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Document 62024CC0480
Opinion of Advocate General Norkus delivered on 4 September 2025.###
Opinion of Advocate General Norkus delivered on 4 September 2025.
Opinion of Advocate General Norkus delivered on 4 September 2025.
ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2025:672
Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
NORKUS
delivered on 4 September 2025 (1)
Case C‑480/24
Ģenerālprokuratūra
other parties to the proceedings:
‘ČIEKURI-SHISHKI’ SIA,
‘COUNTRY HELI’ SIA
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākās tiesas Senāts (Supreme Court, Latvia))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in the light of the situation in Ukraine – Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Article 2 – Concept of legal person ‘associated’ with a natural person listed in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014 – Concept of funds and economic resources ‘belonging to, owned, held or controlled by’ such a natural person – Article 11 – Obligation not to satisfy any claims by the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of that article – Scope – Legal effects – Verification by a national court on its own initiative of the identity of the parties in the light of Articles 2 and 11 – GDPR – Articles 5 and 6 – Disclosure and publication in a judgment of the personal data of a person listed in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014 )
I. Introduction
1. The present request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākās tiesas Senāts (Supreme Court, Latvia) under Article 267 TFEU seeks the interpretation of Article 2 and Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, (2) as amended by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 (3) (‘Regulation No 269/2014’).
2. The request was made in proceedings between a person governed by Latvian law, ‘ČIEKURI-SHISHKI’ SIA, and another person governed by Latvian law, ‘COUNTRY HELI’ SIA, concerning the recovery of a debt due by the latter company to the former. A Latvian court ordered ‘COUNTRY HELI’ to repay the loan in question, by a judicial decision which became final. ‘COUNTRY HELI’ is owned as to 50% by ‘ČIEKURI-SHISHKI’ and by a legal person governed by Cypriot law, ‘ABACUS (CYPRUS) LIMITED’; the beneficial owner of ABACUS (CYPRUS) LIMITED’ is a natural person referred to in the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in the context of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. On appeal on a point of law, the referring court must decide whether, in such a configuration, the judgment of the Latvian court may be enforced or whether it must be set aside.
3. The present case raises a number of questions relating to the interpretation of Regulation No 269/2014, to which the Court must provide an answer in order to ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures. They concern, inter alia, the power of the national court to establish, under EU law, whether the measures set out in that regulation are applicable to a natural person, and the criteria on which the court must base its assessment. The examination of those questions requires an analysis of the relationship between the legal order of the European Union and national law, in particular as regards the role entrusted to the national courts and the impact of the restrictive measures regime on private law. Those questions of interpretation assume a significance which goes far beyond the framework of the main proceedings.
II. Legal framework
A. European Union law
1. Regulation No 269/2014
4. Article 1 of Regulation No 269/2014 provides:
‘For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
(a) “claim” means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before or after 17 March 2014, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular:
(i) a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;
(ii) a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;
(iii) a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;
(iv) a counterclaim;
(v) a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;
…
(c) “competent authorities” means the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex II;
…’
5. Article 2 of that regulation provides:
‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by any natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, or natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, or natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in Annex I.’
6. Article 3(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides that Annex I is to include various categories of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies ‘and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them’.
7. Article 9(1) of that regulation is worded as follows:
‘It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures referred to in Article 2.’
8. Article 11 of Regulation No 269/2014 states:
‘1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, particularly a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:
(a) designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;
(b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).
2. In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, entity or body seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the right of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.’
9. Article 14 of that regulation is worded as follows:
‘1. Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2, it shall amend Annex I accordingly.
2. The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body accordingly.
4. The list in Annex I shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.’
10. Article 17 of that regulation provides:
‘This Regulation shall apply:
…
(d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;
…’
2. Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336
11. Recitals 10 to 13 of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 of 28 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (4) state:
‘(10) On 24 February 2022, the High Representative issued a declaration on behalf of the Union condemning in the strongest possible terms the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation and the involvement of Belarus in this aggression against Ukraine. The High Representative indicated that the Union’s response will include both sectoral and individual restrictive measures.
(11) On 24 February 2022, the European Council condemned in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. By its illegal military actions, Russia is grossly violating international law and the principles of the UN Charter, and undermining European and global security and stability. The European Council agreed on further restrictive measures that will impose massive and severe consequences on Russia for its actions, in close coordination with our partners and allies.
(12) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 26 persons and one entity should be added to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.
(13) Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly[.]’
B. Latvian law
12. Articles 483 and 484 of the civilprocesa likums (Code of Civil Procedure) provide that the Public Prosecutor’s Office may, on certain conditions, lodge an appeal with the Augstākās tiesas Senāts (Supreme Court) against certain judicial decisions which have become final.
III. The facts giving rise to the dispute, the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
13. On 19 May 2015, a loan agreement in the amount of EUR 3 407 347.10 was entered into between ‘ČIEKURI-SHISHKI’, the lender, and ‘COUNTRY HELI’, the borrower.
14. On 19 January 2023, ‘ČIEKURI-SHISHKI’ (‘the applicant’) brought an action against ‘COUNTRY HELI’ (‘the defendant’), seeking recovery of the principal and interest on the loan. The application states that the defendant’s capital is held as to 50% by the applicant and as to 50% by a company established in Cyprus, ‘ABACUS (CYPRUS) LIMITED’, whose beneficial owner is a natural person, D.
15. By decision of 13 September 2023, the Rīgas rajona tiesa (District Court, Riga, Latvia) found that the defendant had not yet reimbursed the amount borrowed or paid the interest on the loan. It therefore upheld the action and ordered the defendant to repay the debt claimed to the applicant. In its decision, however, it did not examine whether the applicant or the defendant was covered by the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in the light of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in particular the measures adopted on the basis of, or pursuant to, Regulation No 269/2014.
16. The decision, which was not the subject of an appeal, became final on 4 October 2023.
17. On 12 October 2023, an authorisation to execute was issued, then sent to the Register of Enforcement of Cases.
18. In the exercise of the rights conferred on him by Articles 483 and 484 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the acting Public Prosecutor lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Rīgas rajona tiesa (District Court, Riga) of 13 September 2023, seeking to have that judgment set aside and its enforcement suspended pending the outcome of the proceedings. The Public Prosecutor submits that since D was included, by Implementing Regulation 2022/336 implementing Regulation No 269/2014, on the list of persons covered by the restrictive measures set out in Annex I to that regulation, the provisions of that regulation apply, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to the defendant. The Public Prosecutor adds that, in view of the fact that the applicant’s action was brought after D had been included on that list, the Rīgas rajona tiesa (District Court, Riga) ought to have verified whether the real object of the action was to circumvent the restrictive measures adopted against D.
19. By order of 8 February 2024, the Augstākās tiesas Senāts (Supreme Court), which is the referring court, decided to initiate proceedings to examine the appeal lodged by the Public Prosecutor and suspended the enforcement of the first-instance judgment.
20. The referring court states that Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014 does not provide a clear answer to the question of how to determine whether a legal person such as the defendant is to be regarded as a legal person ‘associated’ with a natural person listed in Annex I to that regulation, where its capital is owned by several companies and the beneficial owner of one of those companies is such a natural person. It is reasonable to assume in the present case that the defendant is owned or possibly controlled by D, as the beneficial owner. The referring court is also uncertain whether the applicant, as a legal person owning 50% of the defendant’s capital, may also be characterised as an ‘associated’ legal person, failing which the effectiveness of the restrictive measures adopted against D might be undermined.
21. The referring court also seeks clarification of the scope ratione personae and the legal effects of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014. In particular, it considers that there would be no grounds for precluding a national court from adjudicating on and granting a claim under that provision, provided that that court makes clear, in the operative part of its judgment, that the judgment may be enforced voluntarily or compulsorily only if the restrictive measures against the person concerned are lifted. The referring court is also uncertain to what extent Regulation No 269/2014 requires the national court to ascertain on its own initiative whether one of the parties to the proceedings in a civil matter is a person referred to in Article 2 or Article 11(1) of that regulation.
22. In those circumstances the Augstākās tiesas Senāts (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) What circumstances indicate that a person is an associated person within the meaning of Article 2 of [Regulation No 269/2014]? And must a legal person be regarded as an associated legal person if 50% of its shares belong to a legal person and the beneficial owner of the latter is a natural person appearing on the list in the annex to … Implementing Regulation [2022/336]?
(2) If the second part of the first question is answered in the affirmative, must a legal person also be regarded as an associated legal person within the meaning of Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014 if it holds 50% of the shares in the legal person described in the second part of the first question?
(3) Do the persons, entities or bodies mentioned in Article 1(1)(b) of Regulation No 269/2014 also include associated legal persons within the meaning of Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014?
(4) Is a court obliged, when examining any claim, to verify on its own initiative whether any of the parties to the proceedings is one of the persons mentioned in Article 2 or Article 11(1)(a) or (b) of Regulation No 269/2014?
(5) What are the legal effects of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, which provides that “no claims” made by the persons mentioned in points (a) or (b) of that paragraph “shall be satisfied”? Or would it be permissible for the substance of those claims to be heard and determined if the operative part of the court’s judgment contained a statement that the judgment may not be enforced as long as those persons appear on the list concerned?
(6) Does Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 produce legal effects where the applicant is not one of the persons mentioned in points (a) or (b) of that paragraph, but the defendant is one of the persons mentioned in points (a) or (b) of that paragraph?
(7) Should data relating to the natural person affected by sanctions (first name and surname) be disclosed in the legal grounds of the court’s decision? And should those personal data be pseudonymised when the court’s decision is published?’
IV. The procedure before the Court
23. The order for reference dated 4 July 2024 was received at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 9 July 2024.
24. The Public Prosecutor’s Office, the applicant in the main proceedings, the Finnish, Latvian and Netherlands Governments and the European Commission lodged written observations within the period prescribed in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
25. The Court decided not to hold a hearing, in accordance with Article 76(2) of its Rules of Procedure.
V. Legal analysis
A. Preliminary remarks
26. Regulation No 269/2014 was adopted by the European Union on 17 March 2014, in response to the situation in Ukraine, in particular to the unlawful annexation of Crimea by Russia. Following the outbreak of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, that regulation acquired even more significance. It is one of the main instruments of targeted sanctions against Russia. It provides for the freezing of the assets of the persons and entities responsible for actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and of other persons referred to in Article 2 of Decision 2014/145/CFSP. (5) It also prohibits such persons or entities being provided, directly or indirectly, with funds or economic resources. The list annexed thereto is regularly updated and includes politicians, oligarchs, military personnel, undertakings and propagandists connected to the Kremlin. Those measures are part of a wider response by the European Union, which also includes economic and commercial sanctions, to apply pressure on Russia to put an end to its military actions and comply with international law.
27. In EU law, ‘restrictive measures’ are adopted by Council decisions, which ‘define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature’, within the framework of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and under Article 29 TEU. Since the decisions adopted within the framework of the CFSP do not have direct effect in the domestic legal orders of the Member States, they cannot in themselves create obligations for legal or natural persons. Their implementation therefore requires the adoption, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, of the ‘necessary measures’ in the form of acts of secondary law whose purpose is ‘the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries’ (paragraph 1) or ‘restrictive measures … against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities’ (paragraph 2). (6)
28. In the exercise of the powers which the legal basis of Article 215 TFEU confers on it, the Council generally chooses to adopt regulations. Regulation No 269/2014, which is at the centre of the present case, comes precisely within that category of acts. The legal nature of the ‘restrictive measures’ represents one of the various aspects to be addressed when examining the questions referred for a preliminary ruling. It will also be necessary to analyse the actual measures which the competent organs of the Member States, including their courts, must take in order to give full effect to that regulation in their respective legal orders. The coherence and the actual implementation of those measures are crucial for guaranteeing the obligations pursued by the CFSP within the European Union.
29. As requested by the Court, this Opinion will focus on the fourth, fifth and sixth questions, which may be grouped under two distinct themes. The fourth question relates to the potential obligation for the national court to verify on its own initiative whether one of the parties to the proceedings is a person referred to in Articles 2 and 11 of Regulation No 269/2014. The fifth and sixth questions relate to the scope and the legal effects of Article 11(1) of that regulation. I shall deal with those questions separately.
30. Under the rules on the allocation of powers that exist in the context of the cooperation procedure established in Article 267 TFEU, it is for the Court of Justice to interpret the provisions of EU law which the national court has identified, under its sole responsibility and in the light of all the factual and legal elements of the main proceedings, as being decisive for the outcome of the proceedings. (7) On the other hand, it is for the national court to apply those provisions to the case before it, taking into account the interpretation provided by the Court. In order to provide the referring court with a useful answer to the questions referred, I shall include in my analysis a set of provisions which, subject to the assessment of the circumstances by the national court, might be applicable. (8)
B. The fourth question
31. By its fourth question, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether Article 2 and Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 269/2014 must be interpreted as meaning that the national court is required to verify on its own initiative whether one of the parties to the proceedings is a person referred to in those provisions.
32. As I have explained in my preliminary remarks, the European Union generally has recourse to the legal instrument of the regulation to ensure the implementation of the restrictive measures adopted by the Council within the framework of the CFSP. (9) As stated in recital 10 of Regulation No 269/2014, the immediate entry into force of that regulation was provided for in order to ensure that those measures would be effective. In accordance with Article 288 TFEU, the regulation is of general application, is binding in its entirety and is directly applicable in all Member States. The use of that legal instrument therefore ensures that the restrictive measures are applied uniformly. (10) In addition, pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation No 269/2014, that regulation is to apply to any person, entity or body mentioned therein. The implementation and application of those restrictive measures is the responsibility of the Member States, via their competent authorities.
33. The provisions of the regulations are binding, in principle, on all the bodies of Member States within the framework of their respective competences, including the judiciary. The latter plays a central role in ensuring compliance with EU law and, where appropriate, in reviewing the legality of the measures ordered by the State. That means that the courts of the Member States may adjudicate on the legality of the acts implementing, at national level, (11) restrictive measures such as sanctions or commercial restrictions. Thus, the judiciary contributes to ensuring legal certainty and to ascertaining that the measures comply with the legal framework. If a measure is held to be illegal, the court having jurisdiction may annul it or amend it. In that way, the judiciary contributes to preventing misuse of powers and to preserving the rule of law within the European Union.
34. A regulation laying down restrictive measures is principally implemented by the State bodies having a particular specialised competence for financial supervision. Those bodies have the necessary means and are therefore empowered to implement the financial sanctions imposed, such as asset freezing or a prohibition on granting credits or making payments to certain persons or bodies. They are responsible for ordering specific measures against the persons and bodies on the lists referred to by the regulation. Those bodies, responsible for implementing the regulation and, where appropriate, the national implementing measures, are generally – but not always – part of the executive.
35. In that context, it should be noted that although Annex II to Regulation No 269/2014 lists websites that provide information on the competent authorities and addresses for notification to the Commission, the regulation itself contains no information on the national authorities or their specific role in the implementation and application of the restrictive measures. The fact that the designated bodies or ministries differ depending on the Member States reflects the recognition of the wide institutional autonomy granted to the Member States for the implementation of the restrictive measures. It is apparent, however, that certain ministries, such as the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, because of their specialised competence, frequently play a special role in the sphere of international trade and the control of capital movements. (12)
36. It should also be noted that Regulation No 269/2014 also does not contain any specific provisions on the way in which the Member States must actually implement the restrictive measures. It makes no provision for the harmonisation of the national procedural rules. Rather, that regulation is confined to setting a specific objective, such as the freezing of certain assets or economic resources. Certain objectives are also formulated in relatively broad terms, or depend on an assessment of the specific circumstances, as where it is ordered that the natural persons referred to in Annex I, or the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, cannot receive or benefit from, directly or indirectly, funds or economic resources. It may be concluded from those factors that the Member States have a wide discretion as to the way in which the objectives set are attained. (13)
37. That decentralised form of applying and implementing the restrictive measures takes account of the structure of the European Union and of the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the EU Treaty. (14) It also reflects the complexity of the task faced by the European Union and its Member States, notably in the face of a multitude of cases in which persons or bodies attempt to circumvent the sanctions regime. From that aspect, it seems appropriate to entrust responsibility for the actual application of Regulation No 269/2014 and, where appropriate, for the adoption of national implementing measures, to the national authorities, which are closer to the facts and, moreover, have a particular specialised competence.
38. It should be made clear that, notwithstanding the decentralised implementation and enforcement of the restrictive measures, it is for the Member States to take all necessary measures to ensure that the restrictive measures of the European Union are not circumvented. Under Article 29 TEU, Member States are required to ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions. Member States must therefore coordinate their efforts at national and supranational levels in order to prevent any circumvention and, ultimately, to ensure the effectiveness of the EU sanctions. (15) As in other comparable areas, in particular in the matter of the transposition of directives by the Member States, the decentralisation of the implementation and of the enforcement of the restrictive measures cannot undermine the effectiveness of EU law.
39. It is for that reason that where the Court, in the absence of provisions to the contrary in EU law, recognises procedural autonomy to the Member States, it tends to emphasise that the application of EU law must not be made impossible in practice or excessively difficult. Another limit to that procedural autonomy results, according to the Court’s case-law, from the principle of equivalence, according to which the application of EU law must not be less favourable than the application of applicable national law in comparable situations. (16) The principles of equivalence and effectiveness thus constitute crucial legal criteria that permit the assessment of the conformity of a specific national measure to the requirements of Regulation No 269/2014.
40. Indeed, it seems to me that an interpretation of those principles makes it possible to answer the fourth question submitted by the referring court. As I have already mentioned in this Opinion, a regulation laying down restrictive measures is principally implemented by the bodies of the State involved in financial supervision and having the necessary competences to order specific measures. (17) While the central role of the national court in guaranteeing judicial protection is undeniable, (18) it is difficult to require a member of the judiciary to have, in all cases, specialised competences necessary to take the appropriate measures in decisive situations, in particular with respect to the assets of a person listed in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the function of the national court is fundamentally different from that of the executive and that it would be problematic, in the light of the principle of the separation of powers in force in the Member States, to entrust to the national court tasks for which the executive is normally responsible.
41. Nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that the judiciary is also bound by the provisions of Regulation No 269/2014 and that, within the framework of its competences, it is required to ensure that they are applied. In other words, the action of the national court, like that of the other State bodies, must also be assessed by reference to the principle of effectiveness in the application of EU law. (19) However, it is necessary to take account of the particular conditions in which the judiciary intervenes, in particular of the fact that the national court can exercise only the competences conferred on it by national procedural law. That limitation follows from the principle of the rule of law, which characterises the legal systems of all Member States of the European Union.
42. In that regard, it is necessary above all to bear in mind that civil procedure, in the legal systems of the Member States, is mainly characterised by the adversarial principle, according to which the court makes its determination on the basis of the arguments put forward by the parties. In addition, the principle that the parties determine the scope of the action, in civil procedure, (20) means that the parties are free to initiate proceedings, to determine the subject matter and to bring them to an end. In other words, the civil court is required, in principle, to take into consideration only the points raised by the parties to the proceedings. The parties are, therefore, in control of the subject matter of the proceedings and the court, in principle, assumes a passive role. (21) An exception is made for matters which are said to be ‘of common knowledge’, which are generally known or at least familiar to the court, which has a personal specialised competence in a particular area and may thus take them into account in its reasoning. Those characteristics reflect a fundamental distinction between the civil courts and other State bodies, such as the Public Prosecutor’s office in criminal proceedings, which may initiate investigations on their own initiative.
43. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the Court has held that under EU law the national court is not required, in principle, to examine on its own initiative a plea alleging infringement of EU provisions where examination of that plea would require it to go beyond the limits of the dispute as defined by the parties. That limitation on the power of the national court is justified by the principle that, in a civil suit, it is for the parties to take the initiative in proceedings. Consequently, in accordance with that case-law, the national court can act on its own initiative only in exceptional cases where the public interest requires its intervention. (22) That point calls for a fuller explanation.
44. The Court has identified in its case-law a range of situations in which it has recognised that the national court is required to raise on its own initiative an infringement of the rules of EU law. (23) Those situations have in common that the applicable rule is binding in nature and confers rights on individuals. The Court establishes that the national court, having regard to a public interest in the protection of the rights conferred by EU law, is required to raise such an infringement on its own initiative and therefore to step outside the limits defined by the parties, when, one of the parties to the proceedings would suffer harm, inasmuch as that protection could not be ensured otherwise, notably because he or she was not in a position under national law to rely on that protection or where no other form of protection is provided for by EU law.
45. Although the case-law cited in the preceding point is based on considerations linked to the protection of the rights conferred on individuals by EU law, to my mind it cannot be precluded that such an approach might also be taken in situations where it is not a matter of safeguarding a public interest that consists in protecting individual rights, but rather of ensuring the attainment of an autonomous public interest, specific to the European Union as a supranational organisation and a subject of international law capable of carrying out an external action designed to ensure respect for the international rule-based order. (24) The United Nations Charter, the cornerstone of that legal order, is intended to preserve peace and global security. The European Union has solemnly undertaken to contribute to the attainment of that objective. (25)
46. In the present case, it is clear that there is a public interest in the effective application of Regulation No 269/2014, which, in my view, justifies an adjustment of the limits of the procedural autonomy of the Member States in order to respond to the requirements of the attainment of the objectives of the CFSP within the European Union. (26) The diversity of the legal traditions in the Member States cannot constitute an obstacle or thus provide the opportunity to circumvent the EU sanctions regime. That would be the case, however, if the persons listed in Annex I to that regulation were able to carry out transactions in Member States whose national legislation is rather permissive. Furthermore, it is necessary to ensure that disputes are not brought before courts that would not apply the EU restrictive measures with the necessary rigour.
47. The judgment in Bank Melli Iran (27) is particularly relevant for the examination of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, in that it recalls that the national courts are required to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law. According to the Court of Justice, that requirement applies in all proceedings before them, including in the context of civil proceedings. (28) It should also be noted that that judgment proceeds from the principle that it is for the national courts to take action where there is evidence indicating that a person has infringed EU law. (29) Although that judgment does not directly concern the EU restrictive measures regime, but protection against the effects of the extraterritorial application of legislation adopted by a third State – in that particular case, the restrictive measures adopted by the United States of America against Iran – it nonetheless belongs to a related area coming under the law on international sanctions, which justifies its being taken into account in the context of the legal analysis. In the light of that case-law, it seems permissible to require the courts of the Member States to contribute actively, in the context of civil proceedings, to preventing any circumvention of the EU sanctions imposed by Regulation No 269/2014.
48. Last, it is important, in the context of the analysis, to bear in mind the concept of ‘circumvention’, as defined in the Court’s case-law. In the judgment in Afrasiabi and Others, (30) the Court explained that that concept designates activities which have the direct or indirect object or effect of enabling their author to avoid the application of the EU measures, in other words activities which have the aim or result of frustrating the prohibitions laid down by the European Union. (31) The Court’s definition is deliberately wide and shows the importance of the object of the circumventing activities – that is to say, their potential effects – in addition to their actual effect, that is to say, their specific consequences. It follows that ‘circumvention’ must be taken to cover not only the activities that actually frustrate the objectives of the restrictive measures but also those intended to cause them to fail, independently of their actual result. (32) In the light of the challenge facing the European Union and its Member States, strong counter-measures seem to be required.
49. The Court relied in its reasoning on the interpretation of a provision (33) which corresponds, in essence, with Article 9 of Regulation No 269/2014, which the national court will, if appropriate, have to apply in the main proceedings, if it considers that the conditions are satisfied. That provision is a central provision intended to prevent the circumvention of sanctions. While other provisions prohibit specific acts – such as the making available of economic resources to listed persons (34) – Article 9 of that regulation is aimed at indirect or covert forms of acts that allow such prohibitions to be circumvented. Its normative objective is to fill the gaps that might appear when sanctions are evaded by indirect actions. That provision thus plays the role of a safeguard clause designed to ensure that even the most creative or covert circumvention strategies are covered.
50. For the reasons which I have just stated, I consider that the national court should be required to intervene on its own initiative in situations where the parties’ arguments, or facts of which the court is aware, or the circumstances of the case permit the conclusion, on the basis of indicia, that Article 2 and Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 269/2014 are applicable to one of the parties to the dispute. Only where that condition is satisfied is it possible to avoid the national court being forced to take no action and being required, contrary to its own conviction, to allow a person listed in Annex I to avoid the application of the restrictive measures envisaged. The national court must not contribute either intentionally or negligently to the circumvention of sanctions.
51. In order not to impose on the national court requirements that are insurmountable in practice, the obligations which it bears must not be excessive. The principle of effectiveness would already be observed if, in the presence of indicia, the court referred the matter to the competent authorities, within the framework of its powers, in order to obtain further information about the identity and degree of involvement of the person concerned. Those specialised authorities should respond promptly to the court’s request, in a spirit of sincere cooperation for the purposes of the application of EU law, as required by Article 4(3) TEU. If the suspicions that of one of the parties to the proceedings is a person referred to by restrictive measures were confirmed, the court would then have to take the appropriate measures, as referred to in Regulation No 269/2014 and national law.
52. Indicia of the possible involvement of persons on the list of EU sanctions may include, inter alia, the nationality of certain associates, and any cross-border financial transactions passing through Russia or through States having close economic links with that country. However, it should be emphasised that, by nature, it is not possible to establish an exhaustive list of relevant criteria. The practice must therefore continue to evolve and adapt to the actual current circumstances. (35) To that end, ‘soft law’ instruments, such as the guidelines published both by the EU institutions and by the competent authorities of the Member States, are a source of useful guidance. (36) Those guidelines seek to respond to the challenge represented by the harmonisation of national practices in the implementation of sanctions. (37)
53. It therefore seems necessary that a court should intervene at the adversarial stage in order to prevent actions capable of undermining the objectives of Regulation No 269/2014 from being carried out, such as, for example, the enforcement of debts arising under contracts involving natural persons listed in Annex I to that regulation. It is reasonable to expect a court, in the context of a dispute before it, to be in a position to comprehend complex civil legal relationships and to identify the situations in which certain transactions might seek to evade the EU sanctions regime.
54. A court also has procedural powers that allow it to adopt the necessary protective or corrective measures, such as refusing to grant an authorisation to execute on the basis of a contract that falls within the scope of Regulation No 269/2014. In my view, however, it is not sufficient, in the light of the interests of the European Union, to defer the application of the restrictive measures until the enforcement stage. Such an approach would entail the intervention of the State at a very advanced stage of the civil proceedings, with the risk that the bailiff would find it impossible to ascertain whether the enforcement of an authorisation to execute writ contravenes the requirements of Regulation No 269/014.
55. Indeed, save where there is clear evidence to the contrary, an authorisation to execute issued by a court is presumed to be lawful under national law. Legal certainty requires that substantive objections to such a document be rejected in principle as inadmissible. In addition, it should be noted that, in such a situation, only the debt obligation to be enforced by the bailiff would be examined for compatibility with the provisions of Regulation No 269/2014, while any other related debt obligations arising from the same dispute would not.
56. I am therefore of the view that, if the intervention of the bailiff at the stage of the enforcement of an authorisation to execute issued by the court were to be preferred to the intervention of the court at the adversarial stage, for the purpose of assessing the applicability of the restrictive measures, as the Latvian Government appears to suggest in its written observations, there would, in my estimation, be an appreciable risk that Regulation No 269/2014 would not be applied with the requisite rigour. Such an approach must, therefore, be rejected.
57. In the interest of the effectiveness of EU law, it therefore seems appropriate to require the national court to intervene on its own initiative, including by seeking the assistance of the competent services, in order to examine the applicability of Article 2 and Article 11(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 269/2014, but only in the situations referred to above, that is to say, where the parties expressly raise that question, or where the facts brought to the knowledge of the court or the circumstances of the case permit the conclusion that those provisions are applicable. (38)
58. As far as the present case is concerned, it should be noted that the referring court refers to the appeal lodged by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and it may be seen therefrom that the civil case file apparently contains material on the basis of which it may be assumed that the provisions of Regulation No 269/2014 are applicable to the defendant. (39) Furthermore, the referring court states that the applicant, which owns a share of the defendant’s capital, is also a person associated with the defendant and with the defendant’s member ‘ABACUS (CYPRUS) LIMITED’. There is no more precise information in the order for reference.
59. In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, in a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the national court alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts of the case in the main proceedings. (40) It will therefore be for the Latvian courts to examine the circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, including by assessing the evidence produced by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and to determine whether the provisions of Regulation No 269/2014 are applicable.
60. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the answer to the fourth question should be that the court hearing the case is required to verify on its own initiative, where it has indicia, whether one of the parties to the proceedings is among the persons referred to in Article 2 or Article 11(1)(a) or (b) of Regulation No 269/2014 and, for that purpose, to employ all the powers of inquiry at its disposal. In particular, it is required to seek the necessary information from the specialised competent authorities, in order to be in a position to carry out that examination. That requirement to verify also extends to the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the parties to the proceedings.
C. The fifth question
61. By its fifth question, the referring court seeks to ascertain the legal effects of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, according to which ‘no claims’ by the persons referred to in Article 11(1)(a) or (b) ‘shall be satisfied’, and whether such a claim may nonetheless be examined as to its substance if the operative part of a judgment provides that the judgment is not to be enforceable while those persons appear on the list in question.
62. Before I examine the normative content of Article 11 of Regulation No 269/2014, it seems appropriate, in the interest of clarity, to set out briefly the purpose of Article 2 of that regulation, as there is a close and complementary link between those two provisions. It is only in the light of the objective pursued by Article 2 – which is the central provision of the sanctions regime – that the function of Article 11 can be fully understood.
63. In that regard, it should be emphasised that the restrictive measures of a financial nature for which provision is made in Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014 consist, first, in the freezing of the funds and economic resources belonging to the designated natural or legal persons and, second, in the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to those persons.
64. It should be made clear that, as is apparent from the Council guidelines on the implementation of restrictive measures coming under the CFSP, (41) those measures do not in any way affect the right of ownership of the persons concerned over the frozen assets. In particular, they do not entail a transfer of ownership of the funds and resources. The Court has already held that the freezing measure is a preventive measure which is not supposed to deprive the persons affected by the measure of their property, as the measure is by nature temporary and reversible. (42) Regulation No 269/2014 does not preclude either the validity or the conclusion of contracts with the persons listed in Annex I. In other words, the validity of contracts in civil matters remains, in principle, intact.
65. However, Article 2(2) of Regulation No 269/2014 prohibits the making available of funds or economic resources where it is capable of securing an advantage, direct or indirect, for a designated person. It follows that a contract cannot be performed if its performance has the effect of granting a payment or any other economic advantage to such a person. That prohibition extends to any contractual supply, delivery or service for the benefit of a designated person.
66. That provision prohibits the indirect making available of funds or economic resources, that is to say, the procurement of an advantage not directly for the designated person, but for a third party, where that advantage indirectly benefits the designated person. The prohibition on the indirect making available of funds or economic resources also applies with respect to non-designated entities, provided that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the funds or economic resources will be transferred, in whole or in part, to a designated person. Such an indirect ‘making available’ may be presumed where economic resources are made available to a non-designated person held or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated person. (43)
67. As the Court observed in its judgment in Möllendorf and Möllendorf-Niehuus, (44) the concept of ‘making available’ must be given a broad interpretation and covers any transaction that would allow a designated person to have access, directly or indirectly, to an economic resource, including anything provided as a result of the execution of a contract imposing mutual obligations. (45) Relying on that case-law, the Council has made clear in the Guidelines that the regulations imposing freezing measures are to ‘preclude the completion of acts which implement contracts concluded before the entry into force of the Regulations’. (46)
68. It follows that the primacy of EU law results in the de facto suspension of contractual obligations that are incompatible with the sanctions regime, while that regime remains in force. It is in that sense that the statement in the Guidelines that, once in force, the regulations imposing freezing measures ‘override all incompatible contractual arrangements’ must be interpreted. (47) Although the terminology used in the Guidelines lacks legal precision, it is clear that a temporary suspension of contractual obligations is envisaged where their execution would undermine the objectives pursued by Regulation No 269/2014. That applies to all the language versions examined, (48) which seems to be explained by the desire to leave to the national legal orders the task of determining the precise arrangements for implementing that suspensory effect.
69. On the other hand, the purpose of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, which forms the subject matter of the fifth and sixth questions, is to ensure, at the procedural level, the effectiveness of Article 2 of that regulation, by preventing a designated person from being able to enforce, through the courts, a right the exercise of which would breach the restrictive measures. Thus, even where a favourable judgment has been obtained before a national court, its enforcement is suspended as long as the person concerned is subject to EU sanctions.
70. Likewise, that provision aims to protect the other party to the contract who complies with the obligations imposed by Regulation No 269/2014 from actions for damages brought by the designated party, in particular actions seeking compensation for harm or actions under a contractual guarantee. (49) In the absence of such a procedural mechanism, the other party to the contract would be faced with an untenable situation, being required to choose between incurring criminal sanctions by performing the contract (50) and risking an adverse civil judgment by refusing to perform it. As a procedural provision, the application of Article 11(1) of that regulation is primarily a matter for the national courts, provided that the legal conditions laid down therein are satisfied.
71. As the Finnish Government correctly noted in its written observations, Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 is essentially designed to ensure the effective implementation of restrictive measures, but without harmonising the procedural rules of the Member States, which retain their autonomy in that respect, subject to compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness already referred to in this Opinion. (51) The condition in Article 11(1) of that regulation that ‘no claims’ referred to in that provision ‘shall be satisfied’ must therefore be implemented in accordance with the procedures provided for in national law, so that claims cannot be met when satisfying them results in a breach of the obligation laid down in Article 2 of that regulation.
72. It should be made clear, last, that Regulation No 269/2014 does not in any way undermine respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees. Article 11(3) of that regulation expressly establishes the right of persons referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations based on the provisions of that regulation. In addition, paragraph 2 places on any natural or legal person, entity or body relying on a right in judicial proceedings the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1.
73. From that perspective, it should be observed that Article 11 of Regulation No 269/2014 must be interpreted in the light of recital 6 of that regulation, which states, in particular, that that regulation must be applied in accordance with the fundamental rights and the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in particular the rights to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article 47 of that charter. It follows that the competent national court, when required to rule on the possible application of Article 11 of that regulation, is required to comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as provided for in Article 51(1) thereof. (52)
74. It follows from the foregoing considerations that, where proceedings have as their subject matter a claim relating, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, to a contract the performance of which is affected by restrictive measures, the national court is required, in accordance with its own procedural framework, to ensure the outcome prescribed in Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, namely ‘not to satisfy the claim’. In other words, it must not give effect to such a claim. That interpretation is confirmed by the analysis of all the language versions examined. (53)
75. That provision does not preclude the procedural method envisaged by the referring court of determining the substance of such a claim on condition that the operative part of the judgment contains a clause prohibiting its enforcement as long as the persons concerned remain within the scope of Article 11(1)(a) or (b) of Regulation No 269/2014. Such a procedural method would make it possible to reduce the risk that the implementation of the restrictive measures would not be sufficiently effective where the State intervenes only at the stage of enforcement by the bailiff. (54) It would also comply with Article 11(3) of that regulation. (55)
76. In essence, the obligation to ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union justifies the temporary non-compliance with the contractual obligations in question. Conversely, where the proceedings relate to a claim which cannot be regarded as relating, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, to a contract the performance of which is affected by restrictive measures, the national court may allow that claim, including where it is made by a designated person or by any person acting through or on behalf of that person.
77. The national court may therefore, in principle, adjudicate on the substance of the action provided that it does not satisfy a claim covered by the prohibition laid down in Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014. Where the national procedural framework so permits, it may also suspend examination of the claim until such time as the claimant is no longer within the scope of Article 11(1)(a) or (b) of that regulation. In any event, it may satisfy claims that do not fall within the scope of the prohibition. In addition, under Article 7 of that regulation, payments resulting from judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in a Member State or enforceable in the Member State concerned are not prohibited under Article 2(2), provided that the interest, earnings and other payments associated with those payments are frozen in accordance with Article 2(1) of that regulation. It follows that not all civil claims are automatically excluded: rather, each claim must be assessed in the light of its subject matter, the legal status of the parties in question and its economic effects.
78. Thus, a claim seeking a declaration of the existence of a right, having no enforceable effect, may be permissible in certain circumstances. A national court can adjudicate on civil claims only if it is able to ensure that its decision does not contravene the provisions on the sanctions laid down in Regulation No 269/2014, as, for example, where that decision directly or indirectly procures for the designated person an economic advantage prohibited by the sanctions. Last, it should be noted that derogations may be granted by the competent authorities in accordance with Article 5(1) and with other provisions of that regulation. Those authorisations aim to reconcile the application of the sanctions with the requirements of legal protection.
79. For the reasons set out in the preceding points, I propose that the answer to the fifth question should be that Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 must be interpreted as not prohibiting the examination of the substance of a case, but as prohibiting giving effect, in whole or in part, to a claim relating to a contract the performance of which is affected, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, by restrictive measures. The decision of a national court the operative part of which provides that that decision is not to be enforceable while the claimant is within the scope of Article 11(1)(a) or (b) of Regulation No 269/2014 is consistent, in principle, with that prohibition.
D. The sixth question
80. By its sixth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 produces legal effects where the applicant is not one of the persons referred to in point (a) or point (b) of that paragraph but the defendant is such a person.
81. It must be borne in mind, in the first place, that the purpose of that provision consists in preventing the civil enforcement of contracts or debts liable to contravene the sanctions imposed by that regulation. Those sanctions include, inter alia, the freezing of the assets of certain natural or legal persons, exhaustively listed in Annex I to that regulation, (56) and the prohibition on the making available of economic resources or funds to them.
82. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that in the judgment in Bank Sepah (57) the Court considered that, in order to achieve those aims, it is not only legitimate, but also indispensable that the concepts of ‘freezing of funds’ and ‘freezing of economic resources’ should be interpreted broadly, because what is at stake is preventing any use of frozen assets that would enable the regulations at issue to be circumvented and the weaknesses in the system to be exploited. (58) That broad interpretation implies that all the assets of a designated person must be frozen, including funds coming from it and funds going to it. (59)
83. Furthermore, it should be noted that Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 is not confined to civil proceedings in the strict sense, but applies to decisions the recognition, enforcement or legal effects of which would be liable to undermine the effectiveness of the restrictive measures laid down in that regulation. That provision is, therefore, not directly addressed to the parties to the dispute – applicant or defendant – as such, but places on the courts the general obligation not to deliver decisions that might circumvent the purpose of the sanctions.
84. Thus, where an applicant intends to rely on the rights arising under a contract covered by Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 – in particular with a person covered by the sanctions – or aimed at undermining the objectives pursued by that regulation, the court dealing with the matter is required not to satisfy the claim. Article 11(1) of that regulation thus aims to ensure the effectiveness of the EU restrictive measures and may, as such, produce legal effects with respect to the two parties to the proceedings, depending on the person who would benefit from the transaction. (60)
85. In addition, it is appropriate to support the Commission’s analysis, according to which Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 refers expressly to a ‘claim’, (61) a word the scope of which is much narrower than that of ‘proceedings’. Indeed, a person listed in Annex I to that regulation may take part in proceedings both as defendant and as applicant, in particular in the context of a counterclaim. Such a claim may, in principle, be made by either of the parties to the proceedings. Consequently, the applicability of that provision must always be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances of the case.
86. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the answer to the sixth question should be that Article 11(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 must be interpreted as prohibiting the satisfaction of a claim that falls within the scope of that provision, whether that claim is made by the applicant or by the defendant in the proceedings.
VI. Conclusion
87. Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice should answer as follows the questions for a preliminary ruling referred by the Augstākās tiesas Senāts (Supreme Court, Latvia):
(1) Article 2 and Article 11(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as amended by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023,
must be interpreted as meaning that the court hearing the case is required to verify on its own initiative, where it has indicia, whether one of the parties to the proceedings is among the persons referred to in Article 2 or Article 11(1)(a) or (b) of that regulation and, for that purpose, to employ all the powers of inquiry at its disposal. In particular, it is required to seek the necessary information from the specialised competent authorities, in order to be in a position to carry out that examination. That requirement to verify also extends to the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the parties to the proceedings.
(2) Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, as amended by Implementing Regulation 2023/1765,
– must be interpreted as not prohibiting the examination of the substance of a case, but as prohibiting giving effect, in whole or in part, to a claim relating to a contract the performance of which is affected, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, by restrictive measures. The decision of a national court the operative part of which provides that that decision is not to be enforceable while the claimant is within the scope of Article 11(1)(a) or (b) of Regulation No 269/2014 is consistent, in principle, with that prohibition;
– and must also be interpreted as prohibiting the satisfaction of a claim that falls within the scope of Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, whether that claim is made by the applicant or by the defendant in the proceedings.
1 Original language: French.
2 OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6.
3 OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3.
4 JO 2022, L 58, p. 1.
5 Council Decision of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).
6 The Court regards Article 215 TFEU as a bridge between the objectives of the EU Treaty in matters of the CFSP and the actions of the European Union involving restrictive measures falling within the scope of the FEU Treaty (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 89), and of 10 September 2024, Neves 77 Solutions (C‑351/22, EU:C:2024:723, paragraph 45)).
7 See judgment of 10 March 2011, Privater Rettungsdienst und Krankentransport Stadler (C‑274/09, EU:C:2011:130, paragraphs 29 and 36).
8 According to settled case-law, it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the referring court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (see judgment of 9 March 2023, Registrų centras (C‑354/21, EU:C:2023:184, paragraph 35)).
9 See point 28 of this Opinion.
10 See judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 89), and of 10 September 2024, Neves 77 Solutions (C‑351/22, EU:C:2024:723, paragraph 56).
11 The Courts of the European Union and the national courts exercise judicial review in the context of the respective jurisdiction conferred on them. Review of EU acts such as Regulation No 269/2014 falls within the competence of the Courts of the European Union. Conversely, it is for the national court to ensure judicial protection against State acts adopted at national level in order to implement or apply those EU acts.
12 Giumelli, F., Geelhoed, W., de Vries, M., and Molesini, A., ‘United in diversity? A study on the implementation of sanctions in the European Union?’, EU Sanctions at the Intersection of Development, Trade, and CFSP, Vol. 10, No 1, 2022, p. 41.
13 Portela, C., Olsen, K., ‘Implementation and monitoring of the EU sanctions’ regimes, including recommendations to reinforce the EU’s capacities to implement and monitor sanctions’, European Parliament Study of 10 October 2023, p. 26.
14 Starski, P., ‘United in Sanctions? Some Observations on the EU Practice of “Restrictive Measures” in the Face of the Russian Aggression against Ukraine’, The EU Reexamined, 2024, p. 256.
15 Finelli, F., ‘Countering circumvention of restrictive measures: the EU response’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 60, No 3, 2023, p. 737.
16 See judgments of 26 January 2010, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C‑118/08, EU:C:2010:39, paragraph 31); of 7 April 2022, Caixabank (C‑385/20, EU:C:2022:278, paragraph 47); and of 13 March 2025, Banco Santander (C‑230/24, EU:C:2025:177, paragraph 20).
17 See point 34 of this Opinion.
18 See point 33 of this Opinion.
19 Blair, W., ‘The legal effect of sanctions against Russia on financial and commercial transactions’, International sanctions: Monetary and financial law perspectives, Leiden, 2024, p. 313. The author points out that the national courts are not the primary instruments for enforcing the sanctions. However, in so far as their decisions have the effect of enforcing and/or recognising, directly or indirectly, such sanctions, that effect is a decisive element of their overall effectiveness.
20 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Vedial v OHIM (C‑106/03 P, EU:C:2004:457, point 28). According to the Advocate General, the principle under which the parties delimit the scope of proceedings is very useful in regard to specific features of the proceedings, usually civil, which reflect the acknowledgement of individual autonomy. It is for the parties, which are in charge of the action, not only to initiate or terminate proceedings but also to determine their subject matter. After all, it is the manifestation at a procedural level of the individual’s power of disposition concerning his or her own rights, which, on a substantive level, is manifested in the primacy of contractual intent. The ultimate justification for that maxim is that the owner, even the potential or presumed owner of an asset, must preserve that power to exercise his or her rights in order to convert it into an action, claiming it or ceding it, in whole or in part, by means of discontinuance or settlement, thus, in sum, defining the dispute.
21 On condition that the parties may control the subject matter of the proceedings according to substantive law.
22 See judgments of 17 December 2009, Martín Martín (C‑227/08, EU:C:2009:792, paragraph 20); of 26 April 2017, Farkas (C‑564/15, EU:C:2017:302, paragraph 33); and of 14 September 2023, Tuk Tuk Travel (C‑83/22, EU:C:2023:664, paragraph 45).
23 The obligation on the national court to examine on its own initiative respect for EU law applies to certain provisions relating to consumer protection (see judgment of 14 September 2023, Tuk Tuk Travel (C‑83/22, EU:C:2023:664, paragraphs 45 to 47 and the case-law cited)) and international protection (see judgments of 8 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Ex officio review of detention) (C‑704/20 and C‑39/21, EU:C:2022:858, paragraph 94); and of 17 October 2024, Ararat (C‑156/23, EU:C:2024:892, paragraph 52)).
24 See judgment of 4 October 2024, Commission and Council v Front Polisario (C‑779/21 P and C‑799/21 P, EU:C:2024:835, paragraph 133).
25 See, inter alia, the eleventh recital, Article 3(5), Article 21(2)(c) and Article 42(1) TEU. See judgment of 19 July 2012, Parliament v Council (C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 62).
26 Blair, W., ‘The legal effect of sanctions against Russia on financial and commercial transactions’, International sanctions: Monetary and financial law perspectives, Leiden, 2024, p. 313. The author seems to consider that the application of EU sanctions is a matter of public policy.
27 Judgment of 21 December 2021 (C‑124/20, EU:C:2021:1035).
28 Judgment of 21 December 2021, Bank Melli Iran (C‑124/20, EU:C:2021:1035, paragraphs 55, 59 and 60).
29 Judgment of 21 December 2021, Bank Melli Iran (C‑124/20, EU:C:2021:1035, paragraphs 67 and 68).
30 Judgment of 21 December 2011 (C‑72/11, EU:C:2011:874).
31 See judgment of 21 December 2011, Afrasiabi and Others (C‑72/11, EU:C:2011:874, paragraphs 60 and 62).
32 Finelli, F., ‘Countering circumvention of restrictive measures: the EU response’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 60, No 3, 2023, p. 734.
33 Article 7(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 of 19 April 2007 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2007 L 103, p. 1).
34 See point 63 et seq. of this Opinion.
35 Vilà Sánchez, E., ‘The European Union’s sanctions regime on the Russian Federation from 2014 to 2022’, Quaderns IEE: Revista de l’Institut d’Estudis Europeus, Vol. 2, No 1, 2023, p. 55.
36 The guidance contained in the Commission’s guidelines seems to be particularly useful (see, in that regard, Circumvention red flags related to business partners and customers, in the document ‘Guidance for EU operators: Implementing enhanced due diligence to shield against Russia sanctions circumvention’).
37 Giumelli, F., Geelhoed, W., de Vries, M., and Molesini, A., ‘United in diversity? A study on the implementation of sanctions in the European Union’, op. cit., p. 38.
38 See point 50 of this Opinion.
39 See paragraph 4 of the order for reference.
40 See judgment of 28 July 2016, Kratzer (C‑423/15, EU:C:2016:604, paragraph 27).
41 See paragraph 32 of the document entitled ‘Restrictive measure (Sanctions) – Update of the EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures’ of 3 July 2024 (‘the Guidelines’) (No. prev. doc.: 10572/22).
42 See judgment of 15 December 2022, Instrubel and Others (C‑753/21 and C‑754/21, EU:C:2022:987, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
43 Niestedt, M., EU-Außenwirtschafts- und Zollrecht, Krenzler, H.G, Herrmann, C., and Niestedt, M.,‘V. Embargo- und Sanktionsmaßnahm’, C.H. Beck, 2015, paragraph 50.
44 Judgment of 11 October 2007 (C‑117/06, EU:C:2007:596).
45 See judgment of 11 October 2007, Möllendorf and Möllendorf-Niehuus (C‑117/06, EU:C:2007:596, paragraph 56).
46 See paragraph 33 of the Guidelines.
47 See paragraph 33 of the Guidelines.
48 See the Spanish- (‘prevalece sobre cualquier acuerdo contractual incompatible’), Danish- (‘vil de gælde forud for alle uforenelige aftalemæssige arrangementer’), German- (‘treten alle vertraglichen Regelungen, die mit ihnen nicht vereinbar sind, außer Kraft’), English- (‘override all incompatible contractual arrangements’), Italian- (‘prevalgono su tutti gli accordi contrattuali incompatibili’), Latvian- (‘tai ir prioritāte pār visiem neatbilstīgiem līgumiskiem noteikumiem’), Lithuanian- (‘jie yra viršesni už visas su jais nesuderinamas sutartines priemones’), Dutch- (‘hebben zij voorrang boven alle daarmee onverenigbare contractuele regelingen’), Polish- (‘uchylają one wszystkie niezgodne porozumienia umowne’) and Portuguese- (‘invalidam toda e qualquer disposição contratual que com eles seja incompatível’) language versions.
49 Siadat, A., Schultess, A., ‘Russland-Embargo-VO und innerdeutsche Zahlungsaufträge’, Zeitschrift für Bank und Kapitalmarktrecht, 2024, No 13, p. 591.
50 Under EU law, the Member States are required to impose criminal penalties for breaches of EU restrictive measures. See, in that regard, Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673 (OJ L, 2024/1226).
51 See point 39 of this Opinion.
52 See, by analogy, judgment of 12 June 2014, Peftiev and Others (C‑314/13, EU:C:2014:1645, paragraph 24).
53 See the Spanish- (‘no se satisfará’), Danish- (‘ingen fordringer må indfries’), German- (‘wird nicht stattgegeben’), English- (‘no claims … shall be satisfied’), Italian- (‘non è concesso’), Latvian (‘neapmierina’), Lithuanian- (‘netenkinami’), Dutch- (‘worden niet toegewezen’), Polish- (‘nie są zaspokajane’) and Portuguese- (‘não há lugar ao pagamento’) language versions.
54 See point 54 of this Opinion.
55 See point 72 of this Opinion.
56 See judgment of 5 September 2024, Jemerak (C‑109/23, EU:C:2024:681, paragraph 48).
57 Judgment of 11 November 2021, Bank Sepah (C‑340/20, EU:C:2021:903).
58 Judgment of 11 November 2021, Bank Sepah (C‑340/20, EU:C:2021:903, paragraph 56).
59 See, in that regard, Commission document entitled ‘Consolidated FAQs on the implementation of Council Regulation No 833/2014 and Council Regulation No 269/2014’, answer to question 19, p. 34.
60 Conceivably, a person designated in the context of restrictive measures might offset a debt which he or she holds vis-à-vis his or her contracting partner and a credit which he or she holds against that person, in the context of proceedings brought by the contracting partner, without making a counterclaim. Such a set-off would have the effect of releasing the designated person from his or her debt on the occasion of the proceedings initiated by the other party to the contract.
61 See the Spanish- (‘reclamación’), Danish- (‘fordring’), German- (‘Forderung’), English- (‘claim’), Italian- (‘diritto’), Latvian- (‘prasības’), Lithuanian- (‘reikalavimai’), Dutch- (‘vordering’), Polish- (‘roszczenia’) and Portuguese- (‘pedido’) language versions.