1.

This request for a preliminary ruling gives the Court the opportunity to rule on the scope of Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. ( 2 )

2.

The request has been made in the course of proceedings between Mr Ibrahima Diallo, a Guinean national and relative in the ascending line of a child of Netherlands nationality residing in Belgium, and the État belge (Belgian State) concerning a decision by the latter refusing to issue a residence card of a family member of a European Union citizen to Mr Diallo, accompanied by an order to leave the territory.

3.

This request calls on the Court in particular to provide significant clarifications, first, regarding the period within which decisions under Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 must be adopted and notified and any consequences arising from the failure to adopt or notify those decisions. Second, the Court must determine whether, following the judicial annulment of a decision adopted pursuant to that provision, the six-month period available to the competent national authority under that provision is interrupted or suspended.

4.

In this Opinion, I shall set out the reasons why I take the view that Article 10(1) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen must be issued within the six-month period provided for by that provision, and that the decisions adopted under that provision must also be adopted within that period, whereas the notification of a decision to refuse to issue a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen may occur after that period. I shall also explain why I think that the failure to adopt or notify a decision adopted under Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 cannot automatically result in the issue of a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen and, finally, that the judicial annulment of such a decision has the effect of interrupting the six-month period available to the administration and, therefore, of causing the six-month period to start to run afresh.

5.

Article 2 of Directive 2004/38 provides:

‘For the purposes of this Directive:

…’

6.

Article 3(1) of that directive states:

‘This Directive shall apply to all Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members as defined in point 2 of Article 2 who accompany or join them.’

7.

Article 10(1) of the directive provides:

‘The right of residence of family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State shall be evidenced by the issuing of a document called “Residence card of a family member of a Union citizen” no later than six months from the date on which they submit the application. A certificate of application for the residence card shall be issued immediately.’

8.

Article 15 of Directive 2004/38, headed ‘Procedural safeguards’, provides in paragraph 1:

‘The procedures provided for by Articles 30 and 31 shall apply by analogy to all decisions restricting free movement of Union citizens and their family members on grounds other than public policy, public security or public health.’

9.

Article 30 of that directive, headed ‘Notification of decisions’, provides:

‘1.   The persons concerned shall be notified in writing of any decision taken under Article 27(1), in such a way that they are able to comprehend its content and the implications for them.

…

3.   The notification shall specify the court or administrative authority with which the person concerned may lodge an appeal, the time limit for the appeal and, where applicable, the time allowed for the person to leave the territory of the Member State. Save in duly substantiated cases of urgency, the time allowed to leave the territory shall be not less than one month from the date of notification.’

10.

Under Article 42(1) of the loi sur l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers (Law on entry into the territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign nationals) ( 3 ) of 15 December 1980:

‘The right of residence for more than three months in the Kingdom shall be granted as soon as possible and no later than six months from the date of the application as provided for in [paragraph] 4, subparagraph 2 to Union citizens and their family members who are in the circumstances and for the period determined by the King, in accordance with European regulations and directives. In granting that right, account shall be taken of all elements of the case.’

11.

The second subparagraph of Article 52(4) of the arrêté royal sur l’accès au territoire, le séjour, l’établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers (Royal Decree on entry into the territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign nationals) ( 4 ) of 8 October 1981 provides:

‘If the Minister or his authorised representative grants a right of residence, or if no decision is taken within the period specified in Article 42 of the Law [of 15 December 1980], the mayor or his authorised representative shall issue the foreign national a “residence card of a family member of a Union citizen” in accordance with the model contained in Annex 9.’

12.

Mr Diallo is a Guinean national and the father of a child of Netherlands nationality residing in Belgium.

13.

It was in that capacity that, on 25 November 2014, he applied for a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen in that Member State.

14.

On 22 May 2015, the Belgian authorities adopted a decision refusing to grant residence, accompanied by an order to leave the territory, and notified him of that decision on 3 June 2015, that is to say six months and nine days after the application was submitted.

15.

After Mr Diallo brought an action for annulment of that decision before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium), that body, by judgment of 29 September 2015, annulled the decision refusing to grant residence, accompanied by an order to leave the territory, on the ground that it was vitiated by a failure to state reasons.

16.

Subsequently, on 9 November 2015, the Belgian authorities adopted a new decision refusing to grant residence, accompanied by an order to leave the territory. That decision was notified to Mr Diallo on 26 November 2015.

17.

According to that decision, Mr Diallo did not satisfy the conditions to enjoy the right of residence for more than three months as a family member of a Union citizen because he had not proven that he had sufficient resources or demonstrated that his child, who has Netherlands nationality, was his dependant or that he had actual custody of the child.

18.

On 11 December 2015, Mr Diallo brought an action for annulment of that decision before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings) which, by judgment of 23 February 2016, dismissed that action.

19.

On 25 March 2016, Mr Diallo brought an administrative appeal on a point of law against that judgment before the referring court, the Conseil d’État (Council of State, Belgium).

20.

In support of that appeal, he claims, in essence, that, under Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38, the decision on the application for a residence card must be notified to the applicant within six months of the date of the application’s submission, and that national law must be interpreted in accordance with that requirement. He adds that granting the competent national authority a further period of six months, following the annulment of a first decision, undermines the effectiveness of Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38.

21.

For their part, the Belgian authorities take the view that, since a period for notification is not laid down in any provision, the competent authority is required simply to adopt a decision on an application for a residence card within the six-month period. They add that the period available to that authority following the judicial annulment of a first decision is a matter of national law, and that it has not been demonstrated that opening a new six-month period would be unreasonable.

22.

The referring court states, first, that, since national law does not specify whether the decision on the grant of the right of residence must be adopted and notified within the six-month period, interpretation of Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 is required.

23.

Second, it has doubts about the period available to the national authority, following the annulment of a decision refusing to issue a residence card, to adopt a new decision, and states that it is necessary to determine whether it is contrary to the principle of effectiveness for that authority once again to be allowed the full period of six months provided for by Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38.

24.

Third, the referring court asks about the consequences following from the six-month period laid down in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 being exceeded for the purposes of its determining whether that provision precludes a residence card being issued automatically on account of the exceeding of the six-month period, even where the applicant does not satisfy the necessary conditions.

25.

In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

26.

The Belgian Government submits, primarily, that the Court has no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling because EU law does not apply to the situation at issue in the main proceedings. Thus, Mr Diallo does not fall within the scope of Directive 2004/38 and he cannot benefit from the provisions of that directive, since he is not a ‘family member’ within the meaning of point 2 of Article 2 of that directive. Furthermore, the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings are not covered by Directive 2003/86 because Mr Diallo’s application for a residence card is based solely on his capacity as a relative in the ascending line of a Union citizen. Finally, the Belgian Government submits that Mr Diallo cannot be granted a right of residence on the basis of Articles 20 and 21 TFEU.

27.

In my view, all those objections should be rejected.

28.

It must be stated that it is apparent from the order for reference that the referring court set out the reasons why it considers that the interpretation sought is necessary in order to resolve the dispute in the main proceedings and, in particular, clarified that that interpretation of EU law will have a direct bearing on the assessment of Mr Diallo’s situation.

29.

Thus, the referring court stated, first, that, if it were to follow from the Court’s answer that the six-month period laid down in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 required, or did not preclude, the automatic issuing of the residence card sought as a result of that period being exceeded, that residence card should be issued to Mr Diallo.

30.

Second, the referring court asks the Court, in essence, whether EU law precludes national case-law according to which, following the judicial annulment of a decision refusing to issue a residence card, the competent national authority is once again allowed the full period of six months laid down in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38.

31.

Given the wording of the Belgian legislation and the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings, the impact of the requested interpretation on Mr Diallo’s situation is undeniable.

32.

It is common ground that Mr Diallo submitted an application for a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen in his capacity as a relative in the ascending line of a child of Netherlands nationality residing in Belgium, that the refusal decision was notified to him more than six months after the submission of that application, and that, following the annulment of that decision, a second decision was adopted and notified to him.

33.

It is also common ground that, under Belgian law, if no decision is adopted within the six-month period, a residence card is to be issued automatically to the applicant.

34.

Accordingly, the interpretation provided by the Court will enable the referring court to determine whether, in the present case, the national authorities should have issued a residence card to Mr Diallo since the first decision was notified to him after the six-month period had expired and since, depending on the period that was available to the competent national authority to adopt a second decision following the annulment of the first, it cannot be ruled out that that second decision was adopted after that period had expired.

35.

In those circumstances, the Belgian Government cannot claim that Mr Diallo’s situation does not fall within the scope of Directive 2004/38.

36.

In the light of all those factors, I am of the view that the Court has jurisdiction to give the interpretation sought.

37.

By its first, second and fifth questions referred for a preliminary ruling, which — in my view — should be examined together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that the decision on an application for a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen must be adopted and notified within the six-month period laid down by that provision.

38.

If that decision could be notified subsequently, the referring court asks the Court about the period within which notification must take place.

39.

Finally, the referring court asks the Court about the consequences of exceeding the six-month period laid down in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38, in particular as regards the issuing of the residence card.

40.

Those questions raise, in my view, two separate issues: first, the period within which the decision taken following an application for a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen must be adopted and notified and, second, any consequence which must follow from the six-month period laid down by Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 being exceeded.

41.

After demonstrating the mandatory nature of the six-month period provided for in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38, I will set out the obligations on the competent national authorities as regards the notification of decisions issuing and refusing a residence card.

42.

First, with regard to the nature of the period provided for in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38, it must be pointed out that, under that provision, the right of residence of family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State is to be evidenced by the issuing of a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen no later than six months from the date on which they submit the application.

43.

It must therefore be observed, first, that the provisions of that article expressly govern only the situation in which the application for a residence card has been recognised as being well founded and the existence of the right of residence has therefore been established, and, second, that the words chosen and the tenses of the verbs used make the article unquestionably mandatory in nature.

44.

I therefore take the view that the use of both the present indicative and the words ‘no later than’, which clearly indicate that that period constitutes the maximum amount of time to be spent examining the application, ( 7 ) argue in favour of such a conclusion. ( 8 )

45.

In addition, by using the term ‘issuing’, the legislature clearly expressed its intention to fix a time limit for the competent national authorities. By providing that Member States must issue a residence card to applicants ‘no later than six months from the date on which they submit the application’, Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 requires that, within that six-month period, the competent national authorities are to examine the application, adopt a decision and, if they find that the applicant has a right of residence, issue a residence card. Accordingly, the issuing of that document gives tangible form to the positive decision previously adopted by the competent national authorities following their examination of the application.

46.

Thus, as the European Commission has rightly pointed out, the use of the term ‘issuing’ and of corresponding terms in other language versions of Directive 2004/38 ( 9 ) requires not only that the decision be adopted within the six-month period, but also that the residence card be made available to the applicant within that period.

47.

Furthermore, any other interpretation of Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 would cast doubt on the effectiveness of the right of residence and, ultimately, undermine the practical effect of that provision since that practical effect can be brought to bear fully only once the applicant has that card in his possession.

48.

Indeed, as the Commission rightly points out, the possession of a document of a permanent nature rather than a temporary certificate, issued by the national authorities when the application is submitted, unquestionably makes it easier to exercise the right of residence on a day-to-day basis, and the temporary nature of the certificate precludes the benefit of the provisions laid down in Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/38, which exempt family members from visa requirements.

49.

Finally, this interpretation is supported by the case-law of the Court which, when asked not about the nature of the period in question but about the conditions of issue of the residence card, stated that the card evidencing the right of residence had to be ‘furnished’ within six months from the date on which the application was submitted. ( 10 )

50.

It therefore follows, in my view, that the merits of the application must be recognised and concrete expression given to that recognition in the form of a permit within that period, since such official recognition affords the beneficiary the entitlement to certain advantages.

51.

Since the concept of ‘issuing’ covers only those cases in which the competent national authorities find that the applicant satisfies the conditions for the right of residence, the question therefore arises whether, in the light of the silence of Directive 2004/38, the fact that the decision is negative and the issuing of the residence card is refused alters the duration or nature of the period at issue.

52.

It is my view that that is not the case. The nature of the period cannot change and be reduced merely to an indicative period where, as in the present case with respect to Mr Diallo’s situation, the national authorities refuse to issue the residence card.

53.

It is clear that the spirit of Directive 2004/38 requires that the circumstances of people who are in Mr Diallo’s situation be examined as soon as possible.

54.

In addition, if, as I propose, the authorities are required to issue the residence card within the six-month period and adopt a decision to that effect, the examination of the application prior to that decision necessarily is to take place within that period. Consequently, taking the view that the six-month period is also mandatory in cases in which a residence card is refused does not create any additional obligation in terms of speed on the competent national authorities.

55.

In those circumstances, I see no reason why a decision refusing to grant a residence card could be adopted after the six-month period, or even be continuously delayed.

56.

Secondly, turning to the referring court’s questions regarding the notification of the decision, I take the view that, from a procedural perspective, a distinction must be drawn between situations giving rise to the issuing of a residence card and, as is the case here, situations in which that card is refused.

57.

Where the right of residence is established, it is my view that the decision must be adopted and the card issued within the six-month period for the reasons set out in points 44 to 50 of this Opinion.

58.

However, although the binding nature of the period laid down by that provision requires that the decision refusing a residence card be adopted within that period, I am nevertheless of the opinion that the notification of such a decision may occur after that period.

59.

It is true that, in accordance with Directive 2004/38 ( 11 ) and with the right to effective judicial protection, ( 12 ) the notification of a decision refusing to grant a residence card is mandatory. ( 13 )

60.

However, like the Belgian Government, I take the view that notification is fundamentally different from examination of the conditions for the right of residence, and therefore that the six-month period does not concern notification.

61.

Notification has no impact on the right of residence, but is rather a condition for the review of the decisions finding that such a right does or does not exist.

62.

In addition, in the light of the legislature’s silence regarding the notification of decisions refusing to grant a residence card and of the differing scopes of Directives 2003/86 and 2004/38, Article 5(4) of Directive 2003/86, which requires that the competent national authorities give the person concerned written notification of the decision granting or refusing an application for family reunification within a period of nine months from the date on which that application was lodged, is of no assistance as regards the interpretation of the national authorities’ obligations under Directive 2004/38.

63.

That said, notification must, in my view, take place as soon as possible after the adoption of the decision by the competent national authorities, specifically to enable the person concerned to contest it as soon as possible.

64.

Thus, the interpretation which I propose does not affect the rights of applicants for a residence card.

65.

Accordingly, when the application is submitted, a certificate is issued immediately to the applicant; that certificate remains valid until notification of the decision refusing the residence card occurs and provides temporary protection for the applicant.

66.

Furthermore, since the time limit for lodging an appeal begins to run only once the decision has been notified, ( 14 ) and not when that decision is adopted, notification of the decision after the six-month period does not undermine the right to effective judicial protection.

67.

The referring court asks the Court about the consequences of exceeding the six-month period laid down by Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38. In particular, it asks the Court whether that directive requires or permits the consequence of exceeding that period to be the automatic grant of the residence card, without it having been established beforehand that the applicant satisfied the conditions for entitlement.

68.

In this regard, it is true that, since Directive 2004/38 does not specify what consequences follow from the six-month period being exceeded, that question is, in principle, a matter falling within the procedural autonomy of the Member States, subject to compliance with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. ( 15 )

69.

However, in the light of the objective of Directive 2004/38 and of the impact of the automatic issuing of the residence card, I am convinced that Article 10(1) of that directive does not allow such a consequence to follow from the six-month period being exceeded.

70.

First, the Belgian legislation gives rise to situations which, in my view, are contrary to the objective pursued by Directive 2004/38.

71.

Indeed, both the wording and the spirit of Directive 2004/38 presuppose that the response given to an application for a residence card be consistent with the applicant’s circumstances and founded on an extensive and individual examination of his situation. ( 16 )

72.

However, in the present case, Mr Diallo’s situation perfectly illustrates the — at the very least incongruous — outcome to which the Belgian legislation may lead.

73.

For example, notification of a decision recognising a right of residence after the six-month period has no effect, whereas, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, where the application for a residence card is refused, the failure to comply with the six-month period entails the automatic issuing of an unwarranted residence permit establishing a right which, in reality, is at odds with the decision which was not notified in time.

74.

I have, admittedly, taken the reasoning to its extreme here in order to make my point. However, the consequences of that reasoning demonstrate, in my view, that the provisions of Belgian law lead, in any event, to an outcome which is contrary to the objective pursued by Directive 2004/38, which is quite clearly that the response given to an application for a residence card be consistent with the applicant’s circumstances.

75.

Second, it is my view that the system of automatically issuing residence cards is a source of legal uncertainty.

76.

I agree that the Belgian Government’s desire to prevent the denial of administrative action is commendable and that the Belgian legislation allows the applicant to have his situation clarified despite the inaction or the slowness of the competent national authorities.

77.

However, since residence cards which are issued automatically can be withdrawn at a later date, such cards are, in reality, only temporary in nature. The Belgian legislation therefore creates considerable legal uncertainty, if not unfair situations, for the holders of those cards because several years after having issued a residence card without any real examination of the applicant’s circumstances, the Belgian authorities may withdraw the card on the ground that the holder, despite acting in good faith, never satisfied the conditions to be issued such a card.

78.

In addition, unlike the temporary certificate issued to the applicant pending the adoption of a decision, a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen is in no way temporary in nature.

79.

Moreover, given the automatic nature of the issuing of the card, it is paradoxical for the Belgian Government to seek to rely on the right to make a mistake to justify the option of withdrawing that card.

80.

Although is clear that the authorities cannot be denied the possibility of correcting errors, it must be observed that the automatic issuing of residence cards is the result neither of an error nor of the inaction or slowness of the authority which failed to adopted a decision within the prescribed period.

81.

Third, the issuing of a residence permit to a third-country national is to be regarded not as a measure giving rise to rights, but as a measure by a Member State serving to prove the individual position of such a national. ( 17 )

82.

However, as a result of the (in reality) temporary nature that the Belgian legislation confers on that card — a card which may subsequently be withdrawn — that legislation, which requires that the card applied for be issued automatically as a consequence of slowness or inaction on the part of the authorities, assigns that document the status of a rebuttable presumption vis-à-vis the existence of a right and renders it non-declaratory in relation to that right.

83.

In the light of all those factors, I am convinced that the exceeding of the six-month period laid down in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 cannot result in the residence card being issued automatically, that is to say in the automatic — and potentially erroneous — finding that the applicant enjoys that right.

84.

Indeed, although exceeding that period must have some effect, the fact that the applicant does or does not satisfy the conditions to obtain the residence card is independent of inaction on the part of the administration, since such circumstances in no way alter the objective situation of the applicant for a residence card or the finding that he does or does not satisfy the conditions to be granted a residence card.

85.

However, an action to establish the non-contractual liability of the Member State in question for breach of EU law is an appropriate way of determining the consequences of exceeding the mandatory six-month period in each individual case. ( 18 )

86.

If the delay by the Member State were, in and of itself, to entail specific harm, an action seeking compensation for such harm, whatever the nature of that action, should afford the applicant for a residence card a right to damages. ( 19 )

87.

In the light of all those considerations, I take the view, first, that the decision refusing to grant a residence card under Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 must be adopted within the six-month period laid down by that provision, but may be notified subsequently.

88.

Second, in my opinion, that directive precludes national legislation under which, where a decision is not taken within the six-month period, the residence card is automatically granted, even where the applicant does not satisfy the necessary conditions.

89.

By its third and fourth questions referred for a preliminary ruling, which I propose that the Court examine jointly, the referring court asks whether EU law precludes national case-law according to which, following the judicial annulment of a decision refusing to issue a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen, the competent national authority is once again allowed the full period of six months provided for in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38.

90.

It must be stated that, since Directive 2004/38 does not govern the question of the period available to the authorities to adopt a decision following the annulment of a first decision, that question is a matter falling within the procedural autonomy of the Member States. ( 20 )

91.

Accordingly, it will be for the referring court to verify that the principle of equivalence is observed. In that connection, the rule that, following the judicial annulment of a decision refusing to issue a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen, the competent national authority is once again allowed the full period is, as is made clear in the order for reference, a rule of case-law and therefore applies to procedures governing similar situations subject to domestic law.

92.

As for compliance with the principle of effectiveness, it is necessary to verify that the national procedural rules do not render the exercise of rights conferred by EU law impossible in practice or excessively difficult.

93.

I understand Mr Diallo’s position and the scope of his arguments. In his specific case, to require the administration to come to a decision and to notify that second decision in the few days remaining before the expiry of the six-month period is tantamount to imposing on it a virtually impossible task, thus entailing — in view of the automatic nature of the issuing of the residence card if that period is exceeded — the certainty of him being granted a residence permit to which he is perhaps not entitled.

94.

Effective judicial protection does, of course, require that a person whose application for a residence card was rejected by a decision which was subsequently annulled has the right for a new decision to be taken ( 21 ) within a period that does not exceed the period that was available to the authorities for the adoption of the first decision, that is to say — in the present case — a period of six months. ( 22 )

95.

However, the retroactive nature of the annulment means that the decision annulled must be deemed never to have existed, that the administration is in the same position as before and, consequently, that a period of six months is available to it. As the Belgian Government rightly points out, the annulment gives rise to the obligation to resume ab initio the procedure now deemed never to have existed.

96.

That view is by no means called into question by the necessary protection of the rights of applicants for residence cards.

97.

It is clear that the authorities cannot be required to act within such short periods of time that it would make it impossible in practice to conduct any serious, adversarial and diligent examination of the applications submitted to them, even though such examination is necessary given the annulment of the first decision.

98.

In addition, if, as the Commission stated during the legislative procedure, ‘the deadline of six months seems more realistic if Member States are to be able to carry out the necessary checks and issue the residence card’, ( 23 ) such a period is a fortiori necessary where the first decision has been annulled.

99.

Accordingly, to take the view — as the applicant in the main proceedings proposes — that the national authorities have only the remainder of the six-month period at their disposal to adopt a second decision runs counter, in my opinion, to the right of applicants for a residence card to have their application examined seriously and diligently.

100.

In addition, the interpretation advocated by the Commission, namely that the new period must be determined on a case-by-case basis, is, in my view, problematic for two reasons.

101.

First, since that approach is dependent on the degree of care taken by the authority in question as well as the ground for annulment, it is by no means easy to determine the new period of time available to the competent national authority. There is also a risk of it giving rise to new litigation and prolonging decision-making and procedural time limits, since the Commission proposes that the national authority must set out the reasons for the new period available to it.

102.

Second, with regard to mass litigation, this view is unrealistic and would also result in decision-making time limits being extended.

103.

In any event, although it is true that the fact that, following the judicial annulment of a decision refusing to issue a residence card, the competent national authority is once again allowed the full period of six months provided for in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38 may have the result of prolonging the procedure, the applicant is temporarily protected by the certificate issued to him when he submitted his application.

104.

In the light of all those considerations, I take the view that, following the judicial annulment of a decision refusing to issue a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen, the competent national authority is once again allowed the full period of six months provided for in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38.

105.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should answer the questions referred by the Conseil d’État (Council of State, Belgium) as follows: