18.7.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 252/56

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having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 325 thereof,

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having regard to Articles 22a, 22b and 22c of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union,

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having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2013 on organised crime, corruption and money laundering: recommendations on action and initiatives to be taken (1),

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having regard to the Decision of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry OI/1/2014/PMC concerning whistleblowing,

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having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (2),

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having regard to Article 9 of the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption,

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having regard to Article 22(a) of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,

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having regard to Council of Europe recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 on the protection of whistleblowers,

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having regard to Articles 8, 13 and 33 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,

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having regard to Principle 4 of the OECD Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service,

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having regard to the inquiry of the office of the European Ombudsman of 2 March 2015 and to its call for the EU institutions to adopt the required rules on whistleblowing,

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having regard to the OECD publication on ‘Committing to effective whistleblower protection’,

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having regard to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Guja v. Moldova, Application No 14277/04 of 12 February 2008,

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having regard to Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

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having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A8-0004/2017),

A.

whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, Parliament needs as much information as possible relating to any such irregularities; whereas in cases concerning irregularities internal to the institutions, Parliament should be entitled to full access to information so that it can conduct the discharge procedure in full knowledge of the facts;

B.

whereas the European Court of Auditors provides Parliament with an excellent basis for its examinations, but cannot itself cover all individual expenditures;

C.

whereas the Commission and other EU institutions similarly provide Parliament with informative reports on their spending, but also rely on official reporting mechanisms;

D.

whereas the Union’s many funds are subject to shared management by the Commission and the Member States, which makes it difficult for the Commission to report on irregularities concerning individual projects;

E.

whereas Parliament regularly receives information from individual citizens or non-governmental organisations in respect of irregularities concerning individual projects funded entirely or in part from the Union budget;

F.

whereas whistleblowers therefore play an important role in preventing, detecting and reporting irregularities in respect of the expenditures relating to the EU budget, as well as in identifying and publicising cases of corruption; whereas a culture of trust fostering the European public good needs to be established and promoted in which EU officials and other staff, as well as the general public, feel safeguarded by sound management practices, and which shows that the EU institutions support, protect and encourage potential whistleblowers;

G.

whereas it is vital for a horizontal legal framework to be established as a matter of urgency, which, by laying down rights and obligations, protects whistleblowers throughout the EU, as well as in the EU institutions (the protection of anonymity, provision of legal, psychological and, where necessary, financial assistance, access to various information channels, rapid response schemes, etc.);

H.

whereas most EU Member States have ratified the UN Convention against Corruption, which makes it obligatory to provide appropriate and effective protection to whistleblowers;

I.

whereas whistleblowing is an essential source of information in the fight against organised crime and in the investigation of corruption in the public sector;

J.

whereas whistleblowers play a particularly important role when it comes to the detection and reporting of corruption and fraud, as the parties directly involved in these criminal practices will actively try to conceal them from any official reporting mechanisms;

K.

whereas whistleblowing, based on the principles of transparency and integrity, is essential; the protection of whistleblowers should therefore be guaranteed by law and reinforced throughout the EU, but only if the purpose of their action is to protect the public interest by acting in good faith in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights;

L.

whereas the authorities should not limit or reduce the ability of whistleblowers and journalists to document and disclose illegal, unlawful or harmful practices, when revealing this information in good faith and the public interest is a priority;

M.

whereas all the EU institutions have been obliged since 1 January 2014 to introduce internal rules protecting whistleblowers who are officials of the EU institutions, in accordance with Articles 22a, 22b and 22c of the Staff Regulations, and the working group of the interinstitutional Preparatory Committee for Matters relating to the Staff Regulations, dealing with the protection of whistleblowers, has not yet finished its work; whereas part of the work done by that working group should be to assess the situation of whistleblowers who have suffered negative consequences in the institutions, so as to establish best practices based on past experience; whereas those internal rules must take account of the management structure and of the specific characteristics of the various categories under the Staff Regulations;

N.

whereas protection of whistleblowers at Member State level has neither been implemented in all Member States, nor harmonised, which means that even when the financial interests of the European Union are at stake, it may be personally and professionally risky for whistleblowers to provide Parliament with information on irregularities; whereas it is precisely because people are afraid of what might happen to them owing to the lack of protection, and because they believe that no action will be taken, that irregularities are not reported, and the EU’s financial interests are undermined as a result;

O.

whereas there is a need to ensure that any kind of retaliation against whistleblowers will be suitably punished;

P.

whereas in its resolution of 23 October 2013, Parliament called on the Commission to submit a legislative proposal by the end of 2013 establishing an effective and comprehensive European whistleblower protection programme in the public and private sectors, to protect those who detect inefficient management and irregularities and report cases of national and cross-border corruption relating to the EU’s financial interests; whereas, in addition, it called on the Member States to put in place appropriate and effective protection for whistleblowers;

Q.

whereas, the EU legislator has already provided for the protection of whistleblowers in sectorial instruments including Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations, Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 on market abuse, Directive (EU) 2015/849 on money laundering and terrorist financing and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on occurrence reporting;

R.

whereas the protection of whistleblowers in the Union has become even more urgent, as the Trade Secrets Directive limits the rights of whistleblowers and may thus have an unintended discouraging effect on those who want to report irregularities in the context of Union funding from which individual companies have benefitted;

S.

whereas important work has already been undertaken by international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe, who have developed recommendations in regard to the protection of whistleblowers;

T.

whereas according to the OECD more than one third of organisations with a reporting mechanism did not have, or did not know of, a written policy on protecting those who report from reprisals;

U.

whereas non-governmental organisations such as Transparency International, Whistleblowing International Network, etc., have similarly developed international principles for whistleblower legislation which should serve as a source of inspiration for EU initiatives in this regard;

V.

whereas the office of the European Ombudsman has a clear competence in relation to the investigation of complaints of EU citizens about maladministration in the EU institutions, but in itself plays no role in the protection of whistleblowers in the Member States;

W.

whereas the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union introduced in its most recent version, in force since 1 January 2014, several provisions on whistleblowing;

X.

whereas the protection of whistleblowers is essential for safeguarding the public good and the financial interests of the Union and for promoting a culture of public accountability and integrity in both public and private institutions;

Y.

whereas in many jurisdictions, and particularly in the private sector, employees are subject to duties of confidentiality with respect to certain information, which means that whistleblowers might encounter disciplinary actions for reporting outside their organisation;

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