3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/1

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated stability programme of Belgium, which covers the period 2004 to 2008. The programme broadly complies with the data requirements of the ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’. The programme does not include compulsory interest rate assumptions. Accordingly, Belgium is invited to achieve full compliance with the data requirements.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages a real GDP growth of 2.5 % in 2005 and 2006, slowing down to 2.0 % towards the end of the programme period. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario reflects plausible growth assumptions. The programme's projections for inflation also appear realistic.

(3)

The budgetary strategy outlined in the update aims to maintain a balanced budget or a small surplus and the debt ratio on a downward trend to prepare for the budgetary impact of the ageing population. The update projects a balanced budget in 2005 and 2006 and a surplus of 0.3 % of GDP in 2007 and 0.6 % in 2008. Overall, compared with the previous update (which ended in 2007), the current update broadly confirms the planned adjustment against a broadly unchanged macroeconomic scenario. Because of the impact of the ongoing implementation of the 2001 direct tax reform and higher public investment in the run-up to the 2006 local elections, the primary surplus is projected to fall slightly towards 2006 but to rise again afterwards. The programme foresees a declining interest burden, mainly as a result of ongoing debt reduction. Revenue is expected to decrease until 2006 and remain stable afterwards, while primary expenditure decreases slightly towards 2008. The cyclically-adjusted balance (based on the information in the programme, using the commonly agreed methodology) is projected to remain positive throughout the programme period, decreasing from a surplus of 0.5 % of GDP in 2004 to 0.1 % in 2006 and then picking up again to 0.9 % in 2008.

(4)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced. In particular, the Belgian government has not yet announced what measures it will take in order to keep the 2006 budget in balance, despite the decrease by 0.3 % of GDP as a result of the continued implementation of the 2001 direct tax reform and the fact that the 2005 budget benefits from a series of smaller one-off operations (in total about 0.2 % of GDP). Also, while the macroeconomic scenario is plausible, the Belgian government balance remains relatively sensitive to changes in economic growth (sensitivity of 0.6). Finally, there is also some risk as regards the control of primary expenditure, mainly at the level of the social security system. The overrun recorded in the health care system in 2004 (despite the already high annual real growth target of 4.5 %) suggests continued strong growth of these expenditures. New measures were announced near the end of 2004 to reduce costs in health care (in total 0.2 % of GDP), but their effectiveness is still difficult to evaluate. On the other hand, for the larger part of 2005 the minister of social affairs has been given a mandate to take necessary measures without prior parliamentary (or other) consultation, to enable a quick response to a possible further overrun. More generally, the Belgian government has gained credibility for keeping its commitment to take measures to maintain a balanced budget.

(5)

In view of this risk assessment, the risks to the budgetary targets appear to be broadly balanced and the budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to adhere to the Stability and Growth Pact's medium-term objective of a budgetary position of close-to-balance or in surplus. In addition, there is a sufficient margin against the risk of breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value for the deficit in the event of normal cyclical fluctuations in each year.

(6)

The debt ratio is estimated to have reached 96.6 % of GDP in 2004, well above the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to decline by 12.4 percentage points over the programme period to 84.2 % of GDP in 2008. This figure includes the assumption of a EUR 7.4 billion debt (2.5 % of GDP) from the national railway company SNCB in 2005. The integration of the SNCB debt slows down the debt reduction in 2005, but otherwise the planned debt reduction is faster than scheduled in the previous update.

(7)

With regard to the long-term sustainability of the public finances, Belgium appears to be at some risk on grounds of the current level of gross debt. While declining, the debt ratio is still high and a steady reduction hinges upon sustaining high primary surpluses for a prolonged period. The strategy for coping with the budgetary cost of an ageing population outlined in the programme is mainly based on gross debt reduction through maintaining a balanced budgetary position or a small surplus (itself relying primarily on primary expenditure restraint) and an ageing fund. Containing primary expenditures might prove difficult, especially in the health care sector, but is important in view of the government's strategy of reducing the tax burden in order to create employment. Given the projected increase in the old-age dependency ratio, pursuing this broad strategy with determination is crucial to the achievement of long-term sustainability.

(8)

The economic policies outlined in the update are broadly consistent with the country-specific broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances. In particular, the update ensures that the debt ratio is kept on a sustained declining trend. In view of recent overruns in health-care spending (for which the target growth rate in real terms is set at a relatively high 4.5 % annual rate), some risk exists in breaching the guideline to limit the real expenditure growth in entity I (federal government and social security) to 1.5 %. Therefore, maintaining high primary surpluses and limit real expenditure growth is important, especially in view of the financial needs implied by ageing.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/4

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Denmark, which covers the period 2004 to 2010. The programme fully complies with the data requirements of the ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages real GDP growth firming from 2.2 % in 2004 to 2.5 % in 2005 and an average 1.7 % in 2006-10. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario seems to reflect relatively cautious growth assumptions. The programme's projections for inflation appear realistic.

(3)

(4)

The risks to the budgetary projections are fairly balanced, though to some extent weighted towards an outcome better than projected in the first years of the programme. Over a number of years, Denmark has posted general government budget surpluses. This held also in 2003, when the surplus was 1.0 % of GDP in spite of a GDP growth of only 0.5 %. Higher oil prices than assumed in the update could also improve public finances as Denmark is a small net oil exporter. The composition of GDP growth in the coming years, largely based on domestic demand, should also cater for sustained revenues and thus support a favourable development of public finances. Over the medium term, downside risks to the projections include any failure to restrain public expenditure to targeted growth, in particular at local government level, or to reach the medium-term targets of higher employment.

(5)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programmes is sufficient to maintain a medium-term budgetary position of 'close to balance or in surplus' as required by the Stability and Growth Pact throughout the programme period. It also provides a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations.

(6)

(7)

Denmark appears to be in a favourable position with regard to the long-term sustainability of public finances, despite significant projected budgetary costs of an ageing population. The budgetary strategy outlined in the programme, mainly based on further debt consolidation through continued budgetary surpluses, should result in a sustainable position over time. However, achieving continued tight expenditure control and a considerable rise in employment on which the strategy also relies may prove challenging.

(8)

Overall, the economic policies outlined in the update are broadly consistent with the country-specific broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/7

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Estonia, which covers the period 2004 to 2008. The programme complies with the data requirements of the revised ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages real GDP growth to pick up from 5.6 % in 2004 to 6.0 % on average over the rest of the programme period. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario seems to reflect plausible growth assumptions. The programme's projections for inflation also appear realistic.

(3)

Estonia aims at achieving a budgetary position of close-to-balance or small surplus throughout the programme period. For 2004, the programme targets a budget surplus of 1 % of GDP which is 0.3 % higher than the surplus planned in the programme of last May. From 2005 onwards, balanced budgets are envisaged, as was the case in the previous programme. Public investment in 2004 is foreseen to increase by one percentage point of GDP to 4.4 % before declining to 3.9 % by 2008, and remains thus well above the EU average (2.4 % of GDP in 2004).

(4)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced. On the one hand, the cautious macroeconomic scenario suggests that revenues could be higher and expenditure somewhat lower than budgeted. Indeed, Estonia has established a track record of prudent forecasting and repeated overshooting of fiscal targets over the past few years. On the other hand, unexpected revenue shortfalls from the planned tax cuts, or an adverse impact on growth from exogenous shocks cannot be excluded altogether. Considering the balance of risks, the budgetary stance in the programme seems adequate to maintain the Stability and Growth Pact's medium-term objective of a position of close-to-balance over the entire programme period 2004-2008. It also seems to provide a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations.

(5)

The debt ratio is estimated at 4.8 % of GDP in 2004, well below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value and indeed the lowest in the EU. The programme projects the debt ratio to further decline by 1.9 percentage points over the programme period.

(6)

Estonia appears to be in a favourable position with regard to the long-term sustainability of the public finances, despite important projected budgetary costs of an ageing population. A low government debt level, considerable government financial reserves and a medium-term budgetary strategy that is fully consistent with the objective of a close-to-balance-or-in-surplus budgetary position, together with credible and thorough reforms of the pension and health care systems which are meant to stem budgetary pressures in the longer term, should ensure that public finances remain on a sustainable footing.

(7)

The economic policies outlined in the update are broadly consistent with the country-specific broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances. The higher-than-projected budget surplus in 2004 is in line with the recommendation to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Nevertheless, given that the external account deficit has most likely not narrowed significantly (if at all) in 2004, a rapid run-down of the budget surplus may provide insufficient support from the fiscal policy stance to the correction of the external imbalance.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/9

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated stability programme of France, which covers the period 2004 to 2008. The programme broadly complies with the data requirements of the revised ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’. However, it does not provide projections for total employment growth according to the national accounts definition, which are compulsory. Accordingly, France is invited to achieve full compliance with the data requirements.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages real GDP growth at 2.5 % from 2004 to 2008, a rate marginally above potential. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario seems to reflect plausible growth assumptions, although the Commission's projections for growth are slightly lower. The programme's projections for inflation also appear realistic.

(3)

On 3 June 2003, the Council decided that an excessive deficit existed in France and recommended that this be corrected by 2004 at the latest. In its Communication to the Council on ‘the situation of Germany and France in relation to their obligation under the excessive deficit procedure following the judgement of the Court of Justice’ adopted on 14 December 2004 (2), the Commission concluded that 2005 should be considered the relevant deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit since the Council conclusions of November 2003 had produced legal effects until annulled by the Court. The primary aim of the budgetary strategy of the programme is to bring the deficit below 3 % of GDP by 2005. The programme is also aimed at ensuring a continuous decline in the general government deficit in the subsequent years. The deficit is projected to decline steadily by 0.6-0.7 percentage point of GDP per year from 2005 to reach a level of 0.9 % of GDP in 2008. Compared with the previous programme, the current update broadly confirms the planned adjustment against a slightly more favourable macroeconomic scenario. According to Commission calculations based on the projections of the programme and the commonly agreed methodology, the cyclically-adjusted balance would also improve by about 0.6-0.7 percentage point per year from 2005, and would reach -0.7 % of GDP in 2008. As in previous updates, the medium-term budgetary strategy is based on the setting of multi-annual targets for the increase in government expenditures in real terms that imply a reduction of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio notably as a consequence of the implementation of structural reforms.

(4)

(5)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme does not seem to provide a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations before 2007; nor is it sufficient to ensure that the Stability and Growth Pact's medium-term objective of a budgetary position of close to balance is achieved within the programme period.

(6)

The debt ratio is estimated to have reached 64.8 % of GDP in 2004, above the 60 %-of-GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to decline from 2006 onwards and to reach 62 % of GDP in 2008. The evolution of the debt ratio is subject to the same risks as the deficit targets.

(7)

With regard to the long-term sustainability of the public finances, France still appears to be at some risk. The implementation of major structural reforms of the pension and health systems in 2003 and 2004 respectively put it on a better footing. However, further efforts (additional budgetary consolidation and reforms) would be needed in the years ahead in order to ensure fully the sustainability of government finances.

(8)

The economic policies as reflected in the 2004 update are partly consistent with the recommendations in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, specifically those with budgetary implications. France has implemented important structural reforms, notably concerning the health and pension systems, which place it in a better position to face the consequences of an ageing population. The cyclically-adjusted deficit in 2004 will be reduced by 0.4 % of GDP, lower than recommended. Nevertheless higher than expected State revenues were fully allocated to deficit reduction. As a whole, although significant, the medium-term adjustment planned in the 2004 update is subject to uncertainties, and will not fully lead to a close-to-balance budgetary position over the period covered by the programme.

(i)

do the necessary to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit in 2005;

(ii)

make sure that the budgetary consolidation continues in the years after 2005 so as to reach a close to balance budgetary position in 2008; and

(iii)

continue structural reforms and control expenditure in order to secure the respect of the multi-annual expenditure targets set in the programme.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/12

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated stability programme of Germany, which covers the period 2004-2008. The programme complies broadly with the data requirements of the revised ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’. The programme uses mostly rounded figures and mixes incompatible data. However, improvements are noted in terms of details, e.g. in using ESA 95 as a consistent statistical framework in the parts on the macroeconomic scenario and the budgetary projections. Accordingly, Germany is invited to achieve compliance with the data requirements.

(2)

(3)

(4)

Based on current information, the measures announced by the German authorities in November 2004 should be sufficient to reduce the deficit to 2.9 % of GDP in 2005, compared with the deficit projected at 3.4 % by the Commission services autumn forecast of October 2004. The budgetary situation remains vulnerable. Correction of the excessive deficit requires effective full implementation of all the measures envisaged, and of additional measures in case of adverse developments that could jeopardise the target of a deficit below 3 % of GDP in 2005. In the years after 2005, the budgetary outcome could be worse than projected in the programme, although the general government deficit is likely to remain below 3 % of GDP. In view of the improvement in the cyclically-adjusted balance towards the end of the programme period by less than 0.5 pp., the adjustment projected in the update is quite small, despite the implementation of remarkable structural reforms likely to reduce medium-term expenditures. Moreover, the path of budgetary adjustment seems rather optimistic towards the programme horizon. In addition, the one-off measures announced in November 2004 to bring the deficit below 3 % of GDP in 2005 weaken to some extent the budgetary situation towards the end of the programme period and beyond.

(5)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme does not seem to provide a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations before 2008; nor is sufficient to ensure that the Stability and Growth Pact's medium-term objective of a budgetary position of close to balance is achieved within the programme period.

(6)

(7)

As regards long-term sustainability of public finances, Germany appears to be at some risk. Germany could be in a relatively favourable position provided that the structural reforms underlying the programme are actively implemented and the reform efforts are continued to improve further the long-term sustainability. However, long-term sustainability hinges crucially on the achievement of the planned budgetary consolidation in the medium-term and on reducing the debt level; both the federal states and social security systems play a role in this. The already legislated structural reforms of ‘Agenda 2010’ and in particular the pension reform is likely to reduce the budgetary impact of ageing, although the expenditure-reducing effect of the ongoing reforms is subject to uncertainty, in particular for health care.

(8)

(i)

do the necessary to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit in 2005;

(ii)

implement budgetary adjustments in the years beyond 2005 and make the necessary effort in structural terms to achieve a budgetary position of close to balance by the end of the period covered by the programme; and

(iii)

continue with structural reforms in order to further improve the long-term sustainability of public finances in particular as regards the health care system.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/15

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated stability programme of Ireland, which covers the period 2004 to 2007. The programme complies with the data requirements of the ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages real GDP growth of 5.3 % in 2004 and to stabilise around 5.2 % on average over the rest of the programme period. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario seems to reflect plausible growth assumptions. The programme's projections for HICP inflation nevertheless seem on the low side.

(3)

After an initially unplanned surplus in 2004, reflecting stronger than expected receipts, including from one-off factors, and some shortfall in budgeted expenditure, the strategy in the update envisages a modest and broadly stable deficit from 2005 onwards. Both expenditure and revenue ratios are on a declining trend over the programme period, although the former increases in 2005 as a result of recent budgetary measures. At the same time, a significant programme of public investment is being implemented, which results in an average general government investment ratio over the programme period of just below 4 % of GDP (equivalent to just below 5 % of GNP). Adjusting for the estimated impact of the cycle using the common methodology, the cyclically-adjusted balance is in surplus throughout the projection period, with the exception of a small deficit in 2005. It should nevertheless be noted that the estimation of the output gap and hence of the cyclically-adjusted balances presents unusually high margins of uncertainty due to the special features of the Irish economy. Compared with the previous programme, the current update envisages stronger general government balances against a more favourable macroeconomic scenario.

(4)

The risks attached to the budgetary projections appear broadly balanced. On the one hand, the forecast of receipts appears to be plausible and the inclusion of contingency provisions in the projections for 2006 and 2007 might point to the possibility of a better than projected outturn. As regards expenditures, Ireland has also recently shown encouraging progress in adhering to expenditure targets, suggesting that recent measures taken to strengthen spending controls are proving effective. On the other hand, there are also some risks of higher headline deficits. In particular, the growth rate of spending appears somewhat restrained in the later years of the programme.

(5)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to maintain the Stability and Growth Pact's medium-term objective of a position of close to balance or surplus over the period to 2007. It also provides a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations throughout the programme period.

(6)

General government debt is estimated to have fallen to 30.5 % of GDP in 2004, well below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to stabilise close to 30 % of GDP over the period 2005 to 2007. In the absence of acquisition of non-general government assets by the National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF), the debt ratio would be falling significantly throughout the programme period.

(7)

Ireland appears to be in a relatively favourable position with regard to the long-term sustainability of its public finances. The relatively low debt ratio in Ireland, the pension reform measures already enacted and the accumulation of reserves in the NPRF will contribute to budgetary sustainability and help cope with the impact of ageing. The strategy outlined in the programme is mainly based on conformity to the Stability and Growth Pact framework and further asset accumulation in the NPRF. Overall, Ireland's relatively low tax ratio should ease the accommodation of any sustainability gap that might arise in the longer term.

(8)

The update provides an overview of the government's structural reform programme that is oriented towards enhancing the quality of public services, increasing the efficiency of public spending and addressing the infrastructural needs of the Irish economy. Overall, the economic policies outlined in the update are broadly consistent with the country-specific 2003-2005 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in the area of public finances, which recommended the Irish authorities to enhance the efficiency of public spending, improve the medium-term budgetary framework and prioritise the infrastructural elements of the National Development Plan.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/18

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated stability programme of Italy, which covers the period 2004 to 2008. The programme complies partly with the data requirements of the ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’. Information on the additional measures foreseen to achieve the budgetary targets for the years 2006 and beyond would have been necessary in order to assess with precision the path and composition of the adjustment. Accordingly, Italy is invited to achieve full compliance with the requirements of the code of conduct.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme reflects the information set available at around mid-year 2004. It envisages real GDP growth to pick up from 1.2 % in 2004 to 2.1 % in 2005 and to average at around 2.3 % over the rest of the programme period. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario seems to reflect somewhat favourable growth assumption because both (i) projected growth in 2005 appears on the high side of the current forecasting range and (ii) the projected evolution of growth in the medium term appears relatively optimistic. The programme's projections of price developments as measured by the GDP deflator appear realistic. (2)

(3)

The programme aims at gradually reducing the nominal budget deficit from an expected outturn of 2.9 % of GDP in 2004, via a deficit target of 2.7 % of GDP in 2005 to 0.9 % of GDP in 2008. Hence, the programme does no longer target a medium term close to balance or in surplus position. In cyclically-adjusted terms the budget balance is projected to improve by 1.1 percentage points over the programme period, as a result of measures of a permanent nature, with the bulk of the adjustment (0.5 percentage point) expected to take place in 2006. Even though no improvement in cyclically-adjusted terms is expected in 2005, a large part of the one-off measures is going to be replaced by permanent ones. Compared to the previous update the nominal deficit figures are more than one percentage point higher and the planned adjustment is back-loaded against a somewhat less favourable macroeconomic scenario. However, since the cyclical conditions, as measured by the output gap, are almost unchanged the largest part of the revision of the deficit can be taken to be structural.

(4)

There are risks that the budgetary outcome could be worse than projected in the programme. In particular, concerning 2005, where the margins are narrow, lower than projected economic growth, small deviations from the planned budgetary correction of more than 2 % of GDP, risks linked to some one-off measures as well as the possible re-classification of ANAS, the company in charge of road maintenance, entail a risk of breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value. In the year 2006 and beyond, given past experience, it cannot be excluded that the fiscal adjustment needed to achieve the targets presented in the programme is underestimated. In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme does not seem to provide a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations at least up until 2006. It is also insufficient to ensure that the Stability and Growth Pact's medium-term objective of a budgetary position of close to balance is achieved by the end of the programme period.

(5)

The debt ratio is estimated to have reached 106 % of GDP in 2004, only marginally below the level recorded in 2003 and far above the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to decline by over 8 percentage points over the programme period mainly on account of an ambitious privatisation plan coupled with an improving primary balance and accelerating economic growth. A more rapid pace of debt reduction is hampered by debt increasing below-the-line operations of more than 2 percentage points of GDP on average per year. The evolution of the debt may be less favourable than projected notably given the risks to the budgetary targets mentioned above and the remaining uncertainties related to stock-flow adjustments.

(6)

With regard to the long-term sustainability of public finances, Italy appears to be at some risk. However, the adoption in 2004 of a pension reform is an important step towards addressing the budgetary consequences of ageing population and will contribute to improve the situation of Italy in this respect. Italy could be in a relatively favourable position, provided that the budgetary targets are fully implemented, the expected savings from the pension reform are achieved and any departure from the strategy of running large primary surpluses, effectively leading to rapid debt reduction, is promptly corrected.

(7)

The economic policies outlined in the programme are partly consistent with the country-specific Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in the area of public finances. First, the programme does not envisage a medium-term close to balance or in surplus position. Second, the budgetary targets do not ensure an improvement in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance of at least 0.5 percentage point per year although it is recognised that the improvement in the structural budget balance (net of one-offs) reaches in average 0.5 %-points of GDP per year. Third, part of the 2005 tax cut is financed by means of temporary measures. Finally, the programme does not provide sufficient information on how the strengthening of mechanisms for expenditure control would work nor does it outline a clear source of financing regional expenditure.

(i)

do the necessary to ensure the achievement of the 2005 deficit target;

(ii)

make the necessary effort in structural terms in 2006 and beyond to achieve a budgetary position of close to balance by the end of the period covered by the programme; and

(iii)

ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio is declining towards the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value at a more rapid pace, paying particular attention to factors other than net borrowing which contribute to the change in debt levels.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/21

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Malta, which covers the period 2004 to 2007. The programme broadly complies with the Code of Conduct except for the breakdown of forecasted public expenditure figures. The price data are not consistent with the Maastricht harmonised definitions. Accordingly, Malta is invited to achieve compliance with the data requirements.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages real GDP growth to pick up from 0.6 % in 2004 to 1.8 % on average over the rest of the programme period. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario seems to reflect plausible growth assumptions. The programme's projections for inflation also appear realistic.

(3)

On 5 July 2004, the Council decided that an excessive deficit existed in Malta and recommended to correct it by 2006.

(4)

The programme aims at reducing the deficit below the 3 % of GDP reference value in 2006. Fiscal consolidation is based on both revenue-rising measures and expenditure cuts. The general government deficit is projected to fall from 5.2 % in 2004 to 2.3 % of GDP in 2006 and to decline further in 2007 to 1.4 % of GDP. Compared with the previous programme, the current update broadly confirms the planned adjustment against a broadly unchanged macroeconomic scenario.

(5)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced. In particular, on the one hand, the fiscal target of a general government deficit of 5.2 % in 2004 seems within reach, on the other, concerning 2005 and beyond, the prudent underlying macroeconomic scenario and the nature of the announced measures aiming at reducing the deficit, as well as budgetary projections set up in the programme make the consolidation path broadly plausible within the currently projected external environment.

(6)

In view of this risk assessment the budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to reduce the deficit to below 3 % of GDP by 2006 and seems to provide a sufficient safety margin against breaching this threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations in the programme period. However, it may not be sufficient to ensure that the Stability and Growth Pact's medium-term objective of a budgetary position of close to balance is achieved within the programme period.

(7)

According to the programme the debt ratio is likely to reach 73.2 % of GDP in 2004, up from 70.4 % of GDP in 2003. Thereafter, it is projected to decline to 70.4 per cent of GDP at the end of the programme period. The Maltese authorities foresee that economic growth, progressive improvements in the primary balance and the sale of assets will drive the reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio as of 2005. However, a number factors, which partially offset the effects of significant privatization proceeds (more than 2 % of GDP in 2005 and 2006), call for a more detailed information on, and closer monitoring of, below-the-line operations.

(8)

There are risks with regard to the long-term sustainability of public finances, reflecting the projected cost of an ageing population. The strategy for ensuring sustainability outlined in the programme is dependent on the achievement of the budgetary targets. It also includes reforms of the pension and healthcare systems that have not yet been defined or implemented. While failure to achieve budgetary targets would clearly put sustainability at risk, the pursuit of the reform process is also important for the containment of the increase in age-related public expenditure in the long term.

(9)

Overall, the economic policies outlined in the update are broadly consistent with the country-specific broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances. In particular, the programme is in line with the reduction of the general government deficit recommended by the Council.

(i)

do the necessary to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit in 2006;

(ii)

ensure that the debt ratio is declining towards the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value at a satisfactory pace;

(iii)

make further progress in the design and implementation of the pension and health care reforms.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/23

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Poland, which covers the period 2004 to 2007. The programme complies partly with the data requirements of the ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’. The quality of ESA95 data on the composition of the general government revenue and expenditure is not fully in line with ESA95 statistical standards. The programme also deviates from the data requirements specified in the code of conduct in the area of the long-term sustainability of public finances. Accordingly, Poland is invited to achieve full compliance with the data requirements.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages real GDP growth to decelerate from 5.7 % in 2004 to 4.9 % on average in 2005 and 2006, before rebounding to 5.6 % in 2007. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario seems to reflect rather favourable growth assumptions. If the growth projections for 2005 and 2006 are plausible, the growth forecast for the last year of the programme appears on the high side. In particular, the projected acceleration in GDP growth in 2007 reflects rather optimistic assumptions about the growth of potential output and the strength of domestic demand. The programme's projections for inflation appear on the low side.

(3)

On 5 July 2004, the Council decided that an excessive deficit existed in Poland and recommended that this be corrected by 2007. The budgetary strategy underlying the updated programme aims at reducing the general government deficit to below 3 % of GDP by 2007 and maintaining the debt ratio below 60 % of GDP including the contributions to the second pillar pension schemes (estimated impact of about 1.5 % of GDP per year) to be classified outside the general government by 2007 at the latest in accordance with the Eurostat decision. The update foresees a gradual reduction of the deficit to 2.2 % of GDP in 2007 from 5.4 % of GDP in 2004. Compared with the May 2004 programme, the most significant differences are the large downward revision of the debt-to-GDP ratios, which have been lowered, on average, by approximately 4.3 pp., and the upward revision of the general government deficit target in 2007 by 0.7 percentage points of GDP, despite the projected rebound in economic growth.

(4)

The fiscal consolidation over the period 2005-2007 would result from the implementation of a comprehensive set of measures contained in the Hausner plan, which, if fully implemented, would have an estimated total budgetary impact of 4.7 % of GDP (revised downwards by 0.6 percentage points compared with the previous programme). At the same time, a significant programme of public investment is being implemented, which lifts public investment from 3.4 % of GDP in 2003 to an average of 4.1 % over the programme period against an EU-average of 2.4 % of GDP in 2004.

(5)

There are risks that the budgetary outcome could be worse than projected in the programme aiming at reducing the deficit to below 3 % of GDP by 2007. The risk of a delayed or incomplete implementation of the envisaged measures of the Hausner plan, described in the assessment of the May 2004 programme, is already materialising. There is still uncertainty over the implementation of the remaining measures that require legislative procedures but contained already in the budget for 2005. Despite the rejection by Parliament of two important measures, the deficit targets remained unchanged. Almost half of measures aiming at additional revenue and expenditure savings described in the update are not clearly specified. Contingent liabilities constitute an additional risk which will be monitored accordingly in this context. The achievement of the deficit targets is also conditional on projected high GDP growth throughout the programme period. In addition, the funded pension scheme continues to be recorded inside the general government sector as allowed by the transition period granted by Eurostat. Starting with the March 2007 notification and the ensuing change in classification, the deficit level will have to be adjusted upwards by about 1.5 percentage points. This adjustment means that based on the update and in the absence of additional savings measures, Poland will not be able to bring the deficit below 3 % in the end year of the programme.

(6)

In the updated programme the debt ratio is estimated to have reached 45.9 % of GDP in 2004, against 49 % forecast in the May 2004 Convergence Programme and below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to increase by a cumulative 1.8 percentage points over the period 2004-2007, with the increase coming to a halt only in the last year of the programme.

(7)

The lack of budgetary projections beyond 2020 makes it difficult to assess the long-term sustainability of the Polish public finances, as most of the budgetary impact of aging is likely to take place after 2020. However, on the basis of the available information, some risks cannot be ruled out. Uncertainties regarding the budgetary impact of policies aimed at strengthening the long-term budgetary trends remain. The resolute implementation of the planned budgetary consolidation in the medium term should contribute to a sustainable position in the longer term.

(8)

Overall, the economic policies outlined in the update are partly consistent with the country-specific broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances. On the one hand, the programme is in line with the reduction of the general government deficit recommended by the Council and the reduction is based on the implementation of the Hausner plan. On the other hand, the measures of the programme may not be sufficient to safeguard the long-term sustainability of public finances.

(i)

strengthen the fiscal adjustment beyond 2005 and lower the deficit target for 2007;

(ii)

ensure a full implementation of the structural measures contained in the Hausner plan and make further efforts to introduce alternative measures if implementation risks were to materialize.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/26

(1)

On 17 February 2005, the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Slovakia, which covers the period 2004 to 2007. The programme complies with the data requirements of the ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’.

(2)

(3)

On 5 July 2004, the Council decided that an excessive deficit existed in Slovakia and recommended that this be corrected by 2007. The programme update aims at reducing the deficit to the 3 % of GDP reference value in 2007, in line with the Council recommendation under Article 104 (7) (excluding the contributions to the funded pension scheme estimated at 0.4 % of GDP in 2005, 1.0 % in 2006 and 1.1 % in 2007). The reduction of the headline and primary general government deficits is back-loaded: both are envisaged to stay basically constant at, respectively, around 3.8 % and 1.5 % of GDP until 2006 and their planned overall adjustment by 0.8 percentage points is postponed to 2007. Even net of the impact resulting from the introduction of a funded pension pillar in 2005, most of the deficit reduction takes place in the last two years. Compared to the May 2004 programme, when the adjustment was expenditure-based, the update plans a correction of the deficit through expenditure retrenchment and revenue increases. In spite of a more favourable macroeconomic scenario, the update broadly confirms the planned adjustment path of the previous programme and looks therefore less ambitious. Notwithstanding the considerable past consolidation achievements and the pension reform impact, accelerating the deficit reduction, in particular in 2005, would help the implementation of Slovakia's euro adoption strategy, enhance fiscal credibility in an ERM2 context, foster counter-cyclicality, and could assist in stemming appreciation pressures. It would also pave the way to a structural budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus and to attain a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP Treaty reference value for the deficit criterion with normal macroeconomic fluctuations.

(4)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced for the programme horizon as a whole. On the basis of the given macroeconomic assumptions, there seems to be an upside risk on the revenue side throughout the considered period. Balanced uncertainties exist with respect to the impact of the pension reform. The use of EU-funds (and of co-payments) is likely to be lower than budgeted in 2004 to 2006 as the absorption capacity still develops. However, it could exceed the budgeted amount in 2007, if sufficient catch-up in the implementation of postponed spending takes place. And finally, the parliamentary elections scheduled in 2006 lead to uncertainties, in particular on the extent to which further expenditure retrenchments will be implemented in 2007. The latter could fall short or exceed the current target. In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to reduce the deficit to 3 % of GDP by 2007, which is the end-year of the programme, but does not provide for any safety margin.

(5)

(6)

Slovakia appears to be in a relatively favourable position with regard to long-term sustainability of its public finances especially thanks to the adopted structural reforms, in particular in the pension and health areas. However, a full implementation of these measures is a key condition, in addition to the achievement of the planned budgetary consolidation path over the programme period and until 2010.

(7)

The economic policies outlined in the update are broadly consistent with the country-specific broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances. In particular, Slovakia is on track to correct its excessive deficit by the deadline set by the Council.

(i)

seize every opportunity for an accelerated deficit reduction, including through the use of better-than-expected revenues and of savings on the expenditure side, in particular in 2005.

(ii)

make the medium-term expenditure ceilings more binding.

(iii)

be vigilant that second-round effects from the high inflation in 2004 do not affect the inflation convergence path envisaged in the programme.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/29

(1)

On 17 February 2005 the Council examined the updated stability programme of Finland, which covers the period from 2004 to 2008. The programme broadly complies with the data requirements of the revised ‘code of conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes’. Some variables concerning the basic assumptions are missing. Accordingly Finland is invited to achieve full compliance with the data requirements.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages real GDP growth to ease from 3.2 % in 2004 to 2.4 % on average over the rest of the programme period. On the basis of currently available information, this scenario seems to reflect rather cautious growth assumptions. The programme's projections for inflation appear realistic and are in line the Commission services estimates.

(3)

With a projected annual surplus averaging 2 % of GDP for the general government, the update is set to maintain a comfortable budgetary position throughout the programme period. The surplus is essentially generated in the social security funds, while central government finances, currently in balance, should post small deficits in 2005-07. The aim is to have central government finances back in balance in 2007. To this end, the government has adopted annual spending limits for the period 2004-2007. Compared with the previous update, the projections for the general government surplus from 2004 to 2007 are virtually unchanged.

(4)

Although Finland is set to maintain a favourable public sector surplus, the budgetary outcome could be worse than projected as the baseline budgetary trend presented in the update only partially includes the tax cuts of EUR 1.7 billion i.e. 1.2 % of GDP that supplement the two-and-half-year comprehensive wage agreement concluded at the end of November 2004. As there are no announced plans to further restrain spending in 2005-07, the central government deficit would be higher between 2005 and 2007 than mentioned in the programme, unless revenue-raising measures are introduced, thereby also lowering the surplus in general government finances. The government estimates that the wage-agreement-cum-tax-cuts will lower the general government surplus by 0.3 percentage points to about 1.9 % of GDP in 2007. However, the government expects that the package will strengthen dynamism in the economy by improving the growth potential and job creation and in this way raise the revenue-raising capacity.

(5)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme is sufficient to maintain the Stability and Growth Pact's medium-term objective of a position of close-to-balance for 2004-2008. It also provides a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations for 2004-2008

(6)

The debt ratio is estimated to have reached 44.6 % of GDP in 2004, well below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to decline by 3.5 percentage points over the programme period.

(7)

Finland appears to be in a favourable position with regard to long-term sustainability of the public finances, in spite of important projected budgetary costs of an ageing population. The strategy outlined in the programme is broad-based and consists of further debt consolidation and structural reforms e.g. further steps of the pension reform and measures aimed at raising the exit age. The structural reforms enacted and planned should have beneficial effects on the public finances.

(8)

The economic policies outlined in the update are broadly consistent with the country-specific broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances. In particular, the multi-annual spending limits introduced in 2003 seem to have worked well in the first year of operation, namely 2004, when the final budgetary spending was below the ceilings and also expenditure as proposed in the 2005 budget is within the ceilings. The adherence to the expenditure framework is set to be maintained as it is politically binding.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/31

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/32

(1)

The European Commission has received two sets of commitments formally endorsed by the De Beers Group of companies (‘De Beers’) and Alrosa Company Limited (‘Alrosa’) respectively in the course of a Commission investigation pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and to Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement into the Trade Agreement concluded between these two companies.

(2)

By means of the present publication, the Commission intends to market test De Beers and Alrosa's proposed commitments, which purport to address the Commission's competition concerns expressed in its preliminary assessment with regard to the notified Trade Agreement. Subject to the outcome of the present market test, the Commission intends to adopt a decision pursuant to Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (1). Such a decision would not conclude whether or not there has been or still is an infringement.

(3)

On 5 March 2002 De Beers and Alrosa Company Limited notified under Regulation No 17 a Trade Agreement dated 17 December 2001 to the European Commission. Pursuant to this Trade Agreement Alrosa would supply rough diamonds to the value of USD 800 million per annum to De Beers for a duration of five years. At the time of notification, this amount represented about half of Alrosa's output and corresponded in practice to the quantities of rough diamonds Alrosa had been exporting in the previous years outside the Former Soviet Union through similar Trade Agreements with De Beers. The said Trade Agreement provides that its implementation is conditional upon confirmation from the European Commission that it does not infringe Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.

(4)

De Beers is the largest diamond mining company in the world. Next to its wholly-owned diamond mines in South Africa, De Beers has entered into production joint-ventures with the governments of Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania. It has interests in operations throughout the world in relation to diamond exploration, mining, recovery, valuation, marketing, trading, cutting and polishing of rough diamonds and jewellery sales, covering in effect the entire diamond pipeline from the mine to the consumer.

(5)

Alrosa is the second largest diamond mining company in the world, accounting for over 98 % of Russian diamond production, Russia being the second largest diamond producing country in the world, in value, after Botswana. Alrosa has interests in operations throughout the Russian Federation in relation to diamond exploration, mining, recovery, valuation, cutting and polishing of rough diamonds as well as jewellery manufacturing.

(6)

On 14 January 2003 the Commission opened proceedings under Article 81 of the Treaty against De Beers and Alrosa and under Article 82 of the Treaty against De Beers regarding the Trade Agreement notified on 5 March 2002 and provided access to the Commission's file.

(7)

Supplementary statements of objections were addressed to the parties on 1 July 2003. The only purpose of these was to add the legal basis of Articles 53 and 54 of the European Economic Area Agreement to the statements of objections of 14 January 2003.

(8)

The statements of objections referred to at recitals 6 and 7 are deemed to constitute the preliminary assessment within the meaning of Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

(9)

Pursuant to the preliminary assessment, De Beers holds a dominant position in the world-wide rough diamonds market. By entering into the notified Trade Agreement with Alrosa, its largest competitor, De Beers would gain control over a significant source of supply on the rough diamonds market, enabling it to acquire additional market share on that market and to obtain access to an extended range of diamonds otherwise not accessible to it. This would, on the one hand eliminate Alrosa as a source of supply on the market outside Russia and would enhance the already existing market power of De Beers with the effect of hindering the growth or maintenance of competition in the rough diamond market.

(10)

The preliminary assessment also noted that pursuant to the notified Trade Agreement, De Beers, the largest diamond producer in the world, would act as a distributor of about half the production of its largest competitor. In view of the fact that quantities traded would be substantial and the agreement is made between the two largest undertakings on the rough diamonds market, competition on this market as a result of the Trade Agreement would be substantially weakened.

(11)

The parties subject to the proceedings replied to the Commission's objections in writing on 31 March 2003 and defended their arguments orally at a hearing held on 7 July 2003, emphasising that they did not agree with the Commission's preliminary assessment. They have nevertheless offered to abide by a set of commitments, which are designed to remedy the Commission's concerns. These commitments are briefly summarised in what follows and are also published in full in an English version on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases.

(12)

De Beers and Alrosa undertake to gradually decrease the value of the sales of rough diamonds made between them and that the maximum amount of rough diamonds to be sold by Alrosa to De Beers annually would not exceed the amounts specified in the following table:

(13)

In 2011 and thereafter, De Beers and Alrosa undertake that the maximum amount of rough diamonds to be sold by Alrosa to De Beers annually would not exceed USD 275 million.

(14)

De Beers and Alrosa further undertake to implement the commitments by concluding a trade agreement similar in principle (in particular pricing provisions, sorting and valuation) to the notified trade agreement but including an obligation on Alrosa not to sell to De Beers and an obligation on De Beers not to purchase from Alrosa rough diamonds in volumes greater than those specified in recitals 12 and 13.

(15)

An independent third party will be appointed by each De Beers and Alrosa to verify compliance with the commitments by De Beers and Alrosa respectively. The appointment and mandate of this independent third party will be subject to the Commission's approval. A separate report for each of Alrosa and De Beers on compliance with the commitments will be submitted annually to the Commission.

(16)

The Commission intends, subject to the outcome of this market test, to adopt a decision under Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. In accordance with Article 27(4) of Regulation No 1/2003, it therefore invites interested third parties to submit their comments to it within one month of the publication of this notice.

(17)

Interested third parties are also asked to submit a non-confidential version of their comments, in which business secrets and other confidential passages are deleted and are if necessary replaced by a non-confidential summary or by the words ‘[business secrets]’ or ‘[confidential]’.

(18)

Comments can be sent to the Commission by e-mail (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@cec.eu.int), by fax ((32-2) 295 01 28) or by post at the address below, mentioning the reference ‘COMP/B-2/38.381/De Beers–Alrosa’:

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/34

1.

On 27 May 2005, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings BP p. l.c. (‘BP’, United Kingdom) and Nova Chemicals Corporation (‘Nova’, Canada) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation joint control of the undertakings ‘DutchCo’ and ‘SwissCo’ by way of purchase of shares in two newly created companies constituting a joint venture.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.3578 — BP/Nova Chemicals/JV, to the following address:

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/35

1.

On 17 May 2005, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Fortis Private Equity Holding Nederland B.V., controlled by Fortis Bank Nederland (Holding) B.V. (‘Fortis’, The Netherlands) and NIBCapital Principal Investments B.V., controlled by NIBCapital Bank N.V. (‘NIBCapital’, The Netherlands) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation joint control of the undertaking Sandd B.V. (‘Sandd’, The Netherlands) along with Trimoteur Distribution Services B.V. (‘Trimoteur’, The Netherlands) by way of purchase of shares. Currently Sandd is solely controlled by Trimoteur.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M. 3826 — Trimoteur/Fortis/NIB CApital/Sandd, to the following address:

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/36

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/37

—

Nds. Verwaltungskostengesetz (Lower Saxony administrative costs act) of 7.5.1962 (Nds. GVBl. p. 43), as last amended by Article 20 of the Act of 20.11.2001 (Nds. GVBL. p. 701)

—

Gebührenordnung für die Veterinärverwaltung (veterinary fees regulation) of 22.3.1995 (Nds. GVBl. p. 63), as last amended by the Verordnung zur Änderung der Gebührenordnung für die Veterinärverwaltung (regulation amending the veterinary fees regulation) of 14.9.2004 (Nds. GVBL. p. 322)

—

Erlasse zur BSE/TSE-Untersuchungsgebühr (general circulars on the BSE/TSE test fee) of 15.12.2000, 10.1.2001, 30.4.2001, 24.1.2002 — Ref. 107-42282/7-315

—

Décisions de la Commission du 16 novembre 2001 et du 8 décembre 2004 approuvant le programme d'initiative communautaire INTERREG III A entre la France et la Suisse, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du règlement no 1260/1999 du Conseil du 21 juin 1999 portant dispositions générales sur les fonds structurels,

—

Conseil Régional: Commission Permanente du 27 mai 2004,

—

Articles L 1511 et suivants du Code général des collectivités territoriales permettant aux collectivités territoriales d'intervenir dans le cadre de la création ou de l'extension d'activités économiques en accordant des aides directes et indirectes aux entreprises

M. le Président du Conseil Régional de Franche-Comté

Hotel de Region

4 Square Castan

25031 Besancon Cedex

—

Gebührengesetz NRW vom 23.8.1999 (GV NRW 1999 S 528)

—

Verwaltungsgebührenordnung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen vom 3. Juli 2001 in der jeweils geltenden Fassung (GV. NRW 2001 S. 262) zur BSE/TSE-Untersuchungsgebühr

—

Erlass zur BSE/TSE-Untersuchungsgebühr vom 8.12.2003 — Az. VI-1-42.21.09, 18.2.2004 — Az. VI-1-17.80.06 u. 42.21.00, 14.9.04 — Az. VI-1-17.80.06 u. 42.21.00

—

Tierseuchengesetz vom 11.4.2001 in der jeweils geltenden Fassung (BGBl. I. S. 506) § 23 des Ausführungsgesetzes zum Tierseuchengesetz vom 4.6.63 (GV.NRW 1963 S. 203) zur Kostenträgerschaft der Kreise und kreisfreien Städte für Probennahme und -versand

—

TSE-Überwachungsverordnung vom 13.12.2001 (BGBl. I. S. 4532) in der jeweils geltenden Fassung

—

Beihilfebeschluss der Tierseuchenkasse für Schlachtschafe und Schlachtziegen

—

Budget: EUR 990 000

—

Amount of aid: EUR 990 000

—

The financial aid will be granted by waiving fees.

—

where BSE is officially diagnosed in a bovine animal;

—

in order to combat other epizootic diseases, with the exception of animal diseases that spread in the form of epidemics;

—

killed in the framework of a disease eradication campaign;

—

slaughtered for human consumption.

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/40

3.6.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/41

—

Sale and Purchase Agreement of 2 April 1997 between the State Joint Stock Company-Non Profit Organisation Privatisation Agency, State Joint Stock Company under Privatisation Latvijas Gaze, Ruhrgas Aktiengesellschaft and PreussenElektra Aktiengesellschaft.

—

Arbitral Award rendered in Stockholm, Sweden on 19 June 2003 between JSC Latvijas Gaze and The Republic of Latvia.

a)

Zákon č. 303/1995 Z.z. o rospočtových pravidlách v znení neskoršich predpisov,

b)

Zákon č. 231/1999 Z.z. o štátnej pomoci v znani zákona č. 203/2004 — §4 ods. 1, pism.d),

c)

Výnos MK SR — 480/2004 — 1 o poskytovani dotácili v pôsobnosti MK SR