid was linked to the condition that MobilCom and its affiliates must halt their online direct sales of MobilCom mobile telephony contracts for seven months in order to offset the distortions of competition caused by the aid.
422. MobilCom je nemški ponudnik mobilnih telefonskih storitev. Leta 2002 je zašel v težave. Nemčija je odobrila prvo jamstvo za izpad dohodka za posojilo v višini 50 milijonov EUR septembra 2002, da bi zagotovila takojšnjo likvidnost podjetja. Ta pomoč je bila kot pomoč za reševanje odobrena januarja 2003[264] in ni bila del končne pogojne odločbe, sprejete julija 2004[265].	422. MobilCom is a German mobile phone service provider. It ran into difficulties in 2002. Germany granted a first deficiency guarantee for a loan of EUR 50 million in September 2002 to provide immediate liquidity to the company. This aid was approved as rescue aid in January 2003[264] and was not part of the final conditional decision adopted in July 2004[265].
423. Da bi Nemčija in zvezna država Schleswig-Holstein zagotovili dodatna sredstva, nujna za financiranje potrebnih sanacijskih ukrepov na tem segmentu, sta odobrili dodatno 80-odstotno jamstvo za izpad dohodka za posojilo v vrednosti 112 milijonov EUR novembra 2002. Komisija je menila, da je ta ukrep pomenil pomoč za prestrukturiranje.	423. In order to ensure further funding, which was needed to finance the requisite reorganisation measures in this segment, Germany and the Land of Schleswig-Holstein granted another 80% deficiency guarantee for a loan amounting to EUR 112 million in November 2002. The Commission considered that this measure constituted restructuring aid.
424. Glavna težava v zvezi s konkurenco, ki jo je Komisija ugotovila, je bila, da bi lahko družba MobilCom zaradi jamstva svoje dejavnosti hitro prestrukturirala. V tem okviru se pomoč ni uporabila samo za fizično prestrukturiranje družbe, ampak tudi za preusmeritev njene tržne strategije in osredotočenje na donosnejše potrošniške segmente v njeni glavni dejavnosti. Pomoč je tako zlasti škodljivo vplivala na tekmece, saj so tudi ti morali svoje poslovne strategije usmeriti na donosnejše potrošniške skupine.	424. The main competition problem perceived by the Commission was that thanks to the guarantee MobilCom could restructure its activities rapidly. In this context, the aid was not only used to restructure the company physically but also to reorient is marketing strategy and to focus on more profitable customer segments in its core business. The aid thus had a particularly damaging effect on competitors as they too have to target their business strategies at more profitable customer groups.
425. Na koncu je bila sprejeta rešitev, da se pomoč odobri, vendar se zanjo postavijo določeni pogoji. Komisija je v tem posebnem primeru menila, da je izravnalni ukrep, katerega namen je nadomestilo na področju, na katerem je pomoč povzročila svoje neupravičene posledice, in sicer na področju tržnosti storitev, najprimernejši ukrep za odpravo izkrivljanja konkurence. Družba MobilCom je zato morala za določen čas ukiniti svojo spletno ponudbo nekaterih storitev.	425. The solution adopted in the end was to approve the aid but subject to conditions. The Commission deemed in this particular case the compensatory measure which aims at a compensation in the field where the aid produced its undue effects, namely in the field of the marketability of services, to be the most suitable measure to counterbalance the distortions of competition. MobilCom was therefore obliged to suspend the Internet offer of some services during a defined period of time.
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG	Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG
426. Komisija je 18. februarja[266] odobrila pomoč za prestrukturiranje skupini Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG („BGB“) v vrednosti skoraj 10 milijard EUR[267]. Ta sveženj pomoči se je lahko odobril samo v zameno za precejšnje zmanjšanje prisotnosti banke na trgu, da bi se ublažil učinek te obsežnejše pomoči na izkrivljanje konkurence. Po dolgih in obsežnih pogajanjih so nemški organi nazadnje ponudili številne zaveze o odprodaji sredstev, kar je precej spremenilo prvotno predloženi načrt za prestrukturiranje. Te zaveze vključujejo, da morajo podjetja odprodati sredstva banke Berliner Bank, ene od dveh maloprodajnih znamk družbe BGB, za odcepitev hčerinskih podjetij za nepremičninske storitve, ki so bila glavni vzrok za krizo, in končno prodati družbo BGB do konca leta 2007. Načrt za prestrukturiranje predvideva tudi številne druge ukrepe, kot so odprodaja berlinske banke Weberbank ter prodaja ali zaprtje nacionalnih in tujih podružnic in hčerinskih podjetij. Poleg tega je načrtovana odprodaja hčerinskega podjetja za nepremičninsko financiranje BerlinHyp v okviru skupne odprodaje družbe BGB, bodisi ločeno ali skupaj s preostalim delom BGB.	426. On 18 February[266], the Commission approved restructuring aid for the Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG group (“BGB”) worth almost EUR 10 billion[267]. This aid package could only be authorised in exchange for significant reductions of the bank’s market presence in order to mitigate the distorting effect on competition of this large volume of aid. After long and extensive negotiations, the German authorities finally offered a variety of divestiture commitments which significantly modified the restructuring plan originally submitted. These commitments include the undertakings to divest Berliner Bank, one of BGB’s two retail brands, to hive-off the real-estate services subsidiaries which were the main cause of the crisis and, finally, to sell BGB by the end of 2007. The restructuring plan also provides for a series of other measures such as the divestment of Berlin-based Weberbank and the sale or closure of national and foreign branches and subsidiaries. Moreover, it is intended to divest the real-estate financing subsidiary BerlinHyp in the context of the overall divestment of BGB, either separately or together with the rest of BGB.
427. Skupaj bodo zgoraj opisane odprodaje, zaprtja in drugi ukrepi znižali skupno bilanco stanja družbe BGB s približno 189 milijard EUR leta 2001 na okoli 124 milijard leta 2006/2007, ko bodo obdobje prestrukturiranja in ukrepi odprodaje zaključeni. To znižanje ni primerno samo z vidika zelo visokega zneska pomoči, ampak je tudi v skladu s prakso Komisije v zvezi s pomočjo za prestrukturiranje za banke.[268] Vendar pa je odprodaja banke Berliner Bank ostala sporno vprašanje med Komisijo in nemškimi organi do zadnje faze preiskave. Glede na vodilni položaj družbe BGB v Berlinu je morala Komisija vztrajati na tem ukrepu, da bi učinkovito ublažila učinek zelo visokega zneska pomoči na izkrivljanje konkurence na področju bančnega poslovanja z občani v Berlinu. Poleg tega je bil sporazum o povračilu, ki je družbo BGB podpiral v primeru takrat še neodločene, vendar možne odredbe za izterjavo v postopku Landesbank Berlin, dodaten ukrep pomoči, ki ga je bilo treba upoštevati za izravnalne ukrepe. Odprodaja banke Berliner Bank bo znižala tržni delež družbe BGB v posameznih segmentih berlinskega poslovanja na drobno s približno ene tretjine na eno šestino zaradi prodaje.	427. In total, the above-described divestments, closures and other measures will reduce BGB’s balance sheet total from roughly EUR 189 billion in 2001 to about EUR 124 billion in 2006/2007 when the restructuring period and divestiture measures will be completed. This reduction is not only adequate in view of the very high aid amount but also in line with the Commission’s practice regarding restructuring aid for banks.[268] The divestment of Berliner Bank, however, remained a contested issue between the Commission and the German authorities until the final stage of the investigation. In view of BGB’s leading position in Berlin, the Commission had to insist on this measure in order to effectively mitigate the distorting effect of the very high aid amount on competition in the field of retail banking in Berlin. Moreover, the repayment agreement supporting BGB in case of a then non-decided but possible recovery order in the Landesbank Berlin proceeding was an additional aid measure that had to be taken into account for the compensatory measures. The divestiture of Berliner Bank will reduce BGB’s market share in the individual segments of the Berlin retail business by roughly one third to one sixth as a result of the sale.
428. Komisija je morala analizirati tudi vprašanje dolgoročne sposobnosti preživetja družbe BGB v povezavi s prihajajočo odpravo obstoječih državnih jamstev ( Anstaltslast & Gewährträgerhaftung ). To vprašanje je bilo treba ponovno preučiti skupaj z zunanjimi svetovalci, ko je prvi postopek za odprodajo deleža zvezne države v družbi BGB marca 2003 spodletel. Na koncu je Komisija ugotovila, da so ukrepi za prestrukturiranje, ki so že bili izvedeni, in tisti, ki so načrtovani za prihodnost, primerni, smiselni in temeljno ustrezni, da se družbi BGB omogoči obnovitev sposobnosti preživetja.	428. The Commission also had to analyse the question of the long-term viability of BGB in conjunction with the forthcoming abolition of the existing state guarantees ( Anstaltslast & Gewährträgerhaftung ). This question had to be re-examined with the help of external consultants when the first procedure to divest the Land ’s shares in BGB failed in March 2003. Finally, the Commission concluded that the restructuring measures already carried out and those planned for the future are reasonable, logical and fundamentally appropriate in order to enable BGB to restore its viability.
France Télécom	France Télécom
429. Francoski organi so decembra 2002 Komisiji priglasili ukrepe, s katerimi naj bi družbo France Télécom (FT) rešili iz njene finančne krize. Ti ukrepi so zlasti vključevali, da bi (javni organ) ERAP zagotovil delničarsko predplačilo v višini 9 milijard EUR v obliki kredita. To predplačilo je bilo del načrta za prestrukturiranje z naslovom „Ambition 2005“, ki ga je novo vodstvo podjetja predstavilo 4. decembra 2002. Glede na dvome o združljivosti priglašenih ukrepov s pravili o državni pomoči je Komisija januarja 2003 uvedla uradno preiskavo v zvezi s projektom delničarskega posojila[269]. Uradna preiskava je zajemala tudi shema davka na dohodek ( taxe professionnelle) , ki je veljala za družbo FT. Komisija je 2. avgusta 2004 zaključila svojo preiskavo v zvezi z obema vidikoma.	429. In December 2002, the French authorities notified to the Commission measures intended to bring France Télécom (FT) out of its financial crisis. These measures included in particular the setting up by ERAP (a public body) of a shareholders’ advance of EUR 9 billion in the form of a credit facility. This advance was part of the restructuring plan called “Ambition 2005”, which was presented by the new management of the undertaking on 4 December 2002. In view of doubts as to the compatibility of the measures notified with the rules on state aid, the Commission initiated, in January 2003, a formal investigation concerning the shareholders’ loan project[269]. The formal investigation covered also a business tax scheme ( taxe professionnelle ) applicable to FT. On 2 August 2004, the Commission closed its investigation of both aspects.
Shema davka na dohodek („taxe professionnelle“) [270]	The business tax scheme (“taxe professionnelle”) [270]
430. Zadevna davčna ureditev vključuje državno pomoč, ki ni združljiva s Pogodbo ES in jo je treba vrniti.	430. The tax scheme in question involves state aid which is incompatible with the EC Treaty and must be recovered.
431. Med letoma 1994 in 2002 je družba FT uživala posebne pogoje glede lokalnih davkov. Komisija je ugotovila, da je država z obračunavanjem polnega zneska davka na dohodek v tem obdobju dala družbi FT prednost, ki je pripeljala do ukrepa državne pomoči. V skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti[271] je Komisija zavrgla argument francoskih organov, da je treba tako pomoč pojmovati kot „izravnano“ z drugimi dajatvami, ki so veljale za družbo FT na drugih področjih. Po podatkih, ki so jih poslali francoski organi, znašajo ocenjeni prihranki družbe FT v zvezi s posebno ureditvijo za davek na dohodek od 800 milijonov do 1,1 milijarde EUR. Natančni znesek pomoči bo določila Komisija v sodelovanju s francoskimi organi med postopkom vračila.	431. Between 1994 and 2002, FT enjoyed special conditions concerning local taxes. The Commission considered that, by not levying the full amount of business tax during this period, the State offered an advantage to FT which amounts to a state aid measure. In accordance with the Court of Justice’s case law[271], the Commission dismissed the argument raised by the French authorities that such aid could be considered as being “compensated” by other charges to which FT was subject in other respects. According to information provided by the French authorities, the estimated savings for FT linked with this specific business tax scheme are between EUR 800 million and EUR 1.1 billion. The exact amount of the aid will be determined by the Commission in cooperation with the French authorities, during the recovery procedure.
Delničarski predujem [272]	The shareholder’s advance [272]
432. Dejanski okvir je ključni element ocene Komisije: v preteklih letih se je v družbi FT nakopičil precejšen dolg (63 milijard EUR na koncu leta 2001), leta 2002 pa je trg pričakoval, da bo imela družba težave pri odplačilu tega dolga. Medtem ko je bila ocena bonitete družbe FT julija 2002 na pragu, da doseže raven visoko tveganih obveznic (junk status), je vlada javno razglasila svojo namero, da bo podprla podjetje. Vsako poslabšanje položaja družbe FT do ravni visoko tveganih obveznic bi imelo hude posledice za podjetje. Država je javno potrdila svojo podporo podjetju septembra, oktobra in decembra 2002 in družba ni nikoli dosegla ravni visoko tveganih obveznic. Ob tej zadnji priložnosti je bilo v sporočilu za javnost ministrstva za gospodarske zadeve objavljeno, da bo družba FT izdala nove delnice in je pričakovala prispevek države pri izdaji delnic z zagotovitvijo navedenega delničarskega predplačila.	432. The factual context is a key element of the Commission’s assessment: in previous years, FT had accumulated a substantial debt (EUR 63 billion at the end of 2001) and in 2002 the market anticipated that FT would have difficulties refinancing this debt. In July 2002, while the rating of FT was at the threshold of a further downgrade to junk status, the Government publicly declared its intention to support the company. Any downgrade of FT to junk status would have had serious consequences for the company. The State publicly confirmed its support for the undertaking in September, October and December 2002 and the rating never reached junk status. On this last occasion, a press release of the Ministry for Economic Affairs announced that FT was going to issue new shares and anticipated the state participation in the shares issue by offering the said shareholder’s advance.
433. Delničarski predujem, ki je bil decembra 2002 ponujen družbi FT, vsebuje elemente pomoči. Zagotovitev delničarskega predujma je precej izboljšala finančno stanje operaterja. Ta prednost se je zagotovila z uporabo državnih virov, saj je ustvarila možno dopolnilno odgovornost za navedene vire. Ponudba države je bila trdna in družba FT bi samo s podpisom pogodbe o delničarskem posojilu zavarovala pravico do plačila 9 milijard EUR.	433. The shareholder’s advance offered to FT in December 2002 contains aid components. The offer of the shareholder’s advance significantly improved the operator’s financial situation. This benefit was provided using state resources as it created a potential supplementary liability for those resources. The State made a firm offer and simply by signing the shareholders’ loan contract FT could secure the right to payment of the EUR 9 billion.
434. Zagotovitve delničarskega predujma se ne sme obravnavati ločeno, ampak je treba nanjo gledati skupaj z vladnimi izjavami od julija do decembra 2002. Izjave so ustvarile pričakovanja in zaupanje o finančnih trgih ter pomagale ohraniti investicijski položaj družbe FT. Če vlada teh izjav ne bi dala, noben razumen vlagatelj ne bi v teh okoliščinah ponudil delničarskega predujma in sam prevzel zelo velikega finančnega tveganja.	434. The offer of the shareholder’s advance cannot be seen in isolation but must be viewed against the backdrop of government statements from July to December 2002. The statements created expectations and confidence on the financial markets and helped maintain FT’s investment rating. If the statements had not been made, no reasonable investor would have offered a shareholder’s advance in these circumstances and assumed alone a very large financial risk.
435. Vendar pa je Komisija priznala, da ni uspela premagati težav pri natančni opredelitvi gospodarskih učinkov zadevne pomoči ter tako določiti zneska, ki ga je treba vrniti. Odredba vračila v takem položaju lahko pomeni kršitev pravice države članice do obrambe. Poleg tega je Komisija ugotovila, da se je zgodilo prvič, da je bila pomoč rezultat dogodkov pred priglasitvijo same pomoči. Ker je Francija ta ukrep priglasila, je lahko gospodarski subjekt zakonito pričakoval, da bo država spoštovala svojo obveznost po Pogodbi. Tako bi lahko z odredbo vračila v takem položaju prišlo do kršitve načela legitimnega pričakovanja. Ob upoštevanju vsega tega Komisija ni odredila vračila pomoči.	435. The Commission did, however, recognise that it was not able to overcome the difficulties in identifying precisely the economic effects of the aid in question and thus quantifying the amount to be recovered. Ordering recovery in such a situation may constitute a violation of the right of defence of the Member State. Moreover, the Commission noted that this was the first time that aid resulted from events predating the notification of the aid itself. Since France notified this measure, an economic operator may have legitimately expected the State to abide by its obligation under the Treaty. Therefore, ordering recovery in such a situation may constitute a violation of the principle of legitimate expectation. Having taken all this into account the Commission did not order the recovery of the aid.
Bull[273]	Bull[273]
436. Komisija je 16. marca sklenila, da uvede postopek, predviden v členu 88(2), v zvezi z novo pomočjo za prestrukturiranje v korist družbe Bull. Družba Bull proizvaja računalniške strežnike in je dejavna na trgih s tem povezanih storitev. Priglašena pomoč znaša 517 milijonov EUR in je enaka pomoči za reševanje, odobreni leta 2002, skupaj s kumulativnimi obrestmi. Glede na dejanske dobičke bi francoski organi na podlagi določbe v pogodbi o pomoči prejeli od 50 do 60 milijonov EUR. Komisija je v svoji odločbi z dne 1. decembra ugotovila, da v danih okoliščinah primera pomoč ni kršila načela enkratnosti pomoči, in upoštevala, da bo ta izplačana šele po povračilu prejšnje pomoči za reševanje.	436. On 16 March, the Commission decided to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 88(2) with respect to new restructuring aid in favour of Bull. Bull produces computer servers and is active in the related services markets. The notified aid amounts to EUR 517 million and is equal to the rescue aid granted in 2002 with cumulated interest. Depending on actual profits, some EUR 50 to 60 million would devolve to the French authorities on the basis of a clause in the aid contract. In its decision of 1 December, the Commission considered that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the aid did not infringe the “one time, last time” principle, and took note that it would be paid only after reimbursement of the earlier rescue aid.
Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH[274]	Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH[274]
437. Komisija je 8. septembra sklenila, da ne bo ugovarjala zoper pomoč za reševanje, ki jo je Nemčija dodelila nemški ladjedelnici Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH.	437. On 8 September, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to rescue aid granted by Germany to the German shipyard Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH.
438. Družba je objavila plačilno nesposobnost, potem ko je stranka zavrnila plačilo zadnjega obroka za predelavo potniške ladje. Ladja je 14. januarja potonila v ladjedelnici družbe po hudem neurju. Da bi družba nadaljevala svoje poslovanje, je potrebovala premostitveno posojilo v višini 10 milijonov EUR. Posojilo so aprila v enakih delih zagotovile ena javna in dve zasebni finančni ustanovi, medtem ko so bila zasebna posojila delno podprta z javnim jamstvom.	438. The company had filed for insolvency after a customer refused to pay the last instalment for conversion work on a cruise ship. The ship had sunk on 14 January in the company’s yard after a heavy storm. In order to continue operations, the company needed a bridging loan of EUR 10 million. The loan was provided in April in equal parts by one public and two private financial institutions, whereas the private loans were partially backed by a public guarantee.
439. Komisija je v skladu s točko 23 smernic o pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje iz leta 1999 sprejela, da se posojilo zagotovi za šestmesečno obdobje in povrne v naslednjem obdobju, ki ne sme biti daljše od 12 mesecev po plačilu zadnjega obroka družbi. Komisija je soglašala s tem trajanjem glede na dejstvo, da je bil edini namen posojila odpraviti negativne posledice zunanjega dogodka in ni bilo namenjeno kot likvidnostna injekcija družbi, ki bi bila v težavah, če ne bi bilo neurja. Komisija je zlasti upoštevala zavezo nemške vlade, da poroča o finančnem položaju podjetja. Pomoč je bila vrnjena v šestih mesecih.	439. The Commission accepted under point 23 of the 1999 rescue and restructuring guidelines that the loan be provided for a period of 6 months and reimbursed over an additional period not exceeding 12 months after payment of the last instalment to the company. The Commission agreed to this duration in view of the fact that the loan was solely intended to make good the negative consequences of an external event and seemed not to be meant as a liquidity injection into a company that would be in difficulty in the absence of the storm. In particular, the Commission took account of an undertaking by the German Government to report on the financial situation of the company. The aid was paid back within 6 months.
Španske javne ladjedelnice[275]	Spanish public shipyards[275]
440. Komisija je 12. maja odločila, da pomoč španskim javnim ladjedelnicam ni bila v skladu s pravili EU o državni pomoči. Komisija je ugotovila, da je v letih 1999 in 2000 družba v državni lasti Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) dodelila pomoč v višini 500 milijonov EUR javnim civilnim ladjedelnicam, ki so danes vse v lasti družbe IZAR. Pomoč je bila v obliki dokapitalizacije v višini 252,4 milijona EUR leta 2000, posojil v višini 192,1 milijona EUR in nakupne cene 55,9 milijona EUR nad tržno vrednostjo, ko je družba SEPI kupila tri ladjedelnice leta 1999. Komisija je ugotovila, da so zgornji ukrepi pomenili dodatno državno pomoč, ki se po odobritvi končnega svežnja za prestrukturiranje leta 1997 ni mogla več odobriti v skladu s pravili EU za pomoč ladjedelništvu. Ker je posojila v višini 192,1 milijona EUR že vrnila družba IZAR, znaša znesek, ki ga mora IZAR vrniti, 308,3 milijona EUR skupaj s pripadajočimi obrestmi.	440. On 12 May, the Commission decided that aid provided to the Spanish public shipyards was not in line with the EU rules on state aid. The Commission established that, in 1999 and 2000, the state holding company Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) granted aid worth EUR 500 million to the public civil shipyards that are today all owned by IZAR. The aid took the form of a capital injection of EUR 252.4 million in 2000, loans amounting to EUR 192.1 million and a purchase price of EUR 55.9 million above market value when SEPI purchased three shipyards in 1999. The Commission concluded that the above measures constituted further state aid which, after the approval of a final restructuring package in 1997, could no longer be approved under the EU shipbuilding aid rules. As the loans of EUR 192.1 million have already been paid back by IZAR, the sum to be recovered from IZAR amounts to EUR 308.3 million, plus interest.
441. Komisija je 20. oktobra sprejela še eno odločbo, v kateri je ugotovila, da je družba SEPI leta 2000 javnim civilnim ladjedelnicam dodelila dodatnih 556 milijonov EUR.	441. On 20 October, the Commission took another decision, which established that SEPI had in 2000 granted a further EUR 556 million to the public civil shipyards.
442. Pomoč je bila v obliki dokapitalizacije v višini 1477 milijonov EUR za družbo IZAR leta 2000. Del dokapitalizacije, ki se ni štel kot državna pomoč (921 milijonov EUR), se je uporabil za kritje socialnih stroškov in drugih stroškov, povezanih s preteklimi in nedavnimi vojaškimi dejavnostmi družbe IZAR ter njene predhodnice Bazán. Sredstva za vojaške dejavnosti načeloma niso zajeta v pravilih EU o državni pomoči. Pomoč v višini 556 milijonov EUR za civilne dejavnosti družbe IZAR ni bila v skladu s pravili EU o državni pomoči, zato je Komisija sklenila, da mora družba IZAR vrniti tudi ta znesek.	442. The aid took the form of a capital injection of EUR 1 477 million to IZAR in 2000. The part of the capital injection not considered to be state aid (EUR 921 million) was used to cover social costs and other costs linked to the past and recent military activities of IZAR and its predecessor Bazán. Funds for military activities are in principle not covered by the EU state aid rules. The EUR 556 million aid provided to IZAR’s civil activities was not in line with the EU state aid rules and the Commission therefore concluded that this amount also has to be recovered from IZAR.
Nizozemska pomoč za uskladitev [276]	Dutch matching aid [276]
443. Leta 2003 je Nizozemska priglasila načrte za odobritev pomoči v podporo šestim ladjedelniškim pogodbam za štiri nizozemske ladjedelnice. Namen pomoči je bil uskladiti nezakonito in nezdružljivo pomoč, ki jo je domnevno ponudila druga država članica ladjedelnicam v navedeni državi, ki so se potegovale za ladjedelniške pogodbe.	443. In 2003, the Netherlands had notified plans to grant aid in support of six shipbuilding contracts to four Dutch shipyards. The purpose of the aid was to match illegal and incompatible aid allegedly offered by another Member State to shipyards in that country which competed for the shipbuilding contracts.
444. Komisija je 30. junija sklenila, da Nizozemska ne bi smela odobriti te pomoči. Komisija je poudarila, da je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti jasno opredelilo načelo, da država članica ne sme sama ukrepati za odpravljanje posledic nezakonite pomoči iz druge države članice. Sodišče je izrecno odredilo, da ni mogoče utemeljiti ukrepa pomoči na podlagi dejstva, da nezakonito pomoč odobrijo druge države članice.	444. On 30 June the Commission decided that the Netherlands could not grant this aid. The Commission stressed that the principle that a Member State should not act on its own to counter the effects of unlawful aid from another Member State has been clearly established by the Court of Justice. Specifically, the Court has held that it is not possible to justify an aid measure on the ground that other Member States grant illegal aid.
445. Komisija je poleg tega ugotovila, da je bila uskladitev domnevne nezakonite pomoči iz druge države članice EU v nasprotju s splošnimi načeli Pogodbe ES. Komisija je prav tako dvomila o domnevnem dokazu, da je bila pomoč na voljo v drugi državi članici.	445. The Commission furthermore concluded that matching alleged illegal aid from another EU Member State was contrary to the general principles of the EC Treaty. The Commission also had doubts concerning the alleged evidence that the aid in the other Member State was available.
Huta Częstochowa SA[277]	Huta Częstochowa SA[277]
446. Komisija je 19. maja sprejela svojo prvo odločitev zunaj vmesnega postopka za uvedbo podrobne preiskave glede možne pomoči, dodeljene družbi v novi državi članici. Zadevna družba je poljski proizvajalec jekla Huta Częstochowa SA. Poljska država razmišlja o finančnih ukrepih, da bi prestrukturirala družbo. Komisija sedaj pričakuje pojasnilo, ali se je in/ali se bo družbi odobrila pomoč za prestrukturiranje in če se bo, kakšne vrste.	446. On 19 May, the Commission took its first decision outside the interim procedure to launch an in-depth probe into possible aid granted to a company in a new Member State. The company concerned is the Polish steel producer Huta Częstochowa SA. The Polish State is contemplating financial measures with a view to restructuring the company. The Commission is now seeking clarification whether and, if so, what kind of restructuring aid has been and/or will be granted to the company.
Polje 8: Pomoč za prestrukturiranje in koncept „novega podjetja“ Komisija je v dveh negativnih odločbah z dne 20. aprila in 22. septembra[278] o francoskih družbah za popravilo ladij uporabila uvodno izjavo št. 7 Smernic Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah[279], ki novo ustanovljena podjetja izključujejo iz upravičenosti do pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje. Osnovno načelo te določbe je izključiti podjetja, ki čeprav bi lahko imela težave na začetku poslovanja, niso podjetja v težavah, kot so opisana v smernicah. Odločbi jasno kažeta, da je treba ugotovitev, da so podjetja na novo ustanovljena, utemeljiti na pravni in ekonomski podlagi. V zadevnih primerih sta bili obe podjetji novi pravni osebi, prevzeli sta sredstva in delavce prejšnjih popravljalnic ladij ter začeli svoje poslovanje brez dolgov in obveznosti, povezanih s predhodnimi dejavnostmi. Zato bi ju bilo treba šteti kot nova gospodarska subjekta, ki bi morala biti ustanovljena samo, če sta sposobna preživeti v obstoječih razmerah na trgu. Na podlagi te analize je Komisija sklenila, da je bila pomoč za prestrukturiranje obeh podjetij nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom. Vendar pa je Komisija odobrila del pomoči kot regionalno pomoč za naložbe in pomoč za usposabljanje. Za preostali del pomoči je Komisija odredila vračilo. \|	Box 8: Restructuring aid and the concept of “new company” In two negative decisions of 20 April and 22 September[278] concerning French ship repair companies, the Commission applied recital 7 of the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty[279], which excludes newly established companies from eligibility for rescue and restructuring aid. The rationale of this provision is to exclude companies which, although they might encounter start-up problems, are not firms in difficulty as described by the guidelines. The decisions make clear that the finding that the companies are newly established has to be characterised on both legal and economic grounds. In the cases at hand, both companies were new legal entities, had taken over the assets and employees of previous ship repairers, and had started their operation free of debt and obligations related to previous activities. Thus, they were to be considered new economic entities, which should have been created only if viable in existing market conditions. On the basis of this analysis, the Commission concluded that restructuring aid for the two companies was incompatible with the common market. The Commission, however, approved part of the aid as regional investment aid and as training aid. As for the remaining aid, the Commission ordered recovery. \|
Španski in nemški programi financiranja v ladjedelništvu	Spanish and German ship-financing schemes
447. Komisija je marca in julija odobrila španske in nemške programe financiranja v ladjedelništvu[280]. Te sheme naj bi bile v skladu z Dogovorom OEDC o izvoznih kreditih z uradno podporo. V skladu s tem dogovorom obresti, zaračunane lastnikom ladij, temeljijo na ustrezni tržni referenčni obrestni meri. Sistemi ne zajemajo kreditnega tveganja kupca.	447. In March and July respectively, the Commission approved the Spanish and German ship-financing schemes[280]. These schemes were considered to be in compliance with the OECD’s Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. In accordance with this Arrangement, the interest charged to shipowners is based on the relevant commercial interest reference rate. The systems do not cover the buyer’s credit risk.
Spremembe investicijskega programa grških ladjedelnic	Amendments to Hellenic Shipyards’ investment plan
448. Komisija je 23. aprila sklenila, da uvede formalni preiskovalni postopek v skladu s členom 88(2) ES[281] v zvezi s številnimi spremembami načrta za prestrukturiranje grških ladjedelnic. Komisija je leta 1997 po odobritvi odpisa dolga grških ladjedelnic v skladu z Uredbo Sveta št. 1013/97, ki je predvidevala pomoč za nekatere ladjedelnice v fazi prestrukturiranja[282], odobrila pomoč za naložbe za prestrukturiranje ladjedelnice na podlagi investicijskega programa, predloženega Komisiji v skladu s Sedmo direktivo o ladjedelništvu[283]. Naknadne spremembe tega investicijskega programa se Komisiji niso priglasile. Zato grški organi niso izpolnjevali pogojev Sedme direktive o ladjedelništvu, v skladu s katero je Komisija leta 1997 odobrila investicijski program, ki določa, da je treba Komisiji priglasiti vsako spremembo obstoječega ukrepa pomoči, zajetega v direktivi[284]. Prav tako niso izpolnjevali pogojev iz smernic o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah, ki dovoljujejo spremembo načrta za prestrukturiranje po priglasitvi in pod določenimi pogoji.	448. On 23 April, the Commission decided to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Article 88(2) EC[281] with regard to a number of amendments to the restructuring plan of Hellenic Shipyards. In 1997, following the approval of Hellenic Shipyards’ debt write-off under Council Regulation 1013/97, which provided for aid to certain shipyards under restructuring[282], the Commission had approved investment aid aimed at the restructuring of the shipyard on the basis of an investment plan submitted to the Commission pursuant to the 7th Shipbuilding Directive[283]. Subsequent amendments to this investment plan were not notified to the Commission. Therefore, the Greek authorities failed to respect the terms of the 7th Shipbuilding Directive under which the Commission authorised the investment plan in 1997, which provides that the Commission must be notified of any amendment to an existing aid measure covered by the Directive[284]. They also failed to observe the conditions of the guidelines on rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty which allow the amendment to a restructuring plan upon notification and subject to certain conditions.
449. Z uvedbo formalnega preiskovalnega postopka je Komisija prav tako izrazila resne dvome, da so bili pogoji, po katerih je bila pomoč v njeni odločbi iz leta 1997 odobrena, izpolnjeni in da za investicijski program ni bila odobrena nobena nova pomoč. Taka pomoč ne bi bila združljiva s skupnim trgom glede na načelo enkratnosti pomoči in izrecno zahtevo Uredbe Sveta št. 1013/97, ki prepoveduje pomoč za vse ladjedelnice, ki so izkoristile njene določbe.	449. In opening the formal investigation procedure, the Commission also expressed serious doubts that the conditions under which the aid was approved in its 1997 decision had been met and that no new aid had been granted for the investment plan. Such aid would not be compatible with the common market in view of the “one time, last time” principle and the express requirement of Council Regulation 1013/97 which prohibits aid for all shipyards which benefited from its provisions.
Pomoč grškim ladjedelnicam[285]	Aid to Hellenic Shipyards[285]
450. Komisija je 20. oktobra sprejela negativno odločbo o zaključku formalnega preiskovalnega postopka iz člena 88(2), začetega leta 2002[286], v zvezi z dvema ukrepoma za pomoč grškim ladjedelnicam.	450. On 20 October, the Commission adopted a negative decision closing the formal investigation procedure of Article 88(2) opened in 2002[286] with regard to two measures for aid to Hellenic Shipyards.
451. Odločba grškim organom odreja, da morajo razveljaviti določbi 5(20) in 6(4) Zakona 2941/2001, ki določata, da bi morala država kriti stroške upokojitve delavcev v grških ladjedelnicah v prihodnosti in da so bile grške ladjedelnice oproščene vseh davkov ali drugih obveznosti dajatev v zvezi z rezervami, ki so po zakonu oproščene davka, posebnimi rezervami in zneski za povečanje delniškega kapitala, če sta se ti uporabljali za pokritje izgub iz prejšnjih let. Komisija je ugotovila, da ti ukrepi niso združljivi s Pogodbo, saj pomenijo pomoč za tekoče poslovanje, ki ni predvidena v Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 1540/98 z dne 29. junija 1998 o določitvi novih pravil o pomoči ladjedelništvu[287], ki ob njihovem sprejetju ni več veljala. Grški organi so morali vrniti tudi vse pomoči, ki so jih že prejeli v skladu s temi določbami.	451. The decision orders the Greek authorities to repeal provisions 5(20) and 6(4) of Law 2941/2001, which provide respectively that the State should cover future retirement costs of Hellenic Shipyards’ employees and that Hellenic Shipyards was relieved from any tax or other duty obligation with respect to reserves which are tax free by law, special reserves and amounts for the increase of share capital, so long as these were used to set off losses of previous years. The Commission found these measures to be incompatible with the Treaty, as they constitute operating aid not provided for by Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding[287], which was in force at the time when they were adopted. The Greek authorities were also ordered to recover any aid that may have already been granted under these provisions.
Postabank/Erste Bank Hungary Rt	Postabank/Erste Bank Hungary Rt
452. Republika Madžarska je med letoma 2003 in 2004 Komisiji priglasila številne ukrepe v korist družbe Postabank és Takarékpénztár (Postabank) po t. i. postopek vmesnega mehanizma, predvidenega v Prilogi IV.3 k Aktu o pristopu. Madžarski organi so priglašene ukrepe sprejeli v obdobju med letoma 1995 in 2003, da bi pomagali pri prestrukturiranju družbe Postabank in pospešili njeno privatizacijo. Komisija je uradno preiskavo uvedla 20. oktobra 2004[288]. Postabank je bil nazadnje privatiziran oktobra 2003, ko je vlada prodala svoj 99,9-odstotni delež avstrijski banki Erste Bank. Postabank se je 1. septembra 2004 združil z madžarsko podružnico Erste Bank.	452. The Republic of Hungary notified to the Commission in 2003 and 2004 a series of measures in favour of Postabank és Takarékpénztár (Postabank) under the so-called interim mechanism procedure provided for in Annex IV.3 of the Act of Accession. The notified measures were adopted by the Hungarian authorities over the period from 1995 to 2003 to assist the restructuring of Postabank and to facilitate its privatisation. The Commission opened the formal investigation on 20 October 2004[288]. Postabank was eventually privatised in October 2003 when the Government sold its 99.9% stake to Erste Bank of Austria. On 1 September 2004 Postabank was merged with Erste Bank’s Hungarian subsidiary.
453. Komisija je odobrila številne ukrepe za prestrukturiranje, ki so jih v preteklosti madžarski organi odobrili v korist družbe PostaBank, vendar je uvedla formalni preiskovalni postopek v zvezi s t. i. „odškodnino za neznane terjatve“, s katerimi se bo lahko banka, ki je bila leta 2003 prodana banki Erste Bank, srečevala od maja naprej, ko je Madžarska postala članica Evropske unije. „Odškodnina za neznane terjatve“ lahko pripelje do dodatnih terjatev, kot so bile jasno opredeljene z datumom pristopa. Na tej stopnji Komisija meni, da ni mogoče določiti obsega in zneska finančne podpore za Postabank v prihodnosti. Komisija ocenjuje, da je „odškodnina za neznane terjatve“ v skladu s smernicami EU o pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje[289].	453. The Commission has cleared a series of restructuring measures granted in the past by the Hungarian authorities in favour of Postabank, but it has opened formal investigation proceedings regarding so-called “indemnity for unknown claims” that the bank, which was sold to Erste Bank in 2003, may have to face since May, when Hungary became a member of the European Union. The “indemnity for unknown claims” may lead to further claims beyond what was clearly defined by the date of accession. At this stage, the Commission believes that the scope and amount of financial support provided to Postabank in the future cannot be determined. The Commission is assessing the “indemnity for unknown claims” under the EU’s guidelines for rescue and restructuring aid[289].
Nemške deželne banke (Landesbanken)	German Landesbanken
454. Komisija je 20. oktobra zaključila svojo dolgoletno preiskavo glede prenosa javnih sredstev v začetku devetdesetih na sedem nemških deželnih bank in Nemčiji ukazala, naj vrne okoli 3 milijard EUR skupaj s pripadajočimi obrestmi.	454. On 20 October, the Commission concluded its long-standing investigations into the transfer of public assets in the early 1990s to seven German Landesbanken by ordering Germany to recover about EUR 3 billion plus interest.
455. Na začetku devetdesetih so nemške deželne vlade ( Länder) , ki so delno ali v celoti lastnice bank, prenesle javne zgradbe in druga sredstva, da bi povečale kapitalsko osnovo bank. Glavni razlog za te prenose je bila uvedba direktiv o lastnih sredstvih in plačilni sposobnosti, ki so od nemških javnih bank zahtevale, da prevzamejo večje zneske novega kapitala, da bi ohranile svojo raven dejavnosti.	455. At the beginning of the 1990s, the German state governments ( Länder ), which partly or fully own the banks, transferred public housing and other assets to increase the capital base of the banks. The main reason for these transfers was the introduction of the Own Funds and Solvency Directives requiring German public banks to take up large amounts of new capital in order to maintain their level of activities.
456. Finančni transferji so sprožili pritožbo Združenja nemških zasebnih bank (BdB) v zvezi s sedmimi bankami[290]: Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (WestLB) (1991), ki je bila takrat največja nemška javna banka, ter tudi Landesbank Berlin (1993), Norddeutsche Landesbank (1991), Bayerische Landesbank (1994 in 1995), Hamburgische Landesbank (1993), Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein (1991) in Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen (1998).	456. The financial transfers triggered a complaint by the Association of German Private Banks (BdB) concerning seven banks[290]: Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (WestLB) (1991), then the biggest of the German public banks, but also Landesbank Berlin (1993), Norddeutsche Landesbank (1991), Bayerische Landesbank (1994 and 1995), Hamburgische Landesbank (1993), Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein (1991) and Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen (1998).
457. Leta 1999 je Komisija sprejela prvo negativno odločbo o prenosu sredstev na banko WestLB. Leta 2003 je Sodišče prve stopnje preklicalo odločbo na podlagi tega, da Komisija ni dovolj natančno pojasnila svojih izračunov, vendar pa je potrdilo vsebino odločbe.	457. In 1999, the Commission adopted a first negative decision concerning the transfer to WestLB. In 2003, the Court of First Instance annulled the decision taking the view that the Commission had not sufficiently explained its calculations but confirming the substance of the decision.
458. Ocena Komisije je pokazala, da je plačilo, ki je bilo dogovorjeno z deželnimi vladami v zameno za prenos sredstev, zelo nizko (v povprečju manj kot 1 %) in ni ustrezalo običajnemu donosu, ki bi ga zasebni vlagatelj pričakoval za primerljivo, negotovinsko naložbo (ki je bila ocenjena na okoli 6–7 % po obdavčitvi, razen za banko Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen, pri kateri je obrestna mera za drug instrument – tiho udeležbo – precej nižja).	458. The Commission’s assessment showed that the remuneration agreed by the Länder in return for the transfer of assets was very low (on average less than 1%) and did not correspond to the normal return that a private investor would have expected for a comparable, non-cash investment (which has been estimated at some 6-7% after tax, except for Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen where the interest rate for a different instrument - silent participation - is substantially lower).
459. Komisija je tako ugotovila, da nižje plačilo pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES, in Nemčiji ukazala, da sprejme ukrepe, s katerimi bodo deželne banke vrnile razliko(WestLB: 979 milijonov EUR, Landesbank Berlin: 810 milijonov EUR, Norddeutsche Landesbank: 472 milijonov EUR, Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein: 432 milijonov EUR, Hamburgische Landesbank: 91 milijonov EUR, Bayerische Landesbank: 260 milijonov EUR, Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen: 6 milijonov EUR, v vseh primerih skupaj s pripadajočimi obrestmi).	459. The Commission therefore established that the reduced remuneration constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and ordered Germany to take measures to recover the difference from the Landesbanken (WestLB: EUR 979 million, Landesbank Berlin: EUR 810 million, Norddeutsche Landesbank: EUR 472 million, Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein: EUR 432 million, Hamburgische Landesbank: EUR 91 million, Bayerische Landesbank: EUR 260 million, Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen: EUR 6 million, in all cases plus interest).
3. Regionalna pomoč	3. REGIONAL AID
Pomoč španskemu proizvajalcu jekla Siderúrgica Añón SA[291]	Aid to Spanish steel producer Siderúrgica Añón SA[291]
460. Komisija je 14. junija izdala dokončno negativno odločbo proti več finančnim ukrepom v korist španskemu proizvajalcu jekla Siderúrgica Añón SA. Ukrepi so se nanašali na subvencijo v višini približno 2 milijonov EUR, brezobrestno posojilo v višini približno 2 milijonov EUR, subvencioniranje za 25 osnovnih točk obrestne mere ter provizijo za odobritev posojila v višini 10 milijonov EUR, jamstvo za 30 % istega posojila za premijo nad tržnimi razmerami ter zagotovitev kapitala v višini približno 2 milijonov EUR.	460. On 14 June, the Commission issued a final negative decision against several financial measures in favour of Spanish steel producer Siderúrgica Añón SA. The measures concerned a subsidy amounting to approximately EUR 2 million, an interest-free loan amounting to approximately EUR 2 million, a subsidisation by 25 basis points of the interest rate as well as the formalisation fee of a loan in the order of EUR 10 million, a guarantee on 30% of the very same loan for a premium beyond market conditions, and a provision of capital amounting to about EUR 2 million.
461. Komisija je menila, da je treba zadnjo zagotovitev lastniškega kapitala z gospodarskega vidika obravnavati kot enakovredno podrejenemu konzorcijskemu posojilu in da zadevni donos naložbe ni ustrezal običajnim obrestnim meram, plačanim za tako posojilo. Komisija je sklenila, da so vsi ukrepi pomenili državno pomoč. Čeprav se podjetje pojmuje kot srednje veliko podjetje in se lahko pomoč za naložbe za srednje velika podjetja celo v jeklarstvu izvzame, to ne velja za večje dodelitve individualne pomoči, kot je ta.	461. The Commission considered that the latter provision of equity must, from an economic point of view, be treated as equivalent to a subordinated participating loan and that the given return on investment did not correspond to the normal interest rates paid for such a loan. The Commission concluded that all the measures constituted state aid. Although the company is considered a medium-sized enterprise and investment aid for medium-sized enterprises can, even in the steel sector, be exempted, this does not apply to large individual aid grants such as the present one.
Pomoč pri prevozu za industrijo motornih vozil v najbolj oddaljenih regijah in območjih z zelo nizko gostoto prebivalstva[292]	Transport aid to the motor vehicle industry in outermost and low population density regions[292]
462. Komisija je 8. septembra izdala odločbo brez ugovora, ki je dovoljevala dodelitev pomoči družbi Volvo v zvezi s prevozom kamionskih kabin, proizvedenih v obratu Volva v regiji Umeå, ki je opredeljena kot območje z zelo nizko gostoto prebivalstva na severu Švedske.	462. On 8 September, the Commission issued a no-objection decision allowing the grant of aid to Volvo in connection with the transport of truck cabins produced in the Volvo plant in Umeå, a region qualifying as a low population density area in the north of Sweden.
463. Do 31. decembra 2002 je okvir Skupnosti za državno pomoč industriji motornih vozil[293] izrecno prepovedoval dodelitev pomoči pri prevozu za to industrijo, ki je opredeljena kot občutljivi sektor. Primer Volvo je bil od izteka veljavnosti okvira 1. januarja 2003 prvi primer priglasitve v zvezi s pomočjo v transportnem sektorju za proizvajalca motornih vozil. Pomoč je bila dovoljena, ker ne velja več nobeno posebno pravilo za to industrijo, ki bi prepovedovalo ali kako drugače omejevalo dodelitev pomoči pri prevozu v regijah, ki so opredeljene kot najbolj oddaljene ali območja z nizko gostoto prebivalstva v smislu smernic o nacionalni regionalni pomoči[294].	463. Until 31 December 2002, the Community framework for state aid to the motor vehicle industry[293] expressly prohibited the grant of transport aid to this industry qualifying as a sensitive sector. Since the expiry of the framework on 1 January 2003, the Volvo case was the first notification concerning transport aid to a manufacturer of motor vehicles. The aid was allowed because there is no industry-specific rule in force any more which would prohibit or otherwise limit the grant of transport aid in regions qualifying as outermost regions or low population density regions within the meaning of the guidelines on national regional aid[294].
Večsektorski okvir, podaljšanje programov obstoječih regionalnih pomoči	The multisectoral framework, prolongation of existing regional aid maps
464. Leta 2004 so vse države pristopnice v skladu z vmesnim postopkom za obstoječo pomoč, navedenim v odstavku 3(1)(c) Priloge IV k Pristopni pogodbi, predložile programe za podaljšanje svojih obstoječih regionalnih pomoči za obdobje od 1. maja 2004 do 31. decembra 2006. Nove države članice so med drugim morale zagotoviti skladnost z znižanimi zgornjimi mejami regionalne pomoči za večje investicijske projekte, kot je predvideno v Večsektorskem okviru 2002[295]. Komisija je te ukrepe preučila in izdala odločbo o nevložitvi ugovora za vse nove države članice. Skoraj celotno ozemlje vsake nove države članice je namreč upravičeno do statusa iz člena 87(3)(a), pri čemer so edine izjeme ozemlje Cipra ter glavni mesti Praga in Bratislava.	464. In 2004, all acceding States submitted, under the interim procedure for existing aid referred to in Annex IV, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1(c) to the Accession Treaty, the prolongation of their existing regional aid maps for the period from 1 May 2004 to 31 December 2006. Among other things, the new Member States have been requested to ensure compliance with the reduced regional aid ceilings for aid to large investment projects as provided for by the 2002 multisectoral framework[295]. The Commission has examined these measures and has issued a decision not to raise any objections for all new Member States. In effect, virtually the entire territory of each new Member State is eligible for Article 87(3)(a) status, the only exceptions being the territory of Cyprus and the capital cities of Prague and Bratislava.
465. Junija so francoski organi v skladu z zahtevo po posamezni priglasitvi, predvideni v Večsektorskem okviru 2002 za regionalno pomoč, namenjeno večjim investicijskim projektom, priglasili plačilo pomoči v višini 48 milijonov EUR za investicijski projekt družbe Total France[296]. Namen projekta je predvsem sprememba proizvodnega procesa v rafineriji v mestu Gonfreville l’Orcher in pomeni skupno naložbo v višini 547 milijonov EUR. Zagotovil bo dolgoročno sposobnost preživetja obrata, kar pomeni 1000 delovnih mest in oblikovanje 60 novih.	465. In June, the French authorities notified, under the individual notification requirement provided for by the 2002 multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, a EUR 48 million aid payment for an investment project by the Total France[296]. The project is aimed at fundamentally changing the production process at the refinery in Gonfreville l’Orcher and represents a total investment of EUR 547 million. It will ensure the long-term viability of the plant, which represents 1 000 jobs and will create 60 new jobs.
466. Gonfreville l’Orcher leži v francoski regiji, upravičeni do regionalne pomoči, priglašeno pomoč pa dodeljujejo lokalni organi v skladu s programom pomoči, ki ga je odobrila Komisija. V regijah, upravičenih do regionalne pomoči, Komisija šteje, da so s skupnim trgom združljivi ukrepi pomoči, ki podpirajo naložbe v zvezi z ustanovitvijo novega podjetja, razširitvijo obstoječega podjetja ali zagonom dejavnosti, ki vključuje bistveno spremembo v proizvodu ali proizvodnem procesu.	466. Gonfreville l’Orcher is located in a French region eligible for regional aid, and the notified aid is being granted by the local authorities in accordance with an aid scheme authorised by the Commission. In regions eligible for regional aid, the Commission considers compatible with the common market aid measures supporting investments related to the setting-up of a new establishment, the extension of an existing establishment, or the starting-up of an activity involving a fundamental change in the product or production process.
467. V skladu z Večsektorskim okvirom 2002 morajo države članice priglasiti posamezno pomoč, ki presega določeno zgornjo mejo in je odvisna od standardne zgornje meje regionalne pomoči, veljavne v zadevni regiji. Da bi Komisija ocenila združljivost ukrepa pomoči s skupnim trgom, je morala preveriti, ali učinki pomoči na izkrivljanje konkurence niso večji od pozitivnih učinkov za regionalni razvoj. V tem okviru je Komisija ugotovila, da je predlagana 4,9-odstotna intenzivnost pomoči nižja od najvišje 8,4-odstotne intenzivnosti pomoči, ki se lahko odobri po pravilih večsektorskega okvira za večje investicijske projekte, da tržni delež EGP prejemnika za zadevne proizvode ne presega 25 % in da naložba ne bo povečala proizvodne zmogljivosti EGP za več kot 5 %. Komisija je tako ugotovila, da je pomoč združljiva s skupnim trgom. Ta primer je bila prva odločba Komisije v skladu z Večsektorskim okvirom 2002.	467. According to the 2002 multisectoral framework, Member States have to notify individual aid exceeding a certain threshold which depends on the standard regional aid ceiling applicable in the region concerned. In order to assess the compatibility of the aid measure with the common market, the Commission has to examine whether distortion effects of the aid on competition are not greater than its positive effects on regional development. In this context, the Commission noted that the proposed aid intensity of 4.9% is lower than the maximum aid intensity of 8.4% that can be approved under the multisectoral framework rules for large-scale investment projects of this size, that the EEA market share of the recipient for the products concerned does not exceed 25%, and that the investment will not increase EEA-wide production capacity by more than 5%. The Commission thus found the aid to be compatible with the common market. This case was the first Commission decision under the 2002 multisectoral framework.
Zahodna Cumbria, Združeno kraljestvo	West Cumbria UK
468. Komisija je 4. avgusta potrdila, da je povečanje zgornje meje intenzivnosti pomoči z 10 % neto ekvivalenta dotacije na 20 % neto ekvivalenta dotacije v programu Združenega kraljestva za regionalno pomoč za dve območji zaposlitvenih možnosti, območji 22 in 23, ki tvorita Zahodno Cumbrio, združljivo s Pogodbo ES[297]. Prilagoditev začne veljati po začetku veljavnosti odločbe Komisije in velja do 31. decembra 2006.	468. On 4 August, the Commission approved an increase in the aid intensity ceiling from 10% NGE to 20% NGE in the UK regional aid map for two job opportunity zones, zones 22 and 23, which constitute West Cumbria, as being compatible with the EC Treaty[297]. The adjustment takes effect upon the entry into force of the Commission’s decision and is valid until 31 December 2006.
469. V prvotnem programu regionalne pomoči sta območji 22 in 23 t. i. 10-odstotni območji v skladu s točko 4.8 smernic o regionalni pomoči[298]. Odstavek 5.6 smernic o nacionalni regionalni pomoči omogoča, da Komisija odobri prilagoditve obstoječih programov regionalne pomoči med njihovim obdobjem veljavnosti, če se lahko dokaže, da so se družbeno-gospodarske razmere precej spremenile. Če se taka prilagoditev poišče v zvezi z intenzivnostmi pomoči za t. i. regije c, mora država članica dokazati, da so se družbeno-gospodarski kazalci, ki jih je država članica izbrala za izbiro regij c, na nacionalni ravni poslabšali.	469. In the initial regional aid map zones 22 and 23 are so-called 10% zones pursuant to point 4.8 of the regional aid guidelines[298]. Paragraph 5.6. of the guidelines on national regional aid allows the Commission to approve adjustments to existing regional aid maps during their period of validity if it can be shown that socio-economic conditions have changed significantly. If such an adjustment is sought in relation to the aid intensities for so-called c-regions, the Member State has to demonstrate that the socio-economic indicators that have been chosen by the Member State in order to select c-regions have deteriorated on a national basis.
470. Bruto domači proizvod in razpoložljivi podatki o brezposelnosti so potrdili precejšnje poslabšanje družbeno-gospodarskih razmer v obeh zadevnih območjih zaposlitvenih možnosti.	470. The GDP and unemployment data available confirmed a significant deterioration in the socio-economic situation of the two job opportunity zones concerned.
Dežela Molise	Molise region
471. Komisija je 8. septembra odobrila spremembe, ki so jih italijanski organi predlagali v programu regionalne pomoči v zvezi z deželo Molise[299]. V skladu z odločbo Komisije iz leta 2000 o italijanskem programu regionalne pomoči za obdobje 2000–2006, so nekatera območja dežele Molise upravičena do statusa iz člena 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES z intenzivnostjo pomoči 20 % neto ekvivalenta dotacije, k čemer je treba prišteti 10 odstotnih točk bruto za majhna in srednje velika podjetja. Spremembe se nanašajo na vključitev določenih območij v deželi Molise, ki prej niso prejemale pomoči, v italijanski program regionalne pomoči. Ta vključitev se nadomesti z izključitvijo drugih trenutno upravičenih območij dežele Molise, ki imajo enako število prebivalcev. Druga sprememba se nanaša na povečanje intenzivnosti pomoči v zvezi z majhnimi in srednje velikimi podjetji samo na upravičenih območjih dežele Molise. To povečanje upošteva zgornjo mejo intenzivnosti pomoči, določeno v Uredbi Komisije (ES) št. 70/2001 o državni pomoči za majhna in srednje velika podjetja[300], in sicer 30 % neto v primeru regij iz člena 87(3)(a). Za te spremembe je bilo ugotovljeno, da so upravičene zaradi precejšnjega poslabšanja družbeno-gospodarskih razmer (povečanje stopnje brezposelnosti, splošno znižanje gospodarske dejavnosti, znižanje BDP/SKM na prebivalca) v posameznih območjih dežele Molise, ki sta jo prizadeli tudi dve zaporedni naravni nesreči v zelo kratkem časovnem obdobju (potres oktobra 2002 in poplave januarja 2003). Komisija je tako menila, da so spremembe v skladu s smernicami o nacionalni regionalni pomoči ter tako združljive s Pogodbo ES. Prilagoditev začne veljati po začetku veljavnosti odločbe Komisije in velja do 31. decembra 2006.	471. On 8 September, the Commission approved amendments proposed by the Italian authorities to the regional aid map with regard to the Molise region[299]. Pursuant to the Commission’s decision of 2000 on the Italian regional aid map for 2000-2006, certain areas of the Molise region are eligible for Article 87(3)(c) EC Treaty status with an aid intensity of 20% NGE, plus 10 percentage points gross for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The amendments concern the inclusion of certain previously non-assisted areas of the Molise region in the Italian regional aid map. This inclusion is offset by the exclusion of other currently eligible areas of the Molise region having the same population. The second amendment relates to the increase in aid intensity with respect to SMEs only in the eligible c-areas of the Molise region. This increase respects the ceiling of aid intensity laid down in Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 on state aid to SMEs[300], i.e. 30% net in the case of Article 87(3)(a) regions. These amendments were found to be justified owing to the significant deterioration in socio-economic conditions (increase in unemployment rate, overall reduction in economic activity, decrease of per capita GDP/PPS) in the respective areas of the Molise region, which were also affected by two successive natural disasters within a short space of time (earthquake in October 2002 and floods in January 2003). The Commission thus considered the amendments to be in line with the guidelines on national regional aid and, therefore, to be compatible with the EC Treaty. The adjustment takes effect upon the entry into force of the Commission’s decision and is valid until 31 December 2006.
Program tveganega kapitala na Severnem Irskem	Northern Ireland Venture scheme
472. Komisija je 20. oktobra zaključila formalni preiskovalni postopek, uveden novembra 2003, in odobrila program „Invest Northern Ireland Venture 2003“[301]. Program želi spodbujati financiranje tveganega kapitala za majhna in srednje velika podjetja na Severnem Irskem. Temelji na krovnem programu za financiranje tveganega kapitala za majhna in srednje velika podjetja v Združenem kraljestvu, ukrepu „Tvegani kapital in posojilni sklad za majhna in srednje velika podjetja (Small and Medium Enterprises Venture Capital and Loan Fund (SMEVCLF))“, ki ga je Komisija odobrila leta 2003. Vendar se od zadnjega razlikuje po pomembnem vidiku, saj majhnim in srednje velikim podjetjem zagotavlja možnost, da prejmejo tvegani kapital v višini do 1,5 milijona UKL (2,2 milijona EUR). Ta novi element je Združeno kraljestvo – ker prvotno odobreni program za območja iz člena 87(3)(c), kot je Severna Irska, predvideva najvišji znesek 750 000 EUR – utemeljilo z raziskavo trga. Ta raziskava kaže, da obstaja vrzel med zagotavljanjem tveganega kapitala v obsegu med 250 000 in 1,5 milijona UKL. Komisija je novembra 2003 uvedla formalni preiskovalni postopek, da bi zainteresiranim strankam omogočila, da izrazijo pripombe o predlogu Združenega kraljestva. Vse pripombe so bile pozitivne ter so potrdile potrebo po ukrepu in njegovo sorazmernost. Glede na pozitivne elemente tega programa je Komisija sklenila, da program „Invest Northern Ireland 2003“ izpolnjuje pogoje, določene v sporočilu Komisije o državni pomoči in tveganem kapitalu[302]. Komisija je tako ugotovila, da je ukrep združljiv s skupnim trgom.	472. On 20 October, the Commission closed the formal investigation procedure opened in November 2003 and approved the “Invest Northern Ireland Venture 2003” scheme[301]. The scheme seeks to promote risk capital financing for SMEs in Northern Ireland. It builds upon an umbrella scheme for risk capital financing to SMEs in the United Kingdom, the “Small and Medium Enterprises Venture Capital and Loan Fund (SMEVCLF)”, a measure that was approved by the Commission in 2003. However, it deviates from the latter in one important respect by offering the possibility for SMEs to receive risk capital amounts of up to UKL 1.5 million (EUR 2.2 million). This new element – as the initially approved SMEVCLF scheme provides for maximum amounts of EUR 750 000 for Article 87(3)(c) areas like Northern Ireland – was justified by the UK by means of a market study. This study shows that there is a gap in the provision of risk capital in the UKL 250 000 to UKL 1.5 million range. In November 2003 the Commission had opened the formal investigation procedure in order to enable interested parties to comment on the UK proposal. All comments were favourable and confirmed the need for and proportionality of the measure. In view of the positive elements of the scheme, the Commission concluded that the “Invest Northern Ireland 2003” scheme fulfils the conditions set out in the Commission communication on state aid and risk capital”[302]. It has therefore found the measure to be compatible with the common market.
Tremonti bis	Tremonti bis
473. Komisija je 20. oktobra odločila, da je program pomoči, ki izhaja iz podaljšanja obdobja veljavnosti italijanskega zakona iz leta 2001 (Zakon št. 383/2001, „Tremonti bis“), ki podjetjem omogoča, da izvedejo naložbe v občinah, prizadetih zaradi naravnih nesreč leta 2002, do leta 2002, nezdružljiva s pravili o državni pomoči iz Pogodbe ES[303].	473. On 20 October, the Commission ruled that an aid scheme resulting from the extension of the period of validity to 2002 of an Italian law of 2001 (Law No 383/2001, “Tremonti bis”) benefiting firms carrying out investment in municipalities affected by natural disasters in 2002 is incompatible with the state aid rules of the EC Treaty[303].
474. Pomoč za povrnitev škode, ki so jo povzročile naravne nesreče ali izjemni dogodki, je združljiva s skupnim trgom (člen 87(2)(b) Pogodbe ES). Ker je Komisija dvomila o jamstvih za zagotovitev, da bodo nadomestilo prejele samo žrtve naravnih nesreč in da znesek pomoči ne bo višji od škode, je 17. septembra 2003 uvedla formalni preiskovalni postopek. Vendar podrobna raziskava ni uspela razbliniti teh dvomov. Med mehanizmi pomoči, ustanovljenimi s programom, in dejansko škodo ni bilo nobene povezave. Znesek pomoči je bil odvisen od obsega naložbe v določenem obdobju, višine naložb v prejšnji letih in obstoja obdavčljivega prihodka. Glede na to in celo kadar je prejemnik dejansko utrpel škodo zaradi teh naravnih nesreč, znesek pomoči ni mogel biti višji od stroškov škode.	474. Aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences is compatible with the common market (Article 87(2)(b) of the EC Treaty). Since the Commission had doubts regarding the guarantees aimed at ensuring that only victims of the disasters would be compensated and that the amount of aid would not exceed the damage, it launched a formal investigation procedure on 17 September 2003. However, the detailed investigation failed to dispel these doubts. There was no connection between the aid mechanisms established by the scheme and the damage actually suffered. The amount of the aid depended on the volume of investment made during a certain period, the amount of investments made over the previous years and the existence of taxable income. This being so, even in cases where the recipient actually had suffered damage as a result of these natural disasters, the amount of aid could exceed the cost of the damage.
475. Vendar je Komisija priznala, da bi lahko določena plačila posamezne pomoči, odobrene na podlagi programa, izpolnila pogoje združljivosti, četudi je program razglašen za nezakonitega.	475. However, the Commission acknowledged that certain individual aid payments granted on the basis of the scheme could meet the conditions for compatibility even if the scheme is declared illegal.
476. Ker podaljšanje veljavnosti Zakona št. 383/2001 ni bilo priglašeno pred odobritvijo pomoči in ker je Komisija program pomoči kot tak razglasila za nezdružljivega z notranjim trgom, bo morala Italija sprejeti vse potrebne ukrepe, da bodo prejemniki vrnili pomoč, razen tistih določenih plačil posamezne pomoči, odobrene na podlagi programa, ki izpolnjuje pogoje združljivosti v skladu s členom 87(2)(b) Pogodbe ES.	476. Since the extension of Law No 383/2001 was not notified prior to the granting of the aid and as the Commission declared the aid scheme as such incompatible with the internal market, Italy will have to take all necessary measures to recover the aid from recipients, except those certain individual aid payments granted on the basis of the scheme which meet the conditions for compatibility under Article 87(2)(b) of the EC Treaty.
4. Odločba o ukrepu, ki ne pomeni pomoči	4. NON-AID DECISION
Belgijski sektorski skladi	Belgian sectoral funds
477. V Belgiji socialni partnerji na številnih področjih dejavnosti na podlagi prostovoljne odločitve zagotavljajo prispevek delodajalcev v sektorju pri financiranju določenih socialnih ukrepov glede na potrebe sektorja (predvsem za usposabljanje delavcev v sektorju), prispevne stopnje pa vključijo v svoje sektorske kolektivne pogodbe. Kolektivne pogodbe, sklenjene na ravni področij dejavnosti (in posledično prispevki, ki so predvideni), so s kraljevim odlokom obvezne za vsa podjetja v sektorju. Tako ustanovljeni socialni sektorski skladi se financirajo popolnoma iz prispevkov podjetij na zadevnih področjih dejavnosti in v celoti sami upravljajo zbrani denar. Vsa podjetja, ki prispevajo v sklad, lahko uporabljajo programe, ki jih delno financira navedeni sklad.	477. In Belgium, in numerous areas of activity, the social partners, on the basis of a voluntary decision, provide for a contribution by employers in the sector to the financing of certain social actions according to the needs of the sector (mainly for training workers in the sector), and include the contribution rate in their sectoral collective agreement. The collective agreements concluded at the level of the areas of activity (and, consequently, the contributions which are envisaged) are made compulsory by royal decree for all companies belonging to the sector. The thus created social sectoral funds are financed completely out of contributions from companies in the areas of activity concerned and entirely self-manage the money collected. All the companies contributing to a fund can benefit from the programmes part-financed by that fund.
478. Komisija se je osredotočila na vprašanje, ali ta sistem vsebuje elemente državne pomoči[304]. Ko je ugotavljala obstoj ali kak drug pojav državne pomoči, je svojo oceno utemeljila na štirih skupnih merilih, ki jih je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti določilo v svoji sodbi Pearle [305], v kateri je bila ugotovljena odsotnost državnih sredstev in odgovornost države za to. Ta štiri merila, uporabljena v zadevnem primeru, so:	478. The Commission concentrated on the question whether this system includes elements of state aid[304]. In deciding on the existence or otherwise of state aid, it based its assessment on the four cumulative criteria which the Court of Justice laid down in its judgment in Pearle [305], in which the absence of state resources and of imputability to the State was noted. Applied to the case in question, these four criteria are as follows:
5. o ukrepih, financiranih iz sektorskih skladov, v celoti odločajo socialni partnerji v sektorju in ne država;	5. the actions financed by the sectoral funds are entirely decided on by the social partners in the sector and not by the State;
6. 100 % financiranja izhaja iz prispevkov podjetij v sektorju: država ne sofinancira sklada (če bi država sofinancirala določene ukrepe sklada, bi se to sofinanciranje s strani države – in samo države – obravnavalo kot državna sredstva);	6. financing comes 100% from contributions from companies in the sector: the State does not part-finance the funds (If the State did part-finance certain actions of the funds, this co-financing on the part of the State – and it alone - would be characterised as a state resource);
7. tudi načine in stopnje financiranja določijo socialni partnerji v sektorju;	7. the financing methods and rates are also determined by the social partners in the sector;
8. država ne posreduje pri uporabi zbranih sredstev.	8. there is no intervention by the State in the use of the collected resources.
9. Ker so bili ti štirje pogoji v primeru belgijskega sektorskega sklada izpolnjeni, je Komisija – po analogiji s sodbo Pearle – ugotovila odsotnost državnih sredstev in odgovornost države za to ter posledično neobstoj državne pomoči. V odločbi Komisije na podlagi sodne prakse Pearle je treba upoštevati določene omejitve v zvezi s pojmoma državna sredstva in odgovornost države za to.	9. These four conditions being satisfied in the case of the Belgian sectoral funds, the Commission noted – by analogy with the Pearle judgment - the absence of state resources and of imputability to the State and, consequently, the absence of state aid. In the Commission decision based on the Pearle case law it is important to note certain limits to the concepts of state resources and of imputability to the State.
5. DAVčNA POMOč	5. FISCAL AID
Program davčne pomoči za gostinski sektor	Fiscal aid scheme for the restaurant sector
479. Komisija je 1. decembra sklenila, da ne bo vložila nobenih ugovorov zoper program pomoči za zaposlovanje v gostinskem sektorju (hoteli, kavarne in restavracije) v Franciji.[306]	479. On 1 December, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to a scheme involving employment aid to the HCR (hotels, cafes and restaurants) sector in France.[306]
480. Da bi francoski organi izboljšali delovne razmere in pogoje plačila v sektorju, so se z ustreznimi organizacijami delavcev in delodajalcev pogajali o sporazumu, ki med drugim določa povišanje plač in dodatne dneve plačanega dopusta. Posebnost gostinskega sektorja je, da je najnižja zakonita plača nižja od najnižje zakonite plače za druga področja gospodarske dejavnosti.	480. In order to improve working and remuneration conditions in the sector, the French authorities negotiated an agreement with the relevant employees’ and employers’ organisations which provides inter alia for pay rises and additional paid holidays. One peculiarity of the HCR sector is that the minimum legal wage is below the minimum legal wage for other areas of economic activity.
481. Za nadomestitev dodatnih stroškov, ki jih morajo kriti delodajalci, so se francoski organi odločili za dodelitev mesečnih subvencij podjetjem, katerih delavci prejmejo najmanj najnižjo zakonito plačo, ki velja v drugih sektorjih dejavnosti. Ta ukrep velja 18 mesecev od 1. julija 2004 do 31. decembra 2005.	481. To offset the additional costs to be borne by employers, the French authorities decided to award monthly grants to companies whose employees are paid at least as much as the minimum legal wage applicable in other sectors of activity. The measure is in place for a period of 18 months from 1 July 2004 to 31 December 2005.
482. Ker ni bilo nobene zakonske podlage Skupnosti, ki bi vsebovala izrecne določbe za izvzetje takih primerov, se je izkazalo, da je nujna ocena, ki je neposredno temeljila na členu 87(3)(c) Pogodbe. Tako je morala Komisija prispevek pomoči k skupnemu interesu EU primerjati z njegovim vplivom na pogoje poslovanja in konkurenco na skupnem trgu.	482. In the absence of any Community legal basis containing explicit provisions for exempting such cases, an assessment directly based on Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty proved necessary. Thus, the Commission had to weigh the contribution of the aid towards the EU common interest against its impact on trading conditions and competition in the common market.
483. Spodbujanje zaposlovanja in izboljšanje delovnih razmer sta nedvomno prednostni nalogi skupnega interesa EU, ki sta trdno zasidrani v Pogodbi in evropski strategiji zaposlovanja. V zvezi z vplivom programa na pogoje poslovanja in konkurenco je Komisija ugotovila, da bi bil ta precej omejen zaradi več razlogov, in sicer zato, ker so gostinske storitve predvsem lokalna dejavnost, ki se je ne da tržiti, in ker so stroški, ki jih imajo delodajalci, višji od zneska državne pomoči ter so za razliko od pomoči trajni. Komisija je zato ugotovila, da je ukrep združljiv s skupnim trgom.	483. The promotion of employment and the enhancement of working conditions clearly constitute priority objectives of EU common interest that are solidly embedded in the Treaty and in the European employment strategy. With regard to the impact of the scheme on trading conditions and competition, the Commission found that this would be quite limited for a number of reasons, notably because restaurant services are essentially a local, non tradable activity and because the costs incurred by employers exceed the amount of state support and, unlike the aid, are of a perennial nature. The Commission therefore concluded that the measure was compatible with the common market.
484. Ta odločba je v skladu s skupno politiko Skupnosti o državni pomoči in zlasti ciljem preusmeritve pomoči k horizontalnim ciljem skupnega interesa, ki je bil priznan na zaporednih zasedanjih Evropskega sveta.	484. This decision is in keeping with overall Commission state aid policy and, in particular, with the objective of redirecting aid towards horizontal objectives of common interest which has been recognised by successive European Councils.
Davčne gospodarske interesne skupine	Fiscal EIGs
485. Komisija se je 14. decembra odločila, da bo uvedla uradno preiskavo, s katero bi ugotovila, ali je francoska davčna ureditev za „davčne gospodarske interesne skupine“ združljiva s pravili Skupnosti o državni pomoči.	485. On 14 December, the Commission decided to launch a formal investigation to establish whether the French tax scheme for "fiscal EIGs" is compatible with the Community rules on state aid.
486. Člen 39 C francoskega splošnega davčnega zakonika (CGI) določa, da se amortizacija sredstev, ki jih zakupi gospodarska interesna skupina, lahko odšteje od plačila davka, a ne sme biti višja od zneska, zaračunanega za zakupni posel. Vendar člen 39 CA CGI[307] predvideva izjemo od tega pravila. V skladu s tem členom za finančne operacije večjega gospodarskega in socialnega interesa ne veljajo omejitve glede amortizacije. Obstoj večjega gospodarskega in socialnega interesa oceni minister za proračun, ki nato da soglasje podjetju, ki opravlja naložbo.	486. Article 39 C of the French General Tax Code (CGI) stipulates that the tax-deductible depreciation of assets leased by an economic interest grouping (EIG) may not exceed the amount charged for the leasing operation. However, Article 39 CA of the CGI[307] provides for an exception to this rule. Under this article, financing operations of significant economic and social interest are not subject to the depreciation restriction. The existence of a significant economic and social interest is assessed by the Minister for the Budget, who then grants approval to the company making the investment.
487. Da se lahko izkoristi odprava zgornje meje glede amortizacije, mora biti izpolnjenih več drugih pogojev. Zakupljena sredstva je treba amortizirati najmanj v osmih letih. Nabavna cena mora ustrezati tržni ceni. Končni uporabnik mora biti podjetje, ki sredstva uporablja kot del svojih vsakodnevnih dejavnosti in ki mora imeti pravico do nakupa sredstev neposredno na koncu pogodbe o zakupu/nakupu. Upravičena sredstva, razen ladij, je treba kupiti kot novo blago:	487. Several other conditions have to be met in order to be able to benefit from the removal of the upper limit on depreciation. The leased asset has to be depreciable over eight years at least. The procurement price has to correspond to the market price. The end-user must be a company which uses the asset as part of its day-to-day activities and which must have the right to purchase the asset outright at the end of the leasing/purchase agreement. The eligible assets, with the exception of ships, have to be acquired as new goods:
- ker je davek gospodarske interesne skupine davčno pregleden instrument, imajo neposredno korist od odprave zgornje meje glede amortizacije člani, ki sestavljajo gospodarsko interesno skupino. Vendar pogodba izrecno določa, da je treba dve tretjini tako pridobljene prednosti prenesti na končnega uporabnika v obliki znižanja zakupnih dajatev ali cene možnosti nakupa. Poleg tega je ponovna prodaja sredstev končnemu uporabniku oproščena davka od kapitalskih dobičkov.	- The EIG tax being a fiscally transparent instrument, it is the members constituting the EIG who benefit directly from the removal of the upper limit on depreciation. However, the arrangement provides expressly that two thirds of the advantage thus obtained must be passed on to the end-user in the form of a reduction in the leasing charge or in the price of the option to buy. Moreover, the resale of the asset to the end-user is exempted from capital gains tax.
- Gospodarska interesna skupina, ki jo po navadi sestavljajo finančne ustanove, kupuje sredstva, ki jih je treba financirati, in jih daje v zakup končnemu uporabniku. Ker so znižanje amortizacije in finančne dajatve, ki jih nosi gospodarska interesna skupina, osredotočeni na prvih nekaj let zakupnega posla, rezultati gospodarske interesne skupine kažejo izjemno izgubo v tem obdobju in postanejo pozitivni šele pozneje, ko znesek zbranih zakupnih dajatev preseže skupne stroške. Ker morajo gospodarske interesne skupine upoštevati davčno ureditev, ki velja za partnerstva, lahko tako prenesene izgube v prvih nekaj letih poslovanja odbijejo od obdavčljivih dobičkov, ki jih njihovi člani pridobijo iz svojih trenutnih dejavnosti. To članom gospodarske interesne skupine omogoča, da znižajo znesek svojega obdavčljivega prihodka.	- The EIG, which is generally made up of financial institutions, purchases the asset to be financed and leases it to the end-user. Since the decreasing depreciation and the financial charges borne by the EIG are concentrated on the first few years of the leasing operation, the results of the EIG show an exceptional loss during this period and become positive only during a later period when the amount of the leasing charges collected exceeds total costs. Owing to their being subject to the tax arrangements applicable to partnerships, EIGs can deduct the losses thus posted during the first few years of the operation from the taxable profits earned by their members from their current activities. This enables the EIG’s members to reduce the amount of their taxable income.
488. Komisija je v svoji odločbi o uvedbi postopka menila, da je ureditev pomenila nezdružljivo pomoč. Po njenem mnenju so člani davčne gospodarske interesne skupine in uporabniki sredstev, ki jim jih je gospodarska interesna skupina dala v zakup, imeli v okviru te ureditve selektivne prednosti. Komisija je zlasti poudarila, da se je ureditev predvsem nanašala na pomorski promet. Zainteresirane tretje osebe in zlasti upravičenci ureditve ter osebe, ki so lahko dobile soglasje v okviru ureditve, so bili povabljeni, da predložijo svoje pripombe.	488. The Commission considered in its opening decision that the arrangement constituted incompatible aid. It considered that both the members of the fiscal EIG and the users of the assets leased to them by the EIG benefited from selective advantages within the framework of this arrangement. The Commission stressed in particular that the arrangement applied mainly to the maritime transport sector. Interested third parties and in particular the beneficiaries of the arrangement and persons having been able to receive approval within the framework of the arrangement were invited to submit their comments.
Davčne pobude za udeležbo na sejmih	Fiscal incentives for participation in fairs
489. Komisija je 22. septembra sklenila, da so posebne davčne pobude za podjetja, ki sodelujejo na sejmih v tujini (na voljo v skladu s členom 1(1)(b) italijanske proračunske zakonodaje iz leta 2004) nezdružljive s skupnim trgom[308]. Člen 1(1)(b) določa dvojno izvzetje izdatkov, ki so jih leta 2004 neposredno imela podjetja s svojo udeležbo na sejmih v tujini, iz njihovega obdavčljivega prihodka za namene davka na dobiček v Italiji. To izvzetje prihodka odstopa od običajnih pravil, ker pomeni dodaten odbitek glede na običajen odbitek poslovnih izdatkov, dovoljenih po italijanskem davčnem zakoniku. Odločba izhaja iz poglobljene preiskave, uvedene marca 2004.	489. On 22 September, the Commission decided that special tax incentives for companies taking part in trade fairs abroad (available under Article 1(1)(b) of the 2004 Italian budget law) are incompatible with the common market[308]. Article 1(1)(b) provides for a double exclusion of the expenses directly incurred in 2004 by undertakings with respect to their participation in trade fairs abroad from their taxable income for corporation tax purposes in Italy. This income exclusion derogates from the normal rules because it constitutes an additional deduction with respect to the ordinary deduction of business expenses allowed by the Italian tax code. The decision follows an in-depth investigation opened in March 2004.
490. Komisija je menila, da program izkrivlja konkurenco, saj daje davčno prednost za izboljšanje pogojev poslovanja italijanskih podjetij, ki delujejo v čezmorskih državah. Zato se je zdelo, da bi lahko to izkoristila samo omejena skupina upravičencev, ki se ukvarja z izvoznimi dejavnostmi, ter je tako pomenila pomoč, ki bi neposredno vplivala na čezmejno konkurenco in trgovino, vključno s trgovino z drugimi državami članicami. Italija mora vrniti nezakonito plačano pomoč upravičencem, razen tistega dela pomoči, ki se nanaša na 50 % stroškov, ki izhajajo iz prve udeležbe majhnega in srednje velikega podjetja na določenem sejmu ali razstavi glede na novi trg.	490. The Commission considered that the scheme distorts competition because it provides a tax advantage aimed at improving the trading conditions of Italian companies operating overseas. It appeared, therefore, that only a limited group of beneficiaries being engaged in export related activities could benefit from it, and therefore it constituted aid directly affecting cross-border competition and trade, including trade with other Member States. Italy is requested to recover the aid illegally paid to the beneficiaries, except for that part of the aid which concerns 50% of the costs arising from the first participation by an SME in a particular fair or exhibition with respect to a new market.
Izvzetje davka na nepremičnine	Real estate tax exemption
491. Komisija je 1. decembra delno odobrila program, ki je stanovanjske družbe začasno izvzemal iz plačila davka za prenos nepremičnin v primeru združitev, ki vključujejo ozemlje novih nemških dežel ( Länder) [309] . V skladu s trenutnim programom regionalne pomoči (2000–2006) za Nemčijo so večji deli dežel Branderburg, Mecklenburg–Zahodno Pomorjansko, Saška, Saška Anhalt in Turingija območja, ki prejemajo pomoč, v skladu s členom 87(3)(a), medtem ko je trg delovne sile dežele Berlin (vključno z Berlinom in okoliškimi deli Brandenburga) upravičen do pomoči v skladu s členom 87(3)(c) Pogodbe ES. Nepremičninski trg v novih deželah zaznamujejo precejšnje zmanjšanje števila prebivalstva zaradi nizkih stopenj rojstev in množičnega preseljevanja iz države, visoka stopnja prostih delovnih mest ter večje izgube zaradi izpadlih najemnin in negotovosti zaradi tekočih ukrepov za povrnitev v prejšnje stanje. Namen izvzetja iz davka za prenos nepremičnine je omogočiti stanovanjskim družbam, da združijo sile in se spopadejo s temi raznovrstnimi izzivi.	491. On 1 December, the Commission partially approved a scheme that temporarily exempts housing companies from real estate transfer tax in the case of mergers involving property in the new German Länder [309]. According to the current regional aid map (2000-2006) for Germany, the major parts of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia are assisted areas pursuant to Article 87(3)(a), whereas the labour market region of Berlin (including Berlin and surrounding parts of Brandenburg) qualifies for assistance under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. A considerable population decrease due to low birth rates and massive out-migration, a high vacancy rate accompanied by significant losses due to foregone rents and uncertainty due to pending actions for restitution distinguish the real estate market in the new Länder . The exemption from real estate transfer tax is intended to enable housing companies to join forces in order to deal with these multiple challenges.
492. Za tiste dele ukrepa, omejene na območja iz člena 87(3)(a), je Komisija sklenila, da se lahko ukrep odobri glede na določene pomanjkljivosti, omejeno stopnjo izkrivljanja konkurence, omejen časovni okvir in pričakovane pozitivne vplive ukrepa na stanovanjski trg in družbeno-gospodarski razvoj. Komisija je za trg delovne sile dežele Berlin, na katerem so stopnje prostih delovnih mest in odseljevanja manj izrazite ter so značilni zneski zadevne pomoči višji, uvedla formalni preiskovalni postopek, da bi zbrala informacije od drugih zainteresiranih strank[310].	492. For those parts of the measure that are restricted to 87(3)(a) areas, the Commission has concluded that the measure can be approved in view of the particular handicaps, the limited degree of distortion of competition, the limited time frame, and the expected positive effects of the measure on the housing market and socio-economic development. For the labour market region of Berlin, where vacancy rates and depopulation are less pronounced and the typical amounts of aid involved are higher, the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure in order to collect information from other interested parties[310].
6. Pomoč za raziskave in razvoj	6. Research and development aid
Raziskovalni program za vodik: mikro SPTE in projekti družbe CELCO	Hydrogen Research Programme: Micro CHP and CELCO projects
493. Komisija je 30. novembra v skladu s smernicami o raziskavah in razvoju[311] odobrila dva priložnostna projekta pomoči[312], namenjena podpori čim več projektov, imenovanih „razvoj mikro kogeneracijskih postrojenj (SPTE) na podlagi gorivnih celic“ in „razvoj vgrajenih pomožnih pogonski naprav (APU) in pogonskega sistema za plovila za šport in rekreacijo na podlagi gorivnih celic“.	493. On 30 November, the Commission approved, under the R&D guidelines[311], two “ad hoc” aid projects[312] designed to support as many research projects, named “development of a fuel cell micro CHP unit” and “development of a fuel cell-based on-board auxiliary power unit (APU) and propulsion system for pleasure craft”.
494. Oba sta potekala v okviru „Piemontskega vodikovega sistema (SPH2)“, regionalnega raziskovalnega programa, ki ga je začela in nadaljevala italijanska dežela Piemont na podlagi dela skupine visokih predstavnikov – na ravni Skupnosti – na področju „vodikove energije in gorivnih celic“[313].	494. Both took place within the framework of “Hydrogen Piemonte System (SPH2)”, a regional research programme started and carried on by the Piedmont region of Italy, which was inspired by the work of the high-level group – at Community level – on “hydrogen energy and fuel cells” [313].
495. Namen projektov je priti do rezultatov temeljnih raziskav o nosilcu vodika, razčlenijo pa se lahko na naslednja glavna področja: razvoj gorivnih celic za stacionarno in transportno uporabo, razvoj proizvodnje vodika iz obnovljivih in sivih virov – zlasti v zvezi z vprašanjem uskladiščenja ogljikovega dioksida – ter skladiščenje in distribucijo vodika. Vključena je bila industrijska faza raziskav, kar je po podatkih Italije pripeljalo do odobritve 50-odstotne intenzivnosti pomoči.	495. The projects aim to develop the findings of fundamental research on the hydrogen carrier and may be broken down into the following main areas: fuel cell development for both stationary and transport applications, hydrogen production development from both renewable and grey sources - notably in relation to the C02 sequestration issue - and hydrogen storage and distribution. Only the industrial phase of research was involved, according to Italy, thus resulting in a 50% aid intensity being allowed.
496. Vodik in gorivne celice so močno uveljavljeni kot strateška tehnologija za izpolnitev nasprotujočih se zahtev po večji oskrbi z energijo in varnosti, medtem ko ohranjajo stroškovno konkurenčnost, zmanjšujejo podnebne spremembe in izboljšujejo kakovost zraka. Na žalost bodo dosežene koristi dejansko začele delovati potem, ko se bodo uporabile javne pobude in zasebna prizadevanja za spodbuditev in razvoj glavnih trgov, saj je evropski načrt za vodik in gorivne celice še vedno zelo daleč od trga.	496. Hydrogen and fuel cells are firmly established as strategic technologies to meet the conflicting demands of increased energy supply and security, whilst maintaining cost-competitiveness, reducing climate change, and improving air quality. Unfortunately the resulting benefits will only start to really flow after public incentives and private effort is applied to stimulate and develop the main markets, as the European roadmap for hydrogen and fuel cells is indeed still far from the market.
497. Tako je Komisija menila, da priglašena projekta, ki sta bila srednje- do dolgoročne raziskovalne in tehnološko-razvojne narave, spadata v okvir opredelitve pojma industrijskih raziskav ter ju odobrila v skladu s točko 5.3 okvira.	497. Hence the Commission considered that the notified projects, both being of a medium- to long-term research and technological development nature, fell under the definition of industrial research and cleared them pursuant to point 5.3 of the framework.
Pomoč za raziskave in razvoj za družbo Bell Laboratories v Dublinu	R&D aid to Bell Laboratories in Dublin
498. Komisija je 1. oktobra sklenila, da ne bo vložila nobenega ugovora zoper pomoč, ki so jo irski organi dodelili družbi Bell Laboratories, ker je združljiva s Pogodbo ES.[314] Individualna pomoč se dodeli v skladu s programom subvencije za zmogljivosti raziskav in razvoja, ki ga je Komisija priznala kot obstoječi program pomoči in je bil odobren za uporabo v skladu s trenutnim Operativnim programom proizvodnega sektorja za obdobje 2000–2006.	498. On 1 October, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to aid granted by the Irish authorities to Bell Laboratories on the ground that it is compatible with the EC Treaty.[314] Individual aid awards are made under the R&D Capability Grant scheme, which was recognised by the Commission as being an existing aid scheme and which was approved for use under the current 2000-2006 Productive Sector Operational Programme.
499. Prejemnik, Bell Laboratories (BLRI), je del družbe Lucent Technologies – vodilnega podjetja na področju telekomunikacij na svetu. Cilj pomoči je ustanovitev raziskovalnega centra svetovnega razreda v Dublinu na področju raziskav vrednostne verige v telekomunikacijskih sistemih naslednje generacije. Center bo pomembno prispeval k raziskovalnim zmogljivostim Evropske skupnosti kot celote na področju računalniških in telekomunikacijskih tehnologij v skladu z lizbonskim ciljem narediti Evropo vodilno na znanju temelječe gospodarstvo na svetu. Projekt se bo razvil v petletnem obdobju in bo z nepovratno subvencijo prejel skupni znesek pomoči v višini 21,66 milijona EUR za skupne upravičene izdatke v višini 43,32 milijona EUR. Zajemal bo tudi tesnejše sodelovanje z univerzami prek konzorcija univerzitetnih raziskovalcev, ki jih vodi univerza Trinity College iz Dublina.	499. The recipient, Bell Laboratories (BLRI), is part of Lucent Technologies – a global leader in the telecommunications sector. The objective of the aid is the establishment in Dublin of a world-class research centre in the area of value-chain-driven research into next-generation telecommunications systems. The centre will contribute significantly to the research capability of the European Community as a whole in the area of computer- and telecommunications-related technologies, in keeping with the Lisbon objective of making Europe the leading knowledge-based economy in the world. The project will be developed over five years and will receive, through a non-reimbursable grant, a total aid amount of EUR 21.66 million on total eligible expenditure of EUR 43.32 million. It will also involve a considerable amount of cooperation with universities via a consortium of university researchers led by Trinity College Dublin.
500. Komisija je menila, da ukrep spada v okvir člena 87(1) Pogodbe ES; vendar je bila ocena združljivosti pozitivna na podlagi naslednjih dejstev:	500. The Commission considered the measure as falling under the scope of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty; however, the conclusion of the compatibility assessment was favourable based on the following facts:
10. projekti so omejeni na industrijske raziskave in dejavnosti predkonkurenčnega razvoja, opredeljene v Prilogi I k okviru o raziskavah in razvoju;	10. the projects are limited to industrial research and pre-competitive development activities, defined in accordance with Annex I to the R&D framework;
11. upravičeni stroški so v skladu s Prilogo II k okviru o raziskavah in razvoju;	11. the eligible costs are in line with Annex II to the R&D framework;
12. intenzivnost pomoči, ki je omejena na 50 %, je v skladu s točkami 5.3, 5.5, 5.10.2 in 5.10.3 okvira o raziskavah in razvoju ter	12. the aid intensity, limited to 50%, is in line with points 5.3, 5.5, 5.10.2 and 5.10.3 of the R&D framework; and
13. v predlaganem projektu obstaja jasen spodbujevalen vpliv, kot je zahtevano v točki 6.2 okvira o raziskavah in razvoju.	13. there is a clear incentive effect in the project proposed, as required by point 6.2 of the R&D framework.
501. Tako je Komisija sklenila, da pomoč pojmuje kot združljivo s Pogodbo ES v skladu z njenim členom 87(3)(c).	501. Consequently, the Commission decided to consider the aid granted to be compatible with the EC Treaty under its Article 87(3)(c).
Sodelovanje pri povečanju kapitala družbe OCAS	Participation in the capital increase of OCAS
502. Komisija je 20. oktobra dovolila flamski regiji, da sodeluje pri povečanju kapitala družbe OCAS, ki je enota za raziskave in razvoj pri podjetju Arcelor, ki se namerava preoblikovati v bolj avtonomno in dobičkonosno podjetje na trgu storitev raziskav in razvoja[315]. Belgija je ta projekt priglasila zaradi pravne varnosti. Menila je namreč, da se je projekt zdel dovolj dobičkonosen, da bi privabil naložbe zasebnih podjetij. Pri tem je ugotovila, da je podjetje Arcelor, ki je trenutni delničar družbe OCAS, prav tako sodelovalo pri povečanju kapitala v enakem znesku. Po podrobni analizi primera je GD za konkurenco ugotovil, da napovedi glede dobička niso bile natančne in dovolj visoke, da bi bil pričakovani donos dovolj visok za nadomestitev visokega tveganja projekta. Ugotovil je, da so bile nekatere določbe posla za podjetje Arcelor preveč ugodne. Ko je GD za konkurenco ugotovil, da je šlo za potencialno pomoč v korist podjetja Arcelor, je sklenil, da se lahko dovoli na podlagi smernic o raziskavah in razvoju. Javna podpora namreč podjetje Arcelor jasno spodbuja k izvajanju dodatnih raziskav v primerjavi z raziskavami, ki se po navadi izvajajo, intenzivnost pomoči pa bo ostala pod dovoljeno ravnijo za industrijske raziskave.	502. On 20 October, the Commission authorized the Flemish Region to participate in the capital increase of OCAS, an R&D unit of Arcelor which plans to transform itself into a more autonomous and profitable company in the market for R&D services[315]. Belgium had notified this project for the sake of legal certainty. Indeed, it considered that the project seemed profitable enough to attract the investment of private companies. In this respect, it noted that Arcelor, the current shareholder of OCAS, was also participating in the capital increase for the same amount. After a detailed analysis of the case, DG Competition came to the conclusion that the profit outlook was not precise and high enough to consider the return expected sufficient to compensate for the high risk of the project. It noted that certain provisions of the deal appeared too favourable to Arcelor. After finding that there was potential aid in favour of Arcelor, DG Competition came to the conclusion that it could be authorised on the basis of the R&D guidelines. Indeed, the public support clearly incites Arcelor to undertake additional research compared with research normally undertaken and the aid intensity will remain below the level authorised for industrial research.
Schiefergruben Magog	Schiefergruben Magog
503. Komisija je 6. oktobra uvedla uradno preiskavo o državni pomoči nemškega proizvajalca skrilavcev Schiefergruben Magog[316]. Povod za primer je bila pritožba, ki jo je Komisija prejela od nemškega tekmeca družbe Schiefergruben Magog.	503. On 6 October, the Commission launched a formal investigation into state aid to Schiefergruben Magog, a German slate producer[316]. The case originated with a complaint which the Commission received from a German competitor of Schiefergruben Magog.
504. Med letoma 2002 in 2003 je družba Schiefergruben Magog od regionalnih organov prejela subvencijo v višini 0,7 milijona EUR za podporo razvoja nove tehnologije za rezanje strešnih skrilavcev. Nemčija je trdila, da subvencija ni pomenila državne pomoči, saj družbi ni podeljevala nobene prednosti: cilj projekta je bil razviti inovativno tehnologijo za obdelavo strešnih skrilavcev, s katero se zmanjšajo tveganja za zdravje zaposlenih, naložba pa za družbo ni bila dobičkonosna. Nemčija je poleg tega trdila, da to ni vplivalo na trgovino med državami članicami, saj je družba Schiefergruben Magog proizvajala posebne visokokakovostne strešne skrilavce, ki so se zaradi zgodovinskih razlogov proizvajali samo v Nemčiji.	504. In 2002 and 2003 Schiefergruben Magog had received a grant from the regional authorities amounting to around EUR 0.7 million to support the development of a new technology for cutting roofing slate. Germany argued that the grant did not constitute state aid as it did not confer an advantage on the company: the aim of the project was to develop an innovative technology for the treatment of roofing slate in order to reduce health risks to employees and the investment was not profitable for the company. Germany furthermore argued that trade between Member States was not affected as Schiefergruben Magog produced special high-quality roofing slate, which for historical reasons was produced only in Germany.
505. Komisija je v svoji odločbi o uvedbi uradne preiskave menila, da subvencija družbi Schiefergruben Magog ni podelila nobene prednosti. Po podatkih na spletni strani družbe je bil namen projekta avtomatizirati postopek rezanja, ki bi družbi omogočil proizvodnjo visokokakovostnih skrilavcev po nižjih stroških ter tako povečal konkurenčnost družbe. Komisija je prav tako menila, da je to vplivalo na trgovino med državami članicami in da je subvencija zato pomenila državno pomoč. Komisija je dvomila, ali bi lahko bila pomoč združljiva na podlagi uredbe o skupinskih izjemah za majhna in srednje velika podjetja ali okvira Skupnosti o raziskavah in razvoju ali katerih koli drugih izjem, predvidenih v členu 87(2) in (3) Pogodbe[317].	505. In its decision opening the formal investigation, the Commission considered that the grant did confer an advantage on Schiefergruben Magog. According to the company’s own website, the project was intended to automate the cutting process, which would allow the company to produce high-quality slate at lower cost and would thus increase the company’s competitiveness. The Commission was also of the opinion that trade between Member States was affected and that the grant consequently constituted state aid. The Commission doubted whether the aid could be found compatible on the basis of the SME block exemption regulation or the Community framework on research & development or any other exemptions provided for in Article 87(2) and (3) of the Treaty[317].
7. Okoljska pomoč	7. Environmental aid
Pomoč za družbo Akzo Nobel za zmanjšanje transporta klora[318]	Aid to Akzo Nobel for minimising chlorine transport[318]
506. Komisija je 16. junija v skladu s členom 87(3)(c) ES odobrila subvencijo v višini 32,5 milijona EUR družbi Akzo Nobel v zvezi s premestitvijo dveh obratov, ki proizvajata klor in monoklorocetno kislino. Premestitev bo precej zmanjšala potrebo po transportu klora.	506. On 16 June, the Commission approved under Article 87(3)(c) EC a EUR 32.5 million grant to Akzo Nobel in connection with the relocation of two plants producing chlorine and mono-chloro acetic acid. The relocation will significantly reduce the need for chlorine transport.
Pomoč za gradnjo cevovoda za transport etilena med mestoma Stade in Teutschental[319] ter cevovoda za transport propilena med Rotterdamom, Antwerpnom in Porurjem[320]	Aid for an ethylene pipeline between Stade and Teutschental[319] and for a propylene pipeline from Rotterdam via Antwerp to the Ruhr area[320]
507. V skladu s smernicami za nacionalno regionalno pomoč so lahko stroški naložb tistih delov cevovoda, ki ležijo na območjih, ki prejemajo pomoč, upravičeni do pomoči. Takšen je bil primer cevovoda za transport etilena, katerega lastnik in upravljavec je bila družba DOW Olefinverbund GmbH, za katerega je Komisija 8. septembra odobrila dodelitev pomoči v višini 13,6 milijona EUR.	507. According to the guidelines for national regional aid, the investment cost of those parts of a pipeline located in assisted areas may be eligible for aid. This was the case with an ethylene pipeline owned and operated by DOW Olefinverbund GmbH for which the Commission, on 8 September, approved a EUR 13.6 million aid award.
508. Vendar pa to ni veljalo za gradnjo cevovoda za transport propilena med Rotterdamom, Antwerpnom, Kölnom in nemškim Porurjem, saj leži precej zunaj območij, ki prejemajo pomoč. Kljub temu je Komisija 16. junija odobrila 27 milijonov EUR subvencij, ki so se dodelile nemškim, nizozemskim in belgijskim organom kot podpora za gradnjo tega cevovoda. Upravičenec je družba European Pipeline Company, v kateri sodelujejo glavni zadevni proizvajalci propilena. Za razliko od zgoraj navedenega cevovoda za transport etilena, bo ta cevovod deloval v skladu z načeli „odprtega dostopa/splošnega prevoznika“ in „nizkega donosa“.	508. This was not the case with a propylene pipeline from Rotterdam, via Antwerp, to Cologne and the German Ruhr area since it is largely outside assisted areas. Nevertheless, on 16 June, the Commission approved EUR 27 million in subsidies to be granted by the German, Dutch and Belgian authorities in support of this pipeline. The beneficiary is the European Pipeline Company, in which the major propylene producers concerned participate. Unlike the ethylene pipeline mentioned above, this pipeline will be operated in accordance with the principles of "open access/common carrier" and "low profit".
509. Podpora za ta cevovod za transport propilena spada v okvir opredelitve pojma državne pomoči in se ne sme obravnavati kot podpora za splošno infrastrukturo. Vendar pa je Komisija priznala okoljske, varnostne in industrijske prednosti projekta. Potem ko je preverila, ali je bila pomoč sorazmerna in omejena na minimum, ki je potreben, in ali se je preprečilo neupravičeno izkrivljanje konkurence, je menila, da je pomoč združljiva s skupnim trgom. Ker niso veljale niti smernice o pomoči za zaščito okolja niti smernice o nacionalni regionalni pomoči, je Komisija svojo odločitev utemeljila neposredno s členom 87(3)(c) Pogodbe.	509. The support for this propylene pipeline falls within the definition of state aid and should not be considered support for general infrastructure. The Commission recognised, however, the environmental, safety and industrial advantages of the project. Having verified whether the aid was proportional and limited to the minimum necessary, and whether undue distortion of competition had been avoided, it considered that the aid was compatible with the common market. As neither the guidelines on aid for the protection of the environment nor the guidelines on national regional aid were applicable, the Commission based its decision directly on Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty.
Okoljska pomoč za naložbe za družbo Stora Enso Langerbrugge[321]	Environmental investment aid for Stora Enso Langerbrugge[321]
510. Komisija je 8. septembra odobrila 23,5 milijona EUR okoljske pomoči papirnici Stora Enso v belgijskem kraju Langerbrugge. Namen subvencioniranih naložb je zmanjšanje porabe energije pri proizvodnji časopisnega papirja, proizvodnja energije s sežiganjem muljev tiskarskih barv v termoelektrarnah–toplarnah ter prevoz odpadnega papirja in končnih proizvodov po železnici namesto s tovornjaki.	510. On 8 September, the Commission approved EUR 23.5 million in environmental aid to Stora Enso's paper mills in Langerbrugge, Belgium. The aided investments aim at reducing energy consumption in newsprint production, producing energy by combusting de-inking sludge in a combined heat and power installation, and transporting waste paper and finished product by rail instead of truck.
511. Dodatna pomoč za povečanje izkoriščanja recikliranih vlaken pri proizvodnji papirja v višini dodatnih 11,5 milijona EUR ni bila odobrena. Komisija je ugotovila, da je bila zunaj obsega točke 29 smernic o pomoči za zaščito okolja[322], saj naložbe ne zmanjšujejo količine odpadkov, ki nastanejo pri lastni proizvodnji in prodaji družbe Stora Enso, ampak zmanjšujejo količino papirja, ki ga proda kateri koli proizvajalec papirja. Komisija je menila, da se lahko po analogiji s točko 29 smernic taka pomoč za naložbe v zvezi z recikliranjem podpre do 30 % upravičenih stroškov samo, če izpolnjuje naslednja dodatna merila: (i) investicijski projekti morajo biti inovativni in presegati „najnovejše dosežke“, (ii) pomoč ne sme podjetja, ki so proizvajala odpadke, posredno oprostiti bremena, ki bi moralo biti vključeno v njihov proračun v skladu z zakonodajo Skupnosti, ter (iii) treba je določiti pogoje za zagotovitev, da se reciklirajo tiste snovi, ki bi drugače končale kot odpadek, glede na to, da se ne sme odobriti pomoč za naložbe, ki samo povečujejo konkurenco za snovi, ki jih je treba reciklirati.	511. Further aid for increasing the use of recycled fibre in paper production, another EUR 11.5 million, was not approved. The Commission found that it fell outside the scope of point 29 of the guidelines on aid for environmental protection[322], since the investments do not reduce the waste generated by Stora Enso’s own production and sales but rather paper sold by any paper producer. The Commission considers that, by analogy with point 29 of the guidelines, such investment aid for recycling may be supported up to 30% of the eligible cost only if it complies with the following additional criteria: (i) the investment projects should be innovative and go beyond “state of the art”, (ii) the aid should not indirectly relieve the companies that produced the waste from a burden that should be included in their budget under Community law, and (iii) conditions should be imposed to ensure that materials are recycled that otherwise would end up as waste, considering that aid for investments that merely increase competition for the materials to be recycled cannot be authorised.
Vidiki državne pomoči pri izvajanju programa trgovanja z emisijami	State aid aspects of the implementation of the emission trading scheme
512. Sistem trgovanja z emisijami (ETS), uveden z Direktivo 2003/87/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. oktobra 2003[323], ima pomembno vlogo v politiki Skupnosti glede podnebnih sprememb. Njegov namen je pomagati državam članicam pri izpolnjevanju obveznosti v skladu s Kjotskim protokolom z uporabo tržnega instrumenta, ki pomaga doseči zmanjšanje emisij z najnižjimi stroški.	512. The emission trading scheme (ETS), introduced by Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003[323], plays a major role in the Commission’s climate change policy. It aims to help EU Member States to achieve compliance with their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol by using a market-based instrument which helps achieve emissions reductions at least cost.
513. Sistem trgovanja z emisijami je prvi mednarodni sistem za trgovanje z emisijami ogljikovega dioksida na svetu. Zajemal bo več kot 12.000 naprav v EU 25 (kurilne naprave, rafinerije nafte, koksarne, železarne in jeklarne ter tovarne, ki proizvajajo cement, steklo, apno, opeko, keramiko, celulozo in papir), kar pomeni blizu polovico evropskih emisij ogljikovega dioksida.	513. The ETS is the first international trading system for CO2 emissions in the world. It will cover a total of more than 12 000 installations in the EU-25 (combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants, and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper) accounting for close to half of Europe’s emissions of CO2.
514. Temelj izvajanja sistema trgovanja z emisijami so t. i. nacionalni načrti razdelitve pravic. Ti načrti določajo skupno število pravic do emisij, ki jih nameravajo države članice dodeliti v obdobju trgovanja od leta 2005 do 2007, in metode za njihovo dodelitev različnim sektorjem ali zadevnim napravam.	514. A cornerstone of the implementation of the ETS are the so-called national allocation plans (NAPs). These plans establish the total number of emission allowances Member States plan to allocate for the 2005-2007 trading period and the methods of allocating them to the different sectors or installations involved.
515. Direktiva o trgovanju z emisijami zahteva, da mora Komisija oceniti usklajenost teh načrtov s členom 10 direktive o ETS ter z enajstimi merili, določenimi v Prilogi III k tej direktivi. Komisija lahko načrt zavrne v celoti ali delno v treh mesecih od njegove priglasitve, če se ugotovi, da načrt ni skladen. Do konca leta 2004 je Komisija sprejela odločitve o 21 nacionalnih načrtih razdelitve pravic[324].	515. The emission trading directive requires the Commission to assess compliance of these plans with Article 10 of the ETS directive and with eleven criteria established in Annex III thereof. The Commission may refuse a plan in whole or in part within three months of its notification if the plan is found incompliant. By the end of 2004, the Commission had taken decisions on 21 NAPs[324].
Ocena nacionalnih načrtov razdelitve pravic	Assessment of the NAPs
516. Merilo 5 v Prilogi III k direktivi o ETS zahteva, da nacionalni načrt razdelitve pravic ne „razlikuje med družbami ali sektorji, tako da bi neupravičeno dajal prednost nekaterim podjetjem ali dejavnostim, v skladu z zahtevami Pogodbe, zlasti členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe“.	516. Criterion 5 of Annex III to the ETS directive requires that a national allocation plan “shall not discriminate between companies or sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain undertakings or activities in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty, in particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof”.
517. Komisija je v svojem usmerjevalnem dokumentu navedla, da „se bodo uporabljala običajna pravila o državni pomoči“.	517. In its guidance document, the Commission stated that “the normal state aid rules will apply”.
518. Člen 10 direktive države članice obvezuje, da morajo za prvo obdobje trgovanja od leta 2005 do 2007 vsaj 95 % pravic dodeliti brezplačno. To državam članicam omogoča, da prodajo do največ 5 % pravic. Do sedaj so države članice malo izkoristile to možnost. Za prodajo 5 % pravic se je odločila samo Danska. Nekatere druge države članice predvidevajo prodajo neizkoriščenih pravic iz rezerve novih udeležencev na koncu obdobja trgovanja ali prodajo zelo omejenega števila pravic za pokritje upravnih stroškov izvajanja sistema. Če država članica ne izkoristi svoje možnosti za prodajo pravic po tržni ceni, se zdi, da lahko ukrep pripišemo državam članicam in da lahko povzroči uporabo državnih sredstev.	518. Article 10 of the directive obliges Member States for the first trading period from 2005 until 2007 to allocate at least 95% of the allowances free of charge. This allows Member States to sell up to a maximum of 5% of the allowances. So far, Member States have made little use of this possibility. Only Denmark has decided to auction 5% of the allowances. Some other Member States envisage auctioning unused allowances from the new entrants reserve at the end of the trading period or auctioning a very limited number of allowances to cover the administrative costs of the implementation of the scheme. To the extent that a Member State does not use its possibility to sell allowances at the market price, the measure appears to be imputable to the Member States and to entail the use of state resources.
519. Ukrep lahko prav tako vsebuje državna sredstva in se lahko pripiše državi članici, kadar ta dovoli prenos pravic iz prvega v drugo obdobje trgovanja. Do sedaj so vse države članice, razen Francije, izključile prenos pravic.	519. The measure may also contain state resources and be imputable to the Member State where a Member State allows banking of allowances from the first to the second trading period. Until now, all Member States with the exception of France have excluded banking.
520. Razen za Dansko Komisija ni mogla izključiti možnosti, da so nacionalni načrti razdelitve pravic vključevali državno pomoč v skladu s členom 87(1) Pogodbe. Komisija je poleg tega ocenila, ali je bila katera koli potencialna pomoč skladna s skupnim okoljskim ciljem direktive o ETS in se je zdela potrebna za dosego tega cilja.	520. With the exception of Denmark, the Commission therefore could not rule out the possibility that the NAPs involved state aid pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Treaty. The Commission assessed further whether any potential aid was consistent with, and seemed to be necessary to achieve, the overall environmental objective of the ETS directive.
521. Komisija je bila v stikih z državami članicami, zlasti kadar se je zdelo, da nacionalni načrt razdelitve pravic, vsebuje eno od naslednjih lastnosti:	521. The Commission sought contacts with Member States in particular where an NAP seemed to contain one of the following features:
522. Kadar država članica dodeli skupno število pravic, ki ni v skladu s predvidenimi emisijami ali v skladu z zahtevami Kjotskega protokola (merili 1 in 2 v Prilogi III k direktivi), in upravičenci ne zagotovijo zadostne okoljske protistoritve, bi lahko taka čezmerna dodelitev pripeljala do potencialne pomoči (kadar upravičenci prejmejo več, kot so bile realno predvidene emisije, saj pomoč tako ne bi imela spodbujevalnega vpliva na spremembo vedenja); kadar načrt pripelje do diskriminacije med področji trgovanja ali napravami, npr. z uporabo neupravičenih drugačnih metod dodelitve za različne sektorje ali z uporabo metode dodelitve na drugačen način za nekatera podjetja, ter kadar so novi udeleženci neupravičeno drugače obravnavani kot prvotni.	522. Where a Member State allocates a total number of allowances which is not consistent with projected emissions or where it is inconsistent with its path to Kyoto (Criteria 1 and 2 in Annex III to the directive) and the beneficiaries do not deliver a sufficient environmental counterpart, such overallocation might entail potential aid (where the beneficiaries receive more than realistically projected emissions, as the aid would then not have an incentive effect to change behaviour); where a plan leads to discrimination between trading sectors or installations, e.g. by using unjustified different allocation methods for different sectors or applying an allocation method differently to certain undertakings; and where new entrants receive unjustified different treatment vis-à-vis incumbents.
523. Pri ocenjevanju nacionalnih načrtov razdelitve pravic je Komisija naletela na omejeno število takih primerov. Do sedaj se je večina morebitnih groženj neizkrivljeni konkurenci rešila v razpravi z zadevno državo članico. V več primerih so države članice zmanjšale skupno število pravic, da bi ravnale po merilih 1, 2 in 5 direktive o ETS. V nekaterih primerih so države članice opustile rezerve, uvedene za posebne sektorje. Izkazalo se je, da je uporaba različnih metod dodelitve za posebne sektorje v mnogih primerih upravičena. Komisija je tako za večino nacionalnih načrtov razdelitve pravic na podlagi informacij, ki so jih poslale države članice, sklenila, da bi bila po njenem mnenju vsaka potencialna pomoč verjetno združljiva s skupnim trgom, če bi bila ocenjena v skladu s členom 88(3) Pogodbe.	523. When assessing the NAPs, the Commission encountered a limited number of such situations. So far, most of the potential threats to undistorted competition were able to be resolved in discussion with the Member State concerned. In several cases, Member States reduced the total number of allowances in order to comply with Criteria 1, 2 and 5 of the ETS directive. In some cases, Member States abandoned reserves established for specific sectors. The use of different allocation methods for specific sectors appeared to be justified in many cases. The Commission therefore concluded for most NAPs that, based on the information provided by the Member States, it considered that any potential aid was likely to be compatible with the common market if it were assessed in accordance with Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
524. Treba je poudariti, da je Komisija do sedaj pregledala vse nacionalne načrte razdelitve pravic v okviru direktive o ETS, da bi našla očitne težave v zvezi z državno pomočjo, za katero je verjetno, da je nezdružljiva. Komisija do sedaj ni sprejela nobene uradne odločitve o državni pomoči v zvezi z nacionalnim načrtom razdelitve pravic.	524. It should be noted that the Commission has until now screened all NAPs in the context of the ETS directive in order to identify obvious problems of state aid that is likely to be incompatible. The Commission has not so far taken any formal state aid decision on a national allocation plan.
8. Širitev	8. Enlargement
Obstoječa pomoč v novih državah članicah	Existing aid in the new Member States
525. Pristopna pogodba določa, da se od dneva pristopa za obstoječo pomoč v smislu člena 88(1) Pogodbe ES štejejo naslednji ukrepi pomoči:	525. The Accession Treaty provides that the following aid measures are to be regarded as existing aid within the meaning of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty from the date of accession:
- ukrepi pomoči, ki se jih je začelo izvajati pred 10. decembrom 1994;	- aid measures put into effect before 10 December 1994;
- ukrepi pomoči, ki so našteti v dodatku k Pristopni pogodbi („seznam pogodbe“);	- aid measures listed in an appendix to the Accession Treaty (the “Treaty list”);
- ukrepi pomoči, ki jih je pred dnem pristopa ocenil organ za nadzor državnih pomoči nove države članice in ugotovil, da so združljivi s pravnim redom EU, ter ki jim Komisija ni ugovarjala zaradi resnih dvomov o združljivosti ukrepov s skupnim trgom („začasni postopek“).	- aid measures which, prior to the date of accession, were assessed by the state aid authority of the new Member State and found to be compatible with the acquis , and to which the Commission did not raise any objection on the ground of serious doubts as to the compatibility of the measure with the common market (the “interim procedure”).
526. Za uporabo člena 88(3) Pogodbe ES se po pristopu vsi ukrepi, ki so državna pomoč in ne izpolnjujejo zgoraj določenih pogojev, štejejo za novo pomoč.	526. All measures which constitute state aid and which do not fulfil the conditions set out above are regarded as new aid upon accession for the purposes of applying Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.
527. V okviru začasnega postopka so imele nove države članice možnost predložiti ukrepe od začetka leta 2003 do datuma pristopa. Skupaj je bilo predloženih 559 ukrepov, od tega 201 leta 2003 in 358 leta 2004. Do konca leta 2004 je bilo 323 ukrepov (58 % vseh ukrepov) predlaganih kot obstoječa pomoč, od tega 76 leta 2003 in 247 leta 2004. V letu 2004 je Komisija uvedla formalni preiskovalni postopek v zvezi s tremi ukrepi. Skupaj je bilo 207 ukrepov (37 % vseh ukrepov), ki so jih bodisi nove države članice umaknile bodisi so bili predmet odločbe Komisije glede na to, da se po pristopu niso uporabljali. Konec leta 2004 je še vedno potekala ocena preostalih 26 ukrepov.	527. Under the interim procedure, new Member States had the option to submit measures between the beginning of 2003 and the date of accession. Overall, 559 measures were submitted, of which 201 in 2003 and 358 in 2004. By the end of 2004, 323 measures (58% of the total) had been proposed as existing aid, of which 76 in 2003 and 247 in 2004. During the course of 2004, the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure with regard to 3 measures. Overall, 207 measures (37% of the total) were either withdrawn by the new Member States or the subject of a Commission decision considering that they were not applicable after accession. By the end of 2004, the remaining 26 measures were still under assessment.
Pomoč bančnemu sektorju v novih državah članicah	Aid to the banking sector in the new Member States
528. V devetdesetih letih so gospodarstva nekaterih novih držav članic doživela strukturne spremembe. Javni organi so posredovali v različnih primerih. Za zagotovitev ocene teh posredovanj so pristopne pogodbe Komisijo pooblastile, da oceni združljivost ukrepov, ki so pomenili pomoč, ki se je, čeprav odobrena v preteklosti, nadaljevala prek datuma pristopa teh držav.	528. In the 1990s, the economies of some new Member States underwent structural change. Public authorities intervened in various instances. To ensure that these interventions were assessed, the Treaties of Accession granted the Commission powers to assess the compatibility of measures that constituted aid which, although granted in the past, extended beyond the date of accession of these countries.
529. Po priglasitvi je Komisija pregledala pomoč, odobreno za prestrukturiranje bančnega sistema v več novih državah članicah (Češka republika, Madžarska in Slovaška republika). Leta 2004 je Komisija sprejela 16 odločb, ki so razglašale, da se ukrepi „niso uporabljali po pristopu“. To pomeni, da so bili obravnavani ukrepi v celoti odobreni pred dnevom pristopa brez možnosti, da bi bila po pristopu odobrena dodatna pomoč, in da torej Komisiji ni bilo treba oceniti niti ni bila pooblaščena za oceno takih ukrepov. Vendar pa se je Komisija v dveh primerih, tj. češki Agrobanka Praha [325] in madžarski Postabank [326], odločila, da uvede postopek, saj je ugotovila, da so nekateri od ukrepov, ki so se „uporabljali po pristopu“, pomenili državno pomoč, o kateri je imela resne dvome glede njihove združljivosti s skupnim trgom.	529. Following notification, the Commission reviewed aid granted for the restructuring of the banking system in several new Member States (the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic). In 2004, the Commission adopted 16 decisions declaring that the measures were “not applicable after accession”. This means that the measures in question were granted in their entirety before the accession date without the potential of additional aid being granted after accession, and thus the Commission was neither required nor empowered to assess such measures. However, in two cases, the Czech Agrobanka Praha [325] and the Hungarian Postabank [326], the Commission decided to open proceedings as it found that some of the measures that were “applicable after accession” constituted state aid on which it had serious doubts as to their compatibility with the common market.
Znižanje davčne ugodnosti, ki jo je Slovaška odobrila podjetju US Steel Košice	Reduction of a tax concession granted by Slovakia to US Steel Košice
530. V pristopnih pogajanjih je bilo Slovaški odobreno prehodno odstopanje od pravil EU o državni pomoči, na podlagi katerega lahko Slovaška po pristopu nadaljuje dodeljevanje davčne pomoči podjetju US Steel Košice do konca davčnega leta 2009.	530. In the accession negotiations Slovakia was granted a transitional exemption from the EU state aid rules, under which Slovakia could continue to grant tax aid to US Steel Košice after accession until the end of fiscal year 2009.
531. Za izravnavo konkurenčne prednosti podjetja, ki izhaja iz oprostitve davka, je od leta 2002 določena zgornja meja proizvodnje in od dneva pristopa tudi zgornja meja prodaje. Priloga XIV k Pristopni pogodbi za Slovaško tudi določa obveznost polletnega poročanja. Prvo poročilo, ki ga je predložila Slovaška, kaže, da med letoma 2002 in 2003 zgornje meje proizvodnje niso bile upoštevane. Za izravnavo učinka čezmerne proizvodnje je slovaška vlada predlagala precejšnje znižanje državne pomoči, odobrene podjetju US Steel, in Komisijo zaprosila za revizijo pogojev za odobritev prehodnega obdobja.	531. In order to compensate for the company’s competitive advantage resulting from the tax exemption, as from 2002 a cap for production and as from the date of accession also a cap for sales were established. A half-yearly reporting obligation is also imposed on Slovakia by Annex XIV to the Act of Accession. The first report submitted by Slovakia showed that the production caps were not respected in 2002 and 2003. In order to counterbalance the effect of the overproduction the Slovak government proposed a significant reduction in state aid granted to US Steel and asked the Commission for a revision of the conditions for granting the transitional period.
532. Komisija se je 22. septembra[327] odločila o ustreznih ukrepih za izboljšanje stanja. V skladu s to odločbo je skupni znesek pomoči, ki se lahko odobri podjetju US Steel Košice do leta 2009, v obliki oprostitve od davka na dobiček družb, znižan s 500 milijonov USD na 430 milijonov USD. Poleg tega mora upravičenec slovaški vladi plačati davek v višini 32 milijonov USD v dveh enakih obrokih leta 2004 in 2005. US Steel Košice mora upoštevati zgornjo mejo proizvodnje od 1. januarja 2004 in zgornjo mejo prodaje od 1. maja 2004. US Steel Košice mora prav tako upoštevati pogoj, da ne sme razširiti svojega obsega skupin končnih proizvodov, ki obstaja na dan 13. decembra 2002, in mora še naprej izpolnjevati pogoje privatizacijske pogodbe.	532. The Commission decided on 22 September[327] on appropriate measures to remedy the situation. Under this decision, the total aid amount that can be granted to US Steel Košice until 2009, in the form of a corporate income tax exemption, is reduced from USD 500 million to USD 430 million. Additionally, the beneficiary is required to make a tax payment of USD 32 million to the Slovak Government, paid in two equal instalments during 2004 and 2005. US Steel Košice must respect the production cap from 1 January 2004 and the sales caps as from 1 May 2004. US Steel Košice is also required to respect the condition that it must not extend its range of groups of finished products existing on 13 December 2002 and must continue to meet the terms of the privatisation contract.
533. Slovaška vlada je 25. oktobra sprejela predlog Komisije za ustrezne ukrepe in potrdila, da je podjetje US Steel Košice plačalo prvi davčni obrok v višini 525 488 000 SKK (16 milijonov USD).	533. On 25 October, the Slovak Government accepted the Commission proposal for appropriate measures and confirmed that US Steel Kosice had paid the first tax instalment of SKK 525 488 000 (USD 16 million).
Pomoč za prestrukturiranje za proizvajalca jekla v Češki republiki	Restructuring aid to a steel producer in the Czech Republic
534. Komisija se je 14. decembra odločila, da uvede poglobljeno preiskavo morebitne državne pomoči za podjetje Třinecké železárny a.s. (TZ), proizvajalca jekla v Češki republiki[328]. Komisija bo raziskala, ali bi lahko nekateri državni ukrepi pomenili prikrito pomoč za prestrukturiranje. Državna pomoč za prestrukturiranje se lahko za češko jeklarsko industrijo odobri samo v okviru nacionalnega programa prestrukturiranja, ki ga je sprejela EU v Protokolu 2 k Pristopni pogodbi, in samo za podjetja, vključena vanj. TZ ni eno od teh podjetij in tako ni upravičeno do pomoči za prestrukturiranje. Komisija meni, da je pomoč, odobrena za okoljske projekte ter projekte raziskav in razvoja, združljiva z zadevnimi pravili EU o državni pomoči. Vendar pa dvomi o združljivosti pomoči, odobrene za projekte zapiranja in usposabljanja. Komisija bo tudi raziskala, ali je bila cena, ki jo je češka vlada plačala za delnice podjetja TZ, tržna cena.	534. On 14 December, the Commission decided to launch an in-depth probe into possible state aid to Třinecké železárny a.s. (TZ), a producer of steel in the Czech Republic[328]. The Commission will investigate whether certain state measures could constitute disguised restructuring aid. Restructuring state aid may be granted to the Czech steel industry only under the national restructuring programme accepted by the EU in Protocol No 2 to the Act of Accession and only to companies included in it. TZ is not one of these companies and so is not eligible for restructuring aid. The Commission considers that the aid granted for environmental and R&D projects is compatible with the relevant EU state aid rules. However, it has doubts as to the compatibility of the aid granted for closure and training projects. The Commission will also investigate whether the price paid by the Czech Government for the shares which it acquired from TZ was the market price.
9. Ladjedelništvo	9. Shipbuilding
Fincantieri	Fincantieri
535. Glede na Uredbo o ladjedelništvu[329] iz leta 1998 je bil zadnji datum dobave za to, da bi bila ladja upravičena do pomoči za obratovanje, povezane s pogodbo, 31. december 2003. Ladje, dobavljene pozneje, naj bi načeloma ne bile upravičene do take pomoči. Vendar pa lahko Komisija odobri podaljšanje tega roka, kadar so zamude upravičene z nepričakovanimi ali izjemnimi okoliščinami, na katere ladjedelniško podjetje nima vpliva.	535. According to the 1998 Shipbuilding Regulation[329], the last delivery date for a ship to qualify for contract-related operating aid was 31 December 2003. Ships delivered later would not, in principle, be eligible for such aid. Nevertheless, the Commission may grant an extension of this limit when justified by delays resulting from unexpected or exceptional circumstances, external to the shipbuilding company.
536. Komisija je 20. oktobra po priglasitvi Italije sprejela odločbo o dobavnem roku za pet potniških ladij, ki jih je izdelala italijanska ladjedelniška skupina Fincantieri. Italija je trdila, da je bil razlog za zamudo zahteva ladjarja, da se dobava preloži zaradi terorističnih napadov 11. septembra 2001[330].	536. On 20 October, the Commission took a decision, following a notification from Italy, concerning the delivery limit for five cruise ships produced by Fincantieri, an Italian shipbuilding group. Italy argued that the reason for the delays was that the shipowner requested deliveries to be postponed owing to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001[330].
537. Komisija je v svoji odločbi na eni strani odobrila podaljšanje dobavnega roka za štiri ladje, ker je menila, da je argument, ki ga je navedla Italija, zajet v izjemah, ki jih predvideva Uredba o ladjedelništvu, in ker je skupina Fincantieri imela tehnične zmogljivosti za dobavo ladij do konca leta 2003. Vendar pa se je Komisija odločila, da uvede uradno preiskavo v zvezi z eno od ladij, ker je dvomila, da je skupina Fincantieri kdaj koli imela tehnično zmogljivost za dobavo te ladje do 31. decembra 2003.	537. In its decision the Commission on the one hand approved the extension of the delivery limit for four of the ships, since the argument put forward by Italy was considered to be covered by the exceptions foreseen in the Shipbuilding Regulation and since Fincantieri had the technical capacity to deliver the ships by the end of 2003. However, the Commission decided to initiate a formal investigation concerning one of the ships, since it had doubts that Fincantieri ever had the technical capacity to deliver that ship by 31 December 2003.
Kvaerner Warnow Werft[331]	Kvaerner Warnow Werft[331]
538. Po združitvi Nemčije so ladjedelnice bivše Vzhodne Nemčije prejele izjemno velike zneske državne pomoči za svoje prestrukturiranje. Med letoma 1993 in 1995 je Komisija v okviru privatizacije in prestrukturiranja vzhodnonemške ladjedelnice Warnow Werft (zdaj Kvaerner Warnow Werft, KWW) odobrila pomoč v skupnem znesku 639,4 milijona EUR. Dogovorjeno je bilo, da bo to vključevalo pomoč za tekoče poslovanje v višini 382,1 milijona EUR, od tega bo 230,8 milijona EUR porabljenih za kritje izgub iz določenih ladjedelniških pogodb.	538. After the unification of Germany, the former East German shipyards received exceptionally large amounts of state aid for their restructuring. Between 1993 and 1995, in the context of the privatisation and restructuring of the eastern German shipyard Warnow Werft (now Kvaerner Warnow Werft, KWW), the Commission approved aid totallling EUR 639.4 million. It was the understanding that this would include operating aid amounting to EUR 382.1 million, of which EUR 230.8 million would be used to cover losses resulting from specific shipbuilding contracts.
539. Na podlagi poročil o 200 milijonih EUR posojila podjetja Kvaerner Warnow Werft svojemu matičnemu podjetju je Komisija posumila, da je ladjedelnica prejela več pomoči, kot je bilo potrebno za izravnavo izgub iz nekaterih ladjedelniških pogodb. Uvedla je preiskavo in preučila, ali bi moral prejemnik povrniti znesek v višini 60,9 milijona EUR.	539. Following reports of a EUR 200 million loan from Kvaerner Warnow Werft to its parent company, the Commission suspected that the shipyard had received more aid than necessary to offset losses from certain shipbuilding contracts. It opened an investigation and examined whether an amount of EUR 60.9 million should be recovered from the recipient.
540. V svoji dokončni odločbi je Komisija sklenila, da je Kvaerner Warnow Werft dejansko prejel večji znesek pomoči, kot je bil potreben za izravnavo izgub iz nekaterih ladjedelniških pogodb. Vendar pa je bil Kvaerner Warnow Werft med preiskavo sposoben dokazati obstoj dodatnih stroškov, ki jih je bilo mogoče pripisati ladjedelniškim pogodbam in ki so povzročili večje izgube. Ob upoštevanju nadaljnjih pripomb in pojasnil nemške vlade in podjetja, da Kvaerner ni prejel vse nedenarne pomoči za tekoče poslovanje, je Komisija odredila vračilo 13 milijonov EUR, za katere je menila, da so posledična presežna pomoč.	540. In its final decision the Commission concluded that Kvaerner Warnow Werft had indeed received a larger amount of aid than necessary to compensate for losses from certain shipbuilding contracts. However, during the investigation Kvaerner Warnow Werft was able to prove the existence of additional costs which could be attributed to the shipbuilding contracts and which resulted in increased losses. Taking into account further comments and clarifications from the German Government and the company that Kvaerner did not receive all non-cash operating aid, the Commission ordered the recovery of EUR 13 million, which was considered to be the resulting excess aid.
Omejitve zmogljivosti za nekatere ladjedelnice v vzhodni Nemčiji, Španiji in Grčiji	Capacity limitations for certain shipyards in eastern Germany, Spain and Greece
541. Med letoma 1992 in 1997 je pet ladjedelnic v vzhodni Nemčiji doživelo korenito prestrukturiranje. Za izravnavo učinkov izkrivljanja konkurence, ki jih je imela pomoč za prestrukturiranje, je morala Nemčija celotno ladjedelniško zmogljivost v vzhodni Nemčiji zmanjšati za 40 %. Od leta 1995 je Komisija spremljala skladnost ladjedelnic z omejitvijo zmogljivosti kot omejitev proizvodnje v smislu omejitve njihove proizvedene količine.	541. During 1992 and 1997, the five shipyards in eastern Germany underwent radical restructuring. To compensate for the distortive effects of the restructuring aid on competition, Germany was required to reduce overall shipbuilding capacity in eastern Germany by 40%. Since 1995 the Commission had monitored the yards’ compliance with the capacity limitation as a production limitation, in the sense of limiting their output.
542. Vendar pa je Sodišče v svoji sodbi z dne 29. aprila v zvezi s podjetjem Kvaerner Warnow Werft razsodilo, da si je Komisija napačno razlagala omejitev zmogljivosti kot omejitev dejanske proizvodnje. Omejitev zmogljivosti je bilo treba na podlagi odločb Komisije o odobritvi pomoči, sprejetih med letoma 1993 in 1995, razumeti kot tehnično omejitev proizvodnih zmogljivosti. Dokler proizvodne zmogljivosti ladjedelnice, kot so bile opisane v odločbah Komisije o odobritvi pomoči, niso bile spremenjene, je Kvaerner Warnow Werft lahko proizvajal prek svoje tehnične zmogljivosti.	542. However, in its judgment of 29 April concerning Kvaerner Warnow Werft the Court of Justice ruled that the Commission was wrong in interpreting the capacity limitation as a limitation of actual production. The capacity limitation, in the light of the Commission decisions adopted between 1993 and 1995 authorising the aid, had to be understood as a technical limitation of the production facilities. As long as the production facilities of the yard as described in the Commission decisions authorising the aid were not changed, Kvaerner Warnow Werft could produce beyond its technical capacity.
543. Komisija je ob upoštevanju razlage Sodišča ter v interesu doslednosti in enake obravnave sklenila, da omejitve zmogljivosti nekaterih nemških, španskih in grških ladjedelnic obravnava kot zgolj tehnične omejitve, v kolikor so odločbe temeljile na Direktivi Sveta 90/684, kot je bila spremenjena. Vendar pa se bo spremljanje omejitev tehnične zmogljivosti nadaljevalo na podlagi posameznih določb za zadevne ladjedelnice do datuma, določenega v vsaki od odločb o pomoči za prestrukturiranje[332].	543. Taking into account the reasoning of the Court and in the interests of consistency and equal treatment, the Commission decided to consider the capacity limitations of certain German, Spanish and Greek shipyards as merely technical limitations in so far as the decisions were based on Council Directive 90/684 as amended. However, the monitoring of technical capacity limitations will continue in the light of the individual provisions for the shipyards concerned until the date specified in each of the decisions on restructuring aid[332].
10. Kmetijstvo	10. Agriculture
544. Komisija je prejela 252 priglasitev načrtovanih ukrepov državne pomoči v kmetijskem in kmetijsko-industrijskem sektorju. Komisija je tudi začela preverjanje 13 ukrepov pomoči, ki niso bili predhodno priglašeni na podlagi člena 88(3) ES. Začela ali zaključila ni nobenega pregleda ukrepov obstoječe pomoči v skladu s členom 88(1) ES. Komisija ni ugovarjala na skupaj 212 ukrepov. Nekateri od teh ukrepov so bili odobreni potem, ko jih je zadevna država članica bodisi spremenila bodisi se je zavezala, da jih bo spremenila, da bi jih uskladila s pravili Skupnosti o državni pomoči. Komisija je uvedla postopek, določen v členu 88(2) ES, v zvezi z osmimi primeri, v katerih so zadevni ukrepi vzbujali resne dvome o združljivosti s skupnim trgom. Komisija je postopek iz člena 88(2) zaključila v zvezi s 14 primeri. V 10 primerih je bila sprejeta negativna dokončna odločba in v nekaterih od teh primerov je bilo odrejeno vračilo. Naslednji pregled je izbor primerov, ki so odpirali najzanimivejša vprašanja v smislu politike državnih pomoči v kmetijskem in kmetijsko-industrijskem sektorju v letu 2004.	544. The Commission received 252 notifications of planned state aid measures to be granted in the agricultural and agri-industrial sector. The Commission also started the examination of 13 aid measures which had not been previously notified under Article 88(3) EC. No review of existing aid measures pursuant to Article 88(1) EC was commenced or concluded. Overall, the Commission raised no objections to 212 measures. Several of these measures were approved after the Member States concerned either amended them or undertook to amend them in order to bring them into line with Community state aid rules. The Commission started the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) EC in respect of 8 cases, where the measures concerned raised serious doubts of incompatibility with the common market. The Commission closed the Article 88(2) procedure in respect of 14 cases. In 10 of these a negative final decision was taken, some of which ordered recovery. The following overview is a selection of cases which raised the most interesting issues in terms of state aid policy in the agricultural and agri-industrial sector in 2004.
FINSKA	FINLAND
Člen 141 Pristopne pogodbe	Article 141 of the Treaty of Accession
545. Komisija se je 16. marca odločila, da odobri poseben paket podpore, ki ga je priglasila Finska na podlagi člena 141 Pristopne pogodbe. Odločba je formalni rezultat dolgih pogovorov in pogajanj na najvišji ravni skozi vse leto 2003. Odločba dovoljuje Finski, da med letoma 2004 in 2007 odobri posebno dohodkovno podporo za kmete na južnem Finskem v višini približno 420 milijonov EUR in dodatno dohodkovno pomoč v obliki spodbujevalnih dodatnih izplačil za obstoječe kmetijsko-okoljske programe na južnem Finskem v višini 225 milijonov EUR v istem obdobju. Pogoj za odobritev dohodkovne pomoči je izvajanje ukrepov pomoči za spodbujanje naložb, začetek delovanja mladih kmetov in poslovno svetovanje kmetom.	545. On 16 March, the Commission decided to authorise the special support package notified by Finland under Article 141 of the Treaty of Accession. The decision is the formal outcome of lengthy discussions and negotiations at the highest level, throughout the year 2003. The decision authorises Finland to grant between 2004 and 2007 special income support to farmers in southern Finland, to the tune of approximately EUR 420 million, plus additional income aid in the form of incentive top-ups to existing agri-environmental programmes in southern Finland to the tune of EUR 225 million for the same period. The condition for granting the income aid is the implementation of aid measures to promote investments, setting-up of young farmers and business counselling to farmers.
FRANCIJA	FRANCE
PMPOA ( Program za nadzor onesnaževanja kmetijskega izvora )	PMPOA ( Programme to control pollution of agricultural origin )
546. Komisija je 19. februarja sprejela pozitivno dokončno odločbo[333], ki je pomoč za naložbe za varstvo okolja, odobreno v Franciji pred letom 2000, razglasila za združljivo s Pogodbo. Postopek je bil uveden, ker je Francija odobrila do 60 % pomoči za naložbe v času, ko je bilo mogoče odobriti le 35 %. Stopnja 35 % je bila tudi odobrena v odločbi, ki je Francija ni upoštevala in je odobrila več pomoči. Vendar pa je z letom 2000 Komisija povečala najvišjo dovoljeno stopnjo pomoči. Ta višja stopnja pomoči je bila potrjena v členu 4 uredbe o oprostitvi št. 1/2004, ki se z veljavnostjo za nazaj uporablja za pomoč, odobreno pred njenim začetkom veljavnosti. Na tej pravni podlagi je bila pomoč razglašena za združljivo.	546. On 19 February, the Commission adopted a positive final decision[333] declaring compatible with the Treaty aid for investments for environmental protection granted in France before 2000. A proceeding had been opened because France had granted up to 60% investment aid at a time when it was only possible to grant 35%. The rate of 35% had also been authorised in a decision which France had not respected by granting more aid. However, since 2000 the Commission had increased the maximum aid rate allowed. This higher aid rate has been confirmed in Article 4 of the exemption Regulation 1/2004, which applies retroactively to aid granted before its entry into force. On this legal basis, the aid was declared compatible.
Davek na zakol	Slaughter tax
547. Komisija je 30. marca sklenila[334], da ne bo ugovarjala zoper državno pomoč v višini približno 156 milijonov EUR za leto 2004 (in podobne zneske zatem) za odstranitev in uničenje poginulih živali na ravni kmetije. Intenzivnost pomoči je do 100-odstotna. Pomoč je v skladu s smernicami o TSE in trajanje programa je neomejeno. Kar zadeva financiranje odstranjevanja klavničnih odpadkov, odločba ugotavlja, da znesek v višini približno 91 milijonov EUR ni pomoč, saj klavnice plačajo več z novim davkom na zakol ( taxe d’abattage ), določenim na tono odpadkov, kot pa imajo koristi od brezplačnega pobiranja odpadkov, in tako od tega nimajo nobenih finančnih koristi.	547. On 30 March, the Commission decided[334] not to raise any objections to state aid amounting to some EUR 156 million for the year 2004 (and similar amounts thereafter) for the removal and destruction of fallen stock at farm level. The aid intensity is up to 100%. The aid is in line with the TSE guidelines and the duration of the scheme is unlimited. As far as the financing of the removal of slaughterhouse waste is concerned, the decision finds that an amount of some EUR 91 million is non-aid, the reason being that since slaughterhouses pay more through the new slaughter tax ( taxe d’abattage ) imposed per tonne of waste than they get back in terms of benefits through free picking up of the waste they do not derive any financial advantage.
Odškodnina za sušo leta 2003	Compensation for 2003 drought
548. Komisija je 20. oktobra sklenila, da ne bo ugovarjala zoper državno pomoč v višini približno 664 milijonov EUR za kmete, ki jih je leta 2003 prizadela suša[335]. Odškodnina je bila izplačana s kombinacijo denarnih subvencij (339 milijonov EUR), subvencioniranih posojil ob „nesrečah“ (20 milijonov EUR), prevzema obresti na neodplačana posojila (20 milijonov EUR), konsolidacijskih posojil (20 milijonov EUR za podporo posojil v višini 225 milijonov EUR), odložitve plačil neposrednih davkov in DDV (brez obračuna dodatnih obresti za zamudo), preklica teh davkov, neplačila davka na zemljišče in odložitve prispevkov za socialno varnost. Element subvencije v prevzemu obresti na neodplačana posojila je veljal za de minimis. Intenzivnost pomoči je bila do 100 % škode in trajanje je bilo različno glede na vrsto pomoči.	548. On 20 October, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to state aid amounting to some EUR 664 million for farmers hit by the drought in 2003[335]. Compensation was paid through a combination of cash grants (EUR 339 million), subsidised “disaster” loans (EUR 20 million), taking over of interest on outstanding loans (EUR 20 million), consolidation loans (EUR 20 million to support loans of EUR 225 million), postponement of payments due of direct taxes and VAT (without charging additional interest for the delay), cancellation of these taxes, non-payment of land tax, and postponement of social security contributions. The subsidy element contained in the taking over of interest on outstanding loans was considered de minimis . The aid intensity was up to 100% of damage and the duration varied depending on the type of aid.
Davek na predelavo klavničnih odpadkov in trupel poginulih živali	Rendering tax
549. Komisija je 14. decembra sprejela mešano pozitivno in negativno odločbo z vračilom o francoskem davku na predelavo klavničnih odpadkov in trupel poginulih živali ( taxe d’équarrissage )[336]. Od leta 1997 do leta 2003 je Francija pobirala prometni davek na prodajo francoskega mesa in tudi mesa iz drugih držav članic. Davek je financiral brezplačno odstranjevanje klavničnih odpadkov in poginulih živalih. Davek je sprva šel v poseben sklad, namenjen za financiranje te pomoči. Ko je Komisija uvedla postopek za ugotavljanje kršitev, ker je menila, da je davek na meso iz drugih držav članic diskriminacijski, je Francija davčne prihodke preselila v splošni proračun in pomoč financirala iz splošnega proračuna za leti 2001 in 2002.	549. On 14 December, the Commission adopted a mixed positive and negative final decision with recovery on the French rendering tax ( taxe d’équarrissage )[336]. From 1997 to 2003, France levied a sales tax on sales of both French meat and meat from other Member States. The tax financed free removal of slaughterhouse waste and fallen stock. The tax first went into a special fund reserved for financing this aid. After the Commission had initiated infringement proceedings, considering the tax on meat from other Member States discriminatory, France moved the tax proceeds into the general budget and financed the aid from the general budget for the years 2001 and 2002.
550. Ukrepi pomoči, financirani med letoma 1997 in 2002, v skupni višini 829 milijonov EUR so načeloma združljivi s pravili o državni pomoči. Vendar pa bi bilo treba zaradi diskriminacijskega financiranja od leta 1997 do leta 2000 pomoč v višini okoli 400 milijonov EUR razglasiti za nezdružljivo z zakonodajo Skupnosti. Toda povračilo pomoči s strani kmetov ne bi nujno popravilo diskriminacije zoper meso iz drugih držav članic, ki jo je povzročil davek, zaračunan na ravni trgovin. Komisija se je torej odločila, da razglasi pomoč za združljivo, če Francija povrne davek na meso iz drugih držav članic. Francija je v zvezi s tem predložila izjavo o zavezanosti.	550. The aid measures financed between 1997 and 2002 and amounting to a total of EUR 829 million are in principle compatible with the state aid rules. However, because of the discriminatory financing from 1997 until 2000, aid amounting to around EUR 400 million would have had to be found incompatible with Community law. But reimbursement of the aid by farmers would not necessarily repair the discrimination against meat from other Member States caused by the tax levied at supermarket level. Therefore, on the condition that France reimburses the tax levied on meat from other Member States, the Commission decided to declare the aid compatible. France has submitted an undertaking in this respect.
551. Kar zadeva leti 2001 in 2002, je Komisija v zvezi s pomočjo v višini dodatnih 400 milijonov EUR sklenila, da je bila povezava med davkom in pomočjo prekinjena, ker je bil davek razporejen v splošni proračun[337] in prihodki od davka niso ustrezali stroškom javne storitve predelave klavničnih odpadkov in trupel poginulih živali. Odločba torej zajema leta od 1997 do 2002. Za leto 2003 bo odločbo še treba sprejeti. Nadalje je bilo za pomoč, odobreno majhnim prodajalcem mesa z oprostitvijo zadevnega davka, ugotovljeno, da je nezdružljiva, in jo bo treba vrniti.	551. As to the years 2001 and 2002, for aid amounting to a further EUR 400 million, the Commission came to the conclusion that the link between the tax and the aid had been disrupted since the tax was allocated to the general budget[337] and the revenue from the tax did not correspond to the cost of the public rendering service. The decision thus altogether covers the years 1997 to 2002. For the year 2003, a decision will still have to be taken. Furthermore, aid granted to small meat sellers via an exemption from the tax in question is found incompatible and will have to be recovered.
NEMČIJA	GERMANY
Pomoč za strojne krožke	Aid for machinery rings
552. Komisija se je z dvema dokončnima odločbama, sprejetima 19. maja in 14. decembra – pogojno odločbo[338] in deloma negativno odločbo z vračilom[339] – odločila, da zaključi uradno preiskavo podpore, odobrene za strojne krožke na Bavarskem.	552. By means of two final decisions taken on 19 May and 14 December - a conditional decision[338] and a partly negative decision with recovery[339] - the Commission decided to conclude its formal investigation into the support granted for machinery rings in Bavaria.
553. Obe odločbi pojasnjujeta politiko Komisije glede državne pomoči, odobrene v zvezi s strojnimi krožki, ki so organizacije kmetov za samopomoč, katerih „osrednje dejavnosti“ vključujejo upravljanje nadomeščanja na kmetijah in izposojanje strojev med kmeti. Pritožbe, ki jih je prejela Komisija, so opozarjale na možno navzkrižno subvencioniranje drugih komercialnih („neosrednjih“) dejavnosti krožkov. Komisija načeloma priznava pozitivno vlogo strojnih krožkov v kmetijskem sektorju, saj kmetom omogočajo, da z izposojanjem dragih strojev izboljšajo svojo učinkovitost.	553. Both decisions clarify Commission policy on state aid granted in connection with machinery rings, which are self-help organisations of farmers whose “core activities” include the management of farm relief and machinery-sharing between farmers. Complaints received by the Commission pointed to possible cross-subsidisation of other commercial (“non-core”) activities of the rings. The Commission recognises, in principle, the positive role played by machinery rings in the agricultural sector, as they allow farmers to improve their efficiency by sharing costly machinery.
554. Komisija je zato v svoji odločbi C9/A/2004 odobrila pomoč (vredno 19,6 milijona EUR v šestih letih) za kmete v obliki subvencioniranih storitev na podlagi točke 14 kmetijskih smernic. Taka pomoč je degresivna in ne presega 50 % ustreznih stroškov. Vendar pa Komisija navaja, da bi lahko stalna javna podpora v višini 100 % takih stroškov, ki se pri kmetih po navadi ponavljajo, lahko pomenila nezdružljivo pomoč za tekoče poslovanje. Komisija zahteva, da Nemčija v svoj sistem uvede obveznost za strojne krožke, da kmetom posredujejo celotni znesek pomoči, in da bodisi prepove „neosrednje dejavnosti“ strojnih krožkov bodisi omeji izvajanje „neosrednjih dejavnosti“ na pravno neodvisne podružnice strojnih krožkov ter tako prepreči navzkrižno subvencioniranje.	554. In its decision C9/A/2004, the Commission therefore cleared aid (worth EUR 19.6 million over 6 years) benefiting farmers in the form of subsidised services on the basis of point 14 of the Agricultural Guidelines. Such aid is degressive and does not exceed 50% of the relevant costs. The Commission notes, however, that permanent public support amounting to 100% of such costs, which tend to be recurrent for farmers, might constitute incompatible operating aid. The Commission requires Germany to introduce in its scheme the obligation for the machinery rings to pass on the full amount of aid to farmers, and to either prohibit “non-core activities” of machinery rings, or to limit the exercise of “non-core activities” to legally independent subsidiaries of the machinery rings and thus prevent cross-subsidisation.
555. Komisija je v svoji odločbi v zvezi s preteklo (nezakonito) pomočjo (C9/B/2003) ugotovila, da so bili zneski pomoči, ki so jih prejeli posamezni prejemniki (približno 50 EUR na kmeta), premajhni za izkrivljanje konkurence. Vendar pa je Komisija tudi ugotovila, da bavarski sistem za dodeljevanje take pomoči ni učinkovito izključeval odobritve čiste pomoči za tekoče poslovanje za same strojne krožke ali navzkrižnega subvencioniranja drugih komercialnih dejavnosti, ki jih opravljajo strojni krožki. Komisija je zato sklenila, da je vsaka pomoč, za katero ni mogoče predložiti dokaza, da je koristila samo kmetom, nezdružljiva in jo je treba vrniti.	555. In its decision concerning past (unlawful) aid (C9/B/2003), the Commission found that the amounts of aid received by individual recipients (approximately EUR 50 per farmer) were too small to distort competition. However, the Commission also came to the conclusion that the Bavarian system for granting such aid did not effectively preclude the grant of pure operating aid to the machinery rings themselves, or the cross-subsidisation of other commercial activities carried out by the machinery rings. The Commission therefore concluded that any aid for which no evidence can be produced that it benefited only farmers is incompatible and should be recovered.
GRČIJA	GREECE
Program odškodnin zaradi slabega vremena – RAGBY	Bad weather compensation programme - RAGBY
556. Komisija je 20. aprila sprejela odločbo[340], da ne bo ugovarjala zoper državno pomoč v višini približno 60 milijonov EUR za odškodnino kmetom in ribičem za izgube, ki so jih povzročile nesreče (plazovi, poplave), slabo vreme (zmrzal, dež, nevihte, suša) in bolezni med marcem 2002 in marcem 2003. Intenzivnost pomoči je od 50 do 80 % izgub, za nekatere pridelke pa se lahko opravijo pavšalna izplačila na 1000 m2. Trajanje ukrepa je pet let (pomoč je izplačljiva v različnih stopnjah).	556. On 20 April, the Commission adopted a decision[340] not to raise any objections to state aid totalling some EUR 60 million to compensate farmers and fishermen for losses caused by disasters (landslides, floods), bad weather (frost, rain, storm, drought) and diseases between March 2002 and March 2003. The aid intensity is 50-80% of losses, or for certain crops lump-sum payments may be made per 1 000 m². The measure has a duration of 5 years (aid being payable in various stages).
ITALIJA	ITALY
Tvegani kapital za kmetijska majhna in srednje velika podjetja	Risk capital for agricultural SMEs
557. Komisija je 3. februarja sklenila, da ne bo ugovarjala zoper odobritev tveganega kapitala iz javnih skladov v višini okoli 5 milijonov EUR letno do leta 2005[341]. Cilj je ustanoviti sklad za spodbujanje dostopa kmetijskih majhnih in srednje velikih podjetij do tveganega kapitala v obliki pridobitve manjšinskega deleža, udeležbena posojila in udeležbe v drugih skladih tveganega kapitala. Ukrep vsebuje več elementov državne pomoči, za katere je bilo ugotovljeno, da so združljivi s pravili o državni pomoči. Na primer, javni sklad se odpoveduje dobičku, ki sega prek določene stopnje dobička, v korist zasebnih vlagateljev. To je eden od ukrepov za pritegnitev zasebnih vlagateljev. Trajanje ukrepa je 10 let.	557. On 3 February, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to the granting of risk capital from public funds amounting to some EUR 5 million per year until 2005[341]. The objective is to set up a fund to promote the access of agricultural SMEs to risk capital in the form of the acquisition of minority shareholdings, participatory loans and participation in other risk capital funds. The measure contains several state aid elements which were found compatible with state aid rules. For example, the public fund renounces profits going above a certain profit margin, in favour of private investors. This is one of the measures to attract private investors. The duration of the measure is 10 years.
Odškodnina za bolezen modrikastega jezika	Blue tongue compensation
558. Komisija je 16. marca sprejela negativno dokončno odločbo o državni pomoči v višini približno 2,6 milijona EUR za nadomestilo domnevnih izgub, ki so jih utrpela predelovalna podjetja v regiji Sardinija zaradi bolezni modrikastega jezika[342]. Pomoč za odškodnino kmetom za njihove izgube je bila odobrena vzporedno z odločbo o uvedbi postopka v zvezi s predelovalnim sektorjem. Ker pomoč ni bila izplačana, odredba o vračilu ni bila potrebna. Za pomoč je bilo ugotovljeno, da je nezdružljiva, ker:	558. On 16 March, the Commission adopted a negative final decision concerning state aid totalling some EUR 2.6 million to compensate processing companies in the region of Sardinia for alleged losses due to blue tongue disease[342]. Aid to compensate farmers for their losses had been authorised in parallel with the decision to open proceedings in respect of the processing sector. Since the aid had not been paid out, no recovery order was necessary. The aid was found incompatible because:
- pravila o državni pomoči dovoljujejo odškodnino samo za primarne proizvajalce. Izgube v prometu so del običajnega poslovnega tveganja in jih lahko povzročijo različni dejavniki;	- The state aid rules allow compensation only to primary producers. Losses in turnover are part of normal business risk, and may be caused by various factors.
- povezava med izgubami in boleznijo modrikastega jezika ni bila dokazana. V istem času je bila na Sardiniji suša, ki je prav tako lahko povzročila manjši promet; nekatere zadruge so morda prejele manj surovin (in torej utrpele izgube) zaradi drugih razlogov, kot je bolezen modrikastega jezika.	- The link between the losses and blue tongue had not been shown. There was a drought in Sardinia at the same time that may also have led to reductions in turnover; certain cooperatives may have had less raw material delivered (and hence suffered losses) for reasons other than blue tongue.
AIMA – perutninski sektor	AIMA - poultry sector
559. Komisija je 19. maja sprejela negativno dokončno odločbo, ki je državno pomoč v višini približno 10,3 milijona EUR razglasila za nezdružljivo s Pogodbo[343]. Ker pomoč ni bila izplačana, odredba o vračilu ni bila potrebna. Pomoč naj bi rejcem perutnine v Italiji nadomestila domnevne izgube zaradi preplaha v zvezi z dioksinom leta 1999 v Belgiji.	559. On 19 May, the Commission adopted a negative final decision declaring state aid amounting to some EUR 10.3 million incompatible with the Treaty[343]. Since the aid had not been paid out, no recovery order was necessary. The aid was supposed to compensate poultry producers in Italy for alleged losses due the 1999 dioxin scare in Belgium.
560. Italija je trdila, da je preplah v zvezi z dioksinom v Belgiji povzročil medijski preplah v Italiji, posledica česar je bil upad v porabi perutninskega mesa v Italiji. Zato je Italija predlagala odškodnino za svoje rejce perutnine, pri čemer je trdila, da je treba škandal z dioksinom šteti za „izredni dogodek“ ne samo v Belgiji, ampak tudi v Italiji. V skladu s pravili o državni pomoči bi bil edini način za odobritev take pomoči ta, da bi se učinki preplaha v zvezi z dioksinom šteli za „izredni dogodek“. Vendar pa je Komisija izrazila resne dvome o tem pristopu za italijanski trg. Informacije, ki jih je prejela po uvedbi postopka, teh dvomov niso odpravile.	560. Italy had claimed that the dioxin scare in Belgium caused a media scare in Italy, with a resulting drop in the consumption of poultry meat in Italy. Consequently, Italy had proposed to compensate its own poultry producers, arguing that the dioxin scandal should be considered an “extraordinary event” not only in Belgium but also in Italy. Under state aid rules, the only way to authorise such aid would be to consider the effects of the dioxin scare an “extraordinary event”. However, the Commission had expressed serious doubts concerning this approach for the Italian market. The information received after opening proceedings did not dispel these doubts.
Pomoč za reševanje za dobavitelje skupini Parmalat	Rescue aid in favour of Parmalat suppliers
561. Komisija je 14. julija sprejela odločbo[344], da ne bo ugovarjala zoper enkratno pomoč v višini približno 1 milijona EUR za proizvajalce mleka v Lombardiji, ki so se znašli v finančnih težavah, ker niso dobili plačila za mleko, dobavljeno skupini Parmalat. Pomoč za reševanje je sestavljena iz jamstva v skladu s pogoji smernic o pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje. Italija je predlagala metode povprečnega izračuna za določitev, kdaj se za tipičnega kmeta, ki proizvaja mleko, lahko šteje, da je v težavah in torej upravičen do pomoči. Nekateri kmetje bodo izključeni, saj zanje velja, da imajo dovolj sredstev, da niso v težavah. Kar zadeva intenzivnost pomoči, je najvišja vrednost jamstva, upravičenega na podlagi sedanjega programa, 500 000 EUR za posamezna podjetja in 5 milijonov EUR za zadruge.	561. On 14 July, the Commission adopted a decision[344] not to raise objections to one–off aid amounting to some EUR 1 million for milk producers in Lombardy who are in financial difficulties because they have not been paid for milk delivered to the Parmalat group. The rescue aid consists in a guarantee, in line with the conditions of the guidelines for rescue and restructuring aid. Italy proposed average calculation methods for establishing when a typical dairy farmer can be considered in difficulty and therefore qualifies for aid. Certain farmers will be excluded because they are considered sufficiently well-off not to be in difficulties. As regards aid intensity, the maximum value of the guarantee eligible under the present scheme is EUR 500 000 for individual companies and EUR 5 million for cooperatives.
Regionalno posredovanje za razvoj zadrug Confidi v kmetijskem sektorju	Regional intervention for the development of Confidi in the agricultural sector
562. Komisija je 10. maja odobrila pomoč[345] v višini 1 032 913,80 EUR za jamstva in 516 456,90 EUR za tehnično pomoč za zadruge Confidi, sestavljene iz podjetij v kmetijskem sektorju in njihovih združenj, ki upravljajo jamstvene sklade. Pomoč je odobrena za obdobje petih let za:	562. On 10 May, the Commission approved aid[345] amounting to EUR 1 032 913.80 for guarantees and EUR 516 456.90 for technical assistance in favour of Confidi, which are cooperatives made up of undertakings in the agricultural sector and associations thereof that manage guarantee funds. Aid is granted, for a period of five years, with a view to:
- zagotovitev pomožnih jamstev kmetom ali zadrugam, če so jamstva povezana z ukrepi, ki jih financira program regionalne/nacionalne pomoči, ki ga je odobrila Komisija, in da kombinirana pomoč ne presega pragov, določenih v odločbah Komisije o odobritvi pomoči;	- providing subsidiary guarantees to farmers or cooperatives, provided that the guarantees are linked to operations financed by a regional/national aid scheme approved by the Commission and that the combined aid does not exceed the thresholds set in the Commission decisions approving the aid;
- zagotovitev svetovanja za vse kmete, ki delujejo v določeni regiji.	- providing consultancy services to all farmers operating in a particular region.
563. Ekvivalent denarne subvencije pomoči za pomožna jamstva se izračuna enako kot za subvencionirana posojila, tj. kot razlika med tržnimi obrestnimi merami za posojila in dejanskim posojilom, sklenjenim z banko, po obstoju jamstva, minus znesek, ki ga plača upravičenec.	563. The cash grant equivalent of the aid for subsidiary guarantees is calculated in the same way as for subsidised loans, i.e. as the difference between market loan rates and the actual loan concluded with the bank, following the existence of the guarantee, minus the amount paid by the beneficiary.
Pomoč za krizo BSE: Zakon 49/2001 – členi, razen člena 7a	Aid for the BSE crisis: Law 49/2001 - Articles other than Article 7a
564. Komisija je 1. decembra za nazaj dovolila[346] Italiji, da odobri državno pomoč v višini približno 169 milijonov EUR za stroške obveznega uničenja snovi s posebnim tveganjem in shranjevanja snovi z nizkim tveganjem ter dohodkovno pomoč za proizvajalce govejega mesa za odpravo učinkov krize BSE iz leta 2001. Odobreni ukrepi so del italijanskega zakona 49/2001, ki ga je deloma odobrila Komisija v času, ko se je pojavila kriza BSE leta 2001.	564. On 1 December, the Commission retroactively authorised[346] Italy to grant state aid amounting to approximately EUR 169 million for the costs of compulsory destruction of specific risk materials and the storage of low-risk material as well as income aid for beef producers to counter the effects of the 2001 BSE crisis . The measures approved are part of Italian Law 49/2001, partially approved by the Commission at the time when the 2001 BSE crisis occurred.
565. Dohodkovna pomoč za proizvajalce govejega mesa, odobrena z odložitvijo in podaljšanjem rokov za plačilo davkov in prispevkov za socialno varnost, je dovoljena na podlagi člena 87(2)(b) ES. Dohodkovna pomoč za sektor nadaljnje proizvodnje (klavnice, trgovci z mesom na debelo in drobno), ki jo zajema odločba, znaša okoli 103,25 EUR na gospodarstvo in se šteje za de minimis ter torej ni zajeta v prepovedi državne pomoči.	565. Income aid to beef producers, granted via suspension and extension of tax deadlines and social security obligations, is authorised under Article 87(2)(b) EC. Income aid to the downstream sector (slaughtering undertakings, wholesale and retail traders of meat) covered by the decision amounts to around EUR 103.25 per holding and is considered to be de minimis aid and therefore not caught by the state aid prohibition.
NIZOZEMSKA	NETHERLANDS
Ukrepi glede kokošje kuge	Avian flu measures
566. Komisija je 8. septembra sprejela odločbo, da ne bo ugovarjala zoper 11,3 milijona EUR državne pomoči za stroške boja proti kokošji kugi[347]. Ukrep je sprememba ukrepa, odobrenega kot N 700/2000. Prijavljena intenzivnost pomoči je do 100-odstotna in trajanje ukrepa je do 1. januarja 2010.	566. On 8 September, the Commission adopted a decision not to raise any objections to around EUR 11.3 million in state aid towards the cost of combating avian flu[347]. The measure is a modification of the measure approved as N 700/2000. The announced aid intensity is up to 100% and the duration of the measure is until 1 January 2010.
Ukrepi glede slinavke in parkljevke	Foot and mouth disease measures
567. Komisija je 8. septembra sklenila, da ne bo ugovarjala zoper državno pomoč v višini približno 2,7 milijona EUR za stroške boja proti slinavki in parkljevki[348]. Ukrep je sprememba ukrepa, odobrenega kot N 700/2000. Intenzivnost pomoči jo do 100-odstotna, ukrep pa naj bi trajal do 1. januarja 2010.	567. On 8 September, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to state aid amounting to some EUR 2.7 million towards the cost of combating foot and mouth disease[348]. The measure is a modification of the measure approved as N 700/2000. The aid intensity is up to 100% and the measure is to last until 1 January 2010.
11. Ribištvo	11. Fisheries
568. Komisija je dovolila nekatere ukrepe pomoči, ki jih je odobrila Francija (v obliki znižanj prispevkov za socialno varnost in drugih dajatev) po onesnaženju z nafto, ki ga je povzročila nesreča tankerja Erika leta 1999, in hudi nevihti takoj zatem. Pomoč je štela za upravičeno, kar je zadevalo ribogojce na atlantski obali, ki so jih dogodki še posebej prizadeli, medtem ko je za druge ribogojce in tudi za ribiče ugotovila, da je pomoč nezdružljiva s skupnim trgom in jo bo treba vrniti.	568. The Commission authorised certain aid measures granted by France (in the form of reductions in social security contributions and other charges) following the oil pollution caused by the shipwreck of the Erika in December 1999 and a violent storm just afterwards. It considered the aid justified as far as the fish farmers on the Atlantic coast particularly affected by the events were concerned but for other fish farmers, and also for fishermen, it found them incompatible with the common market and the aid will have to be recovered.
569. Komisija je tudi odobrila nekatere ukrepe pomoči za ribištvo, odobrene na Korziki med letoma 1986 in 1999, vendar pa je za ukrepe pomoči za izgradnjo plovil in posodobitev plovil s povečanjem moči, odobrene med 1. januarjem 1997 in 28. oktobrom 1998, ugotovila, da so nezdružljivi s skupnim trgom, zato bo treba tudi to pomoč vrniti. Nova pomoč za nakup rabljenih plovil pa je bila odobrena.	569. The Commission also authorised certain fishery aid measures granted in Corsica between 1986 and 1999, but those for vessel construction and vessel modernisation with an increase in power granted between 1 January 1997 and 28 October 1998 were found incompatible with the common market and must also be recovered. New aid for purchasing second-hand vessels was, however, authorised.
12. Premog in promet	12. COAL AND TRANSPORT
Premog	Coal
570. Leto sta zaznamovala konec proizvodnje premoga v Franciji in širitev Unije, s čimer se je število proizvajalk premoga povečalo s tri (Nemčija, Združeno kraljestvo, Španija) na sedem (še Poljska, Češka, Slovaška in Madžarska). Zaradi neugodnih geoloških pogojev mnogi rudniki EU niso konkurenčni uvoženemu premogu.	570. The year was marked by the end of coal production in France and by the enlargement of the Union, which increased the number of coal-producing countries from three (Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain) to seven, adding Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Owing to unfavourable geological conditions, many EU mines are not competitive against imported coal.
571. Spomniti je treba, da se od 24. julija 2002 uporablja nov okvir za državno pomoč, odobreno v premogovnem sektorju[349], potem ko se je 23. julija 2002 iztekla Pogodba ESPJ. Ta sistem temelji na minimalni proizvodnji premoga, da bi okrepili varnost dobave energije v EU. Državna pomoč v premogovništvu bo podprla tudi prestrukturiranje tega sektorja ob upoštevanju socialnih in regionalnih posledic zmanjšanja v dejavnosti.	571. It has to be recalled that since 24 July 2002 a new framework has applied to state aid granted in the coal sector[349], following the expiry of the ECSC Treaty on 23 July 2002. This regime is based on a minimal production of coal in order to strengthen the EU’s security of energy supply. State aid to the coal industry will also support the restructuring of this sector, taking into account the social and regional repercussions of the reduction in activity.
572. Kar zadeva Španijo, je Komisija uvedla poglobljeno preiskavo v zvezi z načrtom prestrukturiranja in pomočjo za premogovništvo za leto 2003[350]. Komisija je 19. maja 2004 odobrila pomoč za nemško premogovništvo za leto 2004[351].	572. With regard to Spain, the Commission initiated an in-depth investigation concerning the restructuring plan and aid for the coal industry for the year 2003[350]. On 19 May 2004 the Commission authorised aid to the German coal industry for the year 2004[351].
Promet	Transport
Železniški prevoz	Rail transport
573. Komisija je 6. oktobra Nemčiji dovolila podporo za njeno železniško infrastrukturo[352]. Odobreni program pomoči se nanaša na smernice o sredstvih za gradnjo, podaljšanje in reaktivacijo zasebnih železniških industrijskih tirov. Zasebni industrijski tir je železniški tir v lasti podjetja, ki ga v okviru svojih komercialnih dejavnosti uporablja za odpremo in/ali sprejetje tovora. Ta železniški tir mora biti neposredno ali posredno povezan z omrežjem javne železniške infrastrukture. Program pomoči bi moral prispevati k zagotovitvi rasti v tem sektorju in podpreti prenos ravnotežja s cestnega na železniški prevoz.	573. On 6 October, the Commission authorised Germany to support its railway infrastructure[352]. The approved aid scheme concerns guidelines on funding for the construction, extension and reactivation of private railway sidings. A private siding is a railway track owned by a business undertaking and used to dispatch and/or receive freight as part of its commercial activities. This railway track must connect directly or indirectly with the network of a public railway infrastructure. The aid scheme should contribute to securing growth in this sector and support shifting the balance from road to rail transport.
Kombiniran prevoz	Combined transport
574. Ugodno je bil sprejet italijanski program[353] za Furlanijo - Julijsko krajino, ki naj bi odobril subvencije podjetjem, ki zagotavljajo storitve kombiniranega prevoza po železnici v deželo ali iz nje. Te subvencije bodo omejene na izravnavo razlik med zunanjimi stroški cestnega in kombiniranega prevoza. Program bo omogočil znižanje cene storitev kombiniranega prevoza, da bi ta lahko konkuriral s cestnim prevozom pod podobnimi tržnimi pogoji.	574. A favourable approach was taken towards an Italian scheme[353] for the Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia which is to grant subsidies to firms offering combined transport services by rail to or from the Region. These subsidies will be limited to offsetting the differences between the external costs of road and combined transport. The scheme will make it possible to reduce the price of combined transport services in order to compete with road transport under similar market conditions.
575. Komisija je odobrila še en italijanski regionalni program[354] (Sicilija), namenjen spodbujanju za obdobje treh let storitev kombiniranega cestnega/pomorskega prevoza med sicilijanskimi in drugimi italijanskimi pristanišči ter pristanišči Skupnosti. Program bo majhnim in srednje velikim podjetjem za cestni prevoz dodelil „okoljski bonus“ za prevoz z ladjo posameznih težkih tovornih vozil, težjih od 12 ton, ali polpriklopnikov. Glede na poseben geografski in gospodarski položaj Sicilije, težave pri organiziranju trga intermodalnega prevoza in eksperimentalno naravo ukrepa je Komisija menila, da je združljiv s Pogodbo.	575. The Commission approved another Italian regional scheme[354] (Sicily) designed to promote for a three-year period road/sea combined transport services between Sicilian and other Italian and Community ports. The scheme will grant an “environmental bonus” to small and medium-sized road transport companies when shipping individual heavy goods vehicles of more than 12 tonnes or semi-trailers. In the light of the specific geographic and economic situation of Sicily, the difficulties in organising the intermodal transport market and the experimental character of the measure, the Commission considered it to be compatible with the Treaty.
576. Komisija je aprila sklenila, da ne bo ugovarjala zoper program pomoči[355], namenjen spodbuditvi prenosa dela tovornega prometa s ceste na vodo z odobritvijo pomoči za nove/obstoječe ponudnike obalnega prevoza, prevoza po morju na kratkih razdaljah in prevoza po celinskih plovnih poteh, pod pogojem, da se izogibajo prevozom s tovornjaki in ustvarjajo koristi za okolje v ZK. Ta novi program dopolnjuje obstoječi program subvencije za tovorne zmogljivosti (Freight Facilities Grant (FFG))[356]. Subvencije bodo omejene na največ 30 % skupnih stroškov poslovanja za največ tri leta, po tem mora biti projekt sposoben preživeti.	576. In April, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to an aid scheme[355] intended to encourage the modal shift of freight from road to water by granting aid to new/existing coastal, short sea or inland waterway services provided that they avoid lorry journeys and that they generate environmental benefits within the UK. This new scheme complements the existing Freight Facilities Grant (FFG) scheme[356]. Grants will be limited to not more than 30% of the total operating cost for a maximum of three years, after which the project must be viable.
577. Nazadnje je Komisija odobrila belgijski program pomoči[357], ki namerava zagotoviti dostop do pristanišča Antwerpen po celinski plovni poti med obnovitvenimi deli na antwerpenskem obroču[358]. Program bo kril dodatne stroške za pretovarjanje zabojnikov na plovila celinskih plovnih poti, tako da se med deli ohrani promet po celinskih plovnih poteh v pristanišče Antwerpen in iz njega.	577. Finally, the Commission authorised a Belgian aid scheme[357] which intends to guarantee access to the Port of Antwerp through inland waterway during the reconstruction works on the Antwerp Ring[358]. The scheme will bear the additional costs for the loading and unloading of containers on inland vessels so as not to discourage inland waterway traffic to and from the Port of Antwerp during the works.
Cestni prevoz	Road transport
578. Komisija je julija odobrila pomoč za naložbe za opremljanje tovornjakov, registriranih na Danskem, s filtri za delce [359] .	578. In July, the Commission approved investment aid for the retrofitting of particulate filters on lorries registered in Denmark [359] .
579. Komisija je 20. oktobra zaključila uradno preiskavo[360] domnevno nepravilne uporabe predhodne pozitivne odločbe Komisije o prestrukturiranju podjetja Sernam, podružnice francoskega železniškega podjetja SNCF, ki opravlja cestni in železniški prevoz ter tudi špedicijo, s sprejetjem pogojne, deloma pozitivne in deloma negativne odločbe z odredbo vračila.	579. On 20 October, the Commission closed the formal investigation[360] into alleged incorrect application of a previous positive Commission decision concerning the restructuring of the company Sernam, a subsidiary of the French railway company SNCF carrying out road and rail transport as well as freight forwarding, by adopting a conditional, partly positive and partly negative decision with a recovery order.
580. Komisija je nadaljevala preiskavo načrta prestrukturiranja belgijskega podjetja ABX Logistics, vključenega v špedicijo, predvsem v sektorju cestnega prevoza, pa tudi v sektorjih pomorskega in zračnega prevoza.	580. The Commission proceeded with the investigation of the restructuring plan of the Belgian company, ABX Logistics, involved in freight forwarding mainly in the road transport as well as in the maritime and air transport sectors.
581. Komisija trenutno preučuje morebitne učinke državne pomoči sheme nadomestil, ki je povezana z uvedbo cestnine za težka tovorna vozila na nemških avtocestah[361].	581. The Commission is currently examining the possible state aid effects of a reimbursement scheme which is linked to the introduction of a toll for heavy goods vehicles on German highways[361].
Plovne poti	Waterways
Celinske plovne poti	Inland waterways
582. Komisija je odobrila dva programa pomoči za spodbuditev razvoja prevoza po celinskih plovnih poteh v Franciji in Belgiji (Valonija)[362] s posodobitvijo ladjevja ter promocijo in obnovo poklica prevoznika po celinskih plovnih poteh.	582. The Commission cleared two aid schemes intended to encourage the development of inland waterway transport in France and Belgium (Wallonia)[362] through modernisation of the fleet and promotion and renewal of the inland waterway transport profession.
583. Valonski program pomoči predvideva tudi pomoč za operaterje rednih storitev kombiniranega prevoza zabojnikov, ki uporabljajo celinske plovne poti in poslujejo s terminala, povezanega s plovno potjo v Valoniji. Subvencija se izračuna na podlagi števila zabojnikov, pretovorjenih na plovno pot ali s plovne poti. Pomoč naj bi spodbudila razvoj storitev kombiniranega prevoza po celinskih plovnih poteh v Valonijo in iz nje glede na cestni prevoz, ki zagotavlja skoraj celotni prevoz zabojnikov v regiji.	583. The Walloon aid scheme also provides for aid to operators of scheduled container combined transport services using inland waterways and operating from a terminal linked to a waterway located in Wallonia. The grant is calculated on the basis of the number of containers transshipped to or from the waterway. The aid is intended to encourage the development of inland waterway combined transport services, to and from Wallonia, vis-à-vis road transport, which accounts for nearly all container transport in the region.
Pomorski prevoz	Maritime transport
584. Komisija je odobrila več podaljšanj ali sprememb obstoječih programov v Italiji[363], Nemčiji[364], na Danskem[365] in Finskem[366]. Odobrila je tudi sistem pavšalnega obdavčenja na podlagi tonaže[367], s čimer je Italija postala enajsta država članica, ki je uvedla tak sistem, imenovan tudi davek na tonažo.	584. The Commission approved several extensions or amendments to existing schemes in Italy[363], Germany[364], Denmark[365] and Finland[366]. It also cleared a tonnage-based flat-rate tax scheme[367], whereby Italy became the eleventh Member State to introduce such a scheme, also referred to as Tonnage Tax.
585. Komisija je dala zeleno luč programu pomoči, ki ga je sprejela Italija za podjetja v skupini Tirrenia [368] in ki bo veljal do leta 2008 na podlagi sporazumov o javnih storitvah. Komisija je menila, da subvencije, izplačane podjetjem v skupini Tirrenia za zagotovitev opravljanja storitev med celinsko Italijo in njenimi otoki, pomenijo nadomestilo za uvedbo obveznosti javnih služb. Po drugi strani pa je Komisija razglasila, da je bilo nadomestilo, odobreno na nekaterih mednarodnih morskih poteh, nezdružljivo z zakonodajo Skupnosti, češ da ni bilo nobene prave potrebe po javnih storitvah, in zahtevala, da ga prejemnik vrne.	585. The Commission gave the go-ahead to the aid scheme adopted by Italy for companies in the Tirrenia group [368], which will remain in force until 2008 on the basis of public service agreements. The Commission took the view that the grants paid to companies in the Tirrenia group to ensure the operation of services between mainland Italy and its islands constitute compensation for the imposition of public service obligations. On the other hand, the Commission declared that compensation granted on certain international maritime routes was incompatible with Community law, on the ground that there was no real need for public services, and called for it to be recovered from the recipient.
586. Komisija je 30. junija[369] zaključila formalni preiskovalni postopek, ki ga je uvedla 19. marca 2003[370] v zvezi s svežnjem belgijskih davčnih ukrepov v korist trgovske mornarice, in zavrnila nekatere od preučenih ukrepov, namreč znižanje davka za mlajša plovila, prenos davčnih olajšav v okviru podjetja, podvrženega pavšalnemu obdavčenju, in upravičenost dejavnosti, ki niso povezane s pomorskim prevozom, kot so prodaja blaga ali storitev, ki niso namenjeni za porabo na krovu, in prodaja luksuznega blaga ali izletov potnikov ter stave in igralnice. Drugi preučeni ukrepi so bili sprejeti.	586. The Commission closed on 30 June [369] the formal investigation procedure it had opened on 19 March 2003 [370] in respect of a package of Belgian tax measures in favour of the merchant marine, refusing some of the measures examined, namely the tax reduction for more recent vessels, the transfer of tax credits to within the scope of the company subject to flat-rate taxation and the eligibility of activities not intrinsically related to maritime transport, such as the sale of goods or services not intended for consumption on board and the sale of luxury goods or passenger excursions, and betting and casinos. The other measures examined were accepted.
587. Nazadnje je Komisija, kar zadeva Francijo, 14. decembra spremenila svojo odločbo z dne 30. januarja 2002[371] o odobritvi programa pomoči za vzpostavitev novih linij prevoza po morju na kratkih razdaljah, da bi v celoti upoštevala nova pravila Skupnosti v tem sektorju.	587. Lastly, as far as France is concerned, the Commission amended on 14 December its decision of 30 January 2002[371] authorising an aid scheme for the setting up of new short sea shipping services, in order to take full account of the new Community rules in this sector.
Zračni prevoz	Air transport
588. Komisija je 12. februarja sprejela odločbo o ugodnostih, ki sta jih Valonska regija[372] in Brussels South Charleroi Airport (BSCA) odobrila letalskemu prevozniku Ryanair v zvezi z njegovo namestitvijo v Charleroiju. Komisija je ugotovila, da noben zasebni operater ne bi v enakih okoliščinah kot BSCA odobril enakih ugodnosti. Ker načelo zasebnega vlagatelja v tem primeru ni bilo upoštevano, so ugodnosti, odobrene prevozniku Ryanair, pomenile državno pomoč, ki bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco.	588. On 12 February, the Commission took a decision concerning advantages granted by the Walloon Region[372] and the publicly-owned Brussels South Charleroi Airport (BSCA) to the airline Ryanair in connection with its establishment at Charleroi. The Commission concluded that no private operator in the same circumstances as BSCA would have granted the same advantages. Since the market private investor principle had not been adhered to in this case, the advantages granted to Ryanair constituted state aid which could distort competition.
589. Vendar pa je Komisija menila, da bi bila pomoč, odobrena letalskemu prevozniku Ryanair v Charleroiju, lahko združljiva s skupnim trgom v okviru prometne politike, saj omogoča razvoj in izboljšano uporabo sekundarne letališke infrastrukture, ki je trenutno zapostavljena in predstavlja strošek za skupnost kot celoto. V tej odločbi je Komisija odobrila določene vrste pomoči, zlasti pomoč, ki omogoča pravi razvoj novih prog na podlagi jasno opredeljenih pogojev. V odločbi je tudi navedla, da nekaterih oblik pomoči ni mogoče odobriti; Komisija si prizadeva zagotoviti, da ugodnosti, odobrene na določenem letališču, niso diskriminacijske in so bolj pregledne.	589. The Commission took the view, however, that the aid granted to Ryanair at Charleroi could be compatible with the common market in the context of transport policy, insofar as it permits the development and improved use of secondary airport infrastructure which is currently underused and represents a cost to the community as a whole. Certain types of aid were authorised by the Commission in this decision, in particular aid which permits genuine development of new routes under clearly defined conditions. The decision also indicated that certain forms of aid cannot be authorised; the Commission aims to guarantee that the advantages granted at a particular airport are not discriminatory and are surrounded by greater transparency.
590. Ta odločba je pomembna za prihodnost zračnega prevoza, zlasti ker se nanaša na uporabo regionalnih ali sekundarnih letališč. V času odločbe je Komisija tudi naznanila, da bo pripravila smernice, ki bodo obravnavale vprašanja državne pomoči za nizkocenovne letalske prevoznike, zagonske pomoči za nove proge in javnega financiranja letališč: „Smernice Skupnosti o financiranju letališč in zagonski državni pomoči letalskim družbam z odhodi z regionalnih letališč“.	590. This decision is of significance for the future of air transport, especially as it relates to the use of regional or secondary airports. At the time of the decision the Commission also announced that it would draw up guidelines dealing with the issues of state aid to low cost airlines, start-up aid for new routes and the public financing of airports: “Community guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airports”.
591. Komisija je 16. marca sklenila, da bo uvedla preiskavo države pomoči v zvezi z Grčijo[373], pri čemer je izrazila dvome o ustanovitvi in privatizaciji podjetja z imenom Olympic Airlines (NOA) – ki je prevzelo dejavnosti zračnega prometa podjetja Olympic Airways – ter o vrsti drugih ukrepov. Komisija je podvomila tudi o nevračilu s strani grške države nezakonite in nezdružljive pomoči po odločbi iz decembra 2002, neplačilu s strani podjetja davčnega dolga leta 2003, zagotovitvi predujma (več kot 130 milijonov EUR) s strani grške države za financiranje prestrukturiranja in privatizacije podjetja ter neplačilu s strani podjetja davka za posodobitev letališča ( Spatosimo ), zaračunanega potnikom.	591. On 16 March, the Commission decided to open a state aid investigation in respect of Greece[373], expressing doubts about the establishment and privatisation of a company called Olympic Airlines (NOA) - which took over the aviation activities of Olympic Airways – as well as a number of other measures. The Commission also called into question the non-recovery by the Greek State of illegal and incompatible aid after the December 2002 decision, the non-payment by the company of tax debt in 2003, the provision of an advance (over EUR 130 million) by the Greek State to fund the restructuring and privatisation of the company, and the non-payment by the company of the airport modernisation tax ( Spatosimo ) charged to passengers.
592. Med odločbami, sprejetimi v letu 2004 na področju zračnega prometa, je bila med drugim pomembna odločba z dne 20. julija, s katero je Komisija odobrila pomoč za reševanje italijanske letalske družbe Alitalia[374]. Pomoč vsebuje 400 milijonov EUR premostitvenega posojila po kratkoročnih tržnih obrestnih merah, ki ga je treba povrniti ob izteku, da se omogoči določitev načinov za morebitno prestrukturiranje podjetja brez dodatne državne pomoči.	592. Significant among the other decisions taken during 2004 in the area of air transport was the decision of 20 July by which the Commission authorised rescue aid for the Italian airline Alitalia[374]. The aid consists of an EUR 400 million bridging loan at short-term market rates which must be repaid on expiry to enable arrangements to be worked out for the possible restructuring of the company without additional state aid.
593. Nazadnje je Komisija 14. decembra odobrila prvo fazo reprivatizacije oddelka za zemeljsko oskrbo družbe TAP[375]. Portugalia, zasebni portugalski letalski prevoznik, naj bi združil svoje storitve zemeljske oskrbe s storitvami družbe TAP, v zameno pa naj bi dobil 6 % delnic v novem podjetju za zemeljsko oskrbo. Komisija je menila, da ta niz transakcij ni pomenil državne pomoči, ker družbi TAP niso bila dana na razpolago državna sredstva in ker je kupec za svoj delež Portugalia plačal tržno ceno.	593. Finally, the Commission authorised on 14 December the first phase of the reprivatisation of the ground handling division of TAP[375]. Portugalia, a private Portuguese airline, was to merge its ground handling business into that of TAP and in return would acquire 6% of the shares in the new ground handling company. The Commission held that this series of transactions did not constitute state aid as no state resources were to be put at the disposal of TAP and because the purchaser Portugalia paid a market price for the shareholding involved.
13. Javna radiotelevizija, širokopasovne storitve, filmska industrija	13. PUBLIC BROADCASTING, BROADBAND, FILM INDUSTRY
Programi licenčnin	Licence fee schemes
594. Italijanska javna radiotelevizija RAI ima nalogo opravljanja javne storitve, namreč storitev javne radiodifuzije. Licenčnina se uporablja za financiranje zagotavljanja te javne storitve. Ta licenčnina predstavlja obstoječo pomoč, ker je obstajala pred začetkom veljavnosti Rimske pogodbe, njene glavne lastnosti pa so od tedaj niso spremenile.	594. Italian public broadcaster RAI is charged with a public service, namely public service broadcasting. A licence fee serves to finance the provision of this public service. This licence fee constitutes existing aid because it existed before the Treaty of Rome entered into force and its essential features have remained unaltered since then.
595. V času postopka v zvezi z obstoječo pomočjo za zagotovitev neprekinjene združljivosti sistema financiranja RAI z licenčninami[376] so službe Komisije italijanskim organom predlagale izboljšave. Ti predlogi bi morali zagotoviti, da je sistem licenčnin pregleden in vsebuje varovala proti presežnemu nadomestilu. Italijanski organi so 23. junija sprejeli vse izboljšave, ki so jih navedle službe Komisije.	595. In the course of an existing aid procedure aimed at ensuring the ongoing compatibility of the licence fee financing scheme of RAI[376], the Commission’s departments proposed improvements to the Italian authorities. These proposals should ensure that the licence fee scheme is transparent and contains safeguards against excessive compensation. On 23 June, the Italian authorities accepted all the improvements indicated by the Commission’s departments.
596. Podobni postopki so se začeli v zvezi s portugalskimi[377] in francoskimi radiotelevizijami[378], pogajanja o ustreznih ukrepih pa še trajajo.	596. Similar procedures concerning Portuguese[377] and French broadcasters[378] started and negotiations on appropriate measures are ongoing.
Državno financiranje TV2 Denmark[379] in ad hoc državno financiranje organizacij za storitve javne radiodifuzije na Nizozemskem[380]	State financing of TV2 Denmark[379] and ad hoc state financing of public broadcasting organisations in the Netherlands[380]
597. Komisija je leta 2004 v skladu s svojim sporočilom o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za storitve javne radiodifuzije[381] in svojimi odločbami v tem sektorju leta 2003[382] nadaljevala svoje preiskave državnega financiranja organizacij za storitve javne radiodifuzije. V prvih devetih mesecih leta 2004 je Komisija začela preiskave financiranja nizozemskega sistema javne radiodifuzije in sprejela dokončno odločbo o financiranju danskega izvajalca storitev javne radiodifuzije TV2/Danmark (TV2).	597. In line with its communication on the application of state aid rules to public service broadcasting[381] and its decisions in this sector in 2003[382], in 2004 the Commission continued its state aid investigations into the state financing of public service broadcasting organisations. In the first nine months of 2004, the Commission started investigations into the financing of the Dutch public broadcasting system and adopted a final decision on the financing of the Danish public service broadcaster TV2/Danmark (TV2).
598. Komisija je 3. februarja uvedla poglobljeno preiskavo ad hoc financiranja nizozemskih izvajalcev storitev javne radiodifuzije. Predhodne ugotovitve Komisije so, da ad hoc ukrepi, odobreni nizozemskim izvajalcem storitev javne radiodifuzije, pomenijo državno pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) ES in da dvomi o tem, ali so ukrepi združljivi na podlagi člena 86(2) ES. Komisija je ocenila, da je od leta 1992 dalje nizozemska država izvajalcem storitev javne radiodifuzije zagotovila več sredstev (110 milijonov EUR), kot je potrebno za financiranje javne storitve.	598. On 3 February, the Commission initiated an in-depth investigation into the ad hoc financing of Dutch public service broadcasters. The Commission’s preliminary conclusions are that the ad hoc measures granted to the Dutch public service broadcasters constitute state aid under Article 87(1) EC and that it doubts whether the measures are compatible under Article 86(2) EC. The Commission has estimated that, from 1992 onwards, the Dutch State has provided the public service broadcasters with more funding (EUR 110 million) than necessary to finance the public service.
599. Komisija je 19. maja zaključila svojo poglobljeno preiskavo državnega financiranja danskega izvajalca storitev javne radiodifuzije TV2 in TV2 ter odredila vračilo približno 84,4 milijona EUR z obrestmi v nezdružljivi državni pomoči. Uradna preiskava je zajemala obdobje med letoma 1995 in 2002. Ocena Komisija se je nanašala na to, ali je bilo financiranje državne pomoči, ki jo je TV2 prejela za opravljanje svoje naloge javne storitve, združljivo na podlagi člena 86(2) ES. Komisija je v svoji odločbi najprej izračunala, ali je bilo državno nadomestilo sorazmerno z neto stroški, ki jih imela TV2 pri izpolnjevanju svoje obveznosti javnih storitev. Komisija je ugotovila, da je TV2 prejela za 628,2 milijona DKK (84,4 milijona EUR) previsoko nadomestilo. V drugem koraku je Komisija analizirala vedenje TV2 na trgu televizijskega oglaševanja. Glede na sporočilo o radiodifuziji, če si izvajalec storitev javne radiodifuzije ni prizadeval doseči čim višjih prihodkov iz dejavnosti javne storitve, se potreba po javnem financiranju neupravičeno poveča. Izkrivljanje konkurence bi bilo večje, kot je potrebno za izpolnjevanje naloge javne storitve. Čeprav so cene televizijskega oglaševanja na Danskem razmeroma nizke, preiskava Komisije ni pokazala, da se je TV2 odločil, da ne bo poskušal doseči čim višjih prihodkov od oglaševanja. Poleg tega je preiskava Komisije razkrila, da se danska država kot lastnica TV2 ni obnašala kot tržni vlagatelj v obdobju 1995–2002, ko se je odločila, da pusti letne zneske presežnega nadomestila v TV2. Čeprav je potem danska država trdila, da je bil presežek nujen za oblikovanje lastniškega kapitala, pa ni sledila strategiji zasebnega vlagatelja, ker pred ponovnim investiranjem presežnega nadomestila v TV2 ni določila, kakšna bi morala biti ustrezna raven lastniškega kapitala za tako televizijsko postajo in kakšne finančne rezultate je pričakovala, da bo dosegla s svojim lastniškim kapitalom. Nasprotno, danska država se je omejila na to, da je pustila, da se je presežno nadomestilo nabiralo v podjetju. Komisija je zato ugotovila, da je bil znesek 84,4 milijona EUR nezdružljiv s Pogodbo ES.	599. On 19 May, the Commission closed its in-depth investigation into the state financing of the Danish public service broadcaster TV2, ordering TV2 to reimburse approximately EUR 84.4 million plus interest in incompatible state aid. The formal investigation covered the period 1995-2002. The Commission’s assessment considered whether the state aid financing that TV2 had received for fulfilling its public service task was compatible under Article 86(2) EC. In its decision the Commission calculated firstly whether the state compensation was proportionate to the net cost TV2 had to bear in fulfilling its public service obligation. The Commission found that TV2 had been overcompensated by DKK 628.2 (EUR 84.4) million. As a second step, the Commission analysed TV2’s behaviour in the television advertising market. According to the Broadcasting Communication, where a public service broadcaster has not aimed to maximise revenues generated by the public service activity, the need for public funding will be unduly increased. This would distort competition beyond what is necessary for the fulfilment of the public service task. Although television advertising prices in Denmark are rather low, the Commission’s investigation did not produce evidence that TV2 had chosen not to maximise its advertising revenues. In addition, the Commission’s investigation revealed that the Danish State, as owner of TV2, did not behave like a market investor in the period 1995-2002 when it decided to leave the annual amounts of excess compensation in TV2. Although the Danish State claimed afterwards that the surplus was necessary to build up equity, it did not follow the strategy of a private investor because the Danish State did not, before reinvesting the excess compensation into TV2, determine what the appropriate level of equity capital should be for such a TV broadcaster and what financial performance it expected to achieve with its equity. On the contrary, the Danish State limited itself to letting the overcompensation accumulate in the company. The Commission therefore found that the amount of EUR 84.4 million was incompatible with the EC Treaty.
DVB-T Nemčija [383]	DVB-T Germany [383]
600. Za spodbuditev projekta prizemne digitalne video radiodifuzije je organ za medije v Berlin-Brandenburgu zasebnim radiodifuznim hišam izplačal nadomestilo za tako imenovane „stroške prehoda“. Zasebne radiodifuzne hiše so dobile subvencijo, ki naj bi jih spodbudila k prehodu z analogne prizemne televizije na digitalno prizemno televizijo. Novo prizemno digitalno televizijsko omrežje upravlja podjetje T-Systems, podružnica družbe Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG). Komisija je preučila to nadomestilo na podlagi pritožbe. Domneva, da bi lahko izplačila nadomestila pomenila državno pomoč za zasebne radiodifuzne hiše in tudi za T-Systems, operaterja omrežja DVB-T. Komisija je zato 14. julija sklenila, da uvede uradno preiskavo.	600. In order to promote the terrestrial Digital Video Broadcasting project, the media authority in Berlin-Brandenburg has compensated private broadcasters for so-called “switchover costs”. The private broadcasters were granted a subsidy in order to induce them to switch from analogue terrestrial to digital terrestrial television. The new terrestrial digital television network is operated by T-Systems, a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG). The Commission has examined this compensation in response to a complaint. It feels that the compensation payments may amount to state aid, both to the private broadcasters as well as to T-Systems, the operator of the DVB-T network. On 14 July the Commission therefore decided to open a formal investigation.
601. Istega dne in na podlagi več pritožb je Komisija uvedla formalni preiskovalni postopek glede financiranja digitalne prizemne televizije (DVB-T) na Švedskem[384], saj ni mogoče izključiti, da financiranje omrežja digitalne prizemne televizije ne vključuje državne pomoči.	601. On the same date and based on several complaints, the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure into the financing of digital terrestrial television (DVB-T) in Sweden[384], since it cannot be excluded that the financing of the digital terrestrial television network involves state aid.
Širokopasovne storitve	Broadband
602. Komisija je odobrila niz projektov, ki vključujejo javno podporo za izgradnjo širokopasovnih storitev[385]. Razvoj informacijske družbe je ključni vidik lizbonske agende in Komisija je priznala, da je treba razvoj širokopasovnih storitev spodbujati, še zlasti na območjih z omejenimi možnostmi[386]. Službe Komisije so ocenile, pod kakšnimi pogoji so lahko taki projekti združljivi s pravili EU o državni pomoči. Odločbe zagotavljajo smernice o tem, kako oblikovati javno podporo, ki je združljiva s pravili konkurence.	602. The Commission approved a series of projects involving public support for broadband build-out[385]. The development of the information society is a crucial aspect of the Lisbon agenda and the Commission accepted that the deployment of broadband needs to be encouraged, especially in less-favoured areas[386]. The Commission departments assessed under what conditions such projects could be compatible with the EU rules on state aid. The decisions provide guidance on how to design public support that is compatible with the competition rules.
603. V projektu Pyrenées-Atlantiques je francoska država nameravala podpreti vzpostavitev odprte infrastrukture, ki naj bi služila širši javnosti na geografskem območju, kjer bodisi sploh ni bilo širokopasovnih storitev bodisi je pokrivanje veljalo za nezadovoljivo, saj je storitev opravljal le en ponudnik. Komisija je zabeležila, da bo projekt omejen na zagotovitev infrastrukture in „dostopa“ do operaterjev, ne bo pa neposredno ponujal storitev končnim uporabnikom. Komisija je priznala, da bi projekt lahko izpolnjeval opredelitev storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena na širokopasovnem področju. Poleg tega ukrep ni pomenil pomoči, ker je izpolnjeval merila, ki jih je določilo Sodišče v svoji sodbi Altmark [387].	603. In the Pyrenées-Atlantiques project, the French State envisaged supporting the establishment of an open infrastructure to serve the general public in a geographic area where there was either no broadband at all or coverage was deemed unsatisfactory, with a sole provider delivering the service. The Commission noted that the project will be limited to the provision of infrastructure and “access” to operators, but will not directly offer services to end users. The Commission accepted that the project could fulfil the definition of services of general economic interest in the broadband field. In addition, since the project met the criteria established by the Court of Justice in its Altmark judgment[387], the measure did not constitute aid.
604. Projekti na Škotskem, v East Midlandsu in Lincolnshiru v Združenem kraljestvu vključujejo zagotavljanje storitev med koncema in ne samo zagotovitev infrastrukture, ki omogoča dostop. Komisija je menila, da čeprav je bila prisotna pomoč, ta ni izkrivljala konkurence v obsegu, ki bi bil v nasprotju s skupnim interesom, glede na številna varovala, ki zagotavljajo, da je dodeljena samo minimalna potrebna pomoč. V teh primerih je pomoč veljala za združljivo v skladu s členom 87(3)(c) ES.	604. The projects in Scotland, the East Midlands and Lincolnshire in the UK involve the provision of end-to-end services beyond the mere provision of infrastructure enabling access. The Commission considered that while aid was present, it did not distort competition to an extent contrary to the common interest given the multitude of safeguards which ensure that only the minimum aid necessary is given. In those cases the aid was deemed compatible in accordance with Article 87(3)(c) EC.
Kinematografija in avdiovizualni sektor	Cinematographic and audiovisual sector
605. Na podlagi člena 87(3)(d) ES in tako imenovanih „sporočil o kinematografih“[388] je Komisija odobrila različne ukrepe pomoči za podporo filmske produkcije v državah članicah, med drugim za podporo filmske in televizijske produkcije v nemških Länder [389] in belgijskega davčnega zavetja[390]. V okviru teh odločb je Komisija pokazala svojo zavezanost za upoštevanje kulturnih vidikov ter spoštovanje in spodbujanje raznolikosti kultur.	605. On the basis of Article 87(3)(d) EC and the co-called “Cinema Communications[388], the Commission approved various aid measures supporting the production of films in the Member States, inter alia the supporting of film and TV productions in the German Länder [389] and the Belgium tax shelter[390]. In the framework of these decisions the Commission has shown its commitment to take cultural aspects into account and to respect and promote the diversity of cultures.
C – Izvrševanje odločb o državni pomoči	C – ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AID DECISIONS
1. UVOD	1. INTRODUCTION
606. Leta 2004 je Komisija okrepila svoja prizadevanja za spremljanje izvajanja odločb o državni pomoči. V ta namen je GD za konkurenco v drugi polovici leta 2003 oblikoval novo enoto, ki je dobila pooblastilo za „oblikovanje skladnega in sistematičnega pristopa k spremljanju in izvrševanju odločb o državni pomoči, ki spadajo v pristojnost GD za konkurenco“. Enota za izvrševanje je v prvem polnem letu svojega obstoja osredotočila svoje vire na učinkovito izvajanje odločb o vračilu, saj je to izredno pomembno za verodostojnost Komisijine dejavnosti nadzora državnih pomoči.	606. In 2004, the Commission stepped up its efforts to monitor the implementation of state aid decisions. To that end, DG Competition had created in the second half of 2003 a new unit which was given the mandate “to develop a coherent and systematic approach to the monitoring and enforcement of state aid decisions that fall within the remit of DG Competition”. During the first full year of its existence, the Enforcement Unit concentrated its resources on the effective implementation of recovery decisions, this being essential for the credibility of the Commission’s state aid control activity.
607. Komisija je 21. aprila sprejela Uredbo (ES) št. 794/2004[391] o izvajanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999[392]. V poglavju V so pojasnjena pravila o obrestni meri, ki se uporablja za vračilo nezakonite pomoči, ter podrobneje določena metoda za določitev obrestnih mer za vračilo in način izračuna obresti vračila.	607. On 21 April, the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 794/2004[391] implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999[392]. Chapter V clarifies the rules regarding the interest rate applicable to the recovery of illegal aid and sets out in greater detail the method for determining the recovery interest rates and the way in which recovery interest should be calculated.
608. Leta 2004 je Komisija sprejela 22 novih odločb o vračilu državne pomoči. Zaključenih je bilo 19 primerov vračila. Število nerešenih odločb o vračilu, ki spadajo v pristojnost GD za konkurenco, se je tako konec leta povečalo na 93 (z 90 konec leta 2003).	608. In 2004, the Commission adopted 22 new state aid recovery decisions. 19 recovery cases were closed. As a result, the stock of pending recovery decisions that fall within the remit of DG Competition increased to 93 at the end of the year (up from 90 at the end of 2003).
609. Več kot dve tretjini vseh nerešenih primerov vračila se nanaša na ukrepe pomoči, ki sta jih odobrili samo dve državi članici (44 primerov v zvezi z Nemčijo in 20 primerov v zvezi s Španijo) [393]. Na drugem koncu spektra je šestnajst držav članic, ki trenutno nimajo niti enega samega nerešenega primera vračila. Skoraj dve tretjini nerešenih primerov vračila se nanašata na ukrepe individualne pomoči, preostanek na programe pomoči. V skoraj polovici nerešenih primerov vračila v zvezi z individualno pomočjo je zadevni upravičenec plačilno nesposoben. Vendar pa to ne pomeni nujno, da v teh primerih pomoč nima več nobenega učinka izkrivljanja konkurence. Dejansko v skoraj dveh tretjinah teh primerov zadevno podjetje nadaljuje svojo gospodarsko dejavnost, pogosto pod nadzorom stečajnega upravitelja, ki ga imenuje sodišče.	609. More than two thirds of all pending recovery cases relate to aid measures granted by only two Member States (44 cases regarding Germany and 20 cases regarding Spain)[393]. At the other end of the spectrum, there are sixteen Member States that do not have a single pending recovery case at the moment. Almost two thirds of the pending recovery cases concern individual aid measures, the remainder aid schemes. In almost half of the pending recovery cases concerning individual aid, the beneficiary concerned is insolvent. Yet this does not necessarily imply that, in these cases, the aid no longer has any distortive effect. In fact, in almost two thirds of these cases, the undertaking concerned is still continuing its economic activity, often under the supervision of an insolvency administrator appointed by the court.
610. Informacije z dne 31. decembra 2004 kažejo, da skupni znesek pomoči za vračilo znaša vsaj 9,7 milijarde EUR. To je pomembno, saj predstavlja okoli 35 % skupnega zneska državnih pomoči, leta 2002 odobrenih v Skupnosti[394]. Velik delež te pomoči je posledica omejenega števila pred kratkim sprejetih odločb o vračilu, ki se nanašajo na nemške deželne banke ( Landesbanken) [395] , France Télécom[396] in EDF[397]. Za več kot 24 nerešenih primerov vračila zadevna država članica še ni bila sposobna predložiti zanesljivih informacij o vpletenem znesku pomoči. Razpoložljivost informacij o zneskih za vračilo je še posebej omejena v primeru programov pomoči, zlasti pri ukrepih davčne ali davkom podobne pomoči ter ukrepih pomoči, ki vključujejo jamstva.	610. The information available on 31 December 2004 indicates that the total amount of aid to be recovered is equal to at least EUR 9.7 billion. This is significant as it represents about 35% of the total amount of state aid granted in the Community in 2002[394]. A large proportion of this aid is due to a limited number of recently adopted recovery decisions, concerning the German Landesbanken [395], France Télécom[396] and EDF[397]. For more than 24 pending recovery cases, however, the Member State concerned has not yet been able to submit reliable information on the aid amount involved. The availability of information on amounts to be recovered is particularly limited in the case of aid schemes, especially tax or quasi-tax aid measures, and aid measures involving guarantees.
611. V letu 2004 je Komisija omogočila tesno in dosledno upravno spremljanje vseh nerešenih odločb o vračilu, da bi tako zagotovila njihovo učinkovito izvajanje. Kjer je Komisija menila, da določena država članica ni sprejela vseh potrebnih ukrepov za izvajanje odločbe, ki so na voljo v njenem pravnem sistemu, je uvedla pravni postopek na podlagi člena 88(2) ali člena 228(2) Pogodbe. Tak postopek je uvedla v primerih Crédit Mutuel[398], Kimberly Clark[399] in ladjedelnic v javni lasti[400].	611. In the course of 2004, the Commission ensured close and consistent administrative follow-up of all pending recovery decisions to ensure their effective implementation. Where the Commission considered that a particular Member State had not taken all the necessary measures available in its respective legal system to implement the decision, it commenced legal action under either Article 88(2) or Article 228(2) of the Treaty. It took such action in the cases of Crédit Mutuel[398], Kimberley Clark[399] and the publicly owned shipyards[400].
612. Države članice imajo pomembno vlogo pri uveljavljanju pravil EU o državni pomoči, saj morajo izvajati odločbe o vračilu in omogočiti sodne postopke tekmecev v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo. Komisija je zato začela študijo o izvrševanju politike državne pomoči EU na nacionalni ravni. Namen študije je opredeliti prednosti in pomanjkljivosti nacionalnih postopkov vračila ter razviti podrobno razumevanje možnosti za postopke konkurentov na nacionalnih sodiščih. Rezultati študije bi morali biti na voljo do konca leta 2005.	612. Member States play an important role in the enforcement of EU state aid rules, being required to implement the recovery decisions and allowing for court actions by competitors according to national law. The Commission therefore launched a study on the enforcement of EU state aid policy at national level. The purpose of the study is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of national recovery procedures and develop a detailed understanding of the possibilities for actions by competitors in national courts. The results of the study should be available by the end of 2005.
2. Posamezni primeri	2. INDIVIDUAL CASES
Scott Kimberly Clark	Scott Kimberly Clark
613. Komisija je oktobra ugotovila, da Francija ni ravnala v skladu z odločbo o vračilu z dne 12. julija 2000 o pomoči, odobreni podjetju Scott Paper[401], in se zato odločila, da zadevo napoti neposredno na Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti v skladu s členom 88(2) Pogodbe[402]. Odločbo o vračilu z dne 12. julija 2000 trenutno spodbijajo prejemnik in francoski lokalni organi na Sodišču prve stopnje[403]. Hkrati je prejemnik spodbijal nacionalne odredbe o vračilu na nacionalnih sodiščih.	613. In October, the Commission found that France had not complied with the recovery decision of 12 July 2000 on aid granted to Scott Paper[401] and therefore decided to refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Communities directly in accordance with Article 88(2) of the Treaty[402]. The recovery decision of 12 July 2000 is currently being challenged by the recipient and by the French local authorities before the Court of First Instance[403]. At the same time, the recipient has challenged the national recovery orders in the national courts.
614. Komisija je menila, da je treba zadevo napotiti na Sodišče zaradi vrste razlogov. Glavni razlog je, da so se nacionalni organi in nacionalni sodnik dogovorili, da začasno ustavijo postopek na nacionalnem sodišču, dokler Sodišče prve stopnje ne izda svoje sodbe o zadevi. To je v nasprotju s členom 242 Pogodbe, ki določa, da pritožba, vložena pri Evropskem sodišču, nima odložilnega učinka. Poleg tega v francoski zakonodaji ni na voljo začasnih ukrepov, ki bi zagotovili, da je med postopki pred nacionalnimi sodišči pomoč podjetju Scott ukinjena. Nazadnje je Komisija menila, da Francija ni ravnala v skladu s svojo obveznostjo, da mora sodelovati s Komisijo, saj od julija 2003 ni zagotovila nobenih novih informacij o vračilu.	614. The Commission considered that it was necessary to refer the case to the Court for a number of reasons. The main reason is that the national authorities and the national judge have agreed to suspend proceedings in the national court until the Court of First Instance has issued its judgment on the case. This is contrary to Article 242 of the Treaty, which provides that an appeal before the European Court does not have any suspensory effect. Furthermore, there are no provisional measures available under French law to ensure that the aid is withdrawn from Scott during the proceedings before national courts. Finally, the Commission considered that France had not acted in conformity with its obligation to cooperate with the Commission, as it had not provided any new information on the recovery since July 2003.
Španske ladjedelnice	Spanish shipyards
615. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je 26. junija 2003 obsodilo Španijo zaradi njenega neizpolnjevanja odločbe Komisije o vračilu z dne 26. oktobra 1999[404] v zvezi s pomočjo, odobreno ladjedelnicam v javni lasti[405]. Komisija je oktobra 2004 opazila, da Španija še vedno ni izpolnila odločbe o vračilu z dne 26. oktobra 1999 in da pomoč dejansko ni bila vrnjena. Komisija je zato menila, da Španija ni ravnala v skladu s sodbo Sodišča z dne 26. junija 2003, in se odločila, da zadevo obravnava v skladu s členom 228(2) Pogodbe. Komisija se je torej 13. oktobra odločila, da Španiji pošlje pismo z uradnim obvestilom, v katerem je predstavila dejstva in svojo oceno zadeve ter državo članico zaprosila, da predloži svoje pripombe o zadevi. Pismo je bilo ustrezno poslano dne 18. oktobra. Španski organi so svoje pripombe poslali v pismu z dne 21. decembra.	615. On 26 June 2003, the Court of Justice of the European Communities found against Spain for its failure to implement the Commission’s recovery decision of 26 October 1999[404] regarding aid granted to the publicly owned shipyards[405]. In October 2004 the Commission noted that Spain had still not complied with the recovery decision of 26 October 1999, and the aid had not actually been reimbursed. The Commission therefore considered that Spain had not complied with the judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 June 2003 and decided to pursue the matter in accordance with Article 228(2) of the Treaty. The Commission accordingly decided on 13 October to send a letter of formal notice to Spain, setting out the facts and its assessment of the case and asking the Member State to submit its observations on the matter. The letter was duly sent on 18 October. The Spanish authorities submitted their observations on the letter on 21 December.
D – Izbrani sodni primeri	D – SELECTED COURT CASES
Združeni zadevi[406]	Joined cases[406]
616. Sodišče je moralo odločiti o pritožbi zoper sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje, ki sta jo vložila španska regija Territorio Histórico de Álava in podjetje Ramondín Cápsulas SA., ki sta predhodno vložila pritožbo na Sodišče prve stopnje zoper odločbo Komisije, ki je ugotavljala, da je določena oblika preferencialne davčne obravnave pomenila državno pomoč, ki je bila poleg tega nezdružljiva z notranjim trgom, saj je davčna ugodnost presegala mejo 25 % neto ekvivalenta dotacije za regionalno pomoč na tem geografskem območju.	616. The Court of Justice (ECJ) had to decide on an appeal against a Court of First Instance (CFI) judgment brought by the Spanish region Territorio Histórico de Álava and the company Ramondín Cápsulas SA., both of which had brought a complaint before the Court of First Instance against a Commission decision finding that a certain form of preferential tax treatment constituted state aid, which was moreover incompatible with the internal market, since the tax advantage granted was beyond the ceiling of 25% nge for regional aid in that geographic area.
617. Komisija je zato odredila povračilo teh zneskov pomoči, to odločbo pa sta tožnika spodbijala na Sodišču prve stopnje zaradi zlorabe pooblastil Komisije.	617. The Commission had therefore ordered the repayment of these aid amounts, a decision which the complainants challenged in the CFI on grounds of misuse of power by the Commission.
618. Pritožnik je trdil, da je Komisija zlorabila svoja izključna pooblastila za nadzor državne pomoči, da bi dosegla davčno uskladitev, ki jo je bilo drugače pri državah članicah težko doseči. Sodišče je ta argument zavrnilo z utemeljitvijo, da ni bil predložen noben dokaz o tem, da je bil cilj Komisije pri razvrstitvi ukrepa kot državne pomoči doseči davčno uskladitev.	618. The appellant argued that the Commission had misused its exclusive powers to control state aid for the purpose of achieving tax harmonisation which was otherwise difficult to persuade Member States to agree on. The ECJ rejected this argument on the ground that no evidence had been provided that the Commission’s objective in classing the measure as state aid was to achieve tax harmonisation.
619. Sodišče je tudi zavrnilo ugovor pritožnikov, da so davčni ukrepi izključeni iz področja pravil o državni pomoči, saj so bili uvedeni pred sestankom Ekonomsko-finančnega sveta dne 1. decembra 1997 in obvestilom Komisije z dne 10. decembra 1998 o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe, ki zadevajo neposredno obdavčitev ustvarjenega dohodka. Ker ta ugovor ni bil vložen na Sodišče prve stopnje, ampak predstavljen samo v pritožbenem postopku, ga je Sodišče zavrnilo kot nesprejemljivega.	619. The Court also rejected the appellants’ plea that the tax measures were excluded from the scope of the rules on state aid as they were introduced before the Ecofin Council meeting on 1 December 1997 and the Commission notice of 10 December 1998 on the application of state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation. Since this plea was not brought before the CFI, but only introduced in the appellate proceeding, the Court rejected it as inadmissible.
Grčija proti Komisiji (grške zadruge)	Greece v Commission (Greek cooperatives)
620. Sodišče je v svoji sodbi z dne 29. aprila[407] v celoti podprlo negativno dokončno odločbo Komisije o vračilu državne pomoči v skupnem znesku okoli 763 milijonov EUR (znesek, ki ga je izračunala Grčija leta 2000), dodeljene različnim zadrugam, ki so ustvarjale izgube, vključno z mlekarno AGNO. V tem primeru izplačila pomoči brez dovoljenja Komisije je Sodišče menilo, da je bilo vračilo (vključno z obrestmi) po sedmih letih po izplačilu zakonito in ni bilo v nasprotju z upravičenimi pričakovanji. Sodišče je tudi potrdilo, da četudi je bila pomoč priglašena in se Komisija ni odzvala v dveh mesecih, je dejstvo, da je država članica pomoč odobrila, ne da bi o izplačilu obvestila Komisijo (tako imenovana „Lorenzova“ informacija), pomenilo, da je bila pomoč upravičeno razvrščena kot nepriglašena.	620. In its ruling of 29 April[407], the ECJ fully upheld a negative final Commission decision concerning the recovery of state aid totalling approximately EUR 763 million (amount calculated by Greece in 2000) given to various loss-making cooperatives, including the dairy AGNO. In this case of aid payment without Commission authorisation, the Court considered that recovery (including interest) taking place 7 years after payment was legal and did not run counter to legitimate expectations. The Court also confirmed that even where the aid was notified and the Commission did not react within two months, the fact that the aid was granted by the Member State without informing the Commission about the payment (so-called “Lorenz” information) meant that the aid was rightly classified as non-notified.
Nizozemska proti Komisiji (MINAS)	Netherlands v Commission (MINAS)
621. Sodišče je v svoji sodbi z dne 29. aprila[408] v celoti podprlo negativno dokončno odločbo Komisije o pomoči, odobreni rastlinjakom in nekaterim drugim hortikulturnim pridelovalcem z oprostitvijo „nitratnega davka“ (MINAS). Sodišče je zlasti trdilo, da:	621. In its ruling of 29 April[408], the ECJ fully upheld a negative final Commission decision concerning aid granted to glasshouses and certain other horticultural producers via an exemption from a “nitrates tax” (MINAS). The Court notably held that:
- je država članica tista, ki mora dokazati, da diferencirano obdavčitev za nekatera podjetja upravičujeta narava in splošna shema sistema;	- it was for the Member State to show that a tax differentiation for certain companies was justified by the nature and general scheme of the system;
- argument, da sistem MINAS ni bil namenjen ustvarjanju davčnih prihodkov, ni zadostoval, da bi obravnavno oprostitev dokončno izključili iz razvrstitve kot pomoč. Ni bilo sporno, da je oprostitev vodila do izgube sredstev, ki bi jih bilo treba plačati v državni proračun.	- the argument that the MINAS system was not intended to generate tax revenue did not suffice to exclude the exemption at issue outright from classification as aid. It was not disputed that the exemption led to a loss of resources which ought to be paid into the state budget.
Komisija proti Svetu	Commission v Council
622. V sodbi z dne 29. junija[409] je Sodišče pojasnilo in okrepilo pooblastila Komisije na področju nadzora državnih pomoči. Komisija je 25. novembra 1999 in 4. oktobra 2000 sprejela dve negativni dokončni odločbi o državni pomoči, ki jo je Portugalska nezakonito odobrila prašičerejcem, da bi jim zagotovila nadomestilo za nizke cene. Ti odločbi sta zahtevali, da Portugalska zahteva vračilo pomoči od prašičerejcev. Portugalska odločb ni izpodbijala pred Sodiščem. Namesto tega je mnogo pozneje Svet zaprosila, da odobri novo državno pomoč, ki ustreza znesku pomoči, ki ga je bilo treba vrniti na podlagi odločb Komisije – tako da rejcem ne bi bilo treba vrniti pomoči. Svet je 21. januarja uporabil svoja posebna pooblastila na podlagi člena 88(2) ES za soglasno odobritev državne pomoči v izjemnih okoliščinah. Komisija je izpodbijala odločitev Sveta, saj je menila, da pomeni izogibanje odločbi Komisije in zlorabo pooblastil Sveta ter da bi nastala pravna negotovost, če bi Svet lahko kadar koli razveljavil odločbo Komisije, ki je začela veljati.	622. In a ruling of 29 June[409], the ECJ clarified and strengthened the Commission’s powers in the field of state aid control. On 25 November 1999 and 4 October 2000, the Commission had taken two negative final decisions concerning state aid that Portugal had illegally granted to pig farmers to compensate them for low prices. These decisions required Portugal to recover the aid from the farmers. Portugal did not contest the decisions before the ECJ. Instead, much later, it asked the Council to authorise new state aid corresponding to the amount of aid to be recovered under the Commission decisions – so that the farmers would not have to repay. On 21 January 2002, the Council used its special powers under Article 88(2) EC to unanimously authorise state aid in exceptional circumstances. The Commission challenged the Council decision, considering that it constituted a circumvention of the Commission decision and an abuse of power by the Council and that it would create legal uncertainty if the Council could at any time repeal a Commission decision that had entered into force.
623. S svojo sodbo z dne 29. junija je Sodišče v celoti podprlo stališče Komisije in razveljavilo odločitev Sveta. Sodišče je trdilo, da ko Komisija sprejme negativno dokončno odločbo o državni pomoči, država članica nima več pravice zadeve predložiti Svetu niti nima Svet več pooblastila, da to pomoč odobri. Na tej stopnji se ni mogoče sklicevati na izjemne okoliščine.	623. By its ruling of 29 June, the ECJ fully upheld the Commission’s position and annulled the Council decision. The ECJ held that once the Commission has taken a negative final decision on state aid, the Member State no longer has the right to bring the matter before the Council; nor does the Council have the power anymore to approve this aid. Exceptional circumstances cannot be invoked at this stage.
624. Kadar Komisija uvede formalni preiskovalni postopek, mora država članica vključiti Svet, preden Komisija sprejme svojo dokončno odločbo. V takem primeru se postopek Komisije ustavi za tri mesece. Če Svet enoglasno sprejme odločitev v teh treh mesecih, Komisija ne sme nadaljevati. Če Svet ne sprejme odločitve v treh mesecih, Komisija nadaljuje svoje preverjanje. (V tem primeru je Svet sprejel svojo odločitev dolgo zatem, ko je Komisija sprejela dokončno odločbo).	624. Where the Commission opens formal investigation proceedings, a Member State must involve the Council before the Commission takes its final decision. In that case, the Commission proceedings are suspended for three months. If the Council unanimously takes a decision within those three months, the Commission may not continue. If the Council does not take a decision within three months, the Commission continues with its examination. (In the present case, the Council had taken its decision long after the Commission had taken a final decision.)
625. Sodišče je tudi potrdilo, da Svet ne sme sprejeti odločitve za odobritev nove državne pomoči, ki podjetjem zagotovi „nadomestilo“ za vračilo pomoči, ki jo je Komisija razglasila za nezdružljivo v dokončni odločbi. Svet ne mora preprečiti ali razveljaviti polnega učinka negativne dokončne odločbe Komisije, ki odreja vračilo (v nasprotju s tem, kar je Svet storil v tem primeru).	625. The ECJ also confirmed that the Council may not adopt a decision to authorise new state aid that “compensates” companies for the recovery of aid that the Commission has declared incompatible in a final decision. The Council cannot block or annul the full effect of a Commission negative final decision ordering recovery (contrary to what the Council had done in the present case).
626. Da se zagotovi pravna varnost, se je treba izogibati nasprotujočim se odločitvam Komisije in Sveta o isti pomoči.	626. To ensure legal certainty, it is essential that contradictory decisions by the Commission and the Council concerning the same aid are avoided.
Pearle BV	Pearle BV
627. Sodišče je v svoji sodbi z dne 15. julija[410] razsodilo, da pravilniki, ki jih je sprejelo trgovsko združenje javnega prava za financiranje oglaševalske kampanje, organizirane v korist svojih članov in o kateri so se ti člani odločili, s sredstvi, pobranimi od teh članov in obvezno namenjenimi za financiranje te kampanje, niso sestavni del ukrepa pomoči, ki spada v koncept državne pomoči na podlagi člena 87(1) ES. Tako financiranje je bilo opravljeno s sredstvi, za katere trgovsko združenje javnega prava nikoli ni imelo pooblastila za prosto razpolaganje z njimi.	627. In its ruling of 15 July[410], the ECJ held that bye-laws adopted by a trade association governed by public law for the purpose of funding an advertising campaign organised for the benefit of its members and decided on by them, through resources levied from those members and compulsorily earmarked for the funding of that campaign, do not constitute an integral part of an aid measure falling within the concept of state aid under Article 87(1) EC. Such funding was carried out by means of resources which the trade association, governed by public law, never had the power to dispose of freely.
E STATISTIKA	E STATISTICS
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V – Mednarodne dejavnosti	V – INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
A – ŠIRITEV IN ZAHODNI BALKAN	A - Enlargement and Western Balkans
628. Datum 1. maj 2004 označuje širitev Evropske unije z desetimi novimi državami članicami. Ta gladek pristop izraža uspešno večletno usklajevanje sistemov konkurence v teh državah s sistemom konkurence EU. Ta proces je vključeval vzpostavitev zakonodajnega okvira za protimonopolni nadzor/nadzor združevanja ter nadzor državnih pomoči, vzpostavitev organov za konkurenco in državno pomoč z zadostno upravno usposobljenostjo ter zagotavljanje učinkovitega uveljavljanja teh pravil.	628. The date of 1 May 2004 marked the enlargement of the European Union by ten new Member States. This smooth accession reflects the successful alignment of the competition regimes in these countries over several years with the EU competition regime. This process included establishing a legislative framework for antitrust/merger and state aid control, setting up competition and state aid authorities with sufficient administrative capacity and ensuring effective enforcement of these rules.
629. Organi za konkurenco desetih novih držav članic so bili v celoti vključeni v Evropsko mrežo za konkurenco, v kateri so pred pristopom sodelovali kot opazovalci. Pred pristopom je Komisija ponovno preučila ukrepe državne pomoči, ki so jih te države še naprej priglaševale v skladu z obstoječim mehanizmom pomoči v pristopni pogodbi. Za vse ukrepe pomoči, ki se uporabljajo po pristopu in se štejejo za državno pomoč ter niso vključeni v seznam obstoječih pomoči, velja, da pomenijo novo pomoč. Komisija je tudi preverila morebitna težavna področja, opredeljena v izčrpnem poročilu o spremljanju.	629. The competition authorities of the ten new Member States have been fully integrated into the European Competition Network, in which they participated as observers prior to accession. In the run-up to accession, the Commission reviewed the state aid measures which these countries continued to notify in accordance with the existing aid mechanism in the Accession Treaty. Any aid measures applicable after accession which are considered to be state aid and are not included in the existing aid list are deemed to constitute new aid. The Commission also checked possible problem areas identified in its Comprehensive Monitoring Report.
630. Komisija je tudi zelo dejavno izvajala pogajanja o poglavjih o konkurenci z Bolgarijo in Romunijo, ki so bila zaključena decembra ter ki jim bo sledila intenzivna ocena in podpora pred pristopom teh dveh držav k EU leta 2007.	630. The Commission also pursued very actively the negotiations of the competition chapters with Bulgaria and Romania, which were concluded in December and will be followed up by an intensive assessment and support exercise in advance of the accession to the EU of these two countries in 2007.
631. Komisija je oktobra predstavila svoje poročilo in priporočilo o napredku Turčije glede pristopa s ciljem odločitve Evropskega sveta decembra 2004 o odprtju pogajanj o pristopu s Turčijo. Komisija bo morala kot del tega procesa zagotoviti naknadno oceno sistema konkurence in državne pomoči, ko bo ta uveden v Turčiji.	631. In October, the Commission presented its report and recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession with a view to the December 2004 European Council decision on the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. As part of this process, the Commission will have to provide a further assessment of the competition and state aid regime once it is introduced in Turkey.
632. V primeru Hrvaške je Komisija ocenila politiko konkurence te države kot del mnenja o prošnji Hrvaške za članstvo, ki ga je sprejela marca, in okrepila svoje sodelovanje s hrvaško agencijo za konkurenco.	632. In the case of Croatia, the Commission assessed that country’s competition policy as part of the opinion it adopted in March on Croatia's application for membership and has strengthened its cooperation with the Croatian Competition Agency.
633. Komisija je dejavno pomagala pri razvoju sistemov lojalne konkurence v vseh državah zahodnega Balkana. To je vključevalo pomoč pri izdelavi osnutkov zakonodaje o konkurenci in državni pomoči, nasvete pri vzpostavitvi potrebnih ustanov za uveljavljanje teh pravil in spodbujanje konkurenčne discipline. V povezavi z uradom TAIEX GD za širitev je GD za konkurenco tudi organiziral dva dvodnevna seminarja za usposabljanje uradnikov z zahodnega Balkana, enega o državni pomoči oktobra in drugega o boju proti monopolom novembra.	633. The Commission has been active in assisting the development of sound competition regimes in all Western Balkan countries. This included help in drafting competition and state aid laws, advice in setting up the necessary institutions for the enforcement of these rules and promoting a competition discipline. In conjunction with the TAIEX Office of DG Enlargement, DG Competition also organised two 2-day training seminars for officials from the Western Balkans, one on state aid in October and the other on antitrust in November.
B – Sosedska politika	B - Neighbourhood policy
634. V okviru pobude evropske sosedske politike so bili leta 2004 dogovorjeni akcijski načrti z Izraelom, Jordanijo, Moldavijo, Marokom, Palestinsko upravo, Tunizijo in Ukrajino. Vsi akcijski načrti, razen akcijskega načrta s Palestinsko upravo, vključujejo razdelek o politiki konkurence.	634. In the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy initiative, action plans were negotiated in 2004 with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine. All of the action plans except that with the Palestinian Authority include a section on competition policy.
635. Akcijske točke o konkurenci se nanašajo na boj proti monopolom in državno pomoč (razen za Izrael, kjer ni akcijskih točk o boju proti monopolom zaradi visoke ravni uveljavljanja protimonopolnih pravil v Izraelu). Namen akcijskih točk za boj proti monopolom je okrepiti uveljavljanje konkurenčnega prava ter usposobljenost in neodvisnost organa za konkurenco; cilj akcijskih točk za državno pomoč je doseči uskladitev opredelitev, ki se uporabljajo v EU in partnerskih državah, ter izboljšanje medsebojne preglednosti v državni pomoči.	635. The competition action points relate to antitrust and state aid (except for Israel, where there are no antitrust action points, given the advanced level of antitrust enforcement in Israel). For antitrust, the purpose of the action points is to strengthen the enforcement of the competition laws and the capacity and independence of the competition authority; for state aid, the aim is to proceed towards harmonising the definitions used in the EU and partner countries and improving mutual transparency in state aid.
C – Dvostransko sodelovanje	C – Bilateral cooperation
1. Uvod	1. Introduction
636. Komisija sodeluje na dvostranski ravni s številnimi organi za konkurenco, zlasti organi večjih trgovinskih partnerjev Skupnosti. Evropska unija ima namenske sporazume o sodelovanju pri zadevah v zvezi s konkurenco z Združenimi državami, Kanado in Japonsko.	636. The Commission cooperates on a bilateral basis with numerous competition authorities, particularly those of the Community's major trading partners. The European Union has dedicated cooperation agreements in competition matters with the United States, Canada and Japan.
637. Glavni elementi teh namenskih sporazumov so medsebojno obveščanje o dejavnostih izvrševanja in usklajevanje teh dejavnosti ter izmenjava javnih informacij. Na podlagi sporazumov lahko ena stranka od druge zahteva, da sprejme ukrepe izvrševanja (medsebojna pravna kurtoazija), in druga stranka lahko upošteva pomembne interese druge stranke v času svojih dejavnosti izvrševanja (tradicionalna pravna kurtoazija).	637. The principal elements of these dedicated agreements are the provision of mutual information on, and coordination of, enforcement activities and the exchange of non-confidential information. Under the agreements one party may request the other to take enforcement action (positive comity) and one party may take into account the important interests of the other party in the course of its enforcement activities (traditional comity).
638. Evropska unija je sklenila tudi več sporazumov o prosti trgovini, kot so evromediteranski sporazumi in sporazumi z nekaterimi latinskoameriškimi državami, ki po navadi vsebujejo osnovne določbe o sodelovanju pri zadevah v zvezi s konkurenco. Sodelovanje med Komisijo in organi za konkurenco držav članic OECD poteka na podlagi priporočila, ki ga je OECD sprejel leta 1995.	638. The European Union has also concluded several free trade agreements such as the EuroMed Agreements and agreements with certain Latin American countries, which usually contain basic provisions concerning cooperation on competition matters. Cooperation between the Commission and the competition authorities of OECD member states is carried out on the basis of a recommendation adopted by the OECD in 1995.
2. Sporazumi z ZDA, Kanado in Japonsko	2. Agreements with the US, Canada and Japan
Združene države	United States
639. Sodelovanje z organi za konkurenco Združenih držav temelji na namenskih sporazumih o sodelovanju na področju konkurence[411].	639. Cooperation with the US competition authorities is based on dedicated competition cooperation agreements[411].
640. V letu 2004 je Komisija še naprej tesno sodelovala s Protimonopolnim oddelkom Ministrstva za pravosodje ZDA in Zvezno trgovinsko komisijo ZDA. Stiki med uradniki Komisije in njihovimi kolegi v teh dveh ameriških agencijah so bili pogosti in intenzivni. Ti stiki segajo od sodelovanja pri posameznih primerih do splošnejših zadev, povezanih s politiko konkurence. Stiki, povezani s posameznimi primeri, so po navadi potekali v obliki telefonskih klicev, elektronske pošte, izmenjave dokumentov in drugega sporočanja med skupinami, ki se ukvarjajo s posameznimi primeri. To sodelovanje še vedno zelo koristi obema stranema, v smislu krepitve njunih zadevnih dejavnosti izvrševanja, preprečevanja nepotrebnih sporov ali neusklajenosti med dejavnostmi izvrševanja ter izboljšanja razumevanja sistema politike konkurence druge.	640. During 2004 the Commission continued its close cooperation with the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Contacts between Commission officials and their counterparts at the two US agencies were frequent and intense. These contacts range from cooperation in individual cases to more general competition-policy related matters. Case-related contacts usually take the form of regular telephone calls, e-mails, exchanges of documents and other communications between the case teams. This cooperation continues to be of considerable benefit to both sides, in terms of enhancing their respective enforcement activities, avoiding unnecessary conflicts or inconsistencies between enforcement activities and improving understanding of each other's competition-policy regimes.
641. Sodelovanje s protimonopolnimi agencijami ZDA na področju nadzora združevanja se je leta 2004 nadaljevalo zelo intenzivno. Najboljše prakse EU–ZDA iz leta 2002 za sodelovanje pri pregledih združitev zagotavljajo koristen okvir za sodelovanje, zlasti z opredelitvijo kritičnih točk v postopku, kjer bi bilo sodelovanje lahko še posebej koristno. V praksi je sodelovanje pri primerih zelo pragmatično in prožno, prilagojeno primeru in vpletenim vprašanjem.	641. Cooperation in merger control with the US antitrust agencies continued at a high level of intensity during 2004. The 2002 EU-US best practices on cooperation in reviewing mergers provide a useful framework for cooperation, in particular by indicating critical points in the procedure where cooperation could be especially useful. In practice, cooperation on cases is very pragmatic and flexible, adapted to the case and the issues involved.
642. Leta 2004 je bilo veliko primerov združitev, ki so vplivali na obe strani Atlantika ter so vključevali večjo stopnjo praktičnega sodelovanja in izmenjav stališč med zadevnimi skupinami EU in ZDA. V tem letu so bili primeri, ki so vključevali pomembno sodelovanje, naslednji: Oracle/Peoplesoft , Sony/BMG , Air France/KLM , Sanofi/Aventis , Sygenta/Advanta , Air Liquide/Messer , Agfa/Lastra , Magna/NVC in Microsoft/Time Warner/Contentguard .	642. In 2004, there were numerous merger cases with an impact on both sides of the Atlantic, which involved a considerable degree of practical cooperation and exchanges of views between the respective EU and US case teams. In that year, cases involving substantial cooperation included: Oracle/Peoplesoft , Sony/BMG , Air France/KLM , Sanofi/Aventis , Sygenta/Advanta , Air Liquide/Messer , Agfa/Lastra , Magna/NVC and Microsoft/Time Warner/Contentguard .
643. Kot tudi v preteklih letih izkušnje Komisije kažejo, da sta sodelovanje in usklajevanje na področju združevanja najkoristnejša pri vprašanjih, povezanih z oblikovanjem, dogovorom in izvajanjem protiukrepov za kakršne koli težave v zvezi s konkurenco, ki jih opredelijo agencije. Dogovarjanje pomaga zmanjšati potencialne neskladnosti v pristopu, v obojestransko korist udeležencev združitve in samih agencij.	643. As in previous years, the Commission’s experience demonstrates that cooperation and coordination on mergers are most useful on issues related to the design, negotiation and implementation of remedies to any competition problems identified by the agencies. Concertation helps to reduce potential inconsistencies of approach, to the mutual benefit of the merging parties and of the agencies themselves.
644. V zadnjih letih je bilo splošnejše sodelovanje na področju politike nadzora združevanja vzpostavljeno v okviru Delovne skupine EU–ZDA za združitve, stalnega foruma za medagencijske razprave o politiki. Cilj te delovne skupine je izboljšati razumevanje politik in praks druga druge ter izboljšati doslednost nadzora združevanja na obeh straneh Atlantika.	644. In recent years, cooperation on merger control policy more generally has been established in the context of the so-called EU-US Working Group on Mergers, a standing forum for inter-agency policy discussion. The objective of the Working Group is to improve understanding of each other’s policies and practices and to enhance the consistency of merger control on both sides of the Atlantic.
645. Poleg sodelovanja, povezanega s posameznimi primeri združitev, so agencije ohranjale redne neuradne stike v zvezi z vprašanji o politiki nadzora združevanja, ki so vključevali plodne izmenjave stališč o vrsti tem. V letu 2004 so se ti stiki nanašali na sveženj reform nadzora združevanja, ki ga je pripravila Komisija, študijo Komisije o učinkovitosti njene politike protiukrepov in tekoče notranje razmisleke o pristopu k presoji nehorizontalnih združitev, o katerih namerava Komisija razposlati smernice.	645. In addition to case-related cooperation on mergers, regular informal contacts were maintained between the agencies regarding issues of merger control policy, including fruitful exchanges of views on a number of topics. During 2004, these contacts dealt with the Commission’s package of merger control reforms, the Commission’s study on the effectiveness of its remedies policy and ongoing internal reflections on the approach to assessing non-horizontal mergers, on which the Commission intends to circulate guidelines.
646. Med letom so bili stiki pogosti tudi v vrsti primerov, ki niso vključevali združitev. Dvostransko sodelovanje med Komisijo in Ministrstvom za pravosodje ZDA je bilo še zlasti intenzivno v primerih kartelov: vzpostavljeni so bili številni stiki med uradniki enot Komisije za kartele in njihovimi kolegi z Ministrstva za pravosodje. Najpogostejše so bile izmenjave informacij o posameznih primerih, vendar pa so se razprave nanašale tudi na vprašanja politike. Mnogi stiki, povezani s posameznimi primeri, so bili posledica istočasnih prošenj za imuniteto pred denarno kaznijo v ZDA in EU. Poleg tega so v vrsti primerov potekali koordinirani ukrepi izvrševanja v ZDA in EU, pri čemer so agencije poskušale zagotoviti, da je bil časovni zamik med začetkom zadevnih ukrepov čim krajši. Delovna skupina za pravice intelektualne lastnine se je sestala prek videokonference na začetku leta 2004.	646. During the year, there were also frequent contacts in a number of non-merger cases. Bilateral cooperation between the Commission and the US DoJ was particularly intense in cartel cases: numerous contacts took place between officials of the Commission’s cartel units and their counterparts at the DoJ. The exchanges of information on particular cases were most frequent but discussions also took in policy issues. Many of the case-related contacts took place as a result of simultaneous applications for immunity in the US and the EU. Furthermore, in a number of instances, coordinated enforcement actions took place in the US and the EU, in which the agencies tried to ensure that the time lapse between the start of the respective actions was as short as possible. The working group on intellectual property rights met by video conference at the beginning of 2004.
647. Dne 28. septembra se je komisar Mario Monti na letnem dvostranskem srečanju EU/ZDA v Bruslju sestal z vodjema protimonopolnih agencij ZDA, predsednico Zvezne trgovinske komisije Deborah Majoras in pomočnikom ministra za pravosodje Hewom Pateom.	647. On 28 September, Commissioner Mario Monti met the heads of the US antitrust agencies, Deborah Majoras, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, and Hew Pate, Assistant Attorney General, for the annual bilateral EU/US meeting in Brussels.
648. Komisija je med letom opravila 54 uradnih obvestil, medtem ko je v istem obdobju od organov ZDA prejela 28 uradnih obvestil.	648. The Commission made 54 formal notifications during the year while it received 28 formal notifications from the US authorities during the same period.
Kanada	Canada
649. Sodelovanje s kanadskim uradom za konkurenco temelji na Sporazumu med EU in Kanado o sodelovanju na področju konkurence, podpisanem leta 1999[412]. Stiki med Komisijo in Uradom, njenim kanadskim sogovornikom, so bili pogosti in plodni. Pogovori so se nanašali na vprašanja, povezana s posameznimi primeri, in tudi na splošnejša vprašanja politike. Stiki, povezani s posameznimi primeri, so zajemali vsa področja uveljavljanja konkurenčnega prava, čeprav so ti stiki najpogosteje vključevali preiskave združitev in kartelov.	649. Cooperation with the Canadian Competition Bureau is based on the EU/Canada Competition Cooperation Agreement signed in 1999[412]. Contacts between the Commission and the Bureau, its Canadian interlocutor, have been frequent and fruitful. Discussions have concerned both case-related issues and more general policy issues. Case-related contacts covered all areas of competition law enforcement, though these contacts most usually involved merger and cartel investigations.
650. Stiki med agencijami po navadi potekajo prek rednih telefonskih klicev, elektronske pošte in konferenčnih klicev med skupinami, ki se ukvarjajo s posameznimi primeri. V primerih kartelov to vključuje tudi usklajevanje preiskav.	650. Contact between the agencies usually takes the form of regular telephone calls, e-mails, and conference calls between case teams. For cartel cases, this also includes the coordination of investigations.
651. Komisija in kanadski urad za konkurenco sta nadaljevala tudi svoj dialog o splošnih vprašanjih konkurence skupnega pomena. V zvezi s tem sta v Bruslju potekali dve srečanji, prvo, 9. februarja, je bilo osredotočeno na politiko združevanja in drugo, 16. februarja, na sodelovanje pri preiskavah kartelov. Na naslednjem srečanju, ki je potekalo 11. oktobra v Parizu, je bila obravnavana ocena učinkovitosti v nadzoru združevanja.	651. The Commission and the Canadian Competition Bureau also continued their dialogue on general competition issues of common concern. In this connection, two meetings were held in Brussels, one on 9 February focusing on merger policy and the other on 16 February focusing on cooperation in cartel investigations. A further meeting was held on 11 October in Paris on the assessment of efficiencies in merger control.
652. Komisija je med letom opravila dve uradni obvestili, medtem ko je v istem obdobju od kanadskih organov prejela sedem uradnih obvestil.	652. There were two formal notifications by the Commission during the year while the Commission received seven formal notifications from the Canadian authorities during the same period.
Japonska	Japan
653. Sodelovanje z Japonsko komisijo za pošteno trgovino temelji na Sporazumu o sodelovanju iz leta 2003[413]. Stiki z Japonsko komisijo za pošteno trgovino so se leta 2004 precej povečali, nanašali pa so se na vprašanja, povezana s posameznimi primeri, in tudi na splošnejša vprašanja politike.	653. Cooperation with the Japan Fair Trade Commission is based on the 2003 Cooperation Agreement[413]. Contacts with the Japan Fair Trade Commission increased considerably in the course of 2004 and dealt with both case-related issues and more general policy issues.
654. Poleg številnih stikov v zvezi s posameznimi primeri sta Evropska komisija in Japonska komisija za pošteno trgovino nadaljevali tudi svoj stalni dialog o splošnih vprašanjih konkurence skupnega pomena. V zvezi s tem sta v Bruslju potekali dve srečanji, prvo, 25. februarja, je bilo osredotočeno na politiko združevanja in drugo, 9. marca, na sodelovanje pri preiskavah kartelov.	654. In addition to numerous contacts on individual cases, the European Commission and the Japan Fair Trade Commission continued their ongoing dialogue on general competition issues of common concern. In this connection, two meetings were held in Brussels in 2004, one on 25 February focusing on merger policy and the other on 9 March focusing on cooperation in cartel investigations.
655. Letno dvostransko srečanje med Evropsko komisijo in Japonsko komisijo za pošteno trgovino je potekalo 16. septembra v Bruslju. Udeleženki sta razpravljali o najnovejšem razvoju politike in nadaljnjih možnostih dvostranskega sodelovanja. Evropska komisija je tudi pokazala močno zanimanje za tekočo reformo japonske zakonodaje o konkurenci.	655. The annual bilateral meeting between the European Commission and the Japan Fair Trade Commission was held on 16 September in Brussels. The parties discussed recent policy developments and further prospects of bilateral cooperation. The European Commission also took a keen interest in the ongoing reform of Japanese competition law.
656. Evropska komisija je med letom opravila štiri uradna obvestila, medtem ko v istem obdobju od japonskih organov ni prejela nobenega uradnega obvestila.	656. There were four formal notifications made by the European Commission during the year while the European Commission received no formal notifications from the Japanese authorities during the same period.
3. Sodelovanje z drugimi državami in regijami	3. Cooperation with other countries and regions
Avstralija	Australia
657. Leta 2004 je Komisija začela sodelovati z organi za konkurenco številnih drugih držav OECD, zlasti Avstralije. Ti stiki so zajemali vprašanja, povezana s posameznimi primeri, in tudi splošnejša vprašanja, povezana s politiko konkurence.	657. During 2004 the Commission engaged in cooperation with the competition authorities of a number of other OECD countries, most notably Australia. These contacts covered both case-related and more competition-policy related issues.
Kitajska	China
658. Komisar Mario Monti in minister za trgovino Ljudske republike Kitajske Bo Xilai sta 6. maja podpisala Pravilnik strukturiranega dialoga o politiki konkurence med Evropsko unijo in Kitajsko. To je prvi tak dialog o konkurenci, ki ga je Kitajska začela s tretjimi državami. Prvotni cilj dialoga je oblikovati forum za posvetovanje in preglednost med Kitajsko in EU na tem področju ter okrepiti tehnično pomoč in pomoč pri vzpostavitvi zmogljivosti, ki ju EU zagotavlja Kitajski na področju politike konkurence. Začetek tega dialoga je časovno zelo primeren, saj je Kitajska v postopku izdelave osnutka popolnoma oblikovane zakonodaje o konkurenci.	658. On 6 May, Commissioner Mario Monti and Bo Xilai, Minister of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, signed Terms of Reference of a structured dialogue on competition policy between the European Union and China. This is the first such competition dialogue initiated by China with third countries. The primary objective of the dialogue is to establish a forum for consultation and transparency between China and the EU in this area and to enhance the EU’s technical and capacity-building assistance to China in competition policy. The initiation of this dialogue is very timely as China is in the process of drafting a fully fledged competition law.
659. Glede na Pravilnik bo dialog vključeval: (i) izmenjave stališč o trenutnem stanju, izkušnjah in novem razvoju v zakonodaji in izvrševanju protimonopolnih politik; (ii) izmenjave stališč o zakonodaji o združevanju in izvrševanju; (iii) izmenjave izkušenj o vzpostavitvi organov za konkurenco in o njihovi vlogi zavzemanja za konkurenco; (iv) izmenjave stališč o večstranskih pobudah za konkurenco, s posebnim poudarkom na boju proti kartelnim dogovorom; (v) izmenjave stališč o liberalizaciji komunalnega gospodarstva in državnih intervencijah v tržnem procesu; (vi) izmenjave izkušenj o ozaveščanju podjetij in javnosti o konkurenci in protimonopolni zakonodaji ter (vii) sodelovanje za okrepitev tehnične pomoči in pomoči pri vzpostavitvi zmogljivosti, ki jo EU ponuja Kitajski.	659. Following the Terms of Reference, the dialogue will include: (i) exchanges of views on current situations, experiences and new developments in legislation and enforcement of antitrust policies; (ii) exchanges of views on merger legislation and enforcement; (iii) exchanges of experiences on setting up competition authorities, as well as their competition advocacy role; (iv) exchanges of views on multilateral competition initiatives, with a particular focus on combating hard-core cartels; (v) exchanges of views on the liberalisation of public utility sectors and state interventions in the market process; (vi) exchanges of experiences on raising companies and public’s awareness of competition and anti-monopoly laws; and (vii) cooperation to enhance the EU’s technical and capacity-building assistance to China.
660. Od podpisa Pravilnika se je Komisija večkrat sestala s kitajskimi uradniki, vključenimi v izdelavo osnutka nove zakonodaje o konkurenci. Prav tako je imela predstavitve za delegacije iz Pekinga in je predložila pripombe k osnutkom prihajajoče kitajske zakonodaje o konkurenci.	660. Since signing of the Terms of Reference, the Commission has held a series of meetings with Chinese officials involved in drafting the new competition law. It has also given presentations to delegations from Beijing and submitted observations on drafts of the forthcoming Chinese competition law.
Evropsko območje proste trgovine	European Free Trade Area
661. Med letom je Komisija nadaljevala tudi svoje tesno sodelovanje z Nadzornim organom EFTA pri izvrševanju Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru.	661. During the course of the year the Commission also continued its close cooperation with the ESA (EFTA Surveillance Authority) in enforcing the Agreement on the European Economic Area.
Koreja	Korea
662. Komisar Mario Monti in predsednik Komisije za pošteno trgovino Republike Koreje Chul-Kyu Kang sta 28. oktobra podpisala Memorandum o soglasju, ki določa pogoje za dvostranski dialog o konkurenci med EU in Korejo z glavnim ciljem ustanovitve stalnega foruma za posvetovanje, preglednost in izmenjavo izkušenj in stališč med Evropsko komisijo in Komisijo za pošteno trgovino. Sodelovanje med tema organoma za konkurenco je odlično in pogosto imata skupna stališča v večstranskem okolju za konkurenco, kot sta Mednarodna mreža za konkurenco (ICN) in OECD. Koreja je ena izmed aktivnejših udeleženk na teh forumih in aprila je v Seulu gostila letno konferenco Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco. V teh večstranskih okvirih sta si organa redno izmenjavala stališča o vprašanjih konkurence skupnega interesa. Memorandum o soglasju vzpostavlja uradno podlago za ta dialog.	662. On 28 October, Commissioner Mario Monti and Chul-Kyu Kang, Chairman of the Fair Trade Commission of the Republic of Korea, signed a Memorandum of Understanding setting terms of reference for bilateral EU-Korea competition dialogue with the primary objective of establishing a permanent forum for consultation, transparency and exchange of experiences and views between the European Commission and the Fair Trade Commission. Collaboration between these competition authorities is excellent and they often share common views in multilateral competition settings like the International Competition Network (ICN) and the OECD. Korea is one of the more active participants in these forums and in April it hosted the ICN Annual Conference in Seoul. In these multilateral contexts, the two authorities have regularly exchanged views on competition issues of common interest. The Memorandum of Understanding establishes a formal basis for this dialogue.
663. Če povzamemo, Memorandum o soglasju predvideva: (i) letna posvetovalna srečanja; (ii) izmenjavo informacij o glavnih skrbeh med agencijami; (iii) izmenjavo strokovnih študij; (iv) obveščanje o dejavnostih izvrševanja, ki lahko vplivajo na pomembne interese druge agencije; (v) izmenjavo gradiva o trenutnem stanju, izkušnjah in novem razvoju v zakonodaji in izvajanju politike konkurence ter (vi) izmenjavo stališč o večstranskih pobudah za konkurenco s posebnim poudarkom na boju proti mednarodnim kartelnim dogovorom. Sodelovanje med agencijami je podvrženo zadevnim zakonom obeh pogodbenic, zlasti zakonom, ki ščitijo zaupne informacije.	663. In outline, the Memorandum of Understanding provides for: (i) annual consultation meetings; (ii) information exchange on major concerns between the agencies; (iii) exchange of expert studies; (iv) notification of enforcement activities that may affect important interests of the other agency; (v) exchange of materials on current situations, experiences and new developments in legislation and the implementation of competition policy; and (vi) exchange of views on multilateral competition initiatives, with particular reference to combating international hardcore cartels. Cooperation between the agencies is subject to the respective laws of each party, in particular those protecting confidential information.
Latinska Amerika	Latin America
664. Leta 2004 se je povečalo število stikov z organi za konkurenco v Braziliji in Mehiki. Ti so vključevali konferenčne klice med skupinami, ki delajo na istih svetovnih združitvah, da bi primerjale pristope k presoji združitev in vrste možnih protiukrepov ter o njih razpravljale.	664. The year 2004 saw an increase in contacts with competition authorities in Brazil and Mexico. These included conference calls between case teams working on the same global mergers to compare and discuss the approaches taken towards assessing the mergers and the types of remedies being considered.
665. V andski regiji je Komisija nadaljevala svoj triletni projekt za izboljšanje in uskladitev bolivijske, kolumbijske, ekvadorske, perujske in venezuelske zakonodaje o konkurenci ter za podporo ustanovam, odgovornim za njeno spremljanje in uporabo.	665. In the Andean region, the Commission continued its three-year project to improve and harmonise Bolivian, Colombian, Ecuadorian, Peruvian and Venezuelan legislation on competition and support the institutions responsible for monitoring and applying it.
D – Večstransko sodelovanje	D – MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
1. MEDNARODNA MREžA ZA KONKURENCO	1. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK
666. Mednarodna mreža za konkurenco (ICN), katere ustanovna članica je Komisija, je še naprej hitro napredovala. Zdaj je splošno priznana kot vodilni mednarodni forum za razprave o mednarodni politiki konkurence[414]. Mednarodna mreža za konkurenco si prizadeva olajšati mednarodno sodelovanje ter izdelati predloge za postopkovno in vsebinsko zbliževanje. Do konca leta 2004 se je članstvo v ICN povečalo na 86 agencij za konkurenco iz 77 jurisdikcij. Tako obsega veliko večino obstoječih organov sveta iz razvitih gospodarstev in gospodarstev v razvoju. Mednarodna mreža za konkurenco prav tako vabi svetovalce iz akademskega sveta, poslovne skupnosti, potrošniških skupin in pravnih poklicev, da prispevajo k njenim delovnim projektom. Od septembra 2004 upravljavskemu organu ICN, tj. usmerjevalni skupini, predseduje vodja nemškega organa za konkurenco dr. Ulf Böge.	666. The International Competition Network (ICN), of which the Commission is a founding member, has continued to make rapid progress. It is now widely recognized as a leading multilateral forum for the discussion of international competition policy[414]. The ICN seeks to facilitate international cooperation and to formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence. By the end of 2004, ICN membership had grown to 86 competition agencies from 77 jurisdictions. It thus encompasses the vast majority of the world’s existing authorities from both developed and developing economies. The ICN also invites advisers from academia, the business community, consumer groups and the legal profession to contribute to its work projects. Since September 2004 the head of the German competition authority, Dr Ulf Böge, has chaired the ICN’s governing body, the Steering Group.
667. Aprila je imela Mednarodna mreža za konkurenco na povabilo Korejske komisije za pošteno trgovino svojo tretjo letno konferenco v Seulu. V Seulu so se agencije članice ICN odločile, da ustanovijo novo delovno skupino za kartele, ter Evropsko komisijo zaprosile, da skupaj z madžarskim organom za konkurenco predseduje temu projektu.	667. In April, the ICN held its third annual conference in Seoul at the invitation of the Korea Fair Trade Commission. In Seoul, ICN member agencies decided to set up a new Cartel Working Group and asked the European Commission to chair this project together with the Hungarian competition authority.
668. Na konferenci ICN v Seulu so razpravljali tudi o poročilu, ki ga je pripravila Delovna skupina ICN za uveljavljanje protimonopolnih pravil v reguliranih sektorjih[415] ter ki preučuje meje in omejitve, s katerimi se agencije za konkurenco navadno srečujejo, ko posredujejo v reguliranih sektorjih. Poročilo je tudi posebej poudarilo delovne dogovore med organi za konkurenco in regulativnimi organi.	668. The ICN Seoul conference also discussed a report prepared by the ICN Working Group on Anti-trust Enforcement in the Regulated Sectors[415], which reviews the limits and constraints that competition agencies typically face when they intervene in regulated sectors. The report also placed special emphasis on the working arrangements between competition and regulatory authorities.
Delovna skupina ICN za kartele	ICN Cartel Working Group
669. Delovna skupina ICN za kartele se loteva izzivov zatiranja kartelov na nacionalni in mednarodni ravni. V ta namen preuči potrebo in koristi boja proti kartelom z namenom dosega mednarodnega soglasja o upravičenosti za posredovanje v takih primerih. Poleg tega tudi razpravlja o najučinkovitejših orodjih za izvrševanje.	669. The ICN Cartel Working Group addresses the challenges of repression of cartels at national and international levels. To this end, it reviews the necessity and benefits of combating cartels with a view to reaching an international consensus on the justification for intervention in such cases. Moreover, it discusses the most effective enforcement tools.
670. Kot forum za te razprave je Delovna skupina ICN za kartele novembra v Sydneyju organizirala dve konferenci. Prvič so si organi za izvrševanje na podlagi izkušenj predhodne mednarodne delavnice o kartelih lahko izmenjali strokovno znanje in razvili svoje preiskovalne sposobnosti za odkrivanje kartelov na prvi delavnici ICN o kartelih. Drugič so na posebni delavnici o prizanesljivosti predstavniki iz več kot 30 organov za konkurenco obravnavali vrsto pravnih in praktičnih vprašanj, ki izhajajo iz vzporednih prošenj za imuniteto pred denarnimi kaznimi v več jurisdikcijah. Gradivo teh dveh dogodkov bo objavljeno na spletnih strani ICN.	670. As a forum for these discussions, two conferences were organised by the ICN Cartel Working Group in Sydney in November. Firstly, drawing on the experiences of the former International Cartel Workshop, enforcers were able to share know-how and develop their investigative skills in the detection of cartels at the first ICN Cartel Workshop. Secondly, at a special Leniency Workshop, a number of legal and practical issues arising out of parallel applications for immunity from fines in several jurisdictions were discussed by representatives from more than 30 competition authorities. The materials from these events will be made public on the ICN web site.
Delavnica ICN o preiskovalnih tehnikah za združitve	ICN Merger Investigative Techniques Workshop
671. Podskupina za preiskovalne tehnike za združitve je imela svojo drugo delavnico 20. in 21. oktobra tega leta. Delavnico je gostila Evropska komisija, ki je omogočila, da se je 130 pravnikov in ekonomistov iz 49 protimonopolnih organov sestalo v Bruslju in delalo na hipotetičnem primeru združitve v sektorju sojinega mleka. Zasebni sektor je zastopalo 16 nevladnih svetovalcev iz mednarodnih odvetniških pisarn z bogatimi izkušnjami v postopkih nadzora čezmejnega združevanja.	671. The Merger Investigative Techniques Subgroup held its second workshop on 20 and 21 October this year. The workshop was hosted by the European Commission and allowed 130 staff lawyers and economists from 49 antitrust authorities to meet in Brussels to work through a hypothetical merger case in the soya-milk sector. The private sector was represented by 16 non-governmental advisors (NGAs) from international law firms with extensive experience in cross-border merger control proceedings.
672. En cilj delavnice je bil zagotoviti forum za uradnike nacionalnih organov za konkurenco za izmenjavo izkušenj z orodji in tehnikami, povezanimi s preiskavami združitev. Drug cilj je bil slišati mnenja zasebnega sektorja o procesu ter ustvariti ploden dialog med uradniki agencij in zasebnim sektorjem.	672. One aim of the workshop was to provide a forum for officials of national competition authorities to exchange their experiences with the tools and techniques relevant to merger control investigations. Another objective was to hear the private sector’s opinions on the process and to create a fruitful dialogue between agency officials and the private sector.
673. Udeleženci so delali na hipotetičnem primeru združitve med dvema najuspešnejšima proizvajalcema sojinega mleka v državi.	673. Participants worked on a hypothetical case file on a merger between the two most successful soya milk producers in the country.
674. Dogodek je kar se da natančno simuliral ključne korake prave preiskave združitve. Vloga svetovalcev zasebnega sektorja je bila zastopati udeležence združitve in predstaviti posle svojih strank kot „jasen primer brez težav“, da bi vzbudili potreben skepticizem med udeleženci in jih spodbudili k uvedbi njihove preiskave. V ločenih skupinah so udeleženci razvili preiskovalni načrt, razpravljali o zahtevah po dokumentih udeleženk združitve, analizirali različne vrste ekonomskih in ekonometričnih dokazov ter nazadnje delali na zahtevah za informacije, naslovljenih na tretje strani, in vprašanju pristranskosti vprašancev.	674. The event simulated as closely as possible the key steps of a real merger control investigation. The role of the private sector advisers was to represent the merging parties and to present their clients’ transactions as a “clear no-problem case” in order to raise the necessary scepticism among participants and prompt them to launch their investigation. In the breakout groups, participants developed an investigation plan, discussed document requests from the merging parties, analysed different types of economic and econometric evidence and lastly worked on information requests addressed to third parties and on the issue of respondent bias.
Delovna skupina ICN za združitve – Podskupina za priglasitve in postopke	ICN Mergers Working Group - Notification and Procedures Sub-group
675. Komisija je bila leta 2004 dejavno vključena v delo te podskupine. V začetku leta je podskupina pripravila sklop štirih podrobnih priporočenih praks, ki zajemajo naslednja področja: (1) zaupnost, (2) proceduralno poštenost, (3) izvajanje preiskav združitev in (4) medagencijsko sodelovanje. Potrdili so jih člani ICN na plenarnem zasedanju ob letni konferenci ICN aprila v Seulu po interaktivni predstavitvi njihove vsebine in podrobni razpravi na ločenih sejah. S štirimi novimi praksami se je število priporočenih praks, ki jih je sprejela Mednarodna mreža za konkurenco na podlagi osnutkov, ki jih je pripravila ta podskupina, povečalo na enajst. Drugih sedem praks se nanaša na: (1) zadostno povezavo med učinki posla in jurisdikcijo, ki opravlja preverjanje; (2) jasne in objektivne prage priglasitve; (3) prožnost pri časovni določitvi priglasitve združitve; (4) obdobja pregledov združitev; (5) zahteve za začetno priglasitev; (6) izvajanje preiskav združitev ter (7) preglednost.	675. The Commission was actively involved in the work of this sub-group during 2004. In the early part of the year, the sub-group prepared a set of four detailed recommended practices covering the following areas: (1) confidentiality; (2) procedural fairness; (3) conduct of merger investigations; and (4) interagency cooperation. These were endorsed by the ICN membership in plenary session on the occasion of the ICN Annual Conference in Seoul in April, following an interactive presentation of their content and detailed discussion in breakout sessions. The four new practices bring to eleven the number of recommended practices adopted by the ICN, on the basis of drafts produced by this sub-group. The seven others concern: (1) sufficient nexus between the transaction's effects and the reviewing jurisdiction; (2) clear and objective notification thresholds; (3) flexibility in the timing of merger notification; (4) merger review periods; (5) requirements for initial notification; (6) conduct of merger investigations; and (7) transparency.
676. Od Seula naprej podskupina dela na dveh novih priporočenih praksah za protiukrepe v zvezi z združitvami ter za pooblastila, vire in samostojnost agencije za izvrševanje, ki bosta predstavljeni na naslednji letni konferenci, ki naj bi bila predvidoma junija 2005 v Bonnu. Poleg tega podskupina deluje na več novih projektih: razvoj vzorca obrazca ali obrazcev za udeležence združitve in agencije za konkurenco, ki urejajo opustitev varstva zaupnosti za gradivo, predloženo v povezavi s pregledi združitev; zbiranje podatkov o ovirah za jurisdikcijo za izvajanje priporočenih praks in priprava poročila, ki opredeljuje izzive, s katerimi se srečujejo agencije pri sprejemanju praks in tehnik za pomoč pri premagovanju ovir; priprava študije o pristojbinah za vložitev prijave pri nadzoru združitev ter možna razglasitev priporočenih praks za udeležence združitev na podlagi raziskovalnega dela treh članic (Komisije EU, Južne Afrike in Kanade). Podskupina še naprej spremlja prizadevanja za reformo in zagotavlja podporo članom ICN ob upoštevanju sprememb zakonodaje, predpisov in praks agencij ter deluje z nečlani, ki razvijajo novo zakonodajo za preglede združitev.	676. Since Seoul, the sub-group has been working on two new recommended practices on merger remedies and on agency enforcement powers, resources and independence, which will be presented to the next annual conference, scheduled to take place in Bonn in June 2005. In addition, the sub-group is working on several new projects: the development of a model form or forms for use by merging parties and competition agencies governing waivers of confidentiality protection for materials submitted in connection with merger reviews; the gathering of data on impediments to jurisdictions’ ability to implement the recommended practices and preparation of a report identifying challenges agencies face in adopting the practices and techniques to help surmount impediments; the preparation of a study on filing fees in merger control; and the possible promulgation of recommended practices for merging parties, based on exploratory work by three members (EU Commission, South Africa and Canada). The sub-group continues to monitor reform efforts and to provide support to ICN members considering changes to legislation, regulations, and agency practices, as well as working with non-members developing new merger review legislation.
Delovna skupina ICN za združitve – Podskupina za analitični okvir	ICN Mergers Working Group – Analytical Framework Sub-group
677. Na letni konferenci v Seulu je predsednik podskupine (Urad Združenega kraljestva za pošteno trgovanje) predstavil končno študijo o smernicah za združitve v 12 jurisdikcijah (vključno z EU), ki jo je pripravilo združenje odvetniških pisarn. Od Seula Urad Združenega kraljestva za pošteno trgovanje in irski organ za konkurenco skupaj vodita dva projekta: (1) izdelavo kontrolnega seznama ključnih vprašanj, ki se jih morajo lotevati smernice za združitve, in (2) študijo različnih vrst protiukrepov, sprejetih v postopkih v zvezi z združitvami po vsem svetu, zato da se oceni njihova učinkovitost pri reševanju različnih pomislekov glede konkurence. Komisija je vključena v oba projekta kot del posvetovalne skupine.	677. At the Annual Conference in Seoul, the chair of the sub-group (the UK Office of Fair Trading) presented the finalised study on merger guidelines in 12 jurisdictions (including the EU) prepared by a consortium of law firms. Since Seoul, the UK OFT and Irish Competition Authority have been co-steering two projects: (1) the drawing up of a checklist of key questions which merger guidelines ought to address; and (2) a study of various types of remedies accepted in merger proceedings worldwide, with a view to assessing their effectiveness in dealing with different competition concerns. The Commission is involved in both of these projects as part of a consultative group.
Delavnica ICN o vzpostavitvi zmogljivosti	ICN Workshop on Capacity Building
678. V imenu drugega projekta ICN, ki se predvsem nanaša na izzive, s katerimi se srečujejo mlajše agencije za konkurenco, je Komisija februarja 2004 v Parizu organizirala delavnico ICN o vzpostavitvi zmogljivosti[416]. Ta dogodek je prvič združil veliko število agencij za konkurenco s predstavniki skupnosti donatorskih ustanov, ki financirajo projekte tehnične pomoči na področju konkurence.	678. On behalf of another ICN project that is primarily concerned with the challenges faced by younger competition agencies, the Commission organised the ICN Workshop on Capacity Building in Paris in February 2004[416]. This event brought together for the first time a large number of competition agencies with representatives of the community of donor institutions which fund technical assistance projects in the competition field.
679. Cilj delavnice je bil okrepiti medsebojno razumevanje in delovne dogovore med organi, ki zagotavljajo sredstva za projekte tehnične pomoči na področju konkurence, in agencijami, ki prejemajo to podporo. Ena od glavnih ugotovitev dogodka je bila, da so agencije, ki iščejo sredstva, pogosto dobro obveščene o tem, da se obrnejo na predstavništva donatorskih organov v svojih državah.	679. The objective of the Workshop was to enhance the mutual understanding and working arrangements between the bodies that provide funds for technical assistance projects in the competition field and the agencies that receive this support. One of the main conclusions of the event was that agencies seeking funds are often well advised to approach donor bodies' representations in their own countries.
2. Organizacija za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj (OECD)	2. OECD
680. Komisija je še naprej dejavno sodelovala in prispevala k delu Odbora OECD za konkurenco. Komisija je sodelovala na vseh okroglih mizah OECD, povezanih s konkurenco, delovala kot nadzornica Rusije v strokovnem pregledu ruske politike konkurence ter dejavno sodelovala v pregledih politike konkurence Mehike in Japonske. Udeležila se je tudi drugih srečanj OECD, povezanih s konkurenco, kot so Svetovni forum o konferenci in skupne seje Odbora za konkurenco ter odborov za potrošniško politiko in trgovino.	680. The Commission continued to participate actively and contribute to the work of the OECD Competition Committee. The Commission participated in all competition-related OECD roundtables, acted as Russia’s examiner in the peer review of Russian competition policy and participated actively in the reviews of the competition policies of Mexico and Japan. It also attended other competition-related OECD meetings such as the Global Forum on Competition and the joint sessions of the Competition Committee with the Committees on Consumer Policy and Trade.
681. Leta 2004 so potekala tri srečanja Odbora za konkurenco, in sicer februarja, junija in oktobra. Na prvem srečanju so na okrogli mizi razpravljali o konkurenci in regulativi v oskrbi z vodo ter dosegli soglasje o tem, da obstaja prostor za povečanje konkurence na trgu na debelo in na področju oskrbe industrijskih potrošnikov. Odbor za konkurenco je tudi slišal stališča predstavnikov Mednarodne odvetniške zbornice, Ameriške odvetniške zbornice, Mednarodne trgovinske zbornice ter Svetovalnega odbora za podjetja in industrijo pri OECD o izmenjavi informacij med organi za uveljavljanje konkurence v mednarodnih preiskavah kartelov. Na februarskem srečanju so se dogovorili tudi o začetku priprave osnutka novega priporočila OECD za pregled združitev. Osnutek za novo priporočilo je bil dokončan in bo predložen v končno odobritev Odbora za konkurenco februarja 2005.	681. In 2004 three Competition Committee meetings were held in February, June and October. In the first meeting, a roundtable discussed competition and regulation in water supply, reaching a consensus that scope existed for increasing competition in the wholesale market and the supply of industrial consumers. The Competition Committee also heard the views of representatives of the International Bar Association, the American Bar Association, the International Chamber of Commerce and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD concerning the exchange of information among competition enforcers in international cartel investigations. The February meeting also agreed to launch the drafting of a new OECD Recommendation on merger review. The draft for the new Recommendation has been completed and will be submitted for the final approval of the Competition Committee in February 2005.
682. Na drugem srečanju Odbora za konkurenco so potekale štiri okrogle mize. Na prvi okrogli mizi so razpravljali o povezavi med konkurenco in kmetijstvom s poudarkom na zlorabah kupne moči in skupne prodaje v domačih kmetijskih sektorjih. Največji protikonkurenčni učinki organizacij skupne prodaje se bodo verjetno pojavili iz prizadevanj za zmanjšanje proizvodnje in dvig cen. Taka prizadevanja bodo verjetno škodovala potrošnikom in širšemu javnemu interesu. Druga okrogla miza se je osredotočila na interakcijo med pravicami intelektualne lastnine in protimonopolnimi pravili s poudarkom na biotehnologiji. Organi si prizadevajo izboljšati ravnotežje med zaščito spodbud za inovacije in posredovanjem proti licenčnim sporazumom, ki omejujejo konkurenco. Na tretji okrogli mizi so člani OECD razpravljali o tem, kako zagotoviti enotne pogoje delovanja, kadar se javni sektor vključuje v zasebne komercialne dejavnosti. V sistemu EU analiza temelji na načelu, da nacionalne vlade ne smejo odobriti ali ohraniti nobenega ukrepa za javna podjetja, ki je v nasprotju s pravili konkurence, ob priznavanju pomena zagotavljanja storitev v splošnem interesu. Na četrti okrogli mizi so razpravljali o gospodarskih dokazih, ki se po navadi uporabljajo v primerih združitve, in najboljših načinih za predstavitev gospodarskih dokazov neekonomistom.	682. The second Competition Committee meeting held four roundtables. At the first roundtable, the interface between competition and agriculture was discussed, focusing on abuses of buying power and joint selling in domestic agriculture sectors. The most significant anticompetitive effects of joint-selling organisations are likely to arise from efforts to reduce output and raise prices. Such efforts are likely to harm consumers and damage the broader public interest. The second roundtable focused on the interaction between intellectual property rights and antitrust rules with a focus on biotechnology. The authorities are endeavouring to arrive at a better balance between the protection of incentives to innovate and intervention against licensing agreements that restrict competition. During the third roundtable OECD members discussed how to ensure a level playing field when the public sector engages in private commercial activities. In the EU system the analysis is based on the principle that national governments should not grant or maintain any measure to public undertakings which conflicts with the competition rules, while recognising the importance of the provision of services of general interest. The fourth roundtable discussed the economic evidence typically used in merger cases and the best ways to present economic evidence for non-economists.
683. Na tretjem srečanju Odbora za konkurenco so potekale okrogle mize o brezobzirni vnaprejšnji izključitvi in zasebnem uveljavljanju zakonodaje. V zvezi z obema vprašanjema obstajajo razlike v pristopu med državami članicami OECD in razprave so pomagale izboljšati razumevanje različnih pravnih sistemov. Na drugi okrogli mizi se je izkazalo, da imajo nekatere države članice spodbude za olajšanje zasebnega uveljavljanja zakonodaje in se osredotočajo na potrebo po preprečitvi prevelikega odvračanja, ki ima lahko močan negativni učinek na inovacije. Delovne skupine odbora so razpravljale o konkurenci v poklicih v zdravstvu, strukturni ločitvi in potrebi po ozaveščanju o škodi, ki jo povzročajo karteli. Razprava o zdravstvenih poklicih se je osredotočila na tiste spremembe poklicnih predpisov, ki bi lahko spodbudile konkurenco. Posebna skrb v različnih jurisdikcijah je bilo vprašanje dostopa do trga, zlasti v zvezi s paramedicinskim osebjem. V razpravi o kartelih so se agencije strinjale glede velikega pomena večje ozaveščenosti o pravilih konkurence in kartelih med agencijami za javna naročila.	683. The third Competition Committee meeting held roundtables on predatory foreclosure and private enforcement. On both issues there are differences in approach among the OECD member countries and the discussions helped to improve understanding of the different legal systems. The second roundtable heard that some member countries have initiatives to facilitate private enforcement and are focusing on the need to avoid over-deterrence, which can have a strong chilling effect on innovation. The Committee working parties discussed competition in professions in the medical sector, structural separation and the need to raise awareness of the harm caused by cartels. The discussion on the medical professions focused on those changes to professional regulation that could foster competition. A specific concern in various jurisdictions was the issue of market access, in particular concerning paramedicals. In the cartel discussion, agencies shared views on the great importance of increasing awareness of competition rules and cartels among procurement agencies.
684. V letu 2004 je Komisija Odboru za konkurenco predložila 11 pisnih stališč, ki so zajemala naslednje teme razprav na okroglih mizah OECD:	684. During 2004 the Commission presented 11 written submissions to the Competition Committee covering the following discussion topics in OECD roundtables:
- konkurenca in regulativa v oskrbi z vodo,	- competition and regulation in water supply
- konkurenca in regulativa v kmetijstvu,	- competition and regulation in agriculture
- urejanje tržnih dejavnosti z javnim sektorjem – konkurenčna nevtralnost,	- regulating market activities by public sector – competitive neutrality
- konkurenca v zdravstvenih poklicih,	- competition in the health professions
- izkušnje s strukturno ločitvijo v železniškem sektorju,	- experiences with structural separation in the railway sector
- izkušnje s strukturno ločitvijo v poštnih storitvah,	- experiences with structural separation in postal services
- ozaveščanje o škodi, ki jo povzročajo karteli,	- raising awareness of the harm caused by cartels
- opredelitev in reševanje disfunkcionalnih trgov (z GD za zdravje in varstvo potrošnikov),	- identifying and tackling dysfunctional markets (with DG SANCO)
- čezmejno sodelovanje pri uveljavljanju pravil (z GD za zdravje in varstvo potrošnikov),	- cross-border enforcement cooperation (with DG SANCO)
brezobzirna vnaprejšnja izključitev,	- predatory foreclosure
zasebno uveljavljanje protimonopolne zakonodaje.	- private antitrust enforcement.
VI – Predvidevanja za leto 2005	VI – Outlook for 2005
1. Protimonopolna zakonodaja	1. Antitrust
685. Kar zadeva kartele, bo ponovno preučeno delovanje obvestila o prizanesljivosti, vključno s postopki za obravnavo podjetniških izjav. Ukrepi izvrševanja proti kartelnim dogovorom ostajajo prednostna naloga.	685. Concerning cartels, the functioning of the leniency notice, including the procedures for handling corporate statements, will be reviewed. Enforcement action against hardcore cartels remains a priority.
686. Prav tako ostaja prednostna naloga ukrepanje proti zlorabi prevladujočih položajev. Uveljavljanje pravil v farmaciji se bo lotilo drugih omejevalnih praks. Preiskave protikonkurenčnega vedenja bodo vključevale mednarodne storitve mobilnih telekomunikacij, medijske trge in avtomobilsko industrijo, dostop do visokohitrostnega interneta, vedenje prvotnih poštnih operaterjev na nerezerviranih trgih in povezave potniških letalskih prevoznikov. Okrepljeno bo uveljavljanje pravil v železniškem sektorju v tesnem sodelovanju z nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco. Večja pozornost bo namenjena finančnim trgom, kot sta bančništvo in trgovanje z vrednostnimi papirji, ter energetiki.	686. Intervention against abuse of dominant positions also remains a priority. Enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector will address other restrictive practices. Investigations of anticompetitive behaviour will include international mobile telecommunications services, media markets and the car sector, high-speed Internet access, the conduct of incumbent postal operators in non-reserved markets and passenger air travel alliances. Enforcement in the railways sector, in close cooperation with NCAs, will be stepped up. Financial markets, such as banking and security trading, and the energy sector will receive heightened attention.
687. Sektorske poizvedbe in druga orodja za spremljanje trga se bodo uporabljala bolj proaktivno kot v preteklosti in bodo osredotočena na farmacijo, nove medijske trge in trge z električno energijo ter potrošniško bančništvo in zavarovanje.	687. Sectoral enquiries and other market monitoring tools will be used more proactively than in the past and will focus on the pharmaceutical sector, new media and electricity markets and consumer banking and insurance.
688. Zakonodajna dejavnost bo osredotočena na promet: predstavljeni bodo predlog Komisije o ukinitvi skupinske izjeme za pomorstvo, spremenjena skupinska izjema za ladjarske družbe za linijski prevoz (konzorcije) ter spremenjena uredba o sporazumih in usklajenih ravnanjih v sektorju zračnega prometa. Poleg tega so predvidena postopkovna pravila, kot je novo obvestilo o dostopu do spisov, in projekti politike, kot je zelena knjiga o zasebnem uveljavljanju zakonodaje. Komisija bo tudi nadaljevala pregled politike v zvezi z zlorabami prevladujočih položajev.	688. Legislative activity will focus on transport: a Commission proposal abolishing the block exemption for the maritime sector, an amended block exemption for liner shipping consortia and an amended regulation concerning agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector will be presented. Furthermore, procedural rules, such as a new access-to-file notice, and policy projects, such as a green paper on private enforcement, are envisaged. The Commission will also continue its policy review relating to abuses of dominant positions.
2. Združitve	2. MERGERS
689. Na področju združitev bo prednostna naloga pregled politike protiukrepov Komisije. Poleg tega bodo posodobljene preostale tehnične smernice.	689. In the merger field, the review of the Commission’s remedies policy will be a priority. Furthermore, the remaining technical guidelines will be updated.
690. Delo izvrševanja naj bi ostalo na približno enaki ravni kot leta 2004.	690. Enforcement work is expected to remain at roughly the same level as in 2004.
3. Državna pomoč	3. STATE AID
691. V smislu zakonodajne dejavnosti so predvideni posvetovalni dokument o prihodnosti nadzora državne pomoči ter sprejetje smernice o storitvah splošnega gospodarskega pomena in oprostitev za storitve malega obsega splošnega pomena. Predviden je osnutek enotne konsolidirane uredbe o skupinskih izjemah za državno pomoč. Na dnevnem redu je tudi vzpostavitev meril za obravnavo primerov vračila.	691. In terms of legislative activity, a consultation document on the future of state aid control is envisaged, as well as adoption of guidance on services of general economic interest and an exemption for small-scale services of general interest. A draft single consolidated block exemption regulation for state aid is enviseged. The establishment of criteria for the treatment of recovery cases is also on the agenda.
692. Poleg tega bodo pregledane Smernice o regionalni pomoči, Smernice o raziskavah in razvoju ter Sporočilo o tveganem kapitalu. Sporočilo o državni pomoči in inovacijah bo preučilo sistem nadzora državnih pomoči in opredelilo potrebo po spremembah. Predviden je tudi pregled, ki bo povzel izkušnje z okoljsko državno pomočjo.	692. Furthermore, the Regional Aid Guidelines, the Research & Development Guidelines and the Communication on risk capital will be reviewed. A communication on state aid and Innovation will review the system of State aid control and identify the need for changes. A review summarising the experience with environmental State aid is also foreseen.
693. Nadzor državnih pomoči bo osredotočen na nedavni okvir za reševanje in prestrukturiranje, pomoč, priglašeno na podlagi večsektorskega okvira, ter preiskave eksteritorialne davčne pomoči in davčne pomoči v skupini. Primeri v zvezi s prehodnimi ukrepi v jeklarstvu in ladjedelništvu v novih državah članicah in z nasedlimi stroški v energetiki v EU 25 bi morali biti zaključeni. Poleg tega bodo imeli prednost primeri, ki obravnavajo financiranje javnih poštnih storitev, primeri širokopasovnih storitev ter pomoč za telekomunikacijska podjetja in oddajanje programov.	693. State aid control will focus on the recent framework for rescue and restructuring, aid notified under the multi-sectoral framework and investigations of off-shore and inter-group fiscal aid. Cases relating to transitional measures in the steel and shipbuilding sectors in the new Member States and to stranded cost in the energy sector in the EU 25 should be finalized. In addition, priority will be given to cases dealing with financing of postal public service operations and broadband and aid to telecommunications companies and broadcasting.
4. Mednarodne dejavnosti	4. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
694. Delo GD za konkurenco z državami kandidatkami in drugimi državami zahodnega Balkana se bo v letu 2005 nadaljevalo.	694. DG Competition's work with the candidate countries and the other Western Balkan countries will continue in 2005.
695. V letu 2005 se bodo začela pogajanja o akcijskih načrtih z drugim valom partnerskih držav sosedske politike (Armenija, Azerbajdžan, Egipt, Gruzija in Libanon).	695. Negotiations on action plans with a second wave of Neighbourhood Policy partner countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon) will begin in 2005.
696. Komisija se zavzema za ohranitev Delovne skupine EU–ZDA za združitve in predvideno je, da bo v letu 2005 oblikovala forum za razprave.	696. The Commission is keen to maintain the EU-US Working Group on Mergers and it is envisaged that it will form a forum for discussions in 2005.
697. Letna konferenca Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco bo potekala od 6. do 8. junija 2005 v Bonnu. Poseben pomen za Komisijo bodo imeli rezultati Delovne skupine za kartele, ki ji Komisija sopredseduje.	697. The International Competition Network annual conference will be held in Bonn on 6-8 June 2005. Of particular importance to the Commission will be the results of the working group on cartels, which the Commission co-chairs.
698. Leta 2005 bo politika konkurence prvič predmet popolnega strokovnega pregleda OECD, ki bo ocenil učinkovitost politike konkurence EU in njeno izvajanje.	698. In 2005 EU competition policy will for the first time be subject to a fully fledged OECD peer review, which will assess the effectiveness of EU competition policy and its implementation.
699. V okviru uradnega dvostranskega dialoga o konkurenci med EU in Kitajsko bo Komisija še naprej pomagala Kitajski pri izdelavi osnutka njene zakonodaje o konkurenci.	699. Within the framework of the formal EU-China bilateral competition dialogue, the Commission will continue to assist China in drafting its competition law.
Priloga – Primeri, obravnavani v poročilu	Annex – Cases discussed in the Report
1. Členi 81, 82 in 86	1. Articles 81, 82 and 86
Primer \| Objava \| Točka \|	Case \| Publication \| Point \|
CEWAL \| 26 \|	CEWAL \| 26 \|
Clearstream \| 30 \|	Clearstream \| 30 \|
Microsoft \| 36/140 \|	Microsoft \| 36/140 \|
Interbrew \| 42 \|	Interbrew \| 42 \|
Scandlines proti pristanišču Helsingborg in Sundbusserne proti pristanišču Helsingborg \| 45 \|	Scandlines v Port of Helsingborg and Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg \| 45 \|
Deleži priključkov družbe KPN Mobile \| 47 \|	KPN mobile termination rates \| 47 \|
B2/Telia \| 48 \|	B2/Telia \| 48 \|
Bakrene vodovodne cevi \| MEMO 01/104, 23.3.2001 \| 49 \|	Copper plumbing tubes \| MEMO 01/104,23.3.2001 \| 49 \|
Natrijev glukonat \| 52 \|	Sodium gluconate \| 52 \|
Francosko pivo \| 55 \|	French beer \| 55 \|
Surovi tobak v Španiji \| IP/04/1256, 20.10.2004 \| 57 \|	Raw tobacco Spain \| IP/04/1256, 20.10.2004 \| 57 \|
Trda galanterija - šivanke \| 59 \|	Hard haberdashery - needles \| 59 \|
Holin klorid \| 64 \|	Choline chloride \| 64 \|
Air France/Alitalia \| 70 \|	Air France/Alitalia \| 70 \|
Topps \| 71 \|	Topps \| 71 \|
Združenje belgijskih arhitektov \| 75 \|	Belgian Architects’ Association \| 75 \|
Gaz de France \| 81 \|	Gaz de France \| 81 \|
UFEX \| 102 \|	UFEX \| 102 \|
Adalat \| 127 \|	Adalat \| 127 \|
Kartel med proizvajalci cementa \| 128 \|	Cement cartel \| 128 \|
Poštne storitve: Asempre \| 129 \|	Postal service: Asempre \| 129 \|
Kartel grafitnih elektrod \| 131 \|	Graphite electrodes cartel \| 131 \|
Kartel jeklenih cevi iz celega \| 133 \|	Seamless steel tubes cartel \| 133 \|
Akzo & Akros \| 134 \|	Akzo & Akros \| 134 \|
Nemške banke \| 137 \|	German banks \| 137 \|
Protidopinška pravila \| 138 \|	Anti-doping \| 138 \|
Eurovizija \| 139 \|	Eurovision \| 139 \|
2. Nadzor združevanja	2. MERGER CONTROL
Primer \| Objava \| Točka \|	Case \| Publication \| Point \|
Lagardère/Natexis/VUP \| 179 \|	Lagardère/Natexis/VUP \| 179 \|
Sony/BMG \| UL C 13, 17.1.2004 \| 189 \|	Sony/BMG \| OJ C 13, 17.1.2004 \| 189 \|
AREVA/Urenco/ETC JV \| UL C 141, 25.5.2004 \| 195 \|	AREVA/Urenco/ETC JV \| OJ C 141, 25.5.2004 \| 195 \|
Sonoco/Ahlstrom/JV \| UL C 143, 27.5.2004 \| 199 \|	Sonoco/Ahlstrom/JV \| OJ C 143, 27.5.2004 \| 199 \|
Continental/Phoenix \| UL C 140, 20.5.2004 \| 203 \|	Continental/Phoenix \| OJ C 140, 20.5.2004 \| 203 \|
ENI/EDP/GDP \| UL C 185, 20.7.2004 \| 211 \|	ENI/EDP/GDP \| OJ C 185, 20.7.2004 \| 211 \|
Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc \| IP/04/135, 30.1.2004 \| 229 \|	Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc \| IP/04/135, 30.1.2004 \| 229 \|
GE/Amersham \| UL C 301, 12.12.2003 \| 231 \|	GE/Amersham \| OJ C 301, 12.12.2003 \| 231 \|
Air Liquide/Messer \| UL C 134, 7.2.2004 \| 235 \|	Air Liquide/Messer \| OJ C 134, 7.2.2004 \| 235 \|
Sanofi Synthelabo/Aventis \| UL C 111, 30.4.2004 \| 238 \|	Sanofi Synthelabo/Aventis \| OJ C 111, 30.4.2004 \| 238 \|
Group 4 Falck/Securicor \| UL C 96, 21.4.2004 \| 240 \|	Group 4 Falck/Securicor \| OJ C 96, 21.4.2004 \| 240 \|
Owens-Illinois/BSN Glasspack \| UL C 111, 30.4.2004 \| 244 \|	Owens-Illinois/BSN Glasspack \| OJ C 111, 30.4.2004 \| 244 \|
GIMD/Socpress \| UL C 134, 12.5.2004 \| 249 \|	GIMD/Socpress \| OJ C 134, 12.5.2004 \| 249 \|
Syngenta CP/Advanta in Fox Paine/Advanta \| UL C 177, 9.7.2004 \| 254 \|	Syngenta CP/Advanta and Fox Paine/Advanta \| OJ C 177, 9.7.2004 \| 254 \|
Cytec/UCB Surface Specialities \| UL C 274, 9.11.2004 \| 260 \|	Cytec/UCB Surface Specialities \| OJ C 274, 9.11.2004 \| 260 \|
Air France/KLM \| UL C 317, 30.12.2004 \| Polje 7 \|	Air France/KLM \| OJ C 317, 30.12.2004 \| Box 7 \|
Kabel Deutschland/ish \| UL C 111, 30.4.2004 \| 263 \|	Kabel Deutschland/ish \| OJ C 111, 30.4.2004 \| 263 \|
Accor/Barrière/Colony \| 267 \|	Accor/Barrière/Colony \| 267 \|
INA/AIG/SNFA \| IP/04/92, 21.1.2004 \| 271 \|	INA/AIG/SNFA \| IP/04/92, 21.1.2004 \| 271 \|
RWA/AMI \| UL C 143, 27.5.2004 \| 274 \|	RWA/AMI \| OJ C 143, 27.5.2004 \| 274 \|
Portugalska republika proti Komisiji (Cimpor) \| 280 \|	Portuguese Republic v Commission (Cimpor) \| 280 \|
MCI proti Komisiji \| 289 \|	MCI v Commission \| 289 \|
3. DRžAVNA POMOč	3. STATE AID
Primer \| Objava \| Točka \|	Case \| Publication \| Point \|
Belgija: prenos pokojninskih obveznosti iz prvega stebra od družbe Belgacom na belgijsko državo \| IP/04/72, 21.1.2004 \| 403 \|	Belgium: Transfer of first pillar pension obligations from Belgacom to the Belgian State \| IP/04/72, 21.1.2004 \| 403 \|
Pomoč, ki jo je Francija odobrila družbi Coopérative d’exportation du livre français (Celf) \| UL L 85, 2.4.2005 \| 406 \|	Aid granted by France to the Coopérative d’exportation du livre français (Celf) \| OJ L 85, 2.4.2005 \| 406 \|
Sprememba licenčnine za UMTS, Francija \| 407 \|	Modification of UMTS licence fee, France \| 407 \|
Alstom \| IP/04/859, 7.7.2004 \| 416 \|	Alstom \| IP/04/859, 7.7.2004 \| 416 \|
MobilCom \| UL L 116, 4.5.2005 \| 421 \|	MobilCom \| OJ L 116, 4.5.2005 \| 421 \|
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG \| 426 \|	Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG \| 426 \|
France Télécom \| 429 \|	France Télécom \| 429 \|
Shema davka na dohodek \| 430 \|	The business tax scheme \| 430 \|
Delničarski predujem \| 432 \|	The shareholder’s advance \| 432 \|
Bull \| 436 \|	Bull \| 436 \|
Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH \| 437 \|	Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH \| 437 \|
Španske javne ladjedelnice \| 440 \|	Spanish public shipyards \| 440 \|
Nizozemska pomoč za uskladitev \| 443 \|	Dutch matching aid \| 443 \|
Huta Częstochowa SA \| 446 \|	Huta Częstochowa SA \| 446 \|
Španski in nemški programi financiranja v ladjedelništvu \| 447 \|	Spanish and German ship-financing schemes \| 447 \|
Spremembe investicijskega programa grških ladjedelnic \| 448 \|	Amendments to Hellenic Shipyards’ investment plan \| 448 \|
Pomoč grškim ladjedelnicam \| 450 \|	Aid to Hellenic Shipyards \| 450 \|
Postabank/Erste Bank Hungary Rt \| 452 \|	Postabank/Erste Bank Hungary Rt \| 452 \|
Nemške deželne banke (Landesbanken) \| 454 \|	German Landesbanken \| 454 \|
Pomoč španskemu proizvajalcu jekla Siderúrgica Añón SA \| 460 \|	Aid to Spanish steel producer Siderúrgica Añón SA \| 460 \|
Pomoč pri prevozu za industrijo motornih vozil v najbolj oddaljenih regijah in območjih z zelo nizko gostoto prebivalstva \| 462 \|	Transport aid to the motor vehicle industry in outermost and low population density regions \| 462 \|
Večsektorski okvir, podaljšanje programov obstoječih regionalnih pomoči \| 464 \|	The multisectoral framework, prolongation of existing regional aid maps \| 464 \|
Zahodna Cumbria, Združeno kraljestvo \| UL C 16, 22.1.2004 \| 468 \|	West Cumbria UK \| OJ C 16, 22.1.2004 \| 468 \|
Regija Molise \| UL C 81, 2.4.2005 \| 471 \|	Molise region \| OJ C 81, 2.4.2005 \| 471 \|
Program tveganega kapitala na Severnem Irskem \| UL C 33, 6.2.2004 \| 472 \|	Northern Ireland Venture Scheme \| OJ C 33, 6.2.2004 \| 472 \|
Tremonti bis \| UL C 42, 18.2.2004 \| 473 \|	Tremonti bis \| OJ C 42, 18.2.2004 \| 473 \|
Belgijski sektorski skladi \| 477 \|	Belgian sectoral funds \| 477 \|
Program davčne pomoči za gostinski sektor \| 479 \|	Fiscal aid scheme for the restaurant sector \| 479 \|
Davčne gospodarske interesne skupine \| 485 \|	Fiscal EIGs \| 485 \|
Davčne pobude za udeležbo na sejmih \| 489 \|	Fiscal incentives for participation in fairs \| 489 \|
Izvzetje davka na nepremičnine \| 491 \|	Real estate tax exemption \| 491 \|
Raziskovalni program za vodik: mikro SPTE in projekti družbe CELCO \| 493 \|	Hydrogen Research Programme: Micro CHP and CELCO projects \| 493 \|
Pomoč za raziskave in razvoj za družbo Bell Laboratories v Dublinu \| 498 \|	R&D aid to Bell Laboratories in Dublin \| 498 \|
Sodelovanje pri povečanju kapitala družbe OCAS \| 502 \|	Participation in the capital increase of OCAS \| 502 \|
Schiefergruben Magog \| 503 \|	Schiefergruben Magog \| 503 \|
Pomoč za družbo Akzo Nobel za zmanjšanje transporta klora \| 506 \|	Aid to Akzo Nobel for minimising chlorine transport \| 506 \|
Pomoč za gradnjo cevovoda za transport etilena med mestoma Stade in Teutschental ter cevovoda za transport propilena med Rotterdamom, Antwerpnom in Porurjem \| UL C 315, 24.12.2003 \| 507 \|	Aid for an ethylene pipeline between Stade and Teutschental and for a propylene pipeline from Rotterdam via Antwerp to the Ruhr area \| OJ C 315, 24.12.2003 \| 507 \|
Okoljska pomoč za naložbe za družbo Stora Enso Langerbrugge \| UL C 15, 21.2.2004 \| 510 \|	Environmental investment aid for Stora Enso Langerbrugge \| OJ C 15, 21.2.2004 \| 510 \|
Vidiki državne pomoči pri izvajanju programa trgovanja z emisijami \| 512 \|	State aid aspects in the implementation of the emission trading scheme \| 512 \|
Obstoječa pomoč v novih državah članicah \| 525 \|	Existing aid in the new Member States \| 525 \|
Pomoč bančnemu sektorju v novih državah članicah \| 528 \|	Aid to the banking sector in the new Member States \| 528 \|
Znižanje davčne ugodnosti, ki jo je Slovaška odobrila podjetju US Steel Košice \| 530 \|	Reduction of a tax concession granted by Slovakia to US Steel Košice \| 530 \|
Pomoč za prestrukturiranje za proizvajalca jekla v Češki republiki \| 534 \|	Restructuring aid to a steel producer in the Czech Republic \| 534 \|
Fincantieri \| 535 \|	Fincantieri \| 535 \|
Kvaerner Warnow Werft \| 538 \|	Kvaerner Warnow Werft \| 538 \|
Omejitve zmogljivosti za nekatere ladjedelnice v vzhodni Nemčiji, Španiji in Grčiji \| 541 \|	Capacity limitations for certain shipyards in eastern Germany, Spain and Greece \| 541 \|
Sistemi licenčnin \| 594 \|	License fee schemes \| 594 \|
Državno financiranje TV2 Denmark in n ad hoc državno financiranje organizacij za storitve javne radiodifuzije na Nizozemskem \| UL C 262, 23.10.2004 \| 597 \|	State financing of TV2 Denmark and ad hoc state financing of public broadcasting organisations in the Netherlands \| OJ C 262, 23.10.2004 \| 597 \|
DVB-T Nemčija \| UL C 216, 28.8.2004 \| 600 \|	DVB-T Germany \| OJ C 216, 28.8.2004 \| 600 \|
Širokopasovne storitve \| 602 \|	Broadband \| 602 \|
Kinematografija in avdiovizualni sektor \| 605 \|	Cinematographic and audiovisual sector \| 605 \|
Scott Kimberly Clark \| 613 \|	Scott Kimberly Clark \| 613 \|
Španske ladjedelnice \| 615 \|	Spanish shipyards \| 615 \|
[1] V skladu z zadevo T-353/94 Postbank NV , odstavek 87, so poslovne skrivnosti „informacije, katerih razkritje javnosti ali samo njihovo posredovanje osebi, ki teh informacij ni zagotovila, lahko resno škodi interesom osebe, ki je te informacije razkrila“.	[1] According to Case T-353/94 Postbank NV, paragraph 87, business secrets are “information of which not only disclosure to the public but also mere transmission to a person other than the one that provided the information may seriously harm the latter’s interests”.
[2] Člen 30 Uredbe št. 1/2003 in člen 21 Uredbe št. 17/62 določata, da mora Komisija upoštevati samo „zakonite interese družb pri zaščiti njihovih poslovnih skrivnosti“.	[2] Article 30 of Regulation No 1/2003 and Article 21 of Regulation No 17/62 stipulate that the Commission only needs to take account of “the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets”.
[3] Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1/2003 z dne 16. decembra 2002 o izvajanju pravil konkurence iz členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES (UL L 1, 4.1.2003), uredba, kakor je bila spremenjena z Uredbo (ES) št. 411/2004 (UL L 68, 6.3.2004).	[3] Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003), Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 411/2004 (OJ L 68, 6.3.2004).
[4] Uredba Komisije št. 773/2004 z dne 7. aprila 2004 o vodenju postopkov s strani Komisije v skladu s členoma 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES (UL L 123, 27.4.2004).	[4] Commission Regulation 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 123, 27.4.2004).
[5] Obvestilo Komisije o sodelovanju znotraj mreže organov za konkurenco (UL C 101).	[5] Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities (OJ C 101).
[6] Na voljo v registru Sveta na spletni strani http://register.consilium.eu.int (dokument št. 15435/02 ADD 1).	[6] Available from the Council register at http://register.consilium.eu.int (document No 15435/02 ADD 1).
[7] Seznam nacionalnih organov, ki so podpisali izjavo v zvezi z Obvestilom Komisije o sodelovanju znotraj mreže organov za konkurenco, je na voljo na spletni strani Komisije.	[7] A list of national authorities which have signed the Statement regarding the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities can be found on the Commission’s website.
[8] Obvestilo Komisije o sodelovanju med Komisijo in sodišči držav članic EU pri uporabi členov 81 in 82 ES (UL C 101, 27.4.2004).	[8] Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004).
[9] Obvestilo Komisije o Komisijinem obravnavanju pritožb v okviru členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES (UL C 101, 27.4.2004).	[9] Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004).
[10] Obvestilo Komisije o neformalnih smernicah v zvezi z novimi vprašanji glede členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES, ki se pojavijo v posameznih primerih (usmerjevalna pisma) (UL C 101, 27.4.2004).	[10] Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters) (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004).
[11] Smernice o učinku na koncept trgovine iz členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES (UL C 101, 27.4.2004).	[11] Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ C 101, 27. 4.2004).
[12] Smernice o uporabi člena 81(3) Pogodbe ES (UL C 101, 27.4.2004).	[12] Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004).
[13] Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 772/2004 o uporabi člena 81(3) Pogodbe za kategorije sporazumov o prenosu tehnologije (UL L 123, 27.4.2004).	[13] Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements (OJ L 123, 27.4.2004).
[14] Smernice o uporabi člena 81 Pogodbe ES za sporazume o prenosu tehnologije (UL C 101, 27.4.2004). TTBER in smernice so prav tako na voljo na spletni strani: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/entente3_en.html#technology	[14] Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004). The TTBER and guidelines are also available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/entente3_en.html#technology
[15] Prejetih je bilo več kot 70 predlogov panožnih in trgovinskih združenj, odvetniških združenj in združenj IP, posameznih odvetniških podjetij, nacionalnih organov, posameznih družb, univerz in svetovalcev.	[15] Over 70 submissions were received from industry and trade associations, law and IP societies, individual law firms, national authorities, individual companies, universities and consultants.
[16] Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 240/96 z dne 31. januarja 1996 o uporabi člena 81(3) Pogodbe ES za nekatere kategorije sporazumov o prenosu tehnologije (UL L 31, 9.2.1996). Za oceno te uredbe glej poročilo Komisije o oceni, COM(2001) 786 konč.	[16] Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements (OJ L 31, 9.2.1996). For an evaluation of this Regulation, see the Commission’s evaluation report, COM(2001) 786 final.
[17] Prejšnja uredba 1996 je vsebovala bele in sive sezname.	[17] The previous 1996 Regulation contained white and grey lists.
[18] Uredba Sveta št. 19/65/EGS, uredba o pooblastitvi, dovoljuje samo sprejetje uredb o skupinskih izjemah za sporazume o prenosu tehnologije med dvema strankama in v zvezi s pravicami industrijske lastnine.	[18] Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC, the enabling Regulation, only allows adoption of block exemption Regulations for transfer of technology agreements between two parties and concerning industrial property rights.
[19] Tržni delež na tehnološkem trgu prav tako temelji na proizvodnem trgu s tem, da je opredeljen v smislu tržnega deleža proizvodov, proizvedenih z licencirano tehnologijo. Za izračun tržnega deleža se po navadi uporabljajo podatki o prodajni vrednosti za prejšnje koledarsko leto. V primeru prekoračitve ustreznega praga je zagotovljen dveletni odlog plačila.	[19] The market share on the technology market is also based on the product market in that it is defined in terms of the market share of products produced with the licensed technology. For the market share calculation, sales value data for the preceding calendar year are normally to be used. A two-year grace period is provided for in case the relevant threshold is exceeded.
[20] To zlasti zadeva obveznosti pridobitelja licence, da izključno privoli v ali določi neodvisne izboljšave ali nove uporabe licencirane tehnologije, ter klavzule o neizpodbijanju.	[20] This concerns in particular obligations on the licensee to exclusively grant back or assign severable improvements to or new applications of the licensed technology and no-challenge clauses.
[21] TTBER zajema sedaj številne najpogosteje uporabljene omejitve, kot so: omejitve področja uporabe, omejitve aktivnih in pasivnih prodaj med dajalcem in pridobiteljem licence za zaščito njunih izključnih ozemelj ter omejitve lastne uporabe.	[21] The TTBER now covers a number of commonly used restrictions such as: field of use restrictions, active and passive sale restrictions between licensor and licensee to protect their exclusive territories, and captive use restrictions.
[22] Tj. dogovorov, s katerimi dve ali več strank sestavi paket tehnologije, za katero imajo dovoljenje ne samo tisti, ki prispevajo v združenje, ampak tudi tretje stranke.	[22] i.e., arrangements whereby two or more parties assemble a package of technology which is licensed not only to contributors to the pool but also to third parties.
[23] Bela knjiga o pregledu Uredbe (EGS) št. 4056/86 o uporabi pravil konkurence ES za pomorski promet, COM(2004) 675 konč. Glej tudi sporočilo Komisije za javnost IP/04/1213.	[23] White Paper on the review of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 applying the EC competition rules to maritime transport, COM(2004) 675 final. See also Commission press release IP/04/1213.
[24] Za dokument o posvetovanju in odgovorih, ki jih je prejela Komisija, glej: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/#consult_823	[24] For the consultation document and replies received by the Commission, see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/#consult_823
[25] UL C 319, 23.12.2004.	[25] OJ C 319, 23.12.2004.
[26] UL L 68, 6.3.2004. Glej tudi sporočilo za javnost IP/04/272.	[26] OJ L 68, 6.3.2004. See also press release IP/04/272.
[27] Uredba Sveta (EGS) št. 3975/87 o postopku za uporabo pravil konkurence ES v zračnem prometu ter Uredba Sveta (EGS) št. 3976/87 o uporabi člena 85(3) Pogodbe za nekatere kategorije sporazumov in usklajenih ravnanj v zračnem prometu.	[27] Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 laying down the procedure for the application of the EC competition rules in the air transport sector and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector.
[28] Glej združene zadeve 209-213/84 Nouvelles Frontieres [1986] PSES 1425. Pred tem je ocena mednarodnih letalskih povezav Komisijo zavezala k postopkovni ločitvi poti znotraj Skupnosti od poti do tretjih držav, kar je vodilo v nezadovoljiv sestavljen scenarij.	[28] See Joined Cases 209-213/84 Nouvelles Frontières [1986] ECR 1425. Previously, the assessment of international airline alliances obliged the Commission to procedurally separate intra-Community from third-country routes, which led to an unsatisfactory patchwork scenario.
[29] Uredba št. 1/2003 (protimonopolna zakonodaja), Uredba št. 139/2004 (združitve) in zadevni izvedbeni uredbi (uredbi št. 773/2004 in št. 802/2004) določajo, da mora biti dostop do spisa zagotovljen v vseh primerih, ki zajemajo odločbe na podlagi členov 7, 8, 23 in 24(2) Uredbe št. 1/2003 in členov 6(3), 7(3), 8(2) do (6), 14 in 15 Uredbe o združitvah.	[29] Regulation No 1/2003 (antitrust), Regulation No 139/2004 (mergers) and the respective implementing Regulations (Regulations No 773/2004 and No 802/2004) provide that access to the file must be arranged in all cases involving decisions on the basis of Articles 7, 8, 23 and 24(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 and Articles 6(3), 7(3), 8(2) to (6), 14 and 15 of the Merger Regulation.
[30] Pravica dostopa do spisa v postopkih boja proti monopolom in postopkih združitev se razlikuje od splošne pravice dostopa do dokumentov po Uredbi št. 1049/2001, ki je predmet drugačnih meril in sledi drugačnemu namenu.	[30] The right of access to the file in antitrust and merger proceedings is distinct from the general right of access to documents under Regulation No 1049/2001, which is subject to different criteria and pursues a different purpose.
[31] Obvestilo Komisije o internem poslovniku za obdelavo zahtevkov po dostopu do spisa v primerih v skladu s členoma 85 in 86 [sedaj 81 in 82] Pogodbe ES, členoma 65 in 66 Pogodbe ESPJ in Uredbo Sveta (EGS) št. 4064/89 (UL C 23, 23.1.1997).	[31] Commission notice on the internal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file in cases under Articles 85 and 86 [now 81 and 82] of the EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (OJ C 23, 23.1.1997).
[32] Praksa Komisije se je razvijala zaradi novih stanj in stanj brez primere, kot je zelo veliko število strank, vpletenih v postopek, vendar tudi z namenom povečanja učinkovitosti pri zagotavljanju dostopa do spisa prek novih tehnoloških sredstev.	[32] Commission practice has evolved owing to new and unprecedented situations, such as very high numbers of parties involved in proceedings, but also with a view to enhancing efficiency in the provision of access to the file through new technological means.
[33] Zlasti v primeru „kartela med proizvajalci cementa“ pred Sodiščem prve stopnje: sodba v združenih zadevah T-25/95 itd. Cimenteries CBR SA in drugi [2000] PSES II-491.	[33] Notably in the “cement cartel” case before the Court of First Instance: judgment in Joined Cases T-25/95 etc. Cimenteries CBR SA and Others [2000] ECR II-491.
[34] Odločba Komisije z dne 23. maja 2001 o pristojnostih in nalogah pooblaščenca za zaslišanje (UL L 162, 19.6.2001).	[34] Commission Decision of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of the Hearing Officer (OJ L 162, 19.6.2001).
[35] Osnutek obvestila Komisije o pravilih dostopa do spisa Komisije v primerih v skladu s členoma 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES in z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (UL C 259, 21.10.2004). Na voljo na spletni strani: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/general_info/access_to_documents.html	[35] Draft Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (OJ C 259, 21.10.2004). Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/general_info/access_to_documents.html
[36] Konferenca Cewal je obstajala med začetkom 70-ih let in sredino 90-ih let. Sestavljale so jo ladjarske družbe, ki so upravljale redne linijske storitve med pristanišči Zaira in Angole ter Severnega morja, razen Združenega kraljestva. Sekretariat konference Cewal je bil v Antwerpnu.	[36] Cewal existed between the beginning of the 1970s and the mid-1990s. It was made up of shipping companies operating a regular liner service between the ports of Zaïre and Angola and those of the North Sea, with the exception of the United Kingdom. Cewal's secretariat was in Antwerp.
[37] Odločba Komisije 93/82/EGS z dne 23. decembra 1992 o postopku v skladu s členoma 85 (IV/32.448 in IV/32.450: Cewal, Cowac in Ukwal) in 86 (IV/32.448 in IV/32.450: Cewal) Pogodbe EGS (UL L 34, 10.2.1993). Prvotno denarno kazen v višini 9,6 milijona ECU, ki jo je Komisija naložila družbi CBM, je Sodišče prve stopnje s sodbo v združenih zadevah T-24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93 in T-28/93 CMB ter drugi [1996] PSES II-1201 znižalo na 8,64 milijona ECU.	[37] Commission Decision 93/82/EEC of 23 December 1992 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Articles 85 (IV/32.448 and IV/32.450: Cewal, Cowac and Ukwal) and 86 (IV/32.448 and IV/32.450: Cewal) of the EEC Treaty (OJ L 34, 10.2.1993).. The original fine of ECU 9.6 million imposed on CMB by the Commission was reduced by the Court of First Instance to 8.64 million by judgment in Joined Cases T-24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93 and T-28/93 CMB and Others [1996] ECR II-1201.
[38] Sodba v združenih zadevah C-395/96 P CMB , CMBT in C-396/96 P Dafra-Lines [2000] PSES I-1365.	[38] Judgment in Joined Cases C-395/96 P CMB, CMBT and C-396/96 P Dafra-Lines [2000] ECR I-1365.
[39] Uredba 2988/74 o zastaralnih rokih v postopkih, ki so povezani s prometom in konkurenco, vsebuje zastaralni rok petih let, ki ga je mogoče prekiniti, in splošni zastaralni rok desetih let za naložitev denarne kazni. Ti zastaralni roki niso zapadli, saj so bili med sodnim postopkom začasno ustavljeni.	[39] Regulation 2988/74 concerning limitation periods in proceedings relating to transport and competition contains an interruptable limitation period of five years and an overall limitation period of ten years for the imposition of a fine. These limitation periods had not expired as they had been suspended during the court proceedings.
[40] COMP/38.096.	[40] COMP/38.096.
[41] Kliring in poravnava vrednostnih papirjev sta nujna koraka za dokončanje trgovanja z vrednostnimi papirji. Kliring je postopek, s katerim se vzpostavijo pogodbene obveznosti med kupcem in prodajalcem. Poravnava je prenos vrednostnih papirjev od prodajalca h kupcu ter prenos sredstev od kupca k prodajalcu.	[41] Securities clearing and settlement are necessary steps for a securities trade to be completed. Clearing is the process by which the contractual obligations of the buyer and the seller are established. Settlement is the transfer of securities from the seller to the buyer and the transfer of funds from the buyer to the seller.
[42] Centralni registri vrednostnih papirjev hranijo vrednostne papirje in omogočajo obdelavo transakcij z vrednostnimi papirji prek vknjižbe. V matični državi zagotavlja centralni register vrednostnih papirjev storitve obdelave za poklice, ki vključujejo vrednostne papirje, katerih končni skrbnik je. Prav tako lahko storitve obdelave ponuja kot posrednik v čezmejnem kliringu in poravnavi, kadar je prvotni depozitar vrednostnih papirjev v drugi državi.	[42] Central Securities Depositories hold securities and enable securities transactions to be processed through book entry. In its home country, the Central Securities Depository provides processing services for trades involving those securities that it holds in final custody. It can also offer processing services as an intermediary in cross-border clearing and settlement, where the primary deposit of securities is in another country.
[43] Nemške delnice, s katerimi se mednarodno največ trguje (prvorazredne delnice, kot so Daimler Chrysler, Siemens, Allianz, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bank, Lufthansa in druge), so imenske delnice, v nasprotju s prinosniškimi delnicami.	[43] The most widely internationally-traded German shares (blue chip shares such as Daimler Chrysler, Siemens, Allianz, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bank, Lufthansa and others) are registered shares, as opposed to bearer shares.
[44] Zadeva COMP/37.792 je na voljo na spletni strani: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf	[44] Case COMP/37.792 available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf
[45] Družba Microsoft je pokrivala okoli 95 % tega trga.	[45] Microsoft held around 95% of this market.
[46] Ta denarna kazen je znašala 1,62 % svetovnega prometa družbe Microsoft v zadnjem razpoložljivem poslovnem letu.	[46] This fine amounted to 1.62% of Microsoft’s worldwide turnover in the last available business year.
[47] Zadeva T-201/04.	[47] Case T-201/04.
[48] Zadeva T-201/04R.	[48] Case T-201/04R.
[49] Zaslišanja o uporabi začasnih ukrepov so potekala 30. septembra 2004 in 1. oktobra 2004.	[49] Hearings on the application for interim measures were held on 30 September 2004 and 1 October 2004.
[50] Glej spodaj pod oddelek I.C.	[50] See below under Section I.C.
[51] Glej 10. poročilo Komisije o izvajanju [navedba se doda, ko je poročilo na voljo].	[51] See the Commission’s 10th Implementation Report [Add reference, once the Report is available]
[52] Pristojbina, ki jo morajo tekmeci plačati družbi Deutsche Telekom za skupen dostop do njenih lokalnih zank.	[52] Fee which competitors have to pay to Deutsche Telekom for shared access to its local loops.
[53] Sporočilo za javnost IP/04/281.	[53] Press release IP/04/281.
[54] Sporočilo za javnost IP/04/994.	[54] Press release IP/04/994.
[55] COMP/37.409. Glej sporočilo za javnost IP/04/574, 30.4.2004.	[55] COMP/37.409. See press release IP/04/574, 30.4.2004.
[56] COMP/A.36.568.	[56] COMP/A.36.568.
[57] COMP/A.36.570.	[57] COMP/A.36.570.
[58] Različici odločb, ki nista zaupni, sta bili objavljeni na spletni strani GD za konkurenco.	[58] Non-confidential versions of the decisions were published on DG Competition’s website.
[59] Odločbi temeljita na preizkusu, ki ga je razvilo Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi 27/76 United Brands proti Komisiji [1978] PSES 207.	[59] The decisions are based on the test developed by the Court of Justice in Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207.
[60] COMP/37.704 – Deleži priključkov družbe KPN Mobile.	[60] COMP/37.704 – KPN Mobile Termination Rates.
[61] COMP/37.663 – TeliaSonera AB – Širokopasovne storitve .	[61] COMP/37.663 – TeliaSonera AB – Broadband services.
[62] Za povzetke posameznih odločb glej spodaj.	[62] See below for summaries of the individual decisions.
[63] Obvestilo o imuniteti pred denarnimi kaznimi in o znižanju kazni v primerih kartelov (UL C 45, 19.2.2002).	[63] Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 45, 19.2.2002).
[64] Da bi veljalo novo obvestilo, je morala Komisija prejeti zahtevek za prizanesljivost po 19. februarju 2002.	[64] The application for leniency must have reached the Commission after 19 February 2002 for the new notice to apply.
[65] Glej zgornjo točko 1.	[65] See above point 1.
[66] Člen 21 Uredbe.	[66] Article 21 of the Regulation.
[67] Člen 20 Uredbe.	[67] Article 20 of the Regulation.
[68] Člen 19 Uredbe.	[68] Article 19 of the Regulation.
[69] Zadeva C-7/04 P (R). Za podrobnejše informacije glej sodne primere spodaj.	[69] Case C-7/04 P (R). For more details, see below under court cases.
[70] Združeni zadevi T-125/03 R in T-253/03 R Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd in Akcros. Glej tudi Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2003, točko 33.	[70] Joined Cases T-125/03 R and T-253/03 R Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros. See also 2003 Competition Report, point 33.
[71] Glavni primer o tem vprašanju je pred Sodiščem potekal konec leta.	[71] The main case on this question was pending before the Court at the end of the year.
[72] Glej zadevo 155/79 AM & S proti Komisiji [1982] PSES 1575.	[72] See Case 155/79 AM & S v Commission [1982] ECR 1575.
[73] COMP/38.069.	[73] COMP/38.069.
[74] COMP/36.756.	[74] COMP/36.756.
[75] Glej Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2001, točko 48.	[75] See 2001 Competition Report, point 48.
[76] COMP/37.750 – Brasseries Kronenbourg, Brasseries Heineken .	[76] COMP/37.750 - Brasseries Kronenbourg, Brasseries Heineken.
[77] To so hoteli, restavracije in kavarne.	[77] i.e. hotels, restaurants and cafes.
[78] COMP/38.238.	[78] COMP/38.238.
[79] COMP/38.338. Glej sporočilo za javnost IP/04/1313, 26.10.2004.	[79] COMP/38.338. See press release IP/04/1313, 26.10.2004.
[80] COMP/37.533.	[80] COMP/37.533.
[81] COMP/38.284.	[81] COMP/38.284.
[82] To odločbo je pred Sodiščem prve stopnje izpodbijala tretja stranka (Zadeva T-300/04).	[82] This decision has been challenged before the Court of First Instance by a third party (Case T-300/04).
[83] COMP/37.980 – Souris Bleue – Topps.	[83] COMP/37.980 - Souris Bleue – Topps.
[84] Sporočilo za javnost IP/04/682, 26.5.2004.	[84] Press release IP/04/682, 26.5.2004.
[85] COMP/C-2/38.014 – IFPI „Simulcasting“ , odločba z dne 8. oktobra 2002 (UL L 107, 30.4.2003).	[85] COMP/C-2/38.014 - IFPI “Simulcasting”, decision of 8 October 2002 (OJ L 107, 30.4.2003).
[86] COMP/38.126 – Santiago .	[86] COMP/38.126 – Santiago.
[87] Sporočilo za javnost IP/04/586.	[87] Press release IP/04/586.
[88] Sporočilo za javnost IP/04/586.	[88] Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee – The Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market, COM/2004/261, 16.4.2004.
[89] COMP/38.549.	[89] COMP/38.549.
[90] Odločba št. 93/438/EGS v zadevi IV/33.407 – CNSD (OJ L 203, 13.8.1993). Ta odločba je prepovedala lestvico fiksnih pristojbin italijanskih carinskih uslužbencev.	[90] Decision 93/438/EEC in Case IV/33.407 – CNSD (OJ L 203, 13.8.1993). This decision prohibited the fixed fee scale of the Italian customs agents.
[91] V svoji prvi odločbi o tarifah poklicnih združenj leta 1993 je Komisija obsodila fiksne tarife, ne da bi uvedla denarno kazen. Komisija je leta 1996 sprejela odločbo o priporočenih tarifah združenja nizozemskih špediterjev in naložila simbolično kazen v višini 1 000 EUR.	[91] In its first decision concerning tariffs of professional bodies, in 1993, the Commission condemned fixed tariffs without imposing a fine. In 1996, the Commission took a decision concerning the recommended tariffs of the association of Dutch forwarding agents, imposing a symbolic fine of EUR 1 000.
[92] COMP/38.662 – GDF-ENEL, GDF-ENI .	[92] COMP/38.662 - GDF-ENEL, GDF-ENI.
[93] Glej člen 27(4) v UL C 299, 14.9.2004.	[93] See Article 27(4) publication in OJ C 299, 14.9.2004.
[94] Odločba v skladu s členom 9 Uredbe št. 1/2003 je bila sprejeta januarja 2005.	[94] A decision under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 was adopted in January 2005.
[95] COMP/38.173 in 38.453 (UL C 115, 30.4.2004).	[95] COMP/38.173 and 38.453 (OJ C 115, 30.4.2004).
[96] UL C 115, 30.4.2004.	[96] OJ C 115, 30.4.2004.
[97] Glej spodaj pod sodnimi primeri.	[97] See below under court cases.
[98] COMP/38.427. Glej sporočilo za javnost IP/04/2004, 26.10.2004.	[98] COMP/38.427. See press release IP/04/2004, 26.10.2004.
[99] Pojem je dejansko povezan z načelom ponudnika z največjimi ugodnostmi, ki se uporablja v sporazumih.	[99] The term actually refers to the most favoured supplier principle used in the agreements.
[100] Sporočilo za javnost IP/04/134, 30.1.2004.	[100] Press release IP/04/134, 30.1.2004.
[101] COMP/38.745, še ni bilo objavljeno v Uradnem listu .	[101] COMP/38.745, not yet published in the Official Journal.
[102] Direktiva 97/67/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. decembra 1997 o skupnih pravilih za razvoj notranjega trga poštnih storitev Skupnosti in izboljšanje kakovosti storitev (UL L 15, 21.1.1998), kakor je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 2002/39/ES z dne 10. junija 2002 (UL L 176, 5.7.2002).	[102] Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service (OJ L 15, 21.1.1998), as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC of 10 June 2002 (OJ L 176, 5.7.2002).
[103] Obvestilo Komisije o uporabi pravil konkurence v poštnem sektorju in o oceni nekaterih državnih ukrepov v zvezi s poštnimi storitvami (UL C 39, 6.2.1998).	[103] Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector and on the assessment of certain state measures relating to postal services (OJ C 39, 6.2.1998).
[104] Nemčija in družba DPAG sta se pritožili zoper to odločbo: zadevi T-490/04 in T-493/04.	[104] Both Germany and DPAG have appealed against this decision: Cases T-490/04 and T-493/04.
[105] COMP/38.663 – UFEX.	[105] COMP/38.663 - UFEX.
[106] Glej zgoraj oddelek I.A.I.	[106] See above section I.A.I.
[107] COMP/39.116.	[107] COMP/39.116.
[108] Glej točko 6 člena 27(4) obvestila (UL C 258, 20.10.2004).	[108] See point 6 of the Article 27(4) notice (OJ C 258, 20.10.2004).
[109] Različice nacionalnih sodb, ki niso zaupne, so na voljo na naslovu: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts/index_en.html	[109] The non-confidential versions of the national judgments can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts/index_en.html
[110] Dodatni podatki o sofinanciranih projektih so na voljo na spletni strani GD za konkurenco: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/proposals2/table_of_projects_co_financed_out_of_3rd_call.pdf	[110] Further details on the cofinanced projects can be found on DG Competition’s website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/proposals2/table_of_projects_co_financed_out_of_3rd_call.pdf
[111] Poziv za zbiranje predlogov za ta program usposabljanja lahko najdete na spletni strani GD za konkurenco. Poziv za leto 2005 je na voljo na: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/proposals2/20040316_call/call_en.pdf	[111] The calls for proposals for this training programme can be found on DG Competition’s website. For the 2005 call, see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/proposals2/20040316_call/call_en.pdf
[112] Poročilo je na voljo na: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/eca/report_air_traffic.pdf	[112] The report is avalible at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/eca/report_air_traffic.pdf
[113] Združeni zadevi C-2/01 P Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV in Komisija proti družbi Bayer in C-3/01 P Komisija proti družbi Bayer, poročila še ni.	[113] Joined Cases C-2/01 P Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and Commission v Bayer and C-3/01 P Commission v Bayer, not yet reported.
[114] Sodba v zadevi T-41/96 Bayer [2000] PSES II-3383.	[114] Judgment in Case T-41/96 Bayer [2000] ECR II-3383.
[115] Odločba z dne 10. januarja 1996 v zadevi COMP/34.279 Adalat . Ta primer se je nanašal na omejitve vzporednega uvoza farmacevtskih proizvodov in se imenuje po proizvodu, ki ga izdeluje Bayer in na katerega se je postopek nanašal.	[115] Decision of 10 January 1996 in Case COMP/34.279 Adalat. This case concerned restrictions on parallel imports of pharmaceuticals and is named after the product manufactured by Bayer to which the proceedings related.
[116] Združeni zadevi C-204/00 P Aalborg Portland A/S, C-205/00 P Irish Cement Ltd, C-211/00 P Ciments français SA, C-213/00 P Italcementi – Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA, C-217/00 P Buzzi Unicem SpA in C-219/00 Cementir – Cementerie del Tirreno SpA, poročila še ni.	[116] Joined Cases C-204/00 P Aalborg Portland A/S, C-205/00 P Irish Cement Ltd, C-211/00 P Ciments français SA, C-213/00 P Italcementi - Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA, C-217/00 P Buzzi Unicem SpA and C-219/00 Cementir - Cementerie del Tirreno SpA, not yet reported.
[117] Odločba z dne 30. novembra 1994 v zadevah COMP/33.126 in COMP/33.322 - Cement .	[117] Decision of 30 November 1994 in Cases COMP/33.126 and COMP/33.322 - Cement.
[118] Sodba v združenih zadevah T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95 do T-32/95, T-34/95 do T-39/95, T-42/95 do T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95 do T-65/95, T-68/95 do T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 in T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR in drugi [2000] PSES II-491.	[118] Judgment in Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95 to T-32/95, T-34/95 to T-39/95, T-42/95 to T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95 to T-65/95, T-68/95 to T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others [2000] ECR II-491.
[119] Zadeva C-240/02 Asempre in drugi , poročila še ni.	[119] Case C-240/02 Asempre and Others, not yet reported.
[120] UL L 15, 21.1.1998.	[120] OJ L 15, 21.1.1998.
[121] Prenos z lastnimi sredstvi pomeni (glede na uvodno izjavo 21 v Direktivi), da pravna ali fizična oseba, ki pošilja pošiljke, sama opravi poštne storitve ali pa v njenem imenu za prevzem in prenos pošiljk poskrbi tretja oseba.	[121] Self-provision consists (according to Recital 21 of the Directive) in the provision of postal services by the natural or legal person who is the originator of the mail, or collection and routing of these items by a third party acting solely on behalf of that person.
[122] Združene zadeve T-236/01 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd , T-239/01 SGL Carbon AG , T-244/01 Nippon Carbon Co. Ltd , T-245/01 Showa Denko KK , T-246/01 GrafTech International Ltd , T-251/01 SEC Corp in T-252/01 The Carbide/Graphite Group, Inc . , poročila še ni .	[122] Joined Cases T-236/01 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd, T-239/01 SGL Carbon AG, T-244/01 Nippon Carbon Co. Ltd, T-245/01 Showa Denko KK, T-246/01 GrafTech International Ltd, T-251/01 SEC Corp and T-252/01 The Carbide/Graphite Group, Inc., not yet reported.
[123] Odločba z dne 18. julija 2001 v zadevi COMP/36.490 – Grafitne elektrode.	[123] Decision of 18 July 2001 in Case COMP/36.490 - Graphite electrodes.
[124] Smernice iz leta 1998 o metodi določanja glob (UL C 9, 14.1.1998).	[124] 1998 guidelines on the method of setting fines (OJ C 9, 14.1.1998).
[125] Na sodbo se je pritožila Komisija (zadeva C-301/04 P) ter več drugih strank, in sicer SGL (zadeva C-308/04 P), Showa Denko (zadeva 289/04 P) in SEC Corporation (zadeva C-307/04 P), odločeno z odredbo z dne 24.11.2004).	[125] The judgment has been appealed by the Comission (Case C-301/04 P) and several other parties, namely SGL (Case C-308/04 P), Showa Denko (Case 289/04 P) and SEC Corporation (Case C-307/04 P), decided by order of 24/11/2004).
[126] Zadeve T-44/00 Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG , T-48/00 Corus UK Ltd , T-50/00 Dalmine SpA in združene zadeve T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 in T-78/00 JFE Engineering Corp., Nippon Steel Corp., JFE Steel Corp. in Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd , poročila še ni.	[126] Cases T-44/00 Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG, T-48/00 Corus UK Ltd, T-50/00 Dalmine SpA and Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering Corp., Nippon Steel Corp., JFE Steel Corp. and Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd, not yet reported.
[127] Odločba z dne 8. decembra 1999 v zadevi COMP/35.860 B – Jeklene brezšivne cevi .	[127] Decision of 8 December 1999 in Case COMP/35.860 B - Seamless steel tubes.
[128] Zadeva C-7/04 P(R) Komisija proti Akzo Nobel Chemicals in Akcros Chemicals , poročila še ni.	[128] Case C-7/04 P(R) Commission v Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals, not yet reported.
[129] Odredba z dne 30. oktobra 2003 v združenih zadevah T-125/03 R in T-253/03 R Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd in Akcros .	[129] Order of 30 October 2003 in Joined Cases T-125/03 R and T-253/03 R Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros.
[130] Stranke so trdile, da je pet dokumentov zaupne narave. Inšpektorji Komisije so menili, da glede dveh dokumentov ni mogoče odločiti na kraju samem, in so ju dali v zapečateno ovojnico ter jo vrnili Komisiji. Pri preostalih treh dokumentih so menili, da zanje po uveljavljeni sodni praksi ne velja zaupna narava, ter jih skopirali in vključili v dokumentacijo. Komisija je po pregledu formalno zavrnila zahteve strank z odločbo.	[130] The parties claimed five documents to be legally privileged. Commission inspectors considered that for two of them no position could be taken on the spot and placed them in a sealed envelope, which was taken back to the Commission. The other three documents were considered not to be covered by legal privilege under established case law and were copied and placed in the file. After the inspection, the Commission formally rejected the parties’ claims by decision.
[131] Zadeve T-44/02 Dresdner Bank AG , T-54/02 Vereins und Westbank AG , T-56/02 Bayrische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG , T-60/02 Deutsche Verkehrsbank AG , T-61/02 Commerzbank AG , poročila še ni.	[131] Cases T-44/02 Dresdner Bank AG, T-54/02 Vereins und Westbank AG, T-56/02 Bayrische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG, T-60/02 Deutsche Verkehrsbank AG, T-61/02 Commerzbank AG, not yet reported.
[132] Odločba Komisije z dne 11. decembra 2001 v zadevi COMP/E–1/37.919 (ex 37.391) – Bančni stroški za menjavanje valut območja eura – Nemčija .	[132] Commission decision of 11 December 2001 in Case COMP/E–1/37.919 (ex 37.391) - Bank charges for exchanging euro-zone currencies – Germany.
[133] COMP/38.158 – Meca Medina in Majcen proti Mednarodnemu olimpijskemu komiteju , http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/index/by_nr_76.html#i38_158	[133] COMP/38.158 - Meca Medina and Majcen against the International Olympic Committee, http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/index/by_nr_76.html#i38_158
[134] Zadeva T-313/02 Meca Medina in Majcen proti Komisiji, http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62002A0313	[134] Case T-313/02 Meca Medina and Majcen v Commission, http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62002A0313
[135] Zadeva C-470/02.	[135] Case C-470/02.
[136] Zadeva T-185/00.	[136] Case T-185/00.
[137] Odločba Komisije z dne 1. maja 2000 v zadevi COMP/32.150 – EBU/Eurovision (UL L 151, 24.6.2000).	[137] Commission decision of 1 May 2000 in Case COMP/32.150 - EBU/Eurovision (OJ L 151, 24.6.2000).
[138] Zadevi T-201/04 (tožba) in T-201/04 R (začasni ukrepi).	[138] Cases T-201/04 (main action) and T-201/04 R (interim measures).
[139] Glej točko 36 zgoraj.	[139] See above point 36.
[140] Za dodatne informacije glede prvega leta uporabe teh novih določb glej Polje 6 o usklajenem sistemu napotitev.	[140] For further details on the first year of application of these new provisions see Box 6 on the streamlined referrals system.
[141] Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 z dne 20. januarja 2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij (UL L 24, 29.1.2004).	[141] Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004).
[142] Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 802/2004 z dne 7. aprila 2004 o izvajanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij (UL L 133, 30.4.2004).	[142] Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 133, 30.4.2004).
[143] Skupno število je en original in 35 izvodov obrazca CO.	[143] Bringing the total number to one original and 35 copies of the Form CO.
[144] Točka (d) je bila dodana h kategoriji primerov, primernih za priglasitev na kratkem obrazcu. Glej spodaj pod „Obvestilo o poenostavljenem postopku“.	[144] Point (d) has been added to the category of cases that qualify for Short Form notification. See below under “Notice on a simplified procedure”.
[145] Glej drugi pododstavek člena 6(1)(b); drugi pododstavek člena 8(1) in tretji pododstavek člena 8(2).	[145] See Article 6(1)(b), second subparagraph; Article 8(1), second subparagraph and (2), third subparagraph.
[146] Člen 2(3) nove uredbe o združitvah določa, da „koncentracija, ki bi bistveno ovirala učinkovito konkurenco, zlasti kot posledica ustvarjanja ali krepitve prevladujočega položaja, se razglasi za nezdružljivo s skupnim trgom“.	[146] Article 2(3) of the new Merger Regulation provides that “a concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market”.
[147] Indeks HHI ali Herfindahl-Hirschmanov indeks je mednarodno priznano merilo tržne koncentracije. Indeks HHI se izračuna s seštevanjem kvadratov posameznih tržnih deležev vseh podjetij na trgu. Indeks daje sorazmerno večjo težo tržnim deležem večjih podjetij, skladno z njihovim relativnim pomenom v procesu konkurence.	[147] The HHI, or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is an internationally recognised measure of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the firms in the market. The index gives proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms, in line with their relative importance in the competitive process.
[148] COMP/M.2978.	[148] COMP/M.2978.
[149] Glej Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2003.	[149] See the 2003 Competition Report.
[150] COMP/M.3333.	[150] COMP/M.3333.
[151] Glej člen 26(2) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004.	[151] See Article 26(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.
[152] Glej Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti, združeni zadevi C-68/94 in C-30/95 Francija proti Komisiji („ Kali in Salz “) [1998] PSES I-1375; Sodišče prve stopnje, zadeva T-102/96 Gencor proti Komisiji [1999] PSES II-753.	[152] See Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France v Commission (“Kali&Salz”) [1998] ECR I-1375; Court of First Instance, Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753.
[153] Zadeva T-342/99 Airtours proti Komisiji [2002] PSES II-2585.	[153] Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585.
[154] COMP/M.3099.	[154] COMP/M.3099.
[155] COMP/M.3431.	[155] COMP/M.3431.
[156] COMP/M.3436.	[156] COMP/M.3436.
[157] COMP/M.3440.	[157] COMP/M.3440.
[158] Plinska turbina s kombiniranim ciklom.	[158] Combined cycle gas turbine.
[159] COMP/M.1378.	[159] COMP/M.1378.
[160] COMP/M.3304.	[160] COMP/M.3304.
[161] COMP/M.3314.	[161] COMP/M.3314.
[162] COMP/M.3354.	[162] COMP/M.3354.
[163] COMP/M.3396.	[163] COMP/M.3396.
[164] COMP/M.3397.	[164] COMP/M.3397.
[165] COMP/M.3420.	[165] COMP/M.3420.
[166] COMP/M.3465.	[166] COMP/M.3465.
[167] COMP/M.3506.	[167] COMP/M.3506.
[168] COMP/M.3558.	[168] COMP/M.3558.
[169] Sodbe z dne 5. 11. 2002 v zadevah C-475, 471, 467, 469, 476, 472, 468 in 466/98 proti Avstriji, Belgiji, Danski, Finski, Nemčiji, Luksemburgu, Švedski in Združenemu kraljestvu.	[169] Judgments of 5.11.2002 in Cases C-475, 471, 467, 469, 476, 472, 468 and 466/98 against Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom, respectively.
[170] Glej predvsem sklepe Sveta za promet z dne 5. 6. 2003 in Uredbo (ES) št. 847/2004 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (UL L 195, 2.6.2004). Poleg tega je glede pravil konkurence Svet 26. 2. 2004 sprejel Uredbo (ES) št. 411/2004 o spremembi obstoječih uredb v sektorju zračnega prometa ter veljavnosti Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2004 za zračni promet med EU in tretjimi državami.	[170] See notably the conclusions of the Transport Council of 5.6.2003 and Regulation (EC) No 847/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 195, 2.6.2004). In addition, as regards competition rules, the Council adopted on 26.2.2004 Regulation (EC) No 411/2004 amending the existing Regulations in the air transport sector and making Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 applicable to air transport between the EU and third countries.
[171] Po mnenju Komisije iz odstavka 47 njenega sporočila o posledicah sodb Sodišča z dne 5. 11. 2002 za evropsko politiko zračnega prometa (COM/2002/0649 konč.), so letalske družbe, ki niso iz EU, predvsem tiste iz ZDA, precej večje od evropskih glede števila potnikov, števila vozlišč, ki jih upravljajo, in njihovih flot zrakoplovov. Zato bo potrebna konsolidacija, da bi bili sposobni globalno konkurirati tem letalskim družbam.	[171] According to the Commission in paragraph 47 of its communication on the consequences of the Court judgments of 5.11.2002 for European air transport policy (COM/2002/0649 final), non-EU airlines, particularly in the USA, are much bigger than their European counterparts in terms of passenger numbers, number of hubs they operate and their aircraft fleets. Consolidation would be therefore needed to be able to compete globally with these airlines.
[172] COMP/M 3280 – Air France/KLM . Ta sklep je pred Sodiščem prve stopnje izpodbijala tretja stranka (zadeva T-177/04).	[172] COMP/M 3280 – Air France/KLM. This decision has been challenged before the Court of First Instance by a third party (Case T-177/04).
[173] COMP/38.248 – Air France/Alitalia . Ta sklep je pred Sodiščem prve stopnje izpodbijala tretja stranka (zadeva T-300/04).	[173] COMP/38.248 – Air France/Alitalia. This decision has been challenged before the Court of First Instance by a third party (Case T-300/04).
[174] Uredbe (ES) št. 2407, 2408 in 2409/92.	[174] Regulations (EC) Nos 2407, 2408 and 2409/92.
[175] Med prejšnjimi odločbami o združitvah med prevozniki Skupnosti sta: Odločba z dne 5.10.1992 v zadevi IV/M.616 Air France/Sabena in Odločba z dne 11. 8. 1999 v zadevi COMP/JV.19 KLM/Alitalia .	[175] Some previous decisions on mergers between Community carriers are: decision of 5.10.1992 in Case IV/M.616 Air France/Sabena, and decision of 11.8.1999 in Case COMP/JV.19 KLM/Alitalia.
[176] Komisija je 5. 6. 2003 predlagala in bila od Sveta pooblaščena, da se skupaj z državami članicami pogaja o izčrpnem sporazumu o storitvah zračnega prometa z ZDA, in horizontalno pooblaščena za pogajanja s tretjimi državami na vseh področjih, ki spadajo pod izključno pristojnost Skupnosti. Komisija v zgoraj navedenem sporočilu z dne 5. 11. 2002 o posledicah sodb Sodišča na evropsko politiko zračnega prometa navaja, da „bodo pogajanja o klavzulah Skupnosti omogočila letalskim družbam Skupnosti, da razširijo svoje mednarodne operacije z letališč v drugih državah članicah, ter utrla pot večjemu gospodarskemu povezovanju med letalskimi družbami v različnih državah članicah“.	[176] On 5.6.2003, the Commission proposed and obtained from the Council a mandate to negotiate, together with the Member States, a comprehensive air services agreement with the US and a horizontal mandate for negotiations with third countries in all areas which fall under exclusive Community competence. The Commission states in the above-mentioned communication of 5.11.2002 on the consequences of the Court judgments for European air transport policy that “the negotiation of Community clauses will permit Community airlines to expand their international operations from airports in other Member States, as well as pave the way for greater commercial integration between airlines in different Member States”.
[177] Uvodna izjava 32 k Uredbi 4064/89.	[177] Recital 23 to Regulation 4064/89.
[178] Ta sporazum je bil v skladu z Uredbo 4064/89 priglašen 18. 12. 2003.	[178] This Agreement was notified under Regulation 4064/89 on 18.12.2003.
[179] Glej točko 37 odločbe v zadevi Air France/Alitalia .	[179] See point 37 of the Air France/Alitalia decision
[180] Glej sodbo Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen [1989] PSES 803; sodbo Sodišča prve stopnje v zadevi 2/93 Air France proti Komisiji ( TAT ) [1994] PSES 323; odločbo Komisije z dne 12. 1. 2001 v zadevi COMP/M.2041 – United Airlines/US Airways .	[180] See judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen [1989] ECR 803; judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case 2/93 Air France v Commission (TAT) [1994] ECR 323; Commission decision of 12.1.2001 in Case COMP/M.2041 - United Airlines/US Airways.
[181] Časovno občutljivi potniki imajo visoke oportunitetne stroške časa potovanja in so posledično manj pripravljeni menjati direktne lete za indirektne, niso prožni v smislu časa odhoda oziroma prihoda in potrebujejo možnost zamenjave svoje rezervacije na kratek rok.	[181] Time-sensitive passengers have a high opportunity cost of travel time, and as a result they are less willing to substitute non-stop for indirect flights, they are not flexible in terms of time of departure/arrival and they need to have the option of changing their reservation at short notice.
[182] V času sprejetja odločbe v zadevi AF/AZ (v skladu z Uredbo (ES) 3975/87) je imela Komisija izvršilna pooblastila le za zračne poti znotraj Skupnosti.	[182] At the time the AF/AZ decision was taken (under Regulation (EC) 3975/87) the Commission only had enforcement powers for intra-Community routes.
[183] Ta pristop je bil prvič uporabljen pri odločbi v zadevi United Airlines/US Airway .	[183] This approach was first taken in the United Airlines/US Airway decision.
[184] Kadar je uporaba odprodaje zapletena ali nemogoča, „sprememba strukture trga, ki je posledica predlagane koncentracije, lahko vodi do velikih ovir ali motenj za vstop na upoštevni trg. Takšne ovire lahko nastanejo nadzora nad infrastrukturo, zlasti omrežji ... V takšnih okoliščinah imajo protiukrepi lahko za cilj pospešitev vstopa na trg z zagotavljanjem, da bodo tekmeci imeli dostop do potrebne infrastrukture …“ Glej odstavek 28 sporočila Komisije o protiukrepih, sprejemljivih v skladu z Uredbo Sveta (EGA) št. 4064/89 in Uredbo Komisije (ES) št. 447/98 (UL C 68, 2.3.2001).	[184] Where the use of divestiture is difficult or impossible, “the change in the market structure resulting from a proposed concentration can lead to major barriers or impediments to entry into the relevant market. Such barriers might arise from control over infrastructure, in particular networks …. In such circumstances, remedies may aim at facilitating market entry by ensuring that competitors will have access to the necessary infrastructure …”. Cf. paragraph 28 of the Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 (OJ C 68, 2.3.2001).
[185] Glej sodbo v zadevi T-102/96 Gencor [1999] PSES II-753.	[185] See judgment in Case T-102/96 Gencor [1999] ECR II-753.
[186] COMP/M.3271.	[186] COMP/M.3271.
[187] COMP/M.3373.	[187] COMP/M.3373.
[188] COMP/M.3093.	[188] COMP/M.3093.
[189] COMP/M.3423.	[189] COMP/M.3423.
[190] Zadeva C-42/01 Portugalska republika proti Komisiji , poročila še ni.	[190] Case C-42/01 Portuguese Republic v Commission, not yet reported.
[191] Člen 21(3) Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 4064/89, zdaj člen 21(4) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004.	[191] Article 21(3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, now Article 21(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.
[192] COMP/M.2054.	[192] COMP/M.2054.
[193] Cilj Zakonskega odloka št. 380/93.	[193] Objective of Decree-Law No 380/93.
[194] Omeniti je treba, da je med postopkom Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti 4. junija 2002 izdalo sodbo v zadevi C-367/98. V tem sodnem postopku je Komisija na podlagi pravil notranjega trga med drugim izpodbijala portugalski zakon št. 11/90 (okvirni zakon o privatizaciji) in zakonski odlok št. 380/93 (predhodno dovoljenje). Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so portugalska pravila predvidevala očitno diskriminacijsko obravnavanje vlagateljev iz drugih držav članic, kar je imelo za posledico omejevanje prostega pretoka kapitala. Glede argumenta, ki je temeljil na potrebi po zaščiti finančnih interesov Portugalske republike, je Sodišče poudarilo, da po ustaljeni sodni praksi takšni ekonomski razlogi, predloženi v podporo postopka za predhodno dovoljenje, ne morejo biti utemeljitev za omejevanje prostega pretoka. S sprejetjem in ohranjanjem veljavnosti predvsem Zakona št. 11/90 in Zakonskega odloka št. 380/93 Portugalska republika ni izpolnila svojih obveznosti v skladu s členom 73b (zdaj členom 56) Pogodbe.	[194] It should be noted that, during the proceedings, on 4 June 2002, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Case C-367/98. In that action, the Commission challenged on the basis of internal market rules, inter alia, Portuguese Law No 11/90 (framework law on privatisation) as well as Decree Law No 380/93 (prior authorisation). The Court found that the Portuguese rules provided for a manifestly discriminatory treatment of investors from other Member States with the effect of restricting free movement of capital. As to the argument based on the need to safeguard the financial interests of the Portuguese Republic, the Court emphasised that it was settled case law that such economic grounds, put forward in support of a prior authorisation procedure, cannot serve as justification for restrictions on freedom of movement. By adopting and maintaining in force, in particular, Law No 11/90 and Decree Law No 380/93, the Portuguese Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 73b (now Article 56) of the Treaty.
[195] Zadeva T-310/00 MCI proti Komisiji , poročila še ni.	[195] Case T-310/00 MCI v Commission, not yet reported.
[196] COMP/M.1741.	[196] COMP/M.1741.
[197] Glej zgornji oddelek I.C.2.	[197] See above section I.C.3.
[198] Glej spodnjo točko 81.	[198] See above point 81.
[199] COMP/36.246.	[199] COMP/36.246.
[200] IP/04/573.	[200] IP/04/573.
[201] IP/03/1129.	[201] IP/03/1129.
[202] IP/01/1641.	[202] IP/01/1641.
[203] IP/03/547.	[203] IP/03/547.
[204] Odločba z dne 20. 2. 2004, C(2004)527 konč., na voljo na naslovu: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home	[204] Decision of 20.2.2004, C(2004)527 final, available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
[205] Odločba z dne 5.10.2004, C(2004)3682 konč., na voljo na naslovu: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home	[205] Decision of 5.10.2004, C(2004)3682 final, available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
[206] Odločba z dne 20.10.2004, C(2004)4070 konč., na voljo na naslovu: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home	[206] Decision of 20.10.2004, C(2004)4070 final, available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
[207] Sporočilo Komisije z dne 9. 2. 2004, „Poročilo o konkurenci na področju poklicnih storitev“, COM(2004) 83 konč.	[207] Communication COM(2004) 83 final of the Commission of 9.2.2004, “Report on Competition in Professional Services”.
[208] Sodba Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi C-309/99 Wouters [2002] PSES I-1577.	[208] Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577.
[209] http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/liberalization/conference/stocktaking_exercise_en.html	[209] http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/liberalization/conference/stocktaking_exercise_en.html
[210] Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 659/99 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES (UL L 83, 27.3.1999).	[210] Council Regulation (EC) No 659/99 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 83, 27.3.1999).
[211] Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 794/2004 z dne 21. aprila 2004 (UL L 140, 30.4.2004).	[211] Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 (OJ L 140, 30.4.2004).
[212] Spremembe, navedene v členu 4(2), so (a) povečanje proračuna potrjenega programa pomoči, ki je večje od 20 %, (b) podaljšanje obstoječega potrjenega programa pomoči do šest let ter (c) poostritev meril za uporabo potrjenega programa pomoči, zmanjšanje intenzivnosti ali zmanjšanje upravičenih stroškov. Poostritev meril je treba priglasiti (čeprav namerava povečati cilj zmanjšanja državne pomoči, ki je bil večkrat poudarjen na zasedanjih Evropskega sveta), ker lahko v posameznih primerih, čeprav bi lahko pripeljala do splošnega zmanjšanja državne pomoči, spremeni naravo zadevnega ukrepa pomoči in zmanjša spodbujevalni značaj pomoči.	[212] The changes specified in Article 4(2) are (a) increases in the budget of an authorised aid scheme exceeding 20%, (b) prolongation of an authorized scheme for up to six years and (c) the tightening of the criteria for the application of the scheme, a reduction of aid intensity or a reduction of eligible expenses. The tightening of criteria needs to be notified (although it tends to enhance the goal of a reduction of state aid reiterated by several European Councils), because even if it may lead to an overall decrease in state aid, it may in individual cases change the character of the aid measure in question and reduce the incentive character of the aid.
[213] Pogoji za varno in pravilno pošiljanje kot tako, vendar tudi za zaupno obravnavo poslanih informacij. Do konca leta je priprava elektronskih obrazcev že dobro potekala, v sredini leta 2005 pa je predvidena poskusna faza.	[213] Conditions for secure and correct transmission as such, but also for confidential treatment of the information transmitted. By the end of the year preparation of electronic forms was well under way, with a pilot phase envisaged for mid-2005.
[214] Pravila, ki dodajajo pojasnila za področje državnih pomoči, se nanašajo na Uredbo Sveta (EGS, Euratom) št. 1182/71 z dne 3. junija 1971.	[214] The rules adding clarifications for the state aid sector refer to Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1182/71 of 3 June 1971.
[215] Vračilo bi moralo ponovno vzpostaviti stanje, ki je obstajalo pred nezakonito pomočjo. Sporočilo Komisije z dne 8. maja 2003 pojasnjuje, da je učinek nezakonite pomoči prejemniku zagotoviti sredstva v razmerah, ki so podobne pogojem srednjeročnega brezobrestnega posojila.	[215] Recovery should restore the situation existing before the illegal aid. The Commission communication of 8 May 2003 makes clear that the effect of unlawful aid is to provide the recipient with funding on conditions similar to those of a medium-term non-interest-bearing loan.
[216] Sporočilo Komisije o obrestnih merah, ki jih je treba uporabiti pri vračilu nezakonito dodeljene pomoči (UL C 110, 8.5.2003).	[216] Commission communication on the interest rates to be applied when aid granted unlawfully is being recovered (OJ C 110, 8.5.2003).
[217] UL L 63, 28.2.2004.	[217] OJ L 63, 28.2.2004.
[218] UL C 45, 17.2.1996.	[218] OJ C 45, 17.2.1996.
[219] Priporočilo Komisije z dne 6. maja 2003 o opredelitvi mikro, majhnih in srednje velikih podjetij (UL L 124, 20.5.2003).	[219] Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003).
[220] Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 363/2004 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 68/2001 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES pri pomoči za usposabljanje (UL L 63, 28.2.2004).	[220] Commission Regulation (EC) No 363/2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid (OJ L 63, 28.2.2004).
[221] UL L 63, 28.2.2004.	[221] OJ L 63, 28.2.2004.
[222] UL L 124, 20.5.2003.	[222] OJ L 124, 20.5.2003.
[223] UL C 288, 9.10.1999.	[223] OJ C 288, 9.10.1999.
[224] Sporočilo Komisije – Smernice Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah (UL C 244, 1.10.2004).	[224] Communication from the Commission — Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (OJ C 244, 1.10.2004).
[225] Zagotavljanje pomoči za reševanje ali prestrukturiranje podjetjem v težavah je lahko na primer upravičeno s socialnih ali regionalno-političnih vidikov, s potrebo po upoštevanju koristne vloge, ki jo imajo majhna in srednje velika podjetja v gospodarstvu, ter izjemoma z željo po ohranitvi strukture konkurenčnega trga, ko bi lahko zakup podjetij pripeljal do monopola ali tesnega prevladujočega položaja. Na drugi strani ne bi bilo upravičeno podjetje umetno oživljati v sektorju z dolgoročnimi strukturnimi presežnimi zmogljivostmi ali kadar lahko preživi samo kot posledica ponavljajočih se državnih intervencij.	[225] The provision of rescue or restructuring aid to firms in difficulty may be justified, for instance, by social or regional policy considerations, by the need to take into account the beneficial role played by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the economy or, exceptionally, by the desirability of maintaining a competitive market structure when the demise of firms could lead to a monopoly or to a tight oligopolistic situation. On the other hand, it would not be justified to keep a firm artificially alive in a sector with long-term structural overcapacity or when it can only survive as a result of repeated state interventions.
[226] V skladu s smernicami iz leta 1999 sočasne dodelitev pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje niso bile mogoče, čeprav je taka možnost v nekaterih primerih zaželena, da se določeni ukrepi prestrukturiranja uvedejo v začetku procesa.	[226] Under the 1999 guidelines, simultaneous grants of rescue and restructuring aid were impossible, although such a possibility is desirable in some cases in order to introduce certain restructuring measures early on in the process.
[227] Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1177/2002 (UL L 172, 2.7.2002).	[227] Council Regulation (EC) No 1177/2002 (OJ L 172, 2.7.2002).
[228] Sklep Komisije 2002/818/ES z dne 8. oktobra 2002 na podlagi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 386/94 o trgovinski praksi, ki jo ohranja Koreja in ki negativno vpliva na trgovino s trgovskimi plovili (UL L 281, 19.10.2002).	[228] Commission Decision 2002/818/EC of 8 October 2002 under the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 386/94 concerning trade practices maintained by Korea affecting trade in commercial vessels (OJ L 281, 19.10.2002).
[229] Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 502/2004 z dne 11. marca 2004 (UL L 81, 19.3.2004).	[229] Council Regulation (EC) No 502/2004 of 11 March 2004 (OJ L 81, 19.3.2004).
[230] N 242/2004; odločba z dne 14. julija 2004, št. C(2004) 2832, še ni bilo objavljeno.	[230] N 242/2004; decision of 14.7.2004, No C(2004) 2832, not yet published.
[231] N 138/2004; odločba z dne 19. maja 2004, št. C(2004) 1808, še ni bilo objavljeno.	[231] N 138/2004; decision of 19.5.20004, No C(2004) 1808, not yet published.
[232] N 333/2004; odločba z dne 21. januarja 2004, št. C(2004) 4207, še ni bilo objavljeno.	[232] N 333/2004; decision of 21.1.2004, No C(2004) 4207, not yet published.
[233] N 59/2004; odločba z dne 19. maja 2004, št. C(2004) 1807, še ni bilo objavljeno.	[233] N 59/2004; decision of 19.5.2004, No C(2004) 1807, not yet published.
[234] UL L 352, 28.10.2004.	[234] OJ L 352, 28.10.2004.
[235] N 145/2004.	[235] N 145/2004.
[236] N 33/A/2004.	[236] N 33/A/2004.
[237] C 50/02 (ex N 371/2001).	[237] C 50/02 (ex N 371/2001).
[238] NN 154/2003.	[238] NN 154/2003.
[239] Za podrobnejše informacije glej spodaj pod „Primeri“.	[239] For details see below under “Cases”.
[240] NN 151/2002 (ex N 113/B/2001).	[240] NN 151/2002 (ex N 113/B/2001).
[241] Za podrobnejše informacije glej spodaj pod „Primeri“.	[241] For details see below under “Cases”.
[242] Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1/2004 z dne 23. decembra 2003 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč malim in srednje velikim podjetjem, ki se ukvarjajo s proizvodnjo, predelavo in trženjem kmetijskih proizvodov (UL L 1, 3.1.2004).	[242] Commission Regulation (EC) No 1/2004 of 23 December 2003 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to state aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production, processing and marketing of agricultural products (OJ L 1, 3.1.2004).
[243] Glej: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/stateaid/exemption/index_en.htm	[243] See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/stateaid/exemption/index_en.htm
[244] NN 34/A/2000 Programi kakovosti in oznaki kakovosti AMA Biosiegel in AMA Gütesiegel – Avstrija, N 195/2003 Oglaševanje kakovostnega govejega in ovčjega mesa MLC in NN 196/2003 MLC Oglaševanje kakovostnega svinjskega mesa MLC – Združeno kraljestvo.	[244] NN 34/A/2000 Quality programmes and quality labels AMA Biosiegel and AMA Gütesiegel - Austria, N 195/2003 MLC quality beef and sheepmeat advertising and NN 196/2003 MLC quality pigmeat advertising - United Kingdom.
[245] N 571/02 Zakonodaja o promocijskem skladu CMA – Nemčija.	[245] N 571/02 CMA promotion fund law – Germany.
[246] N 195/2003 Oglaševanje kakovostnega govejega in ovčjega mesa MLC in primer N 196/2003 Oglaševanje kakovostnega svinjskega mesa MLC – Združeno kraljestvo.	[246] N 195/2003 MLC quality beef and sheepmeat advertising and Case N 196/2003 MLC quality pigmeat advertising - United Kingdom.
[247] N 175/03 Program oglaševanja generičnega mesa Komisije za meso in živino – Združeno kraljestvo in C 78/2003 (prej NN 36/98, prej N 610/97) Oglaševanje sicilijanskih proizvodov (Člen 4 regionalnega zakona 27/1997) – Italija (Sicilija).	[247] N 175/03 Meat and Livestock Commission generic meat advertising scheme - UK and C 78/2003 (ex NN 36/98, ex N 610/97) Advertising of Sicilian products (Article 4 Regional Law 27/1997) - Italy (Sicily).
[248] Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1595/2004 z dne 8. decembra 2004 o uporabi členov 87 in 88 Pogodbe ES za državno pomoč malim in srednje velikim podjetjem za proizvodnjo, predelavo in trženje ribiških proizvodov (UL L 291, 14.9.2004).	[248] Commission Regulation (EC) No 1595/2004 of 8 September 2004 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to state aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production, processing and marketing of fisheries products (OJ L 291, 14.9.2004).
[249] UL C 229, 14.9.2004.	[249] OJ C 229, 14.9.2004.
[250] UL C 13, 17.1.2004.	[250] OJ C 13, 17.1.2004.
[251] Zadeva C-280/00. Glej točko 621 in naslednje točke Poročila o konkurenci za leto 2003.	[251] Case C-280/00. See points 621 et seq. of the 2003 Competition Report.
[252] Direktiva 80/723/EGS, kakor je bila nazadnje spremenjena z Direktivo 2000/52/ES (UL L 193, 29.7.2000).	[252] Directive 80/723/EEC, as last amended by Directive 2000/52/EC (OJ L 193, 29.7.2000).
[253] Glej http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/.	[253] See http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/
[254] Statistični pregled nadomešča raziskave državnih pomoči, ki so se prenehale izvajati po deveti raziskavi leta 2001. Spletni statistični pregled, ki je na voljo na spletni strani GD za konkurenco, vsebuje sklop ključnih kazalcev in statističnih tabel poleg informacij, navedenih v tiskani obliki.	[254] The scoreboard replaces the state aid surveys, which were discontinued after the ninth survey in 2001. The online scoreboard available on DG Competition's website includes a series of key indicators and statistical tables in addition to the information provided in the paper version.
[255] http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/analytical_section.html. Na voljo sta francoska in nemška različica povzetka. Glej tudi sporočilo za javnost IP/04/1356.	[255] http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/analytical_section.html. French and German versions of the executive summary are available. See also press release IP/04/1356.
[256] N 567/2003.	[256] N 567/2003.
[257] C 39/1996 (ex NN 127/92); pozitivna odločba: 20.4.2004.	[257] C 39/1996 (ex NN 127/92); positive decision: 20.4.2004.
[258] NN 42/2004; odločba: 20.7.2004.	[258] NN 42/2004; decision: 20.7.2004.
[259] N 490/2000.	[259] N 490/2000.
[260] N 161/04.	[260] N 161/04.
[261] SG(2001) D/290869, 6.8.2001.	[261] SG(2001) D/290869, 6.8.2001.
[262] C 58/2003, odločba z dne 7.7.2004, C(2004)2352.	[262] C 58/2003, decision of 7.7.2004, C(2004)2352.
[263] C 5/2003.	[263] C 5/2003.
[264] UL C 80, 3.4.2003; glej tudi UL C 210, 5.9.2003.	[264] OJ C 80, 3.4.2003; see also OJ C 210, 5.9.2003.
[265] Še ni bilo objavljeno.	[265] Not yet published.
[266] C 28/2002, uvedba postopka UL C 141, 14.6.2002.	[266] C 28/2002, opening of procedure OJ C 141, 14.6.2002.
[267] To vključuje, prvič, 1,8 milijarde EUR dokapitalizacije dežele Berlin leta 2001, drugič, zagotovitev jamstev za zaščito družbe BGB pred tveganji starejših poslov nepremičninskih storitev s tržno vrednostjo 6,1 milijarde EUR (teoretični najvišji znesek nominalnih 21,6 milijarde EUR temelji na zakonskih določbah in nadzornih predpisih, vendar je po pesimističnih predvidevanjih nestvaren) ter, tretjič, sporazum o povračilu med deželo Berlin in družbo BGB v zvezi z morebitno odredbo o vračilu do največ 1,8 milijarde EUR po odločbi Komisije o tedaj še nerešenem postopku v zvezi s kapitalskim transferjem banki Landesbank Berlin, ki je od leta 1994 del skupine BGB ter sestavlja del skupine C48/2002 (Komisija je 20. oktobra 2004 sklenila, da mora Nemčija vrniti pomoč v znesku 810 milijonov EUR; glej str. … tega poročila).	[267] This includes, first, EUR 1.8 billion capital injected by the Land of Berlin in 2001, second, the provision of the guarantees to cover BGB’s risks from the old real-estate services business with an economic value of EUR 6.1 billion (the theoretical maximum amount of nominally EUR 21.6 billion is based on legal provisions and supervisory rules but is unrealistic under pessimistic assumptions) and third, a repayment agreement between the Land of Berlin and BGB regarding a potential recovery order up to EUR 1.8 billion following a Commission decision on the then still open proceeding concerning a capital transfer to Landesbank Berlin, part of the BGB group since 1994, forming part of the group C48/2002 (on 20.10.2004, the Commission decided that an aid amount of EUR 810 million had to be recovered from Germany; see p. 454 ss of this Report).
[268] Crédit Lyonnais , UL L 221, 8.8.1998.	[268] Crédit Lyonnais, OJ L 221, 8.8.1998.
[269] Glej Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2003, točko 526 in naslednje točke.	[269] See 2003 Competition Report , points 526 et seq.
[270] Odločba z dne 2.8.2004, C/13/B/2004.	[270] Decision of 2.8.2004, C/13/B/2004.
[271] Zadeva 173/73 Italija proti Komisiji [1974] ECR 709.	[271] Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709.
[272] Odločba z dne 2.8.2004, C/13/A/2004.	[272] Decision of 2.8.2004, C/13/A/2004.
[273] C 10/04 (ex N 94/04).	[273] C 10/04 (ex N 94/04).
[274] NN 37/04 (ex N 106/04), odločba z dne 8.9.2004.	[274] NN 37/04 (ex N 106/04), decision of 8.9.2004.
[275] C 40/00.	[275] C 40/00.
[276] C 66/03.	[276] C 66/03.
[277] NN 20/2004 (ex N 25/2004), odločba z dne 12.8.2004.	[277] C 20/2004 (ex NN 25/2004), decision of 12.8.2004.
[278] C 55/2002 (ex NN 53/2002), Pomoč za popravilo ladij SORENI, Le Havre , odločba z dne 20.4.2004; C 34/2003 (ex N 728/2002), Pomoč za popravilo ladij CMR, Marseille , odločba z dne 22.9..2004.	[278] C 55/2002 (ex NN 53/2002), Aid to ship repair SORENI, Le Havre, decision of 20.4.2004; C 34/2003 (ex N 728/2002), Aid to ship repair CMR, Marseille, decision of 22.9.2004.
[279] UL C 288, 9.10.1999.	[279] OJ C 288, 9.10.1999.
[280] N 811/a/2002 in N 20/2004.	[280] N 811/a/2002 and N 20/2004.
[281] C 16/04 Spremembe investicijskega programa grških ladjedelnic (UL C 202, 10.8.2004).	[281] C 16/04 Amendments to Hellenic Shipyards’ investment plan (OJ C 202, 10.8.2004).
[282] Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1013/97 z dne 2. junija 1997 o pomoči za nekatere ladjedelnice v fazi prestrukturiranja (UL L 148, 6.6.1997).	[282] Council Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 of 2 June 1997 on aid to certain shipyards under restructuring (OJ L 148, 6.6.1997).
[283] Člen 6(1) Direktive Sveta 90/684/EGS z dne 21. decembra 1990 o pomoči ladjedelništvu (UL L 380, 31.12.1990).	[283] Article 6(1) of Council Directive 90/684/EEC of 21 December 1990 on aid to shipbuilding (OJ L 380, 31.12.1990).
[284] Člen 11(1).	[284] Article 11(1).
[285] C 40/02.	[285] C 40/02.
[286] C 40/02 (ex N 513/01) Pomoč grškim ladjedelnicam (UL C 186, 6.8.2002).	[286] C 40/02 (ex N 513/01) Aid to Hellenic Shipyards (OJ C 186, 6.8.2002).
[287] UL L 202, 18.7.1998.	[287] OJ L 202, 18.7.1998.
[288] C(2004)3932, trenutna št. C 35-2004.	[288] C(2004)3932, current No C 35-2004.
[289] http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/aid3.html#DIII. Uvedba uradnega postopka ne vpliva na končni rezultat preiskave.	[289] http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/aid3.html#DIII. The opening of formal proceedings does not prejudge the final outcome of an investigation.
[290] V oklepajih so datumi kapitalskega transferja.	[290] In brackets, dates of capital transfer.
[291] C 95/2001 (ex CP 38/2001 – ex NN 71/2001), odločba z dne 14.7.2004.	[291] C 95/2001 (ex CP 38/2001 – ex NN 71/2001), decision of 14.7.2004.
[292] N 203/2004 Volvo Lastvagnar AB , odločba z dne 8.9.2004.	[292] N 203/2004 Volvo Lastvagnar AB, decision of 8.9.2004.
[293] UL C 279, 15.9.1997.	[293] OJ C 279, 15.9.1997.
[294] UL C 258, 9.9.2000.	[294] OJ C 258, 9.9.2000.
[295] UL C 70, 19.3.2002, kakor je bil spremenjen s Sporočilom Komisije o spremembi Večsektorskega okvira o regionalni pomoči za večje investicijske projekte (2002) v zvezi z oblikovanjem seznama sektorjev, ki se srečujejo s strukturnimi težavami, in o predlogu ustreznih ukrepov v skladu s členom 88(1) Pogodbe ES v zvezi s sektorjem motornih vozil in sektorjem sintetičnih vlaken (UL C 263, 1.11.2003).	[295] OJ C 70, 19.3.2002, as amended by the Commission communication on the modification of the Multisectoral Framework on regional aid for large investment projects (2002) with regard to the establishment of a list of sectors facing structural problems and on a proposal of appropriate measures pursuant to Article 88 paragraph 1 of the EC Treaty, concerning the motor vehicle sector and the synthetic fibres sector (OJ C 263, 1.11.2003).
[296] N 283/2004.	[296] N 283/2004.
[297] N 177/2004.	[297] N 177/2004.
[298] UL C 74, 10.3.1998.	[298] OJ C 74, 10.3.1998.
[299] N 147/2004.	[299] N 147/2004.
[300] UL L 10, 13.1.2001.	[300] OJ L 10, 13.1.2001.
[301] C 72/2003 (ex N 134/2003).	[301] C 72/2003 (ex-N 134/2003).
[302] UL C 235, 21.8.2001.	[302] OJ C 235, 21.8.2001.
[303] C 57/2003 (ex NN 58/2003).	[303] C 57/2003 (ex-NN 58/2003).
[304] NN 136/03.	[304] NN 136/03.
[305] Sodba z dne 15. 7. 2004 v zadevi C-345/02 Pearle BV, Hans Prijs Optiek Franchise BV in Rinck Opticiëns BV proti Hoofdbedrijfschap Ambachten , poročila še ni.	[305] Judgment of 15.7.2004 in Case C-345/02 Pearle BV, Hans Prijs Optiek Franchise BV and Rinck Opticiëns BV v Hoofdbedrijfschap Ambachten, not yet reported.
[306] N 330/2004.	[306] N 330/2004.
[307] Izjema v skladu s členom 39 CA francoskega splošnega davčnega zakonika (CGI) je bila uvedena s členom 77 Zakona št. 98-546 z dne 2. julija 1998, ki določa amortizacijski sistem v korist nekaterih podjetij, ki jih odobri minister za proračun.	[307] Exemption under Article 39 CA of the CGI was introduced by Article 77 of Law No 98-546 of 2 July 1998, which sets up a depreciation system for the benefit of certain companies approved by the Minister for the Budget.
[308] C 12/2004.	[308] C 12/2004.
[309] N 42/2004.	[309] N 42/2004.
[310] C 40/2004.	[310] C 40/2004.
[311] Okvir Skupnosti za državno pomoč za raziskave in razvoj, objavljen v UL C 45, 17.2.1996 (v nadaljevanju: „okvir“, kakor je bil nazadnje potrjen in razširjen s Sporočilom Komisije 2002/C111/03 (UL C 111, 8.5.2002).	[311] Community framework for state aid for research and development, published in OJ C 45, 17.2.1996 (hereinafter also referred to as "the framework"), as last validated and extended by Commission communication 2002/C111/03 (OJ C 111, 8.5.2002).
[312] Priglašeno aprila 2004 kot N184a-184b/2004.	[312] Notified in April 2004 as N184a-184b/2004.
[313] Skupino visokih predstavnikov za tehnologije vodika in gorivnih celic sta oktobra 2002 ustanovila podpredsednik Evropske komisije, Loyola de Palacio, komisar za energetiko in promet, in Philippe Busquin, komisar za raziskave. Skupina je bila povabljena, da oblikuje skupno vizijo o prispevku, ki bi ga vodik in gorivne celice lahko imeli pri uresničevanju trajnostnih energetskih sistemov v prihodnosti. Sestavljena je iz 10 delničarjev, ki zastopajo raziskovalno skupnost, industrijo, javne organe in končne uporabnike.	[313] The High Level Group for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Technologies was set up in October 2002 by the Vice-President of the European Commission, Loyola de Palacio, Commissioner for Energy and Transport, and Mr Philippe Busquin, Commissioner for Research. The Group was invited to formulate a collective vision on the contribution that hydrogen and fuel cells could make to the realization of sustainable energy systems in the future. It is composed of 19 stakeholders representing the research community, industry, public authorities and end-users.
[314] N 214/2004.	[314] N 214/2004.
[315] N 315/2004.	[315] N 315/2004.
[316] C 31/2004 (ex NN 53/2004).	[316] C 31/2004 (ex NN 53/2004).
[317] Intenzivnost pomoči je v skladu s smernicami o pomoči za zaščito okolja (UL C 37, 3.2.2001), ki pa ne zajema pomoči za povečanje varnosti državljanov.	[317] This aid intensity is in line with the guidelines on aid for the protection of the environment (OJ C 37, 3.2.2001), which, however, does not cover aid to increase the safety of citizens.
[318] N 304/03.	[318] N 304/03.
[319] N 598/03.	[319] N 598/03.
[320] C 67/03, C 68/03 in C 69/03.	[320] C 67/03, C 68/03 and C 69/03.
[321] C 73/03.	[321] C 73/03.
[322] UL C 37, 3.2.2001.	[322] OJ C 37, 3.2.2001.
[323] UL L 275, 25.10.2003.	[323] OJ L 275, 25.10.2003.
[324] Komisija je 7. julija odločala o nacionalnih načrtih razdelitve pravic za Dansko, Irsko, Nizozemsko, Slovenijo in Švedsko; 20. oktobra je sprejela odločitve o nacionalnih načrtih razdelitve pravic za Belgijo, Estonijo, Latvijo, Luksemburg, Slovaško in Portugalsko; konec decembra so bile sprejete odločitve o nacionalnih načrtih razdelitve pravic za Ciper, Madžarsko, Litvo, Malto in Španijo. Sporočila o teh odločbah so na voljo na naslovu http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l28012.htm. Odločbe so na voljo na naslovu http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm.	[324] On 7 July, the Commission decided on the NAPs of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden; on 20 October, decisions were taken on the NAPs of Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Slovak Republic and Portugal; in late December, decisions were taken on the NAPs of Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta and Spain. The communications regarding these decisions are accessible at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l28012.htm. The decisions are accessible at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm
[325] CZ 49/2003, C-27/2004, odločba z dne 14.7.2004.	[325] CZ 49/2003, C-27/2004, decision of 14.7.2004.
[326] HU 11/2003, C-35/2004, odločba z dne 20.10.2004.	[326] HU 11/2003, C-35/2004, decision of 20.10.2004.
[327] SK 5/04.	[327] SK 5/04.
[328] NN 62/2004.	[328] NN 62/2004.
[329] Uredba Sveta št. 1540/98 (UL L 202, 18.7.1998).	[329] Council Regulation No 1540/98 (OJ L 202, 18.7.1998).
[330] N 347/03.	[330] N 347/03.
[331] C6/2000 z dne 25.10.2004, C(2004)3910/2.	[331] C6/2000 of 25.10.2004, C(2004)3910/2.
[332] NN 56/2003.	[332] NN 56/2003.
[333] C 27/2001 (ex NN 2/2001).	[333] C 27/2001 (ex NN 2/2001).
[334] N 515/2003.	[334] N 515/2003.
[335] NN 154/2003.	[335] NN 154/2003.
[336] C-49/2002 (ex NN 49/2002).	[336] C-49/2002 (ex NN 49/2002).
[337] Komisija je priznala, da je Francija s tem, ko je prihodke od davka dodelila v splošni proračun, odpravila diskriminacijsko obdavčenje, in je zaključila postopek za ugotavljanje kršitev.	[337] The Commission recognised that by allocating the revenue from the tax to the general budget France had put an end to the discriminatory taxation, and closed the infringment proceedings.
[338] C 9/A/2003 – Nemčija (Bavarska).	[338] C 9/A/2003 - Germany (Bavaria).
[339] C 9/B/2003 – Nemčija (Bavarska).	[339] C 9/B/2003 - Germany (Bavaria).
[340] N 249/2003.	[340] N 249/2003.
[341] N 384/2003 – UL C 56, 4.3.2004.	[341] N 384/2003 - OJ C 56, 4.3.2004.
[342] C 5/2001 (ex N 775/2000) – Italija (Sardinija).	[342] C 5/2001 (ex N 775/2000) - Italy (Sardinia).
[343] C 59/2001 (ex N 797/1999).	[343] C 59/2001 (ex N 797/1999).
[344] N 75/2004 – Italija (Lombardija).	[344] N 75/2004 – Italy (Lombardy).
[345] N 536/2003 – Italija (Kampanija).	[345] N 536/2003 - Italy (Campania).
[346] NN 151/2002 (ex N 113/B/2001).	[346] NN 151/2002 (ex N 113/B/2001).
[347] N 429/2003.	[347] N 429/2003.
[348] N 431/2003.	[348] N 431/2003.
[349] UL L 205, 2.8.2002.	[349] OJ L 205, 2.8.2002.
[350] UL C 182, 15.7.2004.	[350] OJ C 182, 15.7.2004.
[351] N 493/2003 – Nemčija – Državna pomoč za premogovništvo za leto 2004 . Odločba z dne 19.5.2003.	[351] N 493/2003 - Germany – State aid for the coal industry for 2004. Decision of 19.5.2003.
[352] N 170/2004 – Nemčija – Smernice o sredstvih za gradnjo, podaljšanje in reaktivacijo zasebnih železniških industrijskih tirov . Odločba z dne 6.10.2004.	[352] N 170/2004 – Germany – Guidelines on funding for the construction, extension and reactivation of private railway sidings. Decision of 6.10.2004.
[353] N 335/03 – Italija – Pomoč za vzpostavitev storitev potujočih avtocest . Odločba z dne 3.3.2004.	[353] N 335/03 - Italy – Aid for the setting up of rolling-motorways services. Decision of 3.3.2004.
[354] N 551/2003 – Italija – Pomoč za spodbujanje tovornega prometa s kombiniranim prevozom (cestni prevoz/prevoz po morju na kratkih razdaljah) . Odločba z dne 6.10.2004.	[354] N 551/2003 - Italy – Aid to promote freight transport through combined transport (road/short sea shipping). Decision of 6.10.2004.
[355] N 206/2003 – UK – Subvencija za prevoz tovora po vodi . Odločba z dne 20.4.2004.	[355] N 206/2003- UK - Waterborne Freight Grant. Decision of 20.4.2004.
[356] N 649/2001 – ZK – Subvencija za tovorne zmogljivosti . Odločba z dne 20.12.2001.	[356] N 649/2001 - UK - Freight Facilities Grant. Decision of 20.12.2001.
[357] N 88/04 – Belgija – Pomoč za sektor celinskih plovnih poti za ravnanje z zabojniki v pristanišču Antwerpen. Odločba z dne 14.7.2004.	[357] N 88/04- Belgium – Aid to the inland waterway sector for the handling of containers in the Port of Antwerp. Decision of 14.7.2004.
[358] Avtocesta okoli Antwerpna ima štiri pasove v vsako smer. V času del bo število pasov zmanjšano na dva v vsako smer.	[358] The motorway around Antwerp consists of four lanes in each direction. During the works, the number of lanes will be reduced to two in each direction.
[359] N 90/2004 – Danska – Filtri za delce na tovornjakih . Odločba z dne 20.7.2004.	[359] N 90/2004 - Denmark – Particulate filters on lorries. Decision of 20.7.2004.
[360] C 32/2003 – Francija – Sernam 2 – Pregled pomoči za prestrukturiranje . Odločba z dne 20.10.2004.	[360] C 32/2003 - France - Sernam 2 – Review of restructuring aid. Decision of 20.10.2004.
[361] C 54/2003 – Nemčija.	[361] C 54/2003 - Germany.
[362] N 38/2004 – Francija – Pomoč za prevoznike blaga po celinskih plovnih poteh s sedežem v Franciji . Odločba z dne 8.9.2004; N 4/2004 – Belgija – Program pomoči za Valonsko regijo za prevoz po celinskih plovnih poteh 2004–2007 . Odločba z dne 16.6.2004.	[362] N 38/2004 – France - Aid to inland waterway goods carriers established in France. Decision of 8.9.2004; N 4/2004 – Belgium – Walloon Region aid scheme for inland waterway transport 2004-2007. Decision of 16.6.2004.
[363] N 599/2003 – Nadaljevanje v letu 2004 in 2005 programa za znižanje prispevkov delodajalcev za socialno varnost v sektorju obalne plovbe . Odločba z dne 3.2.2004; N 45/2004 – Razširitev mednarodnega registra pomorskega prometa in s tem pravil v zvezi s tem registrom na nekatere dejavnosti obalne plovbe. Odločba z dne 14.7.2004.	[363] N 599/2003 - Continuation in 2004 and 2005 of a scheme to reduce employers’ social security contributions in the coastal shipping sector. Decision of 3.2.2004; N 45/2004 - Extension of the international shipping register, and therefore of the rules relating to that register, to certain coastal shipping activities. Decision of 14.7.2004.
[364] NN 19/2004 – Program za pavšalno znižanje prispevkov pomorščakov za socialno varnost . Odločba z dne 22.9.2004; N 376/2004, odločba z dne 16.11.2004.	[364] NN 19/2004 – Scheme providing for a flat-rate reduction in seafarers’ social security contributions. Decision of 22.9.2004; N 376/2004, decision of 16.11.2004.
[365] N 171/2004 – Tehnična prilagoditev sistema pavšalnega obdavčenja na podlagi tonaže . Odločba z dne 1.12.2004.	[365] N 171/2004 – Technical adjustment to the tonnage-based flat-rate tax scheme approved in 2002. Decision of 1.12.2004.
[366] N 70/04 – Nadaljevanje obstoječega programa za mednarodni register pomorskega prometa in razširitev njegovega področja uporabe na potniška plovila, ki plujejo med Finsko in drugimi državami članicami . Odločba z dne 1.12.2004.	[366] N 70/04 - Continuation of the existing scheme for the international shipping register and extension of its scope to passenger vessels plying between Finland and other Member States. Decision of 1.12.2004.
[367] N 114/2004.	[367] N 114/2004.
[368] C 64/1999 – Italija – Skupina Tirrenia . Odločba z dne 16.3.2004.	[368] C 64/1999 - Italy - Tirrenia group. Decision of 16.3.2004.
[369] Dokončna odločba še ni bila objavljena.	[369] Final decision not yet published.
[370] C 20/2003, UL C 145, 21.6.2003.	[370] C 20/2003, OJ C 145, 21.6.2003.
[371] C 65/200, UL L 196, 25.7.2002.	[371] C 65/200, OJ L 196, 25.7.2002.
[372] C 76/2002 – Belgija – Letališče Charleroi – Ryanair . Odločba z dne 12.2.2004.	[372] C 76/2002 - Belgium - Charleroi Airport – Ryanair. Decision of 12.2.2004.
[373] UL C 192, 28.7.2004.	[373] OJ C 192, 28.7.2004.
[374] N 297/2004 – Italija – Nujni ukrepi za prestrukturiranje in obnovitev družbe Alitalia . Odločba z dne 20.7.2004.	[374] N 297/2004 - Italy – Urgent measures for the restructuring and recovery of Alitalia. Decision of 20.7.2004.
[375] NN 63/2004 – Portugalska – Reprivatizacija SPDH (TAP).	[375] NN 63/2004 - Portugal - Reprivatisation of SPDH (TAP).
[376] Glej oddelek 4.5 Poročila o konkurenci za leto 2003 in zadevo C 62/99.	[376] See section 4.5 of the 2003 Competition Report and Case C 62/99.
[377] CP 114/04 RTP .	[377] CP 114/04 RTP.
[378] E 10/2005 (ex CP 660/1999).	[378] E 10/2005 (ex CP 660/1999).
[379] C 2/2003.	[379] C 2/2003.
[380] C 2/2004.	[380] C 2/2004.
[381] UL C 320, 15.11.2001.	[381] OJ C 320, 15.11.2001.
[382] Glej poglavje 4.5 Poročila o konkurenci za leto 2003.	[382] See Chapter 4.5 of the 2003 Competition Report.
[383] C 25/04 (ex NN 36/04).	[383] C 25/04 (ex NN 36/04).
[384] UL C 238, 25.9.2004.	[384] OJ C 238, 25.9.2004.
[385] Odločbe N213/2003 – Projekt Atlas – Program širokopasovne infrastrukture za poslovne parke , 9.9.2004; N307/2004 – Širokopasovne storitve na Škotskem – oddaljena in podeželska območja ; N199/2004 – Poslovni sklad za širokopasovne storitve ; N381/04 – Projekt omrežja za visoke hitrosti v Pyrenées-Atlantiques , 16.11.2004; Širokopasovne storitve za MSP v Lincolnshiru – povezava podeželskih podjetij , 15.12.2004.	[385] Decisions N213/2003 - Project Atlas - Broadband infrastructure scheme for business parks, 9.9.2004; N307/2004 - Broadband in Scotland – Remote and rural areas; N199/2004 - Broadband Business Fund; N381/04 - High-speed network project in the Pyrenées-Atlantiques, 16.11.2004; Broadband for SMEs in Lincolnshire - Connecting Rural Businesses, 15.12.2004.
[386] Delovni dokument osebja Komisije „Smernice o kriterijih in načinih implementacije strukturnih skladov za podporo elektronskih komunikacij“, 28.7.2003, SEC(2003) 895.	[386] Commission staff working paper, “Guidelines on criteria and modalities of implementation of structural funds in support of electronic communications”, 28.7.2003, SEC(2003) 895.
[387] Sodba v zadevi C-280/00 Altmark Trans in Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] PSES I-7747.	[387] Judgment in Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747.
[388] Sporočilo Komisije Svetu, Evropskemu parlamentu, Ekonomsko-socialnemu odboru in Odboru regij o nekaterih pravnih vidikih v zvezi s kinematografskimi in drugimi avdiovizualnimi deli (COM(2001)534 konč., 26.9.2001 (UL C 43, 16.2.2002)). Sporočilo Komisije Svetu, Evropskemu parlamentu, Ekonomsko-socialnemu odboru in Odboru regij o nekaterih pravnih vidikih v zvezi s kinematografskimi in drugimi avdiovizualnimi deli z dne 26.9.2001 (COM(2004)171 konč., 16.3.2004 (OJ C 123, 30.4.2004)).	[388] Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic and other audiovisual works (COM(2001)534 final, 26.9.2001 (OJ C 43, 16.2.2002)). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic and other audiovisual works of 26.9.2001 (COM(2004)171 final, 16.3.2004 (OJ C 123, 30.4.2004)).
[389] N 41/04.	[389] N 41/04.
[390] N 224/04, http:/europa.eu.int/comm./secretariat_general/sgb/state_aids/comp-2004/n224-04-fr.pdf	[390] N 224/04, http:/europa.eu.int/comm./secretariat_general/sgb/state_aids/comp-2004/n224-04-fr.pdf
[391] UL L 140, 30.4.2004.	[391] OJ L 140, 30.4.2004.
[392] Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena 93 Pogodbe ES (UL L 83, 27.3.1999).	[392] Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 83, 27.3.1999).
[393] Razmeroma veliko število nemških primerov vračila je v določeni meri mogoče pripisati prehodnim težavam po združitvi Nemčije. Kar zadeva španske primere vračila, se jih več kot polovica nanaša na ukrepe davčne pomoči v Baskiji.	[393] The relatively high number of German recovery cases can be attributed to some extent to the transitional problems following German unification. As regards the Spanish recovery cases, more than half relate to tax aid measures in the Basque Country.
[394] 28 milijard EUR za petnajst starih držav članic, brez pomoči v kmetijstvu, ribištvu, prometu in premogovništvu.	[394] EUR 28 billion for the fifteen old Member States and excluding aid in the agricultural, fisheries, transport and coal-mining sectors.
[395] Zadeve C64/1997 (Westdeutsche Landesbank), C48/2002 (Landesbank Berlin), C69/2002 (Norddeutsche Landesbank), C70/2002 (Bayerische Landesbank), C71/2002 (Hamburgische Landesbank), C72/2002 (Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein), C73/2002 (Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen), odločbe z dne 20.10.2004.	[395] Cases C64/1997 (Westdeutsche Landesbank), C48/2002 (Landesbank Berlin), C69/2002 (Norddeutsche Landesbank), C70/2002 (Bayerische Landesbank), C71/2002 (Hamburgische Landesbank), C72/2002 (Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein), C73/2002 (Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen), Decisions of 20.10.2004.
[396] C13B/2003, odločba z dne 2.8.2004.	[396] C13B/2003, decision of 2.8.2004.
[397] C68/2002, odločba z dne 16.12.2003.	[397] C68/2002, decision of 16.12.2003.
[398] C88/1997, Zadeva SES C-337/04.	[398] C88/1997, ECJ Case C-337/04.
[399] C38/1998, odločba z dne 6.10.2004.	[399] C38/1998, decision of 6.10.2004.
[400] C03/1999, odločba z dne 13.10.2004.	[400] C03/1999, decision of 13.10.2004.
[401] C38/1998 (UL L 12, 15.1.2002).	[401] C38/1998 (OJ L 12, 15.1.2002).
[402] Odločba z dne 6.10.2004, še ni bilo objavljeno v Uradnem listu .	[402] Decision of 6.10.2004, not yet published in the Official Journal.
[403] Zadevi Sodišča prve stopnje T-366/00 in T-369/00.	[403] CFI Cases T-366/00 and T-369/00.
[404] Zadeva C03/1999 (UL L 37, 12.2.2000).	[404] Case C03/1999 (OJ L 37, 12.2.2000).
[405] Zadeva SES C-404/00 [2003] PSES I-6695.	[405] ECJ Case C-404/00 [2003] ECR I-6695.
[406] C-186/02 P in C-188/02 P Ramodín SA, Ramodín Cápsulas SA (C 186/02 P) in Territorio Histórico de Álava – Diputación Foral de Álava (C 188/02 P) proti Komisiji.	[406] C-186/02 P and C-188/02 P Ramodín SA, Ramodín Cápsulas SA (C 186/02 P) and Territorio Histórico de Álava - Diputación Foral de Álava (C 188/02 P) v Commission.
[407] C-278/00.	[407] C-278/00.
[408] C-159/01.	[408] C-159/01.
[409] C-110/02.	[409] C-110/02.
[410] C-345/02.	[410] C-345/02.
[411] Sporazum med Vlado Združenih držav Amerike in Komisijo Evropskih skupnosti o uporabi njunega prava konkurence je bil sklenjen 23. 9. 1991. S skupnim sklepom Sveta in Evropske komisije z dne 10. 4. 1995 je bil Sporazum odobren in razglašen za veljavnega od dne, ko ga podpiše Evropska komisija (UL L 95, 27.4.1995). Dne 4. 6. 1998 je začel veljati sporazum o medsebojni pravni kurtoaziji, ki krepi načela medsebojne pravne kurtoazije iz Sporazuma leta 1991 (Sporazum med Evropskimi skupnostmi in Vlado Združenih držav Amerike o uporabi načel medsebojne pravne kurtoazije pri izvrševanju njihovega prava konkurence (UL L 173, 18.6.1998)).	[411] The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities regarding the application of their competition laws was concluded on 23.9.1991. By a joint decision of the Council and the European Commission of 10.4.1995 the Agreement was approved and declared applicable from the date it was signed by the European Commission (OJ L 95, 27.4.1995). On 4.6.1998 the positive comity agreement, which strengthens the positive comity provisions of the 1991 Agreement, entered into force (Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws (OJ L 173, 18.6.1998)).
[412] Sporazum med Evropskimi skupnostmi in Vlado Kanade o uporabi njihovega prava konkurence (UL L 175, 10.7.1999). Sporazum je bil podpisan na vrhu EU/Kanada v Bonnu dne 17. 6. 1999 in je začel veljati s podpisom.	[412] Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application of the competition laws (OJ L 175, 10.7.1999). The Agreement was signed at the EU/Canada Summit in Bonn on 17.6.1999 and entered into force at signature.
[413] Sporazum med Evropsko skupnostjo in Vlado Japonske o sodelovanju pri protikonkurenčnih dejavnostih (UL L 183, 22.7.2003). Sporazum o sodelovanju med Evropsko skupnostjo in Japonsko je bil podpisan v Bruslju dne 10. 7. 2003 in je začel veljati 9. 8. 2003.	[413] Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation on anticompetitive activities (OJ L 183, 22.7.2003). The Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and Japan was signed in Brussels on 10.7.2003 and entered into force on 9.8.2003.
[414] Več informacij o Mednarodni mreži za konkurenco je na voljo na njeni spletni strani: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org	[414] More information on the ICN is available on its web site: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org
[415] Glej http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/annualconference2003.html	[415] See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/annualconference2003.html
[416] Poročilo o glavnih ugotovitvah na tej delavnici je na voljo na http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/capacitytbuild_sg2_seoul.pdf	[416] A report on the main conclusions reached at this Workshop is available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/capacitytbuild_sg2_seoul.pdf

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