Choose the experimental features you want to try

This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website

Document 62019CB0013

    Case C-13/19: Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 3 March 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Zaragoza — Spain) — Ibercaja Banco, SA v TJ, UK (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 53(2) and Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Consumer protection — Directive 93/13/EEC — Mortgage loan agreement — Unfair terms — Term limiting the variability of the interest rate (so-called ‘floor’ clause) — Novation agreement — Waiver of legal action against the terms of the contract — No binding character — Directive 2005/29/EC — Unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices — Article 6(1) and Article 7(1))

    IO C 228, 14.6.2021, p. 9–10 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

    14.6.2021   

    EN

    Official Journal of the European Union

    C 228/9


    Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 3 March 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Zaragoza — Spain) — Ibercaja Banco, SA v TJ, UK

    (Case C-13/19) (1)

    (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) and Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Consumer protection - Directive 93/13/EEC - Mortgage loan agreement - Unfair terms - Term limiting the variability of the interest rate (so-called ‘floor’ clause) - Novation agreement - Waiver of legal action against the terms of the contract - No binding character - Directive 2005/29/EC - Unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices - Article 6(1) and Article 7(1))

    (2021/C 228/11)

    Language of the case: Spanish

    Referring court

    Audiencia Provincial de Zaragoza

    Parties to the main proceedings

    Applicant: Ibercaja Banco, SA

    Defendants: TJ, UK

    Operative part of the order

    1.

    Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as not precluding a term of a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, which is capable of being found to be unfair by a court, from being the subject of a novation agreement between that seller or supplier and that consumer, under which the consumer waives the effects which would result from a declaration that the term is unfair, provided that that waiver is the result of the free and informed consent of the consumer, which it is for the national court to determine. By contrast, a term under which that consumer waives, in respect of future disputes, legal proceedings based on the rights which he or she holds under Directive 93/13, is not binding on that consumer.

    2.

    Article 3 of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that a term in a mortgage loan agreement concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer which seeks to amend a potentially unfair term of an earlier agreement concluded between them or provides that the consumer waives any right to bring legal proceedings against the seller or supplier may be regarded as not having been individually negotiated, where that consumer was not able to influence the content of the new term, which is for the national court to determine.

    3.

    Articles 3 to 5 of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that the requirement of transparency, responsibility for which lies on a seller or supplier under those provisions, implies that, when a novation agreement is concluded which, first, seeks to amend a potentially unfair term of a contract previously concluded and, second, provides for the consumer to waive any legal action against the seller or supplier, that consumer must be put in a position to understand all the decisive legal and economic consequences which would result for him or her from the conclusion of that novation agreement.

    4.

    The tenth and thirteenth questions put by the Audiencia Provincial de Zaragoza (District Court of Zaragoza, Spain) are manifestly inadmissible.


    (1)  OJ C 148, 29.4.2019.


    Top