Keywords
Summary

Keywords

1. Acts of the institutions – Choice of legal basis – Criteria – Community measure pursuing a twofold purpose or having a twofold component

2. International agreements – Conclusion – Rotterdam Convention

(Arts. 133 EC, 175(1) EC, 300(2) EC, first subparagraph and 300(3) EC, first subparagraph)

Summary

1. The choice of the legal basis for a Community measure, including one adopted with a view to conclusion of an international agreement, must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review and include in particular the aim and content of the measure.

If examination of a Community measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component. Exceptionally, if, on the other hand, it is established that the act simultaneously pursues a number of objectives or has several components that are indissociably linked, without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, such an act will have to be founded on the various corresponding legal bases. However, recourse to a dual legal basis is not possible where the procedures laid down for each legal basis are incompatible with each other or where the use of two legal bases is liable to undermine the rights of the Parliament.

(see paras 34-36, 52)

2. The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade includes, both as regards the aims pursued and its contents, two indissociably linked components, neither of which can be regarded as secondary or indirect as compared with the other, one falling within the scope of the common commercial policy and the other within that of protection of human health and the environment. Accordingly, Decision 2003/106/EC approving that Convention on behalf of the European Community should therefore have been based on the two corresponding legal bases, namely, in this case, Articles 133 EC and 175(1) EC, in conjunction with the relevant provisions of Article 300 EC.

In that regard, it must be observed, first, that recourse to both Article 133 EC and Article 175(1) EC at the same time is not precluded by means of the incompatibility of the procedures laid down in respect of those two legal bases. The Convention of Rotterdam does not fall within the category of agreements which, under Article 133(5) EC, require unanimity within the Council, so that additional recourse to Article 133 EC could not have any impact on the voting rules applicable within the Council, since the latter provision provides in principle, in the same way as Article 175(1) EC, for recourse to qualified majority voting. Secondly, recourse to Article 133 EC jointly with Article 175(1) EC is likewise not liable to undermine the Parliament’s rights because, although the first-mentioned article, read in conjunction with the first subparagraph of Article 300(3) EC, does not provide for consultation of that institution prior to the conclusion of an agreement in the area of commercial policy, the second article, on the other hand, does lead to such a result.

It is therefore necessary to annul Decision 2003/106/EC inasmuch as it is based solely on Article 175(1) EC, in conjunction with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2) EC and the first subparagraph of Article 300(3) EC.

(see paras 51-54, 56)