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Sklepni predlogi generalnega pravobranilca M. Bobka, predstavljeni 6. februarja 2019. Evropska komisija proti Združenemu kraljestvu Velika Britanija in Severna Irska. Neizpolnitev obveznosti države – Lastna sredstva – Pridruževanje čezmorskih držav in ozemelj (ČDO) k Evropski uniji – Sklep 91/482/EGS – Člen 101(2) – Dovolitev uvoza v Unijo z oprostitvijo carin za proizvode, ki po poreklu niso iz ČDO, so pa v prostem prometu v posamezni ČDO in se v enakem stanju ponovno izvažajo v Unijo – Izvozna potrdila EXP – Nezakonito izdajanje potrdil s strani organov posamezne ČDO – Člen 4(3) PEU – Načelo lojalnega sodelovanja – Odgovornost države članice, ki ima posebne odnose z zadevno ČDO – Obveznost nadomestitve izgube lastnih sredstev Unije, povzročene z nezakonitim izdajanjem izvoznih potrdil EXP – Uvoz aluminija z Angvile. Zadeva C-391/17. Sklepni predlogi generalnega pravobranilca M. Bobka, predstavljeni 6. februarja 2019. Evropska komisija proti Združenemu kraljestvu Velika Britanija in Severna Irska. Neizpolnitev obveznosti države – Lastna sredstva – Pridruževanje čezmorskih držav in ozemelj (ČDO) k Evropski uniji – Sklep 91/482/EGS – Člen 101(2) – Dovolitev uvoza v Unijo z oprostitvijo carin za proizvode, ki po poreklu niso iz ČDO, so pa v prostem prometu v posamezni ČDO in se v enakem stanju ponovno izvažajo v Unijo – Izvozna potrdila EXP – Nezakonito izdajanje potrdil s strani organov posamezne ČDO – Člen 4(3) PEU – Načelo lojalnega sodelovanja – Odgovornost države članice, ki ima posebne odnose z zadevno ČDO – Obveznost nadomestitve izgube lastnih sredstev Unije, povzročene z nezakonitim izdajanjem izvoznih potrdil EXP – Uvoz aluminija z Angvile. Zadeva C-391/17. Oznaka ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:2019:97	Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 6 February 2019. European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Own resources — Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) with the European Union — Decision 91/482/EEC — Article 101(2) — Acceptance for import into the European Union free of customs duties of products not originating in the OCT but which are in free circulation in an OCT and are re-exported as such to the European Union — Export certificates EXP — Wrongful issue of certificates by the authorities of an OCT — Article 4(3) TEU — Principle of sincere cooperation — Liability of the Member State having special relations with the OCT concerned — Obligation to compensate for the loss of the European Union’s own resources caused by the wrongful issue of export certificates EXP — Imports of aluminium from Anguilla. Case C-391/17. Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 6 February 2019. European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Own resources — Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) with the European Union — Decision 91/482/EEC — Article 101(2) — Acceptance for import into the European Union free of customs duties of products not originating in the OCT but which are in free circulation in an OCT and are re-exported as such to the European Union — Export certificates EXP — Wrongful issue of certificates by the authorities of an OCT — Article 4(3) TEU — Principle of sincere cooperation — Liability of the Member State having special relations with the OCT concerned — Obligation to compensate for the loss of the European Union’s own resources caused by the wrongful issue of export certificates EXP — Imports of aluminium from Anguilla. Case C-391/17. ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2019:97

Datumi	Dates
Datum dokumenta: 06/02/2019 Datum vložitve: 30/06/2017	Date of document: 06/02/2019 Date lodged: 30/06/2017

Drugi podatki	Miscellaneous information
Avtor: Sodišče Država ali organizacija, iz katere je zahtevek poslan: Združeno kraljestvo Pravna oblika: Sklepni predlogi Verodostojni jezik: angleščina	Author: Court of Justice Country or organisation from which the request originates: United Kingdom Form: Opinion of the Advocate General Authentic language: English

Postopek	Procedure
Vrsta postopka: Tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti - uspešen Vlagateljica: Institucije in organi EU, Evropska komisija Tožena_stranka: Države članice EU, Združeno kraljestvo Generalni pravobranilec: Bobek	Type of procedure: Action for failure to fulfil obligations - successful Applicant: EU institutions and bodies, European Commission Defendant: EU Member States, United Kingdom Advocate General: Bobek

Klasifikacije	Classifications
Vsebina: Finančne določbe Čezmorske države in ozemlja Lastna sredstva	Subject matter: Financial provisions Overseas countries and territories Own resources

Besedilo	Text

SKLEPNI PREDLOGI GENERALNEGA PRAVOBRANILCA	OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
MICHALA BOBKA,	BOBEK
predstavljeni 6. februarja 2019 ( 1 )	delivered on 6 February 2019 ( 1 )
Zadeva C‑391/17	Case C‑391/17
Evropska komisija	European Commission
proti	v
Združenemu kraljestvu Velika Britanija in Severna Irska	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
„Neizpolnitev obveznosti države članice – Lastna sredstva – Sklep 91/482/EGS – Pridružitev čezmorskih držav in ozemelj Evropski uniji – Uvoz aluminija z Angvile – Pretovarjanje – Izvozna potrdila EXP, ki so jih carinski organi čezmorske države ali ozemlja nepravilno izdali – Carine, ki jih država članica uvoza ni pobrala – Finančna odgovornost države članice, s katero ima ČDO posebne odnose – Povrnitev izgube lastnih sredstev EU, do katere je prišlo v drugi državi članici“	(Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations — Own resources — Decision 91/482/EEC — Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union — Importations of aluminium from Anguilla — Trans-shipment — EXP certificates incorrectly issued by the customs authorities of an Overseas Country or Territory —Uncollected customs duties by the Member State of importation — Financial liability of the Member State with which an OCT has a special relationship —Compensation for loss to the EU’s own resources incurred in another Member State)
I. Uvod	I. Introduction
1. \| Evropska komisija predlaga, naj se ugotovi, da Združeno kraljestvo ni izpolnilo svojih obveznosti na podlagi načela lojalnega sodelovanja, določenega v členu 5 ES ( 2 ). To pa zato, ker ni povrnilo izgube zneska lastnih sredstev, ki bi jih moralo dati na razpolago proračunu Unije. Ta znesek se nanaša na carine, ki niso bile pobrane ob uvozu pošiljk aluminija, ki so prvotno prišle iz tretjih držav v Italijo. Ta znesek bi bil pobran, če carinski organi Angvile, ki je čezmejna država ali ozemlje (ČDO) Združenega kraljestva, ne bi izdali zadevnih izvoznih potrdil za ponovni izvoz v Evropsko unijo v obdobju od 1998 do 2000 s kršitvijo člena 101(2) Sklepa 91/482/EGS ( 3 ). Komisija meni, da Združeno kraljestvo v skladu s pravom Unije odgovarja za navedeno izgubo lastnih sredstev, ki jo je povzročilo ČDO Združenega kraljestva. Trdi, da mora ta država članica v skladu z obveznostjo lojalnega sodelovanja zdaj proračunu Unije dati na razpolago znesek carin, ki jih druga država članica (Italija) ni pobrala, skupaj z natečenimi obrestmi.	1. \| The European Commission seeks a declaration that the United Kingdom has failed to fulfil its obligations under the principle of sincere cooperation, embodied in Article 5 EC. ( 2 ) That is on the basis that it did not compensate the loss of an amount of own resources which should have been made available to the EU’s budget. That amount relates to customs duties that were not collected upon importation of aluminium consignments originally coming from third States into Italy. That amount would have been collected had the customs authorities of Anguilla, an Overseas Country or Territory (OCT) of the United Kingdom, not issued the relevant export certificates for re-exportation to the European Union during the period 1998 to 2000 in breach of Article 101(2) of Decision 91/482/EEC. ( 3 ) The Commission is of the view that the United Kingdom is responsible under EU law for this loss of own resources, which has been caused by the United Kingdom’s OCT. It claims that, under the obligation of sincere cooperation, that Member State must now make available to the EU budget the amount of customs duties that were not collected by another Member State (Italy), including the interest accrued.
2. \| Z vzporedno tožbo v zadevi C‑395/17, Komisija/Kraljevina Nizozemska, v kateri bom predstavil ločene sklepne predloge, Komisija predlaga podobno ugotovitev in povrnitev izgub lastnih sredstev. Navedena zadeva se nanaša na domnevne opustitve carinskih organov Curaçaa in Arube, ki sta ČDO Kraljevine Nizozemske.	2. \| By a parallel action in Case C‑395/17, Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands, for which I shall deliver a separate Opinion, the Commission is seeking a similar declaration and compensation of losses of own resources. That case concerns alleged failures of the customs authorities of Curaçao and Aruba, two OCTs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
3. \| Tehničnost in zapletenost tožbe, ki jo je treba večkrat prebrati, da bi se razumelo, kaj Komisija zahteva, ne bi smeli prikriti dejstva, da se pod površjem skriva več, kot se zdi na prvi pogled. Tožbi nista to, kar se zdi. Zelo pomembno strukturno in ustavnopravno vprašanje je zavito v meglo tehničnih podrobnosti carinskih pravil, zapletenosti dejanskega stanja posamezne zadeve in precej bogate postopkovne zgodovine, katere jasnost dejansko spominja na Twin Peaks. Ali lahko Komisija s postopkom zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti iz člena 258 PDEU predlaga, naj se ugotovi, da je država članica (Združeno kraljestvo) kršila dolžnost lojalnega sodelovanja, ker ni povrnila izgube, ki je nastala proračunu Unije in do katere je prišlo v drugi državi članici (Italiji) zaradi domnevne kršitve prava Unije, ki jo je storila njena ČDO (Angvila) v (precej oddaljeni) preteklosti? Ali lahko Komisija v tej tožbi zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti kot ukrep zahteva povrnitev škode, povzročene Evropski uniji? Če je taka tožba dejansko dopustna v skladu s členom 258 PDEU, kakšno je dokazno breme Komisije, da bi lahko s tako tožbo uspela?	3. \| The technical and complex nature of the claim, which must be re-read several times in order to grasp what the Commission is requesting, should not disguise the fact that much more lies beneath the surface. The actions are not what they seem. Shrouded in a mist of the technicalities of customs rules, a complex set of facts of a singular case, and a rather rich procedural history, the clarity of which is indeed reminiscent of Twin Peaks, lies a structural and constitutional issue of considerable significance. Can the Commission, by an Article 258 TFEU infringement procedure, seek a declaration that a Member State (the United Kingdom) has infringed the duty of sincere cooperation by not compensating the loss to the EU budget that occurred in another Member State (Italy) due to an alleged breach of EU law committed by its OCT (Anguilla) in the (rather distant) past? Can the Commission request compensation for damage caused to the European Union as a remedy in that infringement claim? If such an action is indeed admissible under Article 258 TFEU, what is the evidentiary burden that the Commission must satisfy for such an action to prosper?
II. Pravni okvir	II. Legal framework
A. Sistem virov lastnih sredstev	A. The system of own resources
4. \| Za dejansko stanje te zadeve se uporablja Uredba (EGS, Euratom) št. 1552/89 ( 4 ), kakor je bila spremenjena z Uredbo (EGS, Euratom) št. 1355/96 ( 5 ) (v nadaljevanju: Uredba 1552/89).	4. \| Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1552/89, ( 4 ) as amended by Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1355/96 ( 5 ) (‘Regulation 1552/89’), is applicable to the facts of this case.
5. \| Člen 2 Uredbe 1552/89 določa: \| „1. Za uporabo te uredbe se pravica Skupnosti do lastnih sredstev iz člena 2(1)(a) in (b) Sklepa št. 88/376/EGS, Euratom določi takoj, ko so izpolnjeni pogoji za knjiženje pravic na račune in za obvestilo dolžnika, določeni v carinskih predpisih. \| 1a. Datum določitve pravice iz odstavka 1 je datum knjiženja v računovodske knjige, ki so določene v carinskih predpisih. \| […] \| 1b. V spornih primerih se šteje, da za namene določitve pravice iz odstavka 1 lahko pravico izračunajo pristojni upravni organi najpozneje do sprejetja prve upravne odločbe, s katero se obvesti dolžnika o dolgu, ali ob začetku sodnega postopka, če je to prej. \| Datum določitve pravice iz odstavka 1 je datum odločbe ali izračuna, ki sledi začetku zgoraj omenjenega sodnega postopka.“	5. \| According to Article 2 of Regulation 1552/89: \| ‘1. For the purpose of applying this Regulation, the Community’s entitlement to the own resources referred to in Article 2(1)(a) and (b) of Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom shall be established as soon as the conditions provided for by the customs regulations have been met concerning the entry of the entitlement in the accounts and the notification of the debtor. \| 1a. The date of the establishment referred to in paragraph 1 shall be the date of entry in the accounting ledgers provided for by the customs regulations. \| … \| 1b. In disputed cases, the competent administrative authorities shall be deemed, for the purposes of the establishment referred to in paragraph 1, to be in a position to calculate the amount of the entitlement no later than when the first administrative decision is taken notifying the debtor of the debt or when judicial proceedings are bought if this occurs first. \| The date of the establishment referred to in paragraph 1 shall be the date of the decision or of the calculation to be made following the abovementioned commencing of judicial proceedings.’
6. \| Člen 6(1) in (2) Uredbe št. 1552/89 določa: \| „1. Račune lastnih sredstev, ki so razčlenjeni po vrstah sredstev, vodi ministrstvo za finance vsake države članice ali organ, ki ga imenuje posamezna država članica. \| […] \| 2. \| (a) \| Pravice, določene v skladu s členom 2, se pod pogoji iz točke (b) tega odstavka knjižijo na računih najkasneje prvi delovni dan po 19. dnevu drugega meseca, ki sledi mesecu, v katerem je bila pravica določena. \| (b) \| Določene pravice, ki niso knjižene na računih iz točke (a), ker še niso izterjane in zanje še ni bilo predloženo jamstvo, se v obdobju iz točke (a) prikazujejo na posebnih računih. Države članice lahko uporabijo isti postopek, kadar se višina določenih pravic, za katere je bilo predloženo jamstvo, izpodbija in bi se po rešitvi zadevnega spora lahko spremenila. \| […]“	6. \| Article 6(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1552/89 states that: \| ‘1. Accounts for own resources shall be kept by the Treasury of each Member State or by the body appointed by each Member State and broken down by type of resources. \| … \| 2. \| (a) \| Entitlements established in accordance with Article 2 shall, subject to point (b) of this paragraph, be entered in the accounts at the latest on the first working day after the 19th day of the second month following the month during which the entitlement was established. \| (b) \| Established entitlements not entered in the accounts referred to in point (a) because they have not yet been recovered and no security has been provided shall be shown in separate accounts within the period laid down in point (a). Member States may adopt this procedure where established entitlements for which security has been provided have been challenged and might upon settlement of the disputes which have arisen be subject to change. \| …’
7. \| Člen 10(1) Uredbe št. 1552/89 določa: „Ko se odšteje 10 % za stroške zbiranja na podlagi člena 2(3) Sklepa 88/376/EGS, Euratom, se lastna sredstva iz člena 2(1)(a) in (b) tega sklepa vknjižijo najkasneje prvi delovni dan po 19. dnevu drugega meseca, ki sledi mesecu, v katerem je bila določena pravica v skladu s členom 2. \| Pravice, ki se prikazujejo na posebnih računih na podlagi člena 6(2)(b), pa se vknjižijo najpozneje prvi delovni dan po 19. dnevu drugega meseca, ki sledi mesecu, v katerem so bile pravice izterjane.“	7. \| According to Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1552/89: ‘After deduction of 10% by way of collection costs in accordance with Article 2(3) of Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom, entry of the own resources referred to in Article 2(1)(a) and (b) of that Decision shall be made at the latest on the first working day following the 19th day of the second month following the month during which the entitlement was established in accordance with Article 2. \| However, for entitlements shown in separate accounts under Article 6(2)(b), the entry must be made at the latest on the first working day following the 19th day of the second month following the month in which the entitlements were recovered.’
8. \| Člen 11 Uredbe št. 1552/89 določa: „Za vsako zamudo pri knjiženju na račun iz člena 9(1) država članica plača obresti po obrestni meri, ki velja na denarnem trgu te države članice za kratkoročne javnofinančne operacije na predpisani datum knjiženja, povečani za dve odstotni točki. Ta obrestna mera se poveča za 0,25 odstotne točke za vsak mesec zamude. Povečana obrestna mera velja za celotno obdobje zamude.“	8. \| Article 11 of Regulation No 1552/89 reads as follows: ‘Any delay in making the entry in the account referred to in Article 9(1) shall give rise to the payment of interest by the Member State concerned at the interest rate applicable on the Member State’s money market on the due date for short-term public financing operations, increased by two percentage points. This rate shall be increased by 0.25 of a percentage point for each month of delay. The increased rate shall be applied to the entire period of delay.’
9. \| Člen 17(1) in (2) Uredbe št. 1552/89 določa: \| „1. Države članice sprejmejo vse potrebne ukrepe za zagotovitev, da je v skladu s to uredbo Komisiji na razpolago znesek v višini pravic, določenih v členu 2. \| 2. Države članice zneskov v višini določenih pravic niso dolžne dati na razpolago Komisiji samo v primeru, če jih zaradi razlogov višje sile niso mogle zbrati. Poleg tega države članice obveznosti dati ta sredstva na razpolago Komisiji niso dolžne upoštevati samo v posebnih primerih, če se po celoviti oceni vseh okoliščin posameznega primera ugotovi, da brez njihove krivde dolgoročno sredstev ni mogoče zbrati. Te primere je treba navesti v poročilu iz odstavka 3, če zneski presegajo 10.000 ECU, preračunano v nacionalno valuto po tečaju, ki je veljal prvi delovni dan oktobra v preteklem koledarskem letu; v poročilu je treba navesti razloge, zakaj država članica teh zneskov ni mogla dati na razpolago. Komisija mora svoje morebitne pripombe zadevni državi članici poslati v šestih mesecih. \| […]“	9. \| Article 17(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1552/89 states that: \| ‘1. Member States shall take all requisite measures to ensure that the amount corresponding to the entitlements established under Article 2 are made available to the Commission as specified in this Regulation. \| 2. Member States shall be free from the obligation to place at the disposal of the Commission the amounts corresponding to established entitlements solely if, for reasons of force majeure, these amounts have not been collected. In addition, Member States may disregard this obligation to make such amounts available to the Commission in specific cases if, after thorough assessment of all the relevant circumstances of the individual case, it appears that recovery is impossible in the long term for reasons which cannot be attributed to them. These cases must be mentioned in the report provided for in paragraph 3 if the amounts exceed ECU 10000, converted into national currency at the rate applying on the first working day of October of the previous calendar year; this report must contain an indication of the reasons why the Member State was unable to make available the amounts in question. The Commission has six months in which to forward, if appropriate, its comments to the Member State concerned. \| ...’
10. \| Uredba (ES, Euratom) št. 1150/2000 ( 6 ) je nadomestila Uredbo št. 1552/89. Člen 2(1), drugi in tretji pododstavek, člen 6(1) in (3)(a) in (b), člen 10(1) in člen 11 navedene uredbe v bistvu ustrezajo zgoraj navedenim določbam Uredbe št. 1552/89. Člen 17 Uredbe št. 1552/89 je bil nadomeščen s členom 17 Uredbe št. 1150/2000 in spremenjen z Uredbo (ES, Euratom) št. 2028/2004 ( 7 ).	10. \| Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000 ( 6 ) replaced Regulation No 1552/89. Article 2(1), (2) and (3), Article 6(1) and (3)(a) and (b), Article 10(1) and Article 11 of that regulation essentially correspond to the provisions of Regulation No 1552/89 cited above. Article 17 of Regulation No 1552/89 was replaced by Article 17 of Regulation No 1150/2000, and amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2028/2004. ( 7 )
B. Sklep ČDO	B. OCT Decision
11. \| Člen 101(2) Sklepa ČDO, ki se ratione temporis uporabi za to zadevo, določa: \| „Proizvodi, ki po poreklu niso iz ČDO, so pa v prostem prometu v posamezni ČDO in se kot takšni ponovno izvažajo v Skupnost, se uvozijo v Skupnost brez uvoznih dajatev in davkov z enakim učinkom pod pogojem, da: \| – \| so v zadevni ČDO plačane carinske dajatve ali davki z enakim učinkom, ki so enako visoki ali višji kot carina, ki se uporablja v Skupnosti za uvoz enakih proizvodov po poreklu iz tretjih držav, za katere se uporablja klavzula največjih ugodnosti; \| – \| niso niti delno niti v celoti predmet oprostitve dajatev ali vračila carine ali davka z enakim učinkom; \| – \| jih spremlja izvozno potrdilo.“	11. \| Article 101(2) of the OCT Decision, applicable ratione temporis in the present case, states: \| ‘Products not originating in the OCT but which are in free circulation in an OCT and are re-exported as such to the Community shall be accepted for import into the Community free of customs duties and taxes having equivalent effect providing that they: \| – \| have paid, in the OCT concerned, customs duties or taxes having equivalent effect of a level equal to, or higher than, the customs duties applicable in the Community on import of these same products originating in third countries eligible for the most-favoured-nation clause, \| – \| have not been the subject of an exemption from, or a refund of, in whole or in part, customs duties or taxes having equivalent effect, \| – \| are accompanied by an export certificate.’
III. Dejansko stanje in predhodni postopek	III. Facts and pre-litigation procedure
12. \| Angvila je ena od „čezmorskih držav in ozemelj Združenega kraljestva“, navedenih v Prilogi II k Pogodbi ES, za katere se uporablja četrti del navedene pogodbe. V tistem času se je za to ozemlje uporabljal tudi Sklep ČDO.	12. \| Anguilla is one of the ‘Overseas Countries and Territories of the United Kingdom’ listed in Annex II to the EC Treaty, to which Part Four of that Treaty applies. The OCT Decision also applied to that territory at the relevant time.
13. \| Leta 1998 je bila na Angvili uvedena shema za pretovarjanje, da bi se izkoristile ugodnosti iz člena 101(2) Sklepa ČDO. Na Angvilo se je uvažal aluminij iz tretjih držav. Tam so uvozniki plačali lokalno 6‑odstotno carino. Družba s sedežem na Angvili, Corbis Trading (Anguilla) Limited (v nadaljevanju: Corbis), je kot uvozni agent plačala „izvozno nadomestilo“ družbam prejemnicam za prevoz tovora prek Angvile. To plačilo je družba Corbis nato posredovala vladi Angvile v izplačilo. Angvilski organi so nato izdali izvozna potrdila EXP za ponovni izvoz aluminija v Evropsko unijo.	13. \| In 1998, a trans-shipment scheme was set up in Anguilla, in order to benefit from Article 101(2) of the OCT Decision. Aluminium from third countries was imported into Anguilla. The local 6% customs duty was paid by importers in Anguilla. An Anguilla-based company, Corbis Trading (Anguilla) Limited (‘Corbis’), as import agent, paid an ‘export shipping allowance’ to the consignee companies to route the cargo via Anguilla. This payment was then submitted by Corbis to the Government of Anguilla for payment as a disbursement. The Anguillan authorities then issued EXP certificates for the aluminium to be re-exported to the European Union.
14. \| United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (ministrstvo Združenega kraljestva za zunanje zadeve in zadeve Commonwealtha, v nadaljevanju: FCO) je imelo pomisleke glede zakonitosti te transakcije. Uradno je zaprosilo Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (davčna in carinska uprava Združenega kraljestva, v nadaljevanju: HMRC), naj izvede preiskavo. Preiskava je bila opravljena novembra 1998. HMRC je ugotovila, da pogoji za izdajo izvoznih potrdil EXP v skladu s členom 101(2) Sklepa ČDO niso bili izpolnjeni. Enota Komisije za koordinacijo boja proti goljufijam (v nadaljevanju: UCLAF) ( 8 ) je bila 25. novembra 1998 obveščena o izidu preiskave.	14. \| The United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (‘the FCO’) had concerns about the legality of the operation. It formally asked the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) to conduct an investigation. That investigation took place in November 1998. HMRC concluded that the requirements for the issue of EXP certificates under Article 101(2) of the OCT Decision had not been met. The Unit for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (‘UCLAF’) ( 8 ) was notified of the outcome of the investigation on 25 November 1998.
15. \| Družba Corbis je pozneje leta 1998 spremenila svojo prakso izdajanja računov. Na računih, ki jih je družba Corbis izdala vladi Angvile, je bilo navedeno, da so bili izdani za „opravljene storitve“ družbe Corbis. Na njih ni bilo več omenjeno „izvozno nadomestilo“.	15. \| Later in 1998, Corbis changed its invoicing practice. The invoices issued by Corbis to the Government of Anguilla stated that they were issued for ‘services rendered’ by Corbis. They no longer referred to ‘export shipping allowance’.
16. \| HMRC je 6. januarja 1999 Komisiji poslala dopis, v katerem ji je sporočila, da HMRC ne želi več, da bi UCLAF ali druge države članice namenjale pozornost izvoznim potrdilom, ki jih izdaja Angvila. Na podlagi predloga Anguilla House of Assembly (angvilska skupščina) z dne 22. januarja 1999 je bilo treba za vsak izdelek, ki se pretovarja prek Angvile v Evropsko unijo v skladu s Sklepom ČDO, plačati dajatev, ki je enaka dajatvi, določeni v tarifi EU za ta izdelek.	16. \| On 6 January 1999, HMRC wrote to the Commission to inform it that HMRC no longer wished to draw the attention of UCLAF or other Member States to export certificates issued by Anguilla. Following a motion of the Anguilla House of Assembly of 22 January 1999, any product trans-shipped through Anguilla to the European Union pursuant to the OCT Decision had to be subject to a rate of duty equivalent to that set out in the EU’s tariff for that product.
17. \| UCLAF je 18. februarja 1999 izdala sporočilo (AM 10/1999) v skladu s členom 45 Uredbe (ES) št. 515/97 ( 9 ). V njem je navedla, da je bilo približno 50 % zneskov, ki jih je Angvila pobrala iz naslova carine, povrnjenih kot „izvozno nadomestilo“ in drugi stroški. UCLAF je sklenila, da so bila ta plačila povezana s pobiranjem carin. Zato je UCLAF carinskim organom držav članic priporočila, „naj se vsa izvozna potrdila EXP, ki so jih izdali organi Angvile, zavrnejo in naj se zahteva polog ali jamstvo za carine za prihodnje uvoze v višini 6 %, dokler se ti dvomi ne odpravijo“.	17. \| On 18 February 1999, UCLAF issued a communication (AM 10/1999) under Article 45 of Regulation (EC) No 515/97. ( 9 ) It stated that about 50% of the sums collected by Anguilla by way of customs duties were reimbursed as ‘export shipping allowances’ and other expenses. UCLAF concluded that these payments were linked to the collection of customs duties. UCLAF therefore recommended to the Member States’ customs authorities ‘that all EXP certificates issued by the authorities in Anguilla be rejected and that customs duties for future importations equivalent to the full 6% be taken on deposit or in the form of a guarantee until such time as these doubts are removed’.
18. \| Od marca 1999 do junija 2000 se je aluminij iz tretjih držav, ki se je najprej uvozil na Angvilo, ponovno izvozil z Angvile in uvozil v Italijo.	18. \| Between March 1999 and June 2000, aluminium originating from third countries that had first been imported into Anguilla was re-exported from Anguilla and imported into Italy.
19. \| OLAF je 28. maja 2003 objavil Skupno poročilo o misiji, v katerem je navedel, da je finančna spodbuda, plačana uvoznikom prek izvoznega nadomestila, znašala 25 ameriških dolarjev (USD) na tono aluminija.	19. \| On 28May 2003, OLAF published a Joint Mission Report which stated that the economic incentive paid to importers by way of the export shipping allowance was of 25 United States dollars (USD) per tonne of aluminium.
20. \| Komisija je 28. decembra 2004 v odgovor na zahtevo Italije sprejela Odločbo REC 03/2004. Ta država članica je 17. marca 2003 zahtevala plačilo dajatev od italijanske družbe, ki je 1. aprila 1999 v Italijo uvozila aluminijske palice, ki jih je spremljalo izvozno potrdilo EXP, ki ga je izdala Angvila. Ta družba je predlagala, da se zadevne uvozne dajatve ne vknjižijo oziroma, podredno, da se ji odpustijo. Komisija je v svoji odločbi ugotovila, da je v tem konkretnem primeru v skladu s členom 220(2)(b) Carinskega zakonika upravičeno, da se uvozne dajatve naknadno ne vknjižijo. ( 10 ) Komisija je navedla, da je treba zadeve, ki so primerljive z zadevo, obravnavano v Odločbi REC 03/2004, obravnavati enako, če so dejanske in pravne okoliščine podobne. ( 11 )	20. \| On 28 December 2004, in response to a request by Italy, the Commission adopted Decision REC 03/2004. On 17 March 2003, that Member State had claimed the payment of duties from an Italian company that on 1 April 1999 had imported aluminium bars into Italy accompanied by EXP certificates issued by Anguilla. That company had applied for the waiving of entry in the accounts or, in the alternative, remission of the import duties concerned. In its decision, the Commission concluded that to the waiving of post-clearance entry in the accounts of import duties was justified in that particular case, pursuant to Article 220(2)(b) of the Customs Code. ( 10 ) The Commission stated that cases comparable to that under consideration in Decision REC 03/2004 should be treated in the same way, provided the circumstances were similar in fact and in law. ( 11 )
21. \| Komisija je 26. maja 2006 v odgovor na zahtevo Nizozemske sprejela Odločbo REM 03/2004. Leta 1998 je nemška družba odpremila aluminij iz Kanade in ga uvozila v Evropsko unijo prek Saint Pierra in Miquelona (ČDO pod suverenostjo Francije). Nizozemski organi so 20. decembra 2000 od te družbe zahtevali plačilo dajatev, ta pa je prosila za odpustitev v skladu s členom 239 Carinskega zakonika. ( 12 ) Komisija je odločila, da gre za poseben položaj v smislu te določbe in da je primerno odobriti odpustitev uvoznih dajatev. Komisija je navedla, da se bodo zahtevki za povrnitev ali odpustitev v zvezi z uvozom s Saint Pierra in Miquelona, Angvile in Nizozemskih Antilov v Unijo, ki so dejansko in pravno primerljivi, obravnavali podobno.	21. \| On 26 May 2006, in response to a request by the Netherlands, the Commission adopted Decision REM 03/2004. In 1998, a German company had shipped aluminium from Canada and imported it into the European Union via Saint Pierre and Miquelon (an OCT under French sovereignty). On 20 December 2000, the Netherlands authorities claimed the payment of duties from that firm which, in turn, asked for remission under Article 239 of the Customs Code. ( 12 ) The Commission decided that this was a special situation within the meaning of that provision and that it was appropriate to grant the remission of the import duties. The Commission stated that repayment or remission requests regarding imports into the EU from Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Anguilla and the Netherlands Antilles that were comparable in fact and in law would be treated similarly.
22. \| Italijanski organi so z dopisoma z dne 28. septembra 2006 in 28. septembra 2007 Komisijo obvestili, da so sprejeli več odločb o odpustu uvoznih dajatev na podlagi odločb REC 03/2004 in REM 03/2004. Komisija je julija 2009 zahtevala dodatne informacije, ki so ji bile posredovane v odgovoru z dne 4. septembra 2009.	22. \| Italian authorities informed the Commission by letters of 28 September 2006 and of 28 September 2007 that they had taken several decisions to remit duties on the basis of Decisions REC 03/2004 and REM 03/2004, respectively. The Commission requested additional information in July 2009, which was provided in a reply dated 4 September 2009.
23. \| Komisija je z dopisom z dne 8. julija 2010 s sklicevanjem na informacije, ki jih je prejela od Italije, od Združenega kraljestva najprej zahtevala, naj da na razpolago 2.619.504,01 EUR, in navedla, da se bodo obračunale obresti od vsake zamude pri dajanju zneska, ki se dolguje lastnim sredstvom, na razpolago. Združeno kraljestvo je odgovorilo z dopisom z dne 17. septembra 2010 in opozorilo na to, da ni nobenih listinskih dokazov. Komisija je z dopisom z dne 27. septembra 2010 organom Združenega kraljestva poslala dodatne informacije in razčlenila zadevne primere na podlagi dopisa italijanskih carinskih organov z dne 4. septembra 2009. Komisija in Združeno kraljestvo sta si dopisovala še do novembra 2011.	23. \| By letter of 8 July 2010, referring to the information received from Italy, the Commission first requested the United Kingdom to make available EUR 2619 504.01, stating that any delay in making the amount owed to own resources available would give rise to interest. The United Kingdom replied by letter of 17 September 2010, pointing to the absence of documentary evidence. By letter of 27 September 2010, the Commission provided the United Kingdom authorities with further information and presented a breakdown of the cases concerned based on the Italian customs authorities’ letter of 4 September 2009. Further correspondence between the Commission and the United Kingdom took place up until November 2011.
24. \| Komisija je 27. septembra 2013 poslala opomin, v katerem je zahtevala, naj se 2.670.001,29 EUR da na razpolago. Združeno kraljestvo je odgovorilo z dopisom z dne 21. novembra 2013 in zanikalo kakršno koli odgovornost ali kršitev prava Unije.	24. \| On 27 September 2013, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice, requesting that EUR 2670 001.29 be made available. The United Kingdom replied by letter of 21 November 2013, denying any responsibility or infringement of EU law.
25. \| Komisija je 17. oktobra 2014 poslala obrazloženo mnenje. Združeno kraljestvo je odgovorilo z dopisom z dne 17. decembra 2014 in vztrajalo pri svojem stališču.	25. \| On 17 October 2014, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion. The United Kingdom replied by letter of 17 December 2014, maintaining its position.
26. \| Komisija je z dopisom z dne 30. oktobra 2015 od italijanskih organov zahtevala, naj ji posredujejo podrobnosti carinskih deklaracij, ki so bile podlaga za skupni znesek, ki se zahteva od Združenega kraljestva. Te deklaracije so bile skupaj z izvoznimi potrdili poslane z obvestilom z dne 23. decembra 2015. Na podlagi teh dokumentov je Komisija ugotovila, da je znesek, ki ga je treba zahtevati od Združenega kraljestva, dejansko 1.500.342,31 EUR, saj so se prej zahtevani preostali zneski nanašali na uvoz, v zvezi s katerim so izvozna potrdila izdale ČDO, ki niso bile Angvila (ampak Saint Pierre in Miquelon).	26. \| By letter of 30 October 2015, the Commission requested the Italian authorities to provide it with the details of the customs declarations that had given rise to the total amounts claimed from the United Kingdom. Those declarations, together with the export certificates, were sent by a note dated 23 December 2015. On the basis of those documents, the Commission established that the amount to be claimed from the United Kingdom was in fact EUR 1500 342.31, since the remaining amounts previously claimed related to imports where export certificates had been issued by OCTs other than Anguilla (namely, Saint Pierre and Miquelon).
27. \| Ker Združeno kraljestvo zahtevanega plačila ni izvedlo, je Komisija začela ta pravni postopek.	27. \| As the United Kingdom did not make the requested payment, the Commission commenced the present legal proceedings.
IV. Postopek pred Sodiščem in predlogi strank	IV. The procedure before the Court and the forms of order sought by the parties
28. \| Komisija v tožbi, vloženi 30. junija 2017, Sodišču predlaga, naj: \| – \| razglasi, da Združeno kraljestvo ni izpolnilo svojih obveznosti na podlagi člena 5 (nato člen 10) Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti (zdaj člen 4(3) PEU), ker ni povrnilo izgube zneska lastnih sredstev, ki bi moral biti določen in dan na razpolago proračunu Unije v skladu s členi 2, 6, 10, 11 in 17 Uredbe št. 1552/89 (zdaj členi 2, 6, 10, 12 in 13 Uredbe (ES, Euratom) št. 609/2014 ( 13 )), če izvozna potrdila za uvoz aluminija z Angvile v obdobju 1999–2000 ne bi bila izdana s kršitvijo člena 101(2) Sklepa 91/482/EGS. \| – \| Združenemu kraljestvu naloži plačilo stroškov.	28. \| By an application lodged on 30 June 2017, the Commission claims that the Court should: \| – \| declare that the [United Kingdom] has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 (subsequently Article 10) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (now Article 4(3) TEU) by not compensating the loss of an amount of own resources which should have been established and made available to the Union’s budget under Articles 2, 6, 10, 11 and 17 of Regulation No 1552/89 (now Articles 2, 6, 10, 12 and 13 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014) ( 13 ) had export certificates not been issued in breach of Article 101(2) of Decision 91/482 for the imports of aluminium from Anguilla in 1999-2000, \| – \| order the United Kingdom to pay the costs.
29. \| Združeno kraljestvo Sodišču predlaga, naj: \| – \| tožbo zavrne kot neutemeljeno, \| – \| Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov.	29. \| The United Kingdom contends that the Court should: \| – \| dismiss the action as unfounded, \| – \| order the Commission to pay the costs.
30. \| Predsednik Sodišča je z odločbo z dne 30. novembra 2017 Kraljevini Nizozemski dovolil intervencijo v podporo predlogom Združenega kraljestva.	30. \| By decision of the President of the Court of 30 November 2017, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the United Kingdom.
31. \| Komisija in vlada Združenega kraljestva sta na obravnavi 2. oktobra 2018, na kateri je sodelovala tudi nizozemska vlada, podali ustne navedbe.	31. \| Both the Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom presented oral argument at the hearing held on 2 October 2018, in which the Government of the Netherlands also participated.
V. Presoja	V. Assessment
32. \| Zgradba teh sklepnih predlogov je podana v nadaljevanju. Najprej bom poskušal razvozlati, kakšna je prava narava zahtevka Komisije (A). Drugič, preučil bom, ali in pod katerimi pogoji je mogoče vložiti tožbo zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti na podlagi tega, da škoda, povzročena Evropski uniji s kršitvijo prava Unije, ki jo je mogoče pripisati državi članici, ni bila povrnjena (B). Tretjič, ker bom načeloma potrdil obstoj take možnosti, bom nato preučil, ali so v tej zadevi pogoji za obveznost povrniti škodo izpolnjeni (C), in bom ugotovil, da niso. Zato bom predlagal, naj se tožba Komisije zavrne kot neutemeljena.	32. \| This Opinion is structured as follows. I will first seek to unpack the exact nature of the claim made by the Commission (A). Second, I will examine whether and under what conditions it may be possible to launch an infringement action on the basis of a failure to compensate for damage caused to the European Union by a breach of EU law attributable to a Member State (B). Third, since I will in principle affirm the existence of such a possibility, I will then examine whether the conditions for an obligation to provide compensation are fulfilled in the present case (C), concluding that they are not. I will therefore suggest that the Commission’s action be dismissed as unfounded.
A. Trije v enem? Prava narava zahtevka	A. Three in One? The exact nature of the claim
33. \| Komisija predlaga, naj se razglasi, da Združeno kraljestvo ni izpolnilo svojih obveznosti na podlagi člena 5 ES, ker ni povrnilo izgube zneska lastnih sredstev, ki bi moral biti določen in dan na razpolago proračunu Unije v skladu s členi 2, 6, 10, 11 in 17 Uredbe št. 1552/89, če izvozna potrdila za uvoz aluminija z Angvile v obdobju od 1999 do 2000 ne bi bila izdana s kršitvijo člena 101(2) Sklepa ČDO.	33. \| The Commission seeks a declaration that the United Kingdom has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 EC by not compensating the loss of an amount of own resources which should have been established and made available to the EU budget under Articles 2, 6, 10, 11 and 17 of Regulation No 1552/89 had export certificates not been issued in breach of Article 101(2) of the OCT Decision for the imports of aluminium from Anguilla from 1999 to 2000.
34. \| Ta zadeva je izredno zapletena. In sicer ne toliko zato, ker se nanaša na čezmorske države in ozemlja Unije, temveč bolj zaradi načina, kako je Komisija zagovarjala to zadevo in kako je oblikovala svoje argumente. Ob razvozlavanju zahtevka Komisije postane jasno, da gre dejansko za več predlogov pod krinko enega samega zahtevka.	34. \| This case presents a singular degree of complexity. This is not so much because it relates to the EU overseas countries and territories, but rather due to the way in which the Commission has pleaded this case and structured its arguments. Seeking to unpack the claim made by the Commission, it becomes clear that there are, in fact, multiple propositions disguised as a single claim.
35. \| Prvič, Komisija trdi, da so angvilski organi napačno izdali izvozna potrdila EXP in s tem kršili člen 101(2) Sklepa ČDO. Komisija pri podajanju tega argumenta ne navede izrecno, ali je to kršitev prava Unije mogoče pripisati neposredno Združenemu kraljestvu, ker se angvilski carinski organi štejejo za organe te države članice (v nadaljevanju: prvotna kršitev).	35. \| First, the Commission claims that EXP certificates were wrongly issued by the authorities of Anguilla, in breach of Article 101(2) of the OCT Decision. In submitting this argument, the Commission is not being explicit as to whether that breach of EU law was directly attributable to the United Kingdom on the basis that the Anguillan were customs authorities of that Member State (‘the original breach’).
36. \| Drugič, Komisija navaja, da Združeno kraljestvo odgovarja za zadevno kršitev, saj ni sprejelo vseh ustreznih ukrepov, da bi preprečilo in spremljalo „prvotno kršitev“. Zato je to nekako podredni argument prvemu argumentu. Ker v Sklepu ČDO ni konkretne pravne podlage za tak predlog, Komisija v zvezi s tem ugotavlja kršitev načela lojalnega sodelovanja (v nadaljevanju: vmesna kršitev).	36. \| Second, the Commission puts forward that the United Kingdom is responsible for the breach in question because it has not taken all the appropriate measures to prevent and follow up on the ‘original breach’. Thus, this represents, in a way, an alternative argument to the first one. As there is no specific legal basis in the OCT Decision for such a proposition, the Commission identifies a breach of the principle of sincere cooperation in this regard (‘the intermediate breach’).
37. \| Tretjič, zunanja plast tožbe Komisije je argument, da Združeno kraljestvo ni izpolnilo iz tega izhajajoče obveznosti povrniti proračunu Unije izgubo, ki je nastala v Italiji in ki sta jo povzročili zgoraj omenjeni kršitvi prava Unije. Ker ni nobene izrecne pravne podlage za tovrstno obveznost, po mnenju Komisije ta dolžnost zopet izhaja iz načela lojalnega sodelovanja (v nadaljevanju: glavna kršitev).	37. \| Third, the outer layer of the Commission’s action is the argument that the United Kingdom has failed to comply with the ensuing obligation to compensate the EU budget for the loss incurred in Italy caused by the previously mentioned breaches of EU law. In view of the absence of any express legal basis for this kind of obligation, that duty follows, according to the Commission, again from the principle of sincere cooperation (‘the main breach’).
38. \| Taka „trije v enem“ kaskadna struktura zahtevka Komisije spominja na rusko babuško: zunanja (tretja) plast zatrjevanih kršitev prava Unije je neločljivo povezana s prejšnjimi plastmi in temelji na njih. Vendar opredelitev posameznih plasti argumentov dejansko ne razreši težave, temveč še poveča zapletenost te zadeve. In sicer zato, ker so različne plasti zatrjevanih kršitev predmet precej različnih ureditev v zvezi (i) z neizpolnjeno obveznostjo in naravo nezakonitosti, (ii) s tem, kako je treba kršitev dokazati z vidika postopka (in dokazov), ter (iii) z naravo posledic ugotovitve nezakonitosti in pravnih sredstev, ki so na voljo.	38. \| Such a ‘three-in-one’ cascading structure of the claim advanced by the Commission resembles a Russian doll: the outer (third) layer of the alleged breaches of EU law is inextricably linked to and based on the previous ones. However, having identified the individual layers of the arguments does not in fact solve the problem, but rather further increases the complexity of this case. This is due to the fact that the different layers of alleged infringements are subject to quite different regimes regarding: (i) the obligation breached and the nature of the illegality, (ii) how that breach is to be established in terms of procedure (and evidence), and (iii) the nature of the consequences of the statement of illegality and the available remedies.
39. \| V zvezi z naravo točke (i), in sicer neizpolnjenimi obveznostmi, ta tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti združuje (a) kršitev Sklepa ČDO, (b) to, da Združeno kraljestvo domnevno ni preprečilo in odpravilo napačne uporabe tega sklepa s strani njegovih ČDO, ter (c) neizpolnitev obveznosti povrniti izgubo, ki je bila povzročena proračunu Unije. Glede na to, da pravna podlaga takih obveznosti in njihovih pravih naslovnikov ni zelo jasna, so vse te zatrjevane kršitve prava Unije združene s sklicevanjem na načelo lojalnega sodelovanja, kot da bi to načelo lahko olajšalo ali celo odpravilo potrebo po tem, da se za vsako od teh plasti natančno opredeli, katere določbe prava Unije so bile kršene in kdo jih je kršil.	39. \| Concerning the nature of (i), the obligations breached, this infringement action conflates (a) a breach of the OCT Decision, (b) the alleged failure by the United Kingdom to prevent and remedy the misapplication of that decision by its OCT, and (c) a failure to fulfil the obligation to compensate the loss caused to the EU budget. In view of the distinct lack of clarity as to the legal basis of such obligations and their exact addressees, all those alleged breaches of EU law are bundled together by reference to the principle of sincere cooperation, as if that principle could mitigate or even eliminate the need to identify, for each of those layers, precisely which provisions of EU law have been breached and by whom.
40. \| Kar zadeva točko (ii), in sicer kateri postopek je treba uporabiti, je Komisija vložila tožbo zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti v skladu s členom 258 PDEU, s katero predlaga, da se ugotovi neizpolnitev obveznosti, ker izguba, nastala proračunu Unije, ni bila povrnjena (in s tem posredno potrdi tudi nezakonitost prejšnjih dveh plasti zatrjevanih neizpolnitev). Vendar je narava vsakega od postopkov (in dokazov ter vrste zahtevanih dokazil) precej drugačna: precej objektivna ureditev iz člena 258 PDEU, s katerim se zahteva ugotovitev strukturne neizpolnitve države članice, ki jo je treba v prihodnje odpraviti, se pomeša z elementi v bistvu posameznega in individualiziranega zahtevka, da se v proračun Unije povrnejo določeni zneski v obliki odškodnine. Vse to je izraženo v smislu analogne uporabe posebnih določb za določitev izgube, nastale v drugi državi članici (Italiji) kot posledica tega, da je ta država članica uporabila pravila Carinskega zakonika in sistem lastnih sredstev.	40. \| With regard to (ii), the procedure to be followed, the Commission has brought an infringement action pursuant to Article 258 TFEU, seeking a declaration of a failure to fulfil obligations on the basis of not the non-compensation of a loss to the EU budget (and thereby implicitly endorsing the illegality of the previous two layers of alleged failures as well). However, the nature of each of the procedures (and the evidence and type of proof required) are quite different: the rather objective regime of Article 258 TFEU, seeking a declaration as to the structural failure of a Member State to be remedied for the future, becomes mixed up with elements of an essentially individual and individualised claim for compensation of the EU budget of specific sums by way of damages. All that is couched in terms of analogous application of specific provisions for establishing the loss incurred in another Member State (Italy) as the result of the application by that Member State of the rules of the Customs Code and of the system of own resources.
41. \| Kar zadeva točko (iii), in sicer v zvezi s pravnimi sredstvi, ki so na voljo, Komisija s tožbo uradno predlaga, naj se ugotovi neizpolnitev obveznosti na podlagi člena 5 ES. Vendar je obveznost, ki naj bi bila kršena, v tem, da konkreten znesek denarja, ki ga je Komisija pred tem ocenila in zahtevala, ni bil povrnjen. Komisija tu ponovno sočasno predlaga, naj se ugotovi neizpolnitev, ki zajema navedbo drugih (in različnih) dveh kršitev prava Unije, ter potrdi obveznost povrniti točno določen znesek denarja.	41. \| In terms of (iii), namely the available remedies, by its action, the Commission nominally seeks the declaration of a failure to fulfil obligations under Article 5 EC. However, the obligation that has allegedly been breached consists in not having compensated a specific amount of money that has previously been quantified and requested by the Commission. Here again, the Commission is requesting, in one fell swoop, a declaration of infringement that encompasses a statement of two other (and different) breaches of EU law, as well the confirmation of an obligation to compensate with an exact sum of money.
42. \| Na tej stopnji moram priznati, da sem skrajno zbegan zaradi takega pristopa kombiniranja postopka (postopkov) in pravnih sredstev. Komisija dejansko išče popolnoma novo pravno sredstvo, ki bi po eni strani zagotovilo procesno udobje, ki ga prinaša tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, po drugi strani pa bi bilo še okrepljeno z analogno uporabo pravil iz posebnega sistema prava Unije. ( 14 ) To bi pomenilo, da bi morala predložiti zelo malo dejanskih dokazov v zvezi s točnim zneskom denarja, ki ga zahteva, da bi dosegla tri ugotovitve kršitve z eno tožbo – dve od njih samo na podlagi dolžnosti lojalnega sodelovanja – vendar brez opredeljene pravne podlage v bolj strogem pomenu besede.	42. \| At this stage, I must admit to being exceedingly puzzled by such a mix-and-match approach to procedure(s) and remedies. What the Commission is actually asking for is a brand new remedy, using the procedural comfort of an infringement action, further enhanced by an analogous application of rules from a specific system of EU law. ( 14 ) That would mean having to produce very little actual evidence with regard to the exact sum of money requested, in order to obtain three declarations of infringement in one action, two of them merely on the basis of the duty of sincere cooperation, but without any identified legal basis within the more conservative meaning of the word.
43. \| Prav tako priznam, da se mi zdi izredno težko naenkrat presojati argumente, ki dejansko spadajo k trem različnim postopkom, ki zahtevajo analizo različnih materialnih obveznosti ter uporabo različnih postopkovnih pravil in zahtev v zvezi z naravo dokazov. Pri tem pa se neobstoj jasnih obveznosti in pravnih podlag za očitane kršitve brezbrižno prikrije s sklicevanjem (oziroma bolj zaklinjanjem) na dolžnost lojalnega sodelovanja.	43. \| I must admit that I also find it extremely difficult to assess in one go arguments actually belonging to three different procedures, which require the analysis of different substantive obligations, and the application of different procedural rules and requirements as to the nature of evidence. And all that, while nonchalantly glossing over the absence of clear obligations and legal bases for the alleged infringements with the invocation, or rather incantation, of the duty of sincere cooperation.
44. \| Kaj bi torej Sodišče lahko in moralo preučiti v tej zadevi? Moj predlog bi bil, da se ruska babuška razstavi. Osnovna logika je, da mora vsak izid temeljiti na obstoju prvotne nezakonitosti. Če se prvotna kršitev ne dokaže, postane kakršna koli tožba, ki temu sledi in je odvisna od te prvotne kršitve, sporna. Tako je v tej zadevi ključno vprašanje: ali so bila izvozna potrdila EXP izdana s kršitvijo Sklepa ČDO? Ali je ta kršitev povzročila izgubo v obliki manjkajočih lastnih sredstev, in če je tako, kakšen znesek je bil izgubljen? Res je, da če teh odgovorov, povezanih s prvotno kršitvijo, ni mogoče ugotoviti, potem ni podlage za zatrjevanje nadaljnje kršitve prava Unije v tem postopku (bodisi na ravni „vmesne kršitve“ – to, da se ni preprečilo nekaj, kar očitno sploh ni bilo nezakonito – niti za „glavno kršitev“, ki logično sledi – obveznost povrniti škodo proračunu Unije).	44. \| What then could and should be examined by the Court in the present case? My suggestion would be to unstack the Russian doll. As a matter of basic logic, any outcome must be based on the existence of the original illegality. If that original breach has not been established, any following action depending on that original breach becomes moot. Thus, in the present case, the key question remains: Were the EXP certificates issued in breach of the OCT Decision? Did that infringement cause a loss in the form of missing own resources and if so, in what amount? Indeed, if such answers connected to the original breach cannot be established, there is no basis to claim any further breach of EU law in these proceedings (be it at the level of the ‘intermediate breach’ — failure to prevent something that was apparently not illegal in the first place — or the logically subsequent ‘main breach’ — the obligation to compensate the EU budget).
45. \| To je po mojem mnenju sicer jedro te zadeve, vendar je vseeno treba pojasniti predhodno zadevo. Komisija predlaga Sodišču, naj ugotovi, da je Združeno kraljestvo kršilo načelo lojalnega sodelovanja s tem, da ni povrnilo izgube, ki je nastala proračunu Unije, zaradi izgube, ki je nastala v drugi državi članici. Komisija je izračunala, da ta izguba znaša 1.500.342,31 EUR. Vendar se je doslej postopek zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti uporabljal in razumel predvsem kot postopek, s katerim se doseže, da države članice v prihodnje odpravijo obstoječe kršitve prava Unije, ne pa – kot se v bistvu zahteva v tej zadevi – da bi se doseglo, da se za nazaj ugotovi kršitev, ( 15 ) na katero se veže odškodninski zahtevek, in sicer natančna in konkretna vsota denarja.	45. \| That being, in my view, the crux of this case, it is nonetheless necessary to clarify a preliminary matter. The Commission asks the Court to declare that the United Kingdom has infringed the principle of sincere cooperation by not compensating the loss suffered by the EU budget due to a loss incurred in another Member State. The Commission has calculated that loss to be EUR 1500 342.31. However, the infringement procedure has been used and primarily understood to date as a procedure for prospectively remedying ongoing infringements of EU law by the Member States, and not, as essentially requested in the present case, to obtain a retrospective declaration of a breach ( 15 ) coupled with a request for compensation, namely, an exact and specific sum of money.
46. \| Po svoji naravi se torej tožba Komisije nanaša na zahtevek za povračilo škode, ki jo je država članica domnevno povzročila proračunu Unije, vendar je vložena kot tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti iz člena 258 PDEU. Zato je treba ugotoviti, ali je tak zahtevek mogoč glede na besedilo, namen in celoten sistem postopka zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti. Če bi se izkazalo, da ni tako, bi bilo treba to tožbo zavreči kot nedopustno.	46. \| By its nature, therefore, the Commission’s action embodies a claim for compensation of damage allegedly caused to the EU budget by a Member State, brought as an Article 258 TFEU infringement claim. It must therefore be established whether such a claim is possible in the light of the wording, purpose and overall scheme of the infringement procedure. Should that prove not to be the case, the present action would have to be dismissed as inadmissible.
B. Ali je v tožbi zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti mogoče zahtevati odškodnino?	B. Claiming compensation for damages in an infringement action?
47. \| Menim, da ni mogoče izključiti ugotovitve, da je država članica kršila pravo Unije, ker ni povrnila izgub, ki jih je povzročila proračunu Unije. Povedano drugače, v besedilu, namenu ali sistemu postopka zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti ne najdem ničesar, kar bi Komisiji preprečevalo, da zahteva odškodnino v skladu s členom 258 PDEU (1). Vendar če se vloži taka tožba, je treba dejansko škodo, ki je nastala Evropski uniji s konkretno kršitvijo (konkretnimi kršitvami) prava Unije, ki jo (jih) je mogoče pripisati državi članici, dokazati v skladu s standardom, ki je primeren za odškodninsko tožbo (2), prav tako pa je treba upoštevati razliko med tako tožbo in konkretnimi pravili, ki veljajo na področju tradicionalnih lastnih sredstev (3).	47. \| In my view, it cannot be ruled out that a Member State could be found in breach of EU law for failure to compensate for losses it has caused to the EU budget. In other words, I see nothing in the text, purpose or system of the infringement procedure that would preclude the Commission from claiming compensation under Article 258 TFEU (1). If such an action is brought, however, the existence of actual damage caused to the European Union by specific infringements(s) of EU law attributable to a Member State must be established to a standard that is appropriate for an action for damages (2), and it must also respect the difference between such an action and the specific rules applicable in the field of traditional own resources (3).
1. Splošne ugotovitve	1. General considerations
48. \| Čeprav Združeno kraljestvo in Kraljevina Nizozemska nista izrecno trdila, da je zadeva nedopustna, pa sta nasprotovala možnosti, da bi država članica finančno odgovarjala za izgube, ki bi jih proračunu Unije povzročile njene ČDO. Eden glavnih argumentov, ki sta jih navedli ti državi članici, je, da za tako finančno odgovornost ni nobene izrecne pravne podlage. Seveda niti carinski zakonik niti sistem lastnih sredstev ali katera koli druga določba sekundarne ali primarne zakonodaje ne vsebujejo izrecnega določila o finančni odgovornosti države članice za izgubo, ki je bila povzročena proračunu Unije in je nastala v drugi državi članici.	48. \| Even though they have not expressly claimed that the case is inadmissible, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands have opposed the possibility for a Member State to be held financially liable for losses caused to the EU budget by its OCTs. One of the main arguments adduced by those Member States is that such financial liability does not have any explicit legal basis. Indeed, neither the Customs Code, nor the system of own resources nor any other provision of secondary or primary law contains any express provision on the financial liability of a Member State for loss caused to the EU budget incurred in another Member State.
49. \| Ni mogoče zanikati, da ni jasne pravne podlage za zahtevek, na podlagi katerega bi države članice odgovarjale za izgube v okoliščinah, kakršne so te v obravnavani zadevi. Vendar preden se obravnava kakršna koli taka (domnevna ali resnična) materialna pravna praznina, je treba preučiti splošnejše postopkovno vprašanje, ki je osnova za samo naravo tožbe v tem postopku: ali je na podlagi člena 258 PDEU mogoče zahtevati, naj se ugotovi neizpolnitev obveznosti, ker država članica ni povrnila izgub, ki jih je povzročila s kršitvijo prava Unije?	49. \| The lack of clear legal basis for a claim aiming to hold Member States accountable for losses in circumstances such as those in the present case cannot be denied. However, before any such (alleged or real) material lacuna is addressed, a more general procedural question that underlies the very nature of the action in these proceedings needs to be addressed: is it possible to seek, through Article 258 TFEU, a declaration of a failure to fulfil obligations due to lack of compensation for losses caused by a Member State through a breach of EU law?
50. \| Vprašanje odgovornosti držav članic v razmerju do Evropske unije ni nepoznano. Sodišče ga je obravnavalo vsaj teoretično, ko je navedlo, da lahko „ob zamudi pri izpolnjevanju obveznosti in dokončni zavrnitvi obstaja stvaren interes za sodbo Sodišča v okviru [postopka zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti], saj ta lahko določi podlago za odgovornost države članice zaradi neizpolnitve do držav članic, Skupnosti ali zasebnopravnih subjektov“. ( 16 ) O možnosti uporabe postopka zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti kot podlage za odškodninski zahtevek v imenu Evropske unije proti državi članici se je razpravljalo tudi v pravni stroki. ( 17 )	50. \| The issue of the liability of the Member States towards the European Union is not unheard of. At least theoretically it has been contemplated by the Court when stating that ‘in the face of both a delay in the performance of an obligation and a definite refusal, a judgment by the Court under [infringement proceedings] may be of substantive interest as establishing the basis of a responsibility that a Member State can incur as a result of its default, as regards Member States, the Community or private parties’. ( 16 ) The possibility of using infringement proceedings as the basis of a claim for compensation on behalf of the European Union against a Member State has also been discussed in the legal scholarship. ( 17 )
51. \| Členi od 258 do 260 PDEU tvorijo okvir, ki omogoča odkrivanje in sankcioniranje kršitev prava Unije, ki jih storijo države članice. Člen 258 PDEU se nanaša samo na to, da država članica ni „izpolnila neke obveznosti iz Pogodb“. Povedno drugače, v Pogodbi ni ničesar o tem, kakšna je pravzaprav narava pravnega sredstva za neizpolnitev obveznosti, ki ga lahko zahteva Komisija. Glede na ta molk ne vidim razloga, zaradi katerega bi bilo treba izključiti odškodninsko tožbo, ki jo v imenu Evropske unije vloži Komisija proti državi članici na podlagi člena 258 PDEU, saj obstajajo precej prepričljivi sistemski argumenti, da se taka možnost dopusti.	51. \| Articles 258 to 260 TFEU make up a framework to allow the detection and sanctioning of infringements of EU law committed by the Member States. Article 258 TFEU refers only to the failure by the Member State to ‘fulfil an obligation under the Treaties’. In other words, the Treaty is silent as to the exact nature of remedy to an infringement that may be requested by the Commission. In view of this silence, I do not see why an action for compensation brought by the Commission in the name of the European Union against a Member State under Article 258 TFEU should be excluded, there being rather compelling systemic arguments to admit such a possibility.
52. \| Prvič, glede na besedilo Pogodb v členih od 258 do 260 PDEU – oziroma kateri koli določbi Pogodbe – ni ničesar, kar bi izključevalo možnost presoje obstoja in kršitve take obveznosti povrniti škodo po postopku zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti. Tovrstna tožba bi bila skladna z namenom in postopkovnimi omejitvami postopkov zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, saj bi se z njo od Sodišča zahtevalo, naj ugotovi, da država članica ni izpolnila obveznosti povrniti škodo, in dejansko ne bi pripeljala do tega, da bi se naložilo plačilo te škode. ( 18 )	52. \| First, looking at the wording of the Treaties, there is nothing in Articles 258 to 260 TFEU — or any other Treaty provision for that matter — precluding the possibility of assessing the existence and breach of such an obligation to compensate through infringement proceedings. An action of that kind would fit within the purpose and procedural limitations of infringement procedures, since it would seek a declaration from the Court that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation to compensate and it would not, indeed, amount to an order to pay. ( 18 )
53. \| Drugič, na sistemski ravni bi bilo težko izpodbijati, da je dolžnost povrniti potencialne izgube, povzročene Evropski uniji, konkretnejši izraz splošne obveznosti povrniti kakršno koli škodo, ki je vodilno načelo vsakega sistema javnega, zasebnega in mednarodnega prava. ( 19 )	53. \| Second, on a systemic level, it would be hardly contested that the duty to compensate for potential losses caused to the European Union is the more specific expression of the general obligation to make good any wrong, the latter being a guiding principle of any system of public, private and international law. ( 19 )
54. \| V pravu Unije člen 340 PDEU določa, da Unija v skladu s splošnimi načeli, ki so skupna pravnim ureditvam držav članic, nadomesti kakršno koli škodo, ki so jo povzročile njene institucije ali njeni uslužbenci. V sodni praksi Sodišča je bilo na podlagi splošnih načel, ki so skupna državam članicam, in s sklicevanjem na dolžnost lojalnega sodelovanja ( 20 ) poleg tega priznano, da je načelo odgovornosti države za škodo, povzročeno posameznikom zaradi kršitev prava Unije, vsebovano v sistemu Pogodb. ( 21 )	54. \| In EU law, Article 340 TFEU states that the Union shall ‘in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States’ make good any damage caused by its institutions or officials. The case-law of the Court has furthermore recognised, drawing from the general principles common to the Member States and relying on the duty of sincere cooperation, ( 20 ) the principle of State liability for damages caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law to be inherent in the system of the Treaties. ( 21 )
55. \| Vendar menim, da je bistveno, da se v zvezi z zadnjo izjavo jasno poudari ena ključna razlika. Ugotovitev, da neobstoj izrecne pravne (postopkovne ali materialne) podlage ni zadosten razlog, ki bi izključil obstoj obveznosti povrniti škodo, se je očitno nanašala na določanje načela odgovornosti držav članic za škodo, povzročeno posameznikom (sistemska raven). Ugotovitev se ni nanašala na dolžnost navesti jasno pravno obveznost v posameznem primeru, ki naj bi pripeljala do odgovornosti države (raven konkretnega primera). ( 22 )	55. \| I think it is vital, however, with regard to the latter statement, to clearly underline one key difference. The statement that the absence of an explicit legal (procedural or material) basis is not a sufficient enough reason to rule out the existence of an obligation to compensate was clearly made with regard to the establishing of the principle of Member States’ liability for damage caused to individuals (systemic level). It was not made with regard to the duty of stating a clear legal obligation in the individual case that is supposed to give rise to State liability (specific case level). ( 22 )
56. \| Tretjič in zadnjič, možnost, da države članice finančno odgovarjajo Uniji za kršitve prava Unije, bi bilo mogoče razumeti tudi, kot da zapolnjuje neki vakuum v sistemu odgovornosti za kršitve prava Unije. Druge možnosti v ureditvi odgovornosti za kršitve prava Unije so namreč že določene. Odgovornost Evropske unije je zagotovljena s členom 340 PDEU. V teoriji bi lahko tudi države članice uporabile to pravno podlago za sprožitev odškodninskih postopkov proti Uniji. ( 23 ) Odgovornost držav članic v razmerju do posameznikov je zagotovljena z zgoraj omenjenim načelom odgovornosti države. Nazadnje, odgovornost fizičnih in pravnih oseb za kršitve prava Unije je predmet nacionalnih pravil o civilnopravni odgovornosti. ( 24 )	56. \| Third, the possibility to hold Member States financially liable for breaches of EU law towards the Union could also be seen as filling a certain vacuum in the system of responsibility for breaches of EU law. Indeed, the other possibilities in the constellation of liability for breaches of EU law have already been provided for. Liability of the European Union is ensured through Article 340 TFEU. Member States could also, in theory, make use of that legal basis to commence proceedings for damages against the Union. ( 23 ) Liability of Member States towards individuals is ensured through the principle of State liability mentioned above. Finally, individual liability of physical and legal persons for infringements of EU law is subject to national rules of civil liability. ( 24 )
57. \| Edini scenarij, ki še preostane, je torej res odgovornost države članice za škodo, povzročeno Uniji s kršitvijo prava Unije. Vendar bi bilo mogoče trditi, da v zvezi s tem ni nobene pravne praznine, saj je ta sistem odgovornosti lahko krit s splošnim sistemom odgovornosti držav članic. ( 25 ) V skladu s takim pristopom bi morala Evropska unija tako kot posamezniki tožiti pred sodišči te države članice zaradi odgovornosti te države članice.	57. \| The only remaining scenario is thus indeed the liability of a Member State for damages caused to the European Union by the breach of EU law. It could however be argued that there is no lacuna in this regard, as that system of liability may be covered by the general system of State liability of the Member States. ( 25 ) According to such an approach, the European Union should sue in the courts of that Member State, for (State?) liability of that Member State, in the same way as individuals.
58. \| Čeprav bi si bilo tak scenarij mogoče predstavljati v primerih, ki se nanašajo na civilnopravno odgovornost države članice zunaj njenih (javnopravnih) dolžnosti in obveznosti, ki jih ima kot članica Unije do Unije, ( 26 ) ne bi bil preveč smiseln oziroma sploh ne bi bil smiseln v zadevah, kakršna je obravnavana, v katerih gre dejansko za institucionalne in ustavne spore med Evropsko unijo in njenimi članicami, ki imajo zgolj določene denarne posledice za državo članico. Ti zadnjenavedeni primeri seveda spadajo v pristojnost sodišč Evropske unije. Poleg tega je tudi res, da je, formalno gledano, tožba, ki jo je Komisija vložila, tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti v skladu s členom 258 PDEU, za katero je Sodišče zagotovo pristojno.	58. \| Although such a scenario could be conceivable for cases concerning civil liability of a Member State outside of its (public law) duties and obligations as a Member of the Union towards the EU, ( 26 ) it would make little or rather no sense in cases like the present one, which are effectively institutional and constitutional disputes between the European Union and its Members, which simply have certain monetary implications for the Member State. The latter types of cases are indeed the inherent domain of the EU Courts. Moreover, it is also true that, formally speaking, the action was brought by the Commission as an infringement action under Article 258 TFEU, for which the Court certainly has jurisdiction.
59. \| Poleg tega je mogoče dodati, da se tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, ki temelji na tem, da države članice niso povrnile izgub, ki so jih povzročile, lepo prilega celotnemu sistemu in sobesedilu členov od 258 do 260 PDEU. Zlasti je taka možnost v skladu s končnim ciljem postopkov zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, ki je „doseči dejansko odpravo neizpolnitev obveznosti držav članic in njihovih [preteklih in prihodnjih] posledic“. ( 27 )	59. \| Moreover, it might be added that an infringement action based on the failure of Member States to compensate losses caused by them seems to fit well in the overall scheme and context of Articles 258 to 260 TFEU. In particular, such a possibility is in line with the ultimate objective of infringement proceedings, which is to ‘achieve the practical elimination of infringements and the consequences thereof’, past and future. ( 27 )
60. \| Navsezadnje bi možnost, da se prosi ne samo za ugotovitev kršitve Pogodbe, ampak tudi za ugotovitev neizpolnitve obveznosti povrnitve škode zaradi te konkretne kršitve Pogodbe, prispevala k skladnosti sistema. Precej res je namreč, da bolj „tradicionalna“ tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, usmerjena proti osnovni kršitvi prava Unije, ki je povzročila škodo, ( 28 ) v konkretnih okoliščinah te in podobnih zadev ne bi bila prav smiselna iz dveh razlogov.	60. \| Eventually, the possibility to ask not only for the declaration of an infringement of the Treaty, but also for the declaration of a failure to compensate because of that specific breach of the Treaty, would also add to the coherence of the system. Indeed, it is quite true that a more ‘traditional’ infringement action aimed at the underlying breach of EU law giving rise to the damage ( 28 ) would, in the particular constellation of the present and similar cases, not make much sense, for two reasons.
61. \| Na eni strani bi bil postopek „dva v enem“ učinkovitejši v primerih, v katerih sta škodo povzročila dogodek ali praksa, ki sta se že končala, ko je bilo izdano obrazloženo mnenje. V teh okoliščinah ugotovitev neizpolnitve obveznosti, ki je omejena na kršitev materialnopravne obveznosti (v tem primeru prvotna ali vmesna kršitev), ne bi bila posebno uporabna. To je še posebej tako na posebnem področju lastnih sredstev, kjer uveljavljanje materialnopravne kršitve prava Unije ločeno od njenih finančnih posledic ne bi bilo zelo smiselno. ( 29 ) Zato je v konkretnih zadevah na tem področju pogosto nujno vložiti tožbe, v katerih so posledice kršitve prava Unije že takoj sam predmet kršitve. Vendar je to zopet popolnoma logično in očitno povezano s strukturo take zadeve: tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, ker izguba ni bila povrnjena, kakor v obravnavani zadevi, je funkcionalno enakovredna tožbi zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti dati na razpolago lastna sredstva, ki jih dolguje država članica.	61. \| On the one hand, a ‘two-in-one’ procedure would be more effective in cases where the damage has been caused by an event or practice, which has already come to an end at the time when the reasoned opinion is issued. In those situations a declaration of an infringement that is limited to the breach of the material obligation (in this case, the original or the intermediate breaches) would serve little purpose. This is particularly the case in the specific field of own resources, where claiming the material breach of EU law separately from its financial consequences does not make much sense. ( 29 ) This often makes it necessary, in the specific cases in this field, to launch actions in which the consequences of the breach of EU law constitute from the outset the very subject of the infringement. But that again is entirely logical, and clearly connected with structure of such a case: an infringement action for not compensating a loss, such as the one in the present case, is functionally equivalent to an infringement action for failure to make own resources that are owed by a Member State available.
62. \| Na drugi strani je res, da člen 260(1) PDEU zajema obveznost države članice, da sprejme vse ukrepe, potrebne za izvršitev sodbe Sodišča, s katero je bila ugotovljena neizpolnitev obveznosti. Ti ukrepi bi lahko navsezadnje vključevali obveznost povrniti nastale izgube. ( 30 ) Vendar je prav tako res, da Sodišče ne more predpisati, kakšni morajo biti ti ukrepi, ( 31 ) ki jih morajo sprejeti države članice, da bi odpravile neizpolnjevanje obveznosti do Unije; to mora še vedno določiti država članica. ( 32 ) Zato bi vprašanje obstoja obveznosti povrniti izgubo še naprej ostalo odprto.	62. \| On the other hand, it is true that Article 260(1) TFEU entails the obligation of the Member State to take all the necessary measures to comply with a judgment of the Court that has found an infringement. Those measures could eventually include the obligation to compensate the ensuing losses. ( 30 ) However, it is also true that the nature of those measures to be taken by the Member States in order to put an end to their failure to fulfil EU obligations cannot be prescribed by the Court, ( 31 ) and remain to be determined by the Member State. ( 32 ) Therefore, the issue about the existence of an obligation to compensate the loss would still be outstanding.
63. \| S formalnega vidika je prav tako res, da bi se z naslednjo tožbo na podlagi člena 260(2) PDEU ponudila možnost, da se preveri, ali je država članica izpolnila svoje obveznosti v skladu s prejšnjo sodbo, vključno z obveznostjo povrniti izgube. Vendar se v tem predlogu ne upošteva logika tožbe zaradi nepovrnitve izgub proračuna Unije, ki jih je temu proračunu povzročila država članica, v kateri je ugotavljanje in ocena izgub, tako kot v vsaki drugi odškodninski tožbi, del odločanja o temelju zadeve. Taka presoja se zelo razlikuje od vsake morebitne naknadne preučitve, ali se je ravnalo v skladu s prejšnjo sodbo ali ne (kot predmet izvršbe), ( 33 ) kot je v primeru presoje na podlagi člena 260 PDEU. Poleg tega, če bi se vprašanje povrnitve izgub postavilo samo v primeru nepravilnega izvajanja sodbe Sodišča, bi se država članica z vprašanjem povrnitve izgub Evropski uniji prvič srečala na tej stopnji, hkrati pa bi se srečala s sankcijami, ki bi izhajale iz uporabe tega člena (katerih namen pa nikakor ni povrnitev škode ali izgub).	63. \| Formally speaking, it is also true that a subsequent action on the basis of Article 260(2) TFEU could offer the possibility to check whether a Member State has fulfilled its duties under a previous judgment, including an obligation to compensate for losses. That suggestion, however, disregards the logic of an action for failure to compensate the EU budget for losses caused to the latter by a Member State, in which the establishment and quantification of losses is, as in any other compensation/damages action, a part of the decision on the merits of the case. Such an assessment is very different from any potential subsequent examination as to whether a previous judgment has been complied with or not (as a matter of enforcement), ( 33 ) as is the case of assessment under Article 260 TFEU. Moreover, if the issue of compensation for losses would arise only as a matter of improper implementation of a judgment of the Court, the Member State would be confronted for the first time with the issue of compensation for losses to the European Union at this stage, while at the same time facing sanctions that may flow from the application of that article (which do not aim, in any case, at the compensation of damage or losses).
64. \| Nazadnje, če se sistem razpoložljivih pravnih poti, ki velja v Uniji, obravnava širše in če se prizna, da države članice ne morejo izpodbijati veljavnosti opominov, ki – tako kot v obravnavanem primeru – od države članice zahtevajo, da da na razpolago znesek iz naslova lastnih sredstev, izgubljenih v drugi državi članici, ( 34 ) morajo države članice imeti pravico izpodbijati utemeljenost take obveznosti pred sodišči Unije v okviru postopkov zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti. ( 35 ) Zato mora biti na stopnji postopka zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti iz člena 258 PDEU vse zatrjevane kršitve prava Unije, vključno s prvotnimi kršitvami, ki so osnova, mogoče podvreči pravnemu nadzoru.	64. \| Finally, from a broader consideration of the EU system of available legal avenues, if it is admitted that Member States cannot contest the validity of letters of formal notice which, as in the present case, request a Member State to make available a sum under the concept of own resources lost in another Member State, ( 34 ) Member States must be entitled to challenge the merits of such an obligation before the EU Courts in the framework of infringement proceedings. ( 35 ) Therefore, at the stage of the Article 258 TFEU infringement procedure, all the alleged breaches of EU law, including the original, underlying ones, must be open to legal review.
2. Elementi, ki jih je treba dokazati	2. Elements to be established
65. \| Tako niti v besedilu Pogodb niti v Pogodbah kot celoti ne vidim ničesar, kar bi per se preprečevalo Komisiji, da prosi za pristop „dva v enem“ v okviru postopka iz člena 258 PDEU. In sicer za ugotovitev nezakonitosti določenega ravnanja, ki ga je mogoče pripisati državi članici, in hkrati za ugotovitev neizpolnitve obveznosti povrniti izgube proračunu Unije, ki izvirajo iz te nezakonitosti.	65. \| Thus, I do not see anything, either in the text of the Treaties or the Treaties as a whole, that would preclude, per se, the Commission from asking for a ‘two-in-one’ approach within the Article 258 TFEU procedure. That would namely be for the declaration of illegality of certain behaviour attributable to a Member State and, simultaneously, for the declaration of the failure to comply with the obligation to compensate for losses to the EU budget arising from that illegality.
66. \| Vendar če se vloži tak zahtevek, se narava take tožbe iz člena 258 PDEU spremeni. Taka tožba ni več „tradicionalna“ abstraktna ugotovitev neizpolnitve države članice. Gre za konkreten primer nezakonitosti, ki naj bi povzročila zelo konkretno škodo proračunu Unije. V bistvu taka tožba postane odškodninska tožba za škodo, ki naj bi jo država članica povzročila Uniji.	66. \| However, if such a claim is brought, the nature of such an Article 258 TFEU action changes. Such an action is no longer the ‘traditional’ abstract declaration of failure by a Member State. It is a specific case of illegality that is said to have caused a very specific amount of damage to the EU budget. It basically becomes an action for damages allegedly caused by a Member State to the European Union.
67. \| Če torej Komisija v imenu Evropske unije prosi, naj se ugotovi, da določen znesek odškodnine za določeno kršitev prava Unije, ki jo je mogoče pripisati državi članici in ki se je zgodila v preteklosti, ni bil povrnjen, potem bi morali za tak zahtevek veljati standardi in dokazi, ki veljajo za tožbo za nepogodbeno odgovornost.	67. \| Thus, if the Commission is asking, on behalf of the European Union, for a declaration of failure to compensate a specific amount of damages for a specific breach of EU law attributable to a Member State that occurred in the past, then that claim shall be subject to the standards and evidence applicable for an action for non-contractual liability.
68. \| Pogoji za odškodninski zahtevek za kršitve prava Unije so se skozi leta združili, ( 36 ) in to upravičeno. Če Komisija dejansko predlaga, naj se ugotovi odgovornost države članice, čeprav je formalno sredstvo za tako tožbo še vedno člen 258 PDEU, ne vidim razloga, zakaj bi se morali ti pogoji ponovno razdružiti. Da bi se vzpostavila nepogodbena odgovornost v pravu Unije, tako na splošno velja, da mora obstajati kršitev pravila prava Unije, s katerim se priznajo pravice. Ta kršitev prava Unije mora biti poleg tega dovolj resna. Škoda mora biti ugotovljena. Med kršitvijo obveznosti, ki je naložena avtorju akta, in škodo, ki je nastala oškodovancu, mora obstajati neposredna vzročna zveza.	68. \| The conditions for a claim for damages for breaches of EU law have converged over the years, ( 36 ) and rightly so. If the Commission is actually asking for a declaration of the Member State’s liability, even if the formal vehicle for bringing such an action is still Article 258 TFEU, I see no reason why those conditions should diverge again. Thus, in general, for extra-contractual liability in EU law to be triggered, there needs to be a breach of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights. That breach of EU law must, moreover, be sufficiently serious. Damage must be established. There must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the injured party.
69. \| Zato menim, da bi morali argumenti, predloženi v okviru tožbe zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, utemeljene s tem, da izgube, povzročene s kršitvijo prava Unije, niso bile povrnjene, izpolnjevati te pogoje. Tovrstni postopki so zaradi svoje narave, in sicer da gre za „dva v enem“, še posebej nejasni v zvezi s pravnimi zahtevami, ki veljajo za obe stopnji. Zlasti obstaja tveganje, da se značilnosti postopkov zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti selektivno vključijo v presojo kršitve prava Unije, zaradi katere naj bi nastala obveznost povrniti škodo.	69. \| That is why, in my view, the arguments submitted in the framework of an infringement action, on the basis of a failure to compensate for losses caused by a breach of EU law, ought to meet those requirements. The ‘two-in-one’ nature of those proceedings makes them particularly prone to confusion as to the legal requirements that correspond to both stages. In particular, there is a risk that the features of infringement procedures are selectively plugged into the assessment of the breach of EU law, arguably giving rise to the obligation to compensate.
70. \| Prvič, tožbe zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti so po svoji naravi objektivne: že samo to, da se obveznost, ki izhaja iz prava Unije, ne izpolni, je dovolj, da se šteje za kršitev. ( 37 ) Subjektivni elementi, kot je krivda ali malomarnost, pri presoji kršitve ne igrajo nobene vloge. ( 38 ) To pa ni tako, če gre za ugotavljanje, ali zaradi kršitve prava Unije nastane obveznost povrniti škodo. Vsaka nezakonitost ne povzroči avtomatično odškodninske odgovornosti. Obstajati mora dovolj resna kršitev, da nastane obveznost povrniti izgube. To pomeni, da je država članica očitno in resno kršila meje svoje diskrecijske pravice. ( 39 ) Dejavniki, ki jih je treba upoštevati pri presoji tega pogoja, vključujejo „jasnost in natančnost kršenega pravila, obseg diskrecijske pravice, ki jo to pravilo pušča nacionalnim organom ali organom [Unije], ali je bila kršitev ali škoda storjena oziroma povzročena namenoma ali nenamerno, ali je bila morebitna napačna uporaba prava opravičljiva ali neopravičljiva, morebitno dejstvo, da je ravnanje institucije [Unije] lahko pripomoglo k opustitvi, sprejetju ali nadaljnji uporabi nacionalnih ukrepov ali praks, ki so v nasprotju s pravom [Unije]“. ( 40 )	70. \| First, infringement actions are objective in nature: the mere failure to comply with an EU obligation is in itself sufficient to constitute a breach. ( 37 ) Subjective elements such as fault, or negligence do not play any role in the assessment of the breach. ( 38 ) By contrast, this is not the case when it comes to establishing whether a breach of EU law gives rise to an obligation to compensate. Not every illegality automatically gives rise to liability. A sufficiently serious breach must exist in order to trigger an obligation to compensate for losses. This entails a manifest and serious disregard by the Member State for the limits to its discretion. ( 39 ) Factors to be taken into account when assessing that condition include ‘the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or [EU] authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by [an EU] institution may have contributed towards the omission, and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to [EU] law’. ( 40 )
71. \| Drugič, v primeru vložitve „tradicionalne“ tožbe na podlagi člena 258 PDEU Komisiji ni treba dokazati konkretnega pravnega interesa: namen postopka zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti ni zaščititi pravice te institucije. ( 41 ) Nasprotno, če se uveljavlja pravica do odškodnine v določenem znesku, ki je posledica konkretne kršitve prava Unije, je treba dokazati obstoj konkretne pravice Evropske unije ( 42 ) ter tej ustrezajočo in jasno opredeljeno obveznost na strani držav članic, ki bi bila kršena in bi povzročila to konkretno škodo, za katero se zahteva odškodnina.	71. \| Second, in bringing a ‘traditional’ claim under Article 258 TFEU, the Commission does not need to show that there is a specific interest in bringing an action: infringement proceedings are not intended to protect the Commission’s own rights. ( 41 ) By contrast, when claiming the right to be compensated for a determined amount that came about as the result of a specific breach of EU law, it is necessary to establish the existence of a specific entitlement of the European Union ( 42 ) and the correlating and clearly defined obligation on the part of the Member States that would have been breached and caused that specific damage for which compensation is requested.
72. \| Tretjič, v okviru postopka zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti mora Komisija dokazati zatrjevano neizpolnitev obveznosti s strani države članice, tako da Sodišču predloži vse dokaze, ki jih to potrebuje za preizkus, ali je ta neizpolnitev podana, ne da bi se samo sklicevala na domneve. ( 43 ) Vendar je glavni cilj tožbe na podlagi člena 258 PDEU, da so države članice prisiljene, da ravnajo v skladu s pravom Unije, ( 44 ) pri tem pa je neobstoj ali obstoj škode ali škodljivih učinkov nepomemben. ( 45 ) Ponovno pa, če Komisija zahteva odškodnino v točno določenem znesku, je treba ne samo ugotoviti nezakonitost, ampak tudi ugotoviti škodo in neposredno vzročno zvezo med nezakonitostjo in to škodo. ( 46 ) Tista stranka, ki poskuša dokazati obstoj odgovornosti, je namreč dolžna predložiti zadosten dokaz o obstoju in obsegu škode, ki jo zatrjuje, ter o tem, ali obstaja dovolj neposredna vzročna zveza med očitanim ravnanjem in zatrjevano škodo. ( 47 )	72. \| Third, within the infringement procedure, it is for the Commission to prove the alleged failure of the Member State to fulfil its obligations by presenting to the Court all the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, without relying on mere presumptions. ( 43 ) However, as the main objective of an Article 258 TFEU action is to bring Member States into compliance with EU law, ( 44 ) the lack of or existence of damage or adverse effects is irrelevant. ( 45 ) Again, by contrast, when it comes to the Commission asking for the compensation of an exact amount of damages, it is necessary not only to establish the illegality, but also to establish the damage and the direct causal link between the illegality and that damage. ( 46 ) Indeed, it is for the party seeking to establish the existence of liability to adduce conclusive proof as to the existence and extent of the damage it alleges, and whether there is a sufficiently direct causal nexus between the conduct objected to and the damage alleged. ( 47 )
73. \| Tako je splošna ugotovitev presenetljivo enostavna: če tožeča stranka dejansko zahteva povrnitev škode, potem mora dokazati škodo v skladu s standardi, ki na splošno veljajo v pravu Unije za tovrstni zahtevek. Del zmešnjave, do katere prihaja v obravnavani zadevi, povzroča dejstvo, da Komisija zahteva ugotovitev „trojne nezakonitosti“ in posledično plačilo točnega zneska odškodnine, pri tem pa trdi, da za vse to veljajo postopkovne zahteve iz člena 258 PDEU, in na splošno ostaja na abstraktni ravni ter naj ji ne bi bilo treba predložiti nobenega dokaza o konkretni škodi, prav tako pa naj ne bi bila zavezana oceniti natančnega zneska zahtevane odškodnine ter vzročne zveze med tem zneskom in zatrjevanimi nezakonitostmi.	73. \| Thus, the overall conclusion is remarkably simple: if a claimant is effectively asking for the compensation of damage, that claimant must establish the damage under the standards applicable under EU law for that type of claim in general. Part of the confusion permeating the present case is caused by the fact that the Commission is asking for the declaration of ‘triple illegality’ and the ensuing payment of an exact amount of compensation while maintaining that this is all subject to the procedural requirements of Article 258 TFEU proceedings, overall remaining at an abstract level and not having to provide evidence as to the specific damage, without being obliged to quantify the precise amount of compensation required and a causal nexus between that amount and the alleged illegalities.
3. Sistem lastnih sredstev	3. The own resources system
74. \| Nazadnje, zadnji element, ki ga je treba pojasniti, je, kakšen pomen ima v zadevi, kakršna je obravnavana, dejstvo, da se zahtevana povrnitev škode (in ena od očitanih nezakonitosti) nanaša na posebno področje lastnih sredstev Unije.	74. \| Finally, the last element to be clarified is what significance arises, in a case like the present one, from the fact that the compensation requested (and one of the illegalities alleged) relate to the specific field of EU own resources.
75. \| V skladu s sistemom lastnih sredstev morajo države članice določiti pravico Unije do lastnih sredstev, takoj ko njihovi carinski organi lahko izračunajo znesek dajatev, ki izhajajo iz carinskega dolga, in določijo dolžnika neodvisno od vprašanja, ali so izpolnjena merila za uporabo člena 220(2)(b) Carinskega zakonika. ( 48 ) Država članica je lahko oproščena te obveznosti samo, če so izpolnjeni pogoji, določeni v členu 17(2) Uredbe št. 1552/89 (višja sila ali če so zneski neizterljivi iz razlogov, ki jih ni mogoče pripisati državi članici). ( 49 )	75. \| Under the system of own resources, Member States are required to establish the EU’s own resources as soon as their customs authorities are in a position to calculate the amount of duties arising from a customs debt and to determine the debtor regardless of whether the criteria for the application of Article 220(2)(b) of the Customs Code are met. ( 48 ) It is only the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in Article 17(2) of Regulation No 1552/89 (force majeure or where there are irrecoverable amounts for reasons that are not attributable to the Member State) which enables a Member State to discharge itself from that obligation. ( 49 )
76. \| Argument, ki ga je navedla Komisija v okviru tega postopka, se v bistvu osredotoča na predlog, da bi moral ta sistem veljati tudi za Združeno kraljestvo in/ali Angvilo, ki je pod nadzorom te države članice.	76. \| The argument advanced by the Commission in the context of the present proceedings essentially boils down to suggesting that this regime should also be applicable to the United Kingdom, and/or to Anguilla, which is under the control of that Member State.
77. \| To stališče se mi zdi zelo sporno. Komisija pravzaprav zahteva ex post uporabo zelo posebnega sistema na podlagi dvojne analogije: ne samo, da ta sistem oddalji od trenutka, ko carinski dolg običajno nastane (ob vstopu na ozemlje Unije), ampak meni, da se ta sistem uporabi za drugo državo članico, in ne tisto, ki običajno nosi to breme (to je država članica, prek ozemlja katere je bil uvoz opravljen).	77. \| I find that approach highly questionable. The Commission is simply asking for an ex post application of a very specific regime by a double analogy: not only shifting it from the moment that the customs debt normally occurs (at the moment of entry into the territory of the Union) but also making that regime applicable to a Member State other than the one on which the burden normally lies (that is, the Member State through the territory of which the imports effectively took place).
78. \| Mislim, da taka analogija ni mogoča. Prvič, vse zadeve, ki jih Komisija navaja v podporo temu predlogu, se nanašajo na položaje, v katerih država članica ni izpolnila svojih obveznosti, ki jih ima na podlagi sistema lastnih sredstev. ( 50 ) Povedano drugače, šlo je za nesporno dolžnost zadevne države članice, ki je bila tudi država članica uvoza, da da znesek lastnih sredstev na razpolago. Vendar se ta zadeva ne nanaša na obveznosti, ki jih konkretne določbe o lastnih virih Unije nalagajo Združenemu kraljestvu. ( 51 ) Ta zadeva se nanaša na obveznost povrniti škodo na podlagi načela lojalnega sodelovanja z vidika izgub, nastalih v drugi državi članici.	78. \| I do not think that such an analogy is possible. First of all, the cases cited by the Commission in support of that proposition all refer to situations in which a Member State had failed to comply with its own obligations under the own resources regime. ( 50 ) In other words, it was unquestionably the duty of the Member State in question, who was also the Member State of importation, to make the amount of own resources owed available. However, this case is not about the obligations imposed on the United Kingdom by the specific provisions on EU own resources. ( 51 ) This case is about an obligation to compensate, based on the principle of sincere cooperation with regard to losses incurred in another Member State.
79. \| Komisija poskuša v tožbi to sodno prakso uporabiti za položaj, ki ni povezan z obveznostmi, določenimi tako v Carinskem zakoniku kot tudi v Uredbi št. 1552/89. ( 52 ) Združenemu kraljestvu poskuša pripisati izgubo lastnih sredstev, do katere je prišlo v Italiji, na podlagi člena 220(2)(b) in člena 239 Carinskega zakonika, verjetno ( 53 ) ob upoštevanju, da Italija ne bi mogla izterjati dajatev iz razlogov, ki jih ni mogoče pripisati njej, v smislu člena 17(2) Uredbe št. 1522/98.	79. \| By its action, the Commission seeks to apply that case-law to a situation outside the obligations laid down both in the Customs Code and in Regulation No 1552/89. ( 52 ) It seeks to attribute to the United Kingdom the losses of own resources incurred in Italy through the application of Article 220(2)(b) and Article 239 of the Customs Code, arguably ( 53 ) having in mind that Italy could not recover duties for reasons that cannot be made attributable to it, within the meaning of Article 17(2) of Regulation No 1522/98.
80. \| To pomeni dvojni problem. Prvič, obveznost, ki jo pravo Unije predvideva za eno državo članico, v bistvu preide na drugo. Drugič, to prav tako pomeni, da se avtomatično in brez dodatnega preverjanja državi članici naloži obveznost plačila zneskov, ki jih določi druga država članica.	80. \| This presents a double problem. First, the obligation provided for by EU law for one Member State is essentially shifted to another. Second, this also means automatically, and with no further verification, imposing on a Member State the obligation to pay sums determined by another Member State.
81. \| Zdi se, da je Komisija pri obrazložitvi te točke prezrla dejstvo, da za morebitno obveznost povrniti izgube, ki so nastale v drugi državi članici, ne veljajo posebna pravila ureditve lastnih sredstev. Ker zadeva ne spada na področje obveznosti, ki so izrecno določene s sistemom lastnih sredstev, je treba uporabiti splošna pravila o ugotavljanju škode. V tem okviru se Komisija ne more enostavno sklicevati na pravila prava Unije na področju lastnih sredstev, ki veljajo za drugačen položaj, zato da bi bilo izgube (in njihovo oceno) mogoče avtomatično pripisati drugi državi članici.	81. \| In its reasoning on this point, the Commission seems to be overlooking the fact that an eventual obligation of compensation of losses incurred in another Member State is not governed by the specific rules of the own resources regulation. As the case finds itself outside the scope of the obligations explicitly established by the system of own resources, the general rules regarding the establishment of damage must apply. In this context, the Commission cannot simply refer to the rules of EU law in the field of own resources, applicable to a different situation, in order to make losses (and their quantification) automatically attributable to another Member State.
82. \| Razumem, da bi Komisija lahko imela težave v zvezi z dokaznim bremenom pri dokazovanju takega zahtevka, še posebej če se ta zahtevek razume tako, da se uveljavlja odgovornost države članice, kot je bilo navedeno v prejšnjem oddelku. Uporaba pogojev iz Carinskega zakonika, v skladu s katerimi je carine mogoče odpustiti ali ne pobrati, ( 54 ) in možnost uporabe člena 17(2) Uredbe št. 1552/89 ( 55 ) sta namreč precej odvisni od presoje države članice, ki bi morala določiti pravico do zadevnih lastnih sredstev.	82. \| I do understand the difficulties of evidentiary burden that might arise for the Commission in establishing such a claim, especially if that claim is to be seen as relating to Member State liability, as suggested in the previous section. Indeed, the application of the conditions of the Customs Code under which customs duties can be remitted or not collected, ( 54 ) as well as the triggering of Article 17(2) of Regulation No 1552/89, ( 55 ) depend greatly on the assessment of the Member State which ought to have established the own resources at issue.
83. \| Tako se bo morala Komisija nazadnje, če želi vložiti odškodninski zahtevek zoper drugo državo članico, opreti na informacije, ki jih zagotovi država članica, kjer so izgube nastale. ( 56 ) Potem pa bo naloga Komisije, da se pozanima o takih informacijah in jih preveri, zato da izpolni zgoraj omenjene zahteve. ( 57 ) Vendar menim, da ni mogoče avtomatično uporabiti rezultatov objektivnega sistema lastnih sredstev, ki jih je ustvarila ena država članica, za drugo državo članico, za katero v obravnavani zadevi ne veljajo obveznosti iz Carinskega zakonika niti iz sistema lastnih sredstev.	83. \| Thus, at the end of the day, if the Commission wishes to launch a claim for compensation against another Member State, it will be obliged in that case to rely on the information provided by the Member State where the losses were incurred. ( 56 ) It will then be for the Commission to enquire about and verify such information, in order to fulfil the requirements mentioned above. ( 57 ) What, in my view, is not however possible, is to automatically apply the results of the objective system of own resources created by one Member State to another Member State, to which neither the obligations of the Customs Code nor the own resources system apply in a given case.
84. \| Skratka, to, da se državi članici vsilijo ocene druge države članice o primerljivosti odločb o odpustu ali opustitvi pobiranja carin ter samopresoja o dokončni nezmožnosti izterjave lastnih sredstev skupaj s potencialno spornim obsegom listinskih dokazov, ki dokazujejo znesek zadevnih dolgov, je brez kakršne koli pravne podlage. Prav tako pa bi to pomenilo precejšnja tveganja za nemoteno delovanje sistema lastnih sredstev, ki izvirajo iz pobiranja carin, saj ne upošteva njegove logike in pripisovanja obveznosti in odgovornosti v okviru tega sistema. Nazadnje bi to prav tako povzročilo resne težave v zvezi s spoštovanjem pravice do obrambe zadevne države članice, saj dejansko nikoli ne bi bilo mogoče izpodbijati presoje in ocen prvotne države članice.	84. \| In sum, imposing on one Member State the estimates made by another on both the comparability of decisions on remission or waiving collection of customs duties, and the self-assessment of the definitive impossibility to recover own resources, together with a potentially questionable level of documentary evidence establishing the amount of debts in question, not only lacks any legal basis, but also entails significant risks for the smooth functioning of the system of own resources flowing from the collection of customs, because it disrespects its logic and the attribution of obligations and responsibility within that system. Finally, it would also pose serious issues with regard to the respect of the rights of the defence of the Member State in question, since the assessment and estimates made by the original Member State would in fact never be challengeable.
C. Uporaba v obravnavani zadevi	C. Application to the present case
85. \| Komisija trdi, da Združeno kraljestvo ni izpolnilo svojih obveznosti na podlagi načela lojalnega sodelovanja. Do tega je prišlo, ker ni povrnilo izgube zneska lastnih sredstev, ki bi morala biti določena in dana na razpolago proračunu Unije v skladu z Uredbo št. 1552/89, če izvozna potrdila EXP za uvoz aluminija z Angvile v obdobju od 1999 do 2000 ne bi bila izdana s kršitvijo člena 101(2) Sklepa ČDO.	85. \| The Commission claims that the United Kingdom has failed to fulfil its obligations under the principle of sincere cooperation. That has occurred because it has not compensated the loss of an amount of own resources, which should have been established and made available to the Union’s budget under Regulation No 1552/89, had EXP certificates not been issued in breach of Article 101(2) of the OCT Decision for imports of aluminium from Anguilla from 1999 to 2000.
86. \| Da bi se ugotovilo, ali obveznost povrniti izgube lastnih sredstev dejansko ni bila izpolnjena, kot trdi Komisija, je treba preveriti, ali je taka obveznost povrnitve sploh obstajala in ali je bila njena kršitev dovolj resna (1), ali je nato povzročila konkretno in opredeljivo škodo (2) ter ali je obstajala vzročna zveza med nezakonitostjo in povzročeno škodo.	86. \| In order to establish whether there was indeed a failure to comply with the obligation to compensate losses of own resources, as claimed by the Commission, it is necessary to ascertain whether such an obligation to compensate existed in the first place, the breach of which was sufficiently serious (1), which would then cause specific and quantifiable damage (2), and whether there was a causal link between the illegality and the ensuing damage.
87. \| Menim, da tožba Komisije teh zahtev ne izpolnjuje. Komisija ni dokazala nezakonitosti izvoznih potrdil EXP, na katerih temelji spor, sploh pa ne resnosti kršitve, ki se pripisuje Združenemu kraljestvu in ki naj bi bila v tem, da to ni preprečilo ali nadzorovalo izdaje teh potrdil (1). Poleg tega obstajajo tudi očitne pomanjkljivosti pri ugotavljanju in oceni škode (2).	87. \| In my view, the action of the Commission does not fulfil those requirements. The Commission has not demonstrated the unlawful nature of the EXP certificates at the origin of the dispute, let alone the seriousness of the breach attributed to the United Kingdom consisting in not preventing or controlling the issuance of those certificates (1). Moreover, there are also clear shortcomings regarding the establishment and quantification of the damage (2).
1. Nezakonitost (ki pripelje do dovolj resne kršitve)	1. Illegality (amounting to a sufficiently serious breach)
88. \| Komisija trdi, da je dokazano, da so carinski organi na Angvili napačno izdajali izvozna potrdila EXP. Združeno kraljestvo pa ni sprejelo ustreznih ukrepov, da bi to preprečilo. Odgovornost Združenega kraljestva izhaja iz suverenosti, ki jo ima nad Angvilo. Komisija poudarja, da ima Združeno kraljestvo določeno oblast nad Angvilo na podlagi ustavnega prava te države članice, vendar pa ta država članica ni ustrezno ukrepala. Med drugim dejstvo, da je FCO prosilo HMRC, naj izvede preiskavo, kaže na to, da je Združeno kraljestvo imelo pooblastilo, da ukrepa. Poleg tega je Združeno kraljestvo, kljub temu da se je FCO zavedalo položaja že februarja 1998, UCLAF obvestilo šele novembra 1998. Če bi se Združeno kraljestvo odzvalo takoj, ko je UCLAF izdala obvestilo o medsebojni pomoči februarja 1999, bi bilo izgube mogoče preprečiti. Ustrezno ukrepanje Združenega kraljestva bi pripeljalo do intervencije, da bi se preprečila izguba lastnih sredstev.	88. \| The Commission argues that it is established that EXP certificates were wrongly issued by the customs authorities in Anguilla. The United Kingdom failed to take the appropriate measures to prevent this from occurring. The responsibility of the United Kingdom emanates from the sovereignty it has over Anguilla. The Commission emphasises that the United Kingdom has certain powers over Anguilla under that Member State’s constitutional law, but that that Member State took insufficient action. Inter alia, the fact that the FCO asked HMRC to conduct an investigation demonstrates that the United Kingdom was empowered to take action. Moreover, even though the FCO was not unaware of the situation in February 1998, the United Kingdom only informed UCLAF in November 1998. Had the United Kingdom acted promptly when UCLAF issued the mutual assistance communication in February 1999, the losses could have been prevented. Appropriate action by the United Kingdom would have led to intervention to prevent a loss of own resources.
89. \| Združeno kraljestvo nasprotuje trditvam Komisije. Najprej izpodbija, da so bila na Angvili izvozna potrdila EXP napačno izdana. Sporazumi med vlado Angvile in družbo Corbis so se decembra 1998 spremenili. Tako na računih, ki so bili izdani po tem datumu, izvozna nadomestila niso bila več omenjena. Združeno kraljestvo je sprejelo številne ukrepe: HMRC je opravila preiskavo, nato pa je bilo 19. novembra 1998 sprejeto poročilo. Vse podrobnosti ugotovitev so bile posredovane UCLAF šest dni po tem datumu. Upošteven uvoz aluminija je bil izveden 1. aprila 1999 ali po tem, do takrat pa je bilo poročilo Združenega kraljestva že izdano, obvestilo UCLAF o medsebojni pomoči pa je bilo zunaj že šest tednov pred tem. S spremembo v izdajanju računov so bili odpravljeni vsi preostali dvomi na strani Združenega kraljestva.	89. \| The United Kingdom has opposed the arguments of the Commission. It first disputes that the EXP certificates were wrongly issued in Anguilla. The arrangements between the Government of Anguilla and Corbis were modified in December 1998. Thus, invoices issued after that date no longer referred to export shipping allowances. The United Kingdom took a number of measures: there was an investigation by HMRC and, a report was subsequently adopted on 19 November 1998. Full details of the findings were passed to UCLAF six days after that date. The relevant imports of aluminium were made on and after 1 April 1999, and by that time the United Kingdom’s report had already been issued and the mutual assistance communication of UCLAF had been in circulation six weeks before that. The change in invoicing practices dispelled any remaining doubts on the part of the United Kingdom.
90. \| S postopkovnega vidika Združeno kraljestvo poleg tega trdi, da se je vlada Angvile sklicevala na partnerski postopek iz člena 7(7) Priloge III k Sklepu ČDO in je nato imela tristranska srečanja s Komisijo in italijanskimi organi. Komisija bi morala uporabiti ukrepe, določene s Sklepom ČDO, in obravnavati napake, vključno s postopkom reševanja sporov iz člena 235 Sklepa ČDO, ali pa sprejeti zaščitne ukrepe. Ob upoštevanju takrat še nerešenega spora v zvezi z razlago pojma „vračilo carin“ med vlado Angvile in Komisijo ne bi bilo primerno, če bi Združeno kraljestvo ukrepalo naprej.	90. \| Furthermore, as to the procedural dimension, the United Kingdom claims that the partnership procedure of Article 7(7) of Annex III to the OCT Decision was invoked by the Government of Anguilla, which then held tripartite meetings with the Commission and Italian authorities. The Commission should have followed the measures prescribed by the OCT Decision to address the errors, including the dispute resolution procedure of Article 235 of the OCT Decision or by adopting safeguard measures. Having in mind the, at the time, unresolved dispute regarding the interpretation of the concept of ‘refund of customs duties’ between the Government of Anguilla and the Commission, it would not have been appropriate for the United Kingdom to take any further action.
a) Glavna obveznost, katere kršitev je treba dokazati	(a) The main obligation, breach of which must be established
91. \| Tožba Komisije ni jasna glede vprašanja, ali bi bilo treba kršitev Sklepa ČDO pripisati neposredno Združenemu kraljestvu. Kljub temu, da se na nekaterih mestih v tožbi navaja nasprotno, ( 58 ) se zdi, da Komisija ne trdi izrecno, da je treba carinske organe Angvile šteti za britanske organe in da je mogoče nezakonito izdajanje izvoznih potrdil EXP pripisati neposredno Združenemu kraljestvu. Komisija je namreč v svojem odgovoru na intervencijsko vlogo, ki jo je v tej zadevi vložila nizozemska vlada, pojasnila, da ne trdi, da zatrjevane kršitve temeljijo na domnevi, da je Angvila sestavni del Združenega kraljestva. Komisija je, ko je bila na obravnavi izrecno pozvana k pojasnitvi tega vprašanja, potrdila, da namen njene tožbe ni bil ugotoviti, kdo je kršil Sklep ČDO.	91. \| The application of the Commission is not clear regarding the issue of whether the breach of the OCT Decision should be attributable directly to the United Kingdom. Despite some points in its action rather suggesting the contrary, ( 58 ) the Commission does not seem to claim explicitly that the customs authorities of Anguilla are to be considered as British authorities, and that the illegal issuance of EXP certificates is directly attributable to the United Kingdom. Indeed, in its reply to the statement in intervention submitted by the Government of the Netherlands in the present case, the Commission has clarified that it is not its contention that the alleged infringements rest on the premiss that Anguilla is an integral part of the United Kingdom. When asked explicitly for clarification about this point at the hearing, the Commission confirmed that it was not the purpose of its action to determine who had breached the OCT Decision.
92. \| Ne da bi želel zveneti preveč kot pravni formalist, se mi zdi precej težko obravnavati vprašanje dolžnosti povrnitve škode, ne da bi bilo izrecno navedeno, kdo naj bi odgovarjal (odgovorna oseba) in za kaj natančno (kršena pravna obveznost). Menim, da dejstvo, da je ta negotovost zavita v očitno vseobsegajočo dolžnost lojalnega sodelovanja, ne prispeva k zmanjšanju pomanjkanja jasnosti.	92. \| Without wishing to sound too much like a legal formalist, I find it rather difficult to deal with the issue of duty to compensate without being explicitly told who is supposed to be liable (subject of liability) and exactly what for (the legal obligation violated). The fact that this uncertainty is wrapped up in the apparently all-encompassing duty of sincere cooperation does nothing, in my mind, to reduce that lack of clarity.
93. \| Vendar prav tako razumem, zakaj bi Komisija morda želela ostati nejasna v zvezi s tem vprašanjem. Zapletena pravna narava razmerja med ČDO in pravom Unije Komisiji ne olajša zagovarjanja te zadeve. V skladu s členom 355(2) PDEU četrti del Pogodbe, na podlagi katerega se sprejme Sklep ČDO, namreč določa „posebno ureditev glede pridruževanja“, ki se uporablja za ČDO. Ta nejasen ustavni okvir se je razlagal tako, da ustvarja „hibridni status“. ( 59 ) Na eni strani ČDO ni mogoče šteti za del Evropske unije (med drugim za namene prostega pretoka blaga in uporabe carinskih pravil) ( 60 ), in če ni izrecnega sklicevanja, se splošne določbe Pogodbe za ČDO ne uporabljajo. ( 61 ) Na drugi strani pravo ČDO ni ločen pravni sistem, ki bi bil zaščiten pred splošnim sistemom prava Unije. ( 62 ) To pomeni, da se uporabljajo splošna načela in določbe Pogodb, ki so nujne za njegovo operativno delovanje kot del prava Unije ( 63 ) ali ki opredeljujejo njihov obseg s sklicevanjem na subjekte, za katere veljajo. ( 64 )	93. \| However, I also understand why the Commission might have wished to remain vague on this issue. The complex legal nature of the relationship of OCTs with EU law does not make it easy for the Commission to argue this case. Indeed, according to Article 355(2) TFEU, Part Four of the Treaty, on the basis of which the OCT decision is adopted, establishes ‘special arrangements for association’ which apply to OCTs. This unclear constitutional setting has been interpreted as giving rise to a ‘hybrid status’. ( 59 ) On the one hand, OCTs cannot be considered as part of the European Union (for purposes related to free movement of goods and application of customs rules, among others) ( 60 ) and, failing an explicit reference, the general provisions of the Treaty do not apply to OCTs. ( 61 ) On the other hand, the law of the OCTs is not a separate legal system, shielded from the general system of EU law. ( 62 ) This entails the applicability of general principles and provisions of the Treaties which are necessary for its operative functioning as part of EU law, ( 63 ) or which define their scope by reference to the subjects to which they apply. ( 64 )
94. \| V tem okviru je vprašanje odgovornosti za upravne ukrepe ČDO še posebej zapleteno, zlasti če se upošteva, da Sklep ČDO določa posebne poti za obravnavo sporov in nesoglasij, ki bi nastali na njegovem področju uporabe. Prvič, na splošni ravni je vzpostavljen mehanizem partnerstva. ( 65 ) Drugič, v okviru posebnega preferencialnega sistema obstaja sistem upravnega sodelovanja na področju carin s posebnimi obveznostmi glede preverjanja, ki so naložene ČDO in državi članici uvoza. ( 66 ) Posebne pristojnosti so podeljene upravnim organom ČDO na eni strani in zadevni državi članici na drugi strani.	94. \| In this framework, the issue of responsibility for the administrative actions of OCTs is particularly complex, having in mind in particular, that the OCT Decision establishes specific avenues to tackle disputes and disagreements emerging within its scope. First, at the general level, a partnership mechanism is established. ( 65 ) Second, in the particular system of preferential trade, there is a system for administrative cooperation in the field of customs, with specific obligations regarding verification imposed on OCTs and on the Member State of importation. ( 66 ) Specific competences are allocated to the OCT’s administrative authorities on the one hand, and to the concerned Member State, on the other.
95. \| V teh konkretnih okoliščinah se je Komisija odločila, da kršitve Sklepa ČDO (z izdajanjem nepravilnih izvoznih potrdil EXP) ne bo pripisala neposredno Združenemu kraljestvu. Kršitev, ki jo Komisija pripisuje Združenemu kraljestvu kot podlago za njegovo finančno odgovornost za povrnitev izgub, ki se v tem primeru obravnava, je, da ni sprejelo ustreznih ukrepov za preprečevanje in spremljanje kršitev Sklepa ČDO s strani angvilskih carinskih organov.	95. \| It is in this specific context that the Commission has chosen not to attribute the breach of the OCT Decision (through the issuing of incorrect EXP certificates) to the United Kingdom directly. The breach which the Commission attributes to the United Kingdom as the basis of its financial liability to compensate for the losses at issue is that of the failure to take the appropriate measures to prevent, and follow up on, the infringement of the OCT Decision by the Anguillan customs authorities.
96. \| V nasprotju s trditvami Združenega kraljestva menim, da ni dvoma, da imajo države članice, ki imajo poseben odnos s ČDO, obveznost sprejeti vse ustrezne ukrepe za preprečevanje in spremljanje kršitev prava Unije, do katerih lahko pride zaradi ravnanja organov ČDO v okviru sistema pridružitve. Ta splošna obveznost namreč izhaja iz ustavnega načela lojalnega sodelovanja. ( 67 ) Kot splošno načelo, ki velja za medsebojni odnos med Evropsko unijo in državami članicami, mora veljati vedno, ko se uporabi pravo Unije, za kar gre v okviru Sklepa ČDO. Drugače ne more biti, če se upošteva predvsem, da so bile te ČDO na seznam Priloge II, na katero se sklicuje člen 355(2) PDEU, uvrščene na pobudo te države članice in da država članica, ki ima poseben odnos s ČDO, ohrani splošno suverenost nad njimi. Poleg tega je Združeno kraljestvo samo poudarilo pomembnost člena 4 PEU v primeru priznanja dolžnosti Unije, kot je določena v odstavku 2, da spoštuje nacionalno identiteto držav članic. ( 68 ) Zato bi bilo precej protislovno, če bi se trdilo, da se ta določba uporabi v zvezi s četrtim delom PDEU in Sklepom ČDO ter da načela lojalnega sodelovanja, določenega v odstavku 3 iste določbe, ni mogoče uporabiti.	96. \| In my view, contrary to the arguments of the United Kingdom, there can be little doubt that Member States which have special relationships with OCTs have an obligation to take all the appropriate measures to prevent and to follow up on violations of EU law which may arise from the behaviour of the OCT authorities in the framework of the association regime. That overall obligation indeed follows from the constitutional principle of sincere cooperation. ( 67 ) As a general principle governing the mutual relationship between the European Union and the Member States, it must apply whenever EU law applies, as is the case within the context of the OCT Decision. It could not be otherwise, having in mind, above all, that it was upon the initiative of that Member State that that OCT was listed in Annex II to which Article 355(2) TFEU refers, and that the Member State having special relationship with the OCT retains overall sovereignty over them. Furthermore, the United Kingdom itself raises the relevance of Article 4 TEU when it comes to recognising the duty of the European Union, as established in its second paragraph, to respect the national identity of the Member States. ( 68 ) It would be therefore rather contradictory to claim that that provision applies with regard to Part Four of the TFEU and the OCT Decision and that the principle of sincere cooperation, enshrined in paragraph 3 of the very same provision, is off limits.
97. \| Obveznost sprejeti vse ustrezne, splošne ali posebne ukrepe, da se zagotovi izpolnjevanje obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz Sklepa ČDO, zavezuje Združeno kraljestvo. Ta splošna odgovornost se potem logično razširi na vse obveznosti, naložene ČDO. Tako je tudi, če ni izrecne določbe v tem sklepu, ki bi izrecno nalagala dolžnost nadzora (oziroma dvojnega preverjanja) carinskih organov ČDO pri izdajanju izvoznih potrdil EXP.	97. \| The obligation to take all appropriate measures, general or specific, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations resulting from the OCT Decision binds the United Kingdom. That overall responsibility then logically stretches to all the obligations imposed on the OCT. That is so even when there is no express provision in that decision that would explicitly impose a duty to monitor (or rather to double-check) the customs authorities of OCTs in the issuance of EXP certificates.
98. \| Združeno kraljestvo je navedlo ustavnopravne utemeljitve zoper to splošno odgovornost in trdilo, da v skladu z ustavno ureditvijo Združenega kraljestva nima nobenega pooblastila, da bodisi na splošno sprejema zakonodajo za Angvilo bodisi nadzira posamezne upravne odločbe, ki jih izdajo navedeni organi. Kljub tem utemeljitvam bi bilo treba zgolj pripomniti, da dejansko stanje v tej zadevi, ki v tem smislu ni bilo izpodbijano (točke 14, 16 in tudi 89 zgoraj), prikazuje drugačno resničnost. Organi Združenega kraljestva so bili prvi, ki so izvedli preiskave na Angvili, na podlagi katerih se je praksa angvilskih organov očitno spremenila. Posledica te spremembe pri izdajanju računov je bila, da se organom Združenega kraljestva ni zdelo več potrebno, da v njihovem imenu sprejmejo dodatne ukrepe.	98. \| The United Kingdom has advanced constitutional arguments against that overall responsibility, by claiming that under the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements, it has no power whatsoever either to generally legislate for Anguilla or to control individual administrative decisions issued by those authorities. In spite of those arguments, it might be simply noted that the facts of this case which, to that extent, have not been challenged (above, points 14, 16, and also 89), show a different reality. It was the United Kingdom authorities that first carried out investigations in Anguilla, on the basis of which the practice of the Anguillan authorities appears to have changed. As a result of the change in those invoicing practices, the United Kingdom authorities no longer felt a need to take any further action.
99. \| Glede na te izjave in potek dogodkov je precej težko sprejeti navedbe, da Združeno kraljestvo kot država članica, ki dejansko ima poseben odnos z zadevno ČDO, nikakor ni nosilo nobene odgovornosti za posreden nadzor in spremljanje morebitnih kršitev Sklepa ČDO, ki naj bi jih storili angvilski organi.	99. \| In view of such statements and course of events, it is rather difficult to embrace the suggestion that the United Kingdom, as a Member State that does indeed have a special relationship with the OCT in question, was not in any way responsible for indirectly monitoring or following up on potential infringements of the OCT Decision allegedly committed by the Anguillan authorities.
100. \| Vendar dejansko ni nobene potrebe, da bi se to vprašanje dokončno rešilo, iz precej preprostega razloga: vprašanje odgovornosti zaradi neizpolnitve dolžnosti lojalnega sodelovanja, ker niso bili sprejeti ustrezni ukrepi preprečevanja in nadzora, bi se postavilo samo, če bi se ugotovilo, da je bilo očitano ravnanje res nezakonito. Tako v skladu s tem, kar je že bilo navedeno, ( 69 ) nezakonitost izvoznih potrdil EXP, ki se obravnavajo, postane prvi in predhodni korak skupaj z obstojem konkretne škode, ki jo je povzročila obravnavana nezakonitost.	100. \| There is, however, in reality no need to definitively settle that issue, for a rather simple reason: the issue of liability for lack of fulfilment of sincere cooperation for failure to adopt appropriate measures of prevention and control would only arise if it was established that the reproached behaviour was indeed illegal in the first place. Thus, in line with what has already been suggested, ( 69 ) it is the illegal nature of the EXP certificates at issue that becomes the first and preliminary step, together with the existence of specific damage caused by the illegality at issue.
b) Prvotna kršitev	(b) The original breach
101. \| Menim, da Združeno kraljestvo pravilno poudarja, da Komisija ni dokazala na ravni zahtevanega dokaznega standarda, da je bilo 12 izvoznih potrdil EXP, ki so bila izdana leta 1999 in so bila priložena tožbi, neveljavnih, ker je vlada Angvile „v celoti ali deloma [odobrila] oprostitev ali vračilo carin“.	101. \| In my view, the United Kingdom is right to point out that the Commission has not established, to the requisite standard of proof, that the 12 EXP certificates issued in 1999 which were attached to its application were invalid on the basis of the grant by the Government of Anguilla of ‘an exemption from, or a refund of, in whole or in part, customs duties’.
102. \| Kot je Komisija pojasnila na obravnavi, presoja, ali plačila za „storitve, ki jih je opravila družba Corbis“ po decembru 1998, pomenijo nedovoljena vračila, zaradi katerih bi upoštevna izvozna potrdila EXP postala neveljavna, temelji samo na ugotovitvah OLAF v njegovem poročilu iz leta 2003.	102. \| As clarified by the Commission at the hearing, the assessment of whether the payments corresponding to the ‘services rendered by Corbis’ after December 1998 constitute impermissible refunds that would vitiate the relevant EXP certificates, is based only on the findings of OLAF in its report of 2003.
103. \| Seveda ni dvoma, da poročilo OLAF na splošno pomeni dokaz, ki ga Sodišče lahko upošteva. Vendar je potrebnih več logičnih in/ali dokaznih korakov med takim splošnim poročilom in tem, da se šteje za dokazano, da so bila nekatera izvozna potrdila izdana nezakonito. To je zlasti tako, ker je tožena država članica v nasprotju s trditvijo Komisije v postopku pred Sodiščem vedno znova izpodbijala dejstvo, da so bila tista potrdila, ki so bila izdana po spremembi prakse glede izdajanja računov decembra 1998, izdana nezakonito.	103. \| There is of course no doubt that in general, a report by OLAF constitutes evidence that may be taken into account by the Court. There are, however, several argumentative and/or evidentiary steps needed between such a general report and proving that certain export certificates were issued illegally. That is in particular the case since the respondent Member State has, contrary to the Commission’s assertion, in the procedure before this Court, repeatedly disputed the fact that those certificates issued after the change in the invoicing practice in December 1998 had been issued illegally in the first place.
104. \| Zato Komisija ni dokazala z zahtevanim dokaznim standardom, da so nedopustna vračila dejansko vplivala na ta konkretna potrdila, ki so bila priložena njeni tožbi v podporo njenemu odškodninskemu zahtevku.	104. \| As a result, the Commission has not established, to the requisite standard of proof, that those particular certificates that have been attached to its application in support of its claim for compensation have in fact been affected by impermissible refunds.
105. \| Skratka, Komisija ni dokazala nezakonitosti izdajanja izvoznih potrdil EXP po decembru 1998. Ker nezakonitost, ki je podlaga za odškodninski zahtevek, ni bila dokazana, Komisija s svojo tožbo ne more uspeti tako glede tega, da obravnavane izgube niso bile povrnjene, kot tudi glede plačila obresti.	105. \| In sum, the Commission has failed to establish the illegality of the issuance of EXP certificates after December 1998. Since the illegality which forms the basis of the claim for compensation has not been established, the Commission’s action cannot prosper, both with regard to the failure to compensate the losses at issue, and to the failure to pay interest.
106. \| Menim, da bi se lahko obrazložitev Sodišča v zvezi s tožbo zoper Združeno kraljestvo na tej stopnji končala. Vendar želim zaradi celovitosti in tudi zaradi vzporedne tožbe zoper Nizozemsko ( 70 ) dodati še dve zaključni pripombi glede dovolj resne kršitve in opredelitve škode v tej zadevi.	106. \| In my view, the reasoning of the Court with regard to the claim brought against the United Kingdom could end at this stage. However, for the sake of completeness and also in view of the parallel claim against the Netherlands, ( 70 ) where these issues are of greater relevance, I wish to add two closing remarks (also) on the sufficiently serious nature of the breach and the qualification of the damage in the present case.
c) Dovolj resna kršitev?	(c) A sufficiently serious breach?
107. \| V vsakem primeru in ne glede na vprašanje, ali bi bila nezakonitost storjena na „prvotni“ ali morebiti na „vmesni“ stopnji, bi mi bilo dejansko težko navesti, da ravnanje Združenega kraljestva v obravnavani zadevi dosega prag dovolj resne kršitve.	107. \| In any case, even if it were to be found that an illegality was committed at either the ‘original’ or potentially the ‘intermediate’ level, I would indeed find it difficult to suggest that the conduct of the United Kingdom in the present case would reach the threshold of a sufficiently serious breach.
108. \| Stališča strank ( 71 ) in dejstva v obravnavni zadevi ( 72 ) kažejo na to, da je v času upoštevnih dogodkov obstajal še nerešen spor o tem, kaj pomeni „vračilo“ carin v smislu člena 101(2) Sklepa ČDO. Nejasnost pojma „vračilo“ je postala še očitnejša pri naknadni različici Sklepa ČDO, ki je določil metodo za presojo, kaj je dovoljena javna finančna pomoč v okviru sistema pretovarjanja. ( 73 )	108. \| The submissions of the parties, ( 71 ) as well as the facts in the present case, ( 72 ) show that at the time of the relevant events there was an ongoing legal dispute about what constituted a ‘refund’ of customs duties within the meaning of Article 101(2) of the OCT Decision. The lack of clarity on the concept of ‘refunds’ was made even more apparent by the subsequent version of the OCT Decision, which established a method for assessing what constituted permissible public financial aid under the trans-shipment regime. ( 73 )
109. \| Zaradi pomanjkanja jasnosti o tem, kaj se je štelo za „vračilo“ v upoštevnem času, ni mogoče ugotoviti, da bi zatrjevana kršitev, ki naj bi jo storilo Združeno kraljestvo, dosegla prag dovolj resne kršitve. Dejavniki, ki jih je treba upoštevati, da bi se ugotovila „dovolj resna kršitev“, vključujejo jasnost in natančnost kršenega pravila, to, ali je bila morebitna napačna uporaba prava opravičljiva ali neopravičljiva, ali dejstvo, da je ravnanje institucije Unije lahko pripomoglo k opustitvi. ( 74 )	109. \| The lack of clarity on what counted as a ‘refund’ at the relevant time precludes the finding that the alleged breach committed by the United Kingdom would reach the threshold of being sufficiently serious. Indeed, the factors which may be taken into consideration to find a ‘sufficiently serious breach’, include the clarity and precision of the rule breached, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, or the fact that the position taken by an EU institution may have contributed towards the omission. ( 74 )
110. \| Nazadnje, če, kot je bilo zgoraj predlagano, ( 75 ) se glede na dejansko stanje v tej zadevi ne zdi, da Združeno kraljestvo ne bi imelo nobenega pooblastila za ukrepanje v zvezi z nadzorom in spremljanjem morebitnih kršitev Sklepa ČDO s strani angvilskih organov, potem bi bilo treba ista dejstva upoštevati tudi v korist iste države članice. Priznati bi bilo treba, da je ta država članica, ko je odkrila morebitne težave z izvoznimi potrdili na Angvili, razmeroma hitro ukrepala. Izvedla je preiskavo ter opozorila Komisijo in druge države članice ter torej ni prispevala h kršitvi oziroma je (s svojim neukrepanjem ali malomarnostjo) ni povečala, da bi jo nato bilo mogoče opredeliti kot dovolj resno.	110. \| Finally, if, as suggested above, ( 75 ) on the facts of this case, it does not appear that the United Kingdom was not empowered to act with regard to the monitoring and follow-up of potential infringements of the OCT Decision by the Anguillan authorities, the same facts should also be considered to the benefit of the same Member State. It should be acknowledged that that Member State, upon detecting potential issues with the export certificates in Anguilla acted in a relatively rapid way. It conducted an investigation as well as alerted the Commission and the other Member States, thus not contributing to or enhancing (by its inactivity or negligence) a breach that could then be qualified as sufficiently serious.
111. \| Iz tega sledi, da tudi če bi se dokazala nezakonitost izvoznih potrdil EXP za upoštevno obdobje, na tej stopnji quid non, kršitev prava Unije, pripisana Združenemu kraljestvu, ne bi dosegla praga dovolj resne kršitve prava Unije, zaradi katere bi lahko nastala dolžnost povrniti finančno škodo.	111. \| As a result, even if the wrongful character of EXP certificates for the relevant period was established, quid non at this stage, the breach of EU law attributed to the United Kingdom does not reach the threshold of being a sufficiently serious infringement of EU law that could trigger its duty to compensate for financial damage.
2. Ocena škode in vzročna zveza	2. Quantifying damage and causal link
112. \| Združeno kraljestvo je navedlo, da Komisija ni uskladila konkretnih oprostitev ali vračil, ki jih je odobrila angvilska vlada, z identificiranimi izvoznimi potrdili EXP, ki so bila predložena italijanskim organom, da bi dokazala vzročno zvezo med zatrjevano neskladnostjo s Sklepom ČDO in izgubami, ki so nastale v Italiji. Združeno kraljestvo je prav tako trdilo, da Komisija ni dokazala, da so obravnavana izvozna potrdila EXP povzročila izgubo lastnih sredstev, saj med drugim ni predložila dokazov, ki bi potrjevali, da vsi zadevni uvozi izpolnjujejo merila, določena z Odločbo REC 03/2004, ki se uporabi za primerljive zadeve.	112. \| The United Kingdom has submitted that the Commission has not reconciled particular exemptions or refunds granted by the Government of Anguilla with identified EXP certificates presented to the Italian authorities in order to establish the causal link between the alleged non-compliance with the OCT Decision and the losses incurred in Italy. The United Kingdom has also claimed that the Commission has not established that the EXP certificates at issue caused the loss of own resources since, inter alia, the Commission has not adduced evidence to establish that all affected imports meet the criteria established by Decision REC 03/2004 to be applied to comparable cases.
113. \| Pomanjkljivosti v tožbi Komisije, ki jih je izpostavilo Združeno kraljestvo, se nanašajo ne samo na ugotavljanje in oceno same škode, ampak tudi na vprašanje vzročne zveze. Deloma se navezujejo na nejasnost v smislu konkretne pravne obveznosti, ki je bila kršena, in posledične nezakonitosti, ( 76 ) deloma pa tudi razkrivajo dodatna vprašanja. Dogodki pred in med predhodnim postopkom ponazarjajo težave, ki se pojavijo v zvezi z ugotavljanjem in oceno škode v njeni tožbi.	113. \| The shortcomings in the Commission’s case, pointed out by the United Kingdom, concern not only the establishment and quantification of damage itself, but also the issue of a causal link. They partially go back to the lack of clarity in terms of the precise legal obligation breached and ensuing illegality, ( 76 ) but also partially reveal additional issues of their own. The events before and during the pre-litigation procedure illustrate the challenges posed with regard to the establishment and quantification of damage in this action.
114. \| Komisija je z dopisom z dne 27. septembra 2010 od Združenega kraljestva zahtevala 2.670.001,29 EUR zaradi informacij, ki jih je predložila Italija na podlagi odločb REM 03/2004 in REC 03/2004. Komisija je šele leta 2015, potem ko je izdala obrazloženo mnenje in potem ko je Združeno kraljestvo večkrat poudarilo neobstoj dokumentov, od italijanskih organov zahtevala, naj ji posredujejo podatke carinskih deklaracij. Ta dodatna zahteva za informacije je razkrila nepravilnosti v prejšnjih ocenah, saj je Komisija na podlagi teh novih informacij ugotovila, da je znesek, ki ga je treba zahtevati od Združenega kraljestva, 1.500.342,31 EUR.	114. \| By letter of 27 September 2010, the Commission requested from the United Kingdom an amount of EUR 2670 001.29, as a result of the information provided by Italy on the application of Decisions REM 03/2004 and REC 03/2004. Only in 2015, after having issued the reasoned opinion and after the United Kingdom had pointed out repeatedly the absence of documents, did the Commission request the Italian authorities to provide it with details of the customs declarations. This additional request for information revealed inaccuracies in the previous assessments as/since, on the basis the new information, the Commission established that the amount to be claimed from the United Kingdom was EUR 1500 342.31.
115. \| Komisija je priznala, da poročilo OLAF iz leta 2003 ni vsebovalo dovolj podatkov za oceno izgub, in da bi potrdila ta znesek, je k svoji tožbi priložila več dokumentov: seznam dajatev, ki jih Italija ni izterjala, izvozna potrdila, ki jih je izdala Angvila, skupaj s carinskimi deklaracijami za uvoz v Italijo, in račune, ki so jih italijanski organi poslali Komisiji.	115. \| Acknowledging that the 2003 report of OLAF did not contain sufficient elements to quantify the losses, and in order to verify that amount, the Commission annexed to its application several documents: a list of duties unrecovered by Italy; export certificates issued by Anguilla with the customs declarations for the imports into Italy; and invoices forwarded to the Commission by the Italian authorities.
116. \| Na podlagi zahteve tega Sodišča je Komisija poskušala pojasniti še, kako so ti dokumenti med sabo povezani. Vendar je potrdila, da preverjanja in predloženi listinski dokazi niso zajeli zneskov, ki bi se skladali z vsako od uvoznih transakcij, ki so predmet tožbe Komisije.	116. \| Following a request by this Court, the Commission sought to provide further clarification on how those documents related to each other. However, it confirmed that the verifications and documentary evidence produced did not cover the amounts corresponding to each of the importation operations which were the subject of the Commission’s action.
117. \| Komisija je na obravnavi trdila, da ni dolžna dokazati usklajenosti med vračili, ki so jih odobrili angvilski organi, in konkretnimi izvoznimi potrdili EXP ter da ne nosi dokaznega bremena, da bi dokazala (celotno ali delno) vračilo tarif. Niti se ji ne bi smela naložiti obveznost preverjati odločbe o odpustu, ki jih je izdala Italija. Komisija svojo trditev podpira s sistematičnimi premisleki, ki temeljijo na delovanju carinske unije. Za presojo neizterjanih zneskov je po mnenju Komisije pristojna država članica, kjer so izgube nastale in ki ni zavezana, da v vseh primerih posreduje spise Komisiji.	117. \| At the hearing, the Commission claimed that it is not obliged to prove reconciliation between the refunds granted by Anguillan authorities and the specific EXP certificates, and that it does not bear the burden of proof to establish the restitution (total or partial) of tariffs. Nor should it be obliged to verify the remission decisions taken by Italy. The Commission draws support for its argument from systematic considerations based on the functioning of the customs union. The assessment of the unrecovered amounts falls, according to the Commission, to the Member State where the losses were incurred, which is not obliged to communicate in every case the files to the Commission.
118. \| Razen če je postopek zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti na podlagi člena 258 PDEU, predvsem pa odškodninski zahtevek Evropske unije zoper državo članico, ki se v njem skriva, treba razumeti kot (precej enostranske) ure pravnega impresionizma, se glede te točke nikakor ne strinjam s Komisijo. Komisija kot tožeča stranka nosi dokazno breme. Če želi Komisija dobiti odškodnino v določenem znesku za določeno konkretno nezakonitost, ki naj bi jo storila država članica, nosi breme, da dokaže nezakonitost, utemelji zahtevane zneske in dokaže vzročno zvezo med obojim.	118. \| Unless the infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU, and above all, a claim for compensation by the European Union against a Member State hidden within that, is to be conceived of as a (rather one-sided) session of legal impressionism, I am bound to disagree profoundly with the Commission on this point. The Commission, as a claimant, bears the burden of proof. The Commission, if it wishes to obtain compensation of a given amount for a certain specific illegality allegedly committed by a Member State, bears the burden of proving both the illegality, and justifying the amounts claimed, as well as proving the causal nexus between both.
119. \| Poleg tega to zaporedje dogodkov lepo kaže tudi na težave v praksi, ki so opisane zgoraj: ( 77 ) avtomatične uporabe ocen in izračunov konkretnih zneskov, ki jih opravi država članica v okviru sistema lastnih sredstev, ni mogoče sprejeti kot nadomestek za dokazovanje in oceno izgub v skladu z ustreznimi standardi v okviru zahtev za ugotavljanje obveznosti povrniti škodo.	119. \| Moreover, this succession of events also neatly demonstrates the problems generally outlined above in practice: ( 77 ) the automatic application of assessments and calculations of specific amounts made by a Member State under the system of own resources cannot be accepted as a substitute for the establishment and quantification of losses according to the appropriate standards within the requirements for establishing an obligation of compensation.
VI. Stroški	VI. Costs
120. \| V skladu s členom 138(1) Poslovnika se plačilo stroškov na predlog naloži neuspeli stranki. Združeno kraljestvo je predlagalo, naj se Komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov, ta pa s predlogi ni uspela. Komisiji se torej naloži plačilo stroškov.	120. \| Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. The United Kingdom has applied for costs to be awarded against the Commission and the latter has been unsuccessful. The Commission should thus be ordered to pay the costs.
121. \| V skladu s členom 140(1) Poslovnika države članice, ki se kot intervenientke udeležijo postopka, nosijo svoje stroške. Zato Kraljevina Nizozemska nosi svoje stroške.	121. \| Under Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Therefore the Kingdom of the Netherlands is to bear its own costs.
VII. Predlog	VII. Conclusion
122. \| Glede na navedeno predlagam, naj Sodišče: \| 1. \| tožbo zavrne; \| 2. \| Evropski komisiji naloži plačilo stroškov; \| 3. \| odloči, da Kraljevina Nizozemska nosi svoje stroške.	122. \| In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should: \| (1) \| dismiss the action; \| (2) \| order the European Commission to pay the costs; \| (3) \| order the Kingdom of the Netherlands to bear its own costs.
( 1 ) Jezik izvirnika: angleščina.	( 1 ) Original language: English.
( 2 ) Ki je pozneje postal člen 10 ES in je zdaj člen 4(3) PEU.	( 2 ) Which later became Article 10 EC and is now Article 4(3) TEU.
( 3 ) Sklep Sveta 91/482/EGS z dne 25. julija 1991 o pridružitvi čezmorskih držav in ozemelj Evropski gospodarski skupnosti (UL 1991, L 263, str. 1, v nadaljevanju: Sklep ČDO).	( 3 ) Council Decision of 25 July 1991 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Economic Community (OJ 1991 L 263, p. 1) (‘the OCT Decision’).
( 4 ) Uredba Sveta z dne 29. maja 1989 o izvajanju Sklepa 88/376/EGS, Euratom o sistemu lastnih sredstev Skupnosti (UL 1989, L 155, str. 1).	( 4 ) Council Regulation of 29 May 1989 implementing Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom on the system of the Communities’ own resources (OJ 1989 L 155, p. 1).
( 5 ) Uredba Sveta z dne 8. julija 1996 o spremembi Uredbe (EGS, Euratom) št. 1552/89 o izvajanju Sklepa 88/376/EGS, Euratom, o sistemu virov lastnih sredstev Skupnosti (UL 1996, L 175, str. 3).	( 5 ) Council Regulation of 8 July 1996 amending Regulation No 1552/89 implementing Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom on the system of the Communities’ own resources (OJ 1996 L 175, p. 3).
( 6 ) Uredba Sveta (ES, Euratom) št. 1150/2000 z dne 22. maja 2000 o izvajanju Sklepa št. 94/728/ES, Euratom, o sistemu virov lastnih sredstev Skupnosti (UL, posebna izdaja v slovenščini, poglavje 1, zvezek 3, str. 169).	( 6 ) Council Regulation No 1150/2000 of 22 May 2000 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom on the system of the Communities’ own resources (OJ 2000 L 130, p. 1).
( 7 ) Uredba Sveta z dne 16. novembra 2004 o spremembah Uredbe (ES, Euratom) št. 1150/2000 o izvajanju Sklepa št. 94/728/ES, Euratom, o sistemu virov lastnih sredstev Skupnosti (UL 2004, L 352, str. 1).	( 7 ) Council Regulation of 16 November 2004 amending Regulation No 1150/2000 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom on the system of the Communities’ own resources (OJ 2004 L 352, p. 1).
( 8 ) To enoto je najprej nasledila Delovna skupina za usklajevanje preprečevanja goljufij in nato Evropski urad za boj proti goljufijam (OLAF). Glej Sklep Komisije z dne 28. aprila 1999 o ustanovitvi Evropskega urada za boj proti goljufijam (OLAF) (1999/352/ES, ESPJ, Euratom) (UL, posebna izdaja v slovenščini, poglavje 1, zvezek 3, str. 110).	( 8 ) This unit was succeeded initially by the Task Force for Coordination of Fraud Prevention, and subsequently by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). See Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ 1999 L 136, p. 20).
( 9 ) Uredba Sveta z dne 13. marca 1997 o medsebojni pomoči med upravnimi organi držav članic in o sodelovanju med njimi in Komisijo zaradi zagotavljanja pravilnega izvajanja carinske in kmetijske zakonodaje (UL, posebna izdaja v slovenščini, poglavje 2, zvezek 8, str. 217).	( 9 ) Council Regulation of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ 1997 L 82, p. 1).
( 10 ) Uredba Sveta (EGS) št. 2913/92 z dne 12. oktobra 1992 o carinskem zakoniku Skupnosti (UL, posebna izdaja v slovenščini, poglavje 2, zvezek 4, str. 307). V skladu s členom 220(2)(b) te uredbe se naknadna vknjižba ne opravi, če se zakonsko dolgovani znesek dajatev ni vknjižil zaradi napake carinskih organov in če dolžnik te napake ni mogel odkriti. Dolžnik je moral ravnati v dobri veri in v skladu z vsemi predpisi, določenimi z veljavno zakonodajo v zvezi s carinsko deklaracijo.	( 10 ) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1). Under Article 220(2)(b) of that regulation, post-clearance entry in the accounts is waived where the amount of duties legally owed failed to be entered in the accounts due to an error on the part of the customs authorities that could not reasonably have been detected by the person liable for payment. The latter must have acted in good faith and complied with all the provisions laid down by the legislation in force concerning the customs declaration.
( 11 ) Natančneje, v odločbi Komisije se zahteva, „da zadevne osebe nikakor niso smele biti vpletene v pošiljanje blaga iz države izvoznice prek Angvile do vstopne točke na carinskem območju Skupnosti. Morale so kupiti blago na podlagi pogodbe DDP (dobavljeno, dajatve plačane). Niso smele sodelovati kot uvoznik blaga v Skupnost ali kot predstavnik uvoznika. Nazadnje, ne smejo se šteti za osebe, povezane z dobaviteljem, izvoznikom na Angvilo, osebami, ki so sodelovale pri pošiljanju blaga iz države izvoza v Skupnost, ali angvilsko vlado. […]“	( 11 ) In particular, the decision of the Commission requires ‘that persons concerned must in no way have been involved in the shipment of the goods from the country of export, via Anguilla, to the point of entry in the Community customs territory. They must have purchased the goods under a DDP (delivered duty paid) contract. They must not have been involved as the importer of the goods into the Community or as the importer’s representative. Lastly, they must not be deemed related persons to their supplier, the exporter to Anguilla, persons involved in the shipment of the goods from the country of export to the Community or the Government of Anguilla. …’.
( 12 ) V skladu s to določbo se uvozne ali izvozne dajatve lahko povrnejo ali odpustijo v drugih primerih od tistih, ki so predvideni v členih 236, 237 in 238 ter ki izhajajo iz okoliščin, pri katerih ne gre niti za malomarnost niti za goljufivo ravnanje udeleženega.	( 12 ) According to that provision, import duties or export duties may be repaid or remitted in situations other than those referred to in Articles 236, 237, and 238 resulting from circumstances in which no deception or obvious negligence may be attributed to the person concerned.
( 13 ) Uredba Sveta z dne 26. maja 2014 o načinih in postopkih za dajanje tradicionalnih lastnih sredstev ter lastnih sredstev iz naslovov DDV in BND na razpolago ter ukrepih za zagotavljanje denarnih sredstev (UL 2014, L 168, str. 39).	( 13 ) Council Regulation of 26 May 2014 on the methods and procedure for making available the traditional, VAT and GNI-based own resources and on the measures to meet cash requirements (OJ 2014 L 168, p. 39)
( 14 ) Kot bo podrobneje opisano spodaj v oddelku B.3 (točke od 74 do 84) teh sklepnih predlogov, kombinacija določb sistema lastnih sredstev in carinskega zakonika dejansko ustvari sistem kvaziobjektivne odgovornosti za carinski dolg. Vendar ta v obravnavani zadevi velja samo za državo članico uvoza. Vzeti enak standard odgovornosti in ga avtomatično uporabiti za drugo državo članico je eden od številnih izvirnih argumentov, ki jih je Komisija navedla v tej zadevi.	( 14 ) As will be further outlined below in Section B.3 (points 74 to 84) of this Opinion, the combination of the provisions of the system of own resources and the Customs Code indeed creates a regime of objective, (quasi-)strict liability for customs debt. However, in the present case, it only applies to the Member State of importation. To take the same standard of liability and automatically apply it to another Member State is one of the many novel arguments submitted by the Commission in the present case.
( 15 ) Res je, da bi bilo mogoče na podlagi „plasti“ domnevne kršitve, ki se izbere, trditi, da je zahtevek Komisije prihodnji, saj Združeno kraljestvo še vedno ni plačalo zneska, ki ga Komisija zahteva. Vendar se zaradi takega argumenta razprava takoj vrne na precej zapleteno naravo tega, kaj Komisija pravzaprav zahteva.	( 15 ) Certainly, based on the ‘layer’ of alleged breach which one chooses, it could be suggested that the Commission’s claim is prospective, because the United Kingdom has still not paid the sum requested by the Commission. But such an argument brings the discussion right back to the rather convoluted nature of what exactly is Commission claiming.
( 16 ) Sodba z dne 7. februarja 1973, Komisija/Italija (39/72, EU:C:1973:13, točka 11). Glej tudi sodbe z dne 30. maja 1991, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑361/88, EU:C:1991:224, točka 31); z dne 30. maja 1991, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑59/89, EU:C:1991:225, točka 35), in z dne 14. junija 2001, Komisija/Italija (C‑207/00, EU:C:2001:340, točka 28). Ta obrazložitev se je dosledno navajala v zvezi z možnostjo začeti postopek zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, čeprav je bila zadevna neizpolnitev odpravljena po roku, določenem v obrazloženem mnenju Komisije.	( 16 ) Judgment of 7 February 1973, Commission v Italy (39/72, EU:C:1973:13, paragraph 11). See also judgment of 30 May 1991, Commission v Germany (C‑361/88, EU:C:1991:224, paragraph 31); of 30 May 1991, Commission v Germany (C‑59/89, EU:C:1991:225, paragraph 35); or of 14 June 2001, Commission v Italy (C‑207/00, EU:C:2001:340, paragraph 28). This reasoning has been consistently held with regard to the possibility to initiate infringement proceedings, even if the failure in question has been remedied after the time limit prescribed by the reasoned opinion of the Commission.
( 17 ) Glej na primer Ehlermann, C.D.,„Die Verfolgung von Vertragsverletzungen der Mitgliedstaaten durch die Kommission“, v: Europäische Gerichtgsbarkeit und nationale Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Festschfrift zum 70. Geburgstag von H. Kutscher, 1981, str. od 135 do 153, na str. 151; Schwarze, J., „Das allgemeine Völkerrecht in den innergemeinschaftlichen Rechtsbeziehungen“, Europarecht 1983 (1), str. od 1 do 39, na str. 24; in Wyatt, D., „New Legal Order, or Old?“, European Law Review 1982 (7), str. od 147 do 166, na str. 160 in naslednjih.	( 17 ) See, for example, Ehlermann, C.D.,‘Die Verfolgung von Vertragsverletzungen der Mitgliedstaaten durch die Kommission', in Europäische Gerichtsbarkeit und nationale Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Festschrift zum 70. Geburgstag von H. Kutscher, 1981, pp. 135 to 153, at p. 151; Schwarze, J., ‘Das allgemeine Völkerrecht in den innergemeinschaftlichen Rechtsbeziehungen’, Europarecht 1983 (1), pp. 1 to 39 at p. 24; and Wyatt, D., ‘New Legal Order, or Old?’, European Law Review 1982 (7), pp. 147 to 166, at p. 160 et seq.
( 18 ) Glej po analogiji sodbo z dne 15. novembra 2005, Komisija/Danska (C‑392/02, EU:C:2005:683, točka 33), pri čemer je treba upoštevati dejstvo, da so take tožbe izključene v postopku zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti: glej sodbi z dne 14. aprila 2005, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑104/02, EU:C:2005:219, točka 49), in z dne 5. oktobra 2006, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑105/02, EU:C:2006:637, točki 44 in 45).	( 18 ) See, by analogy, judgment of 15 November 2005, Commission v Denmark (C‑392/02, EU:C:2005:683, paragraph 33), being mindful of the fact that such actions are precluded in infringement proceedings: see judgments of 14 April 2005, Commission v Germany (C‑104/02, EU:C:2005:219, paragraphs 49), and of 5 October 2006, Commission v Germany (C‑105/02, EU:C:2006:637, paragraphs 44 and 45).
( 19 ) Glej v mednarodnem pravu na primer Chorzów Factory, Stalno meddržavno sodišče, sodba št. 13 z dne 13. septembra 1928, PCJR Reports series A, št. 17, str. 4.	( 19 ) See, in international law, for example, Chorzów Factory, Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment No 13 of 13 September 1928, PCJR Reports, Series A, No 17, p. 4.
( 20 ) Sodba z dne 19. novembra 1991, Francovich in drugi (C‑6/90 in C‑9/90, EU:C:1991:428, točka 36).	( 20 ) Judgment of 19 November 1991, Francovich and Others (C‑6/90 and C‑9/90, EU:C:1991:428, paragraph 36).
( 21 ) Zlasti sodba z dne 5. marca 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur in Factortame (C‑46/93 in C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, točka 29), v skladu s katero je odgovornost Skupnosti „samo izraz splošnega načela, ki je sprejeto v pravnih redih držav članic, in sicer da je škodo zaradi nezakonitega dejanja ali opustitve treba povrniti“.	( 21 ) In particular, judgment of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame (C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraph 29) according to which the liability of the Community ‘is simply an expression of the general principle familiar to the legal systems of the Member States that an unlawful act or omission gives rise to an obligation to make good the damage caused’.
( 22 ) Tako bi bila na primer v (šolskem) primeru neprenosa direktive, ki bi lahko povzročil škodo posameznikom, jasna pravna obveznost, ki jo je država članica kršila v tem konkretnem primeru, vsaj končna določba zadevne direktive, v kateri je naveden datum za prenos, po možnosti skupaj z obveznostjo, ki izhaja iz člena 288 PDEU, in morda celo dolžnostjo lojalnega sodelovanja. Vendar ne bi bilo nobenega dvoma, da obstaja precej konkretna obveznost prenosa direktive do določenega datuma.	( 22 ) Thus, for example, in a (textbook) case of a failure to transpose a directive, which could have caused damage to individuals, the clear legal obligation infringed by a Member State in that individual case would be, at least, the final/closing provision of the directive in question, stating the transposition deadline, potentially coupled with the obligation flowing from Article 288 TFEU and perhaps even the duty of sincere cooperation. There would be, however, no doubt that there is a rather specific obligation to transpose the directive by a given date.
( 23 ) Kot so navedli Lenaerts, K., Maselis, I., in Gutman, K., EU Procedural Law, Oxford University Press 2014, str. 495. Generalna pravobranilka J. Kokott je v sklepnih predlogih v združenih zadevah Slovaška/Komisija in Romunija/Komisija (C‑593/15 P in C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:441, točka 108) prav tako izpostavila to možnost. Zdi se, da so se odškodninski zahtevki v preteklosti uveljavljali (vsaj s strani državnih subjektov), vendar, kolikor mi je znano, očitno nikoli niso prišli do stopnje sodbe. Glej na primer sklep z dne 16. novembra 1998, Nizozemski Antili/Svet in Komisija (T‑163/97 in T‑179/97, EU:T:1998:260).	( 23 ) As noted by Lenaerts, K., Maselis, I., and Gutman, K., EU Procedural Law, Oxford University Press 2014, p. 495. The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Slovakia v Commission and Romania v Commission (C‑593/15 P and C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:441, point 108) also points out that possibility. Claims for compensation seem to have been put forward in the past (at least by State entities), but to my knowledge have apparently never reached the stage of a judgment. See, for example, order of 16 November 1998, Netherlands Antilles v Council and Commission (T‑163/97 and T‑179/97, EU:T:1998:260).
( 24 ) Z logično izjemo osebne odgovornosti uslužbencev Evropske unije do Unije, ki je prav tako določena v členu 340 PDEU.	( 24 ) With the logical exception of the personal liability of EU’s civil servants towards the European Union also provided for in Article 340 TFEU.
( 25 ) Ker v skladu s členom 274 PDEU „[s]pori, v katerih je ena od strank Unija, niso izvzeti iz pristojnosti sodišč držav članic, razen kjer je bila pristojnost s Pogodbama dodeljena Sodišču Evropske unije“.	( 25 ) Since according to Article 274 TFEU, ‘save where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice of the European Union by the Treaties, disputes to which the Union is a party shall not on that ground be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals of the Member States’.
( 26 ) Podobno kot zadeve, ki jih je Komisija sprožila pred nacionalnimi sodišči in v katerih je v bistvu uveljavljala civilnopravni odškodninski zahtevek v razmerju do zasebnopravnih subjektov. Glej na primer sodbo z dne 6. novembra 2012, Otis in drugi (C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684).	( 26 ) Similar to cases launched by the Commission before the national courts essentially claiming civil law damages against private parties. See, for example, judgment of 6 November 2012, Otis and Others (C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684).
( 27 ) Glej na primer sodbo z dne 16. oktobra 2012, Madžarska/Slovaška (C‑364/10, EU:C:2012:630, točka 68). Moj poudarek.	( 27 ) See, for example, judgment of 16 October 2012, Hungary v Slovakia (C‑364/10, EU:C:2012:630, paragraph 68). Emphasis added.
( 28 ) Ne glede na to, ali gre za „prvotno“ ali „vmesno“ kršitev, navedeno v točkah 35 in 36 teh sklepnih predlogov.	( 28 ) Be it either the ‘original’ or the ‘intermediate’ breaches referred to in points 35 and 36 of this Opinion.
( 29 ) Sodba z dne 5. oktobra 2006, Komisija/Belgija (C‑377/03, EU:C:2006:638, točka 36). Sodišče je odločilo, da „obstaja nerazdružljiva vez med obveznostjo določitve lastnih sredstev Skupnosti, obveznostjo knjiženja teh na račun Komisije v predpisanem roku in tudi obveznostjo plačila zamudnih obresti“.	( 29 ) Judgment of 5 October 2006, Commission v Belgium (C‑377/03, EU:C:2006:638, paragraph 36). The Court has found that ‘there is an inseparable link between the obligation to establish the Communities’ own resources, the obligation to credit them to the Commission’s account within the prescribed time limit and the obligation to pay default interest’.
( 30 ) O tem, ali člen 260(1) PDEU zahteva odškodnino kot ukrep, ki ga je treba sprejeti v vsakem primeru, se je že razpravljalo. Glej sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca D. Ruiz‑Jaraboja v zadevi Komisija/Luksemburg (C‑299/01, EU:C:2002:243, točka 23 in naslednje), in sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca J. Mischa v združenih zadevah Francovich in drugi (C‑6/90 in C‑9/90, neobjavljeni, EU:C:1991:221, točka 57 in naslednje). V vsakem primeru odškodnina per se ne pomeni odprave kršitve prava Unije. Glej na primer sodbo z dne 9. decembra 1997, Komisija/Francija (C‑265/95, EU:C:1997:595, točka 60).	( 30 ) Whether Article 260(1) TFEU requires compensation of damages as a measure to be adopted in any case has been debated. See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Commission v Luxembourg (C‑299/01, EU:C:2002:243, point 23 et seq.); Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Joined Cases Francovich and Others (C‑6/90 and C‑9/90, EU:C:1991:221, point 57 et seq.). In any case, compensation for damages does not per se entail the elimination of the breach of EU law. See, for example, judgment of 9 December 1997, Commission v France (C‑265/95, EU:C:1997:595, paragraph 60).
( 31 ) Glej sodbi z dne 14. aprila 2005, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑104/02, EU:C:2005:219, točka 49), in z dne 5. oktobra 2006, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑105/02, EU:C:2006:637, točki 44 in 45). Glej tudi sodbo z dne 2. oktobra 2008, Komisija/Grčija (C‑36/08, neobjavljena, EU:C:2008:536, točki 8 in 9).	( 31 ) See judgments of 14 April 2005, Commission v Germany (C‑104/02, EU:C:2005:219, paragraphs 49), and of 5 October 2006, Commission v Germany (C‑105/02, EU:C:2006:637, paragraphs 44 and 45). See also judgment of 2 October 2008, Commission v Greece (C‑36/08, not published, EU:C:2008:536, paragraphs 8 and 9).
( 32 ) Glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 18. julija 2007, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑503/04, EU:C:2007:432, točka 15). Glej tudi sklepne predloge generalne pravobranilke V. Trstenjak v zadevi Komisija/Nemčija (C‑503/04, EU:C:2007:190, točka 41).	( 32 ) To that effect, see judgment of 18 July 2007, Commission v Germany (C‑503/04, EU:C:2007:432, paragraph 15). See also Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Commission v Germany (C‑503/04, EU:C:2007:190, point 41).
( 33 ) Sodba z dne 12. julija 2005, Komisija/Francija (C‑304/02, EU:C:2005:444, točka 92).	( 33 ) Judgment of 12 July 2005, Commission v France (C‑304/02, EU:C:2005:444, paragraph 92).
( 34 ) Sodba z dne 25. oktobra 2017, Slovaška/Komisija (C‑593/15 P in C‑594/15 P, EU:C:2017:800, točka 75 in naslednje).	( 34 ) Judgment of 25 October 2017, Slovakia v Commission (C‑593/15 P and C‑594/15 P, EU:C:2017:800, paragraph 75 et seq.).
( 35 ) Glej obsežno razpravo o tem v sklepnih predlogih generalne pravobranilke J. Kokott v združenih zadevah Slovaška/Komisija in Romunija/Komisija (C‑593/15 P in C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:441, točka 101 in naslednje).	( 35 ) See extensively on this discussion, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Slovakia v Commission and Romania v Commission (C‑593/15 P and C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:441, point 101 et seq.)
( 36 ) Sodba z dne 4. julija 2000, Bergaderm in Goupil/Komisija (C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, točka 39 in naslednje). Za bolj nedavne primere glej sodbo z dne 4. aprila 2017, Evropski varuh človekovih pravic/Staelen (C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, točka 31), v zvezi z ureditvijo odgovornosti Unije; in sodbo z dne 4. oktobra 2018, C‑571/16, Kantarev (C‑571/16, EU:C:2018:807, točka 94), v zvezi z načelom odgovornosti države za škodo, povzročeno posameznikom.	( 36 ) Judgment of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission (C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 39 et seq.). See for more recent examples, judgments of 4 April 2017, European Ombudsman v Staelen (C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, paragraph 31), regarding the regime of liability of the EU; and of 4 October 2018, Kantarev (C‑571/16, EU:C:2018:807, paragraph 94), regarding the principle of State liability for damage caused to individuals.
( 37 ) Glej na primer sodbo z dne 14. novembra 2002, Komisija/Združeno Kraljestvo (C‑140/00, EU:C:2002:653, točka 34); z dne 30. januarja 2003, Komisija/Danska (C‑226/01, EU:C:2003:60, točka 32); in z dne 13. julija 2006, Komisija/Portugalska (C‑61/05, EU:C:2006:467, točka 32).	( 37 ) See, for example, judgment of 14 November 2002, Commission v United Kingdom (C‑140/00, EU:C:2002:653, paragraph 34); or of 30 January 2003, Commission v Denmark (C‑226/01, EU:C:2003:60, paragraph 32); or of 13 July 2006, Commission v Portugal (C‑61/05, EU:C:2006:467, paragraph 32).
( 38 ) Glej na primer sodbi z dne 16. septembra 2004, Komisija/Španija (C‑227/01, EU:C:2004:528, točka 58), in z dne 4. marca 2010, Komisija/Italija (C‑297/08, EU:C:2010:115, točka 82).	( 38 ) See, for example, judgment of 16 September 2004, Commission v Spain (C‑227/01, EU:C:2004:528, paragraph 58), or of 4 March 2010, Commission v Italy (C--297/08, EU:C:2010:115, paragraph 82).
( 39 ) Glej na primer sodbo z dne 4. oktobra 2018, Kantarev (C‑571/16, EU:C:2018:807, točka 105). V zvezi z odgovornostjo Evropske unije glej na primer sodbo z dne 4. aprila 2017, Evropski varuh človekovih pravic/Staelen (C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, točka 37).	( 39 ) See, for example, judgment of 4 October 2018, Kantarev (C‑571/16, EU:C:2018:807, paragraph 105). With regard to the responsibility of the European Union see, for example judgment of 4 April 2017, European Ombudsman v Staelen (C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, paragraph 37).
( 40 ) Sodba z dne 5. marca 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur in Factortame (C‑46/93 in C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, točka 56).	( 40 ) Judgment of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame (C‑46/93 and C‑48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraph 56).
( 41 ) Glej na primer sodbo z dne 24. marca 2009, Danske Slagterier (C‑445/06, EU:C:2009:178, točki 43 in 44).	( 41 ) See, for example, judgment of 24 March 2009, Danske Slagterier (C‑445/06, EU:C:2009:178 paragraphs 43 and 44).
( 42 ) Res je, da niti za Evropsko unijo niti za Komisijo, ki deluje v njenem imenu, ni mogoče reči, da so jima dodeljene „posamezne pravice“. Vendar je mogoče razumeti (in seveda prilagoditi) ta pogoj tako, da zahteva opredelitev pravne določbe, ki daje tožeči stranki pravico, da od tožene stranke zahteva določeno ravnanje, kršitev katere naj bi povzročila škodo. V zvezi s pogojem, da mora pravilo prava Unije posameznikom priznavati pravice, glej na primer sodbo z dne 11. junija 2015, Berlington Hungary in drugi (C‑98/14, EU:C:2015:386, točka 106).	( 42 ) Certainly, neither the European Union nor the Commission acting on its behalf can be said to be endowed with ‘individual rights’. However, that condition can also be seen (and naturally adapted) to require the identification of the legal provision that would have entitled the claimant to require certain behaviour from the respondent and the breach of which is said to have given rise to the damage. On the requirement that the rule of EU law must give rights to individuals, see, for example, judgment of 11 June 2015, Berlington Hungary and Others (C‑98/14, EU:C:2015:386, paragraph 106).
( 43 ) Glej na primer sodbi z dne 4. oktobra 2007, Komisija/Italija (C‑179/06, EU:C:2007:578, točka 37), in z dne 10. septembra 2009, Komisija/Grčija (C‑416/07, EU:C:2009:528, točka 32).	( 43 ) See, for example, judgments of 4 October 2007, Commission v Italy (C‑179/06, EU:C:2007:578, paragraph 37), and of 10 September 2009, Commission v Greece (C‑416/07, EU:C:2009:528, paragraph 32).
( 44 ) Glej na primer sodbo z dne 6. decembra 2007, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑456/05, EU:C:2007:755, točka 25).	( 44 ) See, for example, judgment of 6 December 2007, Commission v Germany (C‑456/05, EU:C:2007:755, paragraph 25).
( 45 ) Glej na primer sodbi z dne 5. marca 1998, Komisija/Francija (C‑175/97, EU:C:1998:89, točka 14), in z dne 5. oktobra 2006, Komisija/Belgija (C‑377/03, EU:C:2006:638, točka 38).	( 45 ) See, for example, judgments of 5 March 1998, Commission v France (C‑175/97, EU:C:1998:89, paragraph 14); and of 5 October 2006, Commission v Belgium (C‑377/03, EU:C:2006:638, paragraph 38).
( 46 ) Sodba z dne 4. oktobra 2018, Kantarev (C‑571/16, EU:C:2018:807, točka 117).	( 46 ) Judgment of 4 October 2018, Kantarev (C‑571/16, EU:C:2018:807, paragraph 117).
( 47 ) Glej na področju nepogodbene odgovornosti Unije na primer sodbo z dne 7. junija 2018, Equipolymers in drugi/Svet (C‑363/17 P, neobjavljena, EU:C:2018:402, točka 37 in navedena sodna praksa).	( 47 ) See, in the field of the extra-contractual liability of the Union, for example judgment of 7 June 2018, Equipolymers and Others v Council (C‑363/17 P, not published, EU:C:2018:402, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
( 48 ) Sodba z dne 15. novembra 2005, Komisija/Danska (C‑392/02, EU:C:2005:683, točka 68).	( 48 ) Judgment of 15 November 2005, Commission v Denmark (C‑392/02, EU:C:2005:683, paragraph 68).
( 49 ) Prav tam.	( 49 ) Ibid.
( 50 ) Komisija navaja zlasti sodbe z dne 16. maja 1991, Komisija/Nizozemska (C‑96/89, EU:C:1991:213, točka 37); z dne 15. junija 2000, Komisija/Nemčija (C‑348/97, EU:C:2000:317, točka 64); z dne 15. novembra 2005, Komisija/Danska (C‑392/02, EU:C:2005:683, točka 60), in z dne 17. marca 2011, Komisija/Portugalska (C‑23/10, neobjavljena, EU:C:2011:160, točka 60).	( 50 ) The Commission cites, in particular, judgments of 16 May 1991, Commission v Netherlands (C‑96/89, EU:C:1991:213, paragraph 37); of 15 June 2000, Commission v Germany (C‑348/97, EU:C:2000:317, paragraph 64); of 15 November 2005, Commission v Denmark (C‑392/02, EU:C:2005:683, paragraph 60); and of 17 March 2011, Commission v Portugal (C‑23/10, not published, EU:C:2011:160, paragraph 60).
( 51 ) V nasprotju s tem glej sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca L. A. Geelhoeda v zadevi Komisija/Danska (C‑392/02, EU:C:2005:142, točki 46 in 47).	( 51 ) See by contrast, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Commission v Denmark (C‑392/02, EU:C:2005:142, points 46 and 47).
( 52 ) Ni prvič, da je Komisija navedla tak argument. Glej dejansko stanje, na katerem temelji sodba z dne 25. oktobra 2017, Romunija/Komisija (C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801).	( 52 ) This is not the first time that the Commission has made such an argument. See the facts underlying judgment of 25 October 2017, Romania v Commission (C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801).
( 53 ) „Verjetno“ zato, ker Komisija v svojem stališču tega ni navedla izrecno. Vendar bi bilo mogoče tudi ugibati, kakšen bi bil ta argument, če bi bila Italija dejansko zmožna izterjati zadevne dajatve: ali potem ne bi prišlo do nobene take „subsidiarne“ odgovornosti Združenega kraljestva? Ali pa bi se Komisija obrnila proti Združenemu kraljestvu ne glede na to, ali bi Italija lahko izterjala zneske? Kaj če do izterjave ni prišlo deloma iz razlogov, ki jih je mogoče pripisati Italiji?	( 53 ) ‘Arguably’ because the Commission has not made that argument explicitly in its submissions. However, there might also be speculation as to what that argument would have been if, in fact, Italy were able to recover the duties in question: then would no such ‘subsidiary’ responsibility of the United Kingdom come into existence? Or could the Commission then turn against the United Kingdom irrespective of whether the sums were recoverable in Italy? What if the lack of recovery was partially for reasons attributable to Italy?
( 54 ) Glej sklep z dne 21. aprila 2016, Makro autoservicio mayorista in Vestel Iberia/Komisija (C‑264/15 P in C‑265/15 P, neobjavljen, EU:C:2016:301, točka 47).	( 54 ) See order of 21 April 2016, Makro autoservicio mayorista and Vestel Iberia v Commission (C‑264/15 P and C‑265/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:301, paragraph 47) .
( 55 ) Glej sklep z dne 14. septembra 2015, Romunija/Komisija (T‑784/14, neobjavljen, EU:T:2015:659, točke od 27 do 29) (ta odločitev je bila potrjena s sodbo z dne 25. oktobra 2017, Romunija/Komisija, C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801).	( 55 ) See order of 14 September 2015, Romania v Commission (T‑784/14, not published, EU:T:2015:659, paragraphs 27 to 29) (that judgment has been upheld in the judgment of 25 October 2017, Romania v Commission (C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801)).
( 56 ) V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso iz člena 10 ES izhaja, da morajo države članice v dobri veri sodelovati pri vseh poizvedbah Komisije v okviru tožb zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti in ji posredovati vse v ta namen zahtevane informacije (glej na primer sodbo z dne 6. marca 2003, Komisija/Luksemburg, C‑478/01, EU:C:2003:134, točka 24). Menim, da to velja tudi, če se postopek zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti nanaša na druge države članice.	( 56 ) According to settled case-law, Article 10 EC makes it clear that the Member States are required to cooperate in good faith with the enquiries of the Commission pursuant to infringement actions, and to provide the Commission with all the information requested for that purpose (see, for example, judgment of 6 March 2003, Commission v Luxembourg (C‑478/01, EU:C:2003:134, paragraph 24)). In my view, this is also valid when the infringement proceedings concern other Member States.
( 57 ) Oddelek B(2) teh sklepnih predlogov.	( 57 ) Section B(2) of the present Opinion.
( 58 ) Poleg tega se je Komisija na obravnavi sklicevala na sodbo z dne 12. decembra 1990, Komisija/Francija (C‑263/88, EU:C:1990:454). Komisija se je sklicevala tudi na sodno prakso, v skladu s katero se država članica „ne more sklicevati na okoliščine svojega notranjega pravnega reda“, da bi upravičila neizpolnitev obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz prava Unije. Glej na primer sodbo z dne 16. decembra 2004, Komisija/Avstrija (C‑358/03, EU:C:2004:824, točka 13).	( 58 ) Moreover, at the hearing, the Commission referred to the judgment of 12 December 1990, Commission v France (C‑263/88, EU:C:1990:454). The Commission also referred to the case-law according to which a Member State ‘may not plead situations in its internal legal order’ in order to justify a failure to comply with EU obligations. See, for example, judgment of 16 December 2004, Commission v Austria (C‑358/03, EU:C:2004:824, paragraph 13).
( 59 ) Za obsežno analizo glej sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca P. Cruza Villalóna v zadevi Prunus (C‑384/09, EU:C:2010:759, točka 23 in naslednje).	( 59 ) See, for an extensive analysis, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Prunus (C‑384/09, EU:C:2010:759, point 23 et seq.).
( 60 ) Na primer sodbe z dne 11. februarja 1999, Antillean Rice Mills in drugi/Komisija (C‑390/95 P, EU:C:1999:66, točka 36); z dne 21. septembra 1999, DADI in Douane-Agenten (C‑106/97, EU:C:1999:433, točki 37 in 38); in z dne 8. februarja 2000, Emesa Sugar (C‑17/98, EU:C:2000:70, točka 29).	( 60 ) For example, judgments of 11 February 1999, Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission (C‑390/95 P, EU:C:1999:66, paragraph 36); of 21 September 1999, DADI and Douane-Agenten (C‑106/97, EU:C:1999:433, paragraphs 37 and 38); and of 8 February 2000, Emesa Sugar (C‑17/98, EU:C:2000:70, paragraph 29).
( 61 ) Glej na primer v zvezi s prostim pretokom blaga sodbe z dne 12. februarja 1992, Leplat (C‑260/90, EU:C:1992:66, točka 10); z dne 22. novembra 2001, Nizozemska/Svet (C‑110/97, EU:C:2001:620, točka 49), in z dne 28. januarja 1999, van der Kooy (C‑181/97, EU:C:1999:32, točka 37). Glej v zvezi z določbami o prostem pretoku kapitala sodbi z dne 5. maja 2011, Prunus in Polonium (C‑384/09, EU:C:2011:276, točke od 29 do 31), in z dne 5. junija 2014, X in TBG (C‑24/12 in C‑27/12, EU:C:2014:1385, točka 45). Glej v zvezi s sekundarno zakonodajo, sprejeto na podlagi člena 114 PDEU, sodbo z dne 21. decembra 2016, TDC (C‑327/15, EU:C:2016:974, točki 77 in 78). Glej v zvezi z volitvami v Evropski parlament sodbo z dne 12. septembra 2006, Eman and Sevinger (C‑300/04, EU:C.2006:545; točka 46).	( 61 ) See, for example with regard to free movement of goods, judgments of 12 February 1992, Leplat (C‑260/90, EU:C:1992:66, paragraph 10); of 22 November 2001Netherlands v Council (C‑110/97, EU:C:2001:620, paragraph 49); and of 28 January 1999, van der Kooy (C‑181/97, EU:C:1999:32, paragraph 37). With regard to free movement of capital provisions, judgments of 5 May 2011, Prunus and Polonium (C‑384/09, EU:C:2011:276, paragraphs 29 to 31), and of 5 June 2014, X and TBG (C‑24/12 and C‑27/12, EU:C:2014:1385, paragraph 45). Regarding secondary law adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, judgment of 21 December 2016, TDC (C‑327/15, EU:C:2016:974, paragraphs 77 and 78). Regarding elections to the European Parliament, judgment of 12 September 2006, Eman and Sevinger (C‑300/04, EU:C.2006:545; paragraph 46).
( 62 ) Sklepni predlogi generalnega pravobranilca P. Cruza Villalóna v zadevi Prunus (C‑384/09, EU:C:2010:759, točka 33).	( 62 ) Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Prunus (C‑384/09, EU:C:2010:759, point 33).
( 63 ) Glej na primer sodbo z dne 12. decembra 1990, Kaefer in Procacci (C‑100/89 in C‑101/89, EU:C:1990:456), v kateri se dopušča možnost, da sodišča ČDO predložijo vprašanja v predhodno odločanje.	( 63 ) See, for example, judgment of 12 December 1990, Kaefer and Procacci (C‑100/89 and C‑101/89, EU:C:1990:456), admitting the possibility of the courts of OCTs to refer questions for a preliminary ruling.
( 64 ) Glej sodbo z dne 12. septembra 2006, Eman in Sevinger (C‑300/04, EU:C:2006:545, točke od 27 do 29), v kateri je odločeno, da se osebe z državljanstvom države članice, ki prebivajo v ČDO, lahko sklicujejo na pravice iz državljanstva Unije.	( 64 ) See judgment of 12 September 2006, Eman and Sevinger (C‑300/04, EU:C:2006:545, paragraphs 27 to 29), declaring that persons who have the nationality of a Member State residing in an OCT may rely on EU citizenship rights.
( 65 ) Glej člene od 234 do 236 Sklepa ČDO.	( 65 ) See Articles 234 to 236 of the OCT Decision.
( 66 ) Glej zlasti člen 7 Priloge III k Sklepu ČDO. V skladu z odstavkom 7 te določbe se spori, ki jih carinski organi ne rešijo, predložijo Odboru za carinsko zakonodajo.	( 66 ) See, in particular, Article 7 of Annex III to the OCT Decision. According to paragraph 7 of that provision, disputes not settled between customs authorities shall be submitted to the Committee on Customs Legislation.
( 67 ) Člen 5 ES „je izraz splošnejšega pravila, ki državam članicam in institucijam [Unije] nalaga medsebojne dolžnosti lojalnega sodelovanja in pomoči“. Sodba z dne 15. januarja 1986Hurd (44/84, EU:C:1986:2, točka 38). Glej tudi na primer sodbi z dne 29. aprila 2004, Grčija/Komisija (C‑278/00, EU:C:2004:239, točka 114), in z dne 1. aprila 2004, Komisija/Italija (C‑99/02, EU:C:2004:207, točka 17).	( 67 ) Article 5 EC ‘is the expression of the more general rule imposing on the Member States and [the Union] institutions mutual duties of genuine cooperation and assistance’. Judgment of 15 January 1986, Hurd (44/84, EU:C:1986:2, paragraph 38). See also, for example, judgment of 29 April 2004, Greece v Commission (C‑278/00, EU:C:2004:239, paragraph 114), or of 1 April 2004, Commission v Italy (C‑99/02, EU:C:2004:207, paragraph 17).
( 68 ) V zvezi s pomembnostjo člena 4(2) PEU glej točko 63 mojih sklepnih predlogov v zadevi C‑395/17, Komisija/Nizozemska.	( 68 ) For the relevance of Article 4(2) TEU, see point 63 of my Opinion in C‑395/17, Commission v Netherlands.
( 69 ) Točki 44 in 87 zgoraj.	( 69 ) Above, points 44 and 87.
( 70 ) Zadeva C‑395/17, Komisija/Kraljevina Nizozemska.	( 70 ) Case C‑395/17, Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands.
( 71 ) Točka 90 zgoraj. V poročilu OLAF iz leta 2003 je prav tako navedena negotova razlaga, kaj bi bilo pravzaprav treba šteti za „vračilo carin“. Podobno je bilo v obvestilu UCLAF iz leta 1999 navedeno, da je treba zaprositi za razlago člena 101 Sklepa ČDO. Na to negotovost kažejo tudi dokazi, ki sta jih predložili stranki, na primer osnutek zapisnika sestanka delovne skupine za izvajanje partnerstva v skladu s členom 7(3) Sklepa ČDO z dne 1. decembra 2003.	( 71 ) Above, point 90. OLAF’s report of 2003 also makes reference to the uncertain interpretation of what exactly could be considered a ‘refund of customs duties’. Similarly, the UCLAF Communication of 1999 indicated the need to seek an interpretation of Article 101 of the OCT Decision. Evidence produced by the parties also bears witness to that uncertainty, such as the Draft Minutes of the partnership working party meeting under Article 7(3) of the OCT Decision of 1 December 2003.
( 72 ) Točki 15 in 16 zgoraj.	( 72 ) Above points 15 and 16.
( 73 ) Člen 36(2) Sklepa Sveta z dne 27. novembra 2001 o pridružitvi čezmorskih držav in ozemelj Evropski skupnosti (2001/822/ES) (UL, posebna izdaja v slovenščini, poglavje 11, zvezek 38, str. 319). (Sklep ČDO 2001). V tej določbi je izrecno navedeno, da mora imeti ta pomoč „obliko pomoči za transport blaga v prostem prometu in vključevati upravičene tekoče stroške, ki so dobili podporo v zvezi s postopkom pretovarjanja“. V tej določbi je prav tako izrecno navedeno, da če upravni organi ČDO tako zahtevajo, je partnerska delovna skupina iz člena 7(3) odgovorna za reševanje spornih vprašanj, ki izhajajo iz upravljanja postopka pretovarjanja. Prizna se pomanjkanje jasnosti v prejšnjem Sklepu ČDO, saj je v skladu z uvodno izjavo 15 tega sklepa „[p]ostopek pretovarjanja blaga, ki po poreklu ni iz ČDO, vendar je tam v prostem prometu, […] treba dopolniti in razjasniti zaradi zagotovitve preglednega in zanesljivega pravnega okvira za podjetja in upravne organe“.	( 73 ) Article 36(2) of Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Community (‘Overseas Association Decision’) (OJ 2001 L 314, p. 1). (2001 OCT Decision). That provision explicitly states that the aid ‘must take the form of an aid for transport of goods put in free circulation, including legitimate running costs supported in relationship with the transhipment procedure’. That provision also mentions explicitly that, at the request of OCT authorities, a partnership working party referred to in Article 7(3) shall be convened to resolve any issues arising from the administration of the transhipment procedure. The lack of clarity in the previous OCT Decision is acknowledged, since, according to recital 15 to that decision ‘the procedure for the transhipment of goods not originating in the OCTs but in free circulation there should be completed and clarified, with a view to ensuring a transparent and reliable legal framework for operators and administrations’.
( 74 ) Glej točko 70 zgoraj in tam navedeno sodno prakso.	( 74 ) See above, point 70 and the case-law cited therein.
( 75 ) Točka 98 zgoraj.	( 75 ) Above, point 98.
( 76 ) Točke od 101 do 105 zgoraj.	( 76 ) Above, points 101 to 105.
( 77 ) Točke od 74 do 84 zgoraj.	( 77 ) Above, points 74 to 84.

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