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Document 61975CC0048
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mayras delivered on 10 March 1976. # Jean Noël Royer. # Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de première instance de Liège - Belgium. # The right to stay in a Member State and public policy. # Case 48-75.
Konklużjonijiet ta' l-Avukat Ġenerali - Mayras - 10 ta' Marzu 1976.
Jean Noël Royer.
Talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari: Tribunal de première instance de Liège - il-Belġju.
Kawża 48-75.
Konklużjonijiet ta' l-Avukat Ġenerali - Mayras - 10 ta' Marzu 1976.
Jean Noël Royer.
Talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari: Tribunal de première instance de Liège - il-Belġju.
Kawża 48-75.
ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:1976:40
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL MAYRAS
DELIVERED ON 10 MARCH 1976 ( 1 )
Mr President,
Members of the Court,
Both Article 48 (3) of the Treaty of Rome with regard to the movement and employment of wage-earners and Article 56 (1) concerning the right of establishment of the self-employed introduce an exception to the two fundamental principles of freedom of movement of persons within the Community and the prohibition on any discrimination based on nationality. This exception is based on public policy in the wide meaning of the term and enables the Member States to undertake, in respect of foreigners who are Community nationals, measures restricting their right of access to and residence on their territory.
However, the scope of this derogation, which is to be strictly interpreted, cannot be determined unilaterally by any one of these States free from supervision by the Community authorities. In particular there is judicial supervision which is the responsibility of the Court.
Although it may therefore be accepted that in their use of the exception of public policy the national authorities have retained a margin of discretion, this power which the Member States enjoy may only be exercised within the limits imposed by Community law and by the decided cases of the Court.
I have recalled the essential grounds of the judgment delivered by the Court more than a year ago in the Van Duyn case since the answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling to the Court by the Tribunal de premiere instance of Liege, whose order for reference was confirmed on 22 December 1975 by the Cour d'appel, is governed by the same considerations.
These questions have been referred to the Court in the context of criminal proceedings brought against a French national charged with having entered and resided in Belgium without the authorization of the Minister of Justice in the manner set out by the Royal Decree of 21 December 1965 relating to conditions of entry, residence and establishment for aliens in Belgium.
According to the information contained in the files relating to the national proceedings, the accused has in the past been convicted by French courts for procuring. He has also been suspected of having committed armed robbery. However, it appears that the police enquiry did not result in his being charged with a criminal offence.
In accordance with instructions issued by the Procureur General of Liege concerning (I quote) ‘the suppression of gangsterism and the adoption of measures against international criminals’ Jean Royer was detected for the first time on 18 January 1972 in Grâce-Hollogne, in the district of Liege, where his wife ran a cafe and dance-hall. Royer had entered Belgium in November 1971 and had failed to comply with the formalities for registration in the population registers, as required by Belgian law.
Charged with illegal residence, Royer was informed of an administrative decision of ‘expulsion from Belgian territory’ coupled with a prohibition on returning. In accordance with this expulsion order Royer moved to Germany.
However, a few weeks later he returned to Grâce-Hollogne. His presence was quickly detected and on 17 April 1972 he was arrested by the gendarmerie and committed to prison. He was set at liberty by an order of the Chambre des mises en accusation of Liège of 10 May but before leaving prison was served with a Ministerial Decree under the third paragraph of Article 3 of the Law of 28 March 1952 on the control of aliens on the ground that ‘his personal conduct shows his presence to be a danger to public policy’ and that ‘he has not observed the conditions attached to the residence of aliens and he has no permit to establish himself in the Kingdom’.
It is relevant to point out that according to the order making the reference, an enquiry carried out some months earlier on Royer's behaviour in Belgium had disclosed nothing discreditable. It appears then that it was solely the information which the Belgian police had on Royer's criminal past which caused them to take the view that Royer's presence constituted a potential danger to public policy.
Be that as it may, the fact is that the criminal proceedings which gave rise to the order for reference were only based on the charge of illegal residence, an offence created by Article 12 (1) of the Law on the control of aliens which also prescribes the penalty for it. This provides: ‘The following shall be punished by imprisonment of between one month and one year and by a fine of 100 to 1000 francs:
(1) |
an alien who, without the necessary authorization, enters or resides in the country or who, without the required permit, establishes himself albeit temporarily in the Kingdom.’ |
After this expulsion order Royer apparently did in fact leave Belgian territory. The charges of illegal entry and residence were prosecuted before the Tribunal de premiere instance. The Ministère Public appealed against the judgment making the reference to the Court and on 22 December 1975 the Cour de Liège simply confirmed in the same terms the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the court of first instance.
Such are the essential facts which caused the Tribunal correctionnel of Liege to refer questions concerning the interpretation of various provisions of Community law on freedom of movement for workers and the right of establishment.
Whatever may be the complaints levelled against Royer, and in this respect his personality and his convictions in France can hardly be said to operate in his favour, I believe that the Court must simply seek to extract objectively from Community law those elements which are necessary to enable the national court to decide the case before it.
Indeed it is difficult to know in what capacity Royer seeks to claim a right of residence in Belgium. The order making the reference does not supply any precise information in this respect: Royer's counsel submitted to the national court a contract of employment between the accused's wife and the undertaking which owns the establishment of which she is the salaried manageress; this contract provides that the manageress shall be assisted by the members of her family. It is for the national court alone to deduce that Royer may therefore claim either that he is an employed person or that he is the spouse of an employed person. Further, the questions referred by the Tribunal de Liege do not exclude the possibility that Royer may also benefit from the provisions of Article 52 et seq. concerning the right of establishment. However, like the Commission I believe that the questions of interpretation raised must be answered in the same way both as regards freedom of movement for workers and the right of establishment.
Again, like the Commission I find it necessary to rearrange the numerous and detailed questions referred to the Court so as to examine them in a logical order.
I — |
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II — |
The fourth question referred by the Belgian court asks whether it follows from Article 4 (1) and (2) of Directive No 68/360 that the Member States are obliged to grant the right conferred by the Treaty once the person concerned is able to produce the required proof and whether it also follows therefrom that, in the case of a national of another Member State who is unlawfully on its territory, a Member State is obliged, before resorting to a measure invoking physical constraint, to employ other means to induce him to regularize his position voluntarily. I have already recalled that Article 4 (1) and (2) of the directive provides that Member States ‘shall grant’ the right of residence in their territory to those persons who are able to produce the documents listed in the directive and that this right is ‘proved’ by the issue of a special residence card for nationals of the Member States. The aim of this provision is therefore not to create a right for Community nationals but to regulate the exercise of a right conferred by the Treaty. The right of residence must be granted to all persons falling within the categories set out in Article 1 who are capable of proving by producing the documents listed in paragraph (3) that they fall within one of these categories. However it appears to me that this article does not lay down any legal obligation upon the national authorities to prove the existence of special arrangements in respect of a person who is in an unlawful position where these authorities have in addition reasons for believing that his presence may endanger public policy and public security. Where the conduct of the alien leaves something to be desired in this respect and where, without falling ipso facto under the criminal law, an expulsion order appears definitively justified in the opinion of the national authorities, it is my opinion that the alien should be clearly and formally warned of the risk of expulsion unless he changes his attitude. |
III — |
The fifth question referred by the Belgian court asks whether a decision to expel an individual or a decision to refuse to issue a residence or establishment permit may, in view of the requirements of Community law, give rise to an immediate expulsion or whether these measures may only take effect after rights of appeal before the national courts have been exhausted. As the Court of Justice stated in the Rutili case of 28 October 1975, under Article 8 of Directive No 64/221 any person expelled from the territory must have the same legal remedies against this decision as are available to nationals of the State against acts of the administration; in default of this the person concerned must, under Article 9, at the very least be able to exercise his right of defence before a competent authority which must not be the same as that which adopted the measure restricting his freedom; finally, the remedies before a competent authority must, save in cases of urgency, arise before the measure expelling him. Thus, save in cases of urgency which are justified, where a legal remedy within the meaning of Article 8 is available, the decision ordering expulsion may not take effect before the party concerned has been able to invoke such a remedy. The same applies in the cases where although such a remedy is available it has no suspensory effect: the person concerned must be able to exercise his right before an authority which is not the same as that which adopted the measure restricting his freedom and, again save in cases of urgency which are justified, this measure may not take effect before the competent authority has given a ruling. Finally, under Article 7 of the directive, the period allowed for leaving the territory shall not, save in cases of urgency, be less than 15 days following the notification of the final decision whether or not the person concerned retained the residence permit. |
IV — |
The sixth, seventh and eighth questions referred by the Belgian court ask whether, as regards Articles 53 and 62 of the Treaty, a Member State may return to provisions and practices which are less liberal than those which it applied before or after the entry into force of the Treaty. Articles 53 and 62 prohibit the Member States from introducing any new restrictions on the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services as they existed at the date of the entry into force of the Treaty; by new measures of liberalization they clearly refer only to those which must be taken in pursuance of an obligation arising from the Treaty. Directive No 64/221 established a number of limitations on the Member States' discretion in matters relating to the safeguard of public policy, public security and public health and it sets out their obligations under the Treaty in this respect. However it leaves untouched the Member States' jurisdiction as to the form and appropriate means of achieving the necessary result. Therefore in a case where a Member State has adopted provisions or practices more liberal than those required by Community law, Community nationals cannot thereby obtain more extensive rights than those deriving from Articles 53 and 62 and the implementing provisions of Community law, in particular Directive No 64/221. Therefore Belgium could return to a less liberal system provided that this system remains in conformity with Community law and, it may be added, with international agreements. |
In conclusion I propose that the Court should rule that:
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2. |
Article 4 of Directive No 68/360 provides for Member States the obligation to issue a residence permit to any person who has proved that he falls within the categories referred to in Article 1 of this directive by producing the documents prescribed; |
3. |
Save in cases of urgency which have been justified, an expulsion decision may not take effect before the party concerned has been able to exhaust the remedies which are guaranteed him under Articles 8 and 9 of Directive No 64/221; |
4. |
Articles 53 and 62 of the Treaty prohibit a Member State from introducing new restrictions on the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services which have in fact been attained at the date of the entry into force of the Treaty; the Member States may not return to less liberal provisions or practices where the liberalization measures already adopted are in implementation of the Treaty obligations. |
( 1 ) Translated from the French.