Case C-334/12 RX-II

Oscar Orlando Arango Jaramillo and Others

v

European Investment Bank (EIB)

‛Review of the judgment in Case T-234/11 P — Action for annulment — Admissibility — Time-limit for bringing proceedings — Time-limit not set by a provision of EU law — Concept of ‘reasonable period’ — Interpretation — Obligation on the Courts of the European Union to take account of the particular circumstances of each case — Right to an effective legal remedy — Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Whether the consistency of EU law is affected’

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 28 February 2013

1. EU law — Principles — Reasonable period — Administrative procedure — Judicial proceedings — Assessment that must be made in concreto — Criteria for assessment — Actions brought by members of staff of the European Investment Bank — Time-limit for bringing an action not set by a provision of EU law — Application by analogy of the rules in the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union — Not permissible — Infringement of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

   (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 47 and 52(1); Staff Regulations, Art. 91(3); Staff Regulations of the European Investment Bank, Art. 41)

2. Review — Finding that the unity or consistency of EU law is affected — Criteria for assessment — Implications — Judgment set aside and case referred back to the appeal court

   (Art. 6 TEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 62b, first para.)

1.  As regards the reasonableness of the period within which an action or application must be brought and which has not been laid down in any provision of EU law, the Courts of the European Union must take into consideration the particular circumstances of the case, as is the case with the reasonableness of administrative procedures in respect of the conduct of which no provision of EU law lays down a specific period. In that regard, the reasonableness of a period cannot be determined by reference to a precise maximum limit determined in an abstract manner, but, rather, must be appraised in the light of the specific circumstances of each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties to the case. The concept of a reasonable period cannot be regarded as a specific limitation period.

   Therefore, since no provision of EU law lays down a time-limit within which a member of staff of the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’) must bring an action for annulment of a measure adopted by the EIB which adversely affects him, the period of three months laid down in Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations cannot be applied by analogy as a limitation period to the members of staff of the EIB when they bring such an action.

   Moreover, since the time-limit for members of staff of the EIB for bringing an action against the measures adversely affecting them has not been set beforehand by a rule of EU law, nor limited under Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, those members of staff are entitled to expect that the case-law of the Court of Justice on reasonable periods would be applied in order to decide on the admissibility of their action rather than a pre-determined limitation period being imposed. That distortion of the concept of a reasonable period means the members of staff concerned were unable to defend their rights by means of an effective action before a tribunal in accordance with the conditions laid down by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

   (see paras 25, 28, 29, 33, 39, 44, 45)

2.  A judgment in which the General Court, as an appeal court, departed from the established case-law of the Court of Justice concerning the concept of a reasonable period and the principle of effective judicial protection, which are applicable regardless of the matter at issue and which occupy an important position in the legal order of the European Union constitutes a decision affecting the unity or consistency of EU law within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 62b of the Statute of the Court of Justice, where that judgment deals for the first time with a question that could constitute a precedent for future cases. In particular, the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the provisions of the Treaties have, under Article 6 TEU, the same legal value.

   The first paragraph of Article 62b of the Statute of the Court of Justice provides that if the Court of Justice finds that a decision affects the consistency of EU law, it is to refer the case back to the General Court, which is to be bound by the points of law decided by the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice may also state which of the effects of the decision of the General Court are to be considered definitive in respect of the parties to the litigation. It follows that the Court of Justice cannot confine itself to finding that the unity or consistency of EU law is affected without stating the implications of that finding as regards the dispute in question. Such a judgment must therefore be set aside on the ground of distortion of the concept of a reasonable period and the case must be referred back to the General Court.

   (see paras 50-54, 56, 57, 59)