Keywords
Summary

Keywords

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1. Appeals ° Pleas in law ° Incorrect assessment of the facts ° Inadmissibility ° Application to appeals brought against an order on an application for interim measures

(EC Treaty, Art. 168a; EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 50, second para., and 51, first para.)

2. Applications for interim measures ° Suspension of operation ° Provisional measures ° Conditions for granting ° Prima facie case ° Serious and irreparable harm ° Power of assessment of the judge hearing the application

(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83(2); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

3. Applications for interim measures ° Suspension of operation ° Provisional measures ° Conditions for granting ° Urgency ° Imminent likelihood of serious and irreparable harm ° Concept

(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83(2); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))

4. Applications for interim measures ° Suspension of operation ° Conditions for granting ° Balancing of all the interests involved ° Concept

(EC Treaty, Art. 185)

5. Appeals ° Pleas in law ° Insufficient statement of reasons ° Application as regards orders on applications for interim measures

Summary

1. Article 168a of the EC Treaty and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, under which an appeal may lie only on questions of law and may not extend to any assessment of the facts, apply equally to appeals brought under the second paragraph of Article 50 of the said Statute against decisions of the Court of First Instance on applications for interim relief.

2. The judge hearing an application for interim relief may order suspension of the operation of an act, or other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant' s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Such an order must further be provisional inasmuch as it must not prejudge the points of law or fact in issue or neutralize in advance the effects of the decision subsequently to be given in the main action.

In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of Community law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed.

3. To satisfy the condition that the applicant must be likely to suffer serious and irreparable harm in order for suspension of operation or other interim relief to be ordered, it is not necessary to establish with absolute certainty that the harm is imminent. It is sufficient that the harm in question, particularly when it depends on the occurrence of a number of factors, should be foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability.

4. When, in the context of an application for suspension of operation in which it is alleged that the applicant is likely to suffer serious and irreparable harm, the judge hearing the application balances the various interests involved, he must examine whether the possible annulment of the contested decision by the Court giving judgment in the main action would make it possible to reverse the situation that would have been brought about by its immediate implementation and conversely whether suspension of the operation of that decision would be such as to prevent its being fully effective in the event of the main application being dismissed.

5. When deciding on an application for interim relief, the Court of First Instance cannot be required to reply explicitly to all the points of fact and law raised in the course of the interlocutory proceedings. It is sufficient that the reasons given validly justify that order in the light of the circumstances of the case and enable the Court of Justice to exercise its powers of review.