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Document 52011SC1417
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT /* SEC/2011/1417 final */
1.
Public financial support tools of the CFP and the IMP
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has the
following financial tools in 2007-2013: –
The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) (shared management) is the major financial
pillar of the CFP. Budget: €4.304 million. –
The Second Financial Instrument (direct management) supports: Control and enforcement
(€345 million), Data collection and scientific advice (€360 million), Governance
(€45 million) and voluntary and obligatory contributions to Regional
Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO) (€9.8 million in 2010). –
The European Agriculture Guarantee Fund
(EAGF) (direct management) finances
the Common Market Organisation (CMO) for fisheries and aquaculture products (€15
million per year) and compensation for the additional costs incurred in the
marketing of fishery products from the outermost regions (€15 million per year). –
Funding for the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP)
(direct management) was €20.4 million
(2008-10). A new regulation, currently in co-decision, is to be adopted by the
end of 2011 to finance the IMP in 2011-13. The
Second Financial Instrument finances also Fisheries
Partnerships Agreements. These agreements, similarly to obligatory
contributions to RFMO, have their own legal basis and will remain outside of
the scope of the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).
2.
Problem definition
The
CFP reform IA concluded that, notwithstanding progress since 2002, the CFP has
failed to achieve its objectives of environmental, economic and social
sustainability. Some part of the failure can be attributed to CFP funding. This
can be explained by problems linked to their design and delivery mechanism,
in particular the EFF, and by their lack of effectiveness in terms of
content. Regarding the design,
each financial instrument has its own programming, monitoring, evaluation and
control systems and is negotiated separately. This makes coordination and
reaching critical mass difficult. Coordination with other structural funds
through "demarcation lines" is also insufficient to ensure synergies
and to avoid duplications. Furthermore, the EFF
lacks focus on the CFP strategic priorities. Operational Programmes (OP) often
amount to a "menu" of measures from which MS can choose. Many MS give
precedence to investment facilitating absorption rather than focusing on CFP
priorities. This is reinforced by the absence of conditionalities linked to the
compliance with these priorities and by a weak and heterogeneous monitoring and
evaluation: each MS has set its own indicators, which impedes aggregation and
comparisons. In addition, 75% of
the EFF is allocated on the basis of the historical
share of the fisheries in the cohesion policy. For the remaining 25% (non
convergence regions), allocation is based on the size of the fisheries sector.
This results in huge disparities (as high as 30 to 1) in terms of the support per
capita, to the detriment of non-convergence MS with big fisheries and
aquaculture, whereas other MS combine large financial allocations with a relatively
small fishing and aquaculture sector. This, besides the long process of setting
up Management and Control Systems and preparing OP, which are the precondition
for EFF implementation, is the main explanation for the current low absorption
of the EFF funds (20% by October 2011). The lack of
strategic approach explains also the lack of critical mass of many projects and
the very limited use of the EFF possibilities in the environmental field. These design
problems refer mostly to shared management EFF part of the funding, which
accounts for most of the overall funding available. For
the instruments under direct management the most conspicuous problem relate to
the fragmentation of the support to CFP and IMP and the high administrative
burden related to central budgetary management. Regarding the lack
of effectiveness, in environmental terms CFP funding has not
eliminated overcapacity. Despite €1.7 billion spent on scrapping since 1994, actual
fishing capacity has not decreased in most of EU fleets. Overcapacity is a key driver for overfishing and for low economic
profitability. Public funding had also very limited effect on the high level of
discards of many EU fisheries. The new proposal for CFP
reform includes discard ban, which should increase demand for selective gears
and new fishing techniques. Another key factor
for the success of the reformed CFP is the supply of scientific advice and
economic data. Scientific advice is currently available for 45% of commercial
stocks for which the EU is responsible; this number must increase in the coming
year in order to ensure the transition to sustainable fishing. Coordination
with data from other maritime fields is poor and compliance is insufficient. Aquaculture is
another area where public financial needs to be more effective. More emphasis
should be put on the strategic approach, promoting green growth in aquaculture.
Public support shall also foster the environmental conservation services of
extensive aquaculture in sensitive habitats (e.g. enhancement of biodiversity).
Finally, the current development of Maritime Spatial Planning is insufficient
to address the competition for space among maritime activities, with its
negative environmental and economic effects. In economic terms,
public financial tools have not addressed the innovation gap in the EU
fisheries and aquaculture (labour productivity is 25% below the EU average). Low
innovation explains part of the poor performance of the EU fleets and the
stagnation of the aquaculture production for the last 15 years. The innovation
gap is often related to the small size of firms: 91% of fishing firms own a
single vessel and 98% of the aquaculture firms are SME.
The small size limits access to finance and insurance. The gap is
particularly acute in marketing and commercialization. Another area is that of
the high energy consumption, in particular of the catching sector. Finally, the segmentation of maritime
policies results in potential synergies not being exploited and a lack of
adequate support for research for technological innovation. This also impedes a
clear understanding of where the real potential for marine growth exists. In social terms jobs
offered by the catching sector are
not attractive. The importance of fishing is declining in many coastal
communities. New activities are replacing fisheries as sources of income and jobs
in many of them, but some do not have diversification alternatives.
Furthermore, the new CFP could result in short term, additional job losses in
the catching and ancillary services. Hence, some communities may not be viable
in the medium term.
3.
Who is affected?
A successful CFP and
IMP are the ultimate reason of being of public financial support. In view of
that, stakeholders affected are the same identified in the CFP reform IA
report: Stakeholder || Description of stakeholder || Key interests Catching sector in the EU || Vessel owners, operators and crew. || Maintaining profitability and livelihoods. Aquaculture sector || Aquaculture producers || Idem Dependent businesses & communities || Business and communities dependent upon fisheries. || Idem. Viability of communities in fisheries areas. Processing sector || Those processing raw material both imported and caught within EU waters || Increasing value added. Get access to stable supplies. Sector regulators || National, regional and local bodies regulating fishing || Optimize public financial support to achieve policy objectives. Guarantee food supply. Sector research || Scientific bodies contributing to the conservation and management of stocks || Contribution to effective fisheries management r through the timely access to high quality data. || Consumers || Those consuming fisheries & aquaculture products || Availability, cost, quality and nutritional values of fisheries products with varying degrees of environmental scrutiny. || Third countries || Fishing sector competing with EU fleets. Aquaculture producers, exporters. || Conflicting interest between those who see the EU as export market and local fishing communities facing competition from EU fleets on access to local resources. || NGOs, the civil society and EU citizens || NGOs advocating sustainable management. The wider public with an interest in and concern for fisheries and the marine environment || Maintaining fish populations, biodiversity, and the amenity value of oceans, rivers and lakes together with an economically and socially sustainable industry. Adequate food supply. ||
4.
The right to act
The EU has exclusive competence in the conservation of marine
biological resources. Beyond that (i.e. the CFP parts under shared competence)
the subsidiarity and proportionality principles apply. The proposal for the
future budget of the EU has a strong subsidiarity justification as it focuses
already on "the policy areas where the EU can be more effective by
acting through the EU level in the current climate of national austerity and
financial consolidation". Regarding fisheries
and maritime activities, the proposal includes a new EMFF structured on 4
pillars: Smart, green fisheries, smart, green aquaculture, sustainable and
inclusive territorial development and IMP. The first three are to be managed
under shared management, the last under direct centralised management. In
addition, the EMFF will include accompanying measures in the areas of data
collection and scientific advice, control, governance, fisheries markets
(including outermost regions), voluntary payments to RFMO and technical
assistance.
5.
The EMFF objectives
The EMFF shall support: –
the objectives of the new CFP, sustainable and
competitive fisheries and aquaculture. –
further development of the IMP. –
balanced development of fisheries areas. By achieving these
objectives, the EMFF will also contribute to the Europe 2020 strategy, in
particular to three flagship initiatives: a resource efficient Europe, an
innovation Union and the agenda for new skill and jobs. The following specific
objectives are defined.
5.1.
Specific objectives related to the design of the
EMFF
–
Review allocation criteria, –
Focus on smart green investments and territorial
development, –
Improve strategy and programming, –
Foster collective approaches, –
Set up a monitoring and evaluation framework,
based on common indicators, –
Reinforce conditionalities, –
Exploit synergies between CFP and IMP financial
instruments. Simplify delivery and reduce administrative burden, and –
Exploit synergies with other EU funds (e.g. LIFE).
5.2.
Specific objectives related to the content of
the EMFF
–
Eliminate ineffective subsidies, –
Reduce environmental impact of fisheries, –
Contribute, in the context of sustainable
fishing, to the management and preservation of marine ecosystems and to the
objectives of MSFD and Natura2000, –
Promote the green growth of aquaculture, –
Increase the availability of scientific advice
and data. Coordinate fisheries and IMP data, –
Ensure compliance with CFP, –
Promote cross-border/ecosystem-based management
of EU sea basins, –
Increase innovation, –
Promote animal health and welfare. –
Tackle segmentation of maritime policies and contribute
to the identification of growth opportunities, –
Reduce energy consumption, and –
Improve job attractiveness and the viability of coastal
communities.
6.
Policy options
Three reform options
are developed. In line with the CFP reform and the proposal for the future
budget of the EU, the "no policy" and "Status Quo" options
are discarded. The later is nevertheless kept as baseline.
6.1.
Common elements
Reform options have
common elements predetermined by the proposal for the new CFP and the
Commission Communication on MFF: ·
EMFF is included into the Common Strategic
Framework and the scope of Common Regulation. ·
Allocation criteria aligned with the size of the
fishing sector. ·
Most fleet subsidies discontinued. ·
CMO integrated into the EMFF, out of 6 intervention
instruments only storage aid is maintained. ·
Scheme to compensate the outermost regions integrated
into the EMFF. ·
Critical mass is achieved through emphasis on
collective actions, Producer Organisations (PO), other collective bodies and
local action groups under territorial development. ·
Conditionalities are introduced based on: scope
of eligibility and content, compliance with the control and the IUU
Regulations, compliance with data collection obligations and compliance with
the requirement of adopting national Strategic Plan for Aquaculture. ·
Monitoring is based on a common framework and a
set of common indicators. The financial allocation for the EMFF is
€6.692 billion (in current prices). Based on ex ante evaluation its
distribution between policy areas should be as follows: Areas || Percentage of 2014-2020 EMFF Ex - EFF part (out of which) || 67 - 70% -Fisheries || 30 – 35% -Aquaculture || 15-17,5% - Local development || 15-17,5% Voluntary contribution to international organisations including RFMOs || 1,5 -2,0% Data collection and scientific advice || 7 -8% Control and enforcement || 10 - 11% Market Policy including compensation to outermost regions || 2,5 – 3% Governance || 0,8-1% IMP || 6 – 7%
6.2.
Contents
Option 1: “EFF +” (equivalent to options 1 and 1a in the CFP Reform IA) tests the
impact of addressing all the design and content issues related to ex – EFF
part, including discontinuation of the permanent and temporary cessation of
fishing activities, stronger strategic programming (CSF), conditionalities
linked to CFP objectives, new evaluation and monitoring framework and priority
given to collective projects. Territorial development is
reinforced and better coordinated with other local development initiatives. The
current architecture of financial instruments is maintained, although an effort
is made to better co-ordinate their scope and objectives. Option 2: “EFF +
Integration”: In addition to Option 1, all CFP financial
instruments are included into the new fund, but continue to be managed
separately, under the current implementation modes (shared or direct
management). IMP remains outside the future fund. Option 3: “EMFF
Convergence”: Integration
of data collection, control, CMO and the instrument for outermost regions into
EMFF under shared management. IMP included into the future fund.
7.
Assessment of options / the
preferred option
The comparison of
options is based on the analysis of their potential to reduce discards, close
the innovation gap and create jobs in coastal communities. Option 3 is
preferred both in terms of impacts and in cost-effectiveness of EU action. || Environmental sustainability || Economic Sustainability || Social sustainability || Simplification & administrative burden || Cost-effectiveness Status Quo || (-) || (-) || (-) || (-) || (-) EFF+ || (XX) || (XX) || (XX) || (XX) || (XX) EFF+ Integration || (XX) || (XX) || (XX) || (XXx) || (XXx) EMFF Convergence || (XXx) || (XXx) || (XXx) || (XXX) || (XXX)
8.
Monitoring and evaluation
The EMFF should have a strong monitoring
and evaluation system. There should be common output, result and impact
indicators based on data collected at measure/program level and aggregated at
national / EU level, to be agreed between the Commission and MS.