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having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in China, in particular those of 26 November 2009 on China: minority rights and application of the death penalty (1), of 10 March 2011 on the situation and cultural heritage in Kashgar (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) (2), of 15. December 2016 on the cases of the Larung Gar Tibetan Buddhist Academy and Ilham Tohti (3), of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU-China relations (4) and of 4 October 2018 on mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and Kazakhs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (5),

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having regard to the EU-China Strategic Partnership launched in 2003 and to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 22 June 2016 entitled ‘Elements for a new EU strategy on China’(JOIN(2016)0030),

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having regard to the EU guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 24 June 2013,

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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 March 2019 entitled ‘EU-China — A strategic outlook’(JOIN(2019)0005),

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having regard to the ‘Joint statement of the 21st EU-China summit’ of 9 April 2019,

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having regard to the EU-China dialogue on human rights, launched in 1995, and the 37th round thereof, held in Brussels on 1 and 2 April 2019,

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having regard to Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of religious belief, and to Article 4 thereof, which upholds the rights of ‘minority nationalities’,

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having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, signed by China in 1998, but not ratified,

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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

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having regard to the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s review of China,

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having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas in its strategic framework on human rights and democracy, the EU pledges that human rights, democracy, and the rule of law will be promoted ‘in all areas of the EU’s external actions without exception’, and that the EU will ‘place human rights at the centre of its relations with all third countries including strategic partners’; whereas this should remain at the centre of the long-standing relationship between the EU and China, in accordance with the EU’s commitment to uphold these very same values in its external action and China’s expressed interest in respecting international laws and standards relating to human rights in its own development;

B.

whereas China has been successful in lifting 700 million people out of poverty, but whereas since President Xi Jinping assumed power in March 2013, the human rights situation in China has continued to deteriorate, with the government stepping up its hostility towards peaceful dissent, the freedoms of expression and religion, and the rule of law; whereas the Chinese authorities have detained and prosecuted hundreds of human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists;

C.

whereas the new regulations on religious affairs that took effect on 1 February 2018 are more restrictive towards religious groups and activities, and force them to fall more closely into line with party policies; whereas freedom of religion and conscience has reached a new low point since the start of the economic reforms and the opening up of China in the late 1970s; whereas China is home to one of the largest populations of religious prisoners;

D.

whereas, while an accord was reached between the Holy See and the Chinese Government in September 2018 concerning the appointments of bishops in China, the Christian religious communities have been facing increasing repression in China, with Christians, both in underground and government-approved churches, being targeted through the harassment and detention of believers, the demolition of churches, the confiscation of religious symbols and the crackdown on Christian gatherings; whereas Chinese authorities in some provinces do not allow persons under 18 years of age to attend religious activities; whereas in September 2018 China banned the Zion Church, the biggest house congregation in China with more than 1 500 followers;

E.

whereas the situation in Xinjiang, where 10 million Muslim Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs live, has rapidly deteriorated, as stability and the control of Xinjiang has been elevated to a top priority of the Chinese authorities, driven by both periodic terrorist attacks in, or allegedly connected to, Xinjiang by Uyghurs and the strategic location of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region for the Belt and Road Initiative; whereas there is information that the Xinjiang camp system has expanded into other parts of China;

F.

whereas an extrajudicial detention programme has been established, holding ‘from tens of thousands to upwards of a million Uyghurs’ who are being forced to undergo political ‘re-education’ according to estimates cited by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, without being charged or tried, for undetermined periods of time, and are therefore being arbitrarily detained under the pretext of countering terrorism and religious extremism; whereas a policy of strict restrictions on religious practices and the Uyghur language and customs has been developed in the Xinjiang province;

G.

whereas a sophisticated network of invasive digital surveillance has been developed, including facial recognition technology and data collection;

H.

whereas the Chinese Government has refused numerous requests from the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other UN Special Procedures mandates to send independent investigators to Xinjiang;

I.

whereas the situation in Tibet has deteriorated over the past few years, in spite of economic growth and infrastructure development, with the Chinese Government curtailing a wide range of human rights under the pretext of security and stability, and engaging in relentless attacks against Tibetan identity and culture;

J.

whereas the surveillance and control measures in Tibet have been on the increase over the past few years, as well as arbitrary detentions, acts of torture and ill-treatment; whereas the Chinese Government has created an environment in Tibet in which there are no limits to state authority, the climate of fear is pervasive, and every aspect of public and private life is tightly controlled and regulated; whereas in Tibet, any acts of non-violent dissent or criticism of state policies with regard to ethnic or religious minorities can be considered as ‘splittist’ and therefore criminalised; whereas access to the Tibet Autonomous Region today is more restricted than ever before;

K.

whereas an extremely high number of Tibetans, mostly monks and nuns, have reportedly set themselves on fire since 2009 in protest against restrictive Chinese policies in Tibet, and in support of the return of the Dalai Lama and the right to religious freedom in the Aba/Ngaba county prefecture in Sichuan Province and other parts of the Tibetan plateau; whereas no progress has been made in the resolution of the Tibetan crisis in the last 10 years;

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