This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 61998CJ0001
Summary of the Judgment
Summary of the Judgment
1. ECSC - Steel aid - Commission authorisation - General decisions and individual decisions - Adoption of individual decisions to authorise aid not coming under any of the categories of aid authorised by a general decision - Competence
(ECSC Treaty, Arts 4(c) and 95; Decision No 3855/91, Art. 1(1))
2. ECSC - Steel aid - Commission authorisation - General decisions and individual decisions - Protection of legitimate expectations arising under the Fifth Code as to the possibility of derogation from that Code - No legitimate expectation
(ECSC Treaty, Art. 95; Decision No 3855/91)
1. Article 1(1) of the Fifth Steel Aid Code contains no general prohibition of aid but simply defines in general terms the scope of the derogation provided for in Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty. Accordingly, that provision of the Code is not intended to exclude the adoption of other measures derogating from the prohibition laid down in Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty.
Moreover, Article 1(1) of the Code must be interpreted as meaning that the Commission is not competent, under the Code, to approve, in accordance with the simplified procedures introduced by the latter, aid not covered by Articles 2 to 5 of the Code, and that, on the contrary, it is competent to adopt, pursuant to Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty, with the unanimous assent of the Council, supplementary measures, whether general or individual, approving aid not covered by the Fifth Aid Code.
Consequently, the Court of First Instance was right to hold, first, that the Fifth Aid Code represented a binding legal framework only for aid compatible with the ECSC Treaty and enumerated by it and, second, that the Commission is empowered to have recourse to Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty in order to adopt individual decisions.
( see paras 30, 34, 43 )
2. After finding that the Fifth Aid Code did not pursue the same purpose as the Commission decisions adopted to deal with an exceptional situation, the Court of First Instance was right to infer that the Code was not capable in any circumstances of giving rise to legitimate expectations regarding the possibility of derogating from that Code, in exceptional cases, by means of individual decisions based on Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty.
The Court of First Instance was also correct in holding that the proper functioning of the common market in steel clearly involves the obvious need for constant adjustments to fluctuations in the economic situation and economic operators cannot claim a vested right to the maintenance of the legal situation existing at a given time. An undertaking cannot legitimately expect that a given legal situation will remain unchanged even though the economic conditions in the steel market are subject to changes which, in some cases, call for specific measures of adjustment.
( see paras 51-52 )