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Document 52013SC0107
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Final Report on the implementation of the Food Facility
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Final Report on the implementation of the Food Facility
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Final Report on the implementation of the Food Facility
/* SWD/2013/0107 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Final Report on the implementation of the Food Facility /* SWD/2013/0107 final */
Table des matières 1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 3 2.
ALLOCATIONS PER COUNTRY AND IMPLEMENTATION MODE..................... 4 2.1 State of play: Financing
decisions, initial programming and final outlook.................... 4 2.2 Detailed allocations per
country and per implementing channel................................... 6 3. FOOD
FACILITY MAIN INPUTS AND BENEFICIARIES...................................... 16 3.1 Inputs distributed by
implementing partner................................................................ 16 3.2 Direct and Indirect
Beneficiaries.................................................................................... 19 4.
PARTNERSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 20 4.1 State of play of the
contracts at 31 December 2012...................................................... 20 4.2 Main lessons learned from
the projects implemented by International Organisations 22 4.3 Success stories: Zambia,
Mozambique, Cambodia, Cuba, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone 25 5. CALL
FOR PROPOSALS IMPLEMENTATION MODE......................................... 29 5.1 Distribution per EU FF objective.................................................................................... 29 5.2 Lessons learned from the
Food Facility.......................................................................... 29 5.3 Success stories :
Mali, Kenya, Bangladesh, Lao LDR, Tanzania, Nepal, and Ethiopia. 30 5.4 Learning from NGOs - EU FF
case study in Ethiopia.................................................... 34 6.
BUDGET SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION MODE.................................................. 36 6.1 State of play Budget
Support allocations....................................................................... 36 6.2 Lessons learned............................................................................................................... 36 6.3 Examples of EUFF Budget
Support interventions......................................................... 37 7.
RESULTS-BASED GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT........................................ 38 7.1 Performance of EU Food Facility projects monitored................................................... 38 7.2 EU FF projects ROM scores
per region.......................................................................... 43 7.3 EU FF projects ROM scores
per implementing channel............................................... 44 7.4 Main ROM recommendations
and lessons learned...................................................... 46 8. FOOD
FACILITY STUDIES......................................................................................... 47 8.1 Institutional response by
the UN system to the global food price crisis and the EU Food Facility –
November 2009....................................................................................................................... 47 8.2 Supply Response from the
Agricultural Sector in Developing Countries to Food Price Increases – July
2010 50 8.3 Safety Net Interventions
financed under the Food Facility – August 2010.................. 52 8.4 Food Facility Beneficiary
assessment – December 2010.............................................. 54 9. FOOD
FACILITY FINAL EVALUATION.................................................................... 60 9.1 Executive Summary........................................................................................................ 60 9.1.1 Purpose of the evaluation.............................................................................................. 60 9.1.2 Background of the evaluation....................................................................................... 60 9.1.3 Methodology of the evaluation..................................................................................... 61 9.1.4 Main Findings related to the EU FF as
an instrument................................................... 62 9.1.5 Main Findings related to interventions
financed under the EU FF................................. 65 9.1.6 Recommendations......................................................................................................... 67 9.1.7 Lessons learned.............................................................................................................. 68 10. EU
FOOD FACILITY VISIBILITY LINKS................................................................ 70
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Staff Working Document (SWD) accompanying the Food Facility
Final Report is a technical document which aims to present the implementation
of the EU Food Facility, its outcomes, and the lessons learned, building
notably on the findings of the Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) reports, the
implementing partners Final Reports, the Studies
requested throughout the implementation of the Food Facility, the Surveys
filled by 49 EU Delegations and the Food Facility Final Evaluation exercise. From 2009 to 2011, the Food Facility aimed to respond to the
effects of the 2007-2008 food crisis through 232 interventions implemented in
49 countries worst hit by high food prices. The scope of the SWD covers the
whole range of interventions implemented to achieve the three objectives of the
Food Facility which are (i) to encourage a positive supply response from the
agricultural sector, (ii) to respond rapidly and directly to mitigate the
negative effects of volatile food prices on local populations, and (iii) to
strengthen the productive capacities and the governance of the agricultural
sector to enhance the sustainability of interventions. In order to implement effectively such a significant number of
interventions over a three-year period, a blend of implementing partners has
been used including partner countries, Regional, International, and
Non-Governmental Organisations and Member States agencies allowing the
programmes to achieve their objectives swiftly and paving the way for long-term
food security and rural development programmes. The SWD details the Food
Facility implementation, outcomes and lessons learned according to the
distinctive characteristics of each implementing partner and objective
achieved. In this connection, the Food Facility contributed to support
agricultural development and food security with a focus on triggering a
medium term agricultural supply response from smallholders. The Food
Facility improved vulnerable households’ access to agricultural inputs (seed,
fertilizer, small equipment etc.), which contributed to intensify and diversify
smallholder production and to increase crop areas where land was available. A particular emphasise has been placed on smallholders’
capacity building, in particular
through farmers’ organisations and on the construction of local infrastructures and facilities including irrigation, water harvesting and conservation, rural
roads, markets, storage facilities etc. This contributed to improve
smallholders’ agricultural development, reduce post-harvest losses and boost a
greater integration in the local and national markets. In addition, the Food Facility improved the food security situation and the nutritional status of the most
vulnerable people. Nutrition programmes mostly targeted women and
children through safety nets interventions and/or improved food production with projects encouraging for
example crop and livestock diversification, contributing to a greater diversity
of food availability. While programmes were completed recently, the
SDW presents a number of success stories to grasp a view
of the short-term impact of
Food Facility interventions on boosting agricultural
productivity and on taking the initial steps needed to prevent, as far as
possible, further food insecurity situations.
2. ALLOCATIONS PER
COUNTRY AND IMPLEMENTATION MODE
2.1 State of play: Financing
decisions, initial programming and final outlook
Date || Financing Decision || Allocation in million EUR 30/03/2009 || C (2009) 2184 || 313,9 29/04/2009 || C (2009) 3068 || 393,8 09/12/2009 || C (2009) 9932 || 104,5 09/12/2009 || C (2009) 9883 || 17,4 22/12/2009 || C (2009) 10249 || 7,75 22/04/2010 || C (2010) 2449 || 145,3 01/06/2011 || C (2011) 3732 || - TOTAL || || 982,65 Country || Initial Country Allocation || Final Country Allocation || Difference (amount changed) Afghanistan || 24,200,000 || 24,301,279 || 101,279 Bangladesh || 50,000,000 || 52,245,061 || 2,245,061 Benin || 12,900,000 || 15,716,463 || 2,816,463 Bolivia || 9,550,000 || 9,550,000 || 0 Burkina Faso || 23,700,000 || 25,199,393 || 1,499,393 Burma-Myanmar || 24,400,000 || 23,400,000 || 1,000,000 Burundi || 13,400,000 || 14,257,778 || 857,778 Cambodia || 17,200,000 || 17,891,273 || 691,273 Central African Republic || 10,000,000 || 9,672,829 || 327,171 Comoros || 3,600,000 || 0 || 3,600,000 Cuba || 11,700,000 || 11,700,000 || 0 DR Congo || 40,600,000 || 39,685,789 || 914,211 Eritrea || 12,800,000 || 13,565,916 || 765,916 Ethiopia || 45,400,000 || 41,879,712 || 3,520,288 Gambia || 5,500,000 || 5,300,000 || 200,000 Ghana || 20,900,000 || 20,708,863 || 191,137 Guatemala || 15,000,000 || 15,878,781 || 878,781 Guinea Bissau || 8,400,000 || 8,090,682 || 309,318 Guinea Conakry || 13,500,000 || 9.591.035 || 3,908,965 Haiti || 19,800,000 || 19,649,974 || 150,026 Honduras || 9,900,000 || 9,900,000 || 0 Jamaica || 5,900,000 || 5,802,649 || 97,351 Kenya || 31,200,000 || 31,293,179 || 93,179 Kyrgyz Republic || 7,000,000 || 6,700,000 || 300,000 Lao PDR || 10,800,000 || 10,845,860 || 45,860 Lesotho || 6,000,000 || 5,408,030 || 591,970 Liberia || 13,650,000 || 15,148,556 || 1,498,556 Madagascar || 21,800,000 || 12,425,639 || 9,374,361 Malawi || 17,900,000 || 18,464,077 || 564,077 Mali || 25,150,000 || 24,749,926 || 400,074 Mauritania || 7,600,000 || 7,482,801 || 117,199 Mozambique || 23,200,000 || 22,205,774 || 994,226 Nepal || 23,300,000 || 22,995,639 || 304,361 Nicaragua || 7,150,000 || 7,585,986 || 435,986 Niger || 19,200,000 || 19,549,944 || 349,944 OPT Palestine || 39,700,000 || 39,700,000 || 0 Pakistan || 50,000,000 || 49,261,229 || 738,771 Philippines || 31,900,000 || 31,352,114 || 547,886 Rwanda || 15,600,000 || 15,600,000 || 0 Sao Tomé e Principe || 2,100,000 || 1,700,063 || 399,937 Senegal || 14,500,000 || 18,163,541 || 3,663,541 Sierra Leone || 19,050,000 || 18,654,294 || 395,706 Somalia || 14,400,000 || 13,975,933 || 424,067 Sri Lanka || 5,200,000 || 5,127,252 || 72,748 Tajikistan || 15,500,000 || 15,170,000 || 330,000 Tanzania || 32,400,000 || 31,589,770 || 810,230 Togo || 13,700,000 || 14,288,303 || 588,303 Yemen || 21,300,000 || 20,143,789 || 1,156,211 Zambia || 16,300,000 || 22,058,953 || 5,758,953 Zimbabwe || 15,400,000 || 17,112,596 || 1,712,596 TOTAL CHANGES || || || 55,743,154
2.2 Detailed allocations per
country and per implementing channel
IO: International Organization CfP: Call for Proposals BS: Budge Support
3. FOOD FACILITY MAIN
INPUTS AND BENEFICIARIES
3.1 Inputs distributed by
implementing partner
3.2 Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries
Total
number of beneficiaries[1] Implementing Partner || Direct Beneficiaries || Indirect Beneficiaries UNICEF || 23,274,085 || 9,541,224 FAO || 18,291,970 || 34,185,440 NGOs / Member States Agencies || 10,748,991 || 28,020,397 WFP || 4,426,134 || 10,212,455 WB || 1,181,135 || 8,558,342 UNDP || 714,095 || 3,185,877 UNRWA || 396,006 || 0 TOTAL || 59,032,416 || 93,703,735
4. PARTNERSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS
4.1 State of play of the contracts
at 31 December 2012
IO/RO || Contracts || Amount contracted AU-IBAR || AU-IBAR Regional || 20,000,000 AU-IBAR || AU-IBAR Somalia || 4,000,000 AU-IBAR TOTAL || || 24,000,000 COMESA || COMESA - Regional || 20,000,000 COMESA TOTAL || || 20,000,000 IFAD || IFAD I* || 14,498,783 IFAD || IFAD-ECOWAS Reg. || 20,000,000 IFAD || IFAD II Madagascar || 12,425,639 IFAD || IFAD II Mozambique || 4,757,850 IFAD TOTAL || || 51,682,272 FAO || FAO I* || 109,975,439 FAO || FAO I Burkina Faso || 18,064,052 FAO || FAO I Eritrea || 3,221,246 FAO || FAO Honduras || 5,400,000 FAO || FAO Philippines || 4,200,000 FAO || FAO IV* || 13,200,000 FAO || FAO IV Zambia 2 || 3,578,904 FAO || FAO IV Zambia 3 || 5,800,000 FAO || FAO II* || 74,554,532 FAO TOTAL || || 237,994,173 UNDP || UNDP I* || 11,700,000 UNDP || UNDP Liberia || 1,493,139 UNDP || UNDP IV Bangladesh || 7,500,000 UNDP || UNDP IV Eritrea || 5,000,000 UNDP TOTAL || || 25,693,139 UNFPA || UNFPA Niger || 2,000,000 UNFPA TOTAL || || 2,000,000 UNICEF || UNICEF I* || 8,229,000 UNICEF || UNICEF IV Niger || 5,000,000 UNICEF || UNICEF II Niger || 3,000,000 UNICEF TOTAL || || 16,229,000 UNOPS || UNOPS I* || 10,000,000 UNOPS || UNOPS IV* || 13,400,000 UNOPS TOTAL || || 23,400,000 UNRWA || UNRWA I || 18,100,000 UNRWA || UNRWA II || 21,600,000 UNRWA TOTAL || || 39,700,000 WB || WB I* || 63,800,000 WB || WB I* || 10,850,000 WB || WB II* || 37,150,000 WB TOTAL || || 111,800,000 WFP || WFP I* || 41,351,352 WFP || WFP Honduras || 4,500,000 WFP || WFP Liberia || 3,580,405 WFP || WFP II* || 34,446,135 WFP TOTAL || || 83,877,892 || || TOTAL IO || || 636,376,476 * Multi country contract. A large part of the Food Facility has been
implemented by International Organisations.
4.2 Main lessons learned from the projects
implemented by International Organisations
·
Focusing
assistance on marginalised farmers with high production increases the food
security situation of the poorest and most vulnerable communities. Input
Trade Fairs (ITFs) are a proven mechanism to increase farmers’ access to
inputs. ITFs are rapidly becoming the preferred
method of agricultural input distribution in many areas where the EUFF
project was implemented and beyond. By establishing a system of seed
distribution targeted especially towards the most vulnerable populations, ITFs offered
a sustainable supply of quality inputs at the producer level through
economically viable local mechanisms. It was also found that the timely
provision of quality inputs is the best way of promoting the adoption of new
technologies (e.g., new seed varieties or fertilizers). ·
The
performance of the FF projects showed that boosting agricultural production not
only requires access to quality inputs but also the application of
proven methods of crop production. Input distribution interventions were
found to have a much greater impact when combined with training to
establish appropriate use of inputs. Extension methodologies, such as Farmer
Field Schools (FFS) and rural promoters, provide effective channels for
appropriate advice through on-farm demonstrations on sustainable production
intensification, good agriculture practices (GAP), conservation agriculture
(CA), soil fertility management, small-scale irrigation and crop
diversification. Moreover, strengthening producers both in the public and
private sector resulted in increased food availability. Here, establishing
new producers and enabling existing producers to enhance their production
capacity proved effective and efficient. ·
Although
the distribution of tools and machinery to improve and facilitate
agricultural production was appropriate, in some cases, some of the
machinery, even if used properly, did not generate enough additional value to
justify cost. This could be addressed by allowing farmers and prospective
agricultural contractors a choice in the selection of tractors and equipment.
This would take into account their experience with equipment, their ability to
pay for more expensive tractors and their brand preferences. Also, the
relatively small size of some farms in communal areas made it uneconomical for
such farmers to own even a small tractor or related machinery. Here, the
provision of commercial privately operated agricultural contracting services or
machinery pool groups offer a valuable solution. ·
Within
the framework of a large intervention such as the EUFF, it is essential to
account for the effect of procuring large quantities of seeds on the local
seed market as a sudden increase in institutional procurements can place
stress on available suppliers. In some cases, farmers, seed producers, and
other organisations had difficulties ensuring the timely procurement of the
required quantities of quality seed. This led to delays in distribution and
hampered production. By the time some beneficiary farmers received the quality
seed, they had already used their own seed. Some seeds received from the
project were either exchanged with other farmers and/or were inappropriately
cultivated in some areas. It is thus important to consider market capacities
and market linkages in the pre-implementation stage of future projects of a
similar scale. ·
Taking
into account country-specific crop calendars in the design and implementation
of the EUFF projects was of crucial importance for the success of the
interventions, notably for the distribution of agricultural inputs. The
timely planning of input procurement and supply helped farmers to start
up the cropping season as per their own requirements. In the same vein, synchronised
procurement and input distribution ensured proper utilisation in the
farmers’ fields. In some cases, the project would have finished before the
harvest and required an extension to achieve measurable outcomes. Here, the
flexibility and willingness of the EU to provide extensions in time and funding
for the inclusion of additional crop cycles in some project countries was
paramount for the resulting success of these projects. For future programmes of
a similar scope, additional funds and time for the formulation phase would
allow for the seasonality of cropping cycles in target countries already at the
design stage of the programme. This would make certain that the
requirements of seasonal crop calendars and bureaucratic processes were met
through the adequate and timely delivery of inputs to maximise output for
harvesting, avoiding the need for funding extensions at the implementation
stage. ·
The achievements of the
EUFF projects showed that local seed production systems are best supported
through a holistic approach, which involves all actors of the value chain,
including producers, processors and traders, and supports the country-specific
institutional and policy context. In some cases, however, it was found best
to undertake the production of basic or foundation seed as a private sector
activity since some state institutions had insufficient capacity to manage such
a programme. In order to affect a medium-term sustainable outcome, a
systems-based approach was chosen, which started with improved access to inputs
for increased production of surpluses for the market within the existing
agricultural systems. Accordingly, the focus of seed multiplication and
development of the seed industry was placed on increasing input availability,
boosting productivity and improving distribution of outputs by improving market
linkages. ·
FF
interventions have shown that undertaking rehabilitation works on rural
infrastructures, such as irrigation channels, storage and market facilities
and roads, and produces positive short- and long-term impacts on
agricultural production and income-earning opportunities. For maximum
sustainability, it was found best to focus on larger infrastructure, for
instance larger canals, which people cannot rehabilitate manually. Productivity
of crops was most efficiently increased through investments in and improvements
of small irrigation schemes. Post-harvest losses were reduced most effectively
through the introduction of appropriate drying and storage facilities.
Income-earning opportunities were best generated through creation of as well as
improved access to markets, in addition to the production of surpluses and the
improved quality of grains. ·
The
implementation of this component further showed that rehabilitation of
infrastructure through local private companies encouraged these companies to
undertake similar works when they became necessary at a later date, creating a
multiplier effect in the local economy. However, some rehabilitation and
construction required more time to be completed, supervised and inspected than
had been planned. In addition, the
sustainability of operation and management of these renovated or constructed
facilities also required more time than the FF project period, in particular
with regards to work on these issues with governmental counterparts. Here, the
establishment of and training of farmer user groups was a way to ensure that
the maintenance and operation of the schemes function effectively after project
closure. The best approach to rehabilitation and mechanisation of rural
infrastructure was found to be systemic, with agricultural production and
commercialisation, small-scale irrigation, feeder roads and microfinance
developed in parallel. ·
FF
projects have shown that training and capacity building are vital at all
stages and levels of the interventions. Capacity building played a key role
in affecting the appropriate and sustainable use of inputs provided, and should
be an integral part of similar projects in the future. The good results
achieved by the EUFF projects rest partly on the fact that training and
capacity building accompanied all types of interventions and targeted all
levels of beneficiaries from farmers, local implementation counterparts to
government representatives. While in some cases, the short duration of the
project made it difficult to build institutional and management sustainability
capacities, the EUFF projects demonstrated that working through and developing
the capacity of government structures, farmer institutions and/or building on
private sector and existing long-term projects was the most effective
approach to achieving outreach and sustainability. ·
The
support and commitment of host governments and national counterparts was vital
for the outcomes of the projects. Countries in which the government did not
fully support the FF project and its interventions fared much less well than
those with strong national support. Delays in signing some projects, for
instance, shortened their length, undermined sustainability and created
pressure on staff. However, those projects in which governmental staff within
the relevant ministries were involved from the project formulation stage,
benefited from a high degree of local ownership, motivation and commitment. Collaboration
with the government is essential to any project that aims to leave behind
significant technical expertise, considerable number of inputs and
renovated/constructed facilities. The long-term benefits of these
interventions depend greatly on the government’s sustained involvement and
guidance to farmers in the use and operation of inputs. ·
FF
projects, which also addressed the capacity of key ministries, have proven most
effective in sustaining efforts. Furthermore, empowering, from the outset, the
municipalities and departmental offices of agriculture and food security
through Letters of Agreement, and linking them to local initiatives, proved
essential for project sustainability and their inclusion into government
budgets. ·
The
use of existing structures and entities maximised impact. This included
partnerships with on going national and international projects, and the
involvement of a broad range of stakeholders, including government staff as
well as the private sector, NGOs and farming communities in the project
implementation. The integration of
programmes in existing institutions, both public and private, significantly
reinforced sustainable local ownership. Relevant national on
going programmes were, wherever possible, built on and extended, and technical
collaboration and coordination of all stakeholders encouraged. Existing
institutional structures and entities with already defined coordinating and
implementing functions are best used when integrated into the individual
project’s implementing arrangements in the design process. To facilitate future
replication and secure continued governmental support, the design of project
interventions needs to be in compliance with prevailing government policies.
4.3 Success stories: Zambia,
Mozambique, Cambodia, Cuba, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone
Farmer Input Support Response Initiative to Rising Prices of Agricultural Commodities in Zambia Financing: 7.500.000 EUR - Implementing partner: FAO Electronic vouchers, as a means of providing quality agricultural inputs to farmers on time and at minimum transaction cost, were supplied to 7,950 lead farmers for purchasing seeds, fertilizers, tools and Conservation Agriculture (CA) equipment. Initial results in the field collected from monitoring mission clearly showed increased yields as compared to traditional methods. Conservation Agricultural Programme (CAP), Conservation Agriculture for Production and Productivity (CASPP), Conservation Farming Unit (CFU), Zambian National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) indicate that the farming community accepts the technology and that crop increases are realized. During the dry spell (February 2011) it was clearly demonstrated that the agricultural production under CA, mainly vegetables, were resistant to water scarcity. It is estimated that approximately 200,000 households (HH) are now practicing CA. EU Food Facility in support of the Food Production Action Plan (PRO-PAPA) in Mozambique[2] Financing: 4.700.000 EUR - Implementing partner: IFAD The project’s goal was to enhance agriculture and fisheries production and productivity by up scaling selected existing activities in three on-going IFAD-financed programmes: (i) the Sofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project (PPABAS); (ii) the Rural Finance Support Programme (PAFIR); and (iii) the Rural Market Promotion Programme (PROMER). Overall, the project has reached - with tangible services, equipment and infrastructure - 30,160 households directly, which represents 151% of the target. While, at an early stage after its completion, impacts cannot be fully assessed, a preliminary impacts assessment has been presented using available data. Fishery activities aiming to increase in catch, in catch rates and value of the marketed catch targeted 2,500 households. It is estimated that at least 8,800 households benefited from the investments made on the fish markets infrastructure. This figure should substantially increase when the various point of first sale (equipped with the cooling equipment) will enter in full operation. Points of First Sale are built for the first time in Mozambique. This model combines improved infrastructure, including fish conservation equipment, with an inclusive management system, that allows for co-responsibility and full participation of stakeholders in the operation and maintenance of the market. Regarding the financial services component PROPAPA benefited 6,300 clients, out of whom 3,821 are new clients. It is expected that this number will increase by 33-35% per credit cycle, under the assumption of reimbursement rates above 90%. This means that the target will be achieved in 2013, considering two credit cycles per year. In addition 140 kilometres of roads were rehabilitated to improve products’ market access. The total number of beneficiaries of the road improvements is estimated at about 15,000 households, therefore doubling the anticipated result of 7,500 households. The average cost of the improvements per beneficiary is US$ 17. Improving food security of farming families affected by food prices volatility in Cambodia[3] Financing: 10.970.000 EUR- Implementing partner: FAO Despite a short and time bound project with a total duration of 24 months (a key factor to consider in Cambodia is the monsoonal agricultural cycle with rain usually commencing in earnest from July to the end of November) the project contributed to achieving a 10% increase in food stocks for 53 000 vulnerable rural households and, well above this target, food stocks almost doubled from 440 kg/household to 840 kg/household over a one-year period. Likewise, a 10% increase in food self-sufficiency has been reached, in terms of the percentage of farm families able to survive on their own rice stocks. The project provided for an almost 50% increase in the percentage of the population who were self-sufficient, lifting this baseline statistic from 32 % to 48% of beneficiary households. By these two major measures, the project made a significant improvement in the reduction of hunger and malnutrition, thereby also contributing to rural household resilience and confidence. Programa de Apoyo Local a la Modernización Agropecuaria –PALMA - in Cuba Financing: 11.700.000 EUR – Implementing partner: UNDP The effects of the swift and continuous increase in international food prices and Cuba’s high dependency (80%) on imported foodstuffs combined with the 2008 hurricanes represented a paramount challenge for the country, making food security a national priority. In this context, a series of measures have progressively been put in place to increase the quantity, efficiency and quality of food production. The main processes at the core of this new approach include decentralising decision-making to the municipal level, and transferring the key role in food production to cooperatives and individual producers. A process was initiated in September 2008 to distribute idle land on a 10-year renewable usufruct basis to be used for food production purposes, with 100,000 applications accepted by beginning of 2010. Special focus is also given to urban and sub-urban agriculture. The European Commission is providing support to these processes with the Food Facility allowing to launch the Programa de Apoyo Local a la Modernización del sector Agropecuario. PALMA relies on the bottom-up methodology established by the UNDP "Programme for Local Human Development" (PDHL), which has operated in Cuba for more than ten years. It aims to support the modernisation of local agriculture in 37 pilot municipalities and decentralisation of food production by providing support and capacity building to cooperatives and individual farmers. This programme was enhanced with a further € 4.4 million under the EC Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) adopted in May 2009. Addressing the negative impact of rising food prices on food insecure households in Pakistan[4] Financing: 24.700.000 EUR- Implementing partner: FAO Pakistan is listed among the 40 countries where the food prices crisis has exacerbated structural constraints. About 17 million people have joined the food insecure category (60 million) during the current food crisis, bringing the total to about half of the population of Pakistan. Approximately 17,000 tonnes of crop inputs (quality, high yielding and locally appropriate seed, varieties and quality fertilizers) were distributed to more than 94,000 vulnerable farming households in highly food vulnerable areas during four cropping seasons in food-deficient areas of NWFP, Sindh, Baluchistan and Punjab. In addition, households were provided with seed for a secondary crop (lentils, vegetable seed or fodder seed) and 150 secondary irrigation channels were renovated. The input distribution and irrigation channel renovation allowed farmers to greatly increase their crop yields – both by increasing productivity on already irrigated land and by bringing land back into cultivation where previously water was not available for irrigation. The seed and fertilizer distribution enabled farmers to build up their working capital so that in future they are better able to purchase fresh inputs as necessary to maintain increased productivity. Seed can be multiplied for a further 3-4 seasons before it needs replacing with new stocks. Irrigation canals should be maintained in future under the control of the water users associations. Smallholder Commercialization Programme in Sierra Leone Financing: 5.400.000 EUR – Implementing partner: WFP The EUFF directly supported the Government of Sierra Leone Small Holder Commercialization Programme (SCP) that is under the mandate of the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS). Component 5 of the SCP deals with ‘’social protection and productive safety nets’’ for which WFP is a lead agency. The main focus of Component 5 as set forth by MAFFS includes Inland Valley Swamp (IVS) rehabilitation, tree crop rehabilitation, feeder roads rehabilitation and construction of Agricultural Business Centres (ABCs). The external evaluation commissioned by WFP (August 2011), concluded that the Food Facility had enabled WFP to undertake substantial Food-for-Work (FFW) and Food-for-Training activities of ABCs in Sierra Leone and has contributed to the achievement of the Government of Sierra Leone’s SCP. The contribution is more evident in the area of productive and social safety nets in selected rural areas. The project has complemented other interventions by FAO, IFAD and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS). With regard to improving food security of beneficiary families and improving national governance of food security matters, the Project delivered the following outputs: (i) 8,463mt food and nutritional components distributed under Food for Work, (ii) 3,588ha rehabilitated irrigated land, (iii) 644,134 EUR Cash for Work distributed, (iv) 188 post-harvest storage units constructed, (v) 888km roads constructed, and 43,199 trainees in various subjects.
5. CALL FOR PROPOSALS
IMPLEMENTATION MODE
5.1 Distribution per EU FF objective
5.2 Lessons learned from the
Food Facility
·
Beyond the achievement of Food Facility’s objectives,
more than 55% of the interventions increased vulnerable
households resilience, allowing them to cope with successive food crises,
in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, NGOs projects were able to
mitigate the impact of food insecurity (improved diet quality and
quantity, increased incomes, etc.) although this impact was limited in
magnitude as the duration of the projects ranged between 14
and 25 months (21.5 months on average). ·
NGO projects were mostly targeting the
agricultural sector and focused on the rural context. Although the
agricultural sector is key in responding to food insecurity, additional
means and approaches are increasingly necessary to tackle emerging global
challenges (increased inequalities, urbanization and population growth,
market instability, climate changes, etc.). Projects aiming at mitigating the
effects of food price rise through increased food supply alone were not able to
fully demonstrate substantial impact. However, there were particularly
interesting interventions aiming at promoting value chains and innovative
practices, or aiming at enhancing production in challenging agro-ecological
contexts. ·
Agricultural inputs distribution (seeds and
fertilizers), are the backbone of 80% of the projects - barring projects based
on livestock development (in which inputs such as feeds and/or medicines were
seldom distributed). The underlying rationale being that most farmers (and the
general population affected by soaring prices) depend on staple food for their
self-consumption. Hence the provision of quality seeds of staple crops has
been seen as a priority. In many areas where projects intervene, productive
risks factors like topography; climate; soils etc. are factors that need
to be better considered with productive efforts either reoriented to
well-targeted commodities in disaster-prone areas or based on more
hard-researched solutions. NGOs keener on considering long-term concerns
and economic challenges, would be more in favor of high-value crops, in
combination with staple crops and/or with income-generating activities. ·
Having strong local partners was definitely a
plus in project implementation, and many projects benefitted from a good
collaboration that existed between the applicant and its partners. On the other
hand, all projects were designed to incorporate, to some extent, working
arrangements with local authorities, the quality of this partnership varied
considerably. In some cases, local authorities were over-burdened; in other
cases, they were associated in economic functions, such as the management of
storage capacities resulting in a weak management. In this context, more
professional interest groups should handle such kind of economic tasks.
5.3 Success stories : Mali,
Kenya, Bangladesh, Lao LDR, Tanzania, Nepal, and Ethiopia
Best practice in targeting beneficiaries in Mali Financing: 1.700.000 EUR– Implementing partner: Oxfam GB Prior designing its pilot safety net project, Oxfam GB in Mali carried out a socio-economic study using the Household Economy Approach (HEA), an approach based on community participation. The findings of this study has allowed to rank the population of the three areas of intervention according to their wealth rank and defined criteria with the community to identify each of the wealth groups. The two poorest groups were targeted in the project and activities tailored to the needs of both groups; the very poor received cash transfers and training on savings and on health and nutrition, while the poor received a support to improve their productive capacities. The HEA, which quantifies sources on food and incomes, also allowed identifying the necessary level of transfer to achieve expected results. Example of targeting criteria for the agro-cotton food economy zone in Mali / Sikasso: Very Poor households: < 1.5 ha of land exploited; no production of cotton; no ploughing equipment; <5 poultry; < 2 months self-sufficiency. Poor households: 1-3 ha of exploited land; 0- ½ ha of cotton production; 1 bull/plough; < 10 poultry; < 4 months self-sufficiency. Food voucher system to enhance local trade and local production in Kenya Financing 4.569.000 EUR - Save The Children Food assistance has been provided to pastoralist communities in Wajir and Turkana arid lands, through local markets voucher system. A total of 60,969 beneficiaries in Wajir and 4,500 in Turkana had received locally produced food commodities as substitutes. After 22 months of the implementation, positive gains to traders, producers and food assistance beneficiaries emerged. All the 106 cereal traders in Wajir and Turkana reported a minimum of 70% increase in their business income as compared to the baseline figures. All the sampled beneficiaries reported their satisfaction with this alternative way of distributing food assistance through local traders via the use of vouchers. Beneficiaries who had access to meat and fish had access to protein rich foods for significantly longer periods, 13.2 days more than those receiving General Food Distribution (GFD) pulses. About 88% of the normal GFD beneficiaries interviewed indicated their interest to join this alternative approach of GFD distribution using local traders and through vouchers. Strengthening productive capacities of ultra-poor people in Bangladesh Financing 2.088.000 EUR - NETZ NETZ intervention aimed to support 28,000 ultra-poor people in meeting their nutritional needs through safety net (linking to existing government schemes) and through the development of their productive capacities with training, technical assistance and making agricultural utilities available to them. The project achieved exceptionally good results. At the end of the project most of beneficiaries had increased income and were still retaining substantial number of productive assets. Over 80% of target families increased their per capita income per day at least by 40% (inflation adjusted) by October 2011; at least 90% target families have maintained the value of the productive capital transferred by the action, minimum 60% have increased the capital value transferred by the action. At the start of the action the selected 7,200 ultra poor families were able to have 3 meals per day on average for only 4.6 months in a year. Through the achievements of the action these families can consume 3 meals per day for an average of 10 months in a year. Enhancing milled rice production in Lao PDR Financing 2.110.000 EUR – Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation Association The production of good quality rice is limited by both capacity and technology used by farmers to grow paddy, and significant rice milling inefficiencies. The project proposed to rapidly increase the quantity and stability of supplies of good quality milled rice for domestic consumption and trade by supporting the production through strengthening the milling companies, i.e. a value-chain development by the private sector. Activities involve the creation of a co-investment fund managed by miller groups to modernise the sector, the improvement of the manufacturing practices and entrepreneurship behaviours (business plan, quality control, etc.), the support from millers to producers in agricultural input supplies, and policy dialogues with various stakeholders. The project performed exceptionally well. Farmers crop yields increased by 30-50%; farmers’ incomes from rice increased by at least 60%; rice processed through milling companies increased which improved the supply. The project also contributed to an improved framework conditions for rice production and trade. A holistic approach to tackle child malnutrition in Lao PDR Financing 978.800 EUR – Health Practical Action The project targeted former forest dwellers who were recently encouraged to settle in valley areas. These populations were particularly affected by malnutrition due to their lack of knowledge on farming and nutrition practices in their new environment. The intervention proposes a combination of activities tackling holistically child malnutrition and addressing several causes leading to malnutrition. Activities encompass the diversification of vegetal and animal production sources (soybeans, frogs, fish, livestock, fruits, vegetables, etc.) by supporting resource-poor farmers with agricultural and livestock inputs (including fish ponds), by promoting sustainable agriculture techniques, increasing access to irrigation and support for further marketing of production. In parallel, target populations received training and sensitisation on diverse food intakes, child-care practices (including breastfeeding), food conservation and transformation and on appropriate hygiene practices. Finally, the project included a component to identify and treat children affected by severe acute malnutrition. Decentralised services for agriculture, livestock but also health services were involved in various phases. By focusing on the poorest and supporting them in accessing more nutritious food (including animal products), improving hygiene environment, improving child care practices and providing a system to manage severe cases of acute malnutrition at community level and in partnership with health actors, this project achieved a substantial impact. Developing food crop wholesale market in Tanzania Financing 2.395.000 EUR – MVIWATA (National Network of Farmers) The EUFF project implemented by the local NGO MVIWATA (National Network of Farmers) identified timely transfer of agricultural products from production areas as a crucial challenge to the national food security. During national food crisis there is normally a huge variability in food availability at local level with some remote areas in surplus and failing to sell the surplus to deficit areas. MVIWATA (experienced in the construction and organization of markets through projects financed by the French AFD) came up with the idea to promote better access to markets for small-scale farmers’ products, especially food crops. The overall objective was to secure sustainable access to locally produced food crops for urban and rural populations at less volatile but attractive producer prices. This objective was achieved via the construction of two new markets, the rehabilitation of existing markets and enhancing capacity building of the Market Boards that run the markets. The project developed and trained marketed boards, which took over the management of the marketing facilities. Market intelligence strategies to proactively identify food crop production opportunities in relation with estimated quantities and price trends were developed; relationships with local authorities, entrepreneurs and financial institutions were strengthened. Promoting good governance and giving a voice to marginalized population in Nepal[5] Financing 1.447.000 EUR – Oxfam GB Oxfam project supported the Right to Food Network (RtFN), which is actively raising issues on food security at national level. RtFN does also link local level issues to the national level to influence the policies. The project developed RtFN chapters at district levels that are advocating with local agencies such as DDC (District Development Office), DADO (District Agriculture Development Office) and other stakeholders for effective delivery of their services. Moreover the Project developed PLCs (Participatory Learning Centres) that are also facilitating the organization of famers (especially women) to demand for their rights to food security. Through lobbying efforts and improved linkages with different national level networks such as RtFN, food cluster (WFP, FAO and Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives), communities’ farmers have been able to advocate for improved national food security policies and strategies. A result at local level was for example the decision of Dadeldhura DDC to establish and promote seed banks in the whole district. At national level, the right to food and food security issues are included in the draft constitution of Nepal. Decreasing dependency towards social transfers, the graduation mechanism in Ethiopia Financing 1.350.000 EUR – Dan Church Aid Since 2005, the Ethiopian Government has been providing food and cash transfers as a response to chronically food insecure populations through the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). This scheme aims at preventing asset depletion at household level and creating productive assets at community level. The challenge is now to reduce the caseload by ensuring that beneficiaries gain sufficient livelihoods, enabling them not to rely anymore on social transfers. This process is known as graduation. A total of 23,750 food insecure households benefitted from the Dan Church Aid project. According to the graduation assessment, remarkable livelihood improvement was achieved within a short period (food security, asset creation, asset protection, etc.): 21% households were considered food secure before the action and 56% after, mainly due to the increased access to irrigation facilities. The average income of irrigation users (Birr 4,269 per adult equivalent), is higher when compared to the per capita income of those who do not have access to irrigation. As a result 43% of the PSNP targeted households earned more than the regional benchmark (Birr 3,600) and hence became eligible for graduation.
5.4 Learning from NGOs - EU
FF case study in Ethiopia
Overall, 360,136
households, approximately two million people in Ethiopia, have directly benefited
from 13 NGO's projects implemented jointly by 28 international and local NGOs
in Oromia, SNNPR, Amhara and Tigray States. In this framework, the EUFF
financing amounts 19.769.000 EUR. EU FF
interventions aimed to enhance smallholder farmers' and
pastoralists'/agro-pastoralists' resilience through increased
agricultural/livestock production and productivity and the promotion of other income
diversification opportunities. The projects' initiatives have shown good
complementarities to the on-going food security programs, particularly in terms
of facilitating the graduation of those targeted PSNP beneficiaries
(around 50,095 households) through promoting various on-farm and off-farm
income diversification opportunities. wTen[6] projects were
supporting seed multiplication and distribution system. Accordingly, a
total 41,342 quintals improved seeds were distributed to 106,023 households
covering 36,080 hectares of farmland. As a result of the intervention, cereal crop production per hectare has increased on average
by 40-50%. wNine[7] projects have
funded irrigation schemes. Accordingly, 54 river diversion irrigation
schemes (42 new), 40 check dams/water harvesting structures, 808 Rope &
Washer/treadle pumps, and 565 hand dug wells (HDW) were developed for
irrigation enabling 9,718 households to produce 2-3 times in a year. In total,
3,859 hectares of land was irrigated and productivity of food crops has
increased on average by 50% in most of the projects' intervention woredas. wFive projects[8] have supported
24,372 households (mainly women headed households) with livelihood
diversification & asset creation through provision of sheep and goats,
on credit basis. The credit system uses a strategy where the primary
beneficiary will transfer the offspring or mother goats/sheep in kind to the
secondary beneficiary. Both the primary and secondary beneficiaries are from
the same peer group for which they consider the sheep/goats as a common
property. Such a strategy avoids any attempt to be made by the primary
beneficiary to sell or abuse the mother goats. wEleven[9] projects supported
the construction of 114 grain-banks and stores and 38 community market places.
Market places were constructed in the rural growth potential areas facilitating
marketing of agricultural products, and reducing post harvest losses and timely
transportation challenges of perishable agricultural produces. Establishment of
grain banks (GB) also helps to stabilize food price allowing households to
purchase grain at a lower price and/or receive grain loans from the GB at times
of high prices. Grain banks/stores, established and
administered by communities aim to increase
local seed provision security, thereby contributing to the possibilities of
continued utilization of locally important varieties.
6. BUDGET SUPPORT
IMPLEMENTATION MODE
6.1 State of play Budget Support
allocations
1.1
EU FF Budget Support Allocations[10] Sectoral Budget Support || Tajikistan || 7.750.000 || Rwanda || 15.600.000 || Mozambique || 5.200.000 || Bolivia || 7.750.000 General Budget Support || || || DRC || 26.000.000 || Malawi || 15.900.000 || Haiti || 5.800.000 || Ghana || 15.000.000 || Tanzania || 20.000.000 || Togo || 8.200.000 TOTAL || || 127.200.000 (The implementation
of all Budget Support operations under the FF has been managed by the
Geographical Directorates together with the EU Delegations).
6.2 Lessons learned
·
Interventions
financed as Budget Support (BS) presented a good response for all those
countries which had their own satisfactory response to the finance public
criteria and which were already qualified by EU for receiving BS. They allow a
rapid response, the beneficiary countries being able to pre-finance emergency
actions from their own budget, as soon as there was a EU commitment. ·
Many
governments embraced greater levels of overall subsidies of various types,
imported grain at very high prices or imposed severe export restrictions,
installed price controls and subsidized food distribution schemes, established
or reinforced public procurement mechanisms at fixed prices, or organized
subsidized fertilizer distribution schemes for small farmers In many countries
the FPC obliged governments to reduce import taxes and to increase social
expenditures in order to mitigate effects on the most vulnerable parts of the
population.[11]
These measures often had a negative impact on the national budget. Support
provided through EU FF under Budget Support permitted maintaining high
expenditures for the social and rural sector. It is to be noted that, due to
eligibility criteria, only in 10 out of the 15 initially foreseen countries
budget support could be disbursed.
6.3 Examples of EUFF Budget
Support interventions
EU FF budget support to maintain social expenditures in Tanzania Financing: 20.000.000 EUR The Food Facility General Budget Support (GBS) was additional to the already existing GBS (300 Million EUR). The Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADAP) seeks to achieve at least a minimum of 6% growth in the agriculture sector. The key objective is to help smallholder farmers, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and fishing households to adopt improved agricultural practices for which the government needed to allocate a minimum of 10% of its budget. The investment plan is expected to cost the government US$5.3billion when the program is fully implemented by 2016. It brings together all stakeholders to a common agenda of comprehensively transforming the sector to create wealth, reduce poverty and achieve food and nutrition security. In the current budget of 2011/12, the Government has allocated 6.8% of its budget on agriculture out of a total budget of US$7.8billion. The additional general budget support has contributed to mitigate effects of the food crisis and food insecurity in Tanzania, by providing additional resources to address the volatile Food prices. This meant improved food security for the poorest layer of the population through the implementation of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty for Tanzania (MKUKUTA). EU FF budget support complementing budget support interventions in Mozambique Financing: 5.200.000 EUR The European Commission has contributed to the implementation of the national Sector Policy Programme PROAGRI and is the largest contributor with 30% of all donor contributions since the start of the Programme. PROAGRI is aligned with the direct budget support provided by a G19 donors group and is complementary to the EU general budget support (PRBS - Poverty Reduction Budget Support- III, MDG -Millennium Development Goals- Programme). The Programme is financed under the Food Facility Instrument. This financing is on top of the approximately €15 million that the EU makes available annually to agricultural sector via MINAG as part of PROAGRI.
7. RESULTS-BASED GLOBAL MONITORING
REPORT
7.1 Performance of EU Food Facility projects monitored
Overview ROM EU FF || TOTAL N° of countries visited N° of missions undertaken N° of experts mobilized N° of projects monitored N° of Monitoring Reports produced Total budget of monitored EU FF projects (in millions EUR) Average budget per EU FF project monitored (in millions EUR) || 49 235 46 176 236 723 4.1 Overall performance of projects by category Category I Category II Category III Category IV || Very good performance Good performance Performing with problems Not performing, or having major difficulty TOTAL || 2% 68% 23% 7% 100% || 4 119 41 12 176 TYPE || VERY GOOD (A) || GOOD (B) || PROBLEMS (C) || SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES (D) || AVERAGE SCORE Relevance/Quality of Design || 8% || 69% || 23% || . || 2.82 Alignment to policies and target || 22% || 73% || 5% || . || 3.16 Appropriateness of the intervention || 6% || 47% || 44% || 3% || 2.55 Support by stakeholders || 8% || 60% || 31% || 1% || 2.75 Mainstreaming of cross-cutting || 9% || 65% || 25% || 1% || 2.81 Efficiency || 4% || 62% || 31% || 3% || 2.66 Inputs management || 6% || 57% || 34% || 4% || 2.64 Activity timeliness || 6% || 51% || 40% || 3% || 2.59 Outputs achievement || 7% || 56% || 35% || 2% || 2.67 Partner contribution & involvement || 6% || 64% || 28% || 2% || 2.73 Effectiveness || 1% || 55% || 41% || 3% || 2.73 Results attainment || 3% || 59% || 34% || 3% || 2.63 Project Purpose achievement || 9% || 67% || 23% || 1% || 2.83 Impact || 8% || 67% || 24% || 1% || 2.80 Contribution to overall objective || 8% || 67% || 24% || 1% || 2.82 Wider effects || 5% || 67% || 27% || 1% || 2.77 Sustainability || 4% || 51% || 44% || 2% || 2.64 Economic viability || 3% || 43% || 48% || 6% || 2.44 Local ownership || 11% || 56% || 31% || 2% || 2.77 Policy support || 5% || 57% || 36% || 2% || 2.66 Institutional capacity building || 5% || 64% || 29% || 2% || 2.73 Overall Score || 2% || 76% || 22% || 1% || 2.73 Number of projects || 3 || 133 || 39 || 1 || Total number of projects || || || 176 || || Total number of Monitoring Reports || || || 236 || || Monitoring period || 2010 || 2011 N° operations monitored || 122 || 90 N° reports produced || 135 || 101 Criterion || GOOD (A or B)* || AVERAGE SCORE || GOOD (A or B)* || AVERAGE SCORE Relevance || 76% || 2.80 || 73% || 2.80 Efficiency || 57% || 2.55 || 67% || 2.67 Effectiveness || 44% || 2.63 || 60% || 2.76 Impact || 69% || 2.71 || 78% || 2.86 Sustainability || 60% || 2.70 || 52% || 2.58 Overall || 75% || 2.68 || 74% || 2.73 (*) The presented percentages do not add up to 100% because they represent the percentage of projects in the category for each criterion, and the “overall” percentage represents the % of the projects with an overall score in the category.
7.2 EU
FF projects ROM scores per region
Region || 2010 || 2011 || TOTAL || Projects monitored || Overall Score || Projects monitored || Overall Score || Projects monitored || Overall Score European Neighbourhood Countries || 2 || 2.73 || 1 || 2.87 || 3 || 2.77 Africa, Indian Ocean, South Africa || 76 || 2.69 || 54 || 2.74 || 110 || 2.72 Asia || 30 || 2.67 || 26 || 2.69 || 46 || 2.74 Latin America || 10 || 2.75 || 8 || 2.85 || 13 || 2.85 Caribbean, Pacific, Cuba, OCTs || 4 || 2.31 || 1 || 2.58 || 4 || 2.33
7.3 EU FF projects ROM scores per implementing channel
a)
International Organizations Monitoring period || 2010 || 2011 N° operations monitored || 38 || 39 N° reports produced || 40 || 39 Criterion || GOOD (A or B) || AVERAGE SCORE || GOOD (A or B) || AVERAGE SCORE Relevance || 71% || 2.64 || 67% || 2.77 Efficiency || 37% || 2.34 || 69% || 2.71 Effectiveness || 24% || 2.49 || 62% || 2.76 Impact || 63% || 2.67 || 72% || 2.83 Sustainability || 50% || 2.55 || 49% || 2.50 Overall || 66% || 2.54 || 69% || 2.71 (*) The presented percentages do not add up to 100% because they represent the percentage of projects in the category for each criterion, and the “overall” percentage represents the % of the projects with an overall score in the category. b)
Non-Governmental Organisations Monitoring period || 2010 || 2011 N° operations monitored || 84 || 51 N° reports produced || 95 || 62 Criterion || GOOD (A or B) || AVERAGE SCORE || GOOD (A or B) || AVERAGE SCORE Relevance || 79% || 2.87 || 78% || 2.83 Efficiency || 65% || 2.65 || 65% || 2.64 Effectiveness || 54% || 2.70 || 59% || 2.76 Impact || 71% || 2.74 || 82% || 2.88 Sustainability || 64% || 2.77 || 55% || 2.64 Overall || 80% || 2.74 || 78% || 2.75
7.4 Main ROM recommendations
and lessons learned
·
Project
design
should be better taken care of, in particular when setting the Logical Framework
(LFM) of the projects. The stakeholders’ analysis and the problem tree as Annexes
to the LFMs should be considered as requirement in the awarding of the contracts.
Particular focus should be put on the indicators to be SMART (Specific,
Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound). Project design need to have
a built-in flexibility in order to easily adjust to the situation on the
ground. In addition, sustainability is an issue to be considered from project
design and continues throughout project implementation. ·
Paramount
elements to be taken into account regarding projects implementation: the adequate
consideration of factors like droughts is essential regarding the timing of FF
projects; Mandatory pre-assessment of target group absorption and management
capacity; Involvement of experienced local NGOs and motivated
end-beneficiaries; Identification of “Leaders” in Associations and Organizations
of farmers/producers for dissemination of results; Focus on small intervention
area to avoid logistical complexities; Realistic planning of delivery of
resources and inputs (recruitment, tenders); Use of feasibility studies for the
selection of areas of intervention / beneficiaries; Limit the number of
implementing partners; Emphasis on development and capacity building of
community level and national/regional institutional structures rather than on
mere delivery of “physical” results; Information and training material should
be pictorial and easily understandable for easy dissemination; Dissemination
workshops at project completion with as wide as possible range of relevant
participants (e.g. Government, Regional / Local Authorities, NGOs, donors,
civil society and traditional structures); ·
Projects
effectiveness can be increased with improved communication channels
between projects’ management teams and partners. Furthermore, the projects
should enhance the cooperation with relevant third parties (Embassies, Ministries,
Local and National Authorities and Civil Society). This is valid for all
projects independently of their domain of intervention. In addition the active
engagement of final beneficiaries in project design and implementation should
be systematic and Government / beneficiary commitment should be demonstrated in
practical terms (e.g. increase in extension personnel, budgetary commitments,
legal reforms etc.). ·
Crosscutting
issues:
most monitored projects are acting in favor of female workers where and when possible.
Environmental aspects are often not addressed directly but as FF projects often
deal with irrigational and agricultural issues, they usually are designed
following well-known best practices concerning sustainability and the
environment. However, gender and Environment adequate analysis and
mainstreaming require specific OVIs for cross-cutting issues.
8. FOOD FACILITY STUDIES
8.1 Institutional response
by the UN system to the global food price crisis and the EU Food Facility –
November 2009
Executive Summary During the first semester 2008, in response to
the global crisis, the EU decided to commit €1billion on a set of activities
supporting countries shocked by the impact of soaring food prices and focusing
on food production and access to food. The UN system was identified as a possible
intermediary. At that time, under the Initiative on Soaring Food Prices, the
UN-HLTF had just started the joint country assessments led by FAO. Getting
feedback from agencies separately would have implied the availability of
tremendous amount of information, which would have been hard for EC to turn - in
a short time - into one harmonized feedback. There was therefore a need for a
consolidated approach. Thus the request submitted to HLTF to act as an
interface between the EC and the already selected agencies and to present –in a
very limited time frame- the information received from the different agencies
into “One UN feedback.” This study, “Institutional response by the UN
System to the global Food price crisis and the UE Food Facility”, aims at
analyzing the coordination, the synergies and the implementation mechanisms put
in place by UN agencies involved in the EU Food Facility, both within the frame
of the HLTF “Comprehensive Framework of Actions” and the EC regulation
1337/2008 of December 2008. It also aims to assess whether the EU Food Facility
may be the booster of an all-embracing coordination at the country level. The planning phase, for the implementation of
the EU Food Facility, was carried out in a comprehensive and expedite way.
However, country assessments show some shortcomings. This corroborates the
conclusion that the EU Food Facility approach is suitable for an immediate
response covering emergency and recovery, while perhaps being unsuitable for
planning longer-term responses, for which larger investments in field
investigation, data collection and analysis are required. Whereas the EU Food Facility strategy turned out
to be a success at the global level in terms of “One UN feedback”, at the field
level not all the agencies were able to respond in a choral manner, possibly
due to the following reasons: • At country
level there is a divide between agencies dealing with agriculture development
and
those concerned with food assistance and emergency. A further
distinction differentiates implementing agencies from financial and lending
ones, such as IFAD and the WB, which have their own strict procedures. • In-country
development activities are covered by UNDAF; the UN System framework providing
one unified and coordinated response to development challenges. This framework,
however, does not cover emergency and recovery activities. Besides, within the
UN System there is no organization encompassing the full scope of food
security. • UN agencies
have the tendency to follow their own country plans and apply their own
internal rules and procedures.
Overall, field visits confirmed that the
projects under the EU Food Facility, besides responding to the needs of the
country, build on the comparative advantages of partner agencies and are a) fully
consistent with the overall strategy adopted by the Governments concerned to
address emergency and recovery requirements b) coherent with the recovery
actions stressed under the HLTF CFA and with the spirit, the objectives and the
intervention sectors of the EU Food Facility.
The EU Food Facility
projects seem to be well taken by the involved implementing agencies. Beside
the recruitment of ad-hoc staff in support to the projects, no major
adaptations were necessary as the agencies’ technical and logistical capacities
were already in place. Indeed, FAO, being the major recipient of EC funds,
achieved “economies of scale” which allowed the adoption of specific measures
to reduce transaction costs, as well as to harmonize project implementation in
all countries concerned and expedite decisions (ie increased delegation of
Authority to FAO Reps, regular teleconference meetings amongst all EU Food
Facility project units, internal task force for coordination).
Coordination level varies depending on the country as well as on the
actors involved and their institutional mandates. The fact that food security
is a crosscutting issue should not be underestimated. In Liberia, for instance,
despite a well-conceived structure, coordination is limited, mainly due to the
post-conflict Government framework, with its centralized powers and one
geographical control which make it difficult to cut across line ministries. On the other hand in countries such as Rwanda,
Ghana and Bangladesh, where the government takes control of coordination,
activities seem to be implemented more efficiently and delivery is at a
satisfactory level. Without oversimplifying, the use of a common
coordination agreement at the field level for the implementation of "Joint
Programmes" would have facilitated the adoption of the so-called pass-
through agreement. However this approach, which proved to be effective with
humanitarian assistance, has the following constraints: a) it needs specific
arrangements at the country level, which slows down the process, b) it
generates uncertainty on who is technically and financially accountable for
delivery c) the internal rules for determining the Project Support Costs (PSC)
vary depending on the agency d) an additional transaction cost of about 2% has
to be to granted to the administrative agent. The new massive political commitment to long
term food security, as declared in L’Aquila on July 2009, and the proposal
launched for the creation of a Global Fund on Food Security, particularly seen
within the framework of a global evolving context, have to be scored as
positive and encouraging signals. This, after almost two decades of decreasing
aid to agriculture and despite worldwide increases in ODA, are felt as huge
developments, and the challenge is coming on the way to support Food Security
in the 10 20-year period. Within that context, there is a remarkable
eagerness about coordinating funding, thus providing the EC with the
opportunity for building on the experience of the EU-FF. Taking into account that: • The implementation
of the overall FF is still at the initial stage; • In some of
the countries visited (The Philippines), the projects to be financed either did
not
start or are not yet formally approved; • Some of the
Delegations (e.g. Liberia and The Philippines) still have to adjust to the new
load
of responsibility; • No global
solutions are available and that adjustments and improvements are country
specific.
The following recommendations can be made: From now onward, HLTF perhaps may devote
additional efforts in providing support
at the country level for
improving efficiency of coordination and helping to ensure adequate knowledge
and information sharing; hence boosting the capacity of jointly identifying
solutions to common problems that may occur during implementation. As the case may be, improved coordination may be
reflected by an adjustment of HLTF structure so that it can count on focal
people within their respective organizations rather than with seconded people,
so to be able to rely upon specific expertise at the HQ and country level. Innovative and more flexible rules need to be
devised by EC that, though firmly anchored to undisputable principles of
coherence, equity and transparency, may cope with unexpected suddenly changing
situations and allow for the indispensable leeway, at field and project
management level, and prevent further delays and drawbacks in projects
implementation. EC country Delegations may take the opportunity
to step up their cooperation with UN agencies, trying to identify shared
approaches to the achievement of food security and agricultural development
goals, besides pro-actively contributing to an enhanced coordination between
HLTF, UN agencies and EC. The EC Delegations, as it is happening in
Liberia and The Philippines, must be endowed, whenever necessary, with
additional capacities. These should be especially devoted to: i) the
coordination of the FF initiatives, ii) the identification of new alternative
options, iii) the conceptualisation of next steps to be undertaken, iv) the
active participation of NGOs, v) the regular monitoring of programme unfolding
and, vi) the effective implementation of the visibility plan. In countries where the EU-FF is implemented, the
EC Delegations may consider the opportunity to promote the establishment of
"temporary" Food Facility Steering Committees, within broader Food Security
coordination structures, with the participation of the government Departments
and the UN agencies concerned, as well as other major stakeholders and a representation
of relevant NGOs. Indeed, when regulatory and overall guidance tasks would be
fulfilled, it could easily be dissolved. Accordingly, and country specific, it would be
advisable that the coordination of the EU Food Facility related actions be
entrusted to one of the Government Departments/Institutions that already play a
major role in the implementation of the various projects. The envisaged FF Steering Committees - wherever
feasible - under the guidance of the local EC Delegations and in cooperation
with concerned UN agencies, could be the originator and promoter of: -a coordination mechanism that may bring into
line capacities, procedures and
requirements. Such a mechanism not only
would foster synergies, but perhaps more important, would prevent unfortunate,
wasteful and image- damaging overlapping. -a shared reporting and monitoring procedures
that, though based on purposely designed outlines and simple forms, may satisfy
the EU binding requirements. All concerned agencies, having been operational
in the country for sometime, often have an articulated programme of both
ongoing and pipeline projects. On the other side, the emergency situations call
for a quickness of action that does not allow for the design of innovative
ideas and projects. Therefore, the UN agencies strategy of allocating EU FF
funds to support or complement established aid schemes or ongoing initiatives
should be accepted and endorsed. There is an ample scope for the EC to consider
the possibility of carrying out an interim evaluation of the Food Facility, so
to be able to draw perhaps a number of important lessons. This would enable
improving the overall exercise in the event it should be repeated or should the
need arise in the future to identify an appropriate strategy to allocate funds
for Food Security.
8.2 Supply Response from the
Agricultural Sector in Developing Countries to Food Price Increases – July
2010
Executive summary The present contribution to the analysis of the
“Supply Response from the Agricultural Sector in Developing Countries to
Food Price Increases” is a rapid, qualitative assessment of the factors
which have contributed to the present situation of staple food production. The study focuses on cereals production and
public policies responses. It is based on literature review and six country
case studies (Zambia, Benin, Pakistan, Laos, Honduras and Nicaragua). Given the scarcity of statistical data for the
2008-2010 period and the limited country coverage, this review is only
exploratory in nature, while trying to systematically assess the factors which
have influenced supply response. Key findings are the following: • There is to
date no evidence of any significant increase of staple food production in the
developing world, in average, over 2007-2010, that could be linked by a causal
relationship to the world food prices increase. • Many
developing countries have adopted food-self sufficiency as a new orientation of
their agricultural policies and deployed important emergency and mid-term
measures to this end. This has entailed over the past three years significant
interventions on the inputs and outputs markets. • World price
increases have not been transmitted, in average, at the farm gate level.
Consumer prices experienced significant increases (about 50% in real terms in
2008, and they were still 20 higher than pre-crisis prices in July 2009).
However, these high consumer prices typically did not translate into increases
at the producer level. There are cases of countries where public procurement,
however, was offering high prices to farmers (Pakistan, Zambia). • In some
countries where strong production support policy measures were implemented,
efforts concentrated on subsidized fertilizer & seed distribution and
public procurement schemes (often at fixed prices). Such schemes have reached
about a quarter of the peasantry and a third of marketable surplus in Zambia
and Benin. • The countries
that have experienced the best supply response are those where both subsidized
schemes are implemented together (i.e. fertilizer schemes and public
procurement). Zambia for example has experienced two consecutive record crops
and even a bumper crop in 2010, reaching unprecedented exports. Pakistan is
another example where this kind of combination for rice and wheat has
contributed to two consecutive good crops, with above the average net cereals
exports. • High fixed
prices for the producer (when fixed prices are used for public procurement)
seem to be an incentive that works. Zambia and Pakistan have applied with
success prices that were respectively 20% and 50% in nominal terms to the
pre-crisis prices. • Most
countries have not experienced significant production increase in average over
the past three years. Some of them (like Laos, Nicaragua or Honduras) have been
implementing important state driven fertilizer distribution and subsidy schemes
but this was not coupled with significant public procurement schemes. • Inputs
distribution seems to have emerged as the single most strategic solution
adopted for securing higher levels of staple food in a sustainable manner. In
some countries, private sector based inputs distribution is being promoted and
developed now based on existing networks (cooperatives or producers
organizations, or agro-dealers retail networks) and innovative mechanisms (such
as electronic voucher schemes) that ensure a linkage between state subsidy and
private sector’s involvement development (Zambia). In other countries (like
Benin), the challenge is more complex, because of the non-existence of a
pre-existing capacity of the private sector to ensure inputs retail
distribution in rural areas. • Countries are
experiencing contradictions between the state driven and subsidized mechanisms
that were installed as an emergency response in 2008 and that continue to exist
today, and the policy frameworks they had adopted before the crisis. There
seems to be a political willingness to maintain this type of instruments
operational as part of an “emergency preparedness” strategy. This will need to
be taken into consideration while working on overall policy coherence at
country level. • New policy
frameworks need to be established that could permit, as a top priority, the
actual development of the private sector’s role (producers associations and
traders) in inputs distribution and in crops marketing.
Recommendations
addressed to the Food Facility, EC Delegations and the related programmes focus
on: i) a study/research agenda; ii) four priority areas of intervention that
based on the present study and case studies seem to be relevant for the
follow-up of the Food Facility implementation at country level and at global
level, and iii) positive experiences observed in case studies that might
deserve replication.
The instruments/programmes that were observed in
country case studies and assessed as having a positive impact for promoting
sustainable food production increases, and that could be actively supported
elsewhere, are principally the following: Combining (coupling) and implementing simultaneously strong “fertilizer subsidy schemes” and “public procurement schemes” covering a significant share of the national peasantry. This can be achieved either through targeted EC budgetary support or specific technical assistance programmes. The latter must aim at boosting efficiency and effectiveness of practices, and driving them towards “smart fertilizer subsidy” as well as towards public procurement bodies relying on commercial banks (Zambia example, where the total cost of both combined instruments in 2010 was in the range of US$ 125 million). Supporting that inputs traders replace the state for inputs distribution to small holders: this can be achieved by promoting electronic voucher schemes for access to subsidized inputs by farmers through retail agro-dealers’ shops. Vouches can be instrumental tools to foster the development of the private sector’s involvement in inputs distribution even in remote areas, while diminishing costs, improving accountability and transparency, and allowing for traceability (Zambia example). Reinforcing public extension services to food crop producers in parallel with the provision of fertilizers, improved seeds and other agricultural inputs. The advantage can be the promotion of the organization of farmers groups and the transmission of good practices, as well as the facilitation of the replacement of the state by the private sector for input distribution, i.e. promoting the voucher systems. Strengthening farmers’ cooperatives for inputs distribution, marketing facilitation (from bulking at village level up to district and higher levels), and as financial intermediaries. EC and other donor institutions have been strengthening the cooperative sector in Central America. The existing institutions have now a relatively high operational level and are well developed. Promoting modern market institutions such as market information systems (MIS) of the second generation (mobile phone based), warehouse receipt systems (WRS) and commodity exchanges (Zambia example). Promoting conservation agriculture (CA), which offers remarkable potential for the sustainability of production and productivity increases (Zambia example).
8.3 Safety Net Interventions
financed under the Food Facility – August 2010
Summary The Global Objective
is to assist the European Commission Services in the successful implementation
of activities financed under the Food Facility, and to draw lessons for future
EC development policies in the field of food security. The Specific Objective
is to complete an analysis of the role of safety net programmes financed under
the Food Facility, and to assess their added value in helping people manage
risks. Three case studies have been judiciously selected, as per the Terms of
Reference (ToRs) for the study. In
Senegal, the World Food Programme is the implementing
agency, with a Food Facility input of Euro10.9m budget. There are three
activity foci, two of which are in the comparative advantage capability of WFP
to implement (the third, agricultural production was supposedly to be
outsourced to FAO, using its comparative advantage). In Palestine,
UNRWA is the implementing agency, with a Food Facility top-up of Euro39.7m,
assigned on May 26th 2009, and all used to plug a gaping hole in
UNRWA finances. This was caused in large part by the soaring price of food on
the market to enable UNRWA’s safety net programme, itself needed to
counterbalance the socio-political dysfunction in that part of the world. In
the absence of this windfall, many Palestinians in the Gaza Strip would have
perished or starved. The instruments of Direct Support assistance did not
change as a result of the FF contribution. Clearly, UNRWA was the right choice
of implementing partner, although the involvement of WFP could have been
considered to take care of the non-refugees in the Gaza Strip as well. In Ethiopia,
the implementing agency is listed as World Bank in the assignment ToRs, though
the Bank’s role is to head the Trust Fund into which programme monies are paid
and from which they are drawn down. The true implementing partner is the Food
Security Coordinator within the Federal Ministry of Agriculture (MoARD). There
are some misgivings by some parties within the Programme that the Public Works
component, that uses some 80% of the funds available, falls under MoARD. By the
nature of Public Works activities, a lot of the funding goes into Watershed
management and MoARD is the appropriate partner for that; yet it is hardly the
right partner for irrigation engineering, roads and culverts, schools and
clinics. This may explain why in all the latter infrastructural works,
questions have been raised over the quality of the work done, though there is a
trend for this challenge to be resolved to some extent through training given
at woreda level. The FF top-up assigned to the FSNP in 2009 was Euro20m,
subsequently topped up again by Euro3.1m, and all used that year, to compensate
for the price of the Safety Net food component, in the market place. Recommendations whereby
future EC Cooperation could be improved to enhance effectiveness and
sustainability of Safety Net support measures. Ethiopia: Commission an FWC in which a facilitator
identifies and collates the Terms and Conditions applying to PSNP regular (not
contract) staff across the participating Ministries, and at the various levels
from Federal to Woreda; then devises through a process of consultation
cost-free initiatives to improve the T & C, which are likely to be
acceptable to GoE, which the Donor Coordination Team adopt and strongly promote
with GoE, in the interests of all stakeholders. Working through the Donor
Coordination Team, under the current chairmanship of Ireland, work to remove
the various coordination and management dysfunctions in partnership with the
Food Security Coordination Unit; not just in official meetings but through
one-on-one rounds of golf, or similar informal settings. Palestine: Feeding
programmes for children amended so that support is given for the whole three
years up until pre-school starts, rather than merely for the first six months
of life. Yet another example of value being added to both the programme and the
beneficiaries. There will be a cost clearly, and the Food Facility could be
used to good effect to cover it. Supply
assistance for the discussion on whether food distribution can be replaced by
cash. As this seems very complex because of the repercussions on the
programmes’ financial situation and the objectives of serving the refugees the
best it can, in certain UNRWA circles there is quite a resistance towards the
idea. In particular, where food markets are not properly functioning,
alternatives should be looked into in order to have more economical actions, by
which the saving of funds gives better opportunities for the total programme to
be implemented. Senegal: Further
studies are required on the subject of food or cash vouchers versus just cash. UNICEF
and the WB have already done such work, but given the reluctance of WFP,
because of its prioritising ‘food’ from the inception of the programme, it is
advisable that further studies in this subject are done. According to UNICEF,
also the IMF’s advice that cash should be used more, for economic reasons as it
gives rise to more economic development should be taken into account. When
services of other organisations are supposed to be rendered, it should not be
taken for granted that such an organisation steps into the programme, but a
contract should be made also with such an organisation. So, if such services
are included in a programme one should make certain that such actually happens,
lest valuable parts of a project do not get implemented (e.g. involvement of
FAO in the Food for Assets programme, which easily could have been brought
under the overall FF contract with FAO covering several countries; this was the
case with Liberia where a special contract was made with reference to the
overall contract).
8.4 Food Facility Beneficiary
assessment – December 2010
Executive summary From
January to November 2010 a Beneficiaries Assessment (BA) Study was carried out
for projects financed under the Food Facility. Three Experts carried out Field
missions, each of whom was assigned to one country (Philippines, Cambodia and
Zambia). This
Study aims to assist the European Commission services in the successful
implementation of activities financed under the Food Facility, to draw lessons
for future EC development policies and project design in the field of food
security. Its focus is on the beneficiaries of three selected projects financed
under the Food Facility. It shall help the Commission services improve the
effectiveness of the Food Facility and related actions. The target of the study is to improve the decision making of the
managers responsible for the programming and implementation of the Food
Facility and other EC funded actions in the field of food security. The goal of
the study is improvement the EC’s project and policy design in the field of
food security. The
projects assessed are: Philippines: “Making Safe Food Available and
Accessible to Rural Poor Households in the Philippines” implemented by CARE
Nederland; “Focused Food Production Assistance
to Vulnerable Sectors” implemented by SEARCA (Southeast Asian Regional Centre
for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture); Cambodia: “Improve the food security of farming
families affected by the soaring food prices.” implemented by FAO; Zambia: “Responding to soaring food prices: a
step towards sustainable agriculture, income generation and empowerment of
small-scale farmers in Mazabuka and Monze Districts” implemented by CeLIM. BA is a
qualitative research and management tool for verifying the quality of
development interventions. It aims at improving development impacts by gaining
beneficiaries’ views of planned and/or on-going activities. The BA objective is
to assess the value of an activity as perceived by Project beneficiaries and to
integrate findings into Project activities. The BA approach is not intended to
replace quantitative surveys and other data gathering methods. It complements
these by providing reliable, qualitative, in-depth information on the
socio-cultural conditions and perceptions of a Project’s target group. This
information is intended to be of immediate use to managers and policy-makers
responsible for improving peoples’ well being. BA facilitates the development
of demand driven initiates and enhances their sustainability. The approach
relies primarily on conversational interviews, backed by prior review of
secondary data. In well-guided interviews, people are expected to reveal their
feelings, thoughts, and beliefs about particular issues. It uncovers
information that would otherwise not come to light. This is particularly
important when seeking insight from women and the poor. The
following core topical areas for conversation were selected for this study -
the underlined topics were initially presented with the Inception Report: § Food
availability from local production; § Produce
marketing channels and selling price movements; § Food
availability from the market and food price movements; § Food crises; § Social
networks and community-based safety nets; § Food aid; § Farming
support services; § Beneficiaries’
participation in the projects; § Supply of
inputs and services; § Beneficiaries’
satisfaction with the projects; § Local
sustainability mechanisms and institutional capacities. The
Experts’ briefings with the EUDs in the three countries resulted to some extent
in modifications of how the above topics were to be covered, subsequently how
the conversations were structured and guided. The topics above, which are not
underlined, were added before the first Expert went to her Food Facility
project areas in the Philippines, and the Cambodia study followed these topics
later, while the Zambia study was carried out more in line with the initial
core topics due to serious time constraints. The
sample size was determined by the time available to carry out the field level
conversations. Between 44 and 66 beneficiaries could be interviewed during the
field time available to this study. Therefore, utmost care was taken in
representative coverage of all types of beneficiaries, such as better-off,
medium-income and poor farmers, wide age range of farmers, equal number of male
and female farmers, vulnerable women and women involved in nutrition and
supplemental feeding. The sample beneficiaries cover a wide range of food
production activities such as rice, maize, goat production, inland fishing,
marine fishing, aquaculture, and vegetable growing. Findings Most
beneficiaries produce for their subsistence. Little produce can be sold to the
market or shared with poor families in need. Farmers need income in order to
pay other essential necessities and additional food for a better nutrition.
Hence, any surplus - as far as available - has to go to the market. However, at
present none of the projects includes farmer support activities that would aim
at their marketing their eventual surplus production. Dependence on rain-fed
agriculture greatly limits farm productivity. Irrigation is absent in all
project areas, although natural conditions are conducive to water retention and
small irrigation schemes. Fruit and vegetables are usually not being grown by
the beneficiaries. Vegetables are generally considered a welcome food source
and in addition a good income source. Post-harvest losses due to inappropriate
storage occur frequently. Livestock production is an important cash oriented
activity in all project areas visited. In all areas covered by this study,
natural hazards can have a detrimental impact on farm production. Beneficiaries
across the three countries, where the three FF projects are being implemented,
see capital as the main requirement for increasing production and income. Some
rely largely on professional lenders and some cultures do not know of such
approaches. Networks
of communal solidarity that could potentially mitigate impacts of food crises
do not exist in all project areas. Such networks could render the impacts of
the Food Facility’s short-term assistance more sustainable. Frequency
of support from various services (projects and Government) seems often to be a
concern, especially in a context where project duration is short. Agricultural
extension officers, fishery officers, agronomy officers of local, District and
Provincial offices are often - but not always - involved to varying degrees.
Training received from the FF projects is generally found satisfactory and
useful. Livestock related training and extension is rather an exception than a
general rule - veterinary officers are less available than agriculture
specialists. Physical
inputs such as certified seed, fertilisers for the staple crop and for
vegetables, tools, other gear and machinery are being well delivered to the
beneficiaries, although occasional delays are being encountered. Beneficiary
participation depends to one part on the performance of the support mechanisms
in so far that the promoted technologies must be supported by timely delivery
the necessary inputs. Otherwise, production loss is imminent and farmers lose
interest. The beneficiaries receiving inputs and services were generally
satisfied with the quality. Often, farmers see the quantity of inputs delivered
as a constraint to potential impact, hence, they ask for more inputs. Increases
in farm input prices represent a major constraint to potential benefits
beneficiaries could gain from FF projects, particularly in Cambodia. Hence, the
beneficiaries are most grateful for the free high-quality inputs (especially
seeds) they receive from the projects. Only in
Cambodia beneficiaries have to cope with strongly increased food prices. In
most countries marketing does not take place in nearby village markets, due to
(semi-) subsistence economic situation. However, in such environments bartering
of produce may occur. Prices are very variable across the projects covered by
this study. In Zambia, farmers prefer to sell to a Government agency that buys
food at subsidised prices above market prices. This is not necessarily an
incentive to their participation in the FF project. The
majority of the rural smallholders benefitting from the FF projects eat only
two meals a day. The staple food of beneficiary households originates from
their own production, with starchy foods dominating the diet. Meal shortages,
i.e., the limited ability to purchase food from the market are induced by 1.
low agricultural productivity and 2. low level of income available after costs
for other essential items such as schooling, etc. Projects comprise of a
nutrition training component aiming mainly at children. Others comprise of a
post-harvest or safe food storage component. Farmers
have previously experienced and/or are currently experiencing emergency relief
(food aid, cash-for-work and food-for-work) in all of the project areas under
this assessment. Disincentive effects of food aid are widely known in so far
that farmers’ reliance on food aid is often detrimental to their adoption of
new farming technologies such as those proposed by FF projects and regular
development projects - farmers have a less innovative and/or self-confident
behaviour when they rely on food aid as a supplement to their currently low
production that can be increased. It
appears that some of the FF’s implementing partners have commenced field level
operations late; hence, their beneficiaries have little knowledge of the
specific FF project and not yet experienced all inputs and services.
Participation of beneficiaries and local authorities as well as local
Government services in project planning is usually known to be an important
determinant of project impact. Therefore, the implementing organisations of the
FF projects assessed by this study, conducted diligent validation of
beneficiaries’ socio-economic situation in screening of beneficiaries for
eligibility. Timely
delivery of inputs is key with regard to beneficiaries’ satisfaction and
participation over the course of a project. Throughout the projects assessed,
beneficiaries are satisfied with the inputs and services (training) provided.
However, at the early implementation stages some “critical reticence” exists
with regard to the impacts on future yields. Some of
the FF projects assessed have established close working relationships with
local services such as agriculture offices, planning and development offices,
etc. It seems, however, that traditional authorities - where not yet involved
in the projects - could play an important decision-making and advisory role
towards sustainability, if they were taught what is technically required to
take farm production forward. In remote situations such as in the project
intervention areas in the Philippines and in Zambia, local services are often
not very effective, which is reflected in beneficiaries’ limited knowledge of other
potential sources of support, e.g., nationwide programmes. Beneficiaries are
well aware of the “shortness” of the FF projects, hence, in their early stages
have doubt about impact and/or are reticent to participate. In some areas they
believe that Government services will take over, in others they know that
Government services are too weak or resource constrained to continue in a
meaningful manner. Conclusions Overall,
the Food Facility is a short-to-mid-term means for alleviating the negative
impact of global food price hikes. The Food Facility implementation, as
represented by this assessment, is still at its early stages with numerous
inputs and services still to be delivered. Hence, this report can outline only
the findings relating to design (e.g., participatory involvement of
beneficiaries) and to on-going implementation at the activity level, not at
output/result or impact level. Subsequently, a few recommendations can be made
with a view to reinforce project operations so that the desired impacts can be
reached. Recommendations From a
global political point of view, it was important and innovative that the EC
decided to make funds available for the Food Facility to counter the potential
negative impact of global food price increases. In the humanitarian sphere
relating to ECHO projects and within organisations such as the FAO/UN, there is
at present substantial discussion going on as to how emergency interventions
can be linked with development efforts, especially when humanitarian or
emergency/relief interventions relate to mitigating impacts of natural hazards
and/or climate change impacts on smallholder farm production.
In this regard, the Food Facility supports the current global integration
initiatives very well. It is desirable that such effort is carried on, in order
to contribute to bridging the gap between emergency operations and development
interventions. Optimally the lessons learned from the FF projects upon their
completion would contribute to recommending specific interventions to regular
development interventions. I.e., the FF’s motivation, objectives and knowledge
gathered from its project interventions should become part of upcoming
development projects. Urban
populations are much more prone to food price increases due to world market
price movements of inputs and food. Especially in countries where rural
populations feed themselves from their own production (subsistence farming and
fishing) and do not have much of a production surplus to sell to the urban
areas, the Food Facility might bring some impact to urban populations if
national food production can be increased. However, longer-term assistance is
required if smallholders are to induce a reduction of costly food imports. A well
defined Food Facility implementation, i.e., rigorous screening for appropriate
coverage of the desired impact areas in project proposals - is of utmost
importance e.g., surplus marketing is not part of the FF projects assessed by
this study, but with a view to longer-term development projects it is important
to learn how marketing in the FF projects’ geographical areas can be
facilitated. Food security is often understood as just farm-orientated
agricultural interventions with the respective accompanying measures in sector
governance and management - livestock, fisheries and other income generating
activities are often ignored, although household cash income enables food
purchases. It is often claimed that the poorest of the poor must be addressed.
However, they do not have much opportunity in agriculture - a fact that can be
well seen and that is being well addressed by the projects in the Philippines,
Cambodia and Zambia, as they have chosen to work with farm households who have
good potential to improve food supply for themselves and for their
communities including the landless. A non-discriminating and wider livelihoods
approach aiming at food security for farmers and the landless alike often
proves to bring more significant changes than approaches that focus on one
major income earning activity such as agriculture. However, none of the
beneficiaries covered by the present study point to activities and desired
impacts apart from agriculture. Some even point specifically to their livestock
and fisheries related constraints. This could mean that the three FF projects
have so far not undertaken sufficient efforts to deal with their aquaculture
(Philippines) component and income generating activities (Cambodia). Further
scrutiny or monitoring is required to make sure the projects address all of
their desired outputs appropriately. §
Projects
should focus in the course of the remaining implementation time on making their
impact sustainable. While beneficiaries are confident that benefits will accrue
from the projects, the Food Facility needs to ensure proper monitoring and
quantification of such (potential) gains. §
Although
the Food Facility’s support to poor farmers through subsidised or free inputs
is justified in view of the FF’s scope and objectives, longer-term emphasis is
required on stepwise smallholder empowerment and on building of their
self-confidence. The Food Facility cannot fully address this issue, as it is
limited to 3-years duration. However, EDF development projects as well as
ECHO/DIPECHO interventions can learn from the FF project lessons learned. §
Projects
should urgently address marketing aspects. The more surplus a farmer will be
able to produce, the more he needs reliable outlets in terms of price and
quantity. Community-based storage facilities as well as marketing collectives,
and possibly cell phone based price information systems could allow farmers to
maximise their incomes by selling at the right time to the right buyer. §
Wherever
viable and/or where micro-finance (community) organisations are present in the
communities, supporting measures should be added. §
Project
planning must mandatorily consider and implementation must absolutely respect
cultural calendars, so that inputs are available to the farms exactly at the
time when they are needed. The management of the projects under the Food Facility
needs to look into procurement procedures for physical inputs as practiced by
any proposed partner in order to eliminate further undesirable delays. §
Productive
support through income generating activities should be made possible to the
otherwise excluded poorest, i.e., the landless farm workers and gatherers. §
Mitigation
of the negative impacts of natural disasters such as typhoons, floods and
droughts is mandatory in areas where they occur and the FF intervenes. The risk
of losing production to these hazards can in such areas annihilate the complete
FF effort. As it is not the Food Facility’s mandate to mitigate disaster caused
by natural calamities, it s recommended for the three projects support is
sought from specialised agencies that can help to reduce the imminent disaster
risk (e.g., ECHO/DIPECHO). §
It
is mandatory to provide continuous hands-on training and follow-up built on
participation of and frequent interaction with beneficiaries. To this end,
communities shall be organized and empowered to multiply newly acquired
knowledge onto a wider range of beneficiaries. This is of utmost importance in
the FF context, where shorter-term interventions are taking place, i.e., the
time window to impact is narrow. §
Where
appropriate, stronger inclusion of livestock related activities/innovations
and/or of fishing/aquaculture related activities/innovations to cater for
additional income to supplement expected benefits from the current
agriculture-focused interventions. §
Also
timing of nutrition advice is equally important. As the subject matter is about
behaviour changes, constant and long-term assistance is required if real impact
is to be achieved. §
Co-operation
between and co-ordination of local authorities, Government services, NGOs and
Community Based Organisations is also important. Capacity building of local
services should be considered.
9. FOOD FACILITY FINAL
EVALUATION
9.1 Executive Summary
9.1.1 Purpose of the evaluation
The
current evaluation[12]
assesses the European Union Food Facility (Regulation 1337/2008) as an
instrument and the European Commission’s cooperation activities under this
instrument over the period 2008 to 2011. The geographical scope includes all 49
countries where Food Facility funded activities were undertaken[13].
The objective of the evaluation was to ascertain whether the objectives have
been met, to enable the formulation of conclusions based on objective,
credible, reliable and valid findings and to formulate recommendations with a
view to improving relevant future development cooperation operations.
9.1.2 Background of the evaluation
The
volatility of food prices and agricultural inputs in 2007 and 2008 put numerous
developing countries and their populations in a dramatic situation and put the
realisation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at risk. Moreover, the
rising prices have resulted in riots, unrest and instability in several
countries, jeopardising the achievements of years of political development and
peacekeeping investments. This Food Price Crisis (FPC) demanded short-medium
term action from the international community, in order to mitigate its effects
on the poor in developing countries. The
FAO launched its Initiative on Soaring Food Prices (ISFP) in December 2007, in
response to the urgent needs of the most vulnerable people faced with
skyrocketing prices and difficult choices. In April 2008, the Chief Executive
Board (CEB) of the United Nations established a High-Level Task Force (UNHLTF)
on the Global Food Crisis, under the leadership of the UN Secretary-General.
The UNHTLF proposed a unified response to the FPC and a global strategy and
action plan, the so-called Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA). The
FAO High-Level Conference on World Food Security in June 2008 called on the
international community to increase its assistance to developing countries.
This call was echoed by the G8+ Summit in Japan the following month, where the
President of the European Commission announced the Commission's intention to
propose a quick response ‘Facility’ of 1 billion EUR to diminish the effects of
the on-going FPC. The
first EU intervention decisions made in 2008 to mitigate the Food Price Crisis
originated from existing EC instruments: the EDF-B envelope (185.9 million
EUR), FSTP (50 million EUR) and ECHO (210 million EUR). However, the amount
made available or reallocated through these existing instruments was
insufficient to address the financial requirements for responding to the FPC.
On 16 December 2008, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the
Regulation, establishing a “facility for rapid response to soaring food prices
in developing countries” (this was to become the European Union Food Facility -
EU FF). Operating over a 3-year period from 2009-2011, the fund was intended to
bridge the gap between emergency aid and medium to long-term development
assistance. Its primary objectives were to: i) encourage food producers to
increase supply in targeted countries and regions; ii) support activities to
respond rapidly and directly to mitigate the negative effects of volatile food
prices on local populations in line with global food security objectives,
including UN standards for nutritional requirements; and iii) strengthen the
productive capacities and governance of the agricultural sector so as to
enhance the sustainability of interventions. The
1 billion EUR EU FF was planned and designed with a view to complementing
existing EU policies and strategies in the field of Food Security
over a three-year period. Fifty-seven
percent of the total budget was channelled through UN agencies and the World
Bank, while the remainder was disbursed through budget support, non-state
actors, member states agencies and regional organisations.
9.1.3 Methodology of the evaluation
The evaluation approach is based on a
reconstruction of the intervention logic and is structured around ten
evaluation questions, with corresponding judgment criteria and indicators.
These evaluation questions are linked to the five DAC evaluation criteria
(relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability), coherence,
EC added value and to a number of other key issues. Answers to individual
evaluation questions were found, and overall conclusions reached, through an
approach consisting of; i) an overall inventory and typology of the interventions
financed under the EU FF; ii) the collection of information from all 232
interventions financed during the desk study phase; iii) field visits to 12 of
the beneficiary countries; iv) the analysis of surveys completed by the EU
Delegations; v) a consultation of all available project documents; vi) studies
of 231 ROM reports; vii) interviews with stakeholders from the EC HQ and FAO,
UNHLTF, EU delegations, and viii) project level interviews and focus groups.
9.1.4 Main
Findings related to the EU FF as an instrument
The EC,
through its decision to support the coordinated international response to the
FPC, has brought food security and rural development at the forefront of its
own development cooperation agenda and of the international development agenda.
In addition, the EC has gained significant visibility through the
implementation of the EU FF, thus strengthening its leading role in the
international response. The
creation of the EU FF was the sole means at the disposal of the Commission to
rapidly commit a substantial volume of funds to the agricultural and food
security sectors in countries affected by the FPC. By creating a “specific
instrument” in response to the FPC, agricultural
development and food security were brought to the forefront of the EC's
development cooperation and the international development agenda[14].
This achievement would not have been accomplished by simply increasing funding
through existing instruments, which have a far more limited visibility. The
EU FF enabled the rapid increase in the overall volume of funds directed
through EU cooperation to the agricultural and rural sector as part of a
coordinated international response to the food price crisis. Although the EU
re-deployed other instruments in response to the crisis, these were not
sufficiently flexible enough or lacked the sufficient funding to allow the
necessary response to the crisis. So, the creation of a specific instrument was
necessary. The
instrument provided a rapid response to the crisis and allowed the EU to conduct
a dialogue in global fora and with partner countries. The
announcement that the EU would contribute 1 billion EUR towards the L’Aquila
commitments, whereby countries would seek to mobilise 22 billion USD (14.3 billion
EUR), strengthened these commitments, afforded a high visibility to the EU and
made it a leader in the accomplishment of this initiative. At
the instrument level, substantial resources were attributed with a reduced
administrative burden for important interventions. The EU
FF is fully coherent with the 2008 Declaration of the World Summit on Food
Security and supports the pillars of Food Security[15]
in countries affected by the FPC, however, support is concentrated on
triggering a supply response from the smallholder-farming sector. The
EU FF instrument enjoyed a high flexibility for intervention, which translated
into interventions across a wide range of activities. The
main share of interventions financed under the EU FF sought to increase the
availability of food through an intensification of production by smallholders.
The other pillars of Food Security (access to quality food/nutrition) were also
tackled by some of the interventions, but to a lesser extent. There
is a broad consistency and coherence between EU FF interventions, EC instruments
and other donors’ interventions. Coordination was also satisfactory. In fact,
the EU FF is fully in line with the Declaration of the World Summit on Food
Security and the Paris Declaration. The EU
FF was programmed as a short to medium-term instrument and its activities were
concentrated in short-term support. The EU
FF was programmed as a short to medium-term instrument in order to act as a
bridge between emergency and long-term development, even though by 2008 it was
expected that food prices would remain volatile in the mid-term. Due to the
short time period available, the interventions concentrated on promoting
resilience and reducing the effects of the FPC on the most affected groups.
However, the underlying causes (both natural and man-made) of food insecurity
in target countries remain out of the scope of the EU FF. Although there are no
plans for continuing the EU FF with another instrument at this stage, a number
of projects financed under the EU FF have benefitted or will benefit from
further financing under long-term instruments (FSTP, EDF). The
selection of countries benefitting from the EU FF was based on a set of
criteria defined in the appendix to the regulation, however, not all targeted
countries were the “most affected” by the FPC and the large number of
beneficiary countries resulted in a dispersion of efforts. The
choice of partner countries benefitting from the EU FF was made according to a
set of criteria laid down in the appendix to the regulation. Initially, the
proposal was to work in 35 countries but this was increased to 50 countries in
the regulation adopted by European Parliament. All countries chosen met the set
criteria: many countries were strongly hit by the FPC, whilst other countries
with advanced food security measures already in place, found these were
jeopardised by the FPC. In these countries, the support provided under the EU
FF helped national policy-makers to continue the implementation of their
national measures, despite the FPC (e.g. Jamaica, Malawi). The
establishment of the EU FF within a timeframe of only 10 months and the
management of the implementation process demonstrated the high efficiency of
all participating institutions. To
establish the EU FF within a timeframe of only 10 months involved enormous preparatory
work and inter-institutional coordination, thus the achievement of the creation
of the Facility in this short time frame can be considered a considerable
success. The EC HQ and EUDs demonstrated a very efficient management of the EU
FF. Less than 2% of the EU FF funds were used for EC administrative support.
The recruitment of additional contractual agents under the EU FF permitted an
adequate follow-up and coordination of interventions. The use
of UN organisations, many of them with a presence in the target countries and
with well-established direct relations to the Ministry of Agriculture,
facilitated the identification of interventions. The
initial programming of interventions was carried out on the basis of a Country
Needs Assessments (CNAs) performed by UN organisations. These CNAs revealed the
extent of the crisis and proposed responses in each country. However, CNAs were
somewhat limited by their lack of involvement of other key stakeholders and by
not considering Non-State Actors (NSAs) and Budget Support (BS) as possible
channels of support. Interventions
financed under the EU FF were effective in both mitigating the effects of the
FPC on the direct beneficiaries of the interventions and in promoting
resilience within these populations. The
support provided corresponded to the needs of the beneficiaries. The FPC has
caused or aggravated the food insecurity in target countries. Although the
support provided under the EU FF arrived some months after the peak in global
food prices, it did arrive in time to deal with the effects of this crisis and
tackle food insecurity. Nevertheless, it reached a limited proportion of the
vulnerable population at the target country level. This leads to the question:
to what extent was fragmentation between a large number of countries and
implementing partners justified or would it have been more effective to
concentrate efforts in fewer countries through a better sectoral and
geographical division of labour with other partners? The
EU FF was completed in 2012 when all the interventions financed were closed,
administratively speaking. Although food prices remain high and the overall
food security situation in many countries has not improved, no new
interventions can be financed. Whilst resilience has been achieved with direct
beneficiaries of EU FF interventions and in countries with a favourable
context, there could still be a need for financing other interventions on an
ad-hoc basis where needed (in addition to emergency support which can be
provided by ECHO).
9.1.5 Main Findings related to
interventions financed under the EU FF
Interventions
financed under the EU FF were in line with the capacities and strategies of the
targeted countries and regions, and corresponded to the needs of the targeted
beneficiaries. Most interventions promoted a supply response from the smallholder-farming
sector. The
interventions financed focused on triggering a supply response from the smallholder-farming
sector, and were thus important for poverty reduction. However, this strategy
did not encourage a positive supply response beyond direct beneficiaries. There
was a predominance of interventions related to agricultural and local
development, but only a few interventions were in favour of the urban
population or focused on tackling nutrition (food consumption). The
delays in starting activities at the field level were frequent, however, in
most cases these had been recovered by the end of the project. Efficiency of
implementation varied greatly according to country, project and implementation
channel. The
quality of management of interventions through implementing partners and the
coordination of activities with national governments and EUDs was generally
good. About 60% of the interventions financed were
upgrades of existing projects, thus enabling a quicker start-up of activities
at the field level. Thus, about 75% of all projects were implemented without
significant delays. However, because of the pace of planning many projects
(notably 50% of those from IOs) had to be amended in the course of their
implementation. Projects tended to be overambitious in their design given the
time available. However, in most cases delays had been
recovered by the end of the project, and foreseen activities implemented, which
is important efficiency-wise. The
efficiency of interventions varied greatly according to interventions,
countries and implementing partners. The dispersion of support to about 49[16]
countries and more than 232 interventions has multiplied the costs related to
staff (national and international), vehicles and operational costs. A
concentration of support in fewer countries and larger interventions (possibly
under budget support) would increase efficiency. Partner management costs were
limited to 7% of project costs, although this masks the fact that some of the
International Organisations projects subcontracted large share of the work –
therefore inducing an additional level of management costs. The
implementation of projects under multi-country contribution agreements
facilitated the approval of interventions on the one hand, but made monitoring
interventions more complex. As multi-country contribution agreements were
centrally managed, the role of the EU Delegations remained limited. Even if
projects started officially with the signature of the Financial Agreements,
implementation at the field level often showed some delays. The
interventions financed with regional organisations complemented on-going
support provided by the EU through other financial sources (e.g. Intra-ACP
cooperation). The support provided was intended to mitigate the effects of the
FPC at the regional level and speed up the resilience of the target region. The
blend of partners and implementing modalities were generally good. Comparative
advantages of partners could have been better factored in project attribution
for some specific countries or contexts. UN
organisations showed a considerably higher absorption capacity than national
and international NSAs. So, without attributing a considerable share of funds
to UN organisations, the administrative burden on the EU would have
considerably increased and the response of the EU FF would not have been as
quick as it has been. The final choice of channels for intervention –
International Organisations, NSAs, BS and Regional Organisations – was
reflected in the needs and the specific situation of each country and complied
with the specific objectives of the regulation. Ownership
of the projects was generally good with close linkages to governments at the
national, regional or local levels. Although
governments were not generally involved in the management of the projects,
except for Budgetary Support, project ownership by governments (at all levels)
was generally good. All interventions were in line (or at least did not contrast
with) national policies for the agricultural and food security sectors.
International Organisations had a permanent dialogue with national Ministries
of Agriculture, thus ensuring national ownership of projects. Projects
implemented by NSAs were usually closely coordinated with local and regional
government structures. Interventions
corresponded to needs of direct beneficiaries and the level of effectiveness
was good, however, the sustainability of many of the achievements remains
fragile. The
specific objectives corresponded well to the needs generated by the FPC and
were generally in line with the needs assessments undertaken by UN
organisations and other stakeholders. Relatively few interventions contributed
to support measures such as safety net measures aiming at addressing basic food
needs, and nutrition while most contributed to boosting agricultural
production. Interventions demonstrated a good level of
effectiveness at the direct beneficiaries' level and directly targeted
communities and regions, resulting in real increases in production and
resilience to future shocks: -
Production capacity and sector governance (at a local level) were increased
through targeted actions. Direct beneficiaries reported often very important
increases in production thanks to the improved access to agricultural inputs
and technical support. If increases in production/yields were not achieved
and/or reported this was due to climatic problems or simply due to the fact
that the agricultural seasons were not yet completed at the time of the
evaluators' visits. -
Strengthened (or new) farmers’ organisations were better able to manage the use
of shared facilities, gain access to markets and claim their rights with local
authorities. -
Investments in infrastructure and capacity building increased the production
capacity of farmers and made them less vulnerable to future shocks. However,
at the time of the final evaluation of the EU FF, it was too early for a final
assessment of the projects' achievements. Many projects had only recently
completed their activities (training, infrastructure, etc.) and aggregated data
on project achievements (increase in production, increase in yields, reduction
of losses, etc.) were not all available. Interventions financed under the EU FF
did not significantly influence food prices which remained high due to many
other factors. The
sustainability of achievements is variable and will depend on whether national
governments, the EU or other donors will continue to support beneficiaries in order
to consolidate the achievements made. The 2-year time span of many of the
medium-term projects was too short to guarantee lasting results. Cash/food for
work schemes did not require sustainability, and even though the immediate
crisis is over, much remains to be done to achieve lasting food security.
9.1.6 Recommendations
As
the EU FF instrument has already come to its end, the following recommendations
were formulated, with reference to; (1) the design of future specific
instruments for similar situations and; (2) EU support for countries affected
by the food price crisis. The
EU should consider converting the EU FF into a permanent “Stand-by”
instrument, in order to respond rapidly to upcoming and sudden Food Price
Crisis, and mitigate impacts on food insecurity situations. In the case of
permanent, recurrent, or cyclical food insecurity situations, the instrument
could mainly be used for mitigating the effects that have “deepened” existing
food insecurity situations. Food Security should remain on the top of the
long term programmed cooperation of the EU in line with the Agenda for
Change. The
design of future specific instruments should be more focused, so
expected results can be achieved in the initially foreseen time-frame and
resources. In this respect and as advocated in the “Agenda for Change”, the EU
should concentrate its support to the most affected countries and strategic
beneficiaries to ensure resources are allocated where maximum impact can be
achieved. In addition, the EU should ensure complementarity through sectoral
division of labour with EU Member States and UN organisations. Prior
to the creation of any instrument, it is recommended to carry out a problem
analysis and adopt a single primary objective tackling specific issues
and clearly defined beneficiaries. At
country and interventions level, the EU should be involved in Country Needs
Assessments and facilitate civil society participation. If needs assessments
and design of interventions are outsourced to UN Organisations, and/or top up
existing operations, it is recommendable to follow EU methodological
instruments, and clearly define the expected results to be achieved with
the EC's contribution in the timeframe foreseen. In
addition, efforts should concentrate on supporting interventions clearly
linked to the objective of the instrument when selecting individual
interventions at country level. When
selecting partners and aid modalities, the EU should pay specific attention to
the comparative advantages provided by different implementation
channels. At the design stage, and in light of tight timeframes,
specific attention should be given to ensuring sustainability through
systematic inclusion of built-in exit or handing out strategies. Because
of the very nature of food security, attention to horizontal aspects, which
might negatively affect the workload of women and put pressure on the
environment should also receive specific attention at the design stage. At
a more strategic level, the EC (under its programmed cooperation) should continue
to play an active role in policy dialogue at the country level and help the
governments of partner countries realise the importance and multi-sector
dimension of food security. Underlying causes negatively affecting food
security should be established and adequately tackled by Governments in their
national policies. Finally,
EU interventions should endeavour to systematise lessons learnt and share
experiences with implementing partners (on the basis of an agreed system).
Specific attention should be given to questions of the replicability of
interventions and to the cost-benefit analysis of the interventions (ex-post
review).
9.1.7 Lessons learned
At strategic level The EC
has shown that it is possible to rapidly establish an effective instrument
in response to an unforeseen need. The lessons learnt show that delays in
implementations can be avoided or reduced if; (1) the implementing partners
are already present in the project region and an established relationship with
target groups and governments already exists; (2) project design is simple and
does not include too many different levels of actors; and (3) all the
interventions are simply to top up existing projects. A single
primary objective and log-frame for the instrument would lead to greater
clarity on the proposed intervention logic and facilitate the monitoring of the
progress of achievements. Budget
support measures are a suitable instrument if a
country has already "qualified" for BS interventions from
international donors (especially the EU) and if a government has its own
adequate response to a crisis. The assistance provided under the EU FF, in the
form of budgetary support, was in addition to the support provided by the EU
through other instruments and partner countries. As such, it is thus impossible
to isolate the impact achieved thanks to this additional support. However, as BS
interventions support the implementation of national policies, there is a
rather high probability that these interventions will be sustainable after the
end of the EU FF's support. Focusing
assistance on marginalised farmers with
sufficient production potential increases food security at a
community level, but does not necessarily improve food availability in urban
areas and/or influence price development. The question of replicability of
interventions at national level and at what cost should be considered at
the moment of project approval. Policy
issues need to be specifically included in major
programmes funded with international organisations. Without a strong
policy element there is a greater chance of crises being repeated in the
future. It is
particularly important to carefully address sustainability issues in
one-off instruments such as the EU FF, as there is no guarantee that programmes
or funds will be available for follow-up projects. An
instrument that is designed to respond to a single challenge (the food price
crisis) must take into account in its programming the many other external
factors that affect food prices and availability. In this case, the
EU FF had to work against a background of climate change, global fuel price
and financial crises and many other regional and national crises such as
droughts, floods and earthquakes. At operational level The
establishment of global contracts makes it difficult for EUDs to follow up the
EU FF interventions at a national level. The EU FF contained many medium-
and longer-term actions. The severe time constraints on these projects
(including all the NGO projects) did not allow for as much impact as could have
been achieved with a longer implementation period. On
the one hand, the use of UN Agencies enabled a high absorption capacity
of funds and relatively quick service delivery at field level. On the other, the
rather lengthy procedures needed to initiate WB projects and the
difficulties associated with setting up a regional programme make these two
modalities less suitable for programmes designed to produce a rapid response to
a crisis (with the exception of the topping up of existing programmes). Fast
track procedures allow for a quick approval of interventions. However, in order
to achieve a quick implementation at field level, fast track procedures for
implementation (at the implementing partner level) should also be applied. Under
the EU FF, many actions which would have needed a medium to long-term
implementation period to reach their full impact, instead reduced their
implementation period so as to make them eligible for EU FF funding. Input
distribution interventions enjoy a better impact when
combined with strengthening extension services to farmers and
improved market access. Seed production systems give results in the medium
to long term only. To achieve good results, better cooperation between
research institutions, extension services, seed producing farmers, traders and
consuming farmers is necessary and seeds have to be tested under farm
conditions.
10. EU FOOD FACILITY
VISIBILITY LINKS
1. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/184a_foodfacility_en.pdf 2.
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/185a_foodfacility_auction_floor_en.pdf 3. http://www.tvlink.org/mediadetails.php?key=46e49706d858ccfe5bdf&title=Responding+to+the+global+food+crisis+-+EU+Food+Facility+Programme&titleleft=EU%20in%20the%20World 4.
http://www.tvlink.org/mediadetails.php?key=114402889ffe33364bed&title=Food+facility%3A+A+global+food+crisis+response&titleleft=Social%20affairs 5. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xdlh9c_eu-food-facility-en_news 6.
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xqlmwb_inside-story-the-eu-s-food-facility-plan-08-april-pt1_news?ralg=meta2-only#from=playrelon-1 [1] Estimation
from the data of 147 reports out of 198 projects implemented by International Organisations,
Non State Actors, and Member States Agencies. [2] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6vDhDqlBvA&feature=autoplay&list=PLF80520918D66B21D&playnext=2 [3] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VubZHcxRDjs [4] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhjiV-UJtJ4 [5] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzArWgeYts0 [6]
Implementing partners were CAid UK, CARITAS Bel, CISP, DCA, GRC, IDE UK, LVIA,
Oxfam GB, SHA, and VITA. [7] Implementing partners were CA UK, CARITAS,
CISP, DCA, IDE, GRC, LVIA, Oxfam GB, REST, and VITA. [8] Implementing partners were CAid UK, CARE,
CARITAS, IDE UK, and TROCAIRE. [9] EU-FF projects engaged in
the construction grain banks/stores were CAid UK, CARE, CARITAS, CISP, DCA, IDE
UK, GRC, LVIA, Oxfam GB, SHA, and VITA. [10]
10 countries versus 15 countries planned in initial programming and allocation
amounting EUR 165.3 million. [11] FAO “Country responses to
the food security crisis. Nature and preliminary implications of the policies
pursued.” Based on information obtained from 81 countries, the two most widely
applied market and trade policy measures were reduction of tariffs or custom
fees, as reported by 43 countries, and selling grain from public stocks or from
imports, as reported by 35 countries. Reducing tariffs is among the easiest
measures to implement. Some 23 countries suspended or reduced VAT and other
taxes, while 25 countries restricted or banned exports. Price controls were
reported in 21 countries, with 10 of these in Africa. A number of countries
have applied two, three or even four different market and trade measures to
bring down domestic prices. [12] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/intervention-areas/ruraldev/food_intro_en.htm [13] The EU FF regulation
1337/228 laid down the requirement to carry out appropriate external evaluation
of the activities carried out under the regulation. An external final
evaluation was launched in May 2011. [14] The share of ODA devoted
to agriculture reached a level of 19 percent in 1980, but fell to 3.8 percent
in 2006. However it seems that this trend is slightly reversing. [15] Food security exists when
all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food
preferences for an active and healthy life. The four pillars of food security
are availability, access, utilization and stability. The nutritional dimension
is integral to the concept of food security (Source: FAO World Summit on Food
Security, 16-18.11.2009) [16]
Comoros was initially foreseen as a beneficiary country but finally did not
receive support from the instrument.