Table des matières

1.    INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 3

2.    ALLOCATIONS PER COUNTRY AND IMPLEMENTATION MODE..................... 4

2.1    State of play: Financing decisions, initial programming and final outlook.................... 4

2.2    Detailed allocations per country and per implementing channel................................... 6

3.    FOOD FACILITY MAIN INPUTS AND BENEFICIARIES...................................... 16

3.1    Inputs distributed by implementing partner................................................................ 16

3.2    Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries.................................................................................... 19

4.    PARTNERSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL   ORGANISATIONS 20

4.1    State of play of the contracts at 31 December 2012...................................................... 20

4.2    Main lessons learned from the projects implemented by International Organisations 22

4.3    Success stories: Zambia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Cuba, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone 25

5.    CALL FOR PROPOSALS IMPLEMENTATION MODE......................................... 29

5.1    Distribution per EU FF objective.................................................................................... 29

5.2    Lessons learned from the Food Facility.......................................................................... 29

5.3    Success stories : Mali, Kenya, Bangladesh, Lao LDR, Tanzania, Nepal, and Ethiopia. 30

5.4    Learning from NGOs - EU FF case study in Ethiopia.................................................... 34

6.    BUDGET SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION MODE.................................................. 36

6.1    State of play Budget Support allocations....................................................................... 36

6.2    Lessons learned............................................................................................................... 36

6.3    Examples of EUFF Budget Support interventions......................................................... 37

7.    RESULTS-BASED GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT........................................ 38

7.1    Performance of EU Food Facility projects monitored................................................... 38

7.2    EU FF projects ROM scores per region.......................................................................... 43

7.3    EU FF projects ROM scores per implementing channel............................................... 44

7.4    Main ROM recommendations and lessons learned...................................................... 46

8.    FOOD FACILITY STUDIES......................................................................................... 47

8.1    Institutional response by the UN system to the global food price crisis and the EU Food Facility – November 2009....................................................................................................................... 47

8.2    Supply Response from the Agricultural Sector in Developing Countries to Food Price Increases –  July 2010         50

8.3    Safety Net Interventions financed under the Food Facility – August 2010.................. 52

8.4    Food Facility Beneficiary assessment  –  December 2010.............................................. 54

9.    FOOD FACILITY FINAL EVALUATION.................................................................... 60

9.1    Executive Summary........................................................................................................ 60

9.1.1 Purpose of the evaluation.............................................................................................. 60

9.1.2 Background of the evaluation....................................................................................... 60

9.1.3 Methodology of the evaluation..................................................................................... 61

9.1.4 Main Findings related to the EU FF as an instrument................................................... 62

9.1.5 Main Findings related to interventions financed under the EU FF................................. 65

9.1.6 Recommendations......................................................................................................... 67

9.1.7 Lessons learned.............................................................................................................. 68

10.    EU FOOD FACILITY VISIBILITY LINKS................................................................ 70

1. INTRODUCTION

The Staff Working Document (SWD) accompanying the Food Facility Final Report is a technical document which aims to present the implementation of the EU Food Facility, its outcomes, and the lessons learned, building notably on the findings of the Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) reports, the implementing partners Final Reports, the Studies requested throughout the implementation of the Food Facility, the Surveys filled by 49 EU Delegations and the Food Facility Final Evaluation exercise.

From 2009 to 2011, the Food Facility aimed to respond to the effects of the 2007-2008 food crisis through 232 interventions implemented in 49 countries worst hit by high food prices. The scope of the SWD covers the whole range of interventions implemented to achieve the three objectives of the Food Facility which are (i) to encourage a positive supply response from the agricultural sector, (ii) to respond rapidly and directly to mitigate the negative effects of volatile food prices on local populations, and (iii) to strengthen the productive capacities and the governance of the agricultural sector to enhance the sustainability of interventions.

In order to implement effectively such a significant number of interventions over a three-year period, a blend of implementing partners has been used including partner countries, Regional, International, and Non-Governmental Organisations and Member States agencies allowing the programmes to achieve their objectives swiftly and paving the way for long-term food security and rural development programmes. The SWD details the Food Facility implementation, outcomes and lessons learned according to the distinctive characteristics of each implementing partner and objective achieved.

In this connection, the Food Facility contributed to support agricultural development and food security with a focus on triggering a medium term agricultural supply response from smallholders. The Food Facility improved vulnerable households’ access to agricultural inputs (seed, fertilizer, small equipment etc.), which contributed to intensify and diversify smallholder production and to increase crop areas where land was available.

A particular emphasise has been placed on smallholders’ capacity building, in particular through farmers’ organisations and on the construction of local infrastructures and facilities including irrigation, water harvesting and conservation, rural roads, markets, storage facilities etc. This contributed to improve smallholders’ agricultural development, reduce post-harvest losses and boost a greater integration in the local and national markets.

In addition, the Food Facility improved the food security situation and the nutritional status of the most vulnerable people. Nutrition programmes mostly targeted women and children through safety nets interventions and/or improved food production with projects encouraging for example crop and livestock diversification, contributing to a greater diversity of food availability.

While programmes were completed recently, the SDW presents a number of success stories to grasp a view of the short-term impact of Food Facility interventions on boosting agricultural productivity and on taking the initial steps needed to prevent, as far as possible, further food insecurity situations.

2.         ALLOCATIONS PER COUNTRY AND IMPLEMENTATION MODE

2.1       State of play: Financing decisions, initial programming and final outlook

Date || Financing Decision || Allocation in million EUR

30/03/2009 || C (2009) 2184 || 313,9

29/04/2009 || C (2009) 3068 || 393,8

09/12/2009 || C (2009) 9932 || 104,5

09/12/2009 || C (2009) 9883 || 17,4

22/12/2009 || C (2009) 10249 ||     7,75

22/04/2010 || C (2010) 2449 || 145,3

01/06/2011 || C (2011) 3732 || -

TOTAL || || 982,65

Country || Initial Country Allocation || Final Country Allocation || Difference (amount changed)

Afghanistan || 24,200,000 || 24,301,279 || 101,279

Bangladesh || 50,000,000 || 52,245,061 || 2,245,061

Benin || 12,900,000 || 15,716,463 || 2,816,463

Bolivia || 9,550,000 || 9,550,000 || 0

Burkina Faso || 23,700,000 || 25,199,393 || 1,499,393

Burma-Myanmar || 24,400,000 || 23,400,000 || 1,000,000

Burundi || 13,400,000 || 14,257,778 || 857,778

Cambodia || 17,200,000 || 17,891,273 || 691,273

Central African Republic || 10,000,000 || 9,672,829 || 327,171

Comoros || 3,600,000 || 0 || 3,600,000

Cuba || 11,700,000 || 11,700,000 || 0

DR Congo || 40,600,000 || 39,685,789 || 914,211

Eritrea || 12,800,000 || 13,565,916 || 765,916

Ethiopia || 45,400,000 || 41,879,712 || 3,520,288

Gambia || 5,500,000 || 5,300,000 || 200,000

Ghana || 20,900,000 || 20,708,863 || 191,137

Guatemala || 15,000,000 || 15,878,781 || 878,781

Guinea Bissau || 8,400,000 || 8,090,682 || 309,318

Guinea Conakry || 13,500,000 || 9.591.035 || 3,908,965

Haiti || 19,800,000 || 19,649,974 || 150,026

Honduras || 9,900,000 || 9,900,000 || 0

Jamaica || 5,900,000 || 5,802,649 || 97,351

Kenya || 31,200,000 || 31,293,179 || 93,179

Kyrgyz Republic || 7,000,000 || 6,700,000 || 300,000

Lao PDR || 10,800,000 || 10,845,860 || 45,860

Lesotho || 6,000,000 || 5,408,030 || 591,970

Liberia || 13,650,000 || 15,148,556 || 1,498,556

Madagascar || 21,800,000 || 12,425,639 || 9,374,361

Malawi || 17,900,000 || 18,464,077 || 564,077

Mali || 25,150,000 || 24,749,926 || 400,074

Mauritania || 7,600,000 || 7,482,801 || 117,199

Mozambique || 23,200,000 || 22,205,774 || 994,226

Nepal || 23,300,000 || 22,995,639 || 304,361

Nicaragua || 7,150,000 || 7,585,986 || 435,986

Niger || 19,200,000 || 19,549,944 || 349,944

OPT Palestine || 39,700,000 || 39,700,000 || 0

Pakistan || 50,000,000 || 49,261,229 || 738,771

Philippines || 31,900,000 || 31,352,114 || 547,886

Rwanda || 15,600,000 || 15,600,000 || 0

Sao Tomé e Principe || 2,100,000 || 1,700,063 || 399,937

Senegal || 14,500,000 || 18,163,541 || 3,663,541

Sierra Leone || 19,050,000 || 18,654,294 || 395,706

Somalia || 14,400,000 || 13,975,933 || 424,067

Sri Lanka || 5,200,000 || 5,127,252 || 72,748

Tajikistan || 15,500,000 || 15,170,000 || 330,000

Tanzania || 32,400,000 || 31,589,770 || 810,230

Togo || 13,700,000 || 14,288,303 || 588,303

Yemen || 21,300,000 || 20,143,789 || 1,156,211

Zambia || 16,300,000 || 22,058,953 || 5,758,953

Zimbabwe || 15,400,000 || 17,112,596 || 1,712,596

TOTAL CHANGES || || || 55,743,154

2.2       Detailed allocations per country and per implementing channel

IO: International Organization

CfP: Call for Proposals

BS: Budge Support

3.         FOOD FACILITY MAIN INPUTS AND BENEFICIARIES

3.1       Inputs distributed by implementing partner

3.2       Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries

Total number of beneficiaries[1]

Implementing Partner || Direct Beneficiaries || Indirect Beneficiaries

UNICEF || 23,274,085 || 9,541,224

FAO || 18,291,970 || 34,185,440

NGOs / Member States Agencies || 10,748,991 || 28,020,397

WFP || 4,426,134 || 10,212,455

WB || 1,181,135 || 8,558,342

UNDP || 714,095 || 3,185,877

UNRWA || 396,006 || 0

TOTAL || 59,032,416 || 93,703,735

4.         PARTNERSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL   ORGANISATIONS

4.1       State of play of the contracts at 31 December 2012

IO/RO || Contracts || Amount contracted

AU-IBAR || AU-IBAR Regional || 20,000,000

AU-IBAR || AU-IBAR Somalia || 4,000,000

AU-IBAR TOTAL || || 24,000,000

COMESA || COMESA - Regional || 20,000,000

COMESA TOTAL || || 20,000,000

IFAD || IFAD I* || 14,498,783

IFAD || IFAD-ECOWAS Reg. || 20,000,000

IFAD || IFAD II Madagascar || 12,425,639

IFAD || IFAD II Mozambique || 4,757,850

IFAD TOTAL || || 51,682,272

FAO || FAO I* || 109,975,439

FAO || FAO I Burkina Faso || 18,064,052

FAO || FAO I Eritrea || 3,221,246

FAO || FAO Honduras || 5,400,000

FAO || FAO Philippines || 4,200,000

FAO || FAO IV* || 13,200,000

FAO || FAO IV Zambia 2 || 3,578,904

FAO || FAO IV Zambia 3 || 5,800,000

FAO || FAO II* || 74,554,532

FAO TOTAL || || 237,994,173

UNDP || UNDP I* || 11,700,000

UNDP || UNDP Liberia || 1,493,139

UNDP || UNDP IV Bangladesh || 7,500,000

UNDP || UNDP IV Eritrea || 5,000,000

UNDP TOTAL || || 25,693,139

UNFPA || UNFPA Niger || 2,000,000

UNFPA TOTAL || || 2,000,000

UNICEF || UNICEF I* || 8,229,000

UNICEF || UNICEF IV Niger || 5,000,000

UNICEF || UNICEF II Niger || 3,000,000

UNICEF TOTAL || || 16,229,000

UNOPS || UNOPS I* || 10,000,000

UNOPS || UNOPS IV* || 13,400,000

UNOPS TOTAL || || 23,400,000

UNRWA || UNRWA I || 18,100,000

UNRWA || UNRWA II || 21,600,000

UNRWA TOTAL || || 39,700,000

WB || WB I* || 63,800,000

WB || WB I* || 10,850,000

WB || WB II* || 37,150,000

WB TOTAL || || 111,800,000

WFP || WFP I* || 41,351,352

WFP || WFP Honduras || 4,500,000

WFP || WFP Liberia || 3,580,405

WFP || WFP II* || 34,446,135

WFP TOTAL || || 83,877,892

|| ||

TOTAL IO || || 636,376,476

* Multi country contract.

A large part of the Food Facility has been implemented by International Organisations.

4.2       Main lessons learned from the projects implemented by International Organisations

· Focusing assistance on marginalised farmers with high production increases the food security situation of the poorest and most vulnerable communities. Input Trade Fairs (ITFs) are a proven mechanism to increase farmers’ access to inputs. ITFs are rapidly becoming the preferred method of agricultural input distribution in many areas where the EUFF project was implemented and beyond. By establishing a system of seed distribution targeted especially towards the most vulnerable populations, ITFs offered a sustainable supply of quality inputs at the producer level through economically viable local mechanisms. It was also found that the timely provision of quality inputs is the best way of promoting the adoption of new technologies (e.g., new seed varieties or fertilizers).

· The performance of the FF projects showed that boosting agricultural production not only requires access to quality inputs but also the application of proven methods of crop production. Input distribution interventions were found to have a much greater impact when combined with training to establish appropriate use of inputs. Extension methodologies, such as Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and rural promoters, provide effective channels for appropriate advice through on-farm demonstrations on sustainable production intensification, good agriculture practices (GAP), conservation agriculture (CA), soil fertility management, small-scale irrigation and crop diversification. Moreover, strengthening producers both in the public and private sector resulted in increased food availability. Here, establishing new producers and enabling existing producers to enhance their production capacity proved effective and efficient.

· Although the distribution of tools and machinery to improve and facilitate agricultural production was appropriate, in some cases, some of the machinery, even if used properly, did not generate enough additional value to justify cost. This could be addressed by allowing farmers and prospective agricultural contractors a choice in the selection of tractors and equipment. This would take into account their experience with equipment, their ability to pay for more expensive tractors and their brand preferences. Also, the relatively small size of some farms in communal areas made it uneconomical for such farmers to own even a small tractor or related machinery. Here, the provision of commercial privately operated agricultural contracting services or machinery pool groups offer a valuable solution.

· Within the framework of a large intervention such as the EUFF, it is essential to account for the effect of procuring large quantities of seeds on the local seed market as a sudden increase in institutional procurements can place stress on available suppliers. In some cases, farmers, seed producers, and other organisations had difficulties ensuring the timely procurement of the required quantities of quality seed. This led to delays in distribution and hampered production. By the time some beneficiary farmers received the quality seed, they had already used their own seed. Some seeds received from the project were either exchanged with other farmers and/or were inappropriately cultivated in some areas. It is thus important to consider market capacities and market linkages in the pre-implementation stage of future projects of a similar scale.

· Taking into account country-specific crop calendars in the design and implementation of the EUFF projects was of crucial importance for the success of the interventions, notably for the distribution of agricultural inputs. The timely planning of input procurement and supply helped farmers to start up the cropping season as per their own requirements. In the same vein, synchronised procurement and input distribution ensured proper utilisation in the farmers’ fields. In some cases, the project would have finished before the harvest and required an extension to achieve measurable outcomes. Here, the flexibility and willingness of the EU to provide extensions in time and funding for the inclusion of additional crop cycles in some project countries was paramount for the resulting success of these projects.

For future programmes of a similar scope, additional funds and time for the formulation phase would allow for the seasonality of cropping cycles in target countries already at the design stage of the programme. This would make certain that the requirements of seasonal crop calendars and bureaucratic processes were met through the adequate and timely delivery of inputs to maximise output for harvesting, avoiding the need for funding extensions at the implementation stage.

· The achievements of the EUFF projects showed that local seed production systems are best supported through a holistic approach, which involves all actors of the value chain, including producers, processors and traders, and supports the country-specific institutional and policy context. In some cases, however, it was found best to undertake the production of basic or foundation seed as a private sector activity since some state institutions had insufficient capacity to manage such a programme. In order to affect a medium-term sustainable outcome, a systems-based approach was chosen, which started with improved access to inputs for increased production of surpluses for the market within the existing agricultural systems. Accordingly, the focus of seed multiplication and development of the seed industry was placed on increasing input availability, boosting productivity and improving distribution of outputs by improving market linkages.

· FF interventions have shown that undertaking rehabilitation works on rural infrastructures, such as irrigation channels, storage and market facilities and roads, and produces positive short- and long-term impacts on agricultural production and income-earning opportunities.

For maximum sustainability, it was found best to focus on larger infrastructure, for instance larger canals, which people cannot rehabilitate manually. Productivity of crops was most efficiently increased through investments in and improvements of small irrigation schemes. Post-harvest losses were reduced most effectively through the introduction of appropriate drying and storage facilities. Income-earning opportunities were best generated through creation of as well as improved access to markets, in addition to the production of surpluses and the improved quality of grains.

· The implementation of this component further showed that rehabilitation of infrastructure through local private companies encouraged these companies to undertake similar works when they became necessary at a later date, creating a multiplier effect in the local economy. However, some rehabilitation and construction required more time to be completed, supervised and inspected than had been planned.

In addition, the sustainability of operation and management of these renovated or constructed facilities also required more time than the FF project period, in particular with regards to work on these issues with governmental counterparts. Here, the establishment of and training of farmer user groups was a way to ensure that the maintenance and operation of the schemes function effectively after project closure. The best approach to rehabilitation and mechanisation of rural infrastructure was found to be systemic, with agricultural production and commercialisation, small-scale irrigation, feeder roads and microfinance developed in parallel.

· FF projects have shown that training and capacity building are vital at all stages and levels of the interventions. Capacity building played a key role in affecting the appropriate and sustainable use of inputs provided, and should be an integral part of similar projects in the future. The good results achieved by the EUFF projects rest partly on the fact that training and capacity building accompanied all types of interventions and targeted all levels of beneficiaries from farmers, local implementation counterparts to government representatives. While in some cases, the short duration of the project made it difficult to build institutional and management sustainability capacities, the EUFF projects demonstrated that working through and developing the capacity of government structures, farmer institutions and/or building on private sector and existing long-term projects was the most effective approach to achieving outreach and sustainability.

· The support and commitment of host governments and national counterparts was vital for the outcomes of the projects. Countries in which the government did not fully support the FF project and its interventions fared much less well than those with strong national support. Delays in signing some projects, for instance, shortened their length, undermined sustainability and created pressure on staff. However, those projects in which governmental staff within the relevant ministries were involved from the project formulation stage, benefited from a high degree of local ownership, motivation and commitment. Collaboration with the government is essential to any project that aims to leave behind significant technical expertise, considerable number of inputs and renovated/constructed facilities. The long-term benefits of these interventions depend greatly on the government’s sustained involvement and guidance to farmers in the use and operation of inputs.

· FF projects, which also addressed the capacity of key ministries, have proven most effective in sustaining efforts. Furthermore, empowering, from the outset, the municipalities and departmental offices of agriculture and food security through Letters of Agreement, and linking them to local initiatives, proved essential for project sustainability and their inclusion into government budgets.

· The use of existing structures and entities maximised impact. This included partnerships with on going national and international projects, and the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders, including government staff as well as the private sector, NGOs and farming communities in the project implementation.

The integration of programmes in existing institutions, both public and private, significantly reinforced sustainable local ownership. Relevant national on going programmes were, wherever possible, built on and extended, and technical collaboration and coordination of all stakeholders encouraged. Existing institutional structures and entities with already defined coordinating and implementing functions are best used when integrated into the individual project’s implementing arrangements in the design process. To facilitate future replication and secure continued governmental support, the design of project interventions needs to be in compliance with prevailing government policies.

4.3       Success stories: Zambia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Cuba, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone

Farmer Input Support Response Initiative to Rising Prices of Agricultural Commodities in Zambia Financing: 7.500.000 EUR - Implementing partner:  FAO

Electronic vouchers, as a means of providing quality agricultural inputs to farmers on time and at minimum transaction cost, were supplied to 7,950 lead farmers for purchasing seeds, fertilizers, tools and Conservation Agriculture (CA) equipment. Initial results in the field collected from monitoring mission clearly showed increased yields as compared to traditional methods. Conservation Agricultural Programme (CAP), Conservation Agriculture for Production and Productivity (CASPP), Conservation Farming Unit (CFU), Zambian National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) indicate that the farming community accepts the technology and that crop increases are realized. During the dry spell (February 2011) it was clearly demonstrated that the agricultural production under CA, mainly vegetables, were resistant to water scarcity. It is estimated that approximately 200,000 households (HH) are now practicing CA.

EU Food Facility in support of the Food Production Action Plan (PRO-PAPA) in Mozambique[2] Financing: 4.700.000 EUR - Implementing partner:  IFAD

The project’s goal was to enhance agriculture and fisheries production and productivity by up scaling selected existing activities in three on-going IFAD-financed programmes: (i) the Sofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project (PPABAS); (ii) the Rural Finance Support Programme (PAFIR); and (iii) the Rural Market Promotion Programme (PROMER). Overall, the project has reached - with tangible services, equipment and infrastructure - 30,160 households directly, which represents 151% of the target. While, at an early stage after its completion, impacts cannot be fully assessed, a preliminary impacts assessment has been presented using available data. Fishery activities aiming to increase in catch, in catch rates and value of the marketed catch targeted 2,500 households. It is estimated that at least 8,800 households benefited from the investments made on the fish markets infrastructure. This figure should substantially increase when the various point of first sale (equipped with the cooling equipment) will enter in full operation. Points of First Sale are built for the first time in Mozambique. This model combines improved infrastructure, including fish conservation equipment, with an inclusive management system, that allows for co-responsibility and full participation of stakeholders in the operation and maintenance of the market. Regarding the financial services component PROPAPA benefited 6,300 clients, out of whom 3,821 are new clients. It is expected that this number will increase by 33-35% per credit cycle, under the assumption of reimbursement rates above 90%. This means that the target will be achieved in 2013, considering two credit cycles per year. In addition 140 kilometres of roads were rehabilitated to improve products’ market access. The total number of beneficiaries of the road improvements is estimated at about 15,000 households, therefore doubling the anticipated result of 7,500 households. The average cost of the improvements per beneficiary is US$ 17.

Improving food security of farming families affected by food prices volatility in Cambodia[3] Financing: 10.970.000 EUR- Implementing partner:  FAO

Despite a short and time bound project with a total duration of 24 months (a key factor to consider in Cambodia is the monsoonal agricultural cycle with rain usually commencing in earnest from July to the end of November) the project contributed to achieving a 10% increase in food stocks for 53 000 vulnerable rural households and, well above this target, food stocks almost doubled from 440 kg/household to 840 kg/household over a one-year period. Likewise, a 10% increase in food self-sufficiency has been reached, in terms of the percentage of farm families able to survive on their own rice stocks. The project provided for an almost 50% increase in the percentage of the population who were self-sufficient, lifting this baseline statistic from 32 % to 48% of beneficiary households. By these two major measures, the project made a significant improvement in the reduction of hunger and malnutrition, thereby also contributing to rural household resilience and confidence.

Programa de Apoyo Local a la Modernización Agropecuaria –PALMA - in Cuba Financing: 11.700.000 EUR – Implementing partner: UNDP

The effects of the swift and continuous increase in international food prices and Cuba’s high dependency (80%) on imported foodstuffs combined with the 2008 hurricanes represented a paramount challenge for the country, making food security a national priority.  In this context, a series of measures have progressively been put in place to increase the quantity, efficiency and quality of food production. The main processes at the core of this new approach include decentralising decision-making to the municipal level, and transferring the key role in food production to cooperatives and individual producers. A process was initiated in September 2008 to distribute idle land on a 10-year renewable usufruct basis to be used for food production purposes, with 100,000 applications accepted by beginning of 2010. Special focus is also given to urban and sub-urban agriculture. The European Commission is providing support to these processes with the Food Facility allowing to launch the Programa de Apoyo Local a la Modernización del sector Agropecuario. PALMA relies on the bottom-up methodology established by the UNDP "Programme for Local Human Development" (PDHL), which has operated in Cuba for more than ten years. It aims to support the modernisation of local agriculture in 37 pilot municipalities and decentralisation of food production by providing support and capacity building to cooperatives and individual farmers. This programme was enhanced with a further € 4.4 million under the EC Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) adopted in May 2009.

Addressing the negative impact of rising food prices on food insecure households in Pakistan[4] Financing: 24.700.000 EUR- Implementing partner:  FAO

Pakistan is listed among the 40 countries where the food prices crisis has exacerbated structural constraints. About 17 million people have joined the food insecure category (60 million) during the current food crisis, bringing the total to about half of the population of Pakistan. Approximately 17,000 tonnes of crop inputs (quality, high yielding and locally appropriate seed, varieties and quality fertilizers) were distributed to more than 94,000 vulnerable farming households in highly food vulnerable areas during four cropping seasons in food-deficient areas of NWFP, Sindh, Baluchistan and Punjab. In addition, households were provided with seed for a secondary crop (lentils, vegetable seed or fodder seed) and 150 secondary irrigation channels were renovated. The input distribution and irrigation channel renovation allowed farmers to greatly increase their crop yields – both by increasing productivity on already irrigated land and by bringing land back into cultivation where previously water was not available for irrigation. The seed and fertilizer distribution enabled farmers to build up their working capital so that in future they are better able to purchase fresh inputs as necessary to maintain increased productivity. Seed can be multiplied for a further 3-4 seasons before it needs replacing with new stocks.  Irrigation canals should be maintained in future under the control of the water users associations.

Smallholder Commercialization Programme in Sierra Leone Financing: 5.400.000 EUR – Implementing partner: WFP

The EUFF directly supported the Government of Sierra Leone Small Holder Commercialization Programme (SCP) that is under the mandate of the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS).  Component 5 of the SCP deals with ‘’social protection and productive safety nets’’ for which WFP is a lead agency.  The main focus of Component 5 as set forth by MAFFS includes Inland Valley Swamp (IVS) rehabilitation, tree crop rehabilitation, feeder roads rehabilitation and construction of Agricultural Business Centres (ABCs). The external evaluation commissioned by WFP (August 2011), concluded that the Food Facility had enabled WFP to undertake substantial Food-for-Work (FFW) and Food-for-Training activities of ABCs in Sierra Leone and has contributed to the achievement of the Government of Sierra Leone’s SCP. The contribution is more evident in the area of productive and social safety nets in selected rural areas. The project has complemented other interventions by FAO, IFAD and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS). With regard to improving food security of beneficiary families and improving national governance of food security matters, the Project delivered the following outputs: (i) 8,463mt food and nutritional components distributed under Food for Work, (ii) 3,588ha rehabilitated irrigated land, (iii) 644,134 EUR Cash for Work distributed, (iv) 188 post-harvest storage units constructed, (v) 888km roads constructed, and 43,199 trainees in various subjects.

5.         CALL FOR PROPOSALS IMPLEMENTATION MODE

5.1       Distribution per EU FF objective

5.2       Lessons learned from the Food Facility

· Beyond the achievement of Food Facility’s objectives, more than 55% of the interventions increased vulnerable households resilience, allowing them to cope with successive food crises, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, NGOs projects were able to mitigate the impact of food insecurity (improved diet quality and quantity, increased incomes, etc.) although this impact was limited in magnitude as the duration of the projects ranged between 14 and 25 months (21.5 months on average).

· NGO projects were mostly targeting the agricultural sector and focused on the rural context. Although the agricultural sector is key in responding to food insecurity, additional means and approaches are increasingly necessary to tackle emerging global challenges (increased inequalities, urbanization and population growth, market instability, climate changes, etc.). Projects aiming at mitigating the effects of food price rise through increased food supply alone were not able to fully demonstrate substantial impact. However, there were particularly interesting interventions aiming at promoting value chains and innovative practices, or aiming at enhancing production in challenging agro-ecological contexts.

· Agricultural inputs distribution (seeds and fertilizers), are the backbone of 80% of the projects - barring projects based on livestock development (in which inputs such as feeds and/or medicines were seldom distributed). The underlying rationale being that most farmers (and the general population affected by soaring prices) depend on staple food for their self-consumption. Hence the provision of quality seeds of staple crops has been seen as a priority. In many areas where projects intervene, productive risks factors like topography; climate; soils etc. are factors that need to be better considered with productive efforts either reoriented to well-targeted commodities in disaster-prone areas or based on more hard-researched solutions. NGOs keener on considering long-term concerns and economic challenges, would be more in favor of high-value crops, in combination with staple crops and/or with income-generating activities.

· Having strong local partners was definitely a plus in project implementation, and many projects benefitted from a good collaboration that existed between the applicant and its partners. On the other hand, all projects were designed to incorporate, to some extent, working arrangements with local authorities, the quality of this partnership varied considerably. In some cases, local authorities were over-burdened; in other cases, they were associated in economic functions, such as the management of storage capacities resulting in a weak management. In this context, more professional interest groups should handle such kind of economic tasks.

5.3       Success stories : Mali, Kenya, Bangladesh, Lao LDR, Tanzania, Nepal, and Ethiopia

Best practice in targeting beneficiaries in Mali Financing: 1.700.000 EUR– Implementing partner: Oxfam GB

Prior designing its pilot safety net project, Oxfam GB in Mali carried out a socio-economic study using the Household Economy Approach (HEA), an approach based on community participation. The findings of this study has allowed to rank the population of the three areas of intervention according to their wealth rank and defined criteria with the community to identify each of the wealth groups. The two poorest groups were targeted in the project and activities tailored to the needs of both groups; the very poor received cash transfers and training on savings and on health and nutrition, while the poor received a support to improve their productive capacities. The HEA, which quantifies sources on food and incomes, also allowed identifying the necessary level of transfer to achieve expected results. Example of targeting criteria for the agro-cotton food economy zone in Mali / Sikasso: Very Poor households: < 1.5 ha of land exploited; no production of cotton; no ploughing equipment; <5 poultry; < 2 months self-sufficiency. Poor households: 1-3 ha of exploited land; 0- ½ ha of cotton production; 1 bull/plough; < 10 poultry; < 4 months self-sufficiency.

Food voucher system to enhance local trade and local production in Kenya Financing 4.569.000 EUR - Save The Children

Food assistance has been provided to pastoralist communities in Wajir and Turkana arid lands, through local markets voucher system. A total of 60,969 beneficiaries in Wajir and 4,500 in Turkana had received locally produced food commodities as substitutes. After 22 months of the implementation, positive gains to traders, producers and food assistance beneficiaries emerged. All the 106 cereal traders in Wajir and Turkana reported a minimum of 70% increase in their business income as compared to the baseline figures. All the sampled beneficiaries reported their satisfaction with this alternative way of distributing food assistance through local traders via the use of vouchers. Beneficiaries who had access to meat and fish had access to protein rich foods for significantly longer periods, 13.2 days more than those receiving General Food Distribution (GFD) pulses. About 88% of the normal GFD beneficiaries interviewed indicated their interest to join this alternative approach of GFD distribution using local traders and through vouchers.

Strengthening productive capacities of ultra-poor people in Bangladesh Financing 2.088.000 EUR - NETZ

NETZ intervention aimed to support 28,000 ultra-poor people in meeting their nutritional needs through safety net (linking to existing government schemes) and through the development of their productive capacities with training, technical assistance and making agricultural utilities available to them. The project achieved exceptionally good results. At the end of the project most of beneficiaries had increased income and were still retaining substantial number of productive assets. Over 80% of target families increased their per capita income per day at least by 40% (inflation adjusted) by October 2011; at least 90% target families have maintained the value of the productive capital transferred by the action, minimum 60% have increased the capital value transferred by the action. At the start of the action the selected 7,200 ultra poor families were able to have 3 meals per day on average for only 4.6 months in a year. Through the achievements of the action these families can consume 3 meals per day for an average of 10 months in a year.

Enhancing milled rice production in Lao PDR Financing 2.110.000 EUR – Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation Association

The production of good quality rice is limited by both capacity and technology used by farmers to grow paddy, and significant rice milling inefficiencies. The project proposed to rapidly increase the quantity and stability of supplies of good quality milled rice for domestic consumption and trade by supporting the production through strengthening the milling companies, i.e. a value-chain development by the private sector. Activities involve the creation of a co-investment fund managed by miller groups to modernise the sector, the improvement of the manufacturing practices and entrepreneurship behaviours (business plan, quality control, etc.), the support from millers to producers in agricultural input supplies, and policy dialogues with various stakeholders. The project performed exceptionally well. Farmers crop yields increased by 30-50%; farmers’ incomes from rice increased by at least 60%; rice processed through milling companies increased which improved the supply. The project also contributed to an improved framework conditions for rice production and trade.

A holistic approach to tackle child malnutrition in Lao PDR Financing 978.800 EUR – Health Practical Action

The project targeted former forest dwellers who were recently encouraged to settle in valley areas. These populations were particularly affected by malnutrition due to their lack of knowledge on farming and nutrition practices in their new environment. The intervention proposes a combination of activities tackling holistically child malnutrition and addressing several causes leading to malnutrition. Activities encompass the diversification of vegetal and animal production sources (soybeans, frogs, fish, livestock, fruits, vegetables, etc.) by supporting resource-poor farmers with agricultural and livestock inputs (including fish ponds), by promoting sustainable agriculture techniques, increasing access to irrigation and support for further marketing of production. In parallel, target populations received training and sensitisation on diverse food intakes, child-care practices (including breastfeeding), food conservation and transformation and on appropriate hygiene practices. Finally, the project included a component to identify and treat children affected by severe acute malnutrition. Decentralised services for agriculture, livestock but also health services were involved in various phases. By focusing on the poorest and supporting them in accessing more nutritious food (including animal products), improving hygiene environment, improving child care practices and providing a system to manage severe cases of acute malnutrition at community level and in partnership with health actors, this project achieved a substantial impact.

Developing food crop wholesale market in Tanzania Financing 2.395.000 EUR – MVIWATA (National Network of Farmers)

The EUFF project implemented by the local NGO MVIWATA (National Network of Farmers) identified timely transfer of agricultural products from production areas as a crucial challenge to the national food security. During national food crisis there is normally a huge variability in food availability at local level with some remote areas in surplus and failing to sell the surplus to deficit areas. MVIWATA (experienced in the construction and organization of markets through projects financed by the French AFD) came up with the idea to promote better access to markets for small-scale farmers’ products, especially food crops. The overall objective was to secure sustainable access to locally produced food crops for urban and rural populations at less volatile but attractive producer prices. This objective was achieved via the construction of two new markets, the rehabilitation of existing markets and enhancing capacity building of the Market Boards that run the markets. The project developed and trained marketed boards, which took over the management of the marketing facilities. Market intelligence strategies to proactively identify food crop production opportunities in relation with estimated quantities and price trends were developed; relationships with local authorities, entrepreneurs and financial institutions were strengthened.

Promoting good governance and giving a voice to marginalized population in Nepal[5] Financing 1.447.000 EUR – Oxfam GB

Oxfam project supported the Right to Food Network (RtFN), which is actively raising issues on food security at national level. RtFN does also link local level issues to the national level to influence the policies. The project developed RtFN chapters at district levels that are advocating with local agencies such as DDC (District Development Office), DADO (District Agriculture Development Office) and other stakeholders for effective delivery of their services. Moreover the Project developed PLCs (Participatory Learning Centres) that are also facilitating the organization of famers (especially women) to demand for their rights to food security. Through lobbying efforts and improved linkages with different national level networks such as RtFN, food cluster (WFP, FAO and Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives), communities’ farmers have been able to advocate for improved national food security policies and strategies. A result at local level was for example the decision of Dadeldhura DDC to establish and promote seed banks in the whole district. At national level, the right to food and food security issues are included in the draft constitution of Nepal.

Decreasing dependency towards social transfers, the graduation mechanism in Ethiopia Financing 1.350.000 EUR – Dan Church Aid

Since 2005, the Ethiopian Government has been providing food and cash transfers as a response to chronically food insecure populations through the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). This scheme aims at preventing asset depletion at household level and creating productive assets at community level. The challenge is now to reduce the caseload by ensuring that beneficiaries gain sufficient livelihoods, enabling them not to rely anymore on social transfers. This process is known as graduation. A total of 23,750 food insecure households benefitted from the Dan Church Aid project. According to the graduation assessment, remarkable livelihood improvement was achieved within a short period (food security, asset creation, asset protection, etc.): 21% households were considered food secure before the action and 56% after, mainly due to the increased access to irrigation facilities. The average income of irrigation users (Birr 4,269 per adult equivalent), is higher when compared to the per capita income of those who do not have access to irrigation. As a result 43% of the PSNP targeted households earned more than the regional benchmark (Birr 3,600) and hence became eligible for graduation.

5.4       Learning from NGOs - EU FF case study in Ethiopia

Overall, 360,136 households, approximately two million people in Ethiopia, have directly benefited from 13 NGO's projects implemented jointly by 28 international and local NGOs in Oromia, SNNPR, Amhara and Tigray States. In this framework, the EUFF financing amounts 19.769.000 EUR.

EU FF interventions aimed to enhance smallholder farmers' and pastoralists'/agro-pastoralists' resilience through increased agricultural/livestock production and productivity and the promotion of other income diversification opportunities. The projects' initiatives have shown good complementarities to the on-going food security programs, particularly in terms of facilitating the graduation of those targeted PSNP beneficiaries (around 50,095 households) through promoting various on-farm and off-farm income diversification opportunities.

wTen[6] projects were supporting seed multiplication and distribution system. Accordingly, a total 41,342 quintals improved seeds were distributed to 106,023 households covering 36,080 hectares of farmland. As a result of the intervention, cereal crop production per hectare has increased on average by 40-50%.  

wNine[7] projects have funded irrigation schemes. Accordingly, 54 river diversion irrigation schemes (42 new), 40 check dams/water harvesting structures, 808 Rope & Washer/treadle pumps, and 565 hand dug wells (HDW) were developed for irrigation enabling 9,718 households to produce 2-3 times in a year.  In total, 3,859 hectares of land was irrigated and productivity of food crops has increased on average by 50% in most of the projects' intervention woredas.

wFive projects[8] have supported 24,372 households (mainly women headed households) with livelihood diversification & asset creation through provision of sheep and goats, on credit basis. The credit system uses a strategy where the primary beneficiary will transfer the offspring or mother goats/sheep in kind to the secondary beneficiary. Both the primary and secondary beneficiaries are from the same peer group for which they consider the sheep/goats as a common property. Such a strategy avoids any attempt to be made by the primary beneficiary to sell or abuse the mother goats.

wEleven[9] projects supported the construction of 114 grain-banks and stores and 38 community market places. Market places were constructed in the rural growth potential areas facilitating marketing of agricultural products, and reducing post harvest losses and timely transportation challenges of perishable agricultural produces. Establishment of grain banks (GB) also helps to stabilize food price allowing households to purchase grain at a lower price and/or receive grain loans from the GB at times of high prices. Grain banks/stores, established and administered by communities aim to increase local seed provision security, thereby contributing to the possibilities of continued utilization of locally important varieties.

6.         BUDGET SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION MODE

6.1       State of play Budget Support allocations

1.1

EU FF Budget Support Allocations[10]

Sectoral Budget Support || Tajikistan || 7.750.000

|| Rwanda || 15.600.000

|| Mozambique || 5.200.000

|| Bolivia || 7.750.000

General Budget Support || ||

|| DRC || 26.000.000

|| Malawi || 15.900.000

|| Haiti || 5.800.000

|| Ghana || 15.000.000

|| Tanzania || 20.000.000

|| Togo || 8.200.000

TOTAL || || 127.200.000

(The implementation of all Budget Support operations under the FF has been managed by the Geographical Directorates together with the EU Delegations).

6.2       Lessons learned

· Interventions financed as Budget Support (BS) presented a good response for all those countries which had their own satisfactory response to the finance public criteria and which were already qualified by EU for receiving BS. They allow a rapid response, the beneficiary countries being able to pre-finance emergency actions from their own budget, as soon as there was a EU commitment.

· Many governments embraced greater levels of overall subsidies of various types, imported grain at very high prices or imposed severe export restrictions, installed price controls and subsidized food distribution schemes, established or reinforced public procurement mechanisms at fixed prices, or organized subsidized fertilizer distribution schemes for small farmers In many countries the FPC obliged governments to reduce import taxes and to increase social expenditures in order to mitigate effects on the most vulnerable parts of the population.[11] These measures often had a negative impact on the national budget. Support provided through EU FF under Budget Support permitted maintaining high expenditures for the social and rural sector. It is to be noted that, due to eligibility criteria, only in 10 out of the 15 initially foreseen countries budget support could be disbursed.

6.3       Examples of EUFF Budget Support interventions

EU FF budget support to maintain social expenditures in Tanzania Financing: 20.000.000 EUR

The Food Facility General Budget Support (GBS) was additional to the already existing GBS (300 Million EUR). The Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADAP) seeks to achieve at least a minimum of 6% growth in the agriculture sector. The key objective is to help smallholder farmers, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and fishing households to adopt improved agricultural practices for which the government needed to allocate a minimum of 10% of its budget. The investment plan is expected to cost the government US$5.3billion when the program is fully implemented by 2016. It brings together all stakeholders to a common agenda of comprehensively transforming the sector to create wealth, reduce poverty and achieve food and nutrition security. In the current budget of 2011/12, the Government has allocated 6.8% of its budget on agriculture out of a total budget of US$7.8billion. The additional general budget support has contributed to mitigate effects of the food crisis and food insecurity in Tanzania, by providing additional resources to address the volatile Food prices. This meant improved food security for the poorest layer of the population through the implementation of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty for Tanzania (MKUKUTA).

EU FF budget support complementing budget support interventions in Mozambique Financing:  5.200.000 EUR

The European Commission has contributed to the implementation of the national Sector Policy Programme PROAGRI and is the largest contributor with 30% of all donor contributions since the start of the Programme. PROAGRI is aligned with the direct budget support provided by a G19 donors group and is complementary to the EU general budget support (PRBS - Poverty Reduction Budget Support- III, MDG -Millennium Development Goals- Programme). The Programme is financed under the Food Facility Instrument. This financing is on top of the approximately €15 million that the EU makes available annually to agricultural sector via MINAG as part of PROAGRI.

7.         RESULTS-BASED GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT

7.1       Performance of EU Food Facility projects monitored

Overview ROM EU FF || TOTAL

N° of countries visited N° of missions undertaken N° of experts mobilized N° of projects monitored N° of Monitoring Reports produced Total budget of monitored EU FF projects (in millions EUR) Average budget per EU FF project monitored (in millions EUR) || 49 235 46 176 236 723 4.1

Overall performance of projects by category 

Category I Category II Category III Category IV || Very good performance Good performance Performing with problems Not performing, or having major difficulty TOTAL || 2% 68% 23% 7% 100% || 4 119 41 12 176

TYPE || VERY GOOD (A) || GOOD (B) || PROBLEMS (C) || SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES (D) || AVERAGE SCORE

Relevance/Quality of Design || 8% || 69% || 23% || . || 2.82

Alignment to policies and target || 22% || 73% || 5% || . || 3.16

Appropriateness of the intervention || 6% || 47% || 44% || 3% || 2.55

Support by stakeholders || 8% || 60% || 31% || 1% || 2.75

Mainstreaming of cross-cutting || 9% || 65% || 25% || 1% || 2.81

Efficiency || 4% || 62% || 31% || 3% || 2.66

Inputs management || 6% || 57% || 34% || 4% || 2.64

Activity timeliness || 6% || 51% || 40% || 3% || 2.59

Outputs achievement || 7% || 56% || 35% || 2% || 2.67

Partner contribution & involvement || 6% || 64% || 28% || 2% || 2.73

Effectiveness || 1% || 55% || 41% || 3% || 2.73

Results attainment || 3% || 59% || 34% || 3% || 2.63

Project Purpose achievement || 9% || 67% || 23% || 1% || 2.83

Impact || 8% || 67% || 24% || 1% || 2.80

Contribution to overall objective || 8% || 67% || 24% || 1% || 2.82

Wider effects || 5% || 67% || 27% || 1% || 2.77

Sustainability || 4% || 51% || 44% || 2% || 2.64

Economic viability || 3% || 43% || 48% || 6% || 2.44

Local ownership || 11% || 56% || 31% || 2% || 2.77

Policy support || 5% || 57% || 36% || 2% || 2.66

Institutional capacity building || 5% || 64% || 29% || 2% || 2.73

Overall Score || 2% || 76% || 22% || 1% || 2.73

Number of projects || 3 || 133 || 39 || 1 ||

Total number of projects || || || 176 || ||

Total number of Monitoring Reports || || || 236 || ||

Monitoring period || 2010 || 2011

N° operations monitored || 122 || 90

N° reports produced || 135 || 101

Criterion || GOOD (A or B)* || AVERAGE SCORE || GOOD (A or B)* || AVERAGE SCORE

Relevance || 76% || 2.80 || 73% || 2.80

Efficiency || 57% || 2.55 || 67% || 2.67

Effectiveness || 44% || 2.63 || 60% || 2.76

Impact || 69% || 2.71 || 78% || 2.86

Sustainability || 60% || 2.70 || 52% || 2.58

Overall || 75% || 2.68 || 74% || 2.73

(*) The presented percentages do not add up to 100% because they represent the percentage of projects in the category for each criterion, and the “overall” percentage represents the % of the projects with an overall score in the category.

7.2       EU FF projects ROM scores per region

Region || 2010 || 2011 || TOTAL

|| Projects monitored || Overall Score || Projects monitored || Overall Score || Projects monitored || Overall Score

European Neighbourhood Countries || 2 || 2.73 || 1 || 2.87 || 3 || 2.77

Africa, Indian Ocean, South Africa || 76 || 2.69 || 54 || 2.74 || 110 || 2.72

Asia || 30 || 2.67 || 26 || 2.69 || 46 || 2.74

Latin America || 10 || 2.75 || 8 || 2.85 || 13 || 2.85

Caribbean, Pacific, Cuba, OCTs || 4 || 2.31 || 1 || 2.58 || 4 || 2.33

7.3       EU FF projects ROM scores per implementing channel

a) International Organizations

Monitoring period || 2010 || 2011

N° operations monitored || 38 || 39

N° reports produced || 40 || 39

Criterion || GOOD (A or B) || AVERAGE SCORE || GOOD (A or B) || AVERAGE SCORE

Relevance || 71% || 2.64 || 67% || 2.77

Efficiency || 37% || 2.34 || 69% || 2.71

Effectiveness || 24% || 2.49 || 62% || 2.76

Impact || 63% || 2.67 || 72% || 2.83

Sustainability || 50% || 2.55 || 49% || 2.50

Overall || 66% || 2.54 || 69% || 2.71

(*) The presented percentages do not add up to 100% because they represent the percentage of projects in the category for each criterion, and the “overall” percentage represents the % of the projects with an overall score in the category.

b) Non-Governmental Organisations

Monitoring period || 2010 || 2011

N° operations monitored || 84 || 51

N° reports produced || 95 || 62

Criterion || GOOD (A or B) || AVERAGE SCORE || GOOD (A or B) || AVERAGE SCORE

Relevance || 79% || 2.87 || 78% || 2.83

Efficiency || 65% || 2.65 || 65% || 2.64

Effectiveness || 54% || 2.70 || 59% || 2.76

Impact || 71% || 2.74 || 82% || 2.88

Sustainability || 64% || 2.77 || 55% || 2.64

Overall || 80% || 2.74 || 78% || 2.75

7.4       Main ROM recommendations and lessons learned

· Project design should be better taken care of, in particular when setting the Logical Framework (LFM) of the projects. The stakeholders’ analysis and the problem tree as Annexes to the LFMs should be considered as requirement in the awarding of the contracts. Particular focus should be put on the indicators to be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound). Project design need to have a built-in flexibility in order to easily adjust to the situation on the ground. In addition, sustainability is an issue to be considered from project design and continues throughout project implementation.

· Paramount elements to be taken into account regarding projects implementation: the adequate consideration of factors like droughts is essential regarding the timing of FF projects; Mandatory pre-assessment of target group absorption and management capacity; Involvement of experienced local NGOs and motivated end-beneficiaries; Identification of “Leaders” in Associations and Organizations of farmers/producers for dissemination of results; Focus on small intervention area to avoid logistical complexities; Realistic planning of delivery of resources and inputs (recruitment, tenders); Use of feasibility studies for the selection of areas of intervention / beneficiaries; Limit the number of implementing partners; Emphasis on development and capacity building of community level and national/regional institutional structures rather than on mere delivery of “physical” results; Information and training material should be pictorial and easily understandable for easy dissemination; Dissemination workshops at project completion with as wide as possible range of relevant participants (e.g. Government, Regional / Local Authorities, NGOs, donors, civil society and traditional structures);

· Projects effectiveness can be increased with improved communication channels between projects’ management teams and partners. Furthermore, the projects should enhance the cooperation with relevant third parties (Embassies, Ministries, Local and National Authorities and Civil Society). This is valid for all projects independently of their domain of intervention. In addition the active engagement of final beneficiaries in project design and implementation should be systematic and Government / beneficiary commitment should be demonstrated in practical terms (e.g. increase in extension personnel, budgetary commitments, legal reforms etc.).

· Crosscutting issues: most monitored projects are acting in favor of female workers where and when possible. Environmental aspects are often not addressed directly but as FF projects often deal with irrigational and agricultural issues, they usually are designed following well-known best practices concerning sustainability and the environment. However, gender and Environment adequate analysis and mainstreaming require specific OVIs for cross-cutting issues.

8.         FOOD FACILITY STUDIES

8.1       Institutional response by the UN system to the global food price crisis and the EU Food Facility – November 2009

Executive Summary

During the first semester 2008, in response to the global crisis, the EU decided to commit €1billion on a set of activities supporting countries shocked by the impact of soaring food prices and focusing on food production and access to food.

The UN system was identified as a possible intermediary. At that time, under the Initiative on Soaring Food Prices, the UN-HLTF had just started the joint country assessments led by FAO. Getting feedback from agencies separately would have implied the availability of tremendous amount of information, which would have been hard for EC to turn - in a short time - into one harmonized feedback. There was therefore a need for a consolidated approach. Thus the request submitted to HLTF to act as an interface between the EC and the already selected agencies and to present –in a very limited time frame- the information received from the different agencies into “One UN feedback.”

This study, “Institutional response by the UN System to the global Food price crisis and the UE Food Facility”, aims at analyzing the coordination, the synergies and the implementation mechanisms put in place by UN agencies involved in the EU Food Facility, both within the frame of the HLTF “Comprehensive Framework of Actions” and the EC regulation 1337/2008 of December 2008. It also aims to assess whether the EU Food Facility may be the booster of an all-embracing coordination at the country level.

The planning phase, for the implementation of the EU Food Facility, was carried out in a comprehensive and expedite way. However, country assessments show some shortcomings. This corroborates the conclusion that the EU Food Facility approach is suitable for an immediate response covering emergency and recovery, while perhaps being unsuitable for planning longer-term responses, for which larger investments in field investigation, data collection and analysis are required.

Whereas the EU Food Facility strategy turned out to be a success at the global level in terms of “One UN feedback”, at the field level not all the agencies were able to respond in a choral manner, possibly due to the following reasons:

• At country level there is a divide between agencies dealing with agriculture development and 
those concerned with food assistance and emergency. A further distinction differentiates implementing agencies from financial and lending ones, such as IFAD and the WB, which have their own strict procedures.

• In-country development activities are covered by UNDAF; the UN System framework providing one unified and coordinated response to development challenges. This framework, however, does not cover emergency and recovery activities. Besides, within the UN System there is no organization encompassing the full scope of food security.

• UN agencies have the tendency to follow their own country plans and apply their own internal rules and procedures. 
Overall, field visits confirmed that the projects under the EU Food Facility, besides responding to the needs of the country, build on the comparative advantages of partner agencies and are a) fully consistent with the overall strategy adopted by the Governments concerned to address emergency and recovery requirements b) coherent with the recovery actions stressed under the HLTF CFA and with the spirit, the objectives and the intervention sectors of the EU Food Facility. 
The EU Food Facility projects seem to be well taken by the involved implementing agencies. Beside the recruitment of ad-hoc staff in support to the projects, no major adaptations were necessary as the agencies’ technical and logistical capacities were already in place. Indeed, FAO, being the major recipient of EC funds, achieved “economies of scale” which allowed the adoption of specific measures to reduce transaction costs, as well as to harmonize project implementation in all countries concerned and expedite decisions (ie increased delegation of Authority to FAO Reps, regular teleconference meetings amongst all EU Food Facility project units, internal task force for coordination). 
Coordination level varies depending on the country as well as on the actors involved and their institutional mandates. The fact that food security is a crosscutting issue should not be underestimated. In Liberia, for instance, despite a well-conceived structure, coordination is limited, mainly due to the post-conflict Government framework, with its centralized powers and one geographical control which make it difficult to cut across line ministries.

On the other hand in countries such as Rwanda, Ghana and Bangladesh, where the government takes control of coordination, activities seem to be implemented more efficiently and delivery is at a satisfactory level.

Without oversimplifying, the use of a common coordination agreement at the field level for the implementation of "Joint Programmes" would have facilitated the adoption of the so-called pass- through agreement. However this approach, which proved to be effective with humanitarian assistance, has the following constraints: a) it needs specific arrangements at the country level, which slows down the process, b) it generates uncertainty on who is technically and financially accountable for delivery c) the internal rules for determining the Project Support Costs (PSC) vary depending on the agency d) an additional transaction cost of about 2% has to be to granted to the administrative agent.

The new massive political commitment to long term food security, as declared in L’Aquila on July 2009, and the proposal launched for the creation of a Global Fund on Food Security, particularly seen within the framework of a global evolving context, have to be scored as positive and encouraging signals. This, after almost two decades of decreasing aid to agriculture and despite worldwide increases in ODA, are felt as huge developments, and the challenge is coming on the way to support Food Security in the 10 20-year period.

Within that context, there is a remarkable eagerness about coordinating funding, thus providing the EC with the opportunity for building on the experience of the EU-FF.

Taking into account that:

• The implementation of the overall FF is still at the initial stage;

• In some of the countries visited (The Philippines), the projects to be financed either did not 
start or are not yet formally approved;

• Some of the Delegations (e.g. Liberia and The Philippines) still have to adjust to the new load 
of responsibility;

• No global solutions are available and that adjustments and improvements are country specific. 


The following recommendations can be made:

From now onward, HLTF perhaps may devote additional efforts in providing support 
at the country level for improving efficiency of coordination and helping to ensure adequate knowledge and information sharing; hence boosting the capacity of jointly identifying solutions to common problems that may occur during implementation.

As the case may be, improved coordination may be reflected by an adjustment of HLTF structure so that it can count on focal people within their respective organizations rather than with seconded people, so to be able to rely upon specific expertise at the HQ and country level.

Innovative and more flexible rules need to be devised by EC that, though firmly anchored to undisputable principles of coherence, equity and transparency, may cope with unexpected suddenly changing situations and allow for the indispensable leeway, at field and project management level, and prevent further delays and drawbacks in projects implementation.

EC country Delegations may take the opportunity to step up their cooperation with UN agencies, trying to identify shared approaches to the achievement of food security and agricultural development goals, besides pro-actively contributing to an enhanced coordination between HLTF, UN agencies and EC.

The EC Delegations, as it is happening in Liberia and The Philippines, must be endowed, whenever necessary, with additional capacities. These should be especially devoted to: i) the coordination of the FF initiatives, ii) the identification of new alternative options, iii) the conceptualisation of next steps to be undertaken, iv) the active participation of NGOs, v) the regular monitoring of programme unfolding and, vi) the effective implementation of the visibility plan.

In countries where the EU-FF is implemented, the EC Delegations may consider the opportunity to promote the establishment of "temporary" Food Facility Steering

Committees, within broader Food Security coordination structures, with the participation of the government Departments and the UN agencies concerned, as well as other major stakeholders and a representation of relevant NGOs. Indeed, when regulatory and overall guidance tasks would be fulfilled, it could easily be dissolved.

Accordingly, and country specific, it would be advisable that the coordination of the EU Food Facility related actions be entrusted to one of the Government Departments/Institutions that already play a major role in the implementation of the various projects.

The envisaged FF Steering Committees - wherever feasible - under the guidance of the local EC Delegations and in cooperation with concerned UN agencies, could be the originator and promoter of:

-a coordination mechanism that may bring into line capacities, procedures and 
requirements. Such a mechanism not only would foster synergies, but perhaps more important, would prevent unfortunate, wasteful and image- damaging overlapping.

-a shared reporting and monitoring procedures that, though based on purposely designed outlines and simple forms, may satisfy the EU binding requirements.

All concerned agencies, having been operational in the country for sometime, often have an articulated programme of both ongoing and pipeline projects. On the other side, the emergency situations call for a quickness of action that does not allow for the design of innovative ideas and projects. Therefore, the UN agencies strategy of allocating EU FF funds to support or complement established aid schemes or ongoing initiatives should be accepted and endorsed.

There is an ample scope for the EC to consider the possibility of carrying out an interim evaluation of the Food Facility, so to be able to draw perhaps a number of important lessons. This would enable improving the overall exercise in the event it should be repeated or should the need arise in the future to identify an appropriate strategy to allocate funds for Food Security.

8.2       Supply Response from the Agricultural Sector in Developing Countries to Food Price Increases –  July 2010

Executive summary

The present contribution to the analysis of the “Supply Response from the Agricultural Sector in Developing Countries to Food Price Increases” is a rapid, qualitative assessment of the factors which have contributed to the present situation of staple food production.

The study focuses on cereals production and public policies responses. It is based on literature review and six country case studies (Zambia, Benin, Pakistan, Laos, Honduras and Nicaragua).

Given the scarcity of statistical data for the 2008-2010 period and the limited country coverage, this review is only exploratory in nature, while trying to systematically assess the factors which have influenced supply response.

Key findings are the following:

• There is to date no evidence of any significant increase of staple food production in the developing world, in average, over 2007-2010, that could be linked by a causal relationship to the world food prices increase.

• Many developing countries have adopted food-self sufficiency as a new orientation of their agricultural policies and deployed important emergency and mid-term measures to this end. This has entailed over the past three years significant interventions on the inputs and outputs markets.

• World price increases have not been transmitted, in average, at the farm gate level. Consumer prices experienced significant increases (about 50% in real terms in 2008, and they were still 20 higher than pre-crisis prices in July 2009). However, these high consumer prices typically did not translate into increases at the producer level. There are cases of countries where public procurement, however, was offering high prices to farmers (Pakistan, Zambia).

• In some countries where strong production support policy measures were implemented, efforts concentrated on subsidized fertilizer & seed distribution and public procurement schemes (often at fixed prices). Such schemes have reached about a quarter of the peasantry and a third of marketable surplus in Zambia and Benin.

• The countries that have experienced the best supply response are those where both subsidized schemes are implemented together (i.e. fertilizer schemes and public procurement). Zambia for example has experienced two consecutive record crops and even a bumper crop in 2010, reaching unprecedented exports. Pakistan is another example where this kind of combination for rice and wheat has contributed to two consecutive good crops, with above the average net cereals exports.

• High fixed prices for the producer (when fixed prices are used for public procurement) seem to be an incentive that works. Zambia and Pakistan have applied with success prices that were respectively 20% and 50% in nominal terms to the pre-crisis prices.

• Most countries have not experienced significant production increase in average over the past three years. Some of them (like Laos, Nicaragua or Honduras) have been implementing important state driven fertilizer distribution and subsidy schemes but this was not coupled with significant public procurement schemes.

• Inputs distribution seems to have emerged as the single most strategic solution adopted for securing higher levels of staple food in a sustainable manner. In some countries, private sector based inputs distribution is being promoted and developed now based on existing networks (cooperatives or producers organizations, or agro-dealers retail networks) and innovative mechanisms (such as electronic voucher schemes) that ensure a linkage between state subsidy and private sector’s involvement development (Zambia). In other countries (like Benin), the challenge is more complex, because of the non-existence of a pre-existing capacity of the private sector to ensure inputs retail distribution in rural areas.

• Countries are experiencing contradictions between the state driven and subsidized mechanisms that were installed as an emergency response in 2008 and that continue to exist today, and the policy frameworks they had adopted before the crisis. There seems to be a political willingness to maintain this type of instruments operational as part of an “emergency preparedness” strategy. This will need to be taken into consideration while working on overall policy coherence at country level.

• New policy frameworks need to be established that could permit, as a top priority, the actual development of the private sector’s role (producers associations and traders) in inputs distribution and in crops marketing. 
Recommendations addressed to the Food Facility, EC Delegations and the related programmes focus on: i) a study/research agenda; ii) four priority areas of intervention that based on the present study and case studies seem to be relevant for the follow-up of the Food Facility implementation at country level and at global level, and iii) positive experiences observed in case studies that might deserve replication. 
The instruments/programmes that were observed in country case studies and assessed as having a positive impact for promoting sustainable food production increases, and that could be actively supported elsewhere, are principally the following:

Combining (coupling) and implementing simultaneously strong “fertilizer subsidy schemes” and “public procurement schemes” covering a significant share of the national peasantry. This can be achieved either through targeted EC budgetary support or specific technical assistance programmes. The latter must aim at boosting efficiency and effectiveness of practices, and driving them towards “smart fertilizer subsidy” as well as towards public procurement bodies relying on commercial banks (Zambia example, where the total cost of both combined instruments in 2010 was in the range of US$ 125 million).

Supporting that inputs traders replace the state for inputs distribution to small holders: this can be achieved by promoting electronic voucher schemes for access to subsidized inputs by farmers through retail agro-dealers’ shops. Vouches can be instrumental tools to foster the development of the private sector’s involvement in inputs distribution even in remote areas, while diminishing costs, improving accountability and transparency, and allowing for traceability (Zambia example).

Reinforcing public extension services to food crop producers in parallel with the provision of fertilizers, improved seeds and other agricultural inputs. The advantage can be the promotion of the organization of farmers groups and the transmission of good practices, as well as the facilitation of the replacement of the state by the private sector for input distribution, i.e. promoting the voucher systems.

Strengthening farmers’ cooperatives for inputs distribution, marketing facilitation (from bulking at village level up to district and higher levels), and as financial intermediaries. EC and other donor institutions have been strengthening the cooperative sector in Central America. The existing institutions have now a relatively high operational level and are well developed.

Promoting modern market institutions such as market information systems (MIS) of the second generation (mobile phone based), warehouse receipt systems (WRS) and commodity exchanges (Zambia example).

Promoting conservation agriculture (CA), which offers remarkable potential for the sustainability of production and productivity increases (Zambia example).

8.3       Safety Net Interventions financed under the Food Facility – August 2010

Summary

The Global Objective is to assist the European Commission Services in the successful implementation of activities financed under the Food Facility, and to draw lessons for future EC development policies in the field of food security.

The Specific Objective is to complete an analysis of the role of safety net programmes financed under the Food Facility, and to assess their added value in helping people manage risks. Three case studies have been judiciously selected, as per the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the study.

In Senegal, the World Food Programme is the implementing agency, with a Food Facility input of Euro10.9m budget. There are three activity foci, two of which are in the comparative advantage capability of WFP to implement (the third, agricultural production was supposedly to be outsourced to FAO, using its comparative advantage).

In Palestine, UNRWA is the implementing agency, with a Food Facility top-up of Euro39.7m, assigned on May 26th 2009, and all used to plug a gaping hole in UNRWA finances. This was caused in large part by the soaring price of food on the market to enable UNRWA’s safety net programme, itself needed to counterbalance the socio-political dysfunction in that part of the world. In the absence of this windfall, many Palestinians in the Gaza Strip would have perished or starved. The instruments of Direct Support assistance did not change as a result of the FF contribution. Clearly, UNRWA was the right choice of implementing partner, although the involvement of WFP could have been considered to take care of the non-refugees in the Gaza Strip as well.

In Ethiopia, the implementing agency is listed as World Bank in the assignment ToRs, though the Bank’s role is to head the Trust Fund into which programme monies are paid and from which they are drawn down. The true implementing partner is the Food Security Coordinator within the Federal Ministry of Agriculture (MoARD). There are some misgivings by some parties within the Programme that the Public Works component, that uses some 80% of the funds available, falls under MoARD. By the nature of Public Works activities, a lot of the funding goes into Watershed management and MoARD is the appropriate partner for that; yet it is hardly the right partner for irrigation engineering, roads and culverts, schools and clinics. This may explain why in all the latter infrastructural works, questions have been raised over the quality of the work done, though there is a trend for this challenge to be resolved to some extent through training given at woreda level. The FF top-up assigned to the FSNP in 2009 was Euro20m, subsequently topped up again by Euro3.1m, and all used that year, to compensate for the price of the Safety Net food component, in the market place. 

Recommendations whereby future EC Cooperation could be improved to enhance effectiveness and sustainability of Safety Net support measures.

Ethiopia: Commission an FWC in which a facilitator identifies and collates the Terms and Conditions applying to PSNP regular (not contract) staff across the participating Ministries, and at the various levels from Federal to Woreda; then devises through a process of consultation cost-free initiatives to improve the T & C, which are likely to be acceptable to GoE, which the Donor Coordination Team adopt and strongly promote with GoE, in the interests of all stakeholders.

Working through the Donor Coordination Team, under the current chairmanship of Ireland, work to remove the various coordination and management dysfunctions in partnership with the Food Security Coordination Unit; not just in official meetings but through one-on-one rounds of golf, or similar informal settings.

Palestine: Feeding programmes for children amended so that support is given for the whole three years up until pre-school starts, rather than merely for the first six months of life. Yet another example of value being added to both the programme and the beneficiaries. There will be a cost clearly, and the Food Facility could be used to good effect to cover it.

Supply assistance for the discussion on whether food distribution can be replaced by cash. As this seems very complex because of the repercussions on the programmes’ financial situation and the objectives of serving the refugees the best it can, in certain UNRWA circles there is quite a resistance towards the idea. In particular, where food markets are not properly functioning, alternatives should be looked into in order to have more economical actions, by which the saving of funds gives better opportunities for the total programme to be implemented.

Senegal: Further studies are required on the subject of food or cash vouchers versus just cash. UNICEF and the WB have already done such work, but given the reluctance of WFP, because of its prioritising ‘food’ from the inception of the programme, it is advisable that further studies in this subject are done. According to UNICEF, also the IMF’s advice that cash should be used more, for economic reasons as it gives rise to more economic development should be taken into account.

When services of other organisations are supposed to be rendered, it should not be taken for granted that such an organisation steps into the programme, but a contract should be made also with such an organisation. So, if such services are included in a programme one should make certain that such actually happens, lest valuable parts of a project do not get implemented (e.g. involvement of FAO in the Food for Assets programme, which easily could have been brought under the overall FF contract with FAO covering several countries; this was the case with Liberia where a special contract was made with reference to the overall contract).

8.4       Food Facility Beneficiary assessment  –  December 2010

Executive summary

From January to November 2010 a Beneficiaries Assessment (BA) Study was carried out for projects financed under the Food Facility. Three Experts carried out Field missions, each of whom was assigned to one country (Philippines, Cambodia and Zambia).

This Study aims to assist the European Commission services in the successful implementation of activities financed under the Food Facility, to draw lessons for future EC development policies and project design in the field of food security. Its focus is on the beneficiaries of three selected projects financed under the Food Facility. It shall help the Commission services improve the effectiveness of the Food Facility and related actions. The target of the study is to improve the decision making of the managers responsible for the programming and implementation of the Food Facility and other EC funded actions in the field of food security. The goal of the study is improvement the EC’s project and policy design in the field of food security.

The projects assessed are:

Philippines:       “Making Safe Food Available and Accessible to Rural Poor Households in the Philippines” implemented by CARE Nederland;

                        “Focused Food Production Assistance to Vulnerable Sectors” implemented by SEARCA (Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture);

Cambodia:        “Improve the food security of farming families affected by the soaring food prices.” implemented by FAO;

Zambia:            “Responding to soaring food prices: a step towards sustainable agriculture, income generation and empowerment of small-scale farmers in Mazabuka and Monze Districts” implemented by CeLIM.

BA is a qualitative research and management tool for verifying the quality of development interventions. It aims at improving development impacts by gaining beneficiaries’ views of planned and/or on-going activities. The BA objective is to assess the value of an activity as perceived by Project beneficiaries and to integrate findings into Project activities. The BA approach is not intended to replace quantitative surveys and other data gathering methods. It complements these by providing reliable, qualitative, in-depth information on the socio-cultural conditions and perceptions of a Project’s target group. This information is intended to be of immediate use to managers and policy-makers responsible for improving peoples’ well being. BA facilitates the development of demand driven initiates and enhances their sustainability. The approach relies primarily on conversational interviews, backed by prior review of secondary data. In well-guided interviews, people are expected to reveal their feelings, thoughts, and beliefs about particular issues. It uncovers information that would otherwise not come to light. This is particularly important when seeking insight from women and the poor.

The following core topical areas for conversation were selected for this study - the underlined topics were initially presented with the Inception Report:

§ Food availability from local production;

§ Produce marketing channels and selling price movements;

§ Food availability from the market and food price movements;

§ Food crises;

§ Social networks and community-based safety nets;

§ Food aid;

§ Farming support services;

§ Beneficiaries’ participation in the projects;

§ Supply of inputs and services;

§ Beneficiaries’ satisfaction with the projects;

§ Local sustainability mechanisms and institutional capacities.

The Experts’ briefings with the EUDs in the three countries resulted to some extent in modifications of how the above topics were to be covered, subsequently how the conversations were structured and guided. The topics above, which are not underlined, were added before the first Expert went to her Food Facility project areas in the Philippines, and the Cambodia study followed these topics later, while the Zambia study was carried out more in line with the initial core topics due to serious time constraints.

The sample size was determined by the time available to carry out the field level conversations. Between 44 and 66 beneficiaries could be interviewed during the field time available to this study. Therefore, utmost care was taken in representative coverage of all types of beneficiaries, such as better-off, medium-income and poor farmers, wide age range of farmers, equal number of male and female farmers, vulnerable women and women involved in nutrition and supplemental feeding. The sample beneficiaries cover a wide range of food production activities such as rice, maize, goat production, inland fishing, marine fishing, aquaculture, and vegetable growing.

Findings

Most beneficiaries produce for their subsistence. Little produce can be sold to the market or shared with poor families in need. Farmers need income in order to pay other essential necessities and additional food for a better nutrition. Hence, any surplus - as far as available - has to go to the market. However, at present none of the projects includes farmer support activities that would aim at their marketing their eventual surplus production. Dependence on rain-fed agriculture greatly limits farm productivity. Irrigation is absent in all project areas, although natural conditions are conducive to water retention and small irrigation schemes. Fruit and vegetables are usually not being grown by the beneficiaries. Vegetables are generally considered a welcome food source and in addition a good income source. Post-harvest losses due to inappropriate storage occur frequently. Livestock production is an important cash oriented activity in all project areas visited. In all areas covered by this study, natural hazards can have a detrimental impact on farm production. Beneficiaries across the three countries, where the three FF projects are being implemented, see capital as the main requirement for increasing production and income. Some rely largely on professional lenders and some cultures do not know of such approaches.

Networks of communal solidarity that could potentially mitigate impacts of food crises do not exist in all project areas. Such networks could render the impacts of the Food Facility’s short-term assistance more sustainable.

Frequency of support from various services (projects and Government) seems often to be a concern, especially in a context where project duration is short. Agricultural extension officers, fishery officers, agronomy officers of local, District and Provincial offices are often - but not always - involved to varying degrees. Training received from the FF projects is generally found satisfactory and useful. Livestock related training and extension is rather an exception than a general rule - veterinary officers are less available than agriculture specialists.

Physical inputs such as certified seed, fertilisers for the staple crop and for vegetables, tools, other gear and machinery are being well delivered to the beneficiaries, although occasional delays are being encountered. Beneficiary participation depends to one part on the performance of the support mechanisms in so far that the promoted technologies must be supported by timely delivery the necessary inputs. Otherwise, production loss is imminent and farmers lose interest. The beneficiaries receiving inputs and services were generally satisfied with the quality. Often, farmers see the quantity of inputs delivered as a constraint to potential impact, hence, they ask for more inputs.

Increases in farm input prices represent a major constraint to potential benefits beneficiaries could gain from FF projects, particularly in Cambodia. Hence, the beneficiaries are most grateful for the free high-quality inputs (especially seeds) they receive from the projects.

Only in Cambodia beneficiaries have to cope with strongly increased food prices. In most countries marketing does not take place in nearby village markets, due to (semi-) subsistence economic situation. However, in such environments bartering of produce may occur. Prices are very variable across the projects covered by this study. In Zambia, farmers prefer to sell to a Government agency that buys food at subsidised prices above market prices. This is not necessarily an incentive to their participation in the FF project.

The majority of the rural smallholders benefitting from the FF projects eat only two meals a day. The staple food of beneficiary households originates from their own production, with starchy foods dominating the diet. Meal shortages, i.e., the limited ability to purchase food from the market are induced by 1. low agricultural productivity and 2.  low level of income available after costs for other essential items such as schooling, etc. Projects comprise of a nutrition training component aiming mainly at children. Others comprise of a post-harvest or safe food storage component.

Farmers have previously experienced and/or are currently experiencing emergency relief (food aid, cash-for-work and food-for-work) in all of the project areas under this assessment. Disincentive effects of food aid are widely known in so far that farmers’ reliance on food aid is often detrimental to their adoption of new farming technologies such as those proposed by FF projects and regular development projects - farmers have a less innovative and/or self-confident behaviour when they rely on food aid as a supplement to their currently low production that can be increased.

It appears that some of the FF’s implementing partners have commenced field level operations late; hence, their beneficiaries have little knowledge of the specific FF project and not yet experienced all inputs and services. Participation of beneficiaries and local authorities as well as local Government services in project planning is usually known to be an important determinant of project impact. Therefore, the implementing organisations of the FF projects assessed by this study, conducted diligent validation of beneficiaries’ socio-economic situation in screening of beneficiaries for eligibility.

Timely delivery of inputs is key with regard to beneficiaries’ satisfaction and participation over the course of a project. Throughout the projects assessed, beneficiaries are satisfied with the inputs and services (training) provided. However, at the early implementation stages some “critical reticence” exists with regard to the impacts on future yields.

Some of the FF projects assessed have established close working relationships with local services such as agriculture offices, planning and development offices, etc. It seems, however, that traditional authorities - where not yet involved in the projects - could play an important decision-making and advisory role towards sustainability, if they were taught what is technically required to take farm production forward. In remote situations such as in the project intervention areas in the Philippines and in Zambia, local services are often not very effective, which is reflected in beneficiaries’ limited knowledge of other potential sources of support, e.g., nationwide programmes. Beneficiaries are well aware of the “shortness” of the FF projects, hence, in their early stages have doubt about impact and/or are reticent to participate. In some areas they believe that Government services will take over, in others they know that Government services are too weak or resource constrained to continue in a meaningful manner.

Conclusions

Overall, the Food Facility is a short-to-mid-term means for alleviating the negative impact of global food price hikes. The Food Facility implementation, as represented by this assessment, is still at its early stages with numerous inputs and services still to be delivered. Hence, this report can outline only the findings relating to design (e.g., participatory involvement of beneficiaries) and to on-going implementation at the activity level, not at output/result or impact level. Subsequently, a few recommendations can be made with a view to reinforce project operations so that the desired impacts can be reached.

Recommendations

From a global political point of view, it was important and innovative that the EC decided to make funds available for the Food Facility to counter the potential negative impact of global food price increases. In the humanitarian sphere relating to ECHO projects and within organisations such as the FAO/UN, there is at present substantial discussion going on as to how emergency interventions can be linked with development efforts, especially when humanitarian or emergency/relief interventions relate to mitigating impacts of natural hazards and/or climate change impacts on smallholder farm production. In this regard, the Food Facility supports the current global integration initiatives very well. It is desirable that such effort is carried on, in order to contribute to bridging the gap between emergency operations and development interventions. Optimally the lessons learned from the FF projects upon their completion would contribute to recommending specific interventions to regular development interventions. I.e., the FF’s motivation, objectives and knowledge gathered from its project interventions should become part of upcoming development projects.

Urban populations are much more prone to food price increases due to world market price movements of inputs and food. Especially in countries where rural populations feed themselves from their own production (subsistence farming and fishing) and do not have much of a production surplus to sell to the urban areas, the Food Facility might bring some impact to urban populations if national food production can be increased. However, longer-term assistance is required if smallholders are to induce a reduction of costly food imports.

A well defined Food Facility implementation, i.e., rigorous screening for appropriate coverage of the desired impact areas in project proposals - is of utmost importance e.g., surplus marketing is not part of the FF projects assessed by this study, but with a view to longer-term development projects it is important to learn how marketing in the FF projects’ geographical areas can be facilitated. Food security is often understood as just farm-orientated agricultural interventions with the respective accompanying measures in sector governance and management - livestock, fisheries and other income generating activities are often ignored, although household cash income enables food purchases. It is often claimed that the poorest of the poor must be addressed. However, they do not have much opportunity in agriculture - a fact that can be well seen and that is being well addressed by the projects in the Philippines, Cambodia and Zambia, as they have chosen to work with farm households who have good potential to improve food supply for themselves and for their communities including the landless. A non-discriminating and wider livelihoods approach aiming at food security for farmers and the landless alike often proves to bring more significant changes than approaches that focus on one major income earning activity such as agriculture. However, none of the beneficiaries covered by the present study point to activities and desired impacts apart from agriculture. Some even point specifically to their livestock and fisheries related constraints. This could mean that the three FF projects have so far not undertaken sufficient efforts to deal with their aquaculture (Philippines) component and income generating activities (Cambodia). Further scrutiny or monitoring is required to make sure the projects address all of their desired outputs appropriately.

§ Projects should focus in the course of the remaining implementation time on making their impact sustainable. While beneficiaries are confident that benefits will accrue from the projects, the Food Facility needs to ensure proper monitoring and quantification of such (potential) gains.

§ Although the Food Facility’s support to poor farmers through subsidised or free inputs is justified in view of the FF’s scope and objectives, longer-term emphasis is required on stepwise smallholder empowerment and on building of their self-confidence. The Food Facility cannot fully address this issue, as it is limited to 3-years duration. However, EDF development projects as well as ECHO/DIPECHO interventions can learn from the FF project lessons learned.

§ Projects should urgently address marketing aspects. The more surplus a farmer will be able to produce, the more he needs reliable outlets in terms of price and quantity. Community-based storage facilities as well as marketing collectives, and possibly cell phone based price information systems could allow farmers to maximise their incomes by selling at the right time to the right buyer.

§ Wherever viable and/or where micro-finance (community) organisations are present in the communities, supporting measures should be added.

§ Project planning must mandatorily consider and implementation must absolutely respect cultural calendars, so that inputs are available to the farms exactly at the time when they are needed. The management of the projects under the Food Facility needs to look into procurement procedures for physical inputs as practiced by any proposed partner in order to eliminate further undesirable delays.

§ Productive support through income generating activities should be made possible to the otherwise excluded poorest, i.e., the landless farm workers and gatherers.

§ Mitigation of the negative impacts of natural disasters such as typhoons, floods and droughts is mandatory in areas where they occur and the FF intervenes. The risk of losing production to these hazards can in such areas annihilate the complete FF effort. As it is not the Food Facility’s mandate to mitigate disaster caused by natural calamities, it s recommended for the three projects support is sought from specialised agencies that can help to reduce the imminent disaster risk (e.g., ECHO/DIPECHO).

§ It is mandatory to provide continuous hands-on training and follow-up built on participation of and frequent interaction with beneficiaries. To this end, communities shall be organized and empowered to multiply newly acquired knowledge onto a wider range of beneficiaries. This is of utmost importance in the FF context, where shorter-term interventions are taking place, i.e., the time window to impact is narrow.

§ Where appropriate, stronger inclusion of livestock related activities/innovations and/or of fishing/aquaculture related activities/innovations to cater for additional income to supplement expected benefits from the current agriculture-focused interventions.

§ Also timing of nutrition advice is equally important. As the subject matter is about behaviour changes, constant and long-term assistance is required if real impact is to be achieved.

§ Co-operation between and co-ordination of local authorities, Government services, NGOs and Community Based Organisations is also important. Capacity building of local services should be considered.

9.         FOOD FACILITY FINAL EVALUATION

9.1       Executive Summary 9.1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The current evaluation[12] assesses the European Union Food Facility (Regulation 1337/2008) as an instrument and the European Commission’s cooperation activities under this instrument over the period 2008 to 2011. The geographical scope includes all 49 countries where Food Facility funded activities were undertaken[13]. The objective of the evaluation was to ascertain whether the objectives have been met, to enable the formulation of conclusions based on objective, credible, reliable and valid findings and to formulate recommendations with a view to improving relevant future development cooperation operations.

9.1.2 Background of the evaluation

The volatility of food prices and agricultural inputs in 2007 and 2008 put numerous developing countries and their populations in a dramatic situation and put the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at risk. Moreover, the rising prices have resulted in riots, unrest and instability in several countries, jeopardising the achievements of years of political development and peacekeeping investments. This Food Price Crisis (FPC) demanded short-medium term action from the international community, in order to mitigate its effects on the poor in developing countries.

The FAO launched its Initiative on Soaring Food Prices (ISFP) in December 2007, in response to the urgent needs of the most vulnerable people faced with skyrocketing prices and difficult choices. In April 2008, the Chief Executive Board (CEB) of the United Nations established a High-Level Task Force (UNHLTF) on the Global Food Crisis, under the leadership of the UN Secretary-General. The UNHTLF proposed a unified response to the FPC and a global strategy and action plan, the so-called Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA).

The FAO High-Level Conference on World Food Security in June 2008 called on the international community to increase its assistance to developing countries. This call was echoed by the G8+ Summit in Japan the following month, where the President of the European Commission announced the Commission's intention to propose a quick response ‘Facility’ of 1 billion EUR to diminish the effects of the on-going FPC.

The first EU intervention decisions made in 2008 to mitigate the Food Price Crisis originated from existing EC instruments: the EDF-B envelope (185.9 million EUR), FSTP (50 million EUR) and ECHO (210 million EUR). However, the amount made available or reallocated through these existing instruments was insufficient to address the financial requirements for responding to the FPC. On 16 December 2008, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation, establishing a “facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries” (this was to become the European Union Food Facility - EU FF). Operating over a 3-year period from 2009-2011, the fund was intended to bridge the gap between emergency aid and medium to long-term development assistance. Its primary objectives were to: i) encourage food producers to increase supply in targeted countries and regions; ii) support activities to respond rapidly and directly to mitigate the negative effects of volatile food prices on local populations in line with global food security objectives, including UN standards for nutritional requirements; and iii) strengthen the productive capacities and governance of the agricultural sector so as to enhance the sustainability of interventions.

The 1 billion EUR EU FF was planned and designed with a view to complementing existing EU policies and strategies in the field of Food Security over a three-year period. Fifty-seven percent of the total budget was channelled through UN agencies and the World Bank, while the remainder was disbursed through budget support, non-state actors, member states agencies and regional organisations.

9.1.3 Methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation approach is based on a reconstruction of the intervention logic and is structured around ten evaluation questions, with corresponding judgment criteria and indicators. These evaluation questions are linked to the five DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability), coherence, EC added value and to a number of other key issues. Answers to individual evaluation questions were found, and overall conclusions reached, through an approach consisting of; i) an overall inventory and typology of the interventions financed under the EU FF; ii) the collection of information from all 232 interventions financed during the desk study phase; iii) field visits to 12 of the beneficiary countries; iv) the analysis of surveys completed by the EU Delegations; v) a consultation of all available project documents; vi) studies of 231 ROM reports; vii) interviews with stakeholders from the EC HQ and FAO, UNHLTF, EU delegations, and viii) project level interviews and focus groups.

9.1.4 Main Findings related to the EU FF as an instrument

The EC, through its decision to support the coordinated international response to the FPC, has brought food security and rural development at the forefront of its own development cooperation agenda and of the international development agenda. In addition, the EC has gained significant visibility through the implementation of the EU FF, thus strengthening its leading role in the international response.

The creation of the EU FF was the sole means at the disposal of the Commission to rapidly commit a substantial volume of funds to the agricultural and food security sectors in countries affected by the FPC. By creating a “specific instrument” in response to the FPC, agricultural development and food security were brought to the forefront of the EC's development cooperation and the international development agenda[14]. This achievement would not have been accomplished by simply increasing funding through existing instruments, which have a far more limited visibility.

The EU FF enabled the rapid increase in the overall volume of funds directed through EU cooperation to the agricultural and rural sector as part of a coordinated international response to the food price crisis. Although the EU re-deployed other instruments in response to the crisis, these were not sufficiently flexible enough or lacked the sufficient funding to allow the necessary response to the crisis. So, the creation of a specific instrument was necessary.

The instrument provided a rapid response to the crisis and allowed the EU to conduct a dialogue in global fora and with partner countries. The announcement that the EU would contribute 1 billion EUR towards the L’Aquila commitments, whereby countries would seek to mobilise 22 billion USD (14.3 billion EUR), strengthened these commitments, afforded a high visibility to the EU and made it a leader in the accomplishment of this initiative.

At the instrument level, substantial resources were attributed with a reduced administrative burden for important interventions.

The EU FF is fully coherent with the 2008 Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security and supports the pillars of Food Security[15] in countries affected by the FPC, however, support is concentrated on triggering a supply response from the smallholder-farming sector.

The EU FF instrument enjoyed a high flexibility for intervention, which translated into interventions across a wide range of activities. The main share of interventions financed under the EU FF sought to increase the availability of food through an intensification of production by smallholders. The other pillars of Food Security (access to quality food/nutrition) were also tackled by some of the interventions, but to a lesser extent. There is a broad consistency and coherence between EU FF interventions, EC instruments and other donors’ interventions. Coordination was also satisfactory. In fact, the EU FF is fully in line with the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security and the Paris Declaration.

The EU FF was programmed as a short to medium-term instrument and its activities were concentrated in short-term support.

The EU FF was programmed as a short to medium-term instrument in order to act as a bridge between emergency and long-term development, even though by 2008 it was expected that food prices would remain volatile in the mid-term. Due to the short time period available, the interventions concentrated on promoting resilience and reducing the effects of the FPC on the most affected groups. However, the underlying causes (both natural and man-made) of food insecurity in target countries remain out of the scope of the EU FF. Although there are no plans for continuing the EU FF with another instrument at this stage, a number of projects financed under the EU FF have benefitted or will benefit from further financing under long-term instruments (FSTP, EDF).

The selection of countries benefitting from the EU FF was based on a set of criteria defined in the appendix to the regulation, however, not all targeted countries were the “most affected” by the FPC and the large number of beneficiary countries resulted in a dispersion of efforts.

The choice of partner countries benefitting from the EU FF was made according to a set of criteria laid down in the appendix to the regulation. Initially, the proposal was to work in 35 countries but this was increased to 50 countries in the regulation adopted by European Parliament. All countries chosen met the set criteria: many countries were strongly hit by the FPC, whilst other countries with advanced food security measures already in place, found these were jeopardised by the FPC. In these countries, the support provided under the EU FF helped national policy-makers to continue the implementation of their national measures, despite the FPC (e.g. Jamaica, Malawi).

The establishment of the EU FF within a timeframe of only 10 months and the management of the implementation process demonstrated the high efficiency of all participating institutions.

To establish the EU FF within a timeframe of only 10 months involved enormous preparatory work and inter-institutional coordination, thus the achievement of the creation of the Facility in this short time frame can be considered a considerable success. The EC HQ and EUDs demonstrated a very efficient management of the EU FF. Less than 2% of the EU FF funds were used for EC administrative support. The recruitment of additional contractual agents under the EU FF permitted an adequate follow-up and coordination of interventions.

The use of UN organisations, many of them with a presence in the target countries and with well-established direct relations to the Ministry of Agriculture, facilitated the identification of interventions.

The initial programming of interventions was carried out on the basis of a Country Needs Assessments (CNAs) performed by UN organisations. These CNAs revealed the extent of the crisis and proposed responses in each country. However, CNAs were somewhat limited by their lack of involvement of other key stakeholders and by not considering Non-State Actors (NSAs) and Budget Support (BS) as possible channels of support.

Interventions financed under the EU FF were effective in both mitigating the effects of the FPC on the direct beneficiaries of the interventions and in promoting resilience within these populations.

The support provided corresponded to the needs of the beneficiaries. The FPC has caused or aggravated the food insecurity in target countries. Although the support provided under the EU FF arrived some months after the peak in global food prices, it did arrive in time to deal with the effects of this crisis and tackle food insecurity. Nevertheless, it reached a limited proportion of the vulnerable population at the target country level. This leads to the question: to what extent was fragmentation between a large number of countries and implementing partners justified or would it have been more effective to concentrate efforts in fewer countries through a better sectoral and geographical division of labour with other partners?

The EU FF was completed in 2012 when all the interventions financed were closed, administratively speaking. Although food prices remain high and the overall food security situation in many countries has not improved, no new interventions can be financed. Whilst resilience has been achieved with direct beneficiaries of EU FF interventions and in countries with a favourable context, there could still be a need for financing other interventions on an ad-hoc basis where needed (in addition to emergency support which can be provided by ECHO).

9.1.5 Main Findings related to interventions financed under the EU FF

Interventions financed under the EU FF were in line with the capacities and strategies of the targeted countries and regions, and corresponded to the needs of the targeted beneficiaries. Most interventions promoted a supply response from the smallholder-farming sector.

The interventions financed focused on triggering a supply response from the smallholder-farming sector, and were thus important for poverty reduction. However, this strategy did not encourage a positive supply response beyond direct beneficiaries. There was a predominance of interventions related to agricultural and local development, but only a few interventions were in favour of the urban population or focused on tackling nutrition (food consumption).

The delays in starting activities at the field level were frequent, however, in most cases these had been recovered by the end of the project. Efficiency of implementation varied greatly according to country, project and implementation channel.

The quality of management of interventions through implementing partners and the coordination of activities with national governments and EUDs was generally good. About 60% of the interventions financed were upgrades of existing projects, thus enabling a quicker start-up of activities at the field level. Thus, about 75% of all projects were implemented without significant delays. However, because of the pace of planning many projects (notably 50% of those from IOs) had to be amended in the course of their implementation. Projects tended to be overambitious in their design given the time available. However, in most cases delays had been recovered by the end of the project, and foreseen activities implemented, which is important efficiency-wise.

The efficiency of interventions varied greatly according to interventions, countries and implementing partners. The dispersion of support to about 49[16] countries and more than 232 interventions has multiplied the costs related to staff (national and international), vehicles and operational costs. A concentration of support in fewer countries and larger interventions (possibly under budget support) would increase efficiency. Partner management costs were limited to 7% of project costs, although this masks the fact that some of the International Organisations projects subcontracted large share of the work – therefore inducing an additional level of management costs.

The implementation of projects under multi-country contribution agreements facilitated the approval of interventions on the one hand, but made monitoring interventions more complex. As multi-country contribution agreements were centrally managed, the role of the EU Delegations remained limited. Even if projects started officially with the signature of the Financial Agreements, implementation at the field level often showed some delays.

The interventions financed with regional organisations complemented on-going support provided by the EU through other financial sources (e.g. Intra-ACP cooperation). The support provided was intended to mitigate the effects of the FPC at the regional level and speed up the resilience of the target region.

The blend of partners and implementing modalities were generally good. Comparative advantages of partners could have been better factored in project attribution for some specific countries or contexts.

UN organisations showed a considerably higher absorption capacity than national and international NSAs. So, without attributing a considerable share of funds to UN organisations, the administrative burden on the EU would have considerably increased and the response of the EU FF would not have been as quick as it has been. The final choice of channels for intervention – International Organisations, NSAs, BS and Regional Organisations – was reflected in the needs and the specific situation of each country and complied with the specific objectives of the regulation.

Ownership of the projects was generally good with close linkages to governments at the national, regional or local levels.

Although governments were not generally involved in the management of the projects, except for Budgetary Support, project ownership by governments (at all levels) was generally good. All interventions were in line (or at least did not contrast with) national policies for the agricultural and food security sectors. International Organisations had a permanent dialogue with national Ministries of Agriculture, thus ensuring national ownership of projects. Projects implemented by NSAs were usually closely coordinated with local and regional government structures.

Interventions corresponded to needs of direct beneficiaries and the level of effectiveness was good, however, the sustainability of many of the achievements remains fragile.

The specific objectives corresponded well to the needs generated by the FPC and were generally in line with the needs assessments undertaken by UN organisations and other stakeholders. Relatively few interventions contributed to support measures such as safety net measures aiming at addressing basic food needs, and nutrition while most contributed to boosting agricultural production. Interventions demonstrated a good level of effectiveness at the direct beneficiaries' level and directly targeted communities and regions, resulting in real increases in production and resilience to future shocks:

- Production capacity and sector governance (at a local level) were increased through targeted actions. Direct beneficiaries reported often very important increases in production thanks to the improved access to agricultural inputs and technical support. If increases in production/yields were not achieved and/or reported this was due to climatic problems or simply due to the fact that the agricultural seasons were not yet completed at the time of the evaluators' visits.

- Strengthened (or new) farmers’ organisations were better able to manage the use of shared facilities, gain access to markets and claim their rights with local authorities.

- Investments in infrastructure and capacity building increased the production capacity of farmers and made them less vulnerable to future shocks.

However, at the time of the final evaluation of the EU FF, it was too early for a final assessment of the projects' achievements. Many projects had only recently completed their activities (training, infrastructure, etc.) and aggregated data on project achievements (increase in production, increase in yields, reduction of losses, etc.) were not all available. Interventions financed under the EU FF did not significantly influence food prices which remained high due to many other factors.

The sustainability of achievements is variable and will depend on whether national governments, the EU or other donors will continue to support beneficiaries in order to consolidate the achievements made. The 2-year time span of many of the medium-term projects was too short to guarantee lasting results. Cash/food for work schemes did not require sustainability, and even though the immediate crisis is over, much remains to be done to achieve lasting food security.

9.1.6 Recommendations

As the EU FF instrument has already come to its end, the following recommendations were formulated, with reference to; (1) the design of future specific instruments for similar situations and; (2) EU support for countries affected by the food price crisis.

The EU should consider converting the EU FF into a permanent “Stand-by” instrument, in order to respond rapidly to upcoming and sudden Food Price Crisis, and mitigate impacts on food insecurity situations. In the case of permanent, recurrent, or cyclical food insecurity situations, the instrument could mainly be used for mitigating the effects that have “deepened” existing food insecurity situations. Food Security should remain on the top of the long term programmed cooperation of the EU in line with the Agenda for Change.

The design of future specific instruments should be more focused, so expected results can be achieved in the initially foreseen time-frame and resources. In this respect and as advocated in the “Agenda for Change”, the EU should concentrate its support to the most affected countries and strategic beneficiaries to ensure resources are allocated where maximum impact can be achieved. In addition, the EU should ensure complementarity through sectoral division of labour with EU Member States and UN organisations.

Prior to the creation of any instrument, it is recommended to carry out a problem analysis and adopt a single primary objective tackling specific issues and clearly defined beneficiaries.

At country and interventions level, the EU should be involved in Country Needs Assessments and facilitate civil society participation. If needs assessments and design of interventions are outsourced to UN Organisations, and/or top up existing operations, it is recommendable to follow EU methodological instruments, and clearly define the expected results to be achieved with the EC's contribution in the timeframe foreseen.

In addition, efforts should concentrate on supporting interventions clearly linked to the objective of the instrument when selecting individual interventions at country level.

When selecting partners and aid modalities, the EU should pay specific attention to the comparative advantages provided by different implementation channels. At the design stage, and in light of tight timeframes, specific attention should be given to ensuring sustainability through systematic inclusion of built-in exit or handing out strategies. Because of the very nature of food security, attention to horizontal aspects, which might negatively affect the workload of women and put pressure on the environment should also receive specific attention at the design stage.

At a more strategic level, the EC (under its programmed cooperation) should continue to play an active role in policy dialogue at the country level and help the governments of partner countries realise the importance and multi-sector dimension of food security. Underlying causes negatively affecting food security should be established and adequately tackled by Governments in their national policies.

Finally, EU interventions should endeavour to systematise lessons learnt and share experiences with implementing partners (on the basis of an agreed system). Specific attention should be given to questions of the replicability of interventions and to the cost-benefit analysis of the interventions (ex-post review).

9.1.7 Lessons learned

At strategic level

The EC has shown that it is possible to rapidly establish an effective instrument in response to an unforeseen need. The lessons learnt show that delays in implementations can be avoided or reduced if; (1) the implementing partners are already present in the project region and an established relationship with target groups and governments already exists; (2) project design is simple and does not include too many different levels of actors; and (3) all the interventions are simply to top up existing projects. 

A single primary objective and log-frame for the instrument would lead to greater clarity on the proposed intervention logic and facilitate the monitoring of the progress of achievements.

Budget support measures are a suitable instrument if a country has already "qualified" for BS interventions from international donors (especially the EU) and if a government has its own adequate response to a crisis. The assistance provided under the EU FF, in the form of budgetary support, was in addition to the support provided by the EU through other instruments and partner countries. As such, it is thus impossible to isolate the impact achieved thanks to this additional support. However, as BS interventions support the implementation of national policies, there is a rather high probability that these interventions will be sustainable after the end of the EU FF's support.

Focusing assistance on marginalised farmers with sufficient production potential increases food security at a community level, but does not necessarily improve food availability in urban areas and/or influence price development. The question of replicability of interventions at national level and at what cost should be considered at the moment of project approval.

Policy issues need to be specifically included in major programmes funded with international organisations. Without a strong policy element there is a greater chance of crises being repeated in the future.

It is particularly important to carefully address sustainability issues in one-off instruments such as the EU FF, as there is no guarantee that programmes or funds will be available for follow-up projects.

An instrument that is designed to respond to a single challenge (the food price crisis) must take into account in its programming the many other external factors that affect food prices and availability. In this case, the EU FF had to work against a background of climate change, global fuel price and financial crises and many other regional and national crises such as droughts, floods and earthquakes.

At operational level

The establishment of global contracts makes it difficult for EUDs to follow up the EU FF interventions at a national level. The EU FF contained many medium- and longer-term actions. The severe time constraints on these projects (including all the NGO projects) did not allow for as much impact as could have been achieved with a longer implementation period.

On the one hand, the use of UN Agencies enabled a high absorption capacity of funds and relatively quick service delivery at field level. On the other, the rather lengthy procedures needed to initiate WB projects and the difficulties associated with setting up a regional programme make these two modalities less suitable for programmes designed to produce a rapid response to a crisis (with the exception of the topping up of existing programmes).

Fast track procedures allow for a quick approval of interventions. However, in order to achieve a quick implementation at field level, fast track procedures for implementation (at the implementing partner level) should also be applied.

Under the EU FF, many actions which would have needed a medium to long-term implementation period to reach their full impact, instead reduced their implementation period so as to make them eligible for EU FF funding.

Input distribution interventions enjoy a better impact when combined with strengthening extension services to farmers and improved market access. Seed production systems give results in the medium to long term only. To achieve good results, better cooperation between research institutions, extension services, seed producing farmers, traders and consuming farmers is necessary and seeds have to be tested under farm conditions.

10.       EU FOOD FACILITY VISIBILITY LINKS

1. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/184a_foodfacility_en.pdf

2. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/185a_foodfacility_auction_floor_en.pdf

3. http://www.tvlink.org/mediadetails.php?key=46e49706d858ccfe5bdf&title=Responding+to+the+global+food+crisis+-+EU+Food+Facility+Programme&titleleft=EU%20in%20the%20World

4. http://www.tvlink.org/mediadetails.php?key=114402889ffe33364bed&title=Food+facility%3A+A+global+food+crisis+response&titleleft=Social%20affairs

5. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xdlh9c_eu-food-facility-en_news

6. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xqlmwb_inside-story-the-eu-s-food-facility-plan-08-april-pt1_news?ralg=meta2-only#from=playrelon-1

[1] Estimation from the data of 147 reports out of 198 projects implemented by International Organisations, Non State Actors, and Member States Agencies.

[2] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6vDhDqlBvA&feature=autoplay&list=PLF80520918D66B21D&playnext=2

[3] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VubZHcxRDjs

[4] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhjiV-UJtJ4

[5] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzArWgeYts0

[6] Implementing partners were CAid UK, CARITAS Bel, CISP, DCA, GRC, IDE UK, LVIA, Oxfam GB, SHA, and VITA.

[7] Implementing partners were CA UK, CARITAS, CISP, DCA, IDE, GRC, LVIA, Oxfam GB, REST, and VITA.

[8] Implementing partners were CAid UK, CARE, CARITAS, IDE UK, and TROCAIRE.

[9] EU-FF projects engaged in the construction grain banks/stores were CAid UK, CARE, CARITAS, CISP, DCA, IDE UK, GRC, LVIA, Oxfam GB, SHA, and VITA.

[10] 10 countries versus 15 countries planned in initial programming and allocation amounting EUR 165.3 million.

[11] FAO “Country responses to the food security crisis. Nature and preliminary implications of the policies pursued.” Based on information obtained from 81 countries, the two most widely applied market and trade policy measures were reduction of tariffs or custom fees, as reported by 43 countries, and selling grain from public stocks or from imports, as reported by 35 countries. Reducing tariffs is among the easiest measures to implement. Some 23 countries suspended or reduced VAT and other taxes, while 25 countries restricted or banned exports. Price controls were reported in 21 countries, with 10 of these in Africa. A number of countries have applied two, three or even four different market and trade measures to bring down domestic prices.

[12] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/intervention-areas/ruraldev/food_intro_en.htm

[13] The EU FF regulation 1337/228 laid down the requirement to carry out appropriate external evaluation of the activities carried out under the regulation. An external final evaluation was launched in May 2011.

[14] The share of ODA devoted to agriculture reached a level of 19 percent in 1980, but fell to 3.8 percent in 2006. However it seems that this trend is slightly reversing.

[15] Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy  life. The four pillars of food security are availability, access, utilization and stability. The nutritional dimension is integral to the concept of food security (Source: FAO World Summit on Food Security, 16-18.11.2009)

[16] Comoros was initially foreseen as a beneficiary country but finally did not receive support from the instrument.