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Document 92000E000069

    WRITTEN QUESTION E-0069/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council. Checks on data exchange and telecommunications in the EU Member States.

    Dz.U. C 280E z 3.10.2000, p. 169–170 (ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

    European Parliament's website

    92000E0069

    WRITTEN QUESTION E-0069/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council. Checks on data exchange and telecommunications in the EU Member States.

    Official Journal 280 E , 03/10/2000 P. 0169 - 0170


    WRITTEN QUESTION E-0069/00

    by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council

    (24 January 2000)

    Subject: Checks on data exchange and telecommunications in the EU Member States

    As part of the annual Ilets (International Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar) consultation process the police forces of the fifteen Member States are working on the sophisticated interception practices of the National Security Agency (NSA), the American secret service responsible for telecommunications and data exchange. At the request of the NSA, Lotus, Microsoft and Netscape have lowered the security level of their Internet and e-mail programmes for users outside the United Status. The interception facilities are used mainly for industrial espionage.

    In the EU report Interception capabilities 2000 Duncan Campbell says that the result is that virtually every computer in Europe has, as a built-in standard feature, a system that enables the NSA alone to crack the user's code and to read secured messages. The messages are intercepted at US Internet nodes or are picked up by the Echelon espionage network of the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia (the UKUSA group).

    The NSA bases its interception practices on the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (Calea) which was adopted by Congress in 1994. Since then American telecommunications forms have been obliged to build interception facilities into all digital satellite and mobile communications media. In January 1995 the Council adopted a (non-binding) resolution which is virtually identical to Calea. Approval of the use of these radical measures has never been subject to any parliamentary scrutiny.

    1. Can the Council give me a copy of the (non-binding) Calea resolution, as adopted in January 1995?

    If not:

    (a) why not, and

    (b) does this refusal not violate the principle of parliamentary accountability in a constitutional state governed by the rule of law?

    2. Has the Council amended the (non-binding) Calea resolution over the years?

    If so:

    (a) what changes have been made,

    (b) when,

    (c) why, and

    (d) at whose request?

    3. Does the Council not think it would be better to draw up a public directive in order to permit democratic accountability? If not, why does the Council not think that there is a need for such democratic accountability?

    Reply

    (13 March 2000)

    1. The Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications has been published in the Official Journal of the European Communities(1).

    2. The Council has not amended the above-mentioned Resolution of 17 January 1995.

    3. If the development of new technologies makes adjustments necessary, the Council will examine the possible adaptation of the requirements listed in the above Council Resolution.

    (1) OJ C 329, 4.11.1996, p. 1.

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