Keywords

Keywords

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1 . TRANSITIONAL PERIOD - BELGIAN COAL - SELLING PRICES - COMPULSORY FIXING OF PRICES

2 . HIGH AUTHORITY - POWERS - IMPLIED POWERS

( TREATY, ART . 8; CONVENTION, ART . 26 )

3 . TRANSITIONAL PERIOD - BELGIAN COAL - CONVENTION - ARTICLE 26 - INTERPRETATION

( TREATY, ART . 61; CONVENTION, ART . 26 )

4 . MISUSE OF POWERS - BASIC AIM SAFEGUARDED - SUBMISSION UNFOUNDED

( CONVENTION, ART . 26 )

5 . TRANSITIONAL PERIOD - BELGIAN COAL - SELLING PRICES - LIMIT OF THE REDUCTION - MISUSE OF POWERS

( TREATY, ART . 33; CONVENTION, ART . 26 )

6 . TRANSITIONAL PERIOD - BELGIAN COAL - SELLING PRICES - FIXING OF PRICES AS A RESULT OF INTERVENTION BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT - MISUSE OF POWERS

( CONVENTION, ART . 26 )

7 . TRANSITIONAL PERIOD - BELGIAN COAL - SELLING PRICES - COMPULSORY FIXING OF PRICES WITHOUT EQUALIZATION

( CONVENTION, ART . 26 )

8 . TRANSITIONAL PERIOD - BELGIAN COAL - REDUCTION AND WITHDRAWAL OF EQUALIZATION

( CONVENTION, ART . 26 )

9 . TRANSITIONAL PERIOD - BELGIAN COAL - THREAT TO WITHDRAW EQUALIZATION

( CONVENTION, ART . 26 )

1 . -

2 . THE RULES LAID DOWN BY AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY OR A LAW PRESUPPOSE THE OTHER RULES WITHOUT WHICH THAT TREATY OR LAW WOULD HAVE NO MEANING OR COULD NOT REASONABLY AND USEFULLY BE APPLIED . IT RESULTS FROM ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY ENJOYS A CERTAIN INDEPENDENCE IN DETERMINING THE IMPLEMENTING MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES REFERRED TO IN THE TREATY .

3 . THE REDUCTION IN THE PRICE OF BELGIAN COAL PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 26 ( 2 ) ( A ) CANNOT RESULT SOLELY FROM THE EFFECT OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND ON THE MARKET . IN ACCORDANCE WITH A GENERALLY-ACCEPTED RULE OF LAW AN INDIRECT REACTION BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY TO ILLEGAL ACTION ON THE PART OF UNDERTAKINGS MUST BE IN PROPORTION TO THE SCALE OF THAT ACTION . THEREFORE, INDIRECT ACTION ON THE PART OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY, SUCH AS A REDUCTION IN EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS, IS INSUFFICIENT OF ITSELF TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 26 . THE TASK OF ENSURING THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 26 ASSUMES A POWER TO FIX PRICES ON THE PART OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY . ARTICLE 61 OF THE TREATY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THAT END . THE POWER TO FIX PRICES EXTENDS ONLY TO THE AIM OF ENSURING THAT ALL CONSUMERS OF BELGIAN COAL BENEFIT FROM A REDUCTION IN THE PRICE OF THAT PRODUCT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND WITHIN THE LIMITS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONVENTION .

4 . EVEN IF ONE UNJUSTIFIED REASON WERE INCLUDED AMONG THOSE WHICH JUSTIFY THE ACTION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY, DECISION NO 22/55 WOULD NOT FOR THAT REASON INVOLVE A MISUSE OF POWERS, IN SO FAR AS IT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE BASIC AIM OF ARTICLE 26 .

5 . THE QUESTION WHETHER THE RULING COMMON MARKET PRICES ARE DETERMINED BY PRICES IN THE RUHR IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHICH DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE POSSIBLY ARTIFICIAL NATURE OF THE LATTER . AN ERROR IN SELECTING THE BASIS FOR THE CALCULATION OF THE ESTIMATED COSTS OF PRODUCTION OF BELGIAN COAL IS NOT IPSO FACTO PROOF OF MISUSE OF POWERS UNLESS IT HAS ALSO BEEN ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVELY THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY PURSUED, THROUGH A SERIOUS LACK OF CARE OR ATTENTION AMOUNTING TO A DISREGARD FOR THE LAWFUL AIM, PURPOSES OTHER THAN THOSE FOR WHICH THE POWERS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 26 ( 2 ) ( A ) WERE CONFERRED .

6 . IN FAILING TO INDICATE IN WHAT WAY THE AIMS OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY PURSUED BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE WHICH THE HIGH AUTHORITY WAS ENTITLED TO PURSUE THE APPLICANT HAS NOT GIVEN PROOF THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY SACRIFICED THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BELGIAN PRODUCERS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE POLICY OF THEIR GOVERNMENT .

7 . THE REDUCTION OR EVEN WITHDRAWAL OF EQUALIZATION IN ONLY CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL CASES DOES NOT RESULT IN THE TYPES REFERRED TO IN THOSE EXCEPTIONAL CASES BEING PLACED OUTSIDE THE PRICE LIST, SINCE THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE PRICE LIST RESULTING FROM THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 26 ( 2 ) FOR ALL CONSUMERS OF BELGIAN COAL .

8 . THE PAYMENT OF DIFFERING RATES OF EQUALIZATION ON THE BASIS OF PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION TENDS TO ENSURE THAT COMPARABLE CASES RECEIVE COMPARABLE BENEFIT AND, THEREFORE, TO AVOID DISCRIMINATION . EQUALIZATION NEED NOT NECESSARILY COVER THE ENTIRE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REDUCED SELLING PRICES AND RECEIPTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, SINCE IT IS ONLY A NECESSARY PROTECTIVE MEASURE TO AVOID HURRIED AND DANGEROUS SHIFTS IN PRODUCTION LEVELS . THE CONVENTION DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY GUARANTEE THAT ORIGINAL LEVELS OF RECEIPTS WILL BE MAINTAINED .

9 . IF CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS WERE NOT CARRYING OUT THE WORK OF REORGANIZATION AND RE-EQUIPMENT, SUCH THAT THEY INCURRED LIABILITY, THEY WOULD THUS HAVE DEPRIVED THEMSELVES BY THEIR OWN FAULT OF THE RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM EQUALIZATION .