EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 3.8.2015

SWD(2015) 149 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying the document

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

33rd Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU's Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities (2014)

{COM(2015) 385 final}

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying the document

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

33rd Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU's Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities (2014)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive summary

1.Overview of the legislation

1.1Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy

1.1.1.The international framework

1.1.2.The EU legislation

1.2Safeguards

1.2.1.The international framework

1.2.2.The EU legislation

1.3Anti-subsidy and unfair pricing instrument for airline services

2.Basic concepts

2.1.Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy

2.1.1.What is dumping and what are countervailable subsidies - the material conditions for the imposition of duties?

2.1.2.Procedure

2.1.3.Review of measures

2.1.4.Judicial reviews

2.2.Safeguards

2.2.1.What are safeguard measures?

2.2.2.Procedure

3.General overview of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and measures

3.1.Measures in place14

3.2.Review investigations

4.Overview of activities in 2014

4.1.New investigations

4.1.1.Initiations

4.1.2.Provisional measures

4.1.3.Definitive measures

4.1.4.Details on individual cases

4.1.5.Investigations terminated without measures

4.1.6.Details on some individual cases

4.2.Review investigations

4.2.1.Expiry reviews

4.2.2.Interim reviews

4.2.3. “Other” reviews

4.2.4.New exporter reviews

4.2.5.Absorption investigations

4.2.6.Circumvention investigations

4.3.Safeguard investigations

5.Enforcement of anti-dumping/countervailing measures

5.1.Follow-up of measures

5.2.Monitoring of undertakings

6.Refunds

7.TDI Modernisation

8.Country-wide market economy status (MES)

8.1.China

8.2.Vietnam

8.3.Armenia

8.4.Kazakhstan

8.5.Mongolia

8.6.Belarus

9.Information and Communication activities / Bilateral contacts

9.1.Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)

9.2.Bilateral contacts/information activities – EU economic operators including their key stakeholder associations and third countries

10.The Hearing Officer

11.Judicial review: decisions given by the Court of Justice / Court of First Instance

11.1.Overview of the judicial reviews in 2013.

11.2.Cases pending

11.3.New cases

11.4.Judgments rendered by the General Court

11.5.Judgments rendered by the Court of Justice

12.Activities in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO)

12.1.Dispute settlement in the field of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards

12.1.1.Overview of the WTO dispute settlement procedure

12.2.Other WTO activities

13.Conclusion

1.1.LIST OF ANNEXES

1.1.1.ANNEX A

1.1.2.ANNEX B

1.1.3.ANNEX C

1.1.4.ANNEX D

1.1.5.ANNEX E

1.1.6.ANNEX F

1.1.7.ANNEX H

1.1.8.ANNEX I

1.1.9.ANNEX J

1.1.10.ANNEX K

1.1.11.ANNEX L

1.1.12.ANNEX M

1.1.13.ANNEX N

1.1.14.ANNEX O

1.1.15.ANNEX P

1.1.16.ANNEX Q

1.1.17.ANNEX R

Executive summary

This report sets out the European Union's anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard activities during 2014.

The report, as in previous years, gives an overview of the EU legislation in force with regard to the trade defence instruments, anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards.

The report also summarises the developments in general policy. It gives an overview of all investigations together with the most essential information such as, for instance, the rate of individual duties imposed. Cases which merit some special attention are treated in more detail. Consequently, the report covers the essential facts of the year.

The detailed annexes give a complete overview of all the activities carried out during 2014. These are broken down into various categories e.g. initiations, imposition of measures etc. and are designed to complement the narrative of this report by providing details of all cases including references to publications.

2014 saw an increase in the number of new cases initiated when compared to the previous year, 16 as compared to 9 in 2013. In contrast, in 2014 there was a decrease in the number of provisional measures imposed, 2 compared to 6 the previous year while the number of investigations terminated without measures also decreased from 11 in 2013 to 4 in 2014. The number of definitive measures imposed also dropped from 17 in 2013 to 4 in 2014. Note that these changes between 2013 and 2014 do not denote a trend but reflect the fact that following initiations, provisional and definitive measures are imposed normally 9 and 15 months later respectively, which might be in the following year.

As regards review investigations initiated, there was a decrease from 36 in 2013 to 22 in 2014. These included 10 expiry reviews, 5 interim reviews, 2 new exporter review, 2 anti-absorption investigations as well as 3 anti-circumvention investigations. In the period, 8 expiry reviews were concluded with confirmation of the measures and 5 interim reviews were concluded with the measures being confirmed or amended.

There was no new safeguard investigation opened nor safeguard measures imposed during 2014.

On the modernisation of the trade defence instruments, the legislative process continued with the European Parliament voting a legislative resolution in April 2014 and thus closing its first reading. By the end of 2014, despite intensive discussions in the Council, particularly under the Italian presidency, no compromise was reached yet on the proposal.

As in previous years, this report provides an overview of the Court cases relating to the trade policy instruments. In 2014, the Court of Justice (COJ) and the General Court (GC) rendered 28 judgments in total relating to the areas of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy.

2014 was the seventh full year of activity for the Hearing Officer in DG Trade, who will release a separate report on his activities. During 2014 the Hearing Officer continued the work related to guaranteeing the rights of defence in trade proceedings before the European Commission. In addition the Hearing Officer also contributed to improved transparency in TDI activities.

The European Parliament's INTA Committee continued to be informed about major developments in the EU's trade defence activities.

The relevant activities in the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are also reported, including dispute settlement procedures initiated against the EU.

The annexes to this report provide easy access to the activities in table form.

This report is also available to the general public with the following link.

Internet Website : http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-defence/anti-dumping/  

1.Overview of the legislation

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy

1.1.1.The international framework

On an international level, unfair trading practices such as dumping and the granting of subsidies were identified as a threat to open markets as early as 1947, when the first GATT agreement was signed. The agreement contained specific provisions allowing GATT members to take action against these practices if they caused material injury to the domestic industry of a GATT member. Even though, the beginning of the disciplines dates back quite some time, the instruments are still relevant because the trade distortions that underlie the application of these instruments are widespread.

Since the beginning, considerable efforts have been made to harmonise the rules relating to trade instruments. During the last GATT round (the « Uruguay Round ») which led to the creation of the WTO and the detailed Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements, much of the attention was focused on the procedural and material conditions to be fulfilled before measures can be adopted. The EU played an active role in the negotiation of these relevant criteria which are reflected in its own legislation. The EU's role is the more so important today as a number of new users take action without the necessary rigor and restraint, affecting negatively also EU operators. The role the EU plays as a prudent user has therefore also an exemplary function at WTO level.

1.1.2.The EU legislation

The EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation was first enacted in 1968 and has since been modified several times. The current basic texts, which form the legal basis of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations in the EU, entered into force in March 1996 and October 1997 respectively. These are in line with the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements adopted during the GATT/WTO negotiations. The basic texts are:

–Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European EU – Codified Version 1

–Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the European EU – Codified Version 2 .

These regulations will overall be referred to as the "basic Regulation(s)".

The EU legislation contains a number of provisions aimed at ensuring a balanced application of the EU’s Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy rules on all interested parties. These provisions include the “EU interest test” and the “lesser duty rule”, which go beyond the WTO obligations.

The EU interest test is a public interest clause and provides that measures can only be taken if they are not contrary to the overall interest of the EU. This requires an analysis of all the economic interests involved, including those of the EU industry, users, consumers and traders of the product concerned.

The lesser duty rule requires the measures imposed by the EU to be lower than the dumping or subsidy margin, if such lower duty rate is sufficient to remove the injury suffered by the EU industry. Such a “no-injury” rate is determined by using the cost of production of the EU industry and a reasonable profit margin; it reduces the anti-dumping measures for individual exporting companies in almost half of the cases. The EU is one of the few investigating authorities on a world-wide level that applies the lesser duty rule.

Safeguards

1.2.1.The international framework

The principle of liberalisation of imports was set under the GATT 1947 and strengthened under the 1994 WTO Agreements. As safeguard measures consist of the unilateral withdrawal or suspension of a tariff concession or of other trade liberalisation obligations formerly agreed, they have to be considered as an exception to this principle. Article XIX GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards do not only impose strict conditions for the application of this "escape clause”, but also put in place a multilateral control mechanism under the WTO Committee on Safeguards.

Under WTO rules, safeguard action has to be viewed as a temporary defence measure that applies to all imports of the product covered by a measure, irrespective of origin. As regards non-WTO members, safeguard measures may be selective and apply to products originating in a specific country. WTO Accession Protocols may also provide for such selective safeguard mechanisms as was the case in the People's Republic of China's Protocol of Accession, although the provision has now expired.]

WTO safeguards should only be adopted after a comprehensive investigation which provides evidence of the existence of a) unforeseen developments leading to b) increased imports, c) the existence of a serious injury for EU producers and d) a causal link between the imports and the injury.

1.2.2.The EU legislation

The above-mentioned principles are all reflected in the relevant EU regulations, except for the “unforeseen development requirement” (which is not explicitly in the EU legislation but has been confirmed as a self-standing condition by WTO jurisprudence). Additionally, the adoption of measures in the EU requires an analysis of all interests concerned, i.e. the impact of the measures on producers, users and consumers. In other words, safeguard action can only be taken when it is in the EU’s interest to do so. The current EU safeguard instruments are covered by the following regulations:

–Council Regulation (EC) No 260/2009 3 on the common rules of imports – codified Version

–Council Regulation (EC) No 625/2009 4 on common rules for imports from certain third countries – codified version

–Council Regulation (EC) No 517/94 5 on common rules for imports of textile products from certain third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements, or by other specific EU import rules.

These regulations will overall be referred to as the "basic safeguard Regulation(s)".

Anti-subsidy and unfair pricing instrument for airline services

Regulation No 868/2004 6[1] dealing with the effect of subsidisation and unfair pricing for air services from third countries, adopted by the EP and the Council in 2004, has never been used. In December 2012, the Council of the European Union concluded that the Regulation "has proven not to address adequately the specific characteristics of the aviation services sector" and supported the Commission's intention to analyse, in consultation with industry and Member States, possible options for a more effective instrument to safeguard open and fair competition and its intention, on that basis, to present a proposal for a revision or replacement of Regulation 868/2004.  Following a public consultation, which took place in 2013, a study was carried out for DG MOVE in 2014, the purpose of which was to analyse policy options to be envisaged in the context of the review. The review of the regulation, involving different services of the Commission as well as external experts continued during 2014.

2.Basic concepts

2.1.Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy

2.1.1.What is dumping and what are countervailable subsidies - the material conditions for the imposition of duties?

2.1.1.1.Dumping and subsidies

Dumping is traditionally defined as price discrimination between national markets, or as selling below cost of production, plus profit. The EU’s anti-dumping legislation defines anti-dumping as selling a product in the EU at a price below its “normal value”. This “normal value” is usually the actual sales price on the domestic market of the exporting country. Therefore, a country is selling at dumped prices if the prices in its home market are higher than its export prices (i.e. price discrimination).

Where sales in the domestic market are not representative, for instance because they have only been made in small quantities, the normal value may then be established on another basis, such as the sales prices of other producers on the domestic market or the cost of production, plus profit. In the latter case, a company is selling at dumped prices if its export prices are below the cost of production, plus profit.

A certain segregation of the market, triggered by a variety of distortions, exists in the majority of the cases where dumping occurs on a more than incidental basis. That segregation may be caused, amongst other reasons, by government intervention e.g. high customs duties. As a result, exporters are shielded, at least to a certain degree, from international competition on their domestic market.

Subsidies can have similar effects to sales at dumped prices in that they allow exporters to operate from a distorted home base. Subsidies involve a direct support from a government or a government-directed private body which has the effect of conferring a benefit to producers or exporters (e.g. grants, tax and duty exemptions, preferential loans at below commercial rates, export promotion schemes, etc.), all aimed at allowing the exporters to sell at low prices in the EU. Only subsidies which are “specific”, i.e. targeted at individual companies or certain sectors of the economy, can be subject to trade defence measures.

Both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures are thus only second-best solutions in the absence of internationally agreed and enforced rules that ensure full market integration (for instance like in the EU internal market).

2.1.1.2.Material injury and causation

For measures to be taken against these unfair trading practices, it is not sufficient that companies are exporting their products to the EU at dumped or subsidised prices. Measures can only be taken if these exports cause material injury to EU producers.

Typical indicators of injury are that the dumped and/or subsidised import volumes increase over a certain period and import prices undercut the sales prices of the EU industry. As a consequence, the latter is forced to decrease production volumes and sales prices thus losing market shares, making losses or having to make employees redundant. In extreme cases, exporters may try to eliminate viable EU producers by using a predatory, below cost, pricing strategy. In any event, the injury analysis requires that all relevant factors be taken into account before deciding whether the EU industry is in fact suffering “material injury”.

A further condition for the imposition of measures is the need for “a causal link”: the injury must be caused by the dumping or the subsidy. This condition is often fulfilled when the injury to the EU industry coincides with the increase in dumped and subsidised imports. It is important to note that the dumped or subsidised imports do not have to be the only cause of the injury.

2.1.1.3.EU interest

Finally, it has to be established whether there are compelling reasons according to which measures would be contrary to the overall interest of the EU. In this respect, the interests of all relevant economic operators which might be affected by the outcome of the investigation must be taken into account. These interests typically include those of the EU industry, industrial users, consumers and traders of the product concerned and the analysis assesses the positive impact measures will have on some operators as opposed to the negative impact on others. Measures should not be imposed only if it can be clearly concluded that their negative impact would be disproportionate.

2.1.2.Procedure

Investigations are carried out in accordance with the procedural rules laid down in the basic Regulations. These rules guarantee a transparent, fair and objective proceeding by granting significant procedural rights to interested parties. In addition, the results of an investigation are published in the Official Journal, and the EU is obliged to justify its decisions in this publication. Finally, it is ensured that each case is decided on its merits and the Commission does not hesitate to terminate a case if the conditions to impose measures are not met.

Whereas each investigation is different depending on the products and countries involved, all cases follow the same procedural rules. However, certain preferential rules apply to any candidate countries. The rules relating to a new case are summarised below.

Initiation

A case normally starts with a sufficiently substantiated complaint from the EU industry manufacturing the same or a similar product to the one referred to in the complaint. Then, the Commission assesses whether the complaint contains sufficient evidence to allow for the initiation of the case. A case is opened by a notice of initiation published in the Official Journal. In this notice, all interested parties, including users, exporting country authorities in anti-subsidy investigations in particular and, where appropriate, consumer organisations are invited to participate and co-operate in the proceedings. Detailed questionnaires are sent to producers in the exporting countries, in anti-subsidy investigations also to the exporting country authorities, and in the EU to the producers, traders (in particular importers) and other interested parties, such as users. These questionnaires cover all different conditions to be fulfilled, i.e. dumping/subsidy, injury, causation and EU interest. The parties are also informed that they can request a hearing and ask for access to the non-confidential files which will help them defend their case.

The investigation up to the provisional measures

Following receipt of the replies to the questionnaire, investigations are carried out by Commission officials at the premises of the co-operating parties.

The main purpose of these visits is to verify whether the information given in the questionnaires is reliable. The verified information is subsequently used to calculate or determine the dumping margin and the injury factors, in particular the price undercutting margin and injury elimination level, as well as for the EU interest analysis. The respective calculations and analysis often involve the processing of thousands of transactions, the complex examination of production costs and the assessment of the economic situation of numerous economic operators.

The results of the calculations and other findings are summarised in a draft implementing act, on the basis of which it is decided whether to impose provisional measures, whether to continue the investigation without proposing duties or whether to terminate the proceedings. In either eventuality the decision is the Commission's responsibility.

The investigation up to the definitive stage

Following the publication in the Official Journal of a Commission regulation imposing provisional duties, interested parties, which so request, receive a full disclosure which allows them to review the Commission’s findings and to submit comments. Comments can also be made at a hearing. Any submissions and comment,s in reaction to provisional disclosure, are taken into account when a second, definitive, draft implementing act is prepared by the Commission.

After final disclosure, assessment of comments of interested parties and after receiving the opinion of the Member States via the Trade Defence Instruments Committee, the Commission decides whether or not to adopt definitive measures. At definitive stage, Member States can block the adoption of a draft implementing act by qualified majority. The Commission may also accept undertakings offered by exporters, which undertake to respect minimum prices. In the latter case, no duties are generally imposed on the companies from which undertakings are accepted. The Commission regulation imposing definitive duties/accepting undertakings, and deciding on the collection of the provisional duties, is published in the Official Journal.

As set out above, throughout the process and at various specific steps, the procedure - consisting e.g. of requests for information, hearings, access to the file and disclosure ensures that the rights of defence of interested parties are fully respected in this quasi-judicial process.

If one or more of the conditions for imposing measures are not met, the Commission will decide to terminate a case without the imposition of measures. The same procedure (disclosure, comments, hearing, draft implementing act) as described above applies. The termination of the case is made by a Commission Decision after consultation of the Member States.

Timing

The procedure described above is subject to strict statutory time limits. A decision to impose provisional duties must be taken within nine months of the initiation and the total duration of an investigation is limited to fifteen months in anti-dumping cases and to thirteen months in anti-subsidy cases. This leads to significant time constraints, taking into account, inter alia, internal consultations and the necessity to publish regulations and decisions in all EU languages at the same time.

Anti-dumping or countervailing measures will normally remain in force for five years, and may consist of duties or undertakings concluded with exporters. Measures are taken on a countrywide basis, but individual treatment, i.e. the application of a company-specific duty, can be granted to exporters which have co-operated throughout the investigation. During the five-year period, interested parties may, under certain conditions, request a review of measures or the refund of anti-dumping duties paid. Measures may also be suspended for a certain period, subject to given criteria.

2.1.3.Review of measures

The basic Regulations provide for administrative reviews and distinguish between interim reviews, newcomer reviews and expiry reviews.

The expiry review is initiated at the end of the five year life-time of the measures. Initiation of such a review requires a request by the EU industry evidencing that the expiry of the measures would lead to the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. Since the amendment to the basic Regulations, expiry reviews initiated after 20 March 2004 are subject to strict deadlines, i.e. they shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review, but in all cases be concluded within 15 months.

During the five year life-time of measures, the Commission may perform an interim review. Under the latter procedure, the Commission will consider whether the circumstances with regard to subsidy/dumping and injury have changed significantly or whether existing measures are achieving the intended results in removing the injury. Since 20 March 2006, the deadline for concluding an interim review is set at 12 months, but no later than 15 months.

Finally, the basic Regulations provide that a review shall be carried out to determine individual margins for new exporters in the exporting country concerned. Since 20 March 2006, the deadline for conclusion of newcomer reviews is nine months.

During these reviews, the main procedural rules outlined in chapter 2.1.2 are also applicable. However, in reviews there is no provisional stage.

2.1.4.Judicial reviews

The procedural rights of the parties, including hearings and access to non-confidential files, are respected in the course of the proceeding, and a system of judicial review is in place to ensure their correct implementation. The competence to review anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases lies with the General Court and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Furthermore, WTO members may have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

2.2.Safeguards

2.2.1.What are safeguard measures?

Safeguard measures allow temporary protection against the adverse effects of import surges. Under the EU legislation 7 implementing the WTO Safeguards Agreement, they can be applied under the following conditions: safeguard measures may be imposed if, as a result of unforeseen developments, a product is being imported into the EU in such increased quantities and/or on such terms and conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to EU producers of like or directly competitive products. Safeguard measures may only be imposed to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.

2.2.2.Procedure

Investigations are carried out in accordance with the procedural rules laid down in the basic safeguard Regulations. These rules guarantee a transparent, fair and objective proceeding. In addition, the results of safeguard investigations are published in the Official Journal, and the EU is obliged to justify its decisions in this publication.

Initiation

The Commission is informed by one or more Member States should trends in imports of a certain product appear to call for safeguard measures. This information must contain evidence available, of the following criteria: a) the volume of imports, b) the price of imports, c) trends in certain economic factors of the Union industry such as production, capacity utilisation, stocks, sales, market share, prices, profits, employment, etc. Where there is a threat of serious injury, the Commission must also examine whether it is clearly foreseeable that a particular situation is likely to develop into actual injury.

This information is passed on by the Commission to all other Member States. If there is sufficient evidence to justify an investigation, the Commission publishes a notice of initiation in the Official Journal within one month of receipt of the information and commences the investigation, acting in co-operation with the Member States.

Provisional measures

Provisional measures may be imposed at any stage of the investigation. They shall be applied in critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which would be difficult to repair, making immediate action necessary, and where a preliminary determination provides clear evidence that increased imports have caused, or are threatening to cause, serious injury.

The duration of the provisional measures can, however, not exceed 200 days (i.e. slightly more than six months).

Definitive measures

If, at the end of the investigation, the Commission considers that definitive safeguard measures are necessary, it will take the necessary decisions no later than nine months from the initiation of the investigation, at which stage the results of the investigation are published in the Official Journal. In exceptional circumstances, this time limit may be extended by a further maximum period of two months.

Safeguard measures shall be applied only to the extent to prevent or remedy serious injury, thereby maintaining as far as possible traditional trade flows. As to the form of the measures, the EU will choose the measures most suitable in order to achieve these objectives. These measures could consist of quantitative quotas, tariff quotas, duties, etc.

Duration and review of the measures

The duration of safeguard measures must be limited to the period of time necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustments on the part of the EU producers, but should not exceed four years, including the duration of the provisional measures, if any. Under certain circumstances, extensions may be necessary but the total period of application of safeguard measures should not exceed eight years.

If the duration of the measures exceeds one year, the measures must be progressively liberalised at regular intervals during the period of application. If the duration of the measures exceeds three years, the Commission will examine, mid way through their duration, the appropriateness of further liberalisation and necessity for their continued application. This will be done either on the Commission's own initiative or at the request of a Member State. Where the Commission considers that the application of the measure is still necessary, it shall inform the Member States accordingly. Where the Commission considers that any surveillance or safeguard measure should be revoked or amended, it shall do so after having received the approval of the Member States.

3.General overview of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and measures

The number of new investigations initiated in 2014 increased compared to the previous year, 16 compared to 9. The number of definitive measures imposed decreased when compared to 2013 (3 as compared to 17) and the number of provisional measures imposed in 2014 also decreased from 6 in 2013 to 2. These changes between 2013 and 2014 reflect the fact that following initiations, provisional and definitive measures are imposed normally 9 and 15 months later respectively, which might be in the following year. Below are details on new investigations and review investigations.

3.1.Measures in place

At the end of 2014, the EU had 81 anti-dumping measures (which were extended in 26 cases) and 13 countervailing measures in force (which was extended in 1 case) 8 . The anti-dumping measures covered 61 products and 24 countries (see Annex O); the countervailing measures covered 10 products and 7 countries (see Annex P). The large majority of measures was in the form of duties. However, in a number of cases, undertakings were accepted.

Of the 81 anti-dumping measures and 26 extensions in force at the end of 2014 the main countries affected were China (52), Indonesia and Malaysia (6 each), India, Russia and Thailand (5 each), Taiwan (4), Ukraine and Korea (3 each) and USA and Philippines, Sri Lanka and USA (2 each). Of the 13 anti-subsidy measures and 1 extension in place the majority concern imports from China (5 in total), with imports from India subject to 4 measures and Canada, Iran, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates and USA all subject to 1 measure each.

Regarding the anti-dumping measures one has to look at the trade volume of the products concerned, which varies considerably depending on the sector concerned. The largest trade volumes are often generated by high technology, such as electronics, which are high-value products. It should be noted that in 2014, only 0.21% 9 of total imports into the EU was affected by anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures. Table 1 below provides statistical information on the new investigations for the years 2010 – 2014.

TABLE 1

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy new investigations

during the period 1 January 2010 - 31 December 2014 10

3.2.Review investigations

Anti-dumping measures, including price undertakings, may be subject, under the basic anti-dumping Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 11(2)), interim reviews (Article 11(3)), newcomer investigations (Article 11(4)), absorption investigations (Article 12) and circumvention investigations (Article 13).

Also anti-subsidy measures may be subject, under the basic anti-subsidy Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 18), interim reviews (Article 19), absorption investigations (Article 19(3)), accelerated reviews (Article 20) and circumvention investigations (Article 23).

These reviews continue to represent a major part of the work of the Commission's TDI services. In the period from 2010 to 2014, a total of 150 review investigations were initiated. These review investigations represented 64% of all investigations initiated in that period.

In 2014, 22 reviews were initiated. These comprised 10 expiry reviews, 5 interim reviews, 2 newcomer reviews, 2 absorption investigations and 3 circumvention investigations.

An overview of the review investigations in 2014 can be found in Annexes F to K. Table 2 provides statistical information for the years 2010 – 2014.

TABLE 2

Reviews of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations

during the period 1 January 2010 - 31 December 2014 12

4.Overview of activities in 2014

4.1.New investigations

4.1.1.Initiations

In 2014, 14 new anti-dumping investigations and 2 new anti-subsidy investigations were initiated. There was no safeguard investigation initiated. The anti-dumping investigations involved 9 different products from 8 different countries. The anti-subsidy investigations involve 2 products from 2 different countries. Details of these investigations are given in Annex A. The country most affected by the anti-dumping investigations is China with 5 investigations. The anti-subsidy investigations concerned Turkey and China. The main sector concerned by these new cases is Iron and steel.

In the five-year period from 2010 to 2014, 83 investigations were initiated on imports from 20 countries. The main sectors concerned by the investigations included iron and steel – 30 investigations, chemical and allied – 21 investigations, other - 16 investigations, electronics and other metals – 4 investigations each, textiles and allied, and other mechanical engineering – 3 investigations each, wood and paper – 2 investigations. A breakdown of the product sectors is given in Annex B(A).

The breakdown of the countries concerned by initiations during the period from 2010 to 2014 include China with 37 investigations, India 11, Indonesia 5, Thailand 4, Turkey and USA 4 each, Russia 3, Argentina, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Thailand 2 each and Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, F.Y.R.O.M., Ukraine and Vietnam with 1 each. A table showing all the investigations initiated over the last five years broken down by country of export is at Annex B(B).

The list of cases initiated in 2014 can be found below, together with the names of the complainants. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex A.

4.1.2.Provisional measures

In 2014, provisional duties were imposed in 1 anti-dumping investigation and 1 anti-subsidy investigation.

The list of cases where provisional measures were imposed during 2014 can be found below, together with the measure(s) imposed. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex C.

4.1.3.Definitive measures

During 2014, definitive duties were imposed in 1 anti-dumping investigation and in 2 anti-subsidy investigations. They all related to imports from the People’s Republic of China.

The list of cases where definitive measures were imposed during 2014 can be found below, together with the measure(s) imposed. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex D.

4.1.4.Details on individual cases 

Solar glass from China (AD)

In February 2013, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation into the imports of solar glass originating in the People's Republic of China (PRC), following a complaint lodged by EU ProSun Glass on behalf of producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of solar glass. In April 2013, the Commission announced the initiation of a parallel anti-subsidy proceeding with regard to imports into the Union of solar glass originating in the PRC and commenced a separate investigation (more details below).

Product concerned and Investigation Period (IP)

The product concerned was solar glass consisting of tempered soda-lime-flat-glass, with an iron content of less than 300 ppm, a solar transmittance of more than 88 % (measured according to AM1,5 300-2 500 nm), a resistance to heat up to 250 °C (measured according to EN 12150), a resistance to thermal shocks of Δ 150 K (measured according to EN 12150) and having a mechanical strength of 90 N/mm 2 or more (measured according to EN 1288-3) ('the product concerned', commonly referred to as 'solar glass'). The product concerned currently falls within CN code ex 7007 19 80. The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012 (‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2009 to the end of the investigation period.

Sampling

The Commission selected a sample of four Union producers, accounting for 79% of the sales of the Union industry on the Union market. Some Union producers requested the Commission to keep their identities confidential. The Commission found this request to be warranted, and it further decided to keep confidential the identities of all Union producers (whether they requested anonymity or not) to prevent the identities of the former being deduced. As regards exporting producers, the Commission originally selected five companies to be included in the sample. However, in the course of the investigation, two of them were eliminated from the sample as it was established that they had over-stated their export sales to the EU. Thus, the sample finally consisted of three exporting producers accounting for more than 50% of the exports of the product concerned from PRC into the EU. In view of the low number of cooperating importers, sampling was not deemed to be necessary.

Dumping

Ten cooperating exporting companies requested MET pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation and replied to the MET claim form within the given deadlines. One of the companies that were removed from the sample requested individual examination. The Commission considered that it would not be unduly burdensome to grant this company individual examination. In line with the basic Regulation, a MET verification was carried out to the companies which were originally included in the sample. The investigation established that all four exporting producers (groups of companies) claiming MET failed to demonstrate that they fulfilled all of the criteria laid down in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation. In view of the fact that all requests for MET were denied, normal value for Chinese exporting producers was established on the basis of information received from the producer in the analogue country (i.e. Turkey), pursuant to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation. The export prices were based on the prices actually paid or payable for the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

The normal value and the export price were compared on an ex-works basis. The dumping margins were established by comparing the individual ex-works prices of the sampled exporters to the domestic sales prices of the analogue country producer or to the constructed normal value as appropriate. For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. As a result, dumping margins ranging from 41,6% to 90,1% were found.

Injury and causation

The analysis of the situation of the Union industry showed a clear downward trend of most of the injury indicators. The analysis of the situation of the Union industry showed that while overall, consumption and production increased over the period considered, both indicators significantly dropped during the IP with respect to the previous year. Although its volume of sales increased, the market share of the Union industry shrank in the period considered (from 88,6% to 65,8%), despite an overall increase in consumption over the same period. Average sales price fell sharply during the period considered (-23%), negatively impacting all the financial performance indicators such as profitability, cash flow, return on investments and ability to raise capital. In view of this situation, the investigation confirmed in particular the fact that the Union industry's sales prices were below their production costs, thus having a negative effect on the Union industry's profitability, reaching significant negative levels during the IP. Thus, the Commission concluded that the Union industry had suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic regulation.

The investigation showed that the volume of dumped imports from the PRC and their market share increased dramatically over the period considered. The investigation also showed that the prices of the dumped imports decreased by 27,2 % during the period considered and led to higher undercutting margins. The Commission thus established a clear coincidence in time between the increasing volumes of dumped imports from the PRC and the deterioration of the situation of the Union industry. The Commission analysed other possible causes of injury, and concluded that none of them, analysed both individually and cumulatively, were found to be such as to break the causal link established between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from the PRC. Based on the above analysis, the Commission concluded that the presence of dumped imports of the product concerned from the PRC, and the considerable increase of their market share at prices constantly undercutting those of the Union industry caused the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

Union interest and definitive measures

The Commission analysed whether the imposition of measures was in the the interest of the Union as a whole. In this regard, the Commission concluded that should measures not be imposed, further losses in the Union industry’s market share could be expected with a further deterioration of its profitability, which would lead, in the short to medium term, to a likely disappearance of the Union industry. The Commission then analysed the impact that the imposition of measures would have on unrelated importers/traders, users and raw material suppliers, and it also analysed competition-relates aspects. The Commission, based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, concluded that no compelling reasons exist against the imposition of definitive measures on imports of solar glass originating in the PRC.

An anti-subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with the anti-dumping investigation. In view of the use of the lesser duty rule and the fact that the definitive subsidy margins were lower than the injury elimination level, the Commission imposed the definitive countervailing duty at the level of the established definitive subsidy margins, and then impose the definitive anti-dumping duty up to the relevant injury elimination level. Thus, the Commission imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty ranging from 0,4% to 36,1% in May 2014.

Solar glass from China (AS)

In April 2013, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) announced the initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding with regard to imports into the European Union of solar glass originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’). The proceeding was initiated following a complaint lodged by EU ProSun Glass (the complainant) on behalf of producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of solar glass. As outlined above, the Commission had initiated an anti-dumping investigation on solar glass from the PRC in February 2013.

The product concerned and Investigation Period (IP) for the anti-subsidy case were the same as that of the anti-dumping case as set out above. Sampling was also applied in the anti-subsidy investigation for Union producers and exporters, although the selected sample in the AS case for exporters accounted for 76 % of the total volume of exports to the Union of the product concerned in the investigation period, as compared to 50% in the AD investigation.

Subsidisation

The complainant alleged that the PRC is subsidising its solar glass industry. The complaint contained prima facie evidence for several subsidy practices included in legislation and in a number of policy and planning documents which are the basis for state support of the sector, e.g. '12th Five Year Plan', ‘The 12th Five Year Plan for the Solar Photovoltaic Industry’ and 'Decision No. 40'. The Commission reviewed and analysed the documents mentioned in the complaint as well as additional documents submitted by the GOC and by sampled exporting producers in the course of the investigation, and it found that many of these documents showed that the solar glass industry in the PRC received preferential treatment in many areas.

The Commission investigated more than twenty subsidy programmes. As regards preferential lending to the solar glass industry, the Commission first confirmed that State Owned Chinese Banks (SOCBs) are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation. In addition, the Commission confirmed that private banks were entrusted and directed by the Government of China to lend to encouraged industries in the PRC. The Commission concluded that the solar glass industry in China benefited from preferential loans in the IP, both from state-owned banks and from private banks, and that these loans constituted a countervailable subsidy within the meaning of the basic Regulation. In addition, the Commission found that the following schemes were also countervailable; i.e. grant programmes, direct tax exemption and reduction programmes, and Government provision of land at less than adequate remuneration. Overall, the Commission found a subsidy margin for the sampled exporting producers ranging from 3,2% to 17,1%.

The injury and causation findings, as well as for Union interest in the AD and AS investigation were the same therefore the findings are not repeated here.

Definitive measures

The Commission imposed definitive countervailing duties ranging from 3,2% to 17,1% to imports of solar glass originating in the PRC in May 2014.

4.1.5.Investigations terminated without measures

In accordance with the provisions of the respective basic Regulations, investigations may be terminated without the imposition of measures if a complaint is withdrawn or if measures are unnecessary (i.e. no dumping/no subsidies, no injury resulting from dumped or subsidised imports, measures not in the interest of the Union). In 2014, 4 new proceedings (1 anti-dumping and 3 anti-subsidy) were terminated without measures, compared to 11 in 2013 and 9 in 2012.

The list of cases which were terminated without the imposition of measures during 2014 can be found in the following table. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex E.

4.1.6.Details on some individual cases

Polyester staple fibres from the PRC, India and Vietnam (AS)

In December 2013, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-subsidy investigation with regard to imports into the Union of polyester staple fibres originating in the People's Republic of China, India and Vietnam (‘the countries concerned’). The investigation was initiated on the basis of a complaint lodged by the European Man-made Fibres Association (CIRFS) (‘the complainant’) on behalf of seven producers, representing more than 70 % of the total Union production of Polyester Staple Fibres (‘PSF’). Product concerned and IP

The product concerned was synthetic staple fibres of polyesters, not carded, combed or otherwise processed for spinning originating in the People's Republic of China, India and Vietnam, currently falling within CN code 5503 20 00 (‘the product concerned’). The investigation of subsidisation and injury covered the period from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 (‘the investigation period’ or 'IP'). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2010 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

Sampling

The Commission selected a sample of four Union producers, accounting for 54 % of the total Union production of PSF. The Commission based its selection on the sales and production volume of PSF during the investigation period while taking into account the geographical spread. Regarding the exporting producers, the Commission sampled five cooperating Chinese exporting producers/groups of exporting producers with the largest volume of exports to the Union during the IP. As for India, the Commission selected a sample of four Indian exporting producers, representing about 90% of the total Indian exports to the Union in the investigation period. In view of the low number of Vietnamese cooperating exporting producers sampling was not necessary. No sampling was used for importers either. Three Chinese exporting producers requested individual examination; however, the Commission rejected such requests, stating that they would have been unduly burdensome. On the other hand, the Commission accepted the request for individual examination by one Indian exporting producer as in this particular case, it was considered that it would not have been unduly burdensome and it would not have prevented completion of the investigation in good time.

Subsidisation

For the PRC, the schemes investigated comprised, inter alia: preferential lending by State Owned banks, Government provisions of goods at less than adequate remuneration, direct tax exemption, tax rebates and grants. The investigation showed that the amount of subsidies for the Chinese exporting producers, expressed ad valorem, ranged between 0,76% to 1,77%. Thus, in view of the de minimis amounts of countervailable subsidies established, the Commission concluded that the investigation regarding imports of the product concerned from the PRC should be terminated without imposing measures. Regarding India, the Commission found that a number of schemes provided countervailable subsidies to the sampled exporting producers, ranging from 4,16% to 7,65%, e.g. Focus Market Scheme, Focus Product Scheme, Advance Authorisation Scheme and Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme. Lastly, the Commission decided to terminate the investigation regarding imports of the product concerned from Vietnam as the country-wide subsidy margin (i.e. 1,25%) was below the de minimis threshold.

Injury and causation

As the countervailable subsidy margins established for the PRC and Vietnam were de minimis, the injury analysis focused on the imports of the product concerned from India. Over the period considered, imports from India remained stable, accounting for a Union market share of between 6,1 % and 7,5 %. Undercutting was significant (up to 43,7 %). Over the period considered most injury indicators improved. The profitability of the Union producers went up by close to 6 percentage points, but the average profit margin was still at an unsatisfactory break-even level of 0,3 % in the investigation period. The capacity utilisation rate increased from 74 % to 86 %. This however was the result of an increase in Union production volumes as well as the decrease in Union capacity. Average sales prices in the Union peaked in 2011, caused by the sharp surge of the cotton and petrol prices. Overall, average Union sales prices increased by 16 % in the period considered. Return on investment and cash flow developed positively. Employment also increased during the period considered. Signs of recovery were thus observed in a still injurious situation.

Some injury indicators developed negatively during the period considered. The Union market share of Union producers dropped from 45,3% to 40,2% as Union sales volumes fell by 6%. The level of investments decreased overall with the exception of 2011. Capacity declined by 5% during the period considered. On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation.

As regards causation, the Commission considered that it was not possible to establish a causal link between the injurious situation of the Union industry and the subsidised imports from India. This conclusion was based on the relatively low and only slightly increasing market share of the imports from India over the period considered (from 6,1% to 6,8%), as compared to a much higher but still significantly declining market share of the Union industry (from 45,3% to 40,2%). Secondly, imports from certain other countries (Korea, Taiwan, PRC) were more voluminous and/or more strongly increasing and therefore, if imports contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry, this was to be attributed to imports from those countries rather than to imports from India. A causal link between the subsidised imports from India, and the material injury suffered by the Union industry could therefore not be established.

Consequently, the Commission decided to terminate the proceeding without imposing measures in respect of all three countries.

4.2.Review investigations

4.2.1.Expiry reviews

Article 11(2) and Article 18 of the basic Regulations provide for the expiry of measures after 5 years, unless an expiry review demonstrates that they should be maintained in their original form.

In 2014, 2 anti-dumping measures and no anti-subsidy measure expired automatically. The references for these measures are set out in Annex N.

Since the expiry provision of the basic Regulations came into force in 1985, a total of 494 measures have expired automatically.

4.2.1.1.Initiations

During 2014, 10 expiry reviews were initiated, 9 anti-dumping measures and 1 concerning anti-subsidy measures. The list of the expiry reviews initiated in 2014 can be found in the following table, together with the name of the complainant. It should be noted that some expiry reviews may be carried out in parallel with interim reviews, which allow the amendment of the duty rates. However this was not the case in 2014. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex F.    

4.2.1.2.Expiry reviews concluded with confirmation of duties

During 2014, 8 expiry reviews were concluded with confirmation of the duties for a further five years.

The list of the cases which were concluded with confirmation of duty during 2014, together with the result of the investigation, can be found below. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex F.

4.2.1.3.Details on some individual cases concluded by confirmation of duty

Ammonium nitrate from Russia (AD)

In July 2013, the Commission initiated an expiry review investigation with regard to imports into the Union of ammonium nitrate (hereinafter ‘AN’ or ‘the product concerned’ originating in Russia. The original measures (first imposed in 1995) have been subject to several reviews since then. The last expiry review was concluded in 2008. Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry of the anti-dumping measures in force, the Commission received a request for the initiation of an expiry review of those measures pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. The request was lodged by a Union association of manufacturers of fertilisers, 'Fertilisers Europe' on behalf of Union producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of the product concerned. The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would likely result in continuation and recurrence of dumping and injury to the Union industry.

Product concerned and the review investigation period (RIP)

The product concerned by this review was solid fertilisers with an AN content exceeding 80 % by weight, currently falling within CN codes 3102 30 90, 3102 40 90, ex 3102 29 00, ex 3102 60 00, ex 3102 90 00, ex 3105 10 00, ex 3105 20 10, ex 3105 51 00, ex 3105 59 00 and ex 3105 90 20 and originating in Russia). However, with regard to AN produced by JSC Kirovo-Chepetsky Khimichesky Kombinat (Kirovo) only AN currently falling within CN codes 3102 30 90 and 3102 40 90 was the product concerned pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 989/2009. The main raw material used in the production of AN is gas, which accounts for 70 % to 80 % of the total costs of production. The investigation of a continuation and recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2013 (the period considered).

Sampling

The Commission selected a sample of four Union producers located in France, Lithuania, Poland and the United Kingdom, representing around 42 % of the Union production and 41 % of the Union sales. The Commission selected a sample of four exporting producers which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. These producers represented 88 % of the total export sales from Russia in volume during the RIP. They included the two companies that had export sales to the Union under the undertaking during the RIP. No sampling was necessary regarding unrelated importers in the Union.

Likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping

In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the existing measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping. Only one sampled exporting producer (Acron) fully cooperated in the investigation. However, in 2008 the Commission accepted a price undertaking offer from Acron, which was still in force during the RIP. Acron's export prices during the RIP were determined by that price undertaking which sets a minimum import price. In light of the specific circumstances of this investigation, the Commission concluded that such export prices were not considered as a reliable element in assessing whether dumping would be likely to continue or recur should anti-dumping measures be allowed to lapse. As the sampled Russian exporting producers, with the exception of Acron, did not fully cooperate, the Commission did not have sufficient data to carry out any dumping calculations on the basis of the companies' own data.

The Commission then analysed whether there was evidence of likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures lapse. As a result of the investigation, the Commission concluded that the Russian exporting producers were selling the product concerned at dumped prices to third countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. During the RIP the average ex-works export price of the four sampled exporting producers was 201 EUR/tonne to third countries, while the average ex-works domestic price was 221 EUR/tonne. Therefore, the Commission considered that it was likely that, if the current measures were to be repealed, the Russian exporting producers would also sell to the Union at dumped levels. Regarding spare capacity of sampled exporting producers, the Commission concluded that the Russian producers disposed of significant spare capacity which was very likely to be used for substantial additional exports to the Union, should the measures lapse. Given the price gap existing between the export prices of Russian exporting producers to third countries and the prices charged during the RIP on the Union market, it appeared unlikely that, should the measures lapse, prices charged on the Union market would fall to the level currently observed on third country markets to which the Russian producers export. As a result, Russian exporting producers were likely to have an incentive to redirect part of their current export volumes to third countries to the Union. In view of these considerations, the Commission concluded that there was likelihood of recurrence of dumping and of a substantial increase of the quantities exported to the Union, should the measures in force lapse.

Likelihood of recurrence of injury

The investigation showed that the Union industry was in a non-injurious situation. However, there were no indications that this positive situation would be sustainable if measures were allowed to lapse. On the contrary, according to market analysis provided by the applicant the AN market prices had reached their peak and the top of the business cycle. The business cycle, as well as prices, was projected to decline. Therefore the level of price and profit achieved by the Union industry during the period considered would not be obtained in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the costs of production would remain stable or further increase thus squeezing the profit margin of the Union industry. In this scenario, and given the decreasing consumption in the Union, a surge of imports in significant quantities at undercutting prices would exert a strong pressure on the industry's sales prices and cause it to lose significant market share. This would in all likelihood unavoidably cause material injury to recur.

Union interest and definitive measures

The Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures against Russia would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. It was determined that if the measures were allowed to lapse, the Union industry would in all likelihood be faced with increased unfair competition from the Russian producers, which would undoubtedly lead to a quick deterioration of its economic situation. The Commission then analysed the impact of extending the measures as regards importers and traders and concluded that they have access to a number of sources both inside and outside the Union. In addition, the Commission established that users of the product under review were not incurring disproportionate costs as a result of the measures. Therefore, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the current anti-dumping measures.

Consequently, the Commission confirmed that the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Russia currently in force should be maintained. The definitive anti-dumping duty ranged from 28,88 to 47,07 EUR/tonne.

Sulphanilic acid from China and India (AD)

In October 2013, the Commission initiated an expiry review on imports from the People's Republic of China ('PRC') and India, on the basis of a request lodged by CUF — Quimicos Industriais, the sole producer of sulphanilic acid in the Union. The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures currently in force would be likely to result in a continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry. In parallel, the Commission also initiated an expiry review investigation pursuant on the countervailing measures in force on imports of sulphanilic acid originating in India. Both the expiry reviews relating to India (AD and CVD) are described under point 8.2.1.4.

Product concerned and RIP

The product concerned is sulphanilic acid currently classifiable within CN code ex 2921 42 00 (TARIC code 2921 42 00 60). There are two grades of sulphanilic acid, which are determined according to their purity: a technical grade and a purified grade. In addition, the purified grade is sometimes commercialised in the form of a salt of sulphanilic acid. Sulphanilic acid is used as a raw material in the production of optical brighteners, concrete additives, food colorants and speciality dyes. Limited use by the pharmaceutical industry was noted as well. The investigation of a continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2010 to the end of the review investigation period, 30 September 2013.

Sampling

In view of the apparent large number of exporting producers in the countries concerned, and of unrelated importers in the Union, sampling was envisaged. However, the Commission, received replies to the sampling form only from two Indian exporting producers and no replies from Chinese exporting producers, thus sampling was not applied. Sampling was neither applied to Union producers (as there is a sole Union producer), nor to unrelated importers in the Union.

Likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping

For the PRC, normal value was determined on the basis of the price or constructed value obtained in an appropriate market economy third country ('the analogue country'), i.e. India. In view of the lack of cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers and thus, the absence of specific information on Chinese prices, the export price was determined on the basis of facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, and to that end, statistical sources (Eurostat) were used. The comparison between normal value and export price was made on an ex-works basis. Due allowance to the export price in the form of adjustments was made where necessary.

The import volumes from the PRC were very low during the RIP. While, based on import statistics, there was no dumping such conclusion was of limited relevance due to the low imported quantities and the absence of information regarding the imported product mix, which is important due to the significant price difference between the purified and the technical grades. Taking into account the significant spare capacity available in the PRC and the information on their pricing behaviour on a third market (India), not protected by trade defence measures, the Commission determined that likelihood of recurrence of dumping existed should measures be allowed to lapse.

Likelihood of recurrence of injury

In addition to the aforementioned reasons that led to the conclusion that there was likelihood of recurrence of dumping, information available suggested that the PRC had recently sold increased quantities of sulphanilic acid to India at prices undercutting those of the Union industry. Finally, the statistics obtained on Chinese imports to the Indian market seemed to indicate that the PRC was interested in selling predominantly purified grade sulphanilic acid which if directed to the Union market would enter into direct competition with the sales of the Union producer. Thus, the Commission established that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of exports from the PRC at low prices, affecting negatively the financial and economic performance of the Union industry and resulting in recurrence of material injury. Regarding India, the likelihood of recurrence of injury was not analysed due to the negative finding concerning recurrence of dumping.

Union interest

The Commission examined whether the maintenance of the measures would be against the Union interest as a whole. As regards the Union industry, the Commission established that it would be likely to experience a serious deterioration of its situation in case the anti-dumping measures against the PRC were allowed to lapse. Regarding users, the Commission noted that given that existing measures on imports of sulphanilic acid from India should be abolished, it would immediately facilitate access for an additional source of sulphanilic acid supply on the Union market on competitive prices. In addition, only one importer provided a partial questionnaire reply claiming that sulphanilic acid does not play an important role in its activity. Therefore, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the anti-dumping measures against the PRC.

Consequently, the Commission maintained a definitive anti-dumping duty of 33,7% on imports of sulphanilic acid originating in the PRC. and repealed the anti-dumping measures in force for imports of the product concerned originating in India for the reasons explained below.

4.2.1.4.Reviews concluded by termination

During 2014, 4 expiry reviews were concluded by termination.

Details of some individual cases

Sulphanilic acid from India (AD)

The expiry review on sulphanilic acid detailed above regarding imports from China also concerned imports of the product concerned from India. Details of the IP and product concerned are set out above.

Regarding India, the normal value was based on the actual domestic price, calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that type made by the sole cooperating exporting producer during the review investigation period. The product concerned was exported to independent customers in the Union and the export price was established according to Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation, namely on the basis of export prices actually paid or payable. The normal value and the export price were compared on an ex-works basis. For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. The dumping margin calculated for the sole cooperating exporting producer was negative. Hence, there was no dumping during the RIP.

The Commission established that in light of: the absence of dumping during the review investigation period, the spare capacity which was considerably below that of the PRC and that the export price levels to the Union and the rest of the world were made according to market conditions and in significant quantities, no likelihood of recurrence of dumping with regard to India existed. As a result the Commission repealed the anti-dumping measures in force for imports of the product concerned originating in India.

Sulphanilic acid from India (AS)

As mentioned above, in October 2013, the Commission also initiated an expiry review on the countervailing measures on imports of sulphanilic acid from India also on the basis of a request lodged by CUF — Quimicos, the sole producer of the product in the Union. The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures in force would be likely to result in a continuation of subsidisation and recurrence of injury to the Union industry. Details regarding the product concerned, the RIP and sampling are set out under the AD cases outlined above.

Likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of subsidisation

The investigation established a subsidy margin for the cooperating exporting producer of 3,1%. Although the subsidy margin found during the expiry review investigation was lower than the ones established during the original investigation and a previous expiry review, the cooperating Indian exporter of the product concerned continued to benefit from countervailable subsidisation by the Indian authorities. There was no indication that the Duty Drawback Scheme (DDS) — the main programme currently used by the company after de-bonding from the Export Oriented Units Scheme (EOUS) would be phased out in the foreseeable future. Under these conditions, it was clear that the exporter of the product concerned would also continue to receive countervailable subsidies in the future.

Likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury

The investigation showed that imports of the product concerned from India had fallen to a very low level (-54% market share in the period considered). The market share of the Union industry remained fairly stable and the volumes lost by India (-48%) were taken up by imports from the US at a price level similar to that of the Union industry. The Union industry was able to increase its sales volumes, average sales prices and to achieve close to optimal capacity utilisation rates. It was therefore concluded that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the review investigation period.

The investigation did not reveal the existence of significant spare capacity in India. With regard to the price behaviour of Indian exporters, it was found that the cooperating exporting producer, but also other Indian exporters, were selling at prices which did not undercut the Union price levels during the RIP. Moreover, the subsidy margin found in the RIP for the cooperating Indian producer amounted to 3,1 %, thus showing a continued declining trend in subsidisation observed since the imposition of the original countervailing measures in 2002. In view of the findings, it was concluded that repealing the countervailing measures against India was not likely to result in recurrence of injury in the short to medium term. Since it was concluded that there was no likelihood of recurrence of injury, it was not necessary to determine the Union interest.

Consequently, the Commission repealed the countervailing measures in force for imports of the product concerned originating in India and terminated the proceedings concerning these imports.

4.2.2.Interim reviews

Article 11(3) and Article 19 of the basic Regulations provide for the review of measures during their period of validity on the initiative of the Commission, at the request of a Member State or, provided that at least 1 year has lapsed since the imposition of the definitive measure, following a request containing sufficient evidence by an exporter, an importer or by the EU producers. In carrying out the investigations, it is considered, inter alia, whether the circumstances with regard to dumping/subsidization and injury have changed significantly. Reviews can be limited to dumping/subsidization or injury aspects.

During 2014, a total of 5 interim reviews were initiated (3 anti-dumping and 2 anti-subsidy). 5 interim reviews were concluded with amendment of duty, 2 were concluded without amending the duties and no interim reviews led to the termination of the measures. The list of cases which were concluded during 2014 by amending the duties, together with the result of the investigation, can be found below. It should be noted that, in principle, interim reviews may be carried out in parallel with expiry reviews, but this was not the case in 2014. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex G.

4.2.2.1.Details on individual cases

Glass fibre products (continuous filament) (AD)

In December 2013 the Commission initiated a partial interim review, limited in scope to the examination of injury, of the anti-dumping measures in force on the imports of certain filament glass fibre products from the People's Republic of China ('PRC'). The review was initiated following a request by the European Glass Fibre Producers Association (APFE), on behalf of Union producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of the product concerned. In parallel, an anti-subsidy investigation on the same product originating in the PRC was initiated.

Product concerned and IP

The product concerned by both investigations was chopped glass fibre strands, of a length of not more than 50 mm; glass fibre rovings, excluding glass fibre rovings which are impregnated and coated and have a loss on ignition of more than 3 % (as determined by the ISO Standard 1887); and mats made of glass fibre filaments excluding mats of glass wool (‘the product concerned’ or ‘filament glass fibre products’), currently falling within CN codes 7019 11 00, ex 7019 12 00 and 7019 31 00 (the latter code replaced 7019 31 10 on 1.1.2014) and originating in the PRC. The investigation of injury covered the period from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2010 to the end of the IP (‘the period considered’).

Sampling

The sample concerning Union producers consisted of three Union producers located in Belgium, France and Slovakia, representing around 52 % of the total Union production and 49% of all sales on the Union market. For exporting producers, the Commission selected a sample of three exporting producers based on the largest representative volume of exports which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. No sampling was needed for unrelated importers in the Union.

Injury

The investigation confirmed that the Union industry suffered material injury as defined in the basic anti-dumping Regulation. The imposition of anti-dumping measures allowed the Union industry to raise its prices in 2011. At the same time, efforts were undertaken by the Union industry to increase efficiency and productivity. Even though Union consumption had been on the rise, the Union industry had no choice but to lower its unit sales prices again as of 2012 in order to maintain its market share.

The undercutting analysis showed for a major Chinese exporter to the Union an undercutting margin of 2 % despite the anti-dumping measures (and custom duties) that were added to the import price. The vast majority of other imports were made at price levels comparable to Union prices. The declining trend in the sales price of the Union producers clearly showed that the Union producers tried to compete on price with Chinese imports and closed the price gap. However, this led to a strong deterioration of the Union producers' financial results with the Union industry reporting losses since 2012. This situation was not sustainable in the short to medium run. Other indicators, such as production, production capacity, employment, inventories and cash flow, also developed negatively, even after the imposition of measures against the PRC.

As regards causation, there was an increase in the volume and market share of the dumped and subsidised imports from the PRC. At the same time, and despite the increase in consumption, the Union industry saw its market share decreasing by three percentage points during the period considered. The pressure exercised by the increase of the dumped and subsidised imports on the Union market did not allow the Union industry to set its sales prices in line with normal market conditions and the recorded cost increases. Even after lowering its sales price, the sampled Union producers did not succeed in maintaining market share. This price decrease was at the expense of profitability, leading to a non-sustainable loss-making situation. The Commission properly distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The investigation did not reveal any other factors that could possibly break the causal link. Based on this analysis, the conclusion was that the dumped and subsidised imports from the PRC caused material injury to the Union industry.

Union interest and definitive measures

In the original anti-dumping investigation the imposition of measures was considered not to be against the interest of the Union. As the interim review was limited to injury, the Union interest findings reached at the time remained valid.

An anti-subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with the review of the anti-dumping measures limited to injury. In view of the use of the lesser duty rule, and the fact that the definitive subsidy margins were lower than the injury elimination level, the Commission imposed the definitive countervailing duty at the level of the established definitive subsidy margins, and then imposed the definitive anti-dumping duty up to the relevant injury elimination level. Given that the partial interim review was limited to the injury, the dumping margins as established in the previous anti-dumping investigation remained unchanged. As a result, the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed to Chinese exporting producers following the partial interim review, ranged from 0% to 19,9%.

4.2.3. “Other” reviews

There were no 'Other' reviews, falling outside Article 11(3) or Article 19 of the basic Regulations initiated during 2014. 4 such reviews were concluded in the period, 1 of which resulted in confirmation of the measures and the other 3 resulting in termination of the measures.

A list of the cases concerned is given in Annex H which shows, in footnotes, the main issues concerned. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in the Annex.

4.2.4.New exporter reviews

As far as anti-dumping measures are concerned, Article 11(4) of the basic Regulation allows for a review ("newcomer" review) to be carried out in order to determine individual margins of dumping for new exporters located in the exporting country in question which did not export the product during the investigation period.

Such parties have to show that they are genuine new exporters, i.e. that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting country, which are subject to the anti-dumping measures, and that they have actually started to export to the EU following the investigation period, or that they have entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the EU.

When a review for a new exporter is initiated, the duties are repealed with regard to that exporter, though its imports are made subject to registration under Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation in order to ensure that, should the review result in a determination of dumping in respect of such an exporter, anti-dumping duties may be levied retroactively to the date of the initiation of the review.

As far as anti-subsidy measures are concerned, Article 20 of the basic Regulation allows for a review (accelerated review) to be carried out in order to establish promptly an individual countervailing duty. Any exporter whose exports are subject to a definitive countervailing duty but who was not individually investigated during the original investigation for reasons other than a refusal to co-operate with the Commission can request such review.

In 2014, 2 new exporter reviews were initiated relating to anti-dumping measures. Since the Commission carried out the first reviews of this type in 1990, a total of 70 such investigations have been initiated so far. 3 new exporter reviews were concluded during 2014 with an amendment/imposition of the duty.

More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex I.

4.2.5.Absorption investigations

Where there is sufficient information showing that, after the original investigation period and prior to or following the imposition of measures, export prices have decreased or that there has been no or insufficient movement in the resale prices or subsequent selling prices of the imported product in the EU, an absorption review may be opened to examine whether the measure has had effects on the above-mentioned prices. The duty may be increased to take account of such lower export prices. The possibility of absorption reviews is included in Articles 12 and 19(3) of the basic Regulations.

In 2014, there were 2 anti-absorption investigations initiated and none concluded. – Annex J.    

4.2.6.Circumvention investigations

The possibility of investigations being re-opened in circumstances where evidence is brought to show that measures are being circumvented was introduced by Article 13 and Article 23 of the basic Regulations.

Circumvention is defined as a change in the pattern of trade between third countries and the EU which stems from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty. The duties may be extended to imports from third countries of like products, or parts thereof, if circumvention is taking place.

In 2014, 3 anti-circumvention investigations were initiated. 1 such investigation was concluded with an extension of the duty. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex K.

4.2.6.1.Details on individual cases

Open mesh fabrics of glass fibres (PRC)

In December 2013, the Commission initiated an investigation into the possible circumvention of the anti-dumping measures in force on imports of open mesh fabrics of glass fibres originating in the People's Republic of China ('PRC'), by imports of certain slightly modified open mesh fabrics of glass fibres originating in the PRC. The investigation was initiated following a request lodged by four Union producers containing prima facie evidence of the circumvention of the measures. The imports of the product under investigation were thus made subject to registration.

Anti-dumping duties had originally been imposed in 2011 on imports of open mesh fabrics of glass fibres, of a cell size of more than 1,8 mm both in length and in width and weighing more than 35 g/m2, excluding fibreglass discs, currently falling within CN codes ex 7019 51 00 and ex 7019 59 00 (the product concerned) and originating in the PRC ('measures in force'). These measures were subsequently extended to imports consigned from Malaysia; Taiwan and Thailand; and from India and Indonesia respectively, following several anti-circumvention investigations.

Product under investigation and reporting period (RP)]

The product allegedly circumventing the measures was basically the same as the product concerned under the measures in force, except that it contained by weight more rovings than yarns and therefore could be declared under CN code ex 7019 40 00, not subject to duties, while the product concerned contains by weight more yarns than rovings and currently falls under CN codes ex 7019 51 00 and ex 7019 59 00. The investigation period was set from 1 April 2010 to 30 September 2013 (IP) in order to investigate the alleged change in the pattern of trade. The reporting period (RP) covered the period from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 in order to investigate if the imports were made at prices below the non-injurious price established in the investigation that led to the existing measures.

Circumvention

Based on the facts available, it was considered that the overall increase in imports of the product under investigation after the imposition of the anti-dumping measures and the parallel decrease in the imports of the product concerned constituted a significant change in the pattern of trade. The increase in imports of the product under investigation from the PRC as from the imposition of the provisional measures was significant in terms of quantities. The comparison of the injury elimination level as established in the original Regulation and the weighted average export price showed significant underselling. It was therefore concluded that the remedial effects of the measures in force were being undermined both in terms of quantities and prices. Finally, dumping was established by comparing the respective average normal values per product type as established in the original Regulation and the corresponding average export prices of the product under investigation during the RP, expressed as a percentage of the CIF price at the Union frontier duty unpaid. This comparison showed the existence of dumping.

In view of these findings, it was concluded that the anti-dumping duty in force was being circumvented by imports of a certain slightly modified product currently falling in CN code ex 7019 40 00, originating in the PRC. Thus, the Commission extended the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by the original investigation on imports of the product concerned (i.e. ranging from 48,4% to 62,9%), to imports into the Union of open mesh fabrics of glass fibres, of a cell size of more than 1,8 mm both in length and in width and weighing more than 35 g/m2, excluding fibreglass discs, currently falling within CN code ex 7019 40 00 (TARIC codes 7019 40 00 11, 7019 40 00 21 and 7019 40 00 50) and originating in the PRC.

4.3.Safeguard investigations

Safeguard measures have always been and remain an instrument which the Commission would only apply in truly exceptional circumstances. Indeed, they are only used where it is clear that, applying the highest standards, such measures are necessary and justified because, due to unforeseen circumstances, there has been a surge in imports and this has caused or threatens to cause serious damage to the EU industry.

The Commission expects the EU’s commercial partners to follow a similarly strict approach. However, more and more countries are adopting safeguard measures, often in circumstances which do not appear to be entirely in line with Article XIX of the GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards and other WTO rules. Consequently, the activities of the Commission in relation to safeguards is more and more driven towards the defence of the export interests of EU producers, if necessary at WTO level.

There was no safeguard activitity by the EU in 2014 and no measures in place – Annex L.

5.Enforcement of anti-dumping/countervailing measures

Globalisation of trade led to greater possibilities for circumventing or otherwise reducing the effectiveness of anti-dumping and countervailing measures. To address this problem, throughout 2014 the TDI services continued their follow-up activities aimed at ensuring that measures were effectively enforced. In the framework of an integrated approach measures were considered in all their forms - duties and undertakings – and synergy was sought between the TDI services and enforcement-oriented services (OLAF, DG Taxud and customs authorities in Member States).

5.1.Follow-up of measures

The follow-up activities concerning measures in force are centred on four main areas: (1) to pre-empt fraud, by defining risk-related areas, alerting customs authorities and assessing the feedback from customs and economic operators; (2) to monitor trade flows and market developments; (3) to improve the effectiveness with the appropriate instruments (new investigation, interim review, newcomer review, contact with national administrations) and (4) to react to irregular practices by enhancing the co-operation with enforcement-related services (OLAF and national customs) and by initiating anti-absorption or anti-circumvention investigations.

5.2.Monitoring of undertakings

Monitoring of undertakings forms part of the enforcement activities, given that undertakings are a form of AD or CVD measures. They are accepted by the Commission if it is satisfied that they can effectively eliminate the injurious effects of dumping or subsidisation.

At the beginning of 2014, there were 134 undertakings in force. During 2014, the following changes to the portfolio of undertakings took place: The undertaking of one company was withdrawn as it was established that a breach had occurred (polyethylene terephthalate originating in India). The undertakings for two companies were withdrawn due to changes in circumstances during the implementation of the undertakings (polyethylene terephthalate originating in India) . The undertaking for one company expired (sulphanilic acid originating in India) and the undertaking for one company was no longer applicable because of a judgment by the European Court of Justice (zeolite A powder originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina). This brought the total number of undertakings in force at the end of 2014 to 129.

6.Refunds 

Articles 11(8) and 21(1) of the basic Regulations allow importers to request the reimbursement of the relevant collected duties where it is shown that the dumping/subsidy margin, on the basis of which duties were paid, has been eliminated or reduced to a level below that of the duty in force.

During 2014, 42 new refund requests were submitted. At the end of 2014, 13 refund investigations were on-going, covering 31 requests. In 2014, 31 Commission Decisions were adopted: 20 granting a partial refund and 11 rejecting the refund requests. 10 requests were withdrawn.

7.TDI Modernisation 

Following the adoption by the Commission in April 2013 of a legislative proposal and a Communication, the ordinary legislative procedure is under way in the European Parliament and in the Council. The Parliament voted a legislative resolution in April 2014 and thus closed its first reading. At that time, the Commission also took note of draft guidelines on four subjects with a view to their adoption once the legislative process was more advanced.

The modernisation exercise is important for stakeholders as it represents a means to adapt the trade defence instruments (TDIs) to current business realities. Today’s trading environment is significantly different from the one, at the time of the completion of the Uruguay Round over 20 years ago, when the last important changes to the global rules governing TDIs were made. Therefore, there is a need to improve the EU's current trade defence system for the benefit of all stakeholders.

The aim of the modernisation exercise is to render the instruments more efficient and effective. By finding practical solutions to real problems which stakeholders encounter, the TDIs are intended to become more accessible and measures better targeted responses to certain unfair trading practices exercised by our trading partners. Other important elements of the project are increased transparency, particular attention to SMEs, while keeping the balance of interests an essential feature.

8.Country-wide market economy status (MES)

In an anti-dumping investigation, Commission services usually compare the export price of a product with its 'normal value', which is the price paid in the domestic market of the exporting country or a constructed normal value (Article 2 (1) of the basic anti-dumping regulation). However, this methodolgoy can only be used if costs and prices in the exporting country are reliable and the result of supply and demand, i.e. not subject to significant distortions. For the specific purpose of applying the EU basic anti-dumping regulation, the current practice is that a country can be considered a market economy if it fulfils five criteria.. These criteria are:

i.    a low degree of government influence over the allocation of resources and decisions of enterprises, whether directly or indirectly (e.g. public bodies), for example through the use of state-fixed prices, or discrimination in the tax, trade or currency regimes;

ii.    an absence of state-induced distortions in the operation of enterprises linked to privatisation and the use of non-market trading or compensation system;

iii.    the existence and implementation of a transparent and non-discriminatory company law which ensures adequate corporate governance (application of international accounting standards, protection of shareholders, public availability of accurate company information);

iv.    the existence and implementation of a coherent, effective and transparent set of laws which ensure the respect of property rights and the operation of a functioning bankruptcy regime;

v.    the existence of a genuine financial sector which operates independently from the state and which in law and practice is subject to sufficient guarantee provisions and adequate supervision.

Six countries requested country-wide MES: China, Vietnam, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Belarus. In 2014, Vietnam, Kazakhstan and Armenia provided further information in support of their requests, which facilitated updating the assessment reports for those countries. The remaining countries, China and Belarus, did not submit information that would have allowed a further analysis of their progress. An updated assessment was shared with the Mongolian authorities in 2014.

Companies from non-market economy countries which are members of the WTO as well as those located in Kazakhstan have the possibility to request market economy treatment on an individual basis in the context of anti-dumping investigations.

8.1.China

China is undoubtedly the most important MES applicant country and the first of the six countries to have requested the status.

The first preliminary assessment was prepared in 2004 which concluded at that time that China fulfilled only one of the five MES criteria i.e. the second criterion outlined above.

At several working group meetings since then both parties discussed China's progress on the outstanding criteria. The last MES report was shared with the Chinese authorities in 2008. No consultations on MES took place in 2014. The Commission remains willing to discuss further progress made by China towards fulfilling the MES criteria.

8.2.Vietnam

A meeting of an MES working group meeting in Vietnam took place in June 2014 in order to gather information on further developments in the Vietnamese economy. On the basis of the information provided during that meeting, and from other independent sources, the Commission services worked on updating the assessment report during 2014. The Vietnamese continued to be very active in providing updated information on progress in their economy.

8.3.Armenia

In February 2014, the Armenian authorities indiacted that they were interested in reactivating the MES assessment exercise. Since early 2010, the Armenian authorities had not been active in the MES process and had not provided any updated information in response to questions sent following the first assesment report in which they were granted two criterion. Updated material was provided by the Armenian authorities in June 2014 and this, along with data from independent sources, contributed to the continued assessment of Armenia's MES request during 2014.

8.4.Kazakhstan

In April 2014, the Kazakhstan authorities provided updated information regarding progress in their economy. This was the first information from them since 2010 when the Commission had sent questions to Kazakstan seeking information on developments in the economy. The information was verified and additional material gathered during a specific MES mission to the country during September 2014. On the basis of the facts collected, as well as updated information from other independent sources, the Commission services continued their assessment of Kazakhstan's progress towards fulfilling the market economy status criteria during 2014.

8.5.Mongolia

In April 2014, the Commission services shared its assessment report with Mongolia on its progress in relation to MES. The assessment concluded that Mongolia had met the fifth criterion relating to the financial sector. The report also noted that while there had been some progress in relation to the other criteria it was not sufficient to justify the granting of any of the remaining criteria.

8.6.Belarus

In 2014 there were no developments on the Belarus MES file. The Commission had decided already in 2010 to put the consultations with the authorities of the Republic of Belarus on hold due to the political situation in the country. As soon as the situation in Belarus changes the Commission is ready to continue the MES analysis.

9.Information and Communication activities / Bilateral contacts

9.1.Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)

Owing to their small size, resource limitations and their fragmentation SMEs face certain challenges when participating in Trade Defence investigations. In order to help SMEs deal with the specific complexities involved in TDI investigations a Helpdesk for SMEs was set up. During 2014, the helpdesk received and dealt with many requests for information. These questions ranged from case-specific queries to more general trade defence issues addressing both the procedural and substantive elements of proceedings. The TDI website also specifically highlights SME's role in TDI proceedings and offers practical advice and help.

9.2.Bilateral contacts/information activities – EU economic operators including their key stakeholder associations and third countries

Explaining the legislation and practice of the EU's trade defence activity is an important part of the work of the TDI services.

The Commission organized two training seminars on trade defence for officials from several third countries in 2014. In addition, there were a number of other bilateral contacts dedicated to discussing various trade defence topics with a number of third countries including China, Korea, Japan, Australia, Vietnam and Morocco.

There was a seminar in February 2014 which brought together the various EU stakeholders to discuss aspects of the EU's trade defence policy and practice. The attendees included representatives from both producers' and importers' associations. In addition there were a number of meetings with European key stakeholder associations (e.g. Business Europe) in 2014.

10.The Hearing Officer

The primary role of the Hearing Officer (HO) is to guarantee the rights of defence of interested parties and thereby contribute to ensure that the rules are implemented in an objective and transparent manner in trade proceedings.  The role and powers of the HO are set out in a formal mandate by a Decision of the President of the European Commission, guaranteeing due process in trade proceedings and the impartiality of the function. The HO is attached, for administrative purposes, to the Commissioner responsible for trade policy. The activities of the Hearing Officer will no longer be addressed in this report, but will be available in a separate report which can be found on (insert link).

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/contacts/hearing-officer/

11.11Judicial review: decisions given by the Court of Justice / Court of First Instance

11.1.Overview of the judicial reviews in 2013.

In 2014, the General Court ('GC') and the Court of Justice (CoJ') rendered 28 judgments in total relating to the areas of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy. 5 of the judgments of the CoJ concerned appeals against the General Court decisions and 4 were preliminary rulings.

11.2.Cases pending

A list of the anti-dumping/anti-subsidy cases before the GC and the CoJ still pending at the end of 2014 is given in Annex S (55 before the GC and 13 before the CoJ).

11.3.New cases

There were 37 new cases lodged in 2014 (compared to 33 in 2013, 23 in 2012, 16 in 2011, 13 in 2010, 17 in 2009 and 16 in 2008). 28 of these were lodged before the GC and 9 before the CoJ.

11.4.Judgments rendered by the General Court

In 2014, the General Court rendered 19 judgments/orders relating to the area of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy policy. 17 of those were won by the Council/Commmission and 2 were lost. Details of some of the cases are set out below.

11.4.1.    Photo USA Electronic Graphic v Council – T-394/13 – Judgment of 18 November 2014

On 18 November 2014 the general Court delivered a judgment concerning application by the applicant Photo USA Electronic Graphic, Inc. for the annulment of the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 imposing a definitive antidumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2013 L 131, p. 1) in so far as this regulation affects the applicant (imposes anti-dumping duty on it).

The applicant relied on four pleas in law and GC rejected all of them.

By its first plea the applicant submitted that the Council and the Commission allegedly made a manifest error of assessment by including plain polyester coated ceramic mugs in the definition of the product concerned by the investigation. First, the institutions made a manifest error in their assessment of the factors to be taken into account in deciding that those products should be covered by that definition: the appearance, the end-use and the existence within the European Union of producers of plain polyester coated ceramic mugs. Secondly, according to the applicant, if other factors had been taken into account i.e. physical, technical and chemical characteristics, distribution channels, consumer perception, interchangeability and product prices, it would have been clear that such mugs should be excluded from the products concerned.

The GC after recalling, in particular, the fact that the institutions had some latitude when establishing the relevant criteria to be taken into account in defining the products which might be subject to the imposition of anti-dumping duties, concluded that the examination of whether a specific product was validly included in the list of products which would, if necessary, be subject to the imposition of anti-dumping duties had to be carried out in the light of the characteristics of the product concerned as defined by the institutions, not in the light of the characteristics of the products comprising the product concerned or its sub-categories. Accordingly, in order to determine whether plain polyester coated ceramic mugs had to be included within the definition of the product concerned, the characteristics of those mugs had to be examined in the light of the characteristics of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, not solely those of ceramic mugs with no such coating.

As regards the criteria applied by the Council, the GC noted that it was apparent from the file that plain polyester coated ceramic mugs were produced in the European Union, and the Council’s assessment concerning the Union producers, in recital 29 of the contested regulation, could not therefore be considered vitiated by an error. The GC also noted that there was no proof that a consumer would use the mugs solely for purposes other than being in contact with food or beverages, as in the case of the ceramic ware covered by the product concerned, even after the mugs were to be processed further by means of printing. The GC also concluded that the fact that products belonging to the same category were visually similar was not relevant to determining whether or not they came within the products concerned.

The applicant alleged that the institutions made a manifest error of assessment in finding that the anti-competitive practices investigated by the Bundeskartellamt (the German competition authority) had no effect on microeconomic and macroeconomic indicators and, accordingly, the institutions infringed Article 3(7) of the basic regulation.

The GC rejected this plea on the basis that since the Bundeskartellamt investigation had not been closed at the time of the adoption of the contested regulation, no restrictive practices of Union producers could be considered established by the relevant authority and properly found. Moreover, the cartel did not affect any of the sampled producers, it concerned only one Member State and only partially covered the period considered.

The judgment was appealed.

11.4.2    Gold East Paper (Jiangsu) and Gold Huasheng Paper (Suzhou Industrial Park) v Council – T-444/11 – Judgment of 11 September 2014.

The significance of the case is that it was the first case on countervailing measures on imports from China. Applicants asked for annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 452/2011 of 6 May 2011 imposing a definitive anti-subsidy duty on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2011 L 128, p. 18). The main issues are as follows.

The applicants argued that the Council wrongly used the applicants’ total sales turnover as the denominator for the calculation of the amount of the subsidy. They alleged that total subsidies which they received were wrongly expressed as a percentage of their total turnover and not by calculating the amount of countervailable subsidisation received per unit of the product concerned, converted into a percentage of the CIF (cost, insurance, freight) price of the product sold to the European Union.

The GC held that a per unit calculation would not have been appropriate. The GC noted (i) that the subsidies in question were granted to the company as a whole and were not directed at exports to the Union, (ii) that all products produced by the company were equally subsidised and (iii) that the applicants do not claim that the countervailable subsidies were contingent on exports or that they were limited to the product concerned. All of this, according to GC, pointed to the fact that the CIF value of the exports of the product concerned would not have been an appropriate denominator in the present case, contrary to what the applicants claimed.

The applicants also criticized the Commission's choice of Taiwan as a benchmark for establishing whether the allocation by China of land-use rights had conferred benefit on the applicants.

The GC examined the facts and found that the EU institutions engaged in a thorough examination of the alternative proposal to the selection of Taiwan as the reference country. The EU institutions examined the GDP and the population density in India, as proposed by the applicants. In addition, the EU institutions convincingly explained why India had not been chosen as the reference country. The GC also upheld the Commission’s choice of Taiwan based on the current market conditions and not when the land-use rights had been granted.

The applicants alleged that the EU institutions infringed Article 6(b) of the basic regulation in taking the view that the applicants benefited from preferential loans.

The GC found that there was non-cooperation of the Chinese government during the investigation and the applicants did not produce any evidence or arguments and merely alleged that the loans granted by the Chinese banks did not constitute a benefit. Accordingly the GC held that, on the basis of the data available, the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in that it referred to the BB credit rating of the agency Bloomberg, which corresponded to the non-investment grade.

The applicants claimed that the imposition of countervailing measures was not necessary since the subsidies had already been offset by the rejection of their application to benefit from market economy treatment within the context of the regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty. Consequently, the investigation should have been terminated pursuant to Article 14(2) of the basic regulation.

The GC clarified that Article 14(2) of the basic regulation did not oblige the institutions to choose between anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures, nor did it prescribe any rules as to the appropriate combination of those two measures. However, the measures did not have to exceed the amount of the dumping and subsidies established or the injury margin, pursuant to a lesser duty rule. The GC went on to find that since the total subsidy margin established for the applicants was 12%, for a total dumping margin of 43.5%, and the definitive countervailing duties (12%) and anti-dumping duties (8%) were capped at the level of the common injury margin, that being 20%, the measures imposed did not exceed the level of subsidies, dumping or injury established following the investigations. Consequently, the plea had to be rejected.

On injury, the applicants alleged an infringement of Article 8(1) of the basic regulation in that the Commission excluded from the injury assessment one of the five Union producers cooperating in the investigation without any justification and in that the Commission relied on the data of four representative producers when assessing so-called ‘microeconomic’ indicators, and not with respect to the Union industry as a whole.

The GC noted that only four Union producers came forward within the deadlines set in the Notice of initiation and the Commission had no other choice but to exclude the one of the five Union producers, especially since the data submitted by other producers represented 98% of the production of Union producers. The GC also confirmed the Commission's practice of using micro and macroeconomic indicators in injury assessment and clarified that the basic regulation did not prescribe criteria for classification of those indicators.

11.4.3    Guangdong Kito Ceramics and others v Council – T-633/11, Judgment of 22 May 2014

Applicants (four Chinese ceramic tile producers) applied for the annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 of 12 September 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2011 L 238, p. 1).

This case concerned the circumstances in which information submitted by an interested party can be disregarded and resort made to facts available.

The GC recalled that Art. 18(1) of the basic regulation authorised the institutions to use facts available in cases in which any interested party refused access to, or otherwise did not provide, necessary information within the time-limits provided in that regulation, or in which it significantly impeded the investigation. The use of facts available was also authorised if any interested party supplied false or misleading information. However, the basic regulation was silent on the issue of the scope of necessary information, which was why the GC invoked WTO case-law to find that the term “necessary information” had to be determined on the case-by-case basis. That allowed the GC to find that the lack of full and wholly reliable information regarding the precise composition of the whole group of companies in question casted serious doubt on the accuracy of the Commission’s entire calculation, undermining, as a result, the usefulness of the information the applicants had previously provided in relation to other companies in the group, which was why the conclusion by the institutions that the precise identity of all the related companies of the group in question was necessary information within the meaning of Article 18(1) of the basic regulation, was correct. Accordingly the GC found that the institutions did not make any error in resorting, in the present case, to the facts available.

With regard to application of Article 18(3) of the basic regulation the GC found that late submissions of the necessary information could not in itself lead to automatic rejection of the information. However, the GC noted that missing of deadline in certain cases must not be tolerated in order to ensure the orderly conduct of the investigation.

The GC again resorted to WTO case-law and applied the notion of a reasonable period of time with regard to the status of information submitted outside the deadline for a reply to the questionnaire. According to GC, reasonableness should be defined on a caseby-case basis, in the light of the specific circumstances of each investigation, taking into account the following factors:

nature and quantity of the information submitted;

the difficulties encountered by an investigated exporter in obtaining the information;

the difficulties encountered by an investigated exporter in obtaining the information;

whether other interested parties were likely to be prejudiced if the information was used;

whether acceptance of the information would compromise the ability of the investigating authorities to conduct the investigation expeditiously;

the number of days by which the investigated exporter missed the applicable time-limit.

Having regard to all those factors GC held that that the period of time by which the deadline for providing necessary information was missed in the case at hand was not

11.4.4 BP Products North America Inc. v Council – T-385/11 - Judgment of 16 January 2014

BP Chemicals had taken this court action against the Council regulations ((EU) Nos 443/2011 and 444/2011 of 5 May 2011) extending CVD and AD measures on Biodiesel from the US to imports of biodiesel in a blend containing by weight 20% or less of biodiesel originating in the United States of America and imports of biodiesel from Canada, which were found to circumvent the original measures. One of the issues contested related to whether or not the ‘slightly modified like product’ (in this case biodiesel in a blend containing by weight 20% or less of biodiesel) had to be a product specifically created to avoid paying duties.

The applicant relied on four pleas in law and GC rejected all of them.

The applicant first denied that the ≤ B20 and ⟩ B20 blends can be considered as ‘slightly modified like products’ and alleged an infringement of the basic regulations and the principle of legal certainty and misuse of power.

The GC observed that the Council did not commit a manifest error of assessment in treating ≤ B20 and ⟩ B20 blends as slightly modified like products. The GC held that it was not necessary under the provisions of the basic anti-dumping and anti-subsidies regulation that the ‘slightly modified like product’, within the meaning of those provisions, had been specifically created so as to avoid paying duties. GC took account of the fact that the ≤ B20 blends existed on the United States market, but were not exported to the European Union. It was only after the institution of the initial duties that the ≤ B20 blends began to be imported into Europe. Since those blends and the ≤ B20 blends have very similar basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics and the same use in the European Union, the Council was entitled to conclude that the ≤ B20 blends imported by the applicant constituted a slight modification of the product concerned.

The second plea concerned allegations of manifest errors in the assessment of facts concerning the applicant. The Applicant argued that the ⟨ B20 blends could not be transformed back into ⟩ B20 blends, with the result that a circumvention of the initial duties would actually be impossible. The Applicant also argued that there was no change in the pattern of trade with regard to the applicant and that there was sufficient due cause or economic justification to begin exporting the ⟨ B15 blends.

The GC held that by requiring that the modified product, once it has been imported, be transformed back into the product concerned, the applicant added a new criterion for establishing existence of a circumvention which was not laid down by the basic regulations. The GC also held that in order to establish the existence of a change in the pattern of trade, it was sufficient that the institutions found the emergence of imports of the substitute product to the detriment of imports of the products affected by the initial duties, irrespective of whether or not the new imports were carried out by undertakings already affected by the initial duties. Accordingly, having regard to the fact that the imports of the products originally concerned practically ceased following the imposition of the initial duties and that the exports to the European Union of ≤ B20 blends originating in the United States began at the same time, the Commission and the Council were entitled to find the existence of a change in the pattern of trade between the US and the EU.

Lastly, the applicant challenged the fact that the rate imposed on it was nevertheless the same as that imposed on the other undertakings which had not cooperated during the initial investigation, although it itself fully cooperated in the circumvention proceeding.

The GC rejected this argument by stating that the applicant was not in the same situation as the companies which cooperated in the course of the initial investigation. In contrast to the standard antidumping and anti-subsidies proceedings, which may have led to the imposition of lower duties on companies which cooperated, the circumvention proceedings did not lead to the creation of any duty, but merely extended the initial duty which has been circumvented. In the present case, the duties which would have been applied to the applicant if it had not circumvented the measures at issue would, in principle, have been those applicable to all other companies, unless it had requested and obtained, before carrying out its imports of the ⟩ B20 blends, individual treatment as a new exporter. Therefore, the GC held that the Council did not infringe the principle of non-discrimination by imposing on the applicant the residual rates applicable to all other companies which did not cooperate or which did not make themselves known during the initial investigation. Moreover, the GC explained that the fact that the applicant did not participate in the initial investigation, because at the time it did not export biodiesel into the European Union, did not justify exceptional individual treatment on the basis of the principle of sound administration, because the basic anti-dumping and anti-subsidies regulations did not require that the undertakings targeted by a circumvention proceeding would have had previously imported the products concerned by the initial duties. In those circumstances it was not unusual for extended duties to be imposed on producers or importers which were not concerned by the initial regulations following a circumvention proceeding.

11.5.Judgments rendered by the Court of Justice

In 2014, the Court of Justice of the EU rendered 9 judgments (4 preliminary rulings and 5 judgments on appeals) relating to the area of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy policy. 8 of those were won by the Council/Commmission and 1 was lost. Details of some of the cases are set out below.

11.5.1    Council v Alumina – C-393/13 P – Judgment of 01 October 2014

The Council of the European Union asked the CoJ to set aside the judgment of the GC in Alumina v Council, T304/11, by which the GC annulled Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 464/2011 of 11 May 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of zeolite A powder originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OJ 2011 L 125, p. 1) in so far as it concerns Alumina.

The Council argued that the GC erred in law in holding that sales which were not carried out in the ordinary course of trade by reason of the fact that the prices included a premium intended to cover the risk of non-payment by the purchaser, which is not connected to the value of the product, must not be taken into account in order to calculate the normal value. Such an interpretation of the concept of ‘sales carried out in the ordinary course of trade’ is, the Council submitted, not substantiated either by the basic regulation or by the WTO law. The Council took the view that the GC’s interpretation of the concept of ‘sales carried out in the ordinary course of trade’, which excluded from that concept sales whose price included a premium intended to cover the risk that the purchaser might have been unable or unwilling to pay, was contrary to the principle of legal certainty in so far as the institutions would be obliged systematically to guess the basis of payment and of the application of the prices stated and to determine the ‘actual’ value of the product.

The CoJ rejected the plea and held that the price of a product was only one of the conditions of a commercial transaction. The question whether a price was charged in the ordinary course of trade depended also on the other conditions of a transaction which were capable of affecting the prices charged, such as the volume of the transaction, the additional obligations assumed by the parties to that transaction or the delivery period. In the context of that assessment, which had to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, the institutions had to take into consideration all the relevant factors and all the particular circumstances relating to the sales at issue.

The CoJ upheld the finding by the GC that the fact that a premium artificially boosted the normal value calculated was compatible with the Court’s existing case-law according to which the inclusion of that risk premium was such as to affect the normal character of the sales (see the judgment in Ajinomoto and NutraSweet v Council and Commission, T-304/11). The CoJ also emphasized that in that context, the institutions had to examine whether that condition of sale has been applied to all customers in general on the market of the like product or whether it was specific in the light of the situation of the customer at issue.

The judgment is now being implemented.

11.5.2    Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd v Council – C-601/12 P – Judgment of 27 February 2014

Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd sought to set aside the judgment of 10 October 2012 in Case T150/09 Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners v Council by which the GC dismissed its action for annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2009 L 29, p.1) in so far as that regulation imposes a definitive anti-dumping duty on that company.

By its first plea the applicant alleged the infringement of the second subparagraph of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation, in that the GC rendered the threemonth time-limit laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic regulation meaningless by introducing a new criterion of interpretation, namely, the ‘only plausible hypothesis’ criterion.

The CoJ held that this argument by applicant was partly inadmissible. According to the CoJ it was on the basis of an appraisal of the facts before it that the GC decided that the interests of applicant had not been damaged as a consequence of the three-month time-limit having achieved its intended practical effect. That meant that, by the first ground of appeal, applicant was in part effectively challenging the findings of fact made by the GC and set out in paragraphs 61 to 64 of the judgment under appeal, regarding the question whether the purpose of that time-limit had been undermined in the particular circumstances of the case. Having regard to the settled case-law that, an appeal had to be based on a point of law only, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts, the CoJ declared the first plea inadmissible in part. In part where it was admissible, the CoJ held that applicant failed to prove that, if the Commission had not exceeded the three-month timelimit, the Council might have adopted a different regulation more favourable to that company’s interests than the contested regulation.

By its second plea the applicant alleged that the GC applied an incorrect test with regard to the consequences of a procedural irregularity, leading it to impose an unreasonable burden of proof on the applicant. In that regard the applicant maintained that the appropriate test did not consist in requiring proof that, but for that procedural irregularity, a different MET decision – and, accordingly, a more favourable dumping margin – would have been adopted, but in requiring a demonstration that such a possibility could not be totally ruled out.

The CoJ rejected the second plea by finding that it was based on an incorrect reading of the judgment under appeal – the CoJ noticed that the finding in the judgment under appeal was, in essence, that it was for the applicant to establish, in accordance with the line of authority on that point that, if the Commission had complied with the three-month time-limit in question, the Council ‘might have’ adopted a different regulation more favourable to applicant’s interests than the contested regulation.

The CoJ thus rejected the appeal altogether.

11.5.3 Valimar v Nachalnik na Mitnitsa Varna (preliminary ruling) – C-374/12 – Judgment of 18 September 2014

Preliminary ruling procedure was initiated by a Bulgarian court and concerned the validity of Implementing Regulation 1279/2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain iron or steel ropes and cables originating in Russian Federation. This regulation was adopted following an interim review procedure. In the review investigation that led to the adoption of the implementing regulation, the vast majority of sales transactions to the EU had been made under a price undertaking by a Russian producer. The Commission found these export prices to be unreliable for a new dumping calculation and, instead, the Commission used prices charged by the Russian company to third country markets as a proxy. Since such prices were much lower than the undertaking price, the dumping margin and duty rate were higher than what would have been calculated if the prices to the EU had been used.

The first issue before the CoJ was if the actual export prices for sales into the EU could lawfully be disregarded in the context of a review, and if export prices of the product concerned to third countries could be used instead. The CoJ found that the methodology used by the Commission was lawful due to the following reasons:

There were significant differences between an initial investigation and interim review in terms of purpose and methods, including the ratione temporis of the analysis to be carried out.

Article 11(9) of the basic regulation only required to take due account of Art. 2 and did not refer expressly to Article 2(8) and 2(9) (in contrast to express reference to Article 2(11) and (12)).

Article 2(9) of the basic regulation did not contain an exhaustive list of circumstances which provided for the use of methodology different from the one provided for in Article 2(8) of the BR.

The Commission had necessary discretion to use export prices not to the EU but to third countries.

The second issue before the CoJ was whether there was a change in circumstances in the meaning of Article 11(9) of the basic regulation, which could justify the change in methodology in the interim review as compared to the initial investigation. 

Having regard to Article 11(9) of the basic regulation, which provided that in review investigations under Article 11 the Commission shall, provided that the circumstances have not changed, apply the same methodology as in the investigation which led to the duty, with due account being taken of Article 2 and in particular paragraphs 11 and 12 thereof, the CoJ found that there has been a change in circumstances because of the price undertakings to which producer’s exports were subject and because of absence of any reliable basis for the review of the methodology used in the original investigation.

12.Activities in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO)

12.1.Dispute settlement in the field of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards

12.1.1.Overview of the WTO dispute settlement procedure

The WTO provides for a rigorous procedure for the settlement of disputes between WTO Members concerning the application of the WTO agreements. The procedure is divided into two main stages. The first stage, at the level of the WTO Members concerned, consists of a bilateral consultation. Upon failure of the consultation, the second stage can be opened by requesting the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to establish a panel. WTO Members, other than the complaining and defending party, with an interest in a given case, can intervene as "third parties" before the panel. The panel issues a report, which can be appealed before the Appellate Body ('AB') (each appeal being heard by three members of a permanent seven-member body set up by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)). Both the panel report and the report by the Appellate Body are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body ('DSB') unless the latter rejects the report by unanimity.

The findings of a panel or Appellate Body report have to be implemented by the WTO Member whose measures have been found to be inconsistent with the relevant WTO Agreements. If the complaining WTO Member is not satisfied with the way the reports are implemented, it can ask for the establishment of a so-called “implementation panel”. Here too, appeal against the findings of the panel is possible.

It should be noted that the anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards measures are among the most 'popular' subject matters in WTO dispute settlement.

Two panels were composed in 2014, i.e. the panel concerning anti-dumping measures on imports of fatty alcohols from Indonesia (DS442) and the panel regarding anti-dumping measures imposed on biodiesel from Argentina (DS473). In DS397 (compliance procedures following the WTO dispute relating to EU definitive anti-dumping measures on certain iron or steel fasteners from China), the substantive meeting between parties and with third parties took place in November 2014. Lastly, the EU held consultations with Russia on cost adjustment methodologies and certain anti-dumping measures (DS474), with Indonesia on anti-dumping measures on biodiesel (DS480) and with Pakistan on the countervailing measures on imports of PET (DS486).

12.1.2.    Dispute settlement procedures against the Union

European Communities — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (DS397) - Compliance proceedings

On 5 December 2013, China requested the establishment of a compliance panel. China considered that the measures taken by the EU to implement the recommendations of the DSB in the dispute relating to EU definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China were inconsistent with certain provisions of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. The European Union had adopted the measures necessary to comply with the DSB recommendations before the expiry of the reasonable period of time agreed with China. On 27 March 2014 the Director-General composed the compliance panel following the request from China.

On 16 July 2014, the Chairperson of the Panel circulated a communication to the Dispute Settlement Body informing that the Panel could not provide its report within the framework of 90 days set out by Article 21.5 of the DSU and that it expects to issue its final report to the parties in May 2015, in accordance with the timetable adopted after consultation with the parties.

European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols from Indonesia (DS442)

On 1 May 2013, Indonesia requested the establishment of a panel in relation to the AD measures imposed by the EU on Certain fatty alcohols from Indonesia. At its meeting on 25 June 2013, the DSB established a panel.

In December 2014, Indonesia requested the Director-General to determine the composition of the panel pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU, which was done on 18 December 2014. Japan and the United States reserved their rights to participate as third parties in the panel proceedings.

European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina (DS473)

In early 2014, consultations between Argentina and the European Union were held in the dispute relating to the AD measures on biodiesel but failed to reach a mutually agreed solution to the dispute. In March 2014, Argentina requested the establishment of a panel regarding, inter alia, the provisional and definitive anti-dumping measures imposed on biodiesel originating in, inter alia, Argentina, as well as the investigation underlying the measures; and, (b) a provision in Council Regulation (EC) 1225/2009 of November 2009, which refers to the adjustment or establishment of costs associated with the production and sale of products under investigation in the determination of dumping margins. On 25 April 2014, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established the panel. On 10 December 2014, the Chairperson of the panel circulated a communication to the DSB informing that the panel could not provide its report within the time-limit set by the DSU (i.e. 6 months since the composition of the panel), but that it expects to issue its final report to the parties by the end of 2015.

European Union — Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia (DS474)

In early 2014, consultations between the European Union and Russia were held, failing to reach a mutually agreed solution to the dispute.

On 4 June 2014, the Russian Federation requested the establishment of a panel regarding, inter alia, “cost adjustment” methodologies used by the EU for the calculation of dumping margins used in several anti-dumping investigations and reviews concerning, among others, imports from the Russian Federation. The Panel was established on 22 July 2014.

European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia (DS480)

On 10 June 2014, Indonesia requested consultations with the European Union regarding: a) two provisions, namely Articles 2(5) and 2(6)(b) in Council Regulation (EC) 1225/2009 of November 2009, which refer to the adjustment or establishment of costs associated with the production and sale of products under investigation in the determination of dumping margins; b) the anti-dumping measures imposed on biodiesel originating in, inter alia, Indonesia, as well as the underlying investigation.

European Union - Countervailing Measures on Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan (DS486)

On 28 October 2014, Pakistan requested consultations with the European Union with respect to the imposition of provisional and definitive countervailing measures by the EU on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate from Pakistan, and with respect to certain aspects of the investigation underlying those measures.

12.2.Other WTO activities

While there was no negotiating activity during 2014 for the Negotiating Group on Rules, The Chair of the Group, Ambassador Wayne McCook, held open-ended consultations with the WTO Membership on 16 December 2014 to discuss possible ways forward in the rules areas in 2015, including the organisation of a stock-taking session and possible work on transparency.

The Technical Group, a subgroup of the negotiating group, was convened twice during 2014. The group discussed a number of issues including; sunset reviews, price undertakings and product under consideration.

In parallel to these activities, participation by the Commission services in the regular work of the Anti-dumping, Subsidies and Countervailing and Safeguards Committees continued. The Committees met twice in regular sessions to review notifications and raise issues of special interest. The EU’s New and full subsidy notification, which had been made in 2013, was subject to the review process by other members in the spring and autumn meetings of the Subsidies and Countervailing Committee in 2014. Many written questions were received relating to the notification in repect of subsidies granted at EU level as well as by the Member States. Written replies were provided to all the questions received.

13.Conclusion

The activities during 2014 were balanced between both new investigations and review investigations and centred on only anti-dumping and anti-subsidy with no safeguard actions. The type of activity is driven by the complaints received. They cover review requests or new AD or AS complaints. Anti-circumvention and anti-absorption investigations featured more promminantly than previous years.

The TDI services provided considerable information, clarifications and support to the work in the Parliament and the Council in the examination of the proposal to Modernisation Trade Defence instruments which had been adopted by the Commission in 2013. This was particularly intensive in the Council in the latter half of 2014 with strong efforts being made in order to to provide the Presidency with a mandate to engage in trilogues. These efforts had not succeeded by the end of 2014.

The TDI services also continued their information role through organising seminars aimed at third country officials. In addition the services continued to hold bilateral contacts with industry and trade representatives with a seminar being held in the year which brought together the various stakeholders in the TDI process.

13.1.LIST OF ANNEXES

13.1.1.ANNEX A

New investigations initiated
during the period 1 January – 31 December 2014

A.    Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication)

B.    Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication)

13.1.2.ANNEX B

A.    New investigations initiated by product sector during the period 2010 – 2014

B.    New investigations initiated by country of export during the period 2010 – 2014

13.1.3.ANNEX C

Imposition of provisional duties in the course of new investigations
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014

A.    Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication)

B.    Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication)

13.1.4.ANNEX D

New investigations concluded by the imposition of definitive duties
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014

A.    Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication)

B.    Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication)

13.1.5.ANNEX E

New investigations terminated without the imposition of measures
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014

A.    Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication)

B.    Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication)

13.1.6.ANNEX F

Expiry reviews initiated or concluded
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

ANNEX G

Interim reviews initiated or concluded
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

Top                                        List of Annexes

Top                                        List of Annexes

13.1.7.ANNEX H

Other reviews initiated or concluded
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

Top                                        List of Annexes

13.1.8.ANNEX I

New exporter reviews initiated or concluded
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

A.    Anti-dumping investigations

B.    Anti-subsidy investigations ("accelerated" investigations)

13.1.9.ANNEX J

Anti-absorption investigations initiated or concluded
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

Top                                        List of Annexes

13.1.10.ANNEX K

Anti-circumvention investigations initiated or concluded
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

Top                                        List of Annexes

13.1.11.ANNEX L

Safeguard investigations initiated and concluded
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

Top                                        List of Annexes

13.1.12.ANNEX M

Undertakings accepted or repealed
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

Top                                        List of Annexes

13.1.13.ANNEX N

Measures which expired / lapsed
during the period 1 January - 31 December 2014
(chronological by date of publication)

A.    Anti-dumping investigations (chronological by date of publication)

B.    Anti-subsidy investigations (chronological by date of publication)

Top                                        List of Annexes

13.1.14.ANNEX O

Definitive anti-dumping measures in force on 31 December 2014

A. Ranked by product (alphabetical)