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Document 52014SC0018
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC
/* SWD/2014/018 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC /* SWD/2014/018 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Decision of the
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment and
operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission
trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC 1. Problem definition At the start of the third trading period
(2013-2020), the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) was characterised by a
surplus of around 2 billion allowances.[1]
Over the coming years, this surplus is expected to grow and to reach more than 2.6
billion allowances by 2020, to only gradually decrease to around 2.1 billion by
2028 (reference scenario[2]).
The current imbalance in the EU ETS is
primarily due to the economic crisis and a large inflow of international
credits at the end of phase 2 in view of restrictions on the use of certain
credits introduced in phase 3. There is a mismatch between the auction supply
of emission allowances, which is fixed in a very rigid manner, and demand for
them, which is flexible and impacted by economic cycles, fossil fuel prices as
well as complementary policies delivering abatement. Although in a cap-and-trade system, such as
the EU ETS, the agreed environmental objective expressed by the cap, limiting
total emissions for a given period, is guaranteed, the cost-efficiency
objective expressed in the total cost is also of central importance. The presence of a large surplus is a problem as it is expected to
lock the EU into high carbon capital and investment. It reduces the dynamic
efficiency of the market-based outcome and thus increases overall costs when
considered over the mid- and long-term that are relevant for the climate change
challenge. As a short term measure to mitigate the
effects of this problem in the context of additional temporary imbalances
caused by regulatory changes linked to the transition to phase 3, the
Commission proposed to back-load the auctioning of 900 million allowances in
the beginning of phase 3. Back-loading has received a favourable opinion from
Member States in the Climate Change Committee in the comitology process. While
the measure is now under scrutiny by the European Parliament and the Council,
this Impact Assessment takes back-loading for a fact. Back-loading and the
measures considered in this Impact Assessment pursue complementary objectives. As already highlighted in the Report on the
State of the European Carbon Market in 2012 (Carbon Market Report)[3], however, back-loading
leads to a rebound in the surplus in 2019 and 2020 and hence does not affect
the average size of the structural surplus of over 1.8 billion allowances in
phase 3, peaking at 2.6 billion allowances in 2020 (see Figure 1). It is the structural
surplus (and solutions for addressing it in a sustainable way) that is the
focus of this Impact Assessment. Figure 1: Historical and projected future profile of
supply and demand up to 2028 with back-loading 2. Objective The operational objective is to ensure
inter-temporal efficiency[4]
of the carbon market in the short-term and beyond in a market setting
characterised by large-scale auctioning, taking into account the need for
simplicity and predictability. This requires addressing the structural surplus expected
to remain in place even with other possible measures after 2020 in the context
of the 2030 framework (i.e. revision of the linear reduction factor, use of
international credits, extension of the scope). It also requires increasing the
resilience of the EU ETS in the light of large-scale events that may severely
disturb the supply-demand balance. 3. Options In November 2012, the Commission set out a
non-exhaustive list of six options for structural measures in the Carbon Market
Report. The impact assessment on the 2030 climate and energy framework includes
a general assessment of the impacts of those options that realistically do not
have the potential to restore the balance between supply and demand in the
short-term, but would only have an impact in the context of the 2030 framework (early
revision of the linear reduction factor, extension of the scope of the EU ETS
to other sectors and using access to international credits). The option of
increasing the target is excluded from the focus of the 2030 impact assessment
based on stakeholder feedback. During the public consultation on the structural
measures, an additional option – to establish a reserve mechanism to render the
auction supply of emission allowances more flexible – has emerged from the
discussion. Table 1:
Comparison of the options from the Carbon Market Report || Stakeholder views* || Potential effectiveness in improving the functioning of the European carbon market in phase 3 a) Increasing the EU reduction target to 30% in 2020 || Very limited support || Not focus of the assessment Would have been accompanied by a reduction of auction supply over phase 3 by some 1.4 bn allowances. This might have the potential to improve market functioning in the short-term Reference emission projections for 2020 actually already come very close to levels associated with a 30% reduction target. This means that while the EU might not be ready to increase its target to 30%, the full achievement of other agreed targets can reduce emissions in the EU to the level in line with what would be required to achieve a step up to a 30% target b) Retiring a number of allowances in phase 3 || Medium support || Retiring a number of allowances early on has the potential to create scarcity and improve market functioning in the short-term c) Early revision of the annual linear reduction factor || Medium support || Limited potential to improve market functioning the short-term But expected to have a positive impact in the mid- and long-term d) Extension of the scope of the EU ETS to other sectors || Limited support (for phase 3) || Limited potential to improve market functioning in phase the short-term Assessment of administrative challenges and potential to improve market functioning as of phase 4 needs to be further investigated But potential other benefits, e.g. in terms of technology-neutral incentives across sectors e) Use access to international credits || Limited support (for phase 3) || Very limited potential to sufficiently improve market functioning in the short-term Aggregate surrender of international credits has already used up more than two thirds of the amount allowed until 2020 f) Discretionary price management mechanisms || Very limited support for a mechanism focused on price || Not focus of the assessment EU ETS is an instrument based on volume not price Additional option || Medium support for a mechanism focused on (auction) supply to address market imbalance || Potential to improve market functioning in the short-term Most useful and simplest mechanism expected to be a reserve of allowances Accordingly, the focus of this assessment
is on the three options, and several sub-options, that could realistically be
implemented, and already restore the orderly functioning of the EU ETS in the
short-term: ·
Option 1: Retirement of a number of allowances
in phase 3; ·
Option 2: More flexible auction supply in the
form of a market stability reserve (additional option building on a variant of
option of discretionary price management mechanisms from the Carbon Market
Report). ·
Option 3: Combination of a market stability
reserve with the retirement of a number of allowances in phase 3 3.1. Sub-options for a
permanent retirement For the purpose of this assessment, in the
light of the current surplus and its expected evolution, a larger upper limit of
1400 million allowances is put on the number of retired allowances. Of course other amounts of retired
allowances could be conceived. As a sensitivity analysis, another sub-option
with a lower amount of 500 million allowances is assessed (option 1b). 3.2. Sub-options for a market
stability reserve A market stability reserve would, in
principle, function by: ·
Adding allowances to the reserve by deducting
them from future auction volumes with the aim of mitigating market instability
due to a large temporary surplus in the EU ETS; ·
Releasing allowances from the reserve and adding
them to future auction volumes with the aim of mitigating market instability
due to a large temporary deficit in the EU ETS. A market stability reserve, as a rule-based
mechanism, would only change the timing of auction volumes. It would not affect
the level or timing of free allocation. It would furthermore be
"cap-neutral" and not lead to a change of the environmental ambition
level. Based on the pre-assessment of the various
design aspects, several sub-options relating to the decisive factors for adding
to or releasing allowances from the reserve (triggers) as well as the size of
the adjustment are assessed in terms of impact on the market imbalance. Other
combinations of elements would also be possible. Table 2: Sub-options for a market stability
reserve Description || Option || Trigger || Adjustment amount Relative narrow band & unlimited || 2a || Total surplus outside 40-50% of the cap || Distance from the band/unlimited Relative narrow band & limited || 2b || Total surplus outside 40-50% of the cap || Limit of 100 mio allowances Absolute broad band & unlimited || 2c || Total surplus outside 400-1000 mio allowances || Distance from the band/unlimited Absolute broad band & limited || 2d || Total surplus outside 400-1000 mio allowances || 10% of cumulative surplus/instalment of 100 mio allowances Annual change & unlimited || 2e || Annual change in surplus >100 mio allowances || Unlimited/ surplus change above 100 mio allowances Annual change & limited || 2f || Annual change in surplus >100 mio allowances || 50% of the surplus change above 100 mio allowances GDP || 2g || GDP growth forecast outside 2-3% || Instalments of 200 mio allowances The majority of the sub-options focus on
surplus-based triggers. They have the important benefit of being able to
account for the impact of complementary policies, such as renewables and energy
efficiency measures. Considering stakeholder views on the importance to
maintain the nature of the EU ETS as a quantity-based instrument, where the
carbon price signal is not fixed by policy-makers but revealed by the market,
price-based triggers are not in the focus of this assessment. The first set of sub-options focuses on the
surplus-based triggers (options 2a-2f), either in relation to the cumulative
surplus or change in the surplus. The mechanism would aim to maintain the
surplus within a pre-defined target range (band). As views on the optimal values
for the triggers are not yet conclusive, different levels of the surplus band
are chosen in a way to allow for sensitivity analysis in terms of impacts of
different levels and widths of the band. In general, two variants are assessed,
one where there is some kind of a safeguard to avoid large changes in the
auction supply (either in form of a limit on the size of the adjustment or the
adjustment defined as a percentage of the cumulative surplus), and one with
unlimited adjustments. One option looks at a reserve with an
external indicator-based trigger, more specifically based on the GDP growth
forecasts published in the European Economic Forecast – autumn editions. As the
band is not directly expressed in emission allowances, external indicator-based
triggers in any case require an additional step of determining the amount of
allowances placed into / released from the reserve. Given the difficulties of
precisely translating the relation between the unit of GDP growth into a number
of allowances, the external-based indicator trigger is only assessed in
combination with pre-determined adjustment amounts of 200 million allowances. 3.3. Sub-options for a
combination of a market stability reserve and permanent retirement For ease of comparison, the same amount is
used for the permanent retirement part as under option 1b – 500 million
allowances. Regarding the design of the market stability reserve part, there it
is based on the central option(s) that appears from the pre-assessment of
different market stability reserve sub-options, i.e. one without a broad
absolute band and the annual adjustment putting allowances into the reserve
defined as a share of the cumulative surplus. 4. Analysis of impacts 4.1. Market balance It is assessed whether the permanent
retirement and market stability reserve options address the existing problem of
the large market imbalance. In case of the market stability reserve, it is also
assessed, using phase 2 (2008-2012) data, whether the various options would
have prevented the problem if they had already been implemented in phase 2. Permanent
retirement: ·
The large permanent retirement (option 1a) is
expected to reduce the market imbalance early on, without a rebound in the
surplus later on in phase 3. This appears to be more consistent with the
objective of inter-temporal efficiency than the baseline option 0. ·
Lowering the amount of permanent retirement to
500 million allowances (option 1b) would correspondingly decrease the
stabilising impact of the measure, with a rebound in the surplus later on in
phase 3, with a more limited improvement in inter-temporal efficiency than a
large retirement. Market stability reserve: ·
There is a difference between the ability of
various sub-options to prevent a large surplus from accumulating and to address
it once it has already built-up (see Error! Reference source not found.). Certain
sub-options would have prevented the problem to a different degree than others.
However, all sub-options are expected to address the problem, albeit with
different speeds. ·
Surplus-based triggers are more efficient than
GDP-based ones as regards capturing changes in demand not only due to
macroeconomic changes, but also due to other factors that may affect demand, such
as the impact of complementary policies. They also better capture supply side
factors such as changes in the inflow of international credits. ·
Comparing the different surplus-based triggers,
those based on a cumulative surplus are expected to perform better than those
based on annual changes in the surplus in the situation where the market balance
has already been improved by back-loading. While triggers based on changes in
the balance may be more effective in avoiding a market imbalance, they do not
lead to further reductions in the surplus after the market is no longer in
balance. ·
Surplus-based triggers with an absolute band
score better in relation to simplicity. Moreover, a relative band which tapers
off in line with the decreasing cap may perform badly if the trend in hedging
needs increased. ·
A broader band is expected to lead to lower amounts
and frequency of adjustments as well as lower variability in auction volumes.
In contrast, a narrower band is likely to lead to a larger number of
interventions and in both directions, i.e. a number of adjustments putting
allowances into the market stability reserve only to be followed by release of
those allowances shortly thereafter. ·
Limited adjustments, either with an explicit
limit on the amount of adjustment or determined as a certain percentage of the
cumulative surplus, get a better score in terms of predictability. They also
lead to more continuity in terms of auctions, and gradual changes to both the
surplus and market stability reserve. However, unlimited adjustments get a
better score in terms of flexibility in addressing large and rapid fluctuations
in the market balance and generally restore the market balance more swiftly. However,
in situations with a large surplus, as the market is expected to experience by
the end of phase 3, they may lead to no auction supply coming to the market for
several years. Figure 2: Evolution of the surplus under various
sub-options for a permanent retirement and market stability reserve if
implemented in phase 4 For ease of comparison, not all the options
for a market stability reserve are taken forward for further analysis.
Considering a combination of criteria, it is proposed to take option 2d (with
volume triggers, with a broad absolute surplus range between 400 and 1000 million
allowances and annual adjustment putting allowances into a reserve defined as
10% of the cumulative surplus) as the central option for the market stability
reserve to be assessed further in terms of impacts other than on market balance
and compared to the permanent retirement options. This option has an important
advantage in terms of simplicity. While it may not fully address the market
imbalance in phase 3, it starts doing so at the beginning of phase 4. This sub-option also forms the market
stability reserve part for the option for a combination of a market
stability reserve with permanent retirement: ·
While the option leads to a rebound in the
surplus at the end of phase 3, it does reduce it compared to the baseline
option 0. It also keeps gradually decreasing the surplus in phase 4. It seems
to be more consistent with the objective of inter-temporal efficiency than the
baseline option 0. 4.2. Potential impact on carbon price formation In a situation without back-loading and any
structural measures, the carbon price in the reference scenario used for the impact
assessment of the 2030 climate and energy policy framework is expected to be €5
in 2015 and €10 in 2020, while the surplus of allowances is projected to
continue to grow to above 2.5 billion allowances in 2020 and only gradually
decrease afterwards. With back-loading of 900 million allowances (baseline
option 0) being implemented in phase 3, prices should in principle not increase
significantly above these projections, if the remaining surplus in the relevant
period is large enough. In terms of a large retirement (option 1a),
the impact on the carbon price would be at least similar to back-loading in the
early years of phase 3, but without a price rebound as of 2019. If a permanent
retirement only reduced the projected surplus to a limited extent, by 500
million allowances (option 1b), impacts on prices are expected to be
correspondingly limited. Prices can increase when a market stability
reserve builds up. Once it is in place and the market is more balanced, prices
should be more strongly driven by the decreasing mid- and long-term cap. When
allowances are released from the reserve, prices can decline in relative terms.
Any reserve that reduces the surplus to a level that supports the orderly functioning
of the carbon market, would thus rather support the gradual transition to lower
emissions, also in case of a higher ambition in the EU ETS in the context of a
2030 framework. This is expected to reduce the risk of too little low-carbon investment
in the short term which increases costs in the mid- and long-term. However, a
detailed assessment of the annual magnitude of the price impacts of a market
stability reserve cannot be made for a number of reasons[5]. Prices are expected to increase in relative
terms towards the end of phase 3 due to a combined effect of a market stability
reserve complemented with the permanent retirement of 500 million allowances.
Hence, this is expected to provide more support than solely a permanent
retirement of the same amount would (option 1b). It is also likely to have a higher
impact than a similar market stability reserve alone would (e.g. option 2d).
However, the option would still result in some rebound of the surplus at the
end of phase 3 and hence have less of a price impact than the large permanent
retirement (option 1a). 4.3. Competitiveness impacts Not strengthening the EU ETS in the
short-term would in the longer term have an impact on the EU’s competitiveness.
The unrepresentatively weak carbon price signal that the EU ETS has provided recently
and that may remain at a fairly low level well into phase 4, would have adverse
effects on investment and innovation of low-carbon technologies. It would also
lead to a disintegrated EU energy and climate policy, and an increasingly
fragmented internal market. The stronger the carbon price signal in the short
term, the smaller these negative consequences should be. In terms of possible short-term direct cost
for the energy-intensive sectors deemed to be exposed to a risk of carbon
leakage, it is to be noted that the verified emissions data for phase 2 show in
aggregate a surplus of free allowances in relation to emissions reported from
industrial sectors (excluding the power sector) of more than 34% or around 895
million allowances[6].
This is an estimate for industry as a whole, obviously with potential
variations between sectors and installations. If emissions in phase 3 were
similar to those in any year of phase 2, except for 2008, then continued free
allocation is still expected to result in a surplus over phase 3 taking into
account the existing surplus from phase 2. If emissions were to be similar as in 2005
or 2008, then continued free allocation in addition to the existing surplus
would not be sufficient to cover all industry needs, which would partly need to
be covered by buying extra allowances on the market. In this case, industry
could see increased cost in phase 3 due to a structural measure for purchasing
allowances. In relation to possible short-term
increases in electricity cost due to the EU ETS (indirect cost) every €1
increase in the carbon price may on average translate into an increase of 0.8%
compared to the current price for industry[7].
These figures do not take into account the expected lower cost pass-through in
the Member States applying the derogation allowing transitional free allocation
for the modernisation of electricity generation, or the decreasing importance
of fossil fuel-based plants in electricity price setting due to a robust carbon
price. 4.4. Social impacts A €1 increase in the carbon price could on
average translate into an increase of 0.5% compared to the current price for
households[8].
Decarbonisation policies also reduce emissions of PM2.5, SO2
and NOx. Through a more stable carbon price signal, a carbon market
can have positive health impacts by in short-term by improving air quality
through encouraging fuel switching from coal to gas and in the mid- and
long-term by discouraging financing new coal facilities. Revenues from the
auctions may increase and can be used to cushion adverse social impacts. The 2030
impact assessment shows that when auction revenue are recycled and if carbon
pricing extended to all sectors, decarbonisation policies can lead to an
increase in employment of 0.2% or 430.000 net jobs created by 2030. The higher
the impact on the carbon price signal, the higher these impacts are expected to
be. 4.5. Environmental impacts The environmental impact of the EU ETS in
terms of emissions in the sectors covered over a certain period of time is
determined by the cap. As the options that entail a permanent retirement (1a, 1b,
3a and 3b) would imply a change of the cap for phase 3, they have more positive
impacts in terms of emission reductions than the market stability reserve
options. [1] Surplus is defined as the difference between the
cumulative amount of allowances available for compliance at the end of a given
year, and the cumulative amount of allowances effectively used for compliance
with the emissions up to that given year. [2] The reference scenario assumes full implementation of
existing policies, including the achievement of the renewable energy and
greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2020 and implementation of the Energy
Efficiency Directive. The baseline scenario assumes only already implemented
policies, and does not achieve in all Member States all targets, for example
the renewables targets. In the baseline scenario, the surplus is expected to
stay at 2 billion in 2020. [3] COM(2012) 652 [4] In the context of carbon markets, this refers to the
optimal balance between the carbon price signal and low-carbon investment that
is needed now, and those that will be needed in the future. [5] For more information see chapter 4.1 of the impact
assessment on backloading: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/docs/swd_2012_xx2_en.pdf
[6] Some of this surplus may have already been sold by
industry, in which case the value of those allowances for industry would not be
lost but now arise in the form of money. Data includes all stationary
installations reported in the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) that do not
have as activity code "combustion". [7] Ranging from 0.4%-1.7% at Member State level. Based on a simple average of increases for EU Member States, hence not weighted average. [8] Ranging from 0.2%-1.3% at Member State level. Based on a simple average of increases for EU Member States, hence not weighted
average.