Table 7.6.1 Summary of structure, content, mechanisms for regionalisation and level of simplification

(Source: Author)

8.Analysis of impacts

8.1.Methodology

The following sections present an analysis of the potential impacts of the different policy options described on the key stakeholders identified in section 4.5. The impacts on other stakeholder groups indirectly are also indicated where relevant.

The different options largely present different governance structures for the specification and implementation of technical measures. Changes to the substance are primarily restricted to deletion or simplification of existing measures or the establishment of baselines based on existing rules.

Regionalisation is a new concept and other than the first discard plans adopted earlier this year there is little experience as to what impact it will actually have. Therefore how the different governance options, and the possibilities they provide for specification of different technical measures under regionalisation, might actually translate under the different options is based on the limited experience of regionalisation to date.

Determining or disentangling whether, and to what extent, a specific technical measure such as a closed area or a mesh size would impact on a particular stock, compared to an output type measure such as quota management, which may also be in place for the same stock, is challenging. Isolating the costs of enforcing technical rules is similarly not straightforward as monitoring tends to be carried out as part of routine inspections monitoring a range of rules including checking for valid fishing licences and catch reporting.

For this reason the analysis is based on a qualitative assessment of the impacts, supported with an evaluation of the likely risks of the different options (section 8.3). It describes the potential expected direction of change (i.e. will the situation deteriorate, stay the same, or improve under the different options). The assessment of environmental impacts and related indicators such as stock status, a monetisation of economic impacts, and a numerical assessment of social impacts in terms of jobs, is qualitative and largely based on specific examples or case studies. The impacts of the policy options considered in the IA to support the CFP19 remain valid and where relevant are used to support the analysis.

The options are assessed in terms of the short-term impacts up to 2019 corresponding to the full implementation of the landing obligation and in the longer-term covering the period up to 2022 and beyond when the CFP is due to be reviewed69.

The key impacts considered are:

Economic impacts

Economic sustainability is assessed using as indicators the contribution that technical measures under the different options can make to reaching the MSY objective and to reducing unwanted catches under the landing obligation. Economically these two core elements of the CFP will have a huge bearing on future economic viability in terms of growth and investment, sectoral competitiveness and also providing stability for SMEs. The costs for the adaptation of gears to adjust to any new approach to technical measures is also considered along with the likley impacts of the different options on the competitveness of the catching sector.

Social impact

Social sustainability is assessed in terms of the contribution of technical measures to employment evolution in fisheries and the attractivenesses of the catching sector measured by the likely impacts on wages and working conditions of the different options.

Environmental impacts

Environmental sustainability is assessed in terms of protecting biodiversity, preserving the quality of natutral resources and fostering the sustainable use of resources. The contribution technical measures can make to the achievement of GES for MSFD Decriptor 1,3 and 4 (i.e. biological impacts on fish stocks and vulnerable species such as marine mammals and seabirds) and Descriptor 6 (i.e. physical impacts on the seabed) are used as indicators.

Simplification, Administrative Burden and Costs

Governance issues are considered in terms of the degree of simplification achieveable; the involvement of the catching sector and national administrations in the decision-making process under regionalisation. The increase in workload and costs for national research institutes as well as STECF and ICES; and the costs for the catching sector and national administrations incurred as a result of regionalisation are also assessed as well as the costs for controlling technical measures under the differing governance structures.

Impacts on SMEs

Impacts on SMEs are broken down into economic impacts as a result of additional costs and responsibilities associated with regionalisation.

8.2.Baseline scenario

8.2.1.Economic impacts 

MSY and the landing obligation

The economic impacts will continue to be negative. No improvements in current exploitation patterns are likely in the short-term for stocks currently fished above MSY. This will result in significant reductions in fishing opportunities or fishing effort for stocks in the Mediterranean where there are no TACs will be required to bring fishing mortality to MSY levels. Currently out of 176 assessed stocks there are 19 stocks in the North-east Atlantic, 88 stocks in the Mediterranean and 5 stocks in the Black Sea which are considered to be fished unsustainably above MSY37. Some of these are highly depleted and even if the timeframe for reaching MSY is pushed out to 2020, the adjustments required to reach Fishing mortality corresponding to MSY (i.e. Fmsy)) will be significant70. Example 18 provides an example of the scale of the economic impacts for such stocks.

The current levels of unwanted catches will continue and under the landing obligation these catches will have to be landed but only sold for non-human consumption purposes. For some species (e.g. plaice in the sole fishery in the North Sea) these unwanted catches will remain at high levels. Table 4.1.1 provides examples of fisheries with similarly high levels of unwanted catches. Economic returns will reduce given the low value of such unwanted catches. The scale of the economic impacts arising from unwanted catches is illustrated in example 19.

Fishing opportunities will also be exhausted more quickly in fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic and Baltic. Unwanted catches which will have to be landed and counted against quotas will accelerate quota uptake. Exhausted fishing opportunities will force vessels to stop fishing earlier in the year with related negative impacts on their financial performance as shown by example 20.

Adaptation costs

Given the baseline option does not envisage any changes in the existing measures then no additional costs for adapting gears would be expected, at least in the short-term. Research into developing and testing selective gears would continue at current levels but without changes to the regulatory structure the uptake of such gears by the catching sector would remain low based on past experiences. Any additional costs that would be incurred would not be directly related to technical measures but as a result of adaptations to vessels to handle unwanted catches as a consequence of the landing obligation.

In the longer term such costs may increase as the economic impacts associated with moving to MSY, the landing obligation and meeting environmental targets under the MSFD would eventually force fishermen to adapt their gears and fishing practices or go out of business. Such costs could be offset through funding under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF75) in the short term so would not necessarily be significant. This may change in the longer-term after the end of the EMFF in 2020 if there is no such funding mechanism in the future.

Competitiveness

There will be no change in the competitiveness of the catching sector. Fishermen will continue to be governed by the same sets of detailed rules with limited flexibility.

Other stakeholders

Related impacts in downstream business could be expected to result from the landing of unwanted catches. These costs are not directly related to technical measures but to the implementation of the landing obligation. This will have negative impacts on the wider economy and will have knock-on impacts on other enterprises providing inputs to fishing, and processing, marketing and trading catches.

There are likely to be gains for non-human consumption outlets that can utilise and profit from previously discarded catches. There are also likely to be economic benefits for transport companies and storage companies (including markets) that will handle the previously discarded catches. These gains are difficult to estimate given the uncertainty regarding the actual level of unwanted catches that may result once the landing obligation is introduced and are short-term (see example 21).

Any costs of handling material for non-human consumption would likely be passed onto vessel operators although some of these costs could be partially offset by funding through the EMFF.

Third countries, particularly Norway and the Faroe Islands will be impacted in that reduced fishing opportunities arising from a failure to reach MSY will result in lower fishing opportunities for these countries in Union waters. They will have to comply with the landing obligation when fishing in Union waters which may lead to increased costs depending on the species being targeted. Third countries fishing in Union waters in the Mediterranean will be impacted in that a failure to reduce overfishing and the level of unwanted catches will impact on available resources.

For consumers, the need to halt biodiversity loss is of increasing importance and this has created a demand for sustainably and responsibly caught fish products. This was apparent from some of the submissions in the public consultation. Failure to revise the technical measures could indirectly lead to increasing difficulties for the catching sector to sell products in the market because of reduced demand for products not considered to be caught in an environmentally friendly manner.

8.2.2.Social impacts

The social impacts will continue to be negative. They will be most acute for fleet segments having significant levels of unwanted catches (typically the vessels highlighted in table 7.2.1). In the short-term, extra crew will be required to handle unwanted catches onboard which will have to be stowed onboard separately from marketable catches. The study referred to in section 7.2.173 estimated in the Dutch fleet an additional 1-2 FTE's would be required to account for the additional work load on board (approximately 300-400 FTEs for the Dutch fleet) in the short-term. However, these increased levels of employment would be short-lived as the increase in costs for extra crew would be unsustainable when combined with the reductions in fishing opportunities forecasted with the move to MSY.

In the longer term, the number of FTEs in the catching sector would reduce further in these fleet segments. The most affected groups of workers will be those which are employed on fishing fleet segments currently discarding the most. In the fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic (including the North Sea) this would be the beam trawl fleets exploiting flatfish species and otter trawls targeting Nephrops and demersal fish in mixed fisheries. These fleets would consist of approximately 3,500 vessels, employing around 17,200 FTE60. This is around 34% of the total workforce employed on fishing vessels working in the North East Atlantic6. All of these are micro-enterprises.

In the Mediterranean the demersal trawl, shellfish dredge and beam trawl fleets have the highest discards. These fleets consist of approximately 4,200 vessels, employing around 10,586 FTE. This represents around 34% of the total workforce employed on fishing vessels in the Mediterranean60. In other fleet segments the impacts are likely to be less significant as the levels of unwanted catches are much lower and employment levels would remain at current levels. Taking the projection made under the baseline scenario in the IA supporting the CFP19 of a 20% reduction in employment by 2022, which remain valid for this analysis, would mean a loss of FTEs of around 5,560 FTEs in these fleet segments.

The increased workload and reduction in wages that will result from moving to MSY and from the handling and landing of unwanted catches under the landing obligation will result in deterioration in job quality for most sectors of the catching sector. The attractiveness of the sector will reduce. This was identified as the outcome under the baseline scenario considered in the CFP IA19 where crew wages were expected to continue below national averages leading to the attractiveness of the sector remaining constant at best or more likely declining. The scale of decline in wages predicted is further illustrated by example 22:

Other stakeholders

Indirect impacts on downstream business are expected to result from the landing obligation. With increased incomes likely for non-human consumption outlets that can utilise and profit from unwanted catches, employment will increase in the short-term. There are also likely to be employment benefits for transport companies and storage companies (including markets) that will handle the previously discarded catches. The actual extent of any increases in employment numbers is difficult to quantify as it will depend entirely on the level of unwanted catches that would be landed. In the longer term as with the catching sector it is doubtful whether these increased levels of employment are sustainable.

Other ancillary businesses such as gear suppliers and net manufacturers would be negatively impacted under the baseline scenario. Reductions in income for the catching sector will have a knock-on effect on such businesses as fishermen will try to increase cost efficiencies by reducing gear maintenance and replacement gear costs.Overall reductions in downstream and ancillary businesses are likely to be in line with the projections in the CFP IA19 of -15% by 2022.

8.2.3.Environmental impacts

Environmental impacts on fish stocks will continue to be mostly negative in the short-term and at best may stabilise in the longer-term. Any improvements in selectivity will develop only when the economic impacts force fishermen to react. Exploitation patterns for stocks will not change and those stocks that are overfished (as indicated in section 7.2.1) will remain under pressure. Reaching MSY and GES under the MSFD (descriptor 3) within the target timeframe will be extremely difficult without significant cuts in fishing opportunities and reductions in fishing pressure.

The impacts on incidental catches of protected species including marine mammals and seabirds (MSFD descriptor 1) will be neutral in the short-term. Existing mitigation measures will remain in place but continue to be rather piecemeal and not necessarily targeted in the right fisheries or areas.

For cetaceans, ICES16,47&48 have concluded that in a number of fisheries incidental catches remain of concern. These include:

–harbour porpoises in static nets in the Baltic, Kattegat, North Sea and Skagerrak, Atlantic and Black Sea;

–common and striped dolphins in static nets in the Atlantic and Black Sea;

–common dolphins in pelagic trawls for bass and tuna in the Atlantic; and

–bottlenose dolphins in both pelagic trawl and static net fisheries in the Mediterranean.

For seabirds16&78 an ICES report classified bycatch by the EU fishing fleet at c.a. 200,000 seabirds annually in EU waters with at least 25 species of seabirds in EU waters as being of conservation concern either globally or at a local population level. Incidental catches of other marine mammals such as seals and marine reptiles such as sea turtles are also frequently reported.

The Natura 2000 sites already established to protect vulnerable deep-sea ecosystem both inside the waters under Union jurisdiction as well as non-EU waters would remain in place. However, the creation of new closed areas, although possible, will continue to be a slow process (no new areas have been adopted outside territorial waters since 2009). For such habitats delays in taking protection measures could lead to significant or irreversible impacts79. Failure to protect areas will impair the achievement of objectives relating to descriptors 1 and 6 of the MSFD.

Other stakeholders

Media campaigns by NGOs have undoubtedly raised awareness on discards and the environmental impacts of fishing in general. Therefore failure to revise the technical measures leading to environmental sustainability objectives not being met will provoke a negative reaction from the general public as a result of such media campaigns.

8.2.4.Simplification, administrative costs and burden

There would be no simplification of the regulations. Regionalisation of technical measures through multiannual and discard plans would be minimal and even if did happen in the longer-term would merely add additional rules rather than simplifying the current ones.

Administrative costs and burden will remain high for the Member States. Amending the technical measures legislation will remain a costly and lengthy process. There will be additional costs to Member States managing authorities related to the development of discard plans that may contain technical measures. In the longer term, pressure to minimise economic impacts may drive the sectors of the catching sector indicated with the highest level of unwanted catches to actively press Member States and the Commission to develop regionalised measures as part of multiannual plans. This will result in additional costs for Member States.

Costs to the scientific community would not be expected to change as there would be no additional workload expected related to technical measures in the short-term. Scientists would continue to have to develop, test and evaluate technical measures in response to requests from the catching sector, Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament.

Costs for enforcement of technical measures would remain extremely high due to the continued need for a high level of monitoring at sea. The retrospective analysis estimated costs of control of around €33 million per Member State of which 57% is spent on control at sea. Any additional costs over and above this would not be directly related to technical measures but to implementation of the CFP and in particular the landing obligation.

Other stakeholders

There are no indirect administrative costs or burden on other stakeholders.

8.2.5.Impacts on SMEs

Administrative burden and costs on the catching sector, most of which would be classified as micro-enterprises (98%), would remain high. The current complex regulatory structure would remain in place requiring fishermen to comply with multiple technical rules. There would be also additional burden and costs resulting from the landing obligation, which would be indirectly linked to technical measures. These costs would mainly be associated with handling and storing unwanted catches on board, as well as for the landing, storage and transport of such unwanted catches ashore prior to disposal or sale for non-human consumption purposes. Costs will vary considerably from fleet segment to fleet segment depending upon the extent of unwanted catches and the reaction of the vessel owners to deal with these problems. Reactions could vary between hiring additional crew members, to choosing to voluntarily improve selectivity to reduce the level of unwanted catches, choosing to illegal discards such catches or downsizing their business.

8.3.Option 1: Consolidation

8.3.1.Economic impacts

MSY and the landing obligation

In the short-term the economic impacts will be similarly negative to the baseline scenario. Any immediate changes to the regulations under discard plans or the existing legislation would see the introduction of additional measures to reduce unwanted catches. These measures would result in consequential short-term economic losses from reductions in marketable catches. Past experience has shown that if these economic losses are significant then there will be little industry buy-in and fishermen will explore ways to minimise these losses once the measures are introduced. This is illustrated by example 23 below:

In the longer term, it is possible that driven by the need to maintain stocks at MSY and reduce unwanted catches under the landing obligation, the catching sector will explore how different technical measures could contribute to achieving better selectivity under regionalisation. Shifts of exploitation patterns towards the most valuable target size classes/species would optimise the economic returns for the catching sector associated with fishing opportunities. Larger fish will tend to achieve a higher price and this will focus selectivity in such a way as to avoid the capture of younger age classes. The economic gains will be dependent on whether the incentives are big enough to encourage the catching sector to accept these losses in the short-term and adjust exploitation patterns12 for potential gains in the longer-term.

Adaptation costs

In the short-term, costs for adapting gears to new legislation will be the same as the baseline given this option only consolidates the current regulations. In the longer-term the move to regionalisation where fishermen may be forced to adopt more selective gears under legislation implies costs for adapting their fishing gears. Improving the selectivity of fishing gears by adding specific devices into existing gears is not necessarily expensive. The retrospective evaluation indicated that the direct cost of modifying the gears of trawlers of 12-16 m is typically less than €1,000 and for larger vessels may be higher (€2,000-€3,000), depending on the gear modification required6.

Considering a conservative average estimate of a one-off payment of €3,000 per vessel (based on discussions with fishermen and net manufactures carried out as part of the retrospective analysis) for purchasing and rigging into the trawl, the total cost borne by the catching sector in the North East Atlantic and in the North Sea would be in the region of €16.4 million, if only vessels operating active gears, the most in need of selectivity improvements, are considered6. This represents ≈ 0.9 % of the annual value of their landings (See table 7.3.1). Funding is available through the EMFF for grant aid towards those costs. Direct costs for the catching sector can therefore be assumed to be negligible compared to the amounts to be disbursed and the long-term benefits of improved selectivity.

Table 7.3.1: Estimate of direct cost of purchasing and rigging selectivity devices into existing gears (NE Atlantic). The "Need" column reflects the need of fleet segments to improve their current selectivity performances

(Source: MRAG et al 2014 page 47 of prospective evaluation)

The EMFF may also support gear adaptations that limit and, where possible, eliminate the physical and biological impacts of fishing on the ecosystem or the sea bed and equipment that protects gear and catches from mammals and birds protected by environmental legislation. The costs are estimated to be similar to the above although will vary greatly from sector to sector (e.g. incidental catch cetaceans and seabirds are higher in passive gear fisheries compared to demersal trawl fisheries).

Competitiveness

In the short-term there will be no change in competitiveness amongst the catching sector. In the longer-term regionalisation may introduce a degree of competiveness into the sector between regions. Fishermen operating in those fisheries where regional measures are in place may gain a competitive advantage over operators in other sea basins continuing under the detailed rules imposed at Union level. This is dependent on industry buy-in into the regional measures on the basis that they result in improved economic returns.

Other stakeholders

Impacts on downstream businesses such as fish processors, transport, storage companies and gear suppliers would be similar to the baseline (i.e. positive for some, negative for others) in the short-term and longer term.

The catching sector from third countries will be negatively impacted on the short-term as the under the baseline scenario. However, they may benefit in the longer term from stable or increased fishing opportunities if there are improvements in stock levels.

8.3.2.Social impacts

Short-term social impacts will be negative as under the baseline. The simple change to the governance structure of technical measures envisaged will not halt the general decline forecasted as a result of implementation of the CFP. As with the baseline, projected declines in employment of 10-20% by 2020 are the most likely scenario based on the IA supporting the CFP19.

In the longer-term the general decline in employment is likely to stabilise. If regionalisation evolves leading to more effective technical measures then the negative impacts should be lessened over-time. However, this is reliant on such measures having a level of industry buy-in.

This will be similarly the case in terms of job quality and satisfaction. Wages will decline in line with the baseline scenario in the short-term with a gradual improvement as regionalisation evolves. Provided reductions in unwanted catches and sustainable fishing mortalities are achieved through regionalisation then, job quality and attractiveness of the sector will stabilise much more quickly than under the baseline.

Other stakeholders

The social impacts on downstream and ancillary businesses will very much mirror the impacts in the catching sector.

8.3.3.Environmental impacts

In the short-term the environmental impacts on fish stocks would be similar to the baseline scenario. Discard plans would provide the opportunity to introduce measures to improve exploitation patterns for fisheries and species falling under the landing obligation in the period up to 2016-2019. Such measures may lead to reductions in unwanted catches for those species. The impacts on other species caught as bycatch species in those fisheries may also benefit depending on the nature of the fishery and the gears used. Example 24 from the Celtic Sea illustrates the reductions in unwanted catches that could be expected in a mixed fishery for cod, haddock and whiting. Given such measures are likely to result in economic losses, positive environmental impacts will depend on compliance with these measures.

In the longer-term there are further benefits from including technical measures within multi-species multiannual plans. Example 25 illustrates these potential long-term benefits achievable through improvements in exploitation patterns.

Table 7.3.3.1: Quantifiable impacts of exploitation pattern on long-term MSY objective compared to current exploitation pattern

(Source: Adapted from Henichart et al. (2011))

In the Mediterranean it will be more difficult to reduce negative environmental impacts. A study carried out for the European Parliament83 suggested that one possible consequence of the landing obligation may be an increase in illegal marketing of fish below the mcrs. Landing, storage and transportation of juveniles will be legal and this could simplify commercialisation in the black market and incentivise the targeting of juveniles instead of the converse as anticipated in the northeast Atlantic. This is a long-standing problem in the Mediterranean and not necessarily related to technical measures but could create an unwanted incentive to drive non-compliance. Fishermen may choose to fish unselectively and target small fish if the revenues from such catches are significant. As there are no fishing opportunities set in the Mediterranean, Article 17 of the CFP cannot be used to counteract these potential negative impacts.

For sensitive species and habitats the impacts will be at best neutral or negative. Existing nature conservation measures will remain in place. Regionalisation of environmental protection measures would provide Member States with more flexibility to develop effective measures to achieve environmental objectives. Flexibility will allow the consideration of trade-offs and complementarities between measures focusing on environmental requirements under these Directives and measures aimed at the conservation of fish stocks (MSFD descriptor 3). The identification of environmental measures contributing to MSFD descriptors at a regional scale would better take into account the effects of certain measures which could negatively impact other environmental requirements. For example, fishing effort displacement as a consequence of closures adopted to contribute to descriptors 1, 4 or 6 and which could negatively impact stock conservation (descriptor 3) can be anticipated and counteracted from the outset.

Other stakeholders

As with the baseline scenario if perceived negatively in the short-term by NGOs this may translate into a negative reaction from consumers.

8.3.4.Simplification, administrative costs and burden

A degree of simplification is achieved through the consolidation of the common rules into one Regulation. Consolidation would allow specific common provisions of some existing co-decided regulations to be repealed to avoid duplication. Regulations containing regionally specific measures and implementing rules would remain in place without change. In the longer-term regionalisation of technical measures is envisaged by way of derogations to the technical measures. It is unlikely to lead to any major simplification of the rules and may in fact add new rules.

In the short-term as with the baseline administrative costs and burden on Member States will remain high. There will be additional short-term costs for developing temporary discard plans which may include technical measures. By way of example of the projected costs for developing a temporary discard plan for pelagic fisheries in North Western waters are shown below in example 26.

In the longer-term the gradual move towards multiannual plans will lead to increasing costs for Member States administrations. The scale of these costs will depend upon the number of Member States involved, the number and nature of the fisheries, the complexity of the plan and the role of technical measures within the plans. The costs for individual Member States associated with regionalisation will also vary depending on the number of sea basins in which a Member State has a fisheries interest. France for instance are involved in fisheries in the Northwestern waters, Southwestern waters, North Sea and Mediterranean so would have a higher level of costs compared to Ireland who principally have only an interest in Northwestern waters. The IA supporting the CFP19 estimated the move to regionalisation is likely to increase overall costs in the region of 20-50%, although the total direct cost to stakeholders would depend on the allocation of funding and in particular increased contributions from Member States as well as how the Advisory Councils structure their work programme to take account of regionalisation. These costs would be largely front-loaded during the development phase of multiannual and discard plans.

In the short-term costs for scientific agencies will be similar to the baseline scenario and be at similar levels illustrated by example 27. In the longer-term to support the development of regionalised plans that include technical measures would lead to increased costs dependent on the detail and content of the plan. For instance a plan for pelagic fisheries would have a lot less need for technical measures to ensure effective implementation compared to a demersal fisheries plan where the role of technical measures has much more importance.

Regionalisation will also involve STECF and ICES in the provision to i) the regions with information to determine the effectiveness and relevance of regionally-specific technical measures proposed (channelled through the Commission), and ii) the Commission with scientific advice to determine whether to approve the proposals made at the regional level. Provision of this advice will not necessarily result in increased costs for the Commission for contracting STECF or ICES to provide this advice but would require adjustments to the work programmes of both organisations to accommodate these assessments.

The costs for controlling technical measures will remain high as under the baseline scenario. Control authorities will have to enforce the existing technical measure regulations. Any small reductions in costs arising from the simplification of the common technical rules into one Regulation would be offset by increased costs for monitoring the landing obligation.

In the longer term regionalisation should lead to greater acceptability (as a result of increased participation from stakeholders in the specification of measures relevant to them in their regions). This may result in reductions in control costs compared to the baseline if regionalised measures under this option introduce an incentive for compliance. It can be expected that regional measures will be more focused and streamlined, leading to improved controllability.

Other stakeholders

The move to regionalisation should not necessarily impact on third countries fishing in Union waters to any degree. Fishing opportunities and supporting rules including technical measures are already subject to negotiation annually between the Union and third countries84.

8.3.5.Impacts on SMEs

Regionalisation of technical measures under this option would have positive and negative impacts on the catching sector as the main group of SMEs involved. In the short-term administrative burden and costs would remain high for the catching sector. In the longer-term regionalisation may lead to benefits in terms of reduced administrative burden and, through, the Advisory Councils, much greater involvement in the decision-making process (i.e. in the development and implementation of the multiannual and temporary discard plans). However, there are costs associated with regionalisation as indicated which indirectly impact on SMEs as members of the Advisory Councils. There will also be short - and longer-term direct costs for adaptation of gears to regionally developed measures established under multiannual or discard plans. These costs can be offset from funding from the EMFF in the short-term.

8.4.Option 2: Framework Approach

8.4.1.Economic impacts

MSY and the landing obligation

The economic impacts will be positive after a short period of adjustment to the new governance structure introduced by the framework regulation where economic impacts would be similar to option 1. After this transitional period regionalisation of technical measures should be accelerated provided Member States pro-actively embrace the process.

Tailor-made technical measures developed as part of multiannual and discard plans should lead to the optimisation of exploitation patterns and facilitate the move to sustainable levels of fishing mortality and reduction in unwanted catches as indicated under option 1. Integrating technical measures (gear/spatial/temporal) as drivers for changes in exploitation patterns as part of multiannual plans will have a significant bearing on the yield that can be achieved from a given stock12. Using technical measures in this way will incentivise selective fishing. There will be a strong driver for the catching sector to focus on catch profiles that are economically optimal12.

These increases will not be uniform across fleet segments and are dependent on the scale of the fisheries, the target species and the relative impact of technical measures. Regionalisation of technical measures will be more beneficial for towed gear fisheries as improving selectivity in these fisheries is much more critical than static gear fisheries (i.e. gillnet and longline) which are more selective. Towed gear fisheries currently comprise around 16% (14,000 vessels) of the total EU fleet.

The IA supporting the CFP19 estimated improvements in exploitation pattern as a result of moving to MSY and the introduction of discard reduction strategies could lead to significant increases (10-40%) in retained and sold catches of some species currently subject to significant discarding depending on the fishery.

This option will also provide opportunities to move away from prescriptive rules to a more results-based and adaptive approach using the associated selectivity associated of baseline standards as the objective to be achieved. Such a results-based approach has shown to deliver positive benefits in leading to the voluntary use of selective gears. This is best illustrated in the context of the long-term management plan for cod85 (example 26).

Given that the number of overfished stocks in the Mediterranean far outweigh others regions, it is likely that the economic situation will not be as positive. The transition to sustainable fishing will take longer to achieve and therefore the short-term economic impacts are likely to significant on these fleets in the Mediterranean targeting highly depleted stocks – fleets targeting mixed demersal species as identified previously. For these fleets, improving the effectiveness of technical measures will help to cushion these impacts but will not alleviate them altogether.

Adaptation costs

In the short term there would be adjustments to the technical measures currently in place through the creation of baseline standards which would function as default measures while regionalisation evolves. These baseline standards would be linked to the current rules and take account of existing exploitation patterns (as described in section 6.4) but some sectors of the catching sector may face marginal costs associated with adaptation to these baselines. These could be largely offset by financial support under the EMFF.

In the longer-term with the move to a more results-based approach, where focus is more on achieving a result, the decision of whether to change gears will be left largely to the fishermen themselves. It would become a business decision driven by economics rather than by changes in legislation as under option 1.

Competitiveness

The impact on the competitiveness will be similar to option 1. The advantages provided by regionalisation in terms of flexibility will create a competitive advantage over those continuing under the more rigid rules (e.g. common provisions and baselines) contained in the framework regulation. This should act as a strong driver for regionalisation.

Other stakeholders

The impacts on downstream and ancillary industries will be similar to option 1 but will depend on regionalisation affecting change in regulating technical measures quickly.

The catching sector of third countries would benefit from increased fishing opportunities as a result of reaching MSY targets in the northeast Atlantic. Any benefits will depend indirectly on the actions of the catching sector of the Member States.

8.4.2.Social impacts

In the immediate short-term the social impacts on employment would be similar to the baseline scenario as the catching sector adjusts to the challenges of moving to MSY and the landing obligation. However, assuming that regionalisation is accelerated and the most concerned fleet segments notably those targeting mixed demersal species, would strive quickly to improve selectivity, any negative impacts on jobs in would be counteracted more quickly than under the baseline. Employment levels would stabilise. The framework would manage the hard transition period much better than option 1, where additional short-term job losses are to be expected in EU fleets dependent on overfished stocks.

Achieving environmental sustainability as quickly as possible is a precondition for social sustainability. The simulations in the CFP IA19 showed that once MSY levels are achieved, fishing opportunities will increase (by at least 20% by 2020). Such a significant increase has a potential to create new jobs in the catching sector, as shown by the fact that, according to the simulations, employment per vessel increases already after 2017. This is also in line with experience of countries such as New Zealand, where the use of management instruments allowing for the transition to sustainable fishing, very similar to those proposed by CFP reform, ultimately resulted in increases in catches and, consequently, in employing more capital and manpower in the fleets87.

It is also in line with the EU's own experience that stocks already fished sustainably have benefited from TAC increases. It is these TAC increases that help to maintain employment in the sector and represent a significant source of additional income for fishermen. As examples, the increases (based on 2012) represented additional incomes of €10 million for herring fishermen in the Celtic Sea and €12 million more income for anglerfish fishermen in the West Atlantic87.

Fishing sustainably will lead to increase income and wages and therefore job attractiveness. Simulations carried out for the IA of the CFP show that the average wages under the new CFP will nearly double in comparison to what would happen in the absence of reform as a result of fishing at MSY. In addition reducing unwanted catches will decrease the workloads on board associated with sorting and storing such catches, improving work conditions for crews.

As with the economic impacts the situation will not be as positive in the Mediterranean, where a large number of stocks are depleted.

Other stakeholders

The impacts on downstream businesses would mirror the situation in the catching sector. If regionalisation is effective then the impacts on these sectors will be lessened.

8.4.3.Environmental impacts

The benefits in terms of stock sustainability would be positive compared to the baseline. In the short-term the framework approach would manage the transition to regionalisation and, through the inclusion of baseline standards and retention of existing measures that are still necessary, environmental sustainability objectives would continue to be met. The benefits are likely to be marginal but in the longer-term once plans are developed further positive benefits to stock sustainability should accrue as fishermen strive to optimise exploitation patterns to maximise economic returns.

In the terms of impacts on sensitive species and habitats, existing nature conservation measures would be maintained under the framework Regulation so the impacts would be neutral in the short-term. In the longer-term regionalisation under multiannual plans and under Article 11 of the CFP would provide the possibility to adapt measures to be more responsive and anticipatory to threats to marine ecosystems and to take such measures expediently.

Other stakeholders

Assuming this option is perceived positively by NGOs as indicated in the public consultation then the certification of fisheries (such as under the Marine Stewardship Council) could follow from sustainable and responsible fishing. Certification may lead to an improved perception by consumers who are becoming increasingly aware of such schemes.

8.4.4.Simplification, Administrative Costs and Burden

The current regulatory structure will be simplified significantly and provide a direct route to regionalisation. The three overarching regulations (or most of them) would be repealed or rationalised immediately. The current mesh size and catch composition rules contained in the annexes to the current regulations would be converted into a smaller number of results-orientated baseline mesh sizes while the number of closed areas would be reduced by the removal of redundant or ineffective closures. Many of the other implementing and technical measures contained in other regulations would be incorporated into the framework and these regulations or provisions would be repealed. Further simplification is likely under multiannual plans in the longer-term with the move to a results-based approach.

There will be increased administration costs for Member States in the short-term associated with regionalisation but this is balanced by the reduction in administrative burden as a result of the simplification of the regulations and less time spent negotiation of regulations centrally. These costs will stabilise in the longer term once plans are established and the focus shifts from development to monitoring and evaluation of the plans and finding solutions to emerging problems. The costs of regionalisation would be as projected under option 1.

Costs and changes in workloads for research institutes and scientific bodies (i.e. STECF and ICES) would be the same as under option 1.

In the short-term control costs would reduce as a result of simplification but costs for enforcing the remaining technical rules at sea will remain and will be significant. In the longer term there is potential to reduce control costs considerably particularly if regions move towards a result-based approach and widen the use of Joint Deployment Plans (JDPs). JDPs will lead to improve coordination of monitoring and control amongst Member States within regions. If aligned to multiannual plans they would have the potential to ensure the best use of human and material resources pooled by Member States in a coordinated way88 for monitoring and control. This has been the case with a JDP introduced in 2008 which established specific control and inspection programme for the recovery of cod stocks in the Northeast Atlantic and the North Sea to support the implementation of the long-term management plan for cod85. The total estimated cost of all six JDP89 operations during 2013 were €43.4 million of which €34.9 million was spent on at sea inspections. This compares favourably with the costs for individual Member States historically for at sea control.

Once there is confidence in the documentation of catches in the longer-term resulting from the full implementation of the landing obligation (i.e. by 2019), the need for prescriptive technical rules would diminish further and in fact once plans (and JDPs) are in place in all regions it could be envisaged that the number of technical rules required could further reduce if Member States chose to move in this direction. The focus of control would be shifted to monitoring catches rather than controlling and measuring detailed gear construction and operation resulting in substantial reductions as the need to monitor technical rules at sea would be diminished. Based on the retrospective evaluation6 and assuming a 10% reduction in at sea monitoring with the use of alternative monitoring techniques such as CCTV90, savings in the order of €10.2 million for the Member States in the Northeast Atlantic (based on total costs of €102 million euros6) could be achieved. This shift should also act an incentive for compliance for the catching sector given the greater flexibility it provides fishermen in how they operate.

Other stakeholders

The move to regionalisation should not impact on third countries.

8.4.5.Impacts on SMEs

The impact on SMEs in terms of administrative costs and burden would be positive in that there would be immediate simplification of the current regulations and a greater role for the catching sector through the ACs in the development of technical measures. In addition the potential move to a results-based system in the longer-term would lead to further simplification of the technical rules but implies a shift in the burden of proof onto the catching sector. This will put the onus on the catching sector to demonstrate and document catches accurately. Potentially this may increase costs associated with documentation of catches although the costs incurred would depend on the approach of the Member States to “regionalised control” and offset against the greater flexibility such an approach would afford. Member States may attempt to past some of the control costs onto the catching sector as a trade-off for flexibility although equally they may choose to continue to bear the costs for control themselves with support from the EMFF.

8.5.Sub-option 2.1: Framework approach without baselines

8.5.1.Economic impacts

MSY and the landing obligation

Based on past experiences the short-term economic impacts are likely to be negative as a result of partial "de-regulation". Partial de-regulation will introduce uncertainty and create a legal vacuum. With no baseline standards in place there will be no measures directly controlling exploitation patterns (i.e. mesh sizes, minimum conservation reference sizes or closed areas would be deleted). There is a high risk that exploitation patterns will deteriorate and fishing mortality will increase to unsustainable levels as fishermen attempt to adapt to de-regulation. To compensate for overfishing will require downward adjustments of fishing opportunities leading to significant reductions in incomes across the catching sector. In a worst case scenario widespread overfishing could lead to the total closure of a fishery with significant economic consequences. Example 27 concerning the fishery for haddock in Rockall illustrates the potential impacts caused in a fishery with partial de-regulation.

This sub-option may also introduce an incentive to misreport catches or alternatively discard illegally unwanted catches to minimise economic impacts. Without adequate independent monitoring at the level of an individual business, it could result in ‘free-rider’ effects. In the absence of appropriate monitoring, some businesses may choose to adopt measures to minimise unwanted catches, resulting in short-term losses while other ‘free-riders’ (those who don’t change behaviour) may then benefit without paying for the cost. If there are sufficient ‘free-riders’, then no benefit is accrued and the individuals who have acted in a responsible manner are effectively penalised twice12. The use of Article 17 to reward responsible fishing with increased fishing opportunities may counteract these free-rider effects to a certain extent.

These negative economic impacts, however, are likely to be temporary as the risks associated will act as a driver for Member States to put in place regional measures rapidly, in the short-term, under discard plans and in the longer-term, under multiannual plans. At this stage the positive impacts projected under option 2 would be the more likely outcome depending on the scale of any impacts they may have occurred in the transition period.

Adaptation costs

The costs would be similar to option 2 but very-much dependent on the above-mentioned "free-rider" effects.

Competitiveness

The impact on the competitiveness of the catching sector would be similar to option 2 although would be even more dependent on the speed and effectiveness of regionalisation.

Other stakeholders

The impacts on downstream and ancillary businesses are dependent on the reaction of the catching sector. The reaction of third countries to limited regulation is harder to assess. Some countries may see the benefits of such an approach (e.g. in the Mediterranean) whereas in the northeast Atlantic countries such as Norway may not agree with such an approach.

8.5.2.Social impacts

As with the economic impacts, the short-term social impacts are likely to be negative. Overfishing in the short-term would lead to job losses, particularly in those sectors targeting depleted stocks in line with the reductions in employment forecast under the baseline scenario. In the longer-term stabilisation of employment and improvement in job quality through reductions in unwanted catches and increases in wages from landing bigger more valuable fish is likely. Under this scenario job quality would improve in line with option 2.

Other stakeholders

The degree to which downstream and ancillary businesses are impacted will be dependent on the reaction of the catching sector to partial de-regulation.

8.5.3.Environmental impacts

As with the economic impacts based on previous experiences of fisheries with limited technical measures regulations in place, the environmental impacts will be negative in the short-term with the high risk of overfishing. The scale of impacts is illustrated in example 28 concerning the sea bass stock for which there have only been very limited technical measures in place in the past but which have seen rapid increases in fishing pressure.

The negative environmental impacts are likely to be temporary and in the longer-term provided effective measures are in place through regionalisation then the impacts should be reduced. The speed of recovery is dependent on the scale of negative impacts caused from overfishing.

Regarding sensitive species and habitats, the environmental impacts will be similar to option 2. Existing environmental protection measures would remain in place and in the longer-term new measures would introduce under regionalisation to alleviate threats to such species.

Other stakeholders

Evidence from the public consultation showed that NGOs would not be in favour of partial de-regulation. They indicated this to be a risky strategy that could lead to unsustainable fishing. This may translate into a negative reaction from consumers on the basis of information from NGOs.

8.5.4.Simplification, administrative costs and burden

There would be immediate repeal of many of the existing Regulations as well as the deletion of specific articles from several others. Only common technical provisions and essential nature conservation measures would remain in place.

The deletion of multiple regulations and measures would have obvious benefits in reducing administrative burden for Member State administrations but would infer extra responsibility for ensuring accurate catch reporting pending technical measures being put in place at regional level. This additional responsibility would probably create additional costs for Member States in putting in place accurate catch reporting systems although these are not related to regulating technical measures. Member State managing authorities would incur additional costs associated with regionalisation as described under option 2.

Costs and workloads for national/regional scientists, STECF and ICES would be similar to those projected under option 2.

Costs for controlling technical measures will reduce in the short-term as a result of partial de-regulation. However, reductions in costs for monitoring technical rules would be offset by the need for increased monitoring of catches that would be required under the results-based approach envisaged under this option. As with option 2 once there is confidence in catch reporting then the level of control at sea could be reduced and costs are likely to reduce. Conversely a lack of trust in catch reporting by the catching sector may lead to increased costs for catch monitoring in the short-term. Accurate catch reporting will be harder to achieve for towed gear demersal fisheries.

Other stakeholders

Third countries would benefit from reduced administrative burden under this option to the same degree as the EU catching sector. However, similarly the shift in the burden of proof would result in increased responsibilities for fishermen from third countries operating in Union waters. This could make negotiation of third country agreements problematic.

8.5.5.Impacts on SMEs

The catching sector would benefit from the reduction of administrative burden and costs associated with partial de-regulation. In addition the move to a results-based approach would be positive for the catching sector as under option 2 in providing greater flexibility in how they operate. Regionalisation will bring increased costs through the involvement of the catching sector with the ACs but has the benefit of increased their participation in developing technical measures. The risks of overfishing are high which would negatively impact on the catching sector.

8.6.Option 3: Elimination of technical measures

8.6.1.Economic impacts

MSY and the landing obligation

The economic impacts are likely to be similarly negative as sub-option 2.1 in the short-term. The impacts are critically dependent on the degree of compliance and reaction of the catching sector to “de-regulation”. "De-regulation" as envisaged could lead to widespread overfishing with knock-on economic impacts which would be significant and likely to be longer-term than under sub-option 2.1 without any direct linkage to regionalisation.

Adaptation costs

The costs would be similar to sub-option 2.1.

Competitiveness

"De-regulation" would introduce a high degree of competitiveness amongst the catching sector as individual operators would have almost complete freedom to decide on how to operate in the short-term. This could lead to "Olympic fisheries" as fishermen strive to catch available fishing opportunities as quickly as possible to maximise economic efficiency without necessarily having any regard for the environmental impacts on the stocks that could result (i.e. fishing unselectively and illegally discarding low-vale unwanted catches). In a worst case scenario this will result in the least efficient operators or fishermen choosing to fish responsibly being driven out of the industry before Member States have had time to react with regionally rules or the introduction of rules at Union level. Incentives in the form of additional fishing opportunities to those who fish responsibly allowed for under Article 17 of the CFP may help to alleviate these impacts.

Other stakeholders

The reaction of third countries to "de-regulation" is uncertain. Some countries may see the benefits of such an approach (e.g. in the Mediterranean) whereas in the northeast Atlantic countries such as Norway may be negative towards such a management strategy.

8.6.2.Social impacts

The social impacts would be similar to sub-option 2.1.

Other stakeholders

The impacts on downstream and ancillary businesses will be dependent on the reaction of the catching sector.

8.6.3.Environmental impacts

The environmental impacts are most likely to be negative as under sub-option 2.1. There is an even higher risk of overfishing with corresponding negative impacts on stock sustainability, which may be difficult to reverse in the short-term. If the catching sector reacted positively and move to sustainable fishing then the impacts would be alleviated reasonably quickly. However, past experience prior to the CFP would suggest that some level of technical rules is required otherwise sustainability is threatened. In the Mediterranean there is a risk under this option of fishermen targeting small fish without no minimum conservation reference sizes in place in the short-term. This would have significant negative impacts on stocks in the Mediterranean13.

Essential environmental protection measures (e.g. closed areas) would remain in place. Therefore in the short-term the impacts would be neutral as per the baseline scenario. In the longer-term environmental impacts may reduce but will depend on Member States on introducing effective measures regionally.

Other stakeholders

There is likely to be a negative reaction to "de-regulation" from the NGOs. This evidenced by the public consultation and may translate into a negative reaction from consumers affecting prices and economic viability.

8.6.4.Simplification, administrative costs and burden

The removal of virtually all technical rules and also a significant reduction of administrative costs and burden is the major advantage. Most of the existing regulations would be repealed as well as specific articles relating to technical measures would be deleted. The deletion of multiple regulations and measures would have obvious benefits for Member State administrations in cutting red-tape but the immediate move to a fully-fledged results-based approach would infer extra responsibility for accurate catch reporting. In the longer-term, some level of regulation may actually be re-introduced to prevent or reverse the damage caused by unsustainable fishing.

Administrative burden and costs for national/regional scientists, STECF and ICES would be similar to those described for sub-option 2.1.

Costs for control would follow a similar evolution as predicted under sub-option 2.1. There would be significant reductions in control costs for at sea enforcement of technical rules but this would be offset to some extent by increased catch monitoring.

Other stakeholders

Impacts would be the same as those predicted under option 2 and sub-option 2.1.

8.6.5.Impacts on SMEs

This option has obvious benefits for the catching sector in terms of reductions in administrative burden and costs associated with complying with technical rules. However, de-regulation would introduce uncertainty into the industry and create an uneven playing field at the level of individual fishermen. Free –rider effects are likely to be significant.

8.7.Summary of impacts

Table 8.7.1 summarises the economic, social and environmental impacts on the key stakeholders of the different policy options compared to the baseline scenario.

Table 7.6.1: Summary of impacts for the different policyoptions

(Source: Author)

9.Comparing the options

9.1.Qualitative assessment against the general, specific and operational objectives

Table 8.1.1 provides a comparison of options in terms of achieving the objectives of revising the technical measures compared to the baseline.

Table 8.1.1 Comparison of options in terms of achieving the objectives of revising the technical measures

(Source: Author)

Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact, - = negative impact, -/+ = both positive and negative impacts,

9.2.Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability

Effectiveness95

Given this initiative concentrate on changes in governance with only limited to changes to the substance of the regulations, the analysis of effectiveness centres on the benefits of introducing flexibility, simplifying the regulatory structure, creating incentives for behavioural change and compliance and through greater stakeholder participation instilling a sense of ownership with the measures put in place.

Option 1 is not likely to enhance the contribution of technical measures to the achievement of the general objectives of the CFP compared to the baseline scenario, at least in the short-term. The minimal changes in the regulatory structure through splitting common measures from regional rules only partially address the specific and operational objectives. Technical measures are still very much prescriptive and restrictive and there is no direct driver for regionalisation. Amendments to technical measures would be principally under co-decision with only the existing empowerments in the regulations providing a degree of flexibility. This would result in more regulations being added to the regulatory framework (i.e. still very much a top-down prescriptive approach) or derogations, diluting effectiveness as is currently the case. There would be little no added incentives over and above what is included in the CFP and the weaknesses relating to the lack of involvement of stakeholders would continue. The definition of clear objectives and indicators to measures success would be beneficial and even if the use of regionalisation under this option may not necessarily translate into simpler rules, it can be expected that regional measures will be more focused and streamlined, leading to improved effectiveness and controllability in the longer-term.

Option 2 would be more effective than the baseline and option 1. The degree to which effectiveness would be improved is related to the speed of regionalisation (as outlined in Section 9.3). The quicker regionalisation evolves across the region, the more effective the framework will become. In this regard by providing clear and direct linkage to regionalisation it would act driver for regionalisation. It would provide flexibility and the opportunity in the longer-term to move towards a results-based approach where the need for detailed rules is reduced. Under such an approach the stakeholders have a much greater sense of ownership of the fisheries. This combined with the copper fastening of the clearly defined role for stakeholders provided by the CFP through the Advisory Councils in the development of technical measures regionally should provide a greater incentive for compliance and to fish selectively.

In addition, even without the swift development of technical measures at regional level this option provides for a level of simplification through the repealing of a number of existing regulations and the deletion of redundant measures (i.e. addresses the weakness of prescriptive and complex rules). This will have immediate benefit for the catching sector in reducing and simplifying the rules that must be complied with but also for control authorities who will have to monitor compliance. This option provides for the smooth transition to regionalisation, while it also allows for the review and consolidation of existing measures that may be needed in the short-term to ensure the sustainability objectives of the CFP continue to be met while regionalisation evolves. As with option 1 the definition of clear and measurable objectives and indicators in the form of targets to measure success will address one of the five main weaknesses identified with the current regulatory structure. Option 2 will benefit fisheries in the NE Atlantic and Baltic the most. In the Mediterranean, without TAC and quotas based on current experiences, regionalisation is likely to be much slower to develop. It will be harder for Member States to incentivise the use of more selective gears in the absence of fishing opportunities to allocate to reward good practice. The existence of "black" markets for undersize fish will also provide a dis-incentive in the short-term for improved selectivity.

Sub-option 2.1 provides many of the same benefits as option 2. However, it introduces uncertainty and creates a partial legal vacuum in the short-term without baseline standards to act as safeguards in the transitional period up to 2020. There is a risk it will not deliver on the general objectives of the CFP as partial de-regulation may lead to "free-rider" effects with fishermen choosing to fish unselectively to gain advantage over their competitors. It relies heavily on Member States and stakeholders pro-actively embracing regionalisation and regionalisation being immediately effective. There is a risk of over-fishing particularly in the short-term with these options although it is likely these negative impacts will be reversed once regionalisation "kicks-in".

Option 3 has clear benefits in eliminating over-regulation and simplification through immediate de-regulation. As sub-option 2.1 it is an entirely results-based approach where the burden of proof is shifted to the catching sector to demonstrate compliance which some sections of the catching sector have argued for. However, the same risk of overfishing exists and it is doubtful under this option that the Commission or Member States would be able to react in time to prevent significant negative impacts which may be hard to reverse without having to resort to significant cuts in fishing opportunities and fishing effort. De-regulation may create an incentive for fishermen to discard illegally rather than fish selectively, if there are costs associated with selective fishing in terms of lost catches. In turn the costs for control could increase significantly if there is no trust that the catching sector is reporting catches accurately.

Efficiency96

Option 1 would provide no advantage over the baseline in terms of cost efficiency in the short-term. The costs for enforcement of technical measures would continue to be very high, as Member States would still be required to enforce the existing raft of technical rules in addition to the increased levels of catch monitoring that would be required to implement the landing obligation. In the longer –term cost efficiency may improve as regionalisation evolves but this is dependent on what measures are introduced at the regional level

Options 2 and sub-option 2.1 potentially will lead to cost efficiencies in the short to longer term as both of these options are based on the development of regionally specific measures. Through simplification and moving towards a results-based approach would result in the focus of control switching to the monitoring of control of catches with less emphasis on regulating technical rules. In addition as confidence builds that fishermen are complying with the rules in place the need for costly sea based monitoring would diminish, lowering costs. Member States and stakeholders (i.e. the ACs) would, though incur increased costs in the short-term as a result of regionalisation. These costs could be minimised if the ACs are successful at adjusting their work programmes to the requirements of the regionalisation process. With the move to fishing at MSY and the introduction of the landing obligation the CFP has moved in this direction so aligning the regulatory structure of technical measures to a catch based approach will help to achieve the objectives more cost efficiently than the current regulatory structure. Aligning the technical measures with regionally based JDP programmes may also help to reduce costs of enforcement.

The cost efficiency of option 3 is dependent on the speed of behavioural change. If in the short-term there is no confidence that the catching sector is accurately reporting catches then the increases costs for controlling and monitoring catches will outweigh any savings from "de-regulation". If confidence is greater, then cost-efficiency will increase as with option 2 and sub-option 2.1.

Coherence97

Option 1 is coherent with the overarching sustainability objectives of the CFP but not fully coherent with regionalised decision-making. Regionalisation is likely to be very much piece-meal rather than targeted. This option provides only limited scope for simplification and so does not fully correspond to the objectives for Better Regulation under the REFIT programme2. It does not further the linkage with EU environmental policy at least in the short-term.

Option 2 and sub-option 2.1 are coherent with the objectives of the CFP and provide a governance structure that is fully in line with regionalisation. They represent a high level of simplification through the creation of one single framework Regulation rather than retaining multiple Regulations as with the baseline so are coherent with the REFIT programme2. Both will establish much better linkage of environmental policy with technical measures. However, there is a risk with sub-option 2.1 that the sustainability objectives of the CFP could be compromised if the catching sector does not choose to fish responsibly in the transition towards regionalisation.

As with sub-option 2.1 the absence of any technical rules in the short-term under option 3 may jeopardise meeting the sustainability objectives of the CFP. It does not necessarily promote regionalisation. Simplification is achieved by the immediate deletion of the majority of technical measures regulations. As with option 1 it does not further the linkage with EU environmental policy at least in the short-term.

Acceptability

Option 1 would be the least acceptable of the options put forward. It represents a consolidation rather than an overhaul of the current regulatory structure. Member States, the Advisory Councils, NGOs nor the catching sector felt this was a good option. It also limits the role of the co-legislators because there would be only minor changes to the current regulatory structure and any future changes would simply add on additional rules. There would be little or no pressure form stakeholders or added incentive for Member States to develop regionalised technical measures strategically as part of multiannual plans or any real incentive for the ACs to engage proactively.

Option 2 was the preferred option for Member States, several of the Advisory Councils, NGOs and most of the catching sector. They saw it as the best way to manage the transition to full implementation of the landing obligation, reaching MSY and implementing the MSFD. Institutionally this option is more balanced than option 1 in that it provides the co-legislators with an opportunity to establish a new structure for technical measures. It also allows them to fix overarching objectives and targets as well the baseline standards that will be the default option in the absence of measures at regional level. It also promotes a bottom-up approach by providing stakeholders with a clear role in the development of tailored made measures for their particular sea basin. The other advantage is that it has the added safeguard in the form of existing measures that need to remain in place pending regionalisation.

Sub-option 2.1 was favoured by certain sectors of the fishing industry that did not see the need for baseline measures to be included under the framework. Member States, the NGOs and some of Advisory Groups were less in favour seeing this as a riskier option, which would introduce uncertainty. Institutionally it is weaker than Option 2 as the co-legislators have much less of a direct role in shaping technical measures. They have input into setting the objectives and principles and agreeing on common measures but would have no say in the describing of the major implementing measures such as mesh size, minimum conservation reference sizes and closures which would be agreed regionally. It is also riskier in that it is reliant on multiannual plans being developed quickly and on technical measures contained in temporary discard plans to form a stop-gap in this transitional period.

Option 3 would seem to be unacceptable to the Member States and NGOs as it does not have any in built safeguards to deal with conservation problems that emerge. Several of the Advisory Councils were similarly negative. However, as mentioned above, some of the catching sector preferred this option mainly as it does away with most technical rules. It relies on the introduction of technical measures largely through other instruments of the CFP or on a voluntary basis so instructionally it gives the co-legislators little role in defining technical measures.

Table 8.2.1 summarises the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability by stakeholders in achieving the objectives.

Table 8.2.1 Comparison of the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability in achieving the objectives

(Source: Author)

Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - = negative impact, -/+ = both positive and negative impacts, ? = impact unknown

9.3.Risk Assessment

The impacts of the different options compared to the baseline, as well as their effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability by stakeholders are assessed assuming regionalisation is effective. This assumption is not free of risks, and in selecting a preferred option the extent to which they may affect the different options need to be considered.

Four main risk factors exist:

The speed of regionalisation

Option 1 is not impacted directly by the speed of regionalisation. However, it carries a high risk that if regionalisation is slow to evolve then the current technical measures will remain in place for much longer. Acceptance of such a regulatory structure would be low. The incentive for compliance would remain similarly low as in would remain "top-down" rather than "bottom-up".

Option 2 provides for a smooth transition to regionalisation by acting as a central storage facility for existing measures that should remain in place while regionalisation evolves. It allows for the risk of regionalisation being slower and uneven across regions. It clearly triggers regionalisation where directly involved stakeholders see merits to it.

Sub-option 2.1 relies heavily on regionalisation evolving quickly than envisaged under option 2. In this regard it carries a higher risk than option 2.

Although option 3 is a high risk strategy, it is not necessarily impacted by the speed of regionalisation. It relies on the incentive generated by the landing obligation to affect change and much is left to Member States and stakeholders to decide whether technical measures will be needed under plans in the future.

Managing the transition to regionalisation

While regionalisation develops it is important to ensure there is no legal vacuum during the transition and that conservation objectives continue to be met.

Option 1, which assumes regionalisation will be slow to develop, carries a low risk. The governance structure envisaged means the existing rules will be in place, which provides some guarantee that the current situation will not deteriorate any further.

Option 2 provides for a smooth transition so the risk of a legal vacuum or conservation issues is relatively low.

Sub-option 2.1 and option 3 are higher risk strategies as in the short-term there would be fewer technical rules in place to directly control exploitation patterns. The transition from the current management approach to regionalisation is very much left to Member States and the catching sector. There is no guarantee that by the time regionalised plans are developed the situation economically and environmentally would not have deteriorated beyond repair.

Risk of non-compliance and incentive for change

Regionalisation instils a sense of ownership in that the measures put in place will have originated from the Member States themselves with the direct input of the fishing industry through the Advisory Councils. There is a far bigger incentive for Member States to enforce their own rules and much more likelihood of compliance with rules in which the industry has had a direct say in developing. This is compared to the current top-down system where the rules emanated from the Commission and agreed on by the Member States with little or no direct involvement of the stakeholders. Developing this ownership should create more of an incentive for local management and peer pressure amongst fishermen to actively report on other fishermen breaking the rules. Currently there is a perception that those who break the rules are those who benefit most. Regionalisation should minimise this.

Added to this, regionalisation should introduce much more flexibility into the system providing rules tailored to the specific fisheries and that can be changed relatively quickly to react to evolving problems. Rules under co-decision lack this flexibility and specificity as they tend to be "one size fits all" solutions.

The EMFF provides clear financial incentives for fishermen to develop and test new gears or management approaches developed as part of regionalisation, to adapt existing gears to improve selectivity or diversify to gears with lower ecosystem impacts. Article 17 of the CFP also provides Member States with the possibility of rewarding responsible fishing with increased fishing opportunities.

In this context, option 1 does not provide any new incentive for compliance compared to the baseline scenario. There is a high risk that the current low levels of compliance with some technical measures (e.g. the use of illegal attachments to the codends of trawls and the use of acoustic deterrent devices to mitigate against cetacean bycatch) and the incentive for fishermen to minimise the impacts of the rules would continue. This may improve in the longer term as rules that are better adapted to meet the needs of the regions are developed.

The governance framework under option 2 is better suited to addressing the shortcomings of the current technical measures regulations compared to the baseline situation. It should produce positive impacts on sustainability of exploitation, and contribute to a decrease in control costs and burden as well simplification of existing rules. Incentives are provided through increased flexibility, greater ownership and simpler rules in addition to the existing mechanisms.

The lack of rules under sub-option 2.1 and option 3 could act as a strong driver for non-compliance and has the risk that fishermen, within regions and between regions, would adopt different strategies or in a worst case scenario, fishermen would exploit the lack of technical rules to fish unselectively and irresponsibly - "free-rider" effects. This would create tensions between fishermen and Member States. However, if these options were accepted then they would drive self-regulation and the use of peer pressure amongst fishermen.

Risk of uneven implementation or creation of uneven playing field

Regionalisation as envisaged in the CFP will lead to a certain degree of uneven implementation but this a policy choice made by the co-legislators in the CFP. They have already accepted this risk when agreeing on regionalisation. Uneven implementation may create tensions between Member States in the short-term as different rules are developed between different regions. However, this may in fact act as an incentive for Member States in regions where regionalisation is slower to evolve and it is anticipated that this will help Member States to "learn" from "doing". For example based on the experiences to date with regionalisation in respect of temporary discard plans it is clear that Member States in the Northeast Atlantic and the Baltic have been more effective at working collectively at the regional level than in the Mediterranean where there has been only minimal contact between the Member States. However, there are indications that the Member States in the Mediterranean have recognised this and have begun to explore and establish mechanisms to facilitate work regionally taking from the examples of the regional groups of Member States established in other regions (e.g. the Scheveningen group in the North Sea).

The risk of uneven implementation is highest with sub-option 2.1 and option 3 which rely heavily on regionalisation to succeed.

The inclusion of baseline measures on option 2 lessens this risk, while the framework is designed to act directly as a vehicle to encourage regionalisation.

Option 1 is less reliant on regionalisation and so less susceptible to any problems generated through uneven implementation across regions.

Regarding the disturbance of the creation of level playing field for technical measures felt important by stakeholders, again this is a risk associated with regionalisation which has been accepted by the co-legislators.

Under option 2 and sub-option 2.1, clear objectives will be set in the framework regulation, and agreed on by the co-legislators. These will apply across all regions ensuring a level-playing field at the highest level. Operationally how Member States and stakeholders choose to achieve these objectives is left open so there is possibility that different measures will apply in different areas. However, free-rider effects under sub-option 2.1 would negate any concept of a "level playing field".

Option 1 carries a lower risk of uneven measures as this option envisages less latitude for Member States to adapt measures regionally but also defines objective at the level of the co-legislator.

Option 3 runs the highest risk of creating an uneven playing field. Under such a de-regulated approach there is a danger of widely different approaches emerging across regions. There is a risk of "Olympic fishing".

10.Ranking the options

Retaining the current technical measures under the baseline scenario is not an option.

Option 2 best meets the objectives set and provides a level of security that conservation objectives will continue to be met while regionalisation develops. In the longer-term (at the latest by 2022) option 2 aims to have most technical measures required included under regional plans. Option 2 is best geared to managing the transition to regionalisation.

Sub-option 2.1 and option 3 would bring about simplification of technical measures immediately which would find favour with the catching sector but are riskier. They rely in the short-term on significant behavioural change of fishermen and on peer-pressure and self-regulation to ensure unselective fishing practices do not prevail. Member States, some sections of the catching sector and NGOs seem reluctant to move in this direction. However, in the longer-term most Member States, the catching sector and the NGOs see this as a management approach to work towards.

Option 1 is the least favoured and received very little support by stakeholders as an acceptable option. In the short-term it essentially keeps the current complex regulatory structure in place and does not provide any clear incentives for stakeholders over and above the baseline scenario. It is also not fully coherent with the spirit of regionalisation as envisaged under the CFP. It does not directly manage the transition to regionalisation but is a low risk option in the sense that it assumes that by maintaining the current rules in place until regionalisation develops, the current situation will not deteriorate further.

Option 2 is the preferred option.

11.Monitoring and Evaluation

11.1.Monitoring

Under the preferred option clear targets that would act as success indicators would be established for the reduction and as far as possible the elimination of unwanted catches by 2019 and fishing at MSY for all stocks by 2020. Targets for the reduction of the negative impacts of fishing on marine ecosystems to contribute to the achievement of GES by 2020 would also be established. In order to measure achievement of these targets the following environmental, economic, social and compliance indicators are proposed:

Environmental

Evolution of catch profiles (from DCF data): catch profiles in terms of mean lengths or proportion of fish larger than mcrs will be used to monitor improvements of the selectivity properties of fishing gears.

Number of stocks at MSY (from ICES advice): the number of stocks fished at Fmsy will be used to monitor the success of technical measures of increasing selectivity leading to improved exploitation patterns.

Evolution of incidental catches (from DCF data): the level of bycatch compared to overall population levels will be used to monitor the effectiveness of mitigation measures introduced to reduce incidental catches.

Evolution of protection of sensitive habitats or seabed integrity (from DCF data): the number of closed areas crated to protect sensitive habitats, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation measures developed to allow low impact fishing in such areas.

Economic

Income, GVA, revenue/breakeven revenue and net profit margins (from DCF data): the success of technical measures in contributing to revenues remaining stable following the introduction of the landing obligation and the move to MSY.

Social

Employment (FTE) and crew wages per FTE (from DCF data): the success of technical measures in ensuring employment and crew wages do not deteriorate.

Compliance

Number of infringements related to technical rules (from control agencies and EFCA): compliance and acceptability of the catching sector with technical measures.

At sea patrol days (from control agencies and EFCA the amount of time spent at sea monitoring technical rules.

At the operational level technical measures will be monitored principally through catch profile data collected under the DCF. This will be collected through observers on board vessels as well as port sampling of landings. Routine inspections at sea and ashore will also allow assessment of the effectiveness of technical measures through observation of compliance with measures in place and also from catch monitoring which will also provide information on catch profiles. In this regard an initiative taken by EFCA in sampling the "last haul"98 during routine monitoring of fishing vessels by fisheries protection vessel is an important tool to provide information on catch composition and estimated discards). Other monitoring measures such as the use of reference fleets may also be considered as operational monitoring tools which will provide supplementary information on catch profiles. A reference fleet is a pre-defined selection of vessels where the actual sampling is usually carried out by the fishermen themselves or in some cases by observers. The reference fleet is within the population of all active vessels within a given fleet. Reference fleets have the ability to provide documentation on entire catches, especially discards at a fine spatial scale. They also provide a platform for cross-referencing official catch and data collecting systems and procedures (e.g., electronic logbooks, reporting- and grading systems, discards).

11.2.Evaluation

An ex-post evaluation discussing the key evaluation questions (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and relevance) of technical measures should be carried out by 2022 when the landing obligation should be fully operational for several years, MSY achieved for all stocks and Good Environmental Status achieved for marine ecosystems under the MSFD. It would directly also feed into the retrospective evaluation of the CFP scheduled to begin in 2022 in preparation for the next reform.

The new multiannual plans will be assessed by STECF 5 years after entry into force whether sustainability objectives are being achieved. These evaluations will provide indications of whether technical measures included as part of these plans are effective.

Reporting requirements under Articles 49 (functioning of the CFP) and Article 50 of the CFP99 (progress on achieving MSY), while not directly related to technical measures will also provide insight into the effectiveness of technical measures.

Evaluation of measures developed regionally will also have to be carried out on a regular basis by STECF or ICES to ensure such measures are consistent with objectives of the CFP.

Annual Reporting of the EFCA in relation to Joint Deployment Programmes (JDPs) which document the number and reasons for infringements detected compared to the number and nature of inspections carried out. This will provide an indication of the level of compliance with the technical measures regulations.

REFERENCES

1  Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013  OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC

2  COM(2013) 685 final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Social and Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps

3  COM(2009) 261 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on the implementation of the Action Plan for simplifying and improving the Common Fisheries Policy

4  SWD(2013) 401 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT): Initial Results of the Mapping of the Acquis

5  COM(2011) 425 final Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy

6  MRAG et al. (2014) . A study in support of the development of a new Technical conservation measures framework within a reformed CFP. Lot 2: retrospective and prospective evaluation on the Common fisheries policy, excluding its international Dimension. Brussels. 265pp.

7 Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, UK

8  http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/technical-conservation-measures/index_en.htm

9 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/technical-measures/index_en.htm

10

11 STECF. (2012a)  Expert Working Group on different principles for defining selectivity under the future TM regulation (EWG-12-14). 61pp.

12  STECF (2013a) . Expert Working Group on different principles for defining selectivity under the future TM regulation (EWG-13-04). 38pp.

13  STECF (2012b ). 39th Plenary meeting report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (PLEN-12-01). Plenary Meeting, 16-20 April 2012, Brussels

14  STECF (2014a) . 47th Plenary meeting report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (PLEN-14-03). Plenary Meeting, 10-14th November, Brussels

15  ICES (2013a).  EU request on monitoring of bycatch of seabirds. Special request, Advice December 2013.

16  ICES (2013b).  Request from EU concerning monitoring of bycatch of cetaceans and other protected species. Special request, Advice April 2013

17  STECF (2014b).  46th Plenary meeting report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (PLEN-14-02). Plenary Meeting, 7-11 July 2014, Copenhagen.

18  SEC(2008) 1978  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Impact Assessment regarding the Commission's proposal for a Council Regulation concerning the conservation of fisheries resources through technical measures in the Atlantic and the North Sea.

19  SEC(2011) 891 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy [repealing Regulation (EC) N° 2371/2002

20 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 850/98  of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms

21 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1967/2006 of 21 December 2006 concerning management measures for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea, amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1626/94

22 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2187/2005 of 21 December 2005 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound, amending Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 88/98

23  COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 2056/2001 of 19 October 2001 establishing additional technical measures for the recovery of the stocks of cod in the North Sea and to the west of Scotland

24  Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) – 49th Plenary Meeting Report (PLEN-15-02). (2015). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, EUR XXXXXX EN, JRC XXXXXX, 127 pp.

25  CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

26  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/104 of 19 January 2015 fixing for 2015 the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Union waters and, for Union vessels, in certain non-Union waters, amending Regulation (EU) No 43/2014 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 779/2014

27  DIRECTIVE 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)

28  COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92 / 43 / EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora

29  DIRECTIVE 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds

30 Article 17 states that, “When allocating the fishing opportunities available to them, as referred to in Article 16, Member States shall use transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature. The criteria to be used may include, inter alia, the impact of fishing on the environment, the history of compliance, the contribution to the local economy and historic catch levels. Within the fishing opportunities allocated to them, Member States shall endeavour to provide incentives to fishing vessels deploying selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact, such as reduced energy consumption or habitat damage”.

31 Article 44 of the CFP states that, "Advisory Councils shall be consulted on joint recommendations pursuant to Article 18. They may also be consulted by the Commission and by Member States in respect of other measures. Their advice shall be taken into account. Those consultations shall be without prejudice to the consultation of STECF or other scientific bodies. The opinions of the Advisory Councils may be submitted to all Member States concerned and to the Commission".

32  COM (2014) 614 final  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a multiannual plan for the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007

33 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1392/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain small pelagic fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1393/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain pelagic fisheries in north-western waters ; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1394/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain pelagic fisheries in south-western waters ; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1395/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan for certain small pelagic fisheries and fisheries for industrial purposes in the North Sea; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1396/2014 of 20 October 2014 establishing a discard plan in the Baltic Sea.

34 C(2015) 4247 final . COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) …/... of 25.6.2015 establishing fisheries conservation measures to protect reef zones in waters under the sovereignty of Denmark in the Baltic Sea and Kattegat.

35  COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, amending Regulations (EC) No 847/96, (EC) No 2371/2002, (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, (EC) No 676/2007, (EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No 1342/2008 and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006

36  COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 199/2008 of 25 February 2008 concerning the establishment of a Community framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy

37  COM(2015) 239 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Concerning a consultation on Fishing Opportunities for 2016 under the Common Fisheries Policy

38 ICES (2014a). Norway pout in Subarea IV (North Sea) and Division IIIa (Skagerrak–Kattegat).

39 ICES (2014b). Nephrops in Division IIIa (Skagerrak–Kattegat).

40 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC ) No 894/97 of 29 April 1997 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources

41  MRAG et al. (2014). Study in support of the review of the EU regime on the small-scale driftnet fisheries. Brussels. 295pp + Annexes

42  Sala, A. (2015). Alternative solutions for driftnet fisheries. IP/B/PECH/IC/2014-082. Brussels. 90pp.

43  COM (2009) 163 final  GREEN PAPER Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy

44  http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/discards/annex_en.pdf

45 http://www.fishupdate.com/possible-use-of-blinders-by-dutch-trawler-found-after-joint-operation-fishupdate-com/

46 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 812/2004 of 26 April 2004 laying down measures concerning incidental catches of cetaceans in fisheries and amending Regulation (EC) No 88/98

47  COM(2009) 368 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Cetacean incidental catches in Fisheries: Report on the implementation of certain provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 812/2004 and on a scientific assessment of the effects of using in particular gillnets, trammel nets and entangling nets on cetaceans in the Baltic Sea as requested through Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005

48  COM(2011) 578 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of certain provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 812/2004 laying down measures concerning incidental catches of cetaceans in fisheries and amending Regulation (EC) No 88/98

49  ICES. (2014). Report of the Working Group on Bycatch of Protected Species (WGBYC), 4–7 February 2014, Copenhagen, Denmark. ICES CM 2014/ACOM: B28. 96 pp.

50  COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 304/2000 of 9 February 2000 establishing measures for the recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES division VIIa)

51 IMARES (2010). Study for the Revision of the plaice box – Final Report. Brussels. 250pp.

52 COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 345/92 of 27 January 1992 amending for the eleventh time Regulation (EEC) No 3094 / 86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources.

53 COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 129/2003 of 24 January 2003 laying down detailed rules for determining the mesh size and thickness of twine of fishing nets

54 COM(2002)672 final. Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning the conservation of fisheries resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms

55  COM(2008)324 final Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning the conservation of fisheries resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms

56  REGULATION (EU) No 227/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 March 2013 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms and Council Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 specifying conditions under which herring may be landed for industrial purposes other than direct human consumption

57  Suuronen, P. and Sardà, (2007 ). The role of technical measures in European fisheries management and how to make them work better. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64: 751-756.

58  Delaney, A.E., McLay, H.A., van Densen, W.L.T. (2007) . Influences of discourse on decision-making in EU fisheries management: the case of North Sea cod (Gadus morhua). ICES Journal of Marine Science: Journal du Conseil 64, 804-810.

59  Macher, C., Guyader, O., Talidec, C., Bertignac, M. (2008) . A cost–benefit analysis of improving trawl selectivity in the case of discards: The Nephrops norvegicus fishery in the Bay of Biscay. Fisheries Research 92, 76–89

60 The 2013 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 13-15). 307pp.

61 Based on the definition of micro-enterprises contained in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises

62  COM(2012) 432 final  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 concerning the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms

63 COM(2011) 479 final  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 concerning management measures for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea.

64 COM(2012) 591 final Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 for the conservation of fishery through technical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound.

65 REGULATION (EU) 2015/812 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 20 May 2015 amending Council Regulations (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 2187/2005, (EC) No 1967/2006, (EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 254/2002, (EC) No 2347/2002 and (EC) No 1224/2009, and Regulations (EU) No 1379/2013 and (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards the landing obligation, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1434/98.

66 Exemptions (for fish that may survive after returning them to the sea, and a specific de minimis discard allowance under certain conditions) are included under Article 15(4) of the CFP. Quota management will also become more flexible in its application to facilitate the landing obligation under Article 15. Inter-species and inter annual quota management is allowed for.

67  COM(2011) 244 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEANPARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Our life insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020

68  COM(2014) 130 final/2  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth

69 Article 49 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 states that, "the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the functioning of the CFP by 31 December 2022".

70 In accordance with the CFP only if achieving MSY by 2015 would seriously jeopardise the social and economic sustainability of the fishing fleets involved would a delay in reaching the objective beyond 2015 be acceptable.

71  ICES (2014). Cod in Division VIa (West of Scotland).

72  SWFPA (2015). Landing all catches is a recipe for disaster. The Scotsman. 26th March 2015.

73  Buisman., E., Oostenbrugge., H., Beukers R. (2013).  Economische effecten van een aanlandplicht voor de Nederlandse visserij. LEI-rapport 2013-062. 50pp

74  Cappell, R & Macfadyen, G., (2013). A case study review of the potential impact of proposed CFP discard reform. Poseidon report to Seafish, UK, 2013.

75  REGULATION (EU) No 508/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council

76 . Final Report: The English Discard Ban Trial, Cefas report, pp65.

77  Condie, H. M., Catchpole, T. L., and Grant, A. (2013). The short-term impacts of implementing catch quotas and a discard ban on English North Sea otter trawlers. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, doi:10.1093/icesjms/fst187

78  ICES. (2013). Report of the Workshop to Review and Advise on Seabird Bycatch (WKBYCS), 14–18 October 2013, Copenhagen, Denmark. ICES CM 2013/ACOM:77. 79 pp.

79  ICES (2014). EU request to ICES for review of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive: Descriptor 6 – Seafloor integrity Technical services, October 2014.

80 STECF (2014). 47th Plenary Meeting Report (PLEN-14-03). 2014. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, EUR 26944 EN, JRC 93037, 138 pp.

81  Henichart, L.M., Massiot Granier, F., Lesueur, M., Gascuel, D. (2011) . Groupe de travail régional (RMD) - Les enjeux de gestion au rendement maximal durable pour les pêcheries bretonnes. Rapport d’étude. . Les publications du Pôle halieutique AGROCAMPUS OUEST N° 6, 36 p.

82  IEO (2014). The obligation to land all catches – consequences for the Mediterranean. IP/B/PECH/IC/2013-168. Brussels. 52pp.

83 Based on information from Member State Administration involved in the development of discard plans in 2014.

84  http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/index_en.htm & http://www.gfcm.org/gfcm/en

85  COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2004.

86  ICES (2014). Cod in Subarea IV (North Sea) and Divisions VIId (Eastern Channel) and IIIa West (Skagerrak). Advice June 2014.

87  http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/docs/social_dimension_en.pdf

88  European Fisheries Control Agency (2014). Annual Report 2014

89 There are currently JDPs covering North Sea and Western waters demersal stocks, Baltic Sea demersal and pelagic, Western waters pelagic, Mediterranean Bluefin tuna, swordfish and small pelagics, NAFO and NEAFC.

90 ). Fully documented fishery: a tool to support a

catch quota management system. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsr065.

91  ICES (2014) . Celtic Sea and West of Scotland – Haddock in Division VIb (Rockall)

92  http://www.researchgate.net/publication/222201030_Rockall_and_the_Scottish_haddock_fishery#

93 ICES (2015).  Sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in Divisions IVb and c, VIIa, and VIId–h (Central and South North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, Bristol Channel, Celtic Sea)

94 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/sea-bass/index_en.htm

95 The effectiveness of each option in terms of the general, specific and operational objectives has been assessed where effectiveness is defined "as the extent to which options achieve the defined objectives of the proposal".

96 The efficiency of the different options has been compared to the baseline scenario where efficiency is defined as "the extent to which the objectives can be achieved for a given level of resources/at least cost".

97 Coherence, defined as "the extent to which options are coherent with the overarching objectives of EU policy, and the extent to which they are likely to limit trade-offs across economic, social and environmental domain" has also been assessed.

99http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201404/20140408ATT82472/20140408ATT82472EN.pdf

98 As technical measures fall under exclusive competence the evaluation question of EU added value is not applicable.

LIST OF ANNEXES

ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION

ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATION

ANNEX III LIST OF STUDIES

ANNEX IV INVENTORY OF EU TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATIONS

ANNEX V CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF TECHNICAL MEASURES

ANNEX VI DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES FOR TECHNICAL MEASURES BY REGION

ANNEX VII MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY

ANNEX VIII TRENDS IN DISCARDING IN EU FISHERIES

ANNEX IX DETAILED BEAKDOWN OF CATCHING SECTOR

ANNEX X DETAIL ON THE BASELINES AND THE CRITERIA FOR THEIR ESTABLISHMENT

ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION

Introduction

The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) includes as a management instrument the regulation of technical aspects of fishing operations, through so-called technical measures. These define and condition where, when and how a fishing enterprise can exploit and interact with marine resources and the wider marine ecosystem. These rules are laid down in a series of Union Regulations on technical measures for the different sea basins of the Union waters.

The European Commission, in a supporting consultation document, has indicated that current technical measures regulations are too complex, and difficult to understand, control and enforce. Therefore a comprehensive revision is required to look at the technical measures in light of the new CFP which has just entered into force. This revision will also provide an opportunity to bring about a general improvement in the technical rules to facilitate the implementation of the landing obligation and the ecosystem-based approach, which are key objectives in the new CFP. In this context the Commission has signalled its intention to review and revise the current technical measures.

Through the public consultation the views of stakeholders and the public in general were sought on the best way forward to modernise and rationalise technical measures in the context of the new CFP. This document reports on the outcome of this consultation.

The overview of the contributions presented is based on the written contributions received. It is neither intended to draw conclusions regarding the options proposed nor does it represent the position of the Commission. It will support the preparation of the Impact Assessment report, which in turn will be the basis for developing the Commission's proposal for a new framework for technical measures.

Contributions received

The public consultation took place between the 24 January and the 16 May 2014, with a total of 59 written contributions received. Individual contributions are available on the dedicated website to this consultation 1 . Table 1 provides a summary of the submissions by stakeholder grouping.

Table 1 - Breakdown of contributions

Five of the seven operational Advisory Councils (ACs) - the North Western Waters (NWW AC), North Sea (NS AC), Baltic (BS AC), South Western Waters (SWW AC) and Mediterranean (MED AC) - submitted comments. Three ACs (NS, SWW & MED) provided detailed comments covering the main principles and challenges outlined in the consultation document. The two other ACs (NWW & BS) indicated they had difficulties in agreeing a common position amongst the AC membership and therefore their comments were restricted to endorsing the need for a revision of the technical measures regulations and requesting further dialogue.

Fifteen submissions were received from national administrations and regional governmental agencies covering the North Atlantic, North Sea, Baltic and Mediterranean. These submissions either related to the challenges highlighted in the consultation document or dealt with regional issues relating to specific measures that created difficulties at a national level. Two Member States supplied an outline of their vision of the structure and content of a new technical measures framework. No submissions were received from the Member States or industry groups from the Black Sea.

Eleven environmental NGOs submitted contributions. These contributions largely dealt with the main issues included in the consultation document and tended to focus on environmental issues and the linkage of technical measures with environmental rules. Many of these submissions were detailed and provided examples to support their point of view.

Twenty two contributions were submitted by a range of industry interest groups and other stakeholder organisations. The majority of these were from fishermen's representative bodies (sixteen). Other submissions were received from a range of different stakeholder and business organisations representing anglers, consumer groups, workers' rights and one from a fisheries consultancy. The industry groups tended to follow the same line as the ACs although some of these groups concentrated on specific issue or issues relating to their particular region. Most of the remaining submissions tended to be more general in nature concentrating on one or more of the specific challenges highlighted in the consultation document. A fisheries consultant put forward an alternative strategy for technical measures.

There were six submissions from members of general public. Most of these concentrated on a particular issue or issues of interest to that respective individual.

General Comments

There is general support across stakeholders and Member States for the broad approach outlined in the consultation paper (i.e. move away from micromanagement and towards a regionalised, results-based approach). It is clear that the complexity of the current regulations and their multiple amendments should serve as an example to the Commission of "what not to do". Many respondents also point to enforcement issues with the current regulations and the lack of compliance with the complex rules. The current regulations are highlighted as having produced a range of unintended consequences that have in fact forced fishermen to discard and run counter to the principal objective of the measures (i.e. to protect juveniles). There is a generalised, clear message that this should not be repeated in any new framework for technical measures, given the change of approach (i.e. principle of management by result) within the new CFP and the introduction of the landing obligation. There is overwhelming support for a complete overhaul of technical measures not limited to just a re-casting or cleaning-up of the current measures.

Main Challenges

In the consultation document four major principles were identified for the revision of technical measures:

Simplification and enabling regionalisation

Creation of incentives for the industry to take more responsibility

Reduction and avoidance of unwanted catches

Minimisation of the ecosystem impacts of fishing gears

Under each of these principles, stakeholders were requested to respond to some specific questions. The comments received are summarised below. For some questions more detailed comments were received than for others and there was a certain amount of duplication of points across the different questions.

Simplification and regionalisation

Many respondents advocate that the most simple and clear rules will be those created at the lowest level possible, which in the case of the new CFP equates to the regional level. Regionalisation is seen by many as an important opportunity to introduce simplification and flexibility of the technical measures rules and regulations. Multiannual plans are identified by the majority of respondents as the appropriate vehicle for the development of specific technical measures at the regional level. Such measures should be adaptive and open to periodic review. The majority of stakeholders share the view that this cannot be achieved by maintaining the majority of technical measures under normal legislative procedure (i.e. co-decision) as it is too cumbersome a process to be able to react to changes in fisheries.

The ACs and industry groups stress the need for stakeholder involvement in developing technical measures as part of multiannual plans. They see this as essential to the successful implementation of the landing obligation. However, they underscore that dialogue between stakeholders and Member States as envisaged in the CFP must be meaningful. Several Member States acknowledge the involvement of stakeholders in developing regional rules.

There are diverging opinions on the content of any future legislative framework for technical measures. Many of the industry groups (including small-scale fisheries) advocate a minimalistic approach with few (if any) rules under co-decision and any detailed rules that are required to be developed at regional level. One submission describes this as the Commission having to take a "leap of faith", and is not convinced by the argument that EU technical measures should be retained on a transitional basis until multiannual plans are adopted to activate regionalisation for technical measures. Several submissions do advocate for some safeguards (e.g. limits on the amount off undersized fish a vessel may catch), which would act as a safety net against continuing bad practices.

The NGOs consider there remains a strong need for some high-level overarching objectives and minimum common standards that should apply across the EU to ensure no gaps in management occur. Simplification should not happen at the expense of the environmental protection. Many also advocate safeguards. The majority of the NGOs also indicate that additional measures may be needed for the full integration of the ecosystem-based approach in the new CFP and the interaction with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). These follow from the high level objectives but should be implemented regionally.

The position of Member States is not uniform on the structure of a new framework. Most highlight the importance of simplifying the rules while insisting on maintaining a level playing field which will result in some rules remaining under co-decision. Regionalisation is seen as important although Member States express mixed views as to what shape regional measures should take. Most Member States believe that the level of risk that we are prepared to accept should define the number and definition of rules at both Union and regional level. This should be strongly linked to the level of confidence in the control and monitoring system to detect illegal discarding or bad practice in general.

On the inclusion into the framework of reference gears or minimum standards linked to selectivity, most industry groups and some Member States and NGOs see this as unnecessary and likely to stifle regionalisation and innovation. Whereas some other NGOs and Member States indicate that such elements should indeed be included in the framework regulation. From the NGOs perspective this would provide a fall-back position should alternative measures not be developed and agreed regionally. One Member State advocates defining reference gears but at a regional level with provision for alternative highly selective gears that meet agreed standards for certification and monitoring to be used.

Incentivising industry and stakeholders

The industry groups and ACs emphasise that stakeholder involvement in the decision-making process, leading to clear and simple rules will act as a strong incentive for compliance with rules.

The majority of respondents point to the landing obligation as the major incentive to drive selectivity, obviating the need for the current prescriptive approach to technical measures. They point to the problems, both economically and biologically, inadvertently created in the past by the imposition of over-prescriptive rules. Many strongly advocate that to implement the landing obligation will require that fishermen be given the maximum possible liberty to decide on selective measures. However, in return, NGOs and other stakeholders stress that accountability is a critical prerequisite for allowing fishermen flexibility to find innovative ways to meet environmental standards. This is acknowledged by the ACs and industry groups as important.

The ACs, NGOs and some Member States highlight that improvements in selectivity have been achieved in the past when incentives have been aligned with management objectives. This approach should be broadened, extended and deepened. In this context an industry group representing small-scale fishermen, several Member States (Mediterranean countries) as well as the NGOs point to the rewarding of the use of low-impact fishing methods with increased fishing opportunities or privileged access as another way of incentivising fishermen to act responsibly.

The removal of measures that are deemed redundant under the landing obligation, including catch composition rules and effort restrictions, are highlighted by the ACs, industry groups and Member States. This is considered another important incentive to improve compliance with technical rules and to improve selectivity. In this context several Member States and industry groups highlight that a move to fully documented fisheries will allow a much higher degree of simplification of the technical rules and removal of others. The NGOs while accepting this stress the need for stringent monitoring requirements to allow for the relaxing of rules. Fully documented fisheries must amount to what the name implies.

Encouraging innovation will act as an incentive to improve selectivity and responsible fishing and the ACs, NGOs and the industry highlight that funding and additional quota to undertake vital research and pilot projects must be granted by fast track. Innovation needs to be given a very high priority by Member States in developing their national programmes under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund.

Opinions on the use of "soft law" are split. Some industry groups and NGOs very much advocate soft law as a way of supporting technical measures rules. However, others suggest that voluntary measures under soft law are not sufficient in themselves to ensure high level objectives are achieved, and also can lead to the use of unselective gears and fishing techniques. Some industry groups highlight that even such voluntary measures will be superfluous because the landing obligation will provide adequate incentive for selective fishing.

Reduction and avoidance of unwanted catches

The ACs and industry groups stress that measures to reduce and avoid unwanted catches should be developed regionally under multiannual plans. In no circumstances do they advocate developing measures at Union level to address specific bycatch issues. Several industry groups also highlight that what is important is not identifying the worst fisheries in terms of unwanted bycatch and applying stricter measures, but rather identifying those with the biggest hurdles and ensuring the management structure provides the flexibility and freedom for appropriate solutions to be found. In this context regional bodies (i.e. the ACs) are best placed to identify fisheries that require special assistance.

The majority of NGOs highlight the need to improve selectivity in many fisheries and several identify specific fisheries (e.g. mixed demersal and Nephrops fisheries) and sea basins (e.g. Irish Sea, Skagerrak and eastern Baltic) where particular problems exist. They include bycatch of vulnerable or sensitive species in the context of unwanted catches and stress the need to address such issues as a matter of urgency.

One NGO indicates that "institutionalised" overfishing and tolerated use of non-selective and destructive gears is a bigger problem than discarding of unwanted catches. Several others advocate that certain gears and fisheries should be subject to very restrictive measures or phased out altogether if reductions in unwanted catches cannot be achieved quickly.

The ACs, several NGOs, industry groups and Member States advocate the use of avoidance measures such as real-time closures and moving-on provisions. There are divergent views on whether this should be defined at Union or regional level. Some advocate a twin-track approach with the overarching principles for such measures defined in a framework regulation with detailed implementing rules at regional level.

There is broad consensus that minimum landing size, catch composition rules and by-catch provisions generally prevent fishermen from fishing selectively and even induce discards. All advocate and welcome the moves to neutralise the negative impacts of these rules through the Commission's omnibus proposal 2 .

Minimising the ecosystem impact of fishing gears

The majority of stakeholders advocate that detailed ecosystem protection measures should be developed at the regional level. Most agree that only prohibitions of destructive practices or measures to protect rare or vulnerable species and existing closures to protect sensitive habitats should be included in an overarching framework under co-decision. Several NGOs and Member States suggest that performance targets relating to environmental directives could also be established in the framework. These are commonly used in other states to manage marine mammal bycatch. 

The majority of NGOs specifically highlight the need for the new technical measures framework to signal a shift towards low-impact fishing and to the achievement of Good Environmental Status under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. Several advocate the inclusion of a requirement for impact assessments of fishing activities, which would help to identify potential concerns and to propose appropriate mitigation measures. Such measures highlighted include mapping of vulnerable habitats and species, restrictions of fishing in vulnerable habitats, compulsory use of proven mitigation measures to reduce unwanted catches of vulnerable species and more extensive spatial or depth limitations.

An industry group representing small-scale fishermen points to the need for genuine interaction between all stakeholders in defining ecosystem protection measures. Decisions should be made on scientific grounds and not be made at the expense of small-scale fishermen. They point to a number of examples where fishermen and NGOs have developed Marine Protected Areas that meet the aims and aspirations concerned but without creating economic hardship on fishermen.

Member States mainly advocate for a regionalised approach to minimise the ecosystem impacts of fishing gears to ensure that the right fisheries are monitored and required to take appropriate mitigation measures. This will deliver greater benefits in a more targeted way. Some Member States perceive ecosystem measures in quite a negative light indicating that they are disproportionate to the scale of the problem - measures to protect cetaceans in the Baltic are highlighted. These Member States stress the importance of balancing legitimate economic expectations with the broader expectations in society of providing protection for the ecosystem. This view is shared by a stakeholder group representing workers' rights and several industry groups.

Scope of a framework for technical measures

In addition to the four principles detailed, the consultation paper included a question regarding the scope of any new framework regulation. Currently technical measures are contained in separate regulations covering different regions. The question posed was whether the current situation should be maintained or should there be a common framework.

The majority of NGOs very much favour a common technical measures framework covering all sea basins. It should include overarching objectives, common baseline measures, definitions and governance rules that define how technical measures should be designed and implemented regionally.

The ACs and industry groups strongly argue for a minimalistic approach at Union level through a framework regulation. Many question the need for any framework at all while others accept that to ensure a level playing field in terms of direction and goals a common framework may be needed which sets realistic high-level objectives across the various sea basins. Many industry groups advocate that it is not logical to start with the development of a general framework at Union level. Work should focus very much at regional level in the first instance and from this it can be established whether common rules are needed.

Member States have divergent opinions on whether there should be one common framework or different frameworks for different sea basins. Several Member States advocate a separate framework for the Mediterranean because of the particular characteristics of the fisheries in this sea basin.

Other issues raised

A number of submissions dealt with issues outside the scope of the questions contained in the consultation document although nonetheless linked to technical measures.

One fisheries consultation advocates the concept of "balanced harvesting" as a possible "wild-card" policy option. Balanced harvesting changes the technical measures objective, and would aim to make fishing unselective for species. Instead, a defined proportion of natural production per unit area, by size class, of all species, would be removed from the ecosystem. A consumer group also referred to this concept in a positive light.

Several submissions from industry groups supported by one local administration body dealt with a specific issue relating to the size of Japanese calms in the Bay of Arcachon They highlight the need for more flexibility within technical measures regulations to allow the setting of rules (in this case a minimum size) of sedentary shellfish species at local level, rather than at Union level.

Several submissions from industry group relate to the Commission's omnibus proposal to amend certain technical measures regulation and the control regulation (the so-called "omnibus regulation"). These submissions detailed a number of issues and difficulties with the Commission's proposal.

Several submissions from Member States and industry groups highlight specific issues. These include measures in the Mediterranean on the use of purse seines and restrictions on trawling within 3 nautical miles off the coast that requires immediate amendment or deletion. The general ban on fisheries using electricity which has hampered the introduction of sustainable alternatives to the beam trawl was also raised as well as issues relating to the definition of drift nets and the need for clearer rules and conditional derogations for commercial activities outside normal fishing operations (e.g. provision of fish for aquariums).

Citizen’s contributions

A limited number of responses were received from members of the general public reflecting the subject matter of this consultation which is highly technical. Three were from anglers, two from small-scale fishermen (one retired) and one from an active member of an environmental NGO.

These cover a range of issues. The submissions from anglers relate to the setting of minimum landing sizes, specifically for bass. These submissions also put forward other specific measures relating to bass fishing including the banning of pair trawling for this species. More extensive use of temporary or permanently closed areas is advocated in the other responses, either as general comments or in one case specifically in Greek waters. The banning of trawling in inshore waters (inside 6 miles) along with the use of effort control rather than TACs and quotas is also advocated by two of the respondents.

ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATIONS

2011

2012

2013

2014