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Document 62014CJ0351

    Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 16 June 2016.
    Estrella Rodríguez Sánchez v Consum Sociedad Cooperativa Valenciana.
    Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2010/18/EU — Revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC — Reconciliation of professional and family life — Return from maternity leave of a worker member — Request for a reduction of working hours and for a change in work pattern — Situation which does not fall within the scope of Clause 6(1) of the revised Framework Agreement — Inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling.
    Case C-351/14.

    Court reports – general

    Case C‑351/14

    Estrella Rodríguez Sánchez

    v

    Consum Sociedad Cooperativa Valenciana

    (Request for a preliminary ruling from the

    Juzgado de lo Social no33 de Barcelona)

    ‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2010/18/EU — Revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC — Reconciliation of professional and family life — Return from maternity leave of a worker member — Request for a reduction of working hours and for a change in work pattern — Situation which does not fall within the scope of Clause 6(1) of the revised Framework Agreement — Inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling’

    Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 16 June 2016

    1. Social policy — Male and female workers — Access to employment and working conditions — Equal treatment — Revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC — Directive 2010/18 — Return from parental leave — Scope — Return from maternity leave within the meaning of Directive 92/95 — Not included

      (Council Directives 92/85 and 2010/18, Annex, Clause 6(1))

    2. Judicial proceedings — Advocate General’s Opinion — No provision for the parties or the referring court to submit observations in response to that Opinion — Possibility of requesting clarifications from the referring court — Exclusive prerogative of the Court

      (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 101)

    3. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Provisions of EU law rendered directly and unconditionally applicable by national law to situations outside their scope — Included

      (Art. 267 TFEU)

    4. Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — General or hypothetical questions — Question appearing to be abstract or purely hypothetical in relation to the subject matter of the main proceedings — Inadmissibility

      (Art. 267 TFEU; Council Directive 2010/18, Annex, Clauses 1(2), 6(1) and 8(2))

    1.  Clause 6(1) of the Revised Framework Agreement on parental leave, which is annexed to Directive 2010/18 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC, and which governs situations of return to work following parental leave, cannot be interpreted as also covering a situation in which a worker returns from maternity leave within the meaning of Directive 92/85 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding.

      EU law makes a distinction between the notion of ‘maternity leave’, as referred to, in particular, in Directive 92/85, and that of ‘parental leave’, as used in the revised Framework Agreement, and that paragraph 15 of the general considerations of that agreement states expressly, moreover, that the agreement sets out minimum requirements and provisions for parental leave, ‘distinct from maternity leave’.

      Parental leave is granted to parents to enable them to take care of their child and may be taken until the child has reached a given age up to 8 years. Maternity leave has a different purpose. It is intended to protect a woman’s biological condition and the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment.

      (see paras 43, 44, 48)

    2.  See the text of the decision.

      (see para. 50)

    3.  See the text of the decision.

      (see paras 60-62)

    4.  See the text of the decision.

      (see paras 55-57, 71)

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