1. 

In his oral arguments the representative of the Government of the Italian Republic questioned the applicability of Article 177 of the Treaty in this instance.

He based his argument on certain peculiarities of Italian ‘interlocutory’ proceedings, and in particular on the fact that this is a ‘summary’ procedure, maintaining that no valid reference could be made to the Court under Article 177 in the course of such proceedings.

Your case-law has already provided the answer to this objection.

In your judgments in S.p.A. SACE v Minister for Finance of the Italian Republic of 17 December 1970 (Case 33/70, Rec. 1970, p. 1213) and Eunomia di Porro e C. of 26 October 1971 (Case 18/71, Rec. 1971, p. 811), you impliedly but necessarily accepted the validity of a reference to the Court of Justice by the Italian courts under Article 177 of the Treaty within the context of the interlocutory procedure provided for by the national Code of Civil Procedure.

You had certainly not overlooked the problem, since:

2. 

The representative of the Government of the Italian Republic and the representative of the Politi company have stated that on the day that the President of the Tribunale di Torino signed the order making the reference in this case, Law No 447 of 24 June 1971 was published in the Italian Official Journal, abolishing the two charges in question and even providing for that abolition to have a certain retroactive effect, at least as regards one of the charges.

The representative or the Italian Government and the representative of the Politi company draw different conclusions from this fact.

In the opinion of tne representative of the Italian Government its effect was to some extent to render the questions referred to you by the President of the Tribunale Civile di Torino irrelevant.

However, the representative of the Politi company considers that it should lead you to recall in your judgment the principle of the precedence of Community rules over national laws, even if the latter are enacted subsequently. You have been told that it is necessary to recall this principle, since although it is now entirely accepted in the Netherlands by virtue of a Grondwetsbepaling (constitutional provision), in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of Belgium through the case-law of the highest courts, as well as in the Federal Republic of Germany, and although certain trends of the French Cour de Cassation give grounds for hope that it might also be accepted by that high court, ( 2 ) certain objections still prevent its recognition in Italy.

However, I consider that to accede to either of these requests would be contrary to the principles which you have already established for the application of Article 177:

1.

as regards the charge Known as the ‘statistical levy’ you have already decided in your judgment of 1 July 1969— Commission v Italian Republic (Case 24/68, [1969] ECR 203)—that it was to be regarded as a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty within the meaning given to that ex pression by Articles 9, 12 and 13 of the Treaty and by the regulations on the common organization of the markets (recital No 18 of the aforementioned judgment).

2.

As regards the charge known, as the ‘duty for administrative services’, in your judgment of 18 November 1970— Commission v Italian Republic (Case 8/70, Rec. 1970, p. 961)—you ruled that it constituted a charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 9 of the Treaty.

Since, in your judgment or 1 July 1969, you acknowledged that the meaning and scope of the phrase ‘charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties’ was the same when used in the regulations on the agricultural markets as in Article 9 of the Treaty, I consider that the question of this charge is also resolved.

(1)

Regulation No 20 expressly provided that, both as regards imports from Member States of the Community (Article 14 (1)) and imports from third countries (Article 18 (1)), the implementation of the levy system was ‘incompatible’ with ‘the levying of any customs duty or charge having equivalent effect’ (Article 14, with reference to intra-Community trade) or entailed the ‘abolition’ of charges having equivalent effect (Article 18, with reference to trade with third countries').

it is clear from these two provisions mat they created individual rights only with effect from the date of implementation of the levy system.

Article 23 of Regulation No 20 provided that 1 July 1962 should be the uniform date of implementation of the levies.

However, it became clear that it was impossible to take all the necessary measures before 1 July 1962.

Therefore, a series of regulations, which are listed in the report for the hearing, provided for successive exceptions to be made to the original Article 23.

From these various regulations it emerges that the levy system was implemented with effect from:

Therefore, according to the nature of the product, Articles 14 and 18 created individual rights with effect from 30 July 1962 and 2 September 1963 respectively.

(2)

Regulation No 121/67 merely referred once again to the prohibitions already in force.

In pursuance of Articles 17 and 19 of that regulation, individual rights were therefore created with effect from 1 July 1967, the date of implementation — under Article 32 of Regulation No 121/67 — of the system provided for by that regulation.

(1)

Charges such as the ‘statistical levy’ and the ‘duty for administrative services’ as imposed in Italy must be regarded as ‘charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties’ within the meaning given to that phrase by Regulations Nos 20/62 and 121/67.

(2)

The provisions of those regulations prohibiting the imposition of charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties ate directly applicable and create individual rights which national courts must protect.

(3)

The provisions of the said regulations created such rights with effect from