Keywords
Summary

Keywords

European Union law – Direct effect – Rights conferred on individuals – Protected by the national courts – National rules of procedure – Conditions under which applicable – Observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness

Summary

European Union law does not preclude legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, that makes subject to a three-year limitation rule claims for payment of special length-of-service increments that a worker who had exercised his rights to freedom of movement was denied before the delivery of the judgment of 30 September 2003 in Case C‑224/01 Köbler , on the basis of a domestic law incompatible with Community law.

It is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down such a procedural rule, provided, first, that the rule is not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, second, that it does not render in practice impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by European Union law (principle of effectiveness).

In this respect, a limitation rule cannot be regarded as being contrary to the principle of equivalence when there exists, in addition to a limitation rule applicable to actions intended to ensure that the rights derived by individuals from European Union law are safeguarded under domestic law, a limitation rule applicable to domestic actions and when, having regard to their purpose and essential characteristics, the two limitation rules may be considered similar.

As regards the principle of effectiveness, it is compatible with European Union law to lay down reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty which protects both the individual and the authorities concerned. Such time-limits are not liable to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by European Union law. In that regard, a national limitation period of three years appears to be reasonable.

That interpretation is not invalidated by the fact that the effects of the Köbler judgment date back to the time at which the rule interpreted entered into force, the effects not being limited in time by the Court. The application of a procedural rule, such as a limitation period, must not be confused with a limitation on the effects of a judgment of the Court ruling on a request for interpretation of a provision of European Union law.

Moreover, European Union Law does not prohibit a Member State from relying on a limitation period in order to resist an application for a special length-of-service increment, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, in breach of provisions of European Union law, was not granted, even if that Member State has not amended the national rules in order to render them compatible with those provisions. The situation will be different only if the conduct of the national authorities, in conjunction with the existence of a limitation period, had the effect of depriving a person of any opportunity of enforcing his rights before the national courts.

(see paras 17, 20, 27-30, 33, 41, operative part)