This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 62003TJ0303
Summary of the Judgment
Summary of the Judgment
1. Community trade mark – Observations of third parties and opposition – Examination of the opposition – Proof of use of the earlier mark – Genuine use – Definition – Interpretation having regard to the ratio legis of Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94
(Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 43(2) and (3))
2. Community trade mark – Observations of third parties and opposition – Examination of the opposition – Proof of use of the earlier mark – Genuine use – Definition – Criteria for assessment – Requirement of solid and objective evidence
(Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 43(2) and (3))
3. Community trade mark – Observations of third parties and opposition – Examination of the opposition – Proof of use of the earlier mark – Evidential value of items of evidence – Criteria for assessment
(Council Regulation No 40/94, Arts 43(2) and (3), and 76(1)(f); Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 22(3))
4. Community trade mark – Appeals procedure – Actions before the Community judicature – Condition of admissibility – Grounds of appeal directed only against decisions of the Boards of Appeal
(Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 63(1))
5. Community trade mark – Appeals procedure – Decision on the appeal – Observance of the rights of the defence – Scope of the principle
(Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 73)
6. Community trade mark – Procedural provisions – Examination of the facts by OHIM of its own motion – Opposition procedure – Examination restricted to the facts, evidence and arguments provided – Evidence in support – Obligation on the parties to provide that evidence
(Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 74(1))
7. Community trade mark – Observations of third parties and opposition – Examination of the opposition – Proof of use of the earlier mark – Request presented expressly and on time by the applicant – Effect – Burden of proof on the opponent – No challenge to the material put forward in support of the opposition – Not relevant
(Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 43(2) and (3))
1. In order to interpret the concept of genuine use for the purposes of Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the ratio legis of the requirement that the earlier mark must have been put to genuine use if it is to be capable of being used in opposition to a Community trade mark application is to restrict the number of conflicts between two marks, in so far as there is no sound economic reason resulting from an actual function of the mark on the market. However, that provision is not concerned with assessing the commercial success of an undertaking or with monitoring its economic strategy, nor is it designed to reserve the protection of trade marks for large-scale commercial uses of them.
(see para. 35)
2. There is genuine use of a trade mark for the purposes of Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark where the mark is used consistently with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services, but excluding token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark. In that regard, the condition of genuine use of the mark requires that the mark, as protected in the relevant territory, be used publicly and outwardly.
The assessment of whether use of the trade mark is genuine must be based on all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether the commercial exploitation of the mark is real, particularly the kinds of use regarded as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark.
In order to examine whether use of the earlier mark is genuine, an overall assessment must be made taking account of all the relevant factors in the particular case. Furthermore, genuine use of a trade mark cannot be proved by means of probabilities or suppositions, but must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence of effective and sufficient use of the trade mark on the market concerned.
(see paras 36-38)
3. There is nothing in either Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark or Regulation No 2868/95 implementing Regulation No 40/94 to support the conclusion that the evidential value of items of evidence of the use of the mark for the purposes of Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94, including affirmations, must be assessed in the light of the national law of a Member State. In order to assess the evidential value of such a document, regard should be had first and foremost to the credibility of the account it contains. It is then necessary to take account, in particular, of the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears sound and reliable.
(see para. 42)
4. By virtue of Article 63(1) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, actions may be brought before the Community judicature only against decisions of the Boards of Appeal. Accordingly, in the case of such appeals, it is only pleas directed against the decision of the Board of Appeal itself which are admissible in such an action. In so far as it relates to a decision of a unit of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), giving a ruling at first instance, a plea of infringement of a legislative provision must, in consequence, be rejected as being inadmissible.
(see paras 59-60)
5. Where, in an appeal against a decision of a unit of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), giving a ruling at first instance, the applicant itself has produced certain documents before the Office and accordingly has had the opportunity of presenting its comments on them and on their relevance, the Board of Appeal is not obliged to hear the applicant in relation to the assessment of the facts on which it chooses to base its decision.
The assessment of the facts forms part of the decision-making act and the right to be heard extends to all the factual and legal material which forms the basis of the decision-making act, but not to the final position which the authority intends to adopt.
(see para. 62)
6. Article 74(1) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark states that ‘in proceedings relating to relative grounds for refusal of registration, the Office shall be restricted in [its] examination to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought’. While the wording of that provision, in its French version, does not expressly refer to the production of evidence by the parties, it nevertheless follows from it that it is also for the parties to provide the evidence in support of the relief sought.
(see paras 74, 76)
7. Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark provides that, if the applicant so requests, the proprietor of an earlier trade mark who has given notice of opposition is to furnish proof that that mark has been put to genuine use or that there are proper reasons for non-use. The presentation of such a request by the applicant therefore has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the opponent to demonstrate genuine use (or the existence of proper reasons for non-use) if it is not to have its opposition dismissed. For that to occur, the request must be made expressly and on time to the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs).
It follows that the lack of proof of genuine use can be penalised by rejecting the opposition only where the applicant has requested such proof before the Office expressly and on time.
Where the request is made expressly and on time and the opponent does not furnish the evidence he is required to provide, the Office is right to reject the application for opposition, notwithstanding the absence of any challenge on the part of the applicant for the mark to the material put forward by the opponent in support of its opposition.
(see paras 77-78)