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Document 61997CO0248
Order of the President of the Court of 10 September 1997. # Luis Manuel Chaves Fonseca Ferrão v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs). # Application for interim relief - Suspension of operation of a measure - Urgency. # Case C-248/97 P (R).
Order of the President of the Court of 10 September 1997.
Luis Manuel Chaves Fonseca Ferrão v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs).
Application for interim relief - Suspension of operation of a measure - Urgency.
Case C-248/97 P (R).
Order of the President of the Court of 10 September 1997.
Luis Manuel Chaves Fonseca Ferrão v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs).
Application for interim relief - Suspension of operation of a measure - Urgency.
Case C-248/97 P (R).
Izvješća Suda EU-a 1997 I-04729
ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:1997:394
Order of the President of the Court of 10 September 1997. - Luis Manuel Chaves Fonseca Ferrão v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs). - Application for interim relief - Suspension of operation of a measure - Urgency. - Case C-248/97 P (R).
European Court reports 1997 Page I-04729
1 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation - Provisional measures - Conditions for granting - Prima facie case - Serious and irreparable harm - Power of assessment of the judge hearing the application - Cumulative conditions - Consequences in the context of an appeal
(EC Treaty, Arts 185 and 186; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 83(2); Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 104(2))
2 Appeals - Pleas in law - Insufficient statement of reasons - Application as regards orders on applications for interim measures
3 In the context of the overall examination of an application for suspension of the operation of an act or for other interim measures, the judge hearing the application enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of Community law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed.
Consequently, in an appeal against an order dismissing an application for interim measures on the ground that there was no urgency for the measures sought, pleas which relate to the existence of a prima facie case but do not call into question the lack of urgency cannot form grounds for setting the order aside, even partially.
4 The judge hearing an application for interim measures cannot be required to reply explicitly to all the points of fact and law raised in the course of the interlocutory proceedings. It is sufficient that the reasons given validly justify his order in the light of the circumstances of the case and enable the Court of Justice to exercise its powers of review.