Appeal brought on 22 May 2012 by Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 6 March 2012 in Case T-453/10: Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v European Commission

(Case C-248/12 P)

2012/C 200/17

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (represented by: K.J. Brown, Departmental Solicitor's office, D. Wyatt QC, V. Wakefield, Barristers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claim that the Court should:

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea, that the General Court failed to identify and apply the proper legal test, namely that Piraiki-Patraiki and Dreyfus are merely examples of a broader principle of law, namely that a Union measure will be treated as of direct concern to those whose legal situation it affects where its implementation in that way is a ‘foregone conclusion’, or any other possibility is ‘purely theoretical’, or it is ‘obvious’ that any discretionary power will be exercised in a certain way. That principle must be applied to the facts of each case.

Second plea, that the General Court committed an error of law, and acted contrary to the principle of legal certainty, in its attempts to limit the scope of Piraiki-Patraiki and Dreyfus (in particular by restricting the former to cases in which the Union measure is adopted in response to a request by a Member State, and by restricting the latter to cases with a ‘very specific factual context’).

Third plea, that the General Court committed an error of law in narrowing the test for standing under Article 263. This is contrary to the proper interpretation of Article 263 as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, in particular by reference to its purpose and to the principle of effective judicial protection.

Fourth plea, that if the General Court had applied the correct legal principles to the present case, DARD would have been found to be ‘directly concerned’. In particular, the constitutional position in the United Kingdom is that the devolved administration — in this case DARD — is directly responsible for bearing the cost of the disallowance. The chain of causation is direct and automatic. The United Kingdom devolutionary arrangements are well established (see Case C-428/07 Horvath [2009] ECR 1-6355) and any argument that their application is less than a ‘foregone conclusion’ should fail.